REMAINING ISSUES
122 As the lengthy factual and procedural history of this proceeding demonstrates, Mr Lawrence's dogged efforts to persuade the MFC to change its election rules and practices have already resulted in the MFC adopting many of the changes to the club's rules along the lines of those for which he contended.
123 Those changes, along with a number of sensible concessions made by Mr Lawrence and the MFC, meant that very little of the case, as opened, remained to be determined.
124 Mr Lawrence's originating process sought (a) a declaration under s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) that, "pursuant to section 232 of the Corporations Act" certain conduct of the club was oppressive; and (b) orders under s 233 of the Act that the election rules be amended accordingly. The precise form of relief sought is set out at [5] to [6] above, and there is no need to repeat it here.
125 By the time of closing submissions, Mr Lawrence instead sought the following relief (as set out in Schedule C attached to his written closing submissions):
1. Pursuant to s 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act), Melbourne Football Club Limited (MFC)'s conduct of its affairs in relation to elections for its board of directors has been since 2022, and continues to be:
a. contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; and
b. oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to and unfairly discriminatory against Peter Lawrence and other non-preferred candidates seeking election to the board of directors of MFC.
2. Pursuant to s 233 of the Corporations Act, the following paragraphs of the MFC Election Rules dated 8 May 2024 be struck out:
a. paragraph 13(b)(i);
b. paragraph 13(c)(i)(C);
c. paragraph 13(c)(i)(D)
d. the words in parathensis [sic] in paragraph 13(d)(ii).
126 Although Mr Peters did not formally seek leave to amend the originating process accordingly, I will make such an order, because (sensibly enough) no objection was made to the final form of relief being articulated in that way.
127 The MFC submitted that, to the extent that paragraph 1 of Mr Lawrence's proposed orders still sought declaratory relief, such an application was misconceived. In the end, for reasons that no longer matter, Mr Peters accepted that proposed order 1 set out in Schedule C to his written closing submissions was unnecessary.
128 That leaves paragraph 2 of the final form of relief sought in Schedule C. By that paragraph, Mr Lawrence seeks an order that the following paragraphs of the election rules be struck out:
(a) paragraph 13(b)(i), or the "disparagement" rule, which, at 8 May 2024, provided as follows (noting it has now been amended as outlined above):
(b) Election material, Candidate Statements and any other written or oral statement by or on behalf of a Nominee or Candidate must not:
i. disparage or otherwise reflect adversely on the standing of the Club or its players, Members, Directors, officers, staff, Nominees or Candidates;
(b) paragraphs 13(c)(i)(C) and (D) which provide:
(c) Except as provided for under these Rules, Candidates are not permitted to engage in any of the following kinds of electioneering conduct, either engaged in personally by the Candidate or by another person with the permission or authorisation of the Candidate:
i. campaigning for the office of Director or drawing attention to the fact the Candidate is seeking to be appointed as a Director by:
…
C. giving an interview that is transmitted to the general public by way of the media, including radio, television, blog or vlog;
D. posting to a website or to a social media platform material that can be viewed by the general public;
(c) the words in parentheses in paragraph 13(d)(ii) which provides:
(d) For the avoidance of doubt, the electioneering conduct restricted by the preceding paragraph does not include conduct that otherwise complies with these Rules and involves:
…
ii. publishing on the Candidate's social media platform account the fact that they are a Candidate and the Candidate Statement of that person (in doing so the comments function must be turned off in connection with that publication and reference may be made that if a Member has any questions or comments concerning the election they may refer to the Club's online election forum);
129 This ultimately limited his claim for relief to orders for the removal of specific aspects of the election rules which restrict electioneering, namely the rule against disparagement, the rule prohibiting general campaigning through media interviews and social media; and the requirement that a candidate turn off the comments function and direct questions and comments to the club's online election forum when referring to their candidacy and publishing their candidate statement on social media.
130 The result is that the only remaining issue necessary for me to determine is whether the affairs of the MFC have been conducted in a manner contrary to the interests of members as a whole or oppressively to Mr Lawrence and other non-preferred candidates by reason of the restrictions, as they now exist in the current version of the election rules, on "electioneering".
