• The Tribunal is satisfied on the balance of the probabilities that the events as outlined in the assessable information from the Department of Child Protection occurred and that it is appropriate to give these matters significant adverse weight in the risk assessment;
• The positive weight to be given to the applicant's steps towards better mental health, and lack of any other history of concern against her, do not outweigh the significant adverse weight that should properly be given to the child protection information;
• There is a significant risk that the applicant's mental health difficulties may again lead her to neglect children or other vulnerable persons in her care. If the conduct did recur in the context of the applicant's work or volunteering with children and people with disability, the potential consequences would clearly be serious;
• The Tribunal is reasonably satisfied that the applicant poses an unacceptable risk to children and a real and appreciable risk to people with disability.

Administrative Review - Disability Inclusions Act 2018 - Review of a decision by the Central Assessment Unit to issue an NDIS worker check exclusion- Real and appreciable risk of harm - Assessable information in making a determination

Administrative Review - Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 - Review of a decision by the Central Assessment Unit to issue a prohibition notice - Unacceptable risk to children - Assessable information in making a determination

Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 ss 3, 32, 43

Disability Inclusion Act 2018 ss 18M, 18ZI

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 34, 35, 39

Badea v Department of Human Services [2024] SACAT 37

Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34

GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38

GM v Department of Human Services [2024] SASC 23

Griggs v Department of Human Services [2023] SACAT 60

Gupta v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2024] SACAT 61

M v M [1988] HCA 68

Marshall v Department of Human Services [2023] SACAT 83

Penn v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2024] SACAT 11

Schinckel v Registrar of Firearms [2020] SASC 236

This is an edited version of the Tribunal's decision pursuant to s 60 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. The name of the applicant in these proceedings has been de-identified in accordance with the Tribunal's anonymisation policy. Other facts and details that may lead to the identification of any person may have also been anonymised or omitted. These changes do not affect the Tribunal's decision or its reasons for decision.

1. This is a review of a decision of the respondent (the CAU) on 24 May 2024 to issue to the applicant, LDI, a prohibition notice under s 32 of the Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 (CSPP Act) and an NDIS worker check exclusion notice under s 18J of the Disability Inclusion Act 2018 (DI Act). The two applications for review were heard together and turn on the same set of facts and involved the same submissions from the parties.
2. The effect of the prohibition notice and of the exclusion notice is that the applicant cannot undertake any one of the broad range of activities that the CSPP Act regards as working with children and cannot undertake any one of the range of activities that requires an NDIS worker check clearance.
3. In undertaking this review, I have had regard to the material that was before the respondent, including the documents in the respondent's two Book of Documents and a Supplementary Book of Documents provided under s 35 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SACAT Act). This also includes extensive written and oral submissions made on behalf of the respondent. The applicant did not provide any written submissions but tendered a letter from Ms Elizabeth Barefield dated 23 October 2024, which I refer to again below.
4. I explain in these reasons why I am satisfied that the correct or preferable decision in each case is to affirm the respondent's decision. I understand that this will be a disappointing outcome for the applicant. In making my decision, I have applied the principles I discussed in Gupta v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2024] SACAT 61 and Penn v Department of Human Services - Central Assessment Unit [2024] SACAT 11 (the Penn decision). So that the applicant can understand the reasoning behind my decision on her case, I have set out those principles in full later in this decision.

