1. By application dated 28 April 2025, the Legal Practice Board (Board) commenced these proceedings under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA) alleging that the respondent (Mr Barker), engaged in professional misconduct under three grounds:

(a) That, without reasonable grounds and where he ought to have known he lacked reasonable grounds, Mr Barker made and repeated allegations of dishonesty and criminal conduct against another lawyer (Ms L): Ground One;

(b) That, without reasonable grounds and where he ought to have known he lacked reasonable grounds, he lodged for filing in the Family Court of Western Australia (FCWA) letters in which he alleged that the FCWA had ignored or refused to address criminal behaviour and that the FCWA had engaged in behaviour which amounted to (or would do so if it failed to accept his application) a perversion of the course of justice. Amongst other things, in those letters he alleges (in broad terms) misconduct against an independent children's lawyer (Ms K): Ground Two; and

(c) That, without reasonable grounds and where he ought to have known he lacked reasonable grounds, he made allegations of criminal conduct, corruption and/or misfeasance by the Board or its representatives: Ground Three.

1. Each of the allegations concern conduct which has its origin in bitter and protracted proceedings between Mr Barker and his ex-wife in the FCWA.
2. Those proceedings in the FCWA are also the source of other allegations brought by the Board against Mr Barker. Those other allegations have been pursued in other proceedings - VR 20 of 2023. Mr Barker has applied for those proceedings to be struck out. The decision on that application has been reserved for determination on the papers and remains pending.
3. On 14 October 2025, orders were made in this proceeding that required the parties to provide their unavailable dates for a two or three-day hearing in the months of April, May or June 2026.
4. On 5 November 2025 the present proceeding was listed for hearing on 22 to 24 April 2026.
5. A further directions hearing was held in this proceeding on 10 February 2026. Its apparent purpose was as a 'health check'; to ensure that the parties were progressing as anticipated towards the hearing.
6. Orders made on that date included the grant of leave for Mr Barker to apply for the vacation of the current hearing dates and/or to apply for the dismissal of the proceedings under s 47 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act).
7. On 24 February 2026, Mr Barker applied to vacate the current hearing dates. By the same document, Mr Barker sought a stay of the determination of VR 20 of 2023. These reasons address only the application to vacate the April hearing in these proceedings - VR 34 of 2025.
8. Mr Barker's application to vacate the hearing dates takes the form of an affidavit of about 13 pages. In essence, he says that there are two other legal proceedings which should be allowed to conclude before this proceeding goes to hearing.[1]
9. The Board opposes the application and submits that the hearing should proceed on the dates listed.
10. For the reasons that follow, I agree.

1. Nothing in either the SAT Act or the associated Rules expressly provides criteria or guidance to be applied where a party seeks to vacate a hearing.
2. However, the main objectives of the Tribunal, set out in s 9 of the SAT Act, are clearly relevant. They require the Tribunal to act fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case, to act speedily and with as little formality and technicality as possible, and to minimise the costs of the parties.
3. Also relevant is the obligation to afford natural justice (also known as procedural fairness), which is set out in s 32 of the SAT Act.
4. The Court of Appeal has recently said of procedural fairness:

Although sometimes expressed in terms referring to a necessity for a hearing, the fundamental requirement of procedural fairness is (relevantly for present purposes) that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard, in other words, to present their case by evidence, information and submissions. However, the requirements of procedural fairness are not fixed or immutable. Procedural fairness is directed to avoid practical injustice, and what is necessary to avoid practical injustice will depend upon the circumstances.[2]

1. Relevantly, in the current circumstances, Mr Barker must be given a fair opportunity to present his case, but that does not mean that he may pick and choose when he presents his case so as to be most convenient for him.
2. Rather, as the quote above insists, the focus must be on avoiding injustice, which must be assessed against all of the facts and circumstances, which include the relevant statutory provisions and the nature of the dispute.
3. In short, for the foregoing reasons, it is for Mr Barker, as the applicant for the adjournment, to persuade me that it would be unfair to him if his application to vacate is not granted and the hearing proceeds as listed.

