Lawavou v R [2025] NSWCCA 35 | Case summary | Zoe

NSWNSWCCA

Lawavou v R

[2025] NSWCCA 35

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2025-03-14|Before: Garling J at [1], Cavanagh J at [2], Yehia J at [3].

View on NSW Caselaw

At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2025-03-14

Before

Garling J at [1], Cavanagh J at [2], Yehia J at [3].

Catchwords

CRIME – appeal against sentence – child sexual assaults –
whether additional evidence of sexual assaults against
the applicant should be
admitted – characterisation of the additional evidence as

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

CRIME – appeal against sentence – child sexual assaults –whether additional evidence of sexual assaults againstthe applicant should beadmitted – characterisation of the additional evidence as“fresh” or “new”evidence – evidence admitted– appeal allowed – applicant resentenced

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Medium Neutral Citation: Lawavou v R [2025] NSWCCA 35

Hearing dates: 9 October 2024

Date of orders: 14 March 2025

Decision date: 14 March 2025

Before: Garling J at [1];
Cavanagh J at [2];
Yehia J at [3].

Decision: (1) Grant leave to appeal.
(2) Uphold the appeal.
(3) Quash the sentence imposed on the applicant in the District Court on 14 February 2023 and, in lieu thereof, sentence the applicant to an aggregate sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment to commence on 25 December 2021 and expire on 24 December 2036. The aggregate non-parole period is 9 years and 6 months to commence on 25 December 2021 and expire on 24 June 2031. Mr Lawavou will first be eligible for release to parole on 24 June 2031.

Catchwords: CRIME – appeal against sentence – child sexual assaults – whether additional evidence of sexual assaults against the applicant should be admitted – characterisation of the additional evidence as “fresh” or “new” evidence – evidence admitted – appeal allowed – applicant resentenced

The applicant requires leave of the Court to rely on the additional ground. The Crown did not oppose leave being granted to rely on the additional ground. In light of the merit of Ground 2, leave should be granted.
The additional evidence relied upon by the applicant will be summarised more fully below. For present purposes, the applicant relied upon the fact that during his detention in a Fijian gaol, he was brutally raped by another inmate on multiple occasions. The sexual assaults upon him occurred before, but at a time proximate to, the offences for which he was sentenced. The applicant also seeks to rely on expert psychiatric evidence about the impact of those assaults upon him. It should be noted at this early stage that the Agreed Facts on Sentence, tendered in the sentence proceedings, included as an agreed fact, that at the beginning of 2020, the applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months for assaulting a Fijian police officer and that he served 10 months in prison and returned to Australia on 11 November 2020.
The appeal was heard in this Court on 9 October 2024. During the appeal, the Crown sought to challenge the agreed facts that the applicant had served a term of imprisonment in Fiji. This challenge led to a preliminary evidentiary question that must be resolved.
The applicant was cross-examined in this Court, the Crown suggesting that he was not detained in a Fijian gaol. That challenge was in part based on the applicant’s Fijian criminal history (Annexure ACB5 to the affidavit of the respondent’s instructing solicitor Aisling Cunningham, affirmed on 4 October 2024), which records only one offence; being an assault causing actual bodily harm with a penalty expressed as: “bound over in the sum of $500.00 for 6 months not to reoffend”.
The question of whether the applicant was detained in Fiji was inextricably linked to the additional evidence because the applicant maintained that he was sexually assaulted whilst incarcerated in prison in Lautoka.
Given that the records obtained by the respondent were incomplete, leave was granted to the respondent to file further evidence on the issue. As at 18 December 2024, the respondent had received and filed evidence pursuant to a request for Mutual Assistance to the effect that the applicant had not been in custody in Fiji (Annexure ACB1 to the affidavit of Aisling Cunningham, affirmed on 18 December 2024). Further affidavit evidence to this effect was filed and served by the respondent on 20 December 2024.
The applicant was also granted leave to file further material including submissions. On 9 January 2025, in reply to the evidence of the respondent, the applicant served on the respondent an affidavit of the applicant’s instructing solicitor, annexing a letter dated 8 January 2025 from the Fiji Correction Service to the effect that the applicant had been in custody in the Lautoka Corrections Centre between 14 February 2020 and 13 October 2020. The letter states that this period of custody was pursuant to a sentence of “12 months”, presumably referring to 12 months’ imprisonment.
On 9 January 2025, the respondent’s solicitor sought instructions via the Mutual Assistance procedure from the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department as to the source and accuracy of the above-mentioned letter.
On 23 January 2025, the respondent’s solicitor received a letter forwarded by the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, dated 22 January 2025, in which the Fiji Correction Department confirmed the contents of their letter dated 8 January 2025, advising that the previous information stating that the applicant had not been incarcerated in Fiji, “is incorrect and the reason for the mistake was due to the crash of our computer which had our data”.
As a result of this further information, the respondent no longer advances on this appeal, as a positive proposition, that the applicant was not in custody in Fiji. The respondent maintains the position, however, that even if this Court was satisfied that the applicant has established that he was sexually assaulted, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the additional evidence had the potential to have a real bearing on the sentence and its absence did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
The upshot of the procedural history is that this Court can accept that the applicant was in prison in Lautoka between February and October 2020. This was accepted by the Crown in the sentence proceedings as attested to by the agreed facts in those proceedings.
Having obtained what appears to have been an inaccurate Fijian criminal history, I accept that it was incumbent on the respondent to properly investigate the issue and obtain further evidence. It is, however, unfortunate that the process has taken so long.

