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Representation: Proceedings 2026/00031208
Counsel:
P Bristow (Applicant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Applicant)
Plaintiff (self-represented)
Defendant (submitting appearance)
Proceedings 2026/00125563
Plaintiff (self-represented)

File Number(s): 2026/00031208; 2026/00125563

JUDGMENT

1. The Plaintiff in these proceedings, Mr Peter Le, commenced proceedings 2026/00031208 by Summons (the First Summons) filed on 23 January 2026 against the Defendant, who is described as “Michael Saxton SC”. I take that to be a reference to the Solicitor General of New South Wales, Michael Sexton SC, and I will refer to the Defendant as such throughout this judgment.

2. The subject matter of the First Summons is indecipherable. It is not possible to ascertain what relief is being sought. As far as I can ascertain, it raises issues concerning proceedings in the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), proceedings in the Local Court and various complaints about the procedures adopted in those forums, including a refusal to provide equipment so as to allow Mr Le to fully participate in those proceedings on the basis that he has a hearing disability.

3. The First Summons is partly handwritten and partly typed. On the cover sheet of the First Summons are the handwritten words “Urgent on Medical & Legal reasons”. The nature of that urgency is unclear.

4. On 27 March 2026, Mr Le filed another Summons (the Second Summons) commencing proceedings 2026/00125563. He apparently seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Common Law Registrar. Like the First Summons, it is partly handwritten and partly typed and any grounds for relief it articulates are similarly indecipherable. Mr Le proceeds against Mr Sexton SC in those proceedings as well. No appearance has been entered by the Defendant in relation to that Summons. Nor have any orders been sought in relation to it. I return to this below.

5. The allegations that are contained in the Second Summons are diffuse and disaggregated. The first page of Annexure “1” to the document states the following:

“Urgent summons

The nsw supreme court administration staff and registrars wilfully ignored the context of the summons file on 23 January 2026

The unlawful event took place

1)Failure to file the summons urgently

Made protected person’s name public

Refused to provide the court assistance has stated in

Part 2 – of – case number

232026/00031208”

6. The Second Summons seems to complain that Mr Sexton SC or “the crown solicitors office unlawfully interfered in the summons and breach the law… Also being biased”. There is also a command that this Court explain why it failed to “take” the First Summons, allowed an unlawful NCAT hearing to proceed and made the name of a “protected person” public.

7. It is unnecessary to set out in greater detail the remaining pages of the Second Summons except to note that it is repetitious and includes an email sent to the Principal Registrar of this Court on 28 January 2026 which raises complaints about procedural fairness for urgent hearings, flexibility of procedures and impartiality.

8. The form of both the First and Second Summonses prevents the Court from identifying the existence of a justiciable dispute. That issue may be ventilated in the future, but that is not why the matters were listed before me. I am required to consider whether a tutor ought be appointed and, if so, what should be done with the proceedings pending that appointment.

Applicant’s Notice of Motion

9. By Notice of Motion filed on 9 April 2026, the Applicant, the New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation, seeks orders in relation to proceedings 2026/00031208, relevantly, in the following terms:

“1. Pursuant to rule 7.18 of the U**niform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, a tutor be appointed to the Plaintiff.

2. Pursuant to rules 6.24 and 6.29 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005:

a. “Michael Saxton SC” be removed as a Defendant; and

b. The Applicant be joined as a Defendant.”

10. Whilst the Notice of Motion also seeks an order pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (the UCPR) that the proceedings be dismissed, that need not be determined now. As I have stated, it may arise for determination in the future.

11. Mr Le attended the hearing of the motion in person. To accommodate his hearing impairment, the Court made available to Mr Le a computer which provided live transcription of the proceedings. Mr Le indicated to the Court when that transcription ceased working at various points throughout the hearing, and the Court waited until the transcription resumed. I am satisfied that Mr Le was not disadvantaged by his hearing impairment and that he was able to follow the argument presented by Ms Bristow of Counsel, who appeared for the Applicant.

12. In support of the Applicant’s motion, Ms Bristow read two affidavits of her instructing solicitor, Mr Sumen Kumareswaran, affirmed on 22 April 2026 and 4 June 2026 respectively. In addition to Ms Bristow’s oral submissions, I have considered the Applicant’s written submissions. Mr Le was ordered to file and serve any evidence and submissions in response by 28 May 2026, but no such submissions or evidence were filed.