1. The applicant is a 42 year old lady. She has two children - an adult daughter and a young son who is presently living with his father interstate.
2. The applicant has a history of difficulties with her mental health. She told me that she has literacy difficulties as well. She said that she was not very good with words and expressing herself in writing.
3. On 26 July 2023, the applicant applied for a Working with Children Check (WWCC) and an NDIS worker check clearance. A risk assessment was conducted by the respondent. She was found to pose an unacceptable risk to children and a risk of harm to people with disability.
4. The respondent's decisions are similar in both instances.
5. The assessable information in both cases was received from the Department for Child Protection (DCP) and concerned the applicant's young son. At the relevant times, her son was between three and four years of age and she was his sole parent.
6. The DCP information contained the following allegations:
   1. in August and September 2021, the applicant was admitted to hospital due to suicidal ideation. She reported difficulty managing her child and feeling unable to cope with her parenting responsibilities;
   2. between February 2022 and January 2023, DCP received several notifications regarding the applicant's mental health and ability to provide safe care for her son;
   3. multiple reports had been made to DCP that the child was found in the community unaccompanied, partially naked and appearing to be dirty and unkempt. These reports were made on five separate occasions;
   4. there were further concerns that the applicant was unaware that her son had left the house, and later appeared apathetic to the seriousness of the matter; and
   5. it was further observed that the applicant's household was unhygienic and unsafe for the child which was deemed to compromise the child's physical and emotional safety. This included:
      1. multiple animals living in the home with animal excrement observed throughout the floors of the home;
      2. a cat litter tray overflowing with faeces in the son's room;
      3. a strong odour throughout the house, exacerbated by the animal excrement; and
      4. kitchen appliances and bench tops were dirty and unhygienic, with a build up of spilt food, dirt and grime.
7. A DCP investigation later took place where the applicant was recorded as responsible for harm and the following was substantiated:
   1. the child had significant symptoms and emotional distress;
   2. inadequate supervision by the applicant of her son; and
   3. inadequate basic care of the applicant's son by her.
8. Subsequently, on 31 January 2023, the child was removed from the applicant's care and, on 20 February 2023, he was placed under the temporary guardianship of the Chief Executive of DCP.
9. The DCP material in the Tribunal documents includes a neuropsychological assessment report dated 28 April 2023 from Ms Rochelle Loy, a psychologist.
10. Ms Loy opined:

[LDI] demonstrated Low Average intellectual function, with commensurate ability in learning, memory, and executive functioning (i.e. self regulation, idea generation, multitasking, and problem solving). > > ... > > It is likely that her difficulties with daily living are predominantly underlined by psychosocial factors and her borderline personality disorder given her response on a personality assessment screener indicated a moderate potential for clinical problems, particularly in the areas of alienation and social withdrawal. The precipitating events to DCP's involvement may also be attributable to neuro vegetative symptoms of depression, and the reported drowsiness and irritability associated with her previous medication dosage which together may have prevented [LDI] from being able to engage in household maintenance and provide adequate supervision and care ... > > A barrier for [LDI] maybe her propensity for projection and blame which is associable with her BPD and prevents her from building insight and taking responsibility for her own behaviour. There is a history of a lack of insight into the chronic nature of her mental health and her poor distress tolerance. It is advisable for [LDI] to urgently engage in specialised treatment for her BPD, such as Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT), to build her insight into her behaviour, develop strategies for emotional regulation, managing relationships, and tolerating overwhelm.[1]

11. The DCP material also includes a report dated 4 June 2023 from Dr Michelle Atchison, a psychiatrist, after an interview with the applicant.
12. Dr Atchison opined that the applicant:

... presents as a woman with a long history of unstable mood, including periods of depressed mood and periods of difficulty managing her distress that have led to threats of suicide. She has had some treatment for depression over the years but does not appear to have had a consistent therapist or consistently engaged in mental health treatment for herself. ... > > [LDI] presented as a woman with very low emotional IQ or understanding of any psychological connections between events in her life and her feelings or their outcomes. Her history shows difficulties with distress tolerance, choosing health[y] relationships and choosing a healthy lifestyle that I believe corroborates a diagnosis of a Borderline Personality Disorder.... > > ... I note that [LDI] has not demonstrated a strong commitment to psychological therapy, for example, not getting back to Focus One who were reaching out to provide therapy and only having sporadic general practice consultations.... I would have to question [LDI]'s capacity to engage in the appropriate therapy that is required and she would likely require considerable help and support to get to consultations and to stay committed if she is going to be involved in therapy. > > I note with concern [LDI]'s difficulties focusing on her own psychological health and her even greater difficulties having empathy and understanding of her young son's emotional and physical safety. This would be in keeping with how she presented during our consultation and the records available to me, where it would appear that [LDI] has been only just managing on a physical and emotional basis with considerable support from her mother and now finds herself without that support.[2]

13. During the DCP care and protection phase, it was alleged that the applicant displayed limited insight into the concerns regarding her son, minimised the concerns, and failed to engage meaningfully with support services, and that, accordingly, DCP recommended that the child remain in the long-term care of his father.
14. The applicant provided brief submissions to the respondent regarding her applications in an email dated 25 March 2024, in which she said [sic]:

... during the time of the dates above my mental state wasn't in the right state of mind due to losing my mother from cancer I was extremely depressed and had no motivation to do anything for when it comes to every day living, as someone can be after losing the only parent you basically know for most of my life.... I'd never EVER EVER be a risk to anyone ever especially my own children or anyone else.