On 23 or 24 November 2021, LH and the applicant were in their bedroom speaking about how GE had been talking to her biological father. LH was of the view that the applicant did not like GE speaking to her biological father, or her step-mother. In response to learning GE had spoken to her biological father, the applicant stormed out of the bedroom and began yelling at GE and said words to the effect of “Do you even want to live here?”. LH followed him out and stood between GE and the applicant. The applicant then struck LH in the face with the back of his hand.
The applicant went into the kitchen and began consuming beers. He drove away from the house, and then returned, demanding to know if there was any vodka in the house. He then yelled at GE, telling her to go to bed. The applicant went outside and sat in the car. He eventually returned to the house and began yelling at LH saying words to the effect of “Why did you let her speak to her father?”, in reference to GE. The applicant punched LH in her left arm, her left thigh, and struck her in the back of the head.
The applicant then entered GE’s room and woke her up. She was laying on her stomach, and he pulled her pants and underwear off and placed his penis on GE’s vagina. The applicant’s penis was erect, and he placed it at the entrance of GE’s vagina. GE began yelling out to LH. It is likely LH was having a shower at the time. In response to GE’s yelling, the applicant grabbed her throat and squeezed it with force, and said words to the effect of “I’ll strangle you to death”. GE could not breathe and reported having bruises on her throat for two weeks after the incident.
Upon hearing footsteps, the applicant got off GE and pulled his underwear up. LH had decided to check on GE and as she was walking towards GE’s bedroom, she observed the applicant leaving GE’s bedroom, pulling his underwear up and tucking his penis inside his underwear. Both GE and LH observed the applicant with his pants across his shoulder as he left GE’s bedroom.
LH yelled “What are you doing in [GE]’s room, what have you done?”. LH entered GE’s bedroom and observed GE cowered in the corner of the room with her underwear at her ankles, shaking. LH grabbed a knife and ran towards the bathroom the applicant was in. LH observed the applicant washing his penis and hands.
The applicant said words to the effect of “Tell you mum I’ve done this before, I’ve done this since Valentine”. LH gave GE the knife and told her to get her younger sister. LH yelled words to the effect of “Get out of this house and never come back.” In response the applicant backed LH, GE, and her younger sister into the bathroom and yelled words to the effect of “Give me the knife so I can slit your Mum’s throat”. The applicant then tried to find the car keys and was saying words to the effect of “Give me the fucking keys before I kill both of you”. LH gave the applicant the car keys and yelled words to the effect of “Get out and never come back”.
On 26 November 2021, LH called the applicant via Facebook messenger and recorded conversations with him, in which he can be heard to say the following:
“I touched [GE]”;
“I touched her inappropriately”;
In response to a question of “Did you tell them you did it many, many times?” the applicant responded “Yeah”;
“I was going to tell you this I was thinking of saying it”;
“This is not the first time this has happened”;
In response to a question of whether the applicant told his family that he had choked GE’s throat while he was telling her to “shut the fuck up”, he responded “Yeah”;
LH said that she saw the applicant with his penis on GE. The applicant responded that he was not going to penetrate her with his penis;
"I'm really sorry";
“I'm sorry for what l've done... I hurt [GE]. I hurt our family.”;
With reference to their family unit: "It was me all along that kept breaking it.";
In response to a question of “How are you going to go when you come back in the house with [GE], are you going to be tempted to touch her again?” the applicant responded “I won't”;
In response to a question of "Be honest, how many times did you touch [GE]?" the offender can be heard to say “4, 5, 6”.
On 20 December 2021, LH, GE, and her younger sister attended the Mid North Coast Child Abuse Office and GE participated in an electronically recorded interview with Detective Senior Constable Chinner.
The applicant was arrested on 25 December 2021 by Leading Senior Constable Chapman at the premises in Belmont. The applicant declined to participate in an ERISP.