1. As noted above, Mr Barker's Affidavit represents his application to vacate the April hearing.
2. Consistent with orders made on 26 February 2026, the Board filed submissions resisting the application on 3 March 2026.
3. The orders provided Mr Barker with an opportunity to file 'any further written submissions ... which respond to matters raised by the applicant ...' by 6 March 2026. Nothing was filed by that date, save for a letter indicating that any response would be late. On 9 March 2026 three further documents were filed. None of them could reasonably be described as submissions:

(a) The first is an affidavit of Mr Barker dated 5 June 2025 and originally filed in VR 20 of 2023, headed '[Ms L's] fabrication of evidence';

(b) The second is an email dated 9 March 2026 from Mr Barker to an officer of the Board which amounts to a series of allegations of misconduct against three other legal practitioners - Ms L, Ms K and Mr H (who appears to have acted for Ms K); and

(c) The third appears to be a summary of an affidavit filed with the FCWA on 20 November 2025 which, again, amounts to a series of allegations of misconduct against the same three legal practitioners.

1. While I have read and considered these documents, I am unable to understand what relevance they have to the current application.

1. Mr Barker's Affidavit states expressly that he does not rely on any medical reasons as a ground on which his application to vacate the hearing is based.[3]
2. Rather, the ground on which this application is based is that the subject matter of this proceeding is also to be addressed in other proceedings, in other jurisdictions, to which the Tribunal should yield.
3. Additionally, and although it is not expressly articulated as a ground on which the application to vacate is based, Mr Barker devoted a substantial amount of his affidavit to describe other proceedings to which he is currently, or anticipates being, a party, and describes the work that he anticipates he will need to carry out in those proceedings.
4. Although not expressed as a ground on which the application to vacate is based, I have considered it as such.
5. In what follows, I consider each ground in turn.

1. Mr Barker says that two other legal proceedings should be allowed to take their course and that the listed hearing for this matter should only proceed once those other proceedings are complete.[4]
2. The other two proceedings he refers to in this context are:

(a) an application he has made to the Supreme Court under the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) (VPRA);[5] and

(b) an appeal he proposes to bring against a recently made Family Violence Restraining Order (FVRO).[6]

1. Section 4 of the VPRA provides that applications may only be made under that Act:

(a) as of right by the Attorney General and the Principal Registrars of each of the Supreme and District Courts; and

(b) by a person 'against whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings' or 'who has a sufficient interest in the matter' but only with the leave of the Court.