13. I will deal with the orders sought by the motion in the same order in which they were presented.

Appointment of a tutor

14. The Applicant seeks an order for the appointment of a tutor pursuant to UCPR r 7.18 on the basis that the Plaintiff is a person under legal incapacity. Mr Le, when given the opportunity to respond orally to Ms Bristow’s oral submissions and Mr Kumareswaran’s affidavits, made no relevant submissions.

15. Ms Bristow, quite properly, drew the Court’s attention to page three of the First Summons, where Mr Le appears to mount an argument that the Court can, under s 14 of the C**ivil P**rocedure A**ct 2005 (NSW) (CPA), dispense with the rules in relation to the appointment of a tutor. Ms Bristow then addressed me proleptically in relation to that issue.

16. Ms Bristow, contending that a tutor was so required, advanced the following argument with care and precision.

17. First, the former Guardianship Tribunal made a financial management order in respect of Mr Le on 27 September 2011. That order remains in force.

18. Secondly, Mr Le is a “protected person” pursuant to s 38 of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (NSW) (the TAGA). That provision defines a “protected person” as “a person in respect of whom an order is in force under Part 4.2 or 4.3 or the Guardianship Act 1987 that the whole or any part of the person’s estate be subject to management under this Act”.

19. Thirdly, Mr Le falls within the definition of a “person under legal incapacity” pursuant to CPA s 3 because he is a protected person within the meaning of the TAGA. The Note to the Dictionary to the UCPR contains a list of words and expressions which are defined in the CPA and have the same meaning for the purposes of the UCPR. One such expression is “person under legal incapacity”. It follows that Mr Le, who meets that definition under the CPA, is also a person under legal incapacity for the purposes of the UCPR.

20. It is unclear whether Mr Le cavils with the Applicant’s contention that he is a protected person. First, Mr Le, in the Second Summons, appears to characterise himself as a protected person. Secondly, by seeking to invoke the dispensation provisions so that a tutor is not appointed, Mr Le appears to accept implicitly that he falls within that description.

21. On 27 September 2011, the Presiding Member of the former Guardianship Tribunal made a financial management order subjecting Mr Le to management under the TAGA, whereby the management of his estate was committed to the NSW Trustee and Guardian (the NTAG).

22. On 27 November 2025, the Chief Executive Officer of the NTAG issued a certificate pursuant to TAGA s 122(2) which confirmed that Mr Le’s estate “remains under management at the date of this notice”. Under that provision, such a certificate is admissible in any legal proceedings and is evidence of the matters stated within it.

23. Annexed to the 4 June 2026 affidavit of Mr Kumareswaran is an email where a solicitor at the NTAG confirmed the currency of the s 122(2) certificate. That update confirms that, as of 3 June 2026, Mr Le is a protected person within the meaning of the TAGA and therefore, by reason of CPA s 3, is a person under legal incapacity. I shall return to that communication below.

24. On the basis of these matters, I am satisfied that Mr Le is a person under legal incapacity for the purposes of the UCPR.

Is there any basis to dispense with the appointment of a tutor?

25. UCPR r 7.14 provides as follows:

7.14 Proceedings to be commenced or carried on by tutor

(1) A person under legal incapacity may not commence or carry on proceedings except by his or her tutor.

(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, the tutor of a person under legal incapacity may not commence or carry on proceedings except by a solicitor.

26. The Court may, by order, dispense with any requirement of rules of court if satisfied that it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances of the case: CPA s 14.

27. In the First Summons, Mr Le argues that the Court should dispense with the appointment of a tutor. His argument is not persuasive. Indeed, the Court is generally reluctant to grant such a dispensation, and such orders are seldom made.

28. There is longstanding authority which makes it clear that the requirement for a tutor is not a mere procedural matter but a requirement of substantive law. The history of the substantive principles was addressed by Isaacs J in Myers v Nominal Defendant (1966) 1 NSWR 659 (Myers) at 667–668. His Honour first discussed the principles concerning proceedings brought by infants. In so doing, Isaacs J traced the roots of that principle to cases such as Goodwin v Moore (1629) Cro. Car. 161; 79 ER 740 and Smith v Bowen (1709) 2 Raym. Ld. 1288; 92 ER 344 (Smith).