15. When the respondent requested further submissions from the applicant, she replied that she had no criminal record and that she was not a harm to anyone and she was put on medication when her mental health was affected by her mother's death.
16. After conducting the assessment, the respondent concluded that the assessable information was recent and serious and it was given significant weight. The respondent found that there was no information before it which would indicate that the underlying serious issues of concern which led to the removal of the applicant's son had been addressed. The respondent found that the applicant had not provided any corroborating evidence of her mental health issues having been addressed, nor of her having learned or developed strategies which she could implement if she were to experience any other significant emotional events in the future. For these reasons, the respondent said it could not be satisfied that the underlying issues giving rise to the assessable information had been addressed such that they would not contribute to further adverse conduct in the future.
17. The respondent also concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for her conduct, which was given significant weight, and that her assertion that she was not a risk to anyone was indicative of a lack of insight and a minimising attitude towards her conduct, which the respondent considered heightened the risk of future repetition. The respondent concluded that, were the applicant to be neglectful of a person in the same manner which led to the removal of her child, the potential harm to that person could be significant.

Review under s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013

1. The Tribunal conducts its review of the respondent's decisions as an independent body. The Tribunal will, in exercising its review jurisdiction, examine the decisions of the decision‑maker by way of rehearing. On a rehearing, the Tribunal must reach the correct or preferable decision but in doing so must have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision‑maker.
2. The procedure on a rehearing will include an examination of the evidence or material before the decision‑maker and consideration of any further evidence or material that the Tribunal decides, in the circumstances of the particular case, to admit for the purposes of rehearing the matter.
3. After making its decision, the Tribunal can affirm or vary the decision under review or can set the decision aside and either substitute its own decision or send the matter back to the decision-maker for reconsideration.

1. An application for review to the Tribunal must be made within 14 days after the applicant receives notice of the reviewable decision or such longer period that the Tribunal may allow. However, s 43(3) of the CSPP Act and s 18ZI(4) of the DI Act state that the Tribunal may only allow an extension of time where:
   1. special circumstances exist; and
   2. another party will not be unreasonably disadvantaged because of the delay in commencing the proceedings.
2. The applicant's applications for review to the Tribunal were made late. They both ought to have been made by about 7 June 2024 but were not made until 30 August 2024, nearly three months later.
3. Ms Bulling said that the respondent had no objection to the Tribunal granting the applicant an extension of time to make these applications.
4. The applicant acknowledged that she received a copy of each decision on the day it was made. I am well satisfied that the applicant knew that she had 14 days to seek a review of those decisions. I was not satisfied with her various reasons for failing to do so.
5. I consider that the applicant did not, at the beginning, have a significant interest in seeking a review of these two decisions. It is reasonably clear to me that it was the fact that her aged care and vulnerable persons screenings were prejudiced because she had been issued with the prohibition notice and the NDIS worker check exclusion notice that prompted these applications for review to the Tribunal. These screenings were revoked on account of the applicant being issued with the two notices.[3] The applicant did not seek a review of the decisions to issue the two notices until after she was informed by the respondent on 22 August 2024 of the revocation of her aged care and vulnerable persons screenings.
6. Ordinarily, I would regard these circumstances adversely to granting an extension of time to an applicant. However, I decided to grant the applicant an extension of time to make these applications. I consider that the prejudice to the applicant's employment prospects in the vulnerable and aged care sector, and her mental health and literacy issues, amount to special circumstances to grant an extension of time. I am satisfied also that the respondent has not been unreasonably disadvantaged because of the applicant's delay in commencing the proceedings.