131 Section 232 of the Act relevantly provides that the court may make an order under s 233 if:
(a) the conduct of a company's affairs; or
(b) an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company; or
(c) a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of members of a company;
is either:
(d) contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or
(e) oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.
132 Section 233 of the Act relevantly provides:
(1) The Court can make any order under this section that it considers appropriate in relation to the company, including an order:
…
(c) regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in the future;
…
(i) restraining a person from engaging in specified conduct or from doing a specified act;
…
(j) requiring a person to do a specified act.
133 In RBC Investor Services Australia Nominees Pty Ltd v Brickworks Ltd [2017] FCA 756; (2017) 348 ALR 605, Jagot J emphasised that the role of the court in oppression actions where evaluative decisions are challenged is not to step into the shoes of the directors and decide for itself what it thinks is in the company's best interests, recognising that directors routinely weigh competing considerations about which reasonable minds can and do differ. At 616 [42] her Honour said:
The touchstone of oppression, that conduct be so unfair that reasonable directors who consider the matter would not have thought the conduct or decision fair, may appear circular but is designed to reinforce that the role of the court is not to step into the shoes of the directors and unilaterally decide what it thinks to be in the best interests of the company as a whole. The courts recognise that it is the responsibility of the directors to weigh the competing considerations with which they will be routinely confronted and determine what is in the best interests of the company as whole. They recognise also that as the task of the directors is evaluative it is necessarily one about which reasonable minds may differ. In performing its own evaluation, accordingly, the courts do not merely substitute what appears to them to be the preferable commercial decision. As Mansfield J summarised in Territory Realty Pty Ltd v Garraway [2009] FCA 292 at [312]:
The authorities indicate that the Court should not readily find either s 232(d) or (e) is made out: Edwards v Idaville Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 1. Such a finding requires consideration of all the circumstances, viewed cumulatively, but not with a hypercritical approach, as the measure is the standard of reasonable directors: De Tocqueville Private Equity Pty Ltd v Linden & Conway Ltd (2006) 59 ACSR 587; [2006] FCA 1309. It is not a finding to be made because the Court may, on the information available, disagree with the decision of the directors, or because the wisdom of hindsight may show that the decision of the directors was unwise and perhaps grossly so, or because the directors or management did not conduct the affairs of the company as well as the Court considers they may have: Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 688; [1998] NSWSC 413. As Murray J said in Re Spargos Mining NL (1990) 3 ACSR 1 at 44, the Court should not in substance adopt an approach to those provisions without clear justification, so that it does not simply take "over the management of the company".
134 In New South Wales Rugby League Ltd v Wayde (1985) 1 NSWLR 86 the New South Wales Court of Appeal overturned the primary judge's finding that a decision of the Rugby League's board of directors to refuse to allow a club associated with the respondent entry into a NSW rugby competition was oppressive or contrary to the interests of the members as a whole. The Court (Street CJ, Kirby P and Hope JA) said at 100-102:
It would not follow that, because a decision prejudicially affected a particular club, the decision could not reasonably be considered as being in the interests of the members of the league as a whole. The decision of the directors would have to be based upon relevant considerations, the decision could not be simply arbitrary or capricious. But if the directors act bona fide without collateral motive and have regard to the relevant considerations; balancing the interests of the members of the league as a whole as against the interests of a particular member, and if there is material upon which they can reasonably come to such a decision, the directors are entitled to make a decision which would be very prejudicial to that particular member, even to the point of destroying it.
…
Role of the courts in cases such as this:
Necessarily, this conclusion does not involve the court in pronouncing on the merits of the decision made by the directors … decisions on the best interests of the members of the league as a whole (and thus on the organization of the professional game of rugby league football) are properly made by the directors of the league familiar with it and deeply involved in its organization; not by the courts. The directors have the power to make the relevant decisions by reason of the articles of association. Indeed, prior to incorporation, these articles were specifically amended precisely to clarify this power of the directors and, in the amended form, became the articles of association of the league upon its incorporation. Courts may only interfere in the directors' decisions, relevantly, where oppression or unfair prejudice is shown. Whilst it is true that the Code should be given a beneficial construction and not unduly narrowed by judicial decisions, the terms of s 320 must not lead courts into assuming the management of corporations, substituting their decisions and assessments for those of directors, who can be expected to have much greater knowledge and more time and expertise at their disposal to evaluate the best interests of the members of the corporation as a whole.