1. In his affidavit, Mr Barker says that the documents constituting his application under s 4 of the VPRA 'were accepted' by the Supreme Court registry on 30 January 2026 but were 'still being reviewed' at the time of his affidavit.
2. By that statement I infer that leave has not yet been granted to commence the proceedings under s 4(2)(c) of the VPRA.
3. In his affidavit, Mr Barker deposes that the purposes of his application under the VPRA is to ask the Supreme Court 'to make a judgement on the criminal conduct' of Ms L, Ms K and others.[7]
4. From the Board's Statement of Facts and Contentions,[8] filed as part of its application in this proceeding, I understand that Ms L acted (and perhaps still acts) for Mr Barker's ex-wife and that Ms K was an independent children's lawyer for one or more of his children.
5. It would appear that, by his attempt to apply under the VPRA, Mr Barker seeks to repeat and prove both the allegations which are the subject of Ground One (that Ms L fabricated evidence against him), and those which form some of the underlying factual matrix of Ground Two (his allegation that Ms K has engaged in improper conduct).
6. As I have indicated, Mr Barker's application is to the effect that the Tribunal ought to yield to the jurisdictions in which those other proceedings are, or are to be, brought.
7. Mr Barker puts the matter a little more colourfully, describing the Tribunal as 'relatively minor' compared to the other jurisdictions[9] and submitting that the Tribunal 'cannot finalise' this proceeding 'until after the superior courts - SCWA and FCFCoA - have finalised their determination of [Ms L] and ... [Ms K's] et al's criminal conduct and recommended any action be taken by WA Police'.[10]
8. I do not agree with that submission.
9. The question is not whether the Tribunal must yield to another, more superior, jurisdiction.
10. In some cases, where the dispute in question might be brought in more than one jurisdiction, there may be a question as to whether a dispute has been brought in the most suitable place but that is not the concern raised by Mr Barker.
11. Of course, the risk of inconsistent decisions, flowing from two or more 'parallel disputes' that cover the same or similar facts and legal questions litigated in different fora, should, if possible, be avoided. However, even then it is not inevitable that one proceeding must be stayed or otherwise give way to the other so that only one proceeding continues.[11]
12. In any event, I am satisfied that there is no real or material risk of inconsistent determinations between the current proceedings and the application made under the VPRA.
13. Most obviously, that is because, on the material before me, Mr Barker has not yet been granted leave to commence proceedings: unless and until leave is granted, no proceedings are on foot and, therefore, there cannot be a risk of inconsistent decisions.
14. But, even if leave is granted, and proceedings are thereby commenced under the VPRA, it does not appear likely that the Supreme Court will make a finding about Ms L's conduct (or, indeed, anyone else's conduct).
15. That is because the primary (and perhaps the sole) focus of the Court in an application under the VPRA is whether a person has 'instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings' or is likely to do so.[12]
16. The allegations made by Mr Barker that form the basis of Ground One are not that Ms L 'instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings' but that, while acting as his ex-wife's solicitor, she communicated to his ex-wife a false version of the contents of certain hospital records which version was then included in his ex-wife's affidavit.[13]
17. I presume it is that difficulty to which Mr Barker refers in his affidavit when he candidly acknowledges that it is 'pushing the law in seeking to set a legal precedent against Ms L for her vexatious conduct as [his ex-wife's] lawyer'.[14]
18. The same conclusions follow in relation to Ms K, the allegations against whom also concern her conduct while acting as an independent children's lawyer in FCWA proceedings.[15] It seems most unlikely that the Supreme Court will make findings about her conduct in any proceedings brought under the VPRA.
19. As to the second proceedings relied upon, Mr Barker's Affidavit is to the effect that, as at the date his affidavit was sworn, he had not filed any appeal against the decision of Jones J on 23 January 2026 to grant a FVRO against him.[16]
20. He does, however, depose that he had previously prepared documents for an appeal in the Supreme Court on the mistaken understanding that that was the appropriate forum and that the work simply needs to be 'cut-and pasted into different documents and refiled'[17] in the 'Appeal Division' of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCFCoA). He says that he will do so by 25 February 2026. It is unclear whether that has occurred.
21. However, even if such an appeal has been lodged, I do not accept that there is a real or material risk that the FCFCoA might make a finding inconsistent with a finding in these proceedings.
22. Mr Barker does not attempt to explain how that could occur in his affidavit.
23. That is, the risk of inconsistent determinations is not expressly addressed in his affidavit. Rather, as I have noted, his affidavit simply asserts that the Tribunal must not proceed until the 'Appeal Division' of the FCFCoA has determined the FVRO appeal.
24. But even in that regard, his affidavit is entirely free of explanation as to how or why the alleged misconduct of Ms L and others might be relevant to such an appeal, save for the explanation that in both the VPRA and the FVRO Appeal proceedings, he is seeking 'a determination on the criminal conduct of [Ms L, Ms K and others] which will be influential'[18] in this proceeding and that he will appeal as 'premature' any decision in this proceeding that predates those of the FCFCoA in the FVRO appeal (or the Supreme Court in the VPRA matter).[19]
25. There are otherwise no details as to the factual basis on which it is said that Jones J granted an FVRO against Mr Barker such that an appeal might require, or even invite, a 'determination on the criminal conduct' of Ms L, Ms K and others.
26. It seems to me most unlikely that, in determining an appeal against Jones J's decision to grant a FVRO against Mr Barker, it will be necessary to make findings about the conduct of anyone other than Mr Barker.
27. But even if the conduct of Ms L and Ms K or others might be relevant to the appeal of the FVRO, it seems most unlikely that any such conduct is the same conduct, or overlaps in time with conduct relevant to the present proceedings.
28. That is because the FVRO was, on Mr Barker's evidence, granted by Jones J on 23 January 2026, nine months after these proceedings were commenced on 28 April 2025. [20]
29. As the Board submits, any decision on appeal will be determined on the evidence before it, whereas the Tribunal's decision will turn on whether there was a proper basis for Mr Barker to make his allegations at the time that they were made.[21]
30. For these reasons, I do not accept that there is a real or material risk of inconsistent outcomes should the Tribunal proceed to determine the current proceedings.
31. In any event, even if there was such a risk, I do not accept that the Tribunal proceedings should be stayed to avoid such an outcome.
32. That is primarily because these proceedings were, as the Board submits, 'commenced first [i.e. before the VPRA and FVRO proceedings], are far more advanced, and will be able to be finalised relatively soon'.[22]
33. As the Board also submits, and as I have already found, '[c]onversely, the course of the other proceedings are beset with uncertainty'.[23] That is:

(a) As to the VPRA proceedings, the Court is yet to grant leave to commence proceedings and, as Mr Barker acknowledges, if leave is granted the application 'is pushing the law';[24] and

(b) As to the FCFCoA appeal, I have nothing before me to say that an appeal has in fact been commenced and, even if it has, its subject matter (the grant of an FVRO) does not appear well suited to achieve Mr Barker's aims of exposing illegality by, amongst others, his ex-wife's solicitor.