1. The statutory schemes for worker checks established under the CSPP Act and the DI Act are complex. In respect of the CSPP Act, the statutory provisions were addressed in substantial detail by the Tribunal in GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 (GJC) and, in respect of the DI Act, in the decision of Griggs v Department of Human Services [2023] SACAT 60 (Griggs). I adopt what was said in GJC and Griggs about the relevant statutory provisions.
2. There are considerable similarities between the two schemes. In brief, the CSPP Act and DI Act establish a regime for the screening by the CAU of (respectively) people who want to work with children or with people with disability and for the prohibition of those persons who would (respectively) pose an unacceptable risk of harm to children or a risk of harm to people with disability. The screening process occurs by the CAU considering assessable information[4] of past behaviour and undertaking an assessment of potential future risk (with reference to Ministerial Guidelines).[5] As discussed further below, this involves a weighting process that takes into account, amongst other things, the reliability and context of the assessable information, the likelihood of recurrence of concerning conduct and the potential consequences of such conduct were it to recur.[6]
3. "Unacceptable risk" is not defined in the CSPP Act. However, in GJC, the Tribunal found that unacceptable risk means that there is a risk that, if a person is allowed to work with children, this would not ensure the adequate protection of children.[7]
4. Section 18M of the DI Act provides that a "risk of harm" to people with disability means a real and appreciable risk of harm, which does not need to be likely or significant or arise from recent events, and that "harm" includes any detrimental effect on a person's physical, psychological, emotional or financial wellbeing and non-consensual or inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature.
5. Both Acts set out certain objects or principles to be observed. Under the DI Act, this includes that people with disability have the right to live free from neglect, abuse and exploitation and a recognition that women and children are more vulnerable to risk of abuse or exploitation.
6. The Intergovernmental Agreement that is referred to in more detail in Griggs (and which is an interpretive aid in the construction of the DI Act) provides in clause 15 that, to realise the objective of protecting people with disability, NDIS worker screening is to be guided by a number of principles. This includes that "the paramount consideration is the right of people with disability to live lives free from abuse, violence, neglect and exploitation".
7. Section 3 of the CSPP Act sets out its objects and principles. In brief, they relevantly state that the primary object of the Act is to minimise the risk to children posed by persons who work with them and that the paramount consideration must always be the best interests of children, having regard to their safety and protection. Further, persons who pose an unacceptable risk to children are to be prevented from working with children.
8. In each case, there is no punitive or deterrent aspect to a risk assessment. However, the effect on an individual of not receiving a clearance is not relevant to the ultimate issue of whether they pose an unacceptable risk to children or a risk of harm to people with disability. The objects of the legislation are entirely protective of children and people with disability.
9. The CSPP Act evinces the intention that working with children is a privilege not a right and that the risk of injustice to an applicant is preferred over a risk to the safety of children.[8] As I indicated in the Penn decision, these principles apply also to persons who would seek an NDIS worker check clearance under the DI Act to work with people with disability.

Dealing with assessable information that discloses conduct of concern

1. A determination on the ultimate issue of risk involves first a finding as to the likelihood of the conduct of concern having occurred.
2. The CSPP Act Guidelines state:

Information that is of low quality (i.e. incomplete, vague, circumstantial or uncorroborated) will be given less weight than evidence that is direct, unrefuted or supported by other information from a reliable source. For example, information provided by an independent witness or notifier regarding abuse sustained by a child will attract greater weight than information offered by a person whose evidence may be compromised in some way.[9]

To determine the relative weight given to information in a risk assessment, the central assessment unit should take into account the context and characteristics of that information, including its reliability, how it was obtained, and the nature, extent and outcome of misconduct investigations. > > The weight attributed to sources of information (evidence) refers to the quality and/or reliability, or persuasiveness of the information. In the context of a risk assessment, it is the emphasis or degree of reliance a decision maker may place on the different pieces of information before them. Information that is indefinite, vague, or improbable will be given less or no weight in comparison to evidence that has been tested by a court of law or is direct and unrefuted.[10]

4. The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inform itself as it sees fit.[11] However, the Tribunal observed in GJC that, as assessable information will often include information that has not been scrutinised or tested in a court or tribunal (and may include hearsay or mere allegations of misconduct obtained from diverse sources), a comprehensive and meticulous approach to the scrutiny and evaluation of the information is essential.[12]
5. The conduct of concern may in some cases be proven to a high standard, for example, by admissions or by findings in criminal proceedings that are established on the usual criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
6. In other cases, the CAU or the Tribunal may be satisfied on the evidence that the allegations made against the applicant are groundless. Those allegations are to be ignored in the risk assessment.
7. The CAU or the Tribunal may be satisfied on the civil standard of the balance of probabilities (with, where relevant, additional consideration of the Briginshaw[13] factors) that the conduct of concern occurred.
8. In Briginshaw, Dixon J said at 362-363:

The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters 'reasonable satisfaction' should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences...This does not mean that some standard of persuasion is fixed intermediate between the satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt required upon a criminal inquest and the reasonable satisfaction which in a civil issue may, not must, be based on a preponderance of probability. It means that the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is attained.

9. Or, the CAU or the Tribunal, may not be so satisfied but, nevertheless, cannot be satisfied that the conduct did not occur.
10. Where conduct of concern is admitted or proven to the criminal standard, it would ordinarily be given significant weighting in a risk assessment under the CSPP Act and DI Act. Where conduct of concern is not admitted or proven to this standard, the weighting given to it in the risk assessment must reflect the possibility that the conduct of concern did not occur, although findings made on the balance of probabilities would generally have a decisive impact on the risk assessment. This is consistent with the Guidelines.
11. Once having determined the likelihood of the conduct of concern having occurred and the weighting to give it in the risk assessment, the decision-maker must conduct the risk assessment by taking account all other relevant matters to determine the risk posed by the individual, with reference to Table 2 of the relevant Guidelines and s 18O of the DI Act (see below).
12. This requires an evaluation of the nature and degree of the risk posed by the individual and whether it is acceptable to allow it, i.e. a consideration of the likelihood of offending or conduct recurring in the future and the seriousness of the consequences if the conduct were to recur. Where the possible future harm is serious a minimal chance or possibility that it will occur would usually be sufficient to regard that outcome as unacceptable. Conversely, an acceptable risk might be one which is fanciful, farfetched or theoretical and where the potential consequences are mild or insignificant. It is not required that there be no risk of harm.
13. The standard of satisfaction in the assessment of the ultimate issue of risk is a statutory standard of reasonable satisfaction, which cannot be measured against, or equated to, an evidential standard of proof. This means the decision-maker does not necessarily need to be satisfied that it is likely, to any standard or level of satisfaction (such as the balance of probabilities), that the person will cause harm, merely that there is a possibility of future harm, and that the potential consequences would be serious if the perceived risk eventuated.
14. I adopt what I said in the Penn decision, namely that certain principles developed in decisions concerning working with children checks[14] apply also to clearances under the DI Act given the similarities in the statutory schemes and their purposes and objects.

1. The respective Guidelines under the CSPP Act and DI Act are broadly similar. They each contain indicia relating to whether information should be given greater or lesser weight depending on matters such as its quality, relevance and seriousness.
2. The Guidelines also contain indicia relating to whether the information points to an increased risk or decreased risk of harm to children or people with disability. In this regard, s 18O of the DI Act sets out the following matters that must be considered in a risk assessment:

(a) the nature, gravity and circumstances of any offence, misconduct or other event that resulted in, or contributed to, the requirement for a risk assessment in relation to the person (a relevant event), and how it is relevant to NDIS work;

(b) the length of time that has passed since a relevant event occurred;

(c) the vulnerability of any victim of a relevant event at the time of the event and the person's relationship to the victim or position of authority over the victim at the time of the event;

(d) the person's criminal history, history of misconduct and other relevant history, including whether there is a pattern of concerning behaviour;

(e) the person's conduct since a relevant event;

(f) all other circumstances in respect of the person's criminal offending, misconduct and other relevant history and their impact on eligibility to be engaged in NDIS work;

(g) such other matters as the central assessment unit considers appropriate.