29. The antiquity of the notion that the requirement for a tutor is a substantive matter goes back even further. Although Isaacs J indicated that in Smith the proceedings were abated and the infant plaintiff amerced, that was not the case. The confusion comes from a marginal note in Smith which directs the reader to (1576) 41 Ass. p. 14. Bro. Appeal 75, a case in which an infant plaintiff was amerced.

30. Finding that those principles were applied in Australia in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62; [1949] HCA 1, Isaacs J in Myers concluded that “it is abundantly clear from the authorities that the common law position always has been and still is that an infant cannot make any application to a court without the intervention of a next friend.”

31. Myers was referred to by PLG Brereton J in Steinecke v Wayne [2011] NSWSC 428, where his Honour said at [3]:

“What Myers does make abundantly clear is that the requirement for a tutor issue is more than a mere procedural matter, but a requirement of substantive law imposed because a child or an incapable person is not capable of binding themselves by the institution of proceedings. This is particularly important, to ensure not only that the proceedings and the conduct of litigation is under the conduct of a responsible person, but also to ensure that the parties to the proceedings are bound by the outcome, and to secure a successful defendant’s costs. Because of the importance of that rule and its substantive nature, I do not accept that it would be appropriate to dispense with it.”

32. I conclude that Mr Le is a person under legal incapacity and that there is no compelling reason to dispense with the appointment of a tutor. A tutor must therefore be appointed.

33. The Applicant also submits that dispensing with a tutor would be imprudent bearing in mind Mr Le’s conduct. In that regard, the Applicant refers to the form and content of the First and Second Summonses as well as Mr Le’s attempt to email Mr Sexton SC on 6 February 2026. In that email, Mr Le demanded that Mr Sexton SC (and “no-one else”) respond to his various complaints, which followed from his emails to the Chief Judge at Common Law on 4 February 2026. The Applicant also refers to an email Mr Le sent on 22 April 2026 to the Applicant’s solicitor, where he wrote, among other things:

“Drafting this f****** email and document or any court form

Is more than extremely difficult because of medical episode I had in April

(Not mental health) and you bastard like housing and others contributed to it

And NSW Housing has no legal authority to appear in this case be legally f****** warned about that I had more than a gutfull of bull s*** and corrupt rotten justice system

Getting the f****** message a******

To government assholes named above

…

When I told [the Common Law Registrar] to step down for being bias behaviour she ignored me she will bloody well f****** regret it like you crown solicitors as well”

(Asterisks in original.)

34. The Applicant draws attention to Mr Le’s conduct at the directions hearing before the Common Law Registrar on 18 March 2026, which Mr Kumareswaran describes in his 22 April 2026 affidavit as follows:

“21. After I announced my appearance, the Registrar asked whether I know if the Plaintiff was present, as no appearance had been made for him at that stage. I indicated that I did not know with certainty. There was a person in the Court that I thought might be the plaintiff, but before I could indicate that to the Registrar, that person approached the bar table and indicated frustration that the Solicitor General had not appeared himself. I understand that person to be the Plaintiff…

22. The Registrar repeatedly asked the Plaintiff to confirm his identity. The Plaintiff did not do so, but made submissions which I understood to assert that the Solicitor General’s failure to appear amounted to a denial of procedural fairness such that these proceedings were void. The Registrar had been attempting to ask that the Plaintiff confirm his identity during this time. The Plaintiff told the Registrar to stop asking him to ‘shut up’, and told the Registrar to ‘shut up’. I do not recall the Registrar asking the Plaintiff to ‘shut up’, but I recall her having asked the Plaintiff to ‘hold on’. The Plaintiff also complained that his name had been broadcast to all parties in the directions list against his wishes and that the matter should not go to the High Court. The Plaintiff then departed the Court.”

35. The transcript of that directions hearing annexed to Mr Kumareswaran’s 4 June 2026 affidavit confirms his description.

36. That evidence supports a view that Mr Le is unable to conduct himself appropriately in court and to make coherent and relevant submissions. I add to that my own observations of Mr Le in Court before me. At the commencement of proceedings, he embarked upon a monologue that was rambling, repetitious and only rarely engaged with either the Applicant’s motion or any of the matters that could be discerned from his First and Second Summonses.