1. As noted, Mr Barker's application does not seek vacation of the April hearing on the basis that he is overwhelmed by, or is otherwise unable to prepare for the April hearing as a result of, the multiplicity of proceedings to which he is a party.
2. His affidavit does, however, outline those various proceedings.
3. In his affidavit he deposes that he has 'effectively six ... ongoing current legal matters across three court jurisdictions'.[25] He also says that he expects to file documents in a seventh matter within the next month.[26]
4. Upon closer consideration, it appears that matters are less complex than that. Nonetheless, he still appears to have quite a lot on his plate.
5. The first matter listed by Mr Barker is a property dispute in the FCWA. He says that '[i]n theory, this was settled ... on 23 - 24 July 2025'. He foreshadows future applications but says that they 'can maybe wait until after April 2026'.[27]
6. His second matter is a custody dispute in the FCWA. That appears to have been the subject of a hearing on 24 February 2026, which he says he did not attend but which he will appeal. It may be that, if that occurs, there may be tasks that he must attend to at or about the same time as the April hearing listed for this matter. [28]
7. The third matter is the VPRA application. As noted, that awaits a decision as to whether leave should be granted. Nothing further is required from Mr Barker until that occurs, and the timing of that decision is uncertain. He also refers to an application to FCWA to release him from his Harman undertaking to rely on documents in that proceeding in the VPRA matter. Plainly, that cannot occur unless and until leave is granted.
8. The fourth matter is the appeal against the FVRO. As noted above, there is nothing before me that confirms that that appeal has yet been filed. If it is filed shortly, there may be tasks that he must attend to at or about the same time as the April hearing.
9. The fifth matter is VR 20/2023. As noted, Mr Barker has applied for that matter to be struck out, which application is currently reserved for determination on the papers.
10. The sixth matter is the current proceedings.
11. In short, Mr Barker anticipates appealing against two decisions of the FCWA, is awaiting determination of his application for leave to commence the VPRA proceedings and is awaiting a decision on his application to strike out the proceedings in VR 20 of 2023, as well as the April hearing in these proceedings. He has also foreshadowed an application to the Corruption and Crime Commission, although no timeframe is proposed for that step.
12. As I have said, that amounts to quite a lot 'on his plate' and it raises a question whether he is able to give sufficient attention to the present proceeding.
13. There is insufficient material before me to form a firm view in this regard.
14. But, in any event, at least at this stage, it seems unlikely to me that Mr Barker's litigation load will improve even if I was to adjourn the April hearing for a period of months.
15. Indeed, based on my review of the various matters, it might reasonably be said that if he pursues the two appeals of the FCWA decisions and leave is granted in the VPRA matter, his workload is likely to increase after April, rather than decrease, such that any adjournment of the April hearing may make his position worse, not better.

1. For those reasons, I will dismiss the application to vacate the April hearing, which will proceed as listed.

1. The application to vacate the hearing of this matter, currently listed for 22 - 24 April 2026, is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] Affidavit of Michael Henry Barker to Vacate SAT VR 34/2025 22 April 2022 [sic] Trial (Mr Barker's Affidavit).

[2] Davie v Manuel [2024] WASCA 21; (2024) 107 MVR 147 [88].

[4] Mr Barker's Affidavit, paras 8 and 53.

[5] Mr Barker's Affidavit, paras 24 - 27.

[6] Mr Barker's Affidavit, paras 31 - 33.

[7] Mr Barker's Affidavit, para 27. Also, para 43.

[8] Statement of Facts and Contentions attached by the applicant Legal Practice Board as Annexure A to application made 28 April 2025 (Statement of Facts and Contentions).

[11] See, for example, Union Steamship Co of New Zealand v The Caradale [1937] HCA 1; (1937) 56 CLR 277, 281.

[13] Statement of Facts and Contentions, para 11.

[15] Statement of Facts and Contentions, Particulars to para 30.2.

[20] Submissions in Response to Respondent's Application to Vacate the Hearing Listed for 22 - 24 April 2026 (Respondent's Submissions), para 10.

[21] Respondent's Submissions, para 11.

[22] Respondent's Submissions, para 13(a).

[23] Respondent's Submissions, para 13(a).

[27] Mr Barker's Affidavit, paras 14 and 15.

[28] Mr Barker's Affidavit, paras 16 and 20.