1. In nearly identical terms, the Ministerial Guidelines for the CSPP Act state that:

While the weight given to information relates to its quality, or the degree of reliance the central assessment unit decision-maker may place on the information before them, the risk assessment criteria is concerned with the content of the information. > > Events or conduct referenced in this section includes alleged (unproven) events or conduct. > > The central assessment unit decision-maker should consider the substance of the information and have regard to:

• the person's criminal, child protection, disciplinary or other relevant history, including whether a pattern of concerning conduct is identified;
• the nature, gravity and circumstances of the events or conduct detailed in the information and how those factors are relevant to children or child-related work;
• the length of time that has passed since the events or conduct occurred;
• the person's conduct since the events or conduct occurred;
• the vulnerability of any victim at the time of the events or conduct including the age of the victim, the age of the person at that time, the age difference between the person and the victim and the person's relationship to the victim or position of authority over the victim at the material time; and
• all other relevant circumstances identified in the assessable information including, but not limited to, those pertaining to conduct which may be indicative of child grooming, poor boundary recognition, prurient interests, or other behaviour that may pose a risk to children and impact on the person's suitability to be engaged in child-related work.

In weighing up the risk assessment criteria, the paramount consideration must be the best interests of children, having regard to their safety and protection_.[15]_

1. The questions for the Tribunal are essentially the same as those dealt with by the CAU, namely whether the assessable information indicates that the applicant poses an unacceptable risk to children and a real and appreciable risk to people with disability and then the weight to be given to this and other relevant matters to determine the fundamental issue of risk.

1. I have set out above the assessable (or relevant) information considered by the CAU.
2. In terms of weighting information sources under Table 1 of the Guidelines, in making my decision, I place primary reliance on the child protection information obtained from DCP, including the reports from Ms Loy and Dr Atchison. The weight of this information is significant and its quality is high. Its relevance and seriousness are high because it pertains to the serious neglect of a child who was reliant on the applicant and because of the gravity of such conduct and its potential impact on children and people with disability (which includes children). I agree with the respondent's written submissions that the child protection notifications demonstrated a consistent pattern and that they derived from a professional and unbiased source.
3. I agree with the submissions of the respondent that the conduct disclosed in the child protection notifications translates also to a risk if the applicant was to work with people with disability, not only children.
4. At the hearing, the applicant agreed with the specific factual allegations set out at paragraph 10 of these reasons (save that she did not agree that her son was sleeping in the room with the cat litter tray). At the hearing, she said that after her mother's death she failed to look after her son, herself and her house. She said that she let herself go, and didn't care about anything or anyone, and didn't care if she didn't wake up. She said that her son got out of the house numerous times but would be brought back home by a neighbour or she herself would find him and bring him back.
5. In view of the applicant's admission of these allegations, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that these events occurred. I am satisfied that the applicant's mental health difficulties manifested themselves in the ongoing serious neglect of, and lack of supervision of, her young son, a vulnerable child reliant on her care.
6. I consider that it is appropriate to give these matters significant adverse weight in the risk assessment.
7. Save for the letter from Ms Barefield, the applicant did not provide any material to the Tribunal that would indicate that she has significantly addressed her mental health difficulties and the lack of insight identified by Ms Loy and Dr Atchison. The applicant told me that she has been taking the medication Pristiq (desvenlafaxine)[16] since August 2024 and that she is not seeing a psychologist or psychiatrist but occasionally attends a drop-in mental health service.
8. There are some positive indications in Ms Barefield's letter, including Ms Barefield's belief that the applicant has attended appointments with her general practitioner about her mental health and is taking medication. However, I am unable to place significant weight on Ms Barefield's letter. While Ms Barefield refers to herself as a counsellor and a person holding a Bachelor of Psychology, she was not in a professional, arm's length, therapeutic relationship with the applicant. The applicant described Ms Barefield as a family acquaintance with whom she had regularly spoken "as a friend" about her life circumstances over a period of about 10 years since the applicant's mother was diagnosed with cancer. This contact has apparently since ceased. There is no indication that Ms Barefield was apprised of the full history of the applicant's child protection concerns or was possessed of the same level of information about her mental health difficulties as were Ms Loy and Dr Atchison. Ms Barefield makes no comment at all on the applicant's risk to children and people with disability if she were to work with them.
9. The applicant said at the hearing that she is now looking after her house and takes full responsibility for what happened to her son. She said that she has spoken with Ms Barefield and is taking her medication. The applicant is to be commended for the steps she is taking towards better mental health.
10. However, the positive weight to be given to Ms Barefield's letter, the applicant's steps towards better mental health, and lack of any other history of concern against the applicant, do not outweigh the significant adverse weight that should properly be given to the child protection information.