37. During his oral submissions, Mr Le again requested the matter be sent to the High Court. He then insisted that the Applicant had no relationship with the matter and that it was necessary and apposite for Mr Sexton SC to remain the Defendant in the proceedings.

38. It was apparent to me that, whatever arguments Mr Le may have, he is incapable of presenting them in a way which exposes a justiciable issue to a court or tribunal. This is another reason why I will not dispense with the requirement that a tutor be appointed for Mr Le.

39. I note that, had it been necessary for me to contemplate whether the Court should, of its own motion, appoint a tutor, it is almost inevitable that I would have done so. However, in circumstances where Mr Le is a person under legal incapacity, I need not dwell upon this further.

Removal of Defendant

40. In proceedings 2026/00031208, the Applicant seeks that Mr Sexton SC be removed as a Defendant and that the New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation be joined in his place.

41. The Applicant notes that the First Summons refers to four proceedings. Two of them were before NCAT while the other two are apparently criminal proceedings in the Local Court. The Applicant was a party to the NCAT proceedings.

42. Mr Sexton SC has no connection with either the NCAT or Local Court proceedings. The joinder of Mr Sexton SC was misconceived. It is unclear what relief this Court could grant against him.

43. At the hearing, Mr Le was unable to explain why he decided to join Mr Sexton SC as the appropriate contradictor to these proceedings beyond bare assertion. I accept the Applicant’s submission that there is no material before the Court that links Mr Sexton SC to anything that Mr Le seeks to review.

44. The Applicant notes that if Mr Le sought to identify a senior legal officer of the State to be named as a contradictor to the proceedings, it may, when the administration of justice so requires, be the Attorney General for New South Wales: Oliver Markisic v Magistrate David Heilpern; Dragan Markisic v Magistrate David Heilpern [2011] NSWSC 410 at [19]–[23] (Johnson J). That is not the case here. The proceedings before NCAT had in the Applicant an active opposing party. The Applicant also notes that, insofar as other defendants, such as the Local Court or prosecutors in the Local Court proceedings, may be joined, that is a matter for Mr Le.

45. I will remove “Michael Saxton SC” as a defendant to proceedings 2026/00031208 and join the New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation as a defendant. Although I have found that Mr Le is under a person under legal incapacity and that a tutor should be appointed for him, I do not consider this to be a barrier to making such an order. I am unable to identify any reason Mr Sexton SC should be party to these proceedings. If a tutor, once appointed, can articulate a proper basis for joining the Solicitor General, an application to that effect may be made.

46. No orders have been sought in relation to proceedings 2026/00125563. Those proceedings also require the appointment of a tutor for the reasons given above. The question of the proper defendant to those proceedings can be resolved if and when a tutor is appointed.

Stay and adjournment

47. The Court may not appoint a tutor without identifying the person so appointed: Mao v AMP Superannuation Ltd [2015] NSWCA 252 at [50] (Beazley ACJ, Emmett and Leeming JJA). The 4 June 2026 affidavit of Mr Kumareswaran refers to correspondence in which the NTAG has indicated that it is prepared to act as Mr Le’s tutor on certain conditions. The condition germane at this time is that the proceedings be adjourned to allow the NTAG to obtain legal advice. Ms Bristow sought an order that the Applicant’s motion be adjourned for ten weeks.

48. I am content to adjourn the motion for that period. It is appropriate for both proceedings to be stayed in the meantime. Such a stay is consistent with the approach in Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51; [2003] NSWCA 249 at 61 [52] (Handley JA) and Mao v AMP Superannuation Ltd [2018] NSWCA 72 at [2] (Basten and Leeming JJA).

Orders

49. I make the following orders:

50. In proceedings 2026/00031208:

(a) “Michael Saxton SC” be removed as a defendant; (b) New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation be joined as a defendant; and (c) the directions hearing on 25 June 2026 be vacated.

2. Proceedings 2026/00125563 and 2026/00031208 be stayed pending the appointment of a tutor for the Plaintiff.
3. Proceedings 2026/00125563 and 2026/00031208, and the Applicant’s Notice of Motion, be adjourned to 13 August 2026 for directions.
4. Costs of the hearing on 4 June 2026 be reserved.

**********

Amendments

09 June 2026

Formatting at [33].