135 In Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1985) 180 CLR 459, the High Court dismissed an appeal against that decision, on the basis that it had not been shown that the relevant decisions of the board were such that no board acting reasonably could have made them. The plurality (Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ) at 467-468 said:
Given the special expertise and experience of the Board, the bona fide and proper exercise of the power in pursuit of the purpose for which it was conferred and the caution which a court must exercise in determining an application under s. 320 of the Code in order to avoid an unwarranted assumption of the responsibility for management of the company, the appellants faced a difficult task in seeking to prove that the decisions in question were unfairly prejudicial to Wests and therefore not in the overall interests of the members as a whole. It has not been shown that those decisions of the Board were such that no Board acting reasonably could have made them. The effect of those decisions on Wests was harsh indeed. It has not, however, been shown that they were oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or discriminatory or that their effect was such as to warrant the conclusion that the affairs of the League were or are being conducted in a manner that was or is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.
136 It follows, as counsel for the MFC submitted, that where what is sought to be impugned are evaluative decisions made by the company's board as to what is in the company's best interests, it must ordinarily be shown that there has been a lack of good faith or that the decision was one which no reasonable board could have reached in order to warrant a finding that the conditions of s 232 are satisfied.
137 Counsel for Mr Lawrence submitted that the reasoning of Brennan J in Wayde has subsequently found favour with lower courts. The particular passage from his Honour's reasons upon which Mr Lawrence relied is at 472-473:
The question of unfairness is one of fact and degree which s 320 requires the court to determine, but not without regard to the view which the directors themselves have formed and not without allowing for any special skill, knowledge and acumen possessed by the directors. The operation of s 320 may be attracted to a decision made by directors which is made in good faith for a purpose within the directors' power but which reasonable directors would think to be unfair. The test of unfairness is objective and it is necessary, though difficult, to postulate a standard of reasonable directors possessed of any special skill, knowledge or acumen possessed by the directors. The test assumes (whether it be the fact or not) that reasonable directors weigh the furthering of the corporate object against the disadvantage, disability or burden which their decisions will impose, and address their minds to the question whether a proposed decision is unfair. The court must determine whether reasonable directors, possessing any special skill, knowledge or acumen possessed by the directors and having in mind the importance of furthering the corporate object on the one hand and the disadvantage, disability or burden which their decision will impose on a member on the other hand, would have decided that it was unfair to make that decision.
(emphasis added)
138 Mr Peters contended that in that passage, and in the emphasised part of it in particular, Brennan J articulated a different test to that posited by the plurality, and that it has subsequently been applied in other decisions, citing Hylepin Pty Ltd v Doshay Pty Ltd (2021) 288 FCR 104 at 128-129 [125]-[126], 155 [269] (Markovic, Banks-Smith and Anderson JJ); Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd v MacKay Sugar Ltd [2017] FCAFC 40; (2017) 345 ALR 174 at 179 [12] (Dowsett, Jagot and White JJ); MacKay Sugar Ltd v Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd [2016] FCAFC 133; (2016) 338 ALR 374 at 377 [9] (Gilmour, Jagot and White JJ); Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 55; (2014) 314 ALR 62 at 65-66 [8]-[9] (Siopis, Rares and Davies JJ); Parker v Auswild [2022] VSCA 8; (2022) 403 ALR 111 at 140 [129]-[130] (Ferguson CJ, Kennedy JA and Garde AJA); Knights Quest Pty Ltd v Daiwa Can Company [2018] VSCA 349; (2018) 366 ALR 557 at 588-589 [130] and footnotes 102, 104 (Beach, Kyrou and Hargrave JJA); Joint v Stephens [2008] VSCA 210; (2008) 26 ACLC 1467 at 1496-1497 [134] (Nettle, Ashley and Neave JJA); Saykan v Elhan [2006] VSCA 230 at [33] (Nettle JA); Aqua-Max Pty Ltd v MT Associates Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 473 at 482 [61] (Brooking, Charles and Chernov JJA); Soulos v Pagones [2023] NSWCA 243 at [174]-[176] (Ward P, with whom Meagher and Mitchelmore JJA agreed); Tzavaras v Tzavaras [2023] NSWCA 168 at [73]-[74] (Gleeson, Adamson JJA, and Griffiths AJA); Wambo Coal Pty Ltd v Sumiseki Materials Co Ltd (2014) 88 NSWLR 689 at 739-741 [225] (Barrett JA, with whom Bathurst CJ and Beazley P agreed).