1. I turn now to evaluating under Table 2 of the Guidelines the nature and degree of the risk posed by the applicant and whether it is acceptable to allow it.
2. There are factors in this case that the Guidelines consider demonstrate an increased risk of harm. This includes that the applicant's neglect of her son was serious and ongoing; that the events occurred very recently (only two to three years ago); that the applicant's son has not been returned to her care since; and that there is no real indication that satisfies me that the applicant has addressed her mental health problems and her serious lack of insight into her behaviour.
3. In particular, I agree with the respondent's submissions that the applicant's attempts to minimise her conduct regarding her son fails to demonstrate not only insight into, but also her acceptance of responsibility for, the risk of harm associated with a young child repeatedly leaving home unsupervised, or from his home being in a squalid, unhygienic and unsafe condition.
4. I agree also with the respondent's submissions that the applicant did not have an intention to harm her son but rather that her son was put at risk as a result of deficits in her judgement or capacity. I agree with the respondent that the evidence indicates that the risks to the applicant's son were sustained over time, despite police involvement, and that this conduct did not cease without external intervention.
5. Factors demonstrating a decreased risk, and which are weighted in the applicant's favour, include the lack of any other adverse findings against the applicant and her apparent recent acceptance of responsibility for her conduct towards her son. However, I do not consider that these factors outweigh factors demonstrating that the applicant poses an increased risk of harm to children and people with disability.
6. I have considered the likelihood of the conduct of concern (i.e. neglect of children or other vulnerable persons in the applicant's care) recurring in the future, and the seriousness of the consequences if the conduct were to recur in the context of the applicant's work or volunteering with children and people with disability. I am not able on the evidence to positively find that the applicant would repeat the conduct of concern. However, given that I am not satisfied that her mental health difficulties and poor insight have been sufficiently addressed, I consider that there is a significant risk that this conduct would recur.
7. There is no or scant information before the Tribunal about the efficacy of the medication that the applicant is presently taking for her mental health problems, or any other treatment or counselling that she may have received, or how her attitudes or behaviour have changed since the events regarding her son. There is scant information about how the applicant would respond were she to face future life stressors.
8. There is a significant risk that the applicant's mental health difficulties may again lead her to neglect children or other vulnerable persons in her care. If the conduct did recur in the context of the applicant's work or volunteering with children and people with disability, the potential consequences would clearly be serious.
9. This is not a case of a risk that is acceptable because it is fanciful, farfetched or theoretical or where the potential consequences are mild or insignificant.
10. For all the above reasons, I am reasonably satisfied that the applicant poses an unacceptable risk to children and a real and appreciable risk to people with disability.

1. For the above reasons, I conclude that the correct or preferable decision is to affirm the decisions under review.
2. As discussed at the hearing, there will be orders made under s 60(2)(h) of the SACAT Act in respect of Volume 1 of the respondent's Supplementary Book of Documents.

[1] Supplementary Book of Documents, pp 44 - 49.

1. [3] The revocation of the screenings is not reviewable by the Tribunal. I understand that an internal review sought by the applicant against the revocation of the screenings was placed on hold until the present matters before the Tribunal are determined.

[4] Referred to as "relevant information" for the purposes of the Disability Inclusion Act 2018.

[5] Working with Children Check Guidelines, July 2024; NDIS Worker Check Guidelines, May 2021.

[6] See Schinckel v Registrar of Firearms [2020] SASC 236 at [30].

[7] GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 at [104].

[8] Badea v Department of Human Services [2024] SACAT 37 at [79].

[9] Working with Children Check Guidelines, July 2024, chapter 9.

[10] NDIS Worker Check Guidelines, May 2021, p 18.

[11] Section 39 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.

[12] GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38 at [83] - [84].

[13] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34.

[14] See M v M [1988] HCA 68; GJC v Department of Human Services [2020] SACAT 38; Marshall v Department of Human Services [2023] SACAT 83; GM v Department of Human Services [2024] SASC 23.

[15] Working with Children Check Guidelines, July 2024, chapter 10.

[16] The applicant said that Pristiq is the first medication she has taken for her mental health. This is inconsistent with other information available to the Tribunal, and I give it little weight.