139 Mr Peters submitted that "[i]n all the circumstances … the test which this Court ought apply in this proceeding is the test articulated by Brennan J in Wayde".
140 I am unable to accept that submission. Assuming that there is a difference between the reasoning of the plurality in Wayde and the observations of Brennan J, I am bound to follow the plurality, however many times the test articulated by Brennan J has been repeated by courts of intermediate appeal.
141 As Mr Rennick in substance deposed, the electioneering rules are aimed at ensuring the election process is a fair one which does not favour wealthy candidates able to fund a large-scale public campaign. The rules also serve to protect the club and candidates against ad hominem attacks that may deter good candidates from standing for election and cause damage to the club's brand and reputation. He also explained that the board had due regard to the competing imperative of ensuring candidates have a reasonable opportunity to communicate with members so that members can make an informed choice; that the election rules reflect the board's judgment as to what is an appropriate balance between those competing objectives; and that in making that judgment, the board has responsibly taken into account member feedback including that of Mr Lawrence. None of that evidence was challenged, and I accept it.
142 In my view, the directors of the club acted bona fide, without collateral motive. They had regard to relevant considerations, and they balanced the interests of the members of the club as a whole as against the interests of a particular member (here, Mr Lawrence). In my view, the reasons given by the board in respect of the electioneering rules are founded upon matters which permitted it reasonably to adopt the electioneering rules in their current form. That is to say, the decisions to amend or keep in place, as the case may be, the election rules which restrict electioneering, namely the rule against disparagement, the rule prohibiting general campaigning through media interviews and social media; and the requirement that a candidate turn off the comments function and direct questions and comments to the club's online election forum when referring to their candidacy and publishing their candidate statement on social media, were and are not "oppressive". That would be so, as the cases make clear, even if their consequence is "very prejudicial to that particular member" or (to use the plurality's expression in Wayde in the High Court) "was harsh indeed". Here, Mr Lawrence has not demonstrated that the impugned decisions of the board were such that no board acting reasonably could have made them.
143 Mr Lawrence, of course, has a different view about these questions. He says, for example, that candidates seeking election to the board should be free to give media interviews and use and have unrestricted access to websites and social media that can be viewed by the general public. And those views are not unreasonable. But, as the cases make clear, it is not the court's role in oppression cases to be an arbiter of competing views about such matters.
144 I should briefly mention another (albeit faintly pressed) submission made on behalf of Mr Lawrence. It was submitted that his original, now abandoned, complaints in relation to the filling of casual vacancies, notice of nominations and board endorsements and so on, are still relevant because they are said to form part of "the totality of the circumstances" of the alleged oppressive conduct, and should therefore be taken into account when determining whether the electioneering rules are oppressive. I do not agree. In the context of this case, such considerations may be relevant when it comes to considering questions about the costs of the proceeding, but they have no bearing in my view on the remaining allegations of oppression.
145 In closing submissions, Mr Peters also referred to (a) the fact that certain members of the board had attempted to dissuade Mr Lawrence from contesting elections; and (b) the decision of the board to no longer accept donations or player sponsorship from Mr Lawrence, which he described as the club's "punishment" of Mr Lawrence for his continuing to run in elections. It was submitted (again, faintly) that both these actions amounted to conduct that should be taken into account in determining whether the electioneering rules were oppressive as alleged.
146 I do not agree. First, the allegations about this conduct formed no part of the relief sought by Mr Lawrence in the proposed orders or, for that matter, the originating process or joint list of issues. Secondly, it is difficult to understand how such conduct could be relevant to the only remaining issue of whether the electioneering rules were oppressive and ought to be struck out.
147 I should also mention the disparagement rule. As I have explained, Mr Lawrence did not accept that the amendment made to the rule by the board on 6 June 2024 met his concerns, but I confess that I am unable to understand why. In any event, the new rule is not, strictly speaking, the subject of any controversy that I am required to decide.