The applicant deposed that in 2020 he became intoxicated and punched a police officer in Fiji. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced towards the “end of January 2020” to 10 months’ imprisonment which he served in prison in Lautoka. He was housed in one of four dormitories. Each dormitory had “10 double bunks on one side and the same number of single beds on the other side” in addition to people sleeping on the floor. The applicant estimated about 50 people, and sometimes more, were housed in one dormitory. The applicant slept on a lower bunk and would put fabric on the top bunk to give himself privacy and block the light out.
Not long after the applicant entered custody, one night, at about 1:00am, while he slept, four men took hold of him. One of the men held his neck, one held his feet and another was standing close by. The fourth person was a “big man” in the gaol. A “big man” is a person with “considerable power among the inmates”. He weighed around 130kg and was “6’ 8””. The “big man” told the applicant to “be quiet” and said “if [the applicant] said anything ‘things will be worse and bad things will happen to your family’”. At the time the applicant was being held by two of the other men. The applicant believed that the “big man” knew his family, as Lautoka is a small community.
The applicant felt his pants being removed and felt considerable pain as he was penetrated in the anus by one of the men. He was held down throughout the assault. As a result of the sexual assault, the applicant was bleeding and suffered bruising around his neck.
The applicant could not reliably estimate how long the assaults lasted but recalled that “it felt like a long time”. When the assault finished, the perpetrators threatened him by saying that if he reported the incident, his family would be killed.
Two nights after the first assault, the same thing happened again. It was “the same big man and his friends”. The sexual assaults became “a repeated event about 10 times” and “it was the same man each time”. The applicant recalled that the assaults occurred over about a month every couple of nights in the same way, and each time he bled from the anus.
The Crown cross-examined the applicant during the hearing of the appeal, suggesting that he did not serve a term of imprisonment in Fiji and questioning his account of being sexually assaulted. The applicant maintained his account that he had been imprisoned in Fiji and that whilst there he had been sexually assaulted on a number of occasions.
In challenging the applicant’s account that he was imprisoned in Fiji, and by extension, his account that he was sexually assaulted in prison, the respondent relied on information obtained in respect of the proceedings in Fiji. That information was both incomplete and inaccurate.
The summary of the procedural history (set out above) reveals that following the hearing of the appeal, further documentation was received by the parties establishing that the applicant was indeed incarcerated in Fiji in 2020, as he said he was. The applicant maintained that whilst incarcerated, he was sexually assaulted. Dr Furst has provided expert evidence outlining the impact upon the applicant of the sexual assaults.
In addition to the applicant’s evidence, he relied upon the Agreed Facts in two ways. First, that he had served 10 months in prison in Fiji before his return to Australia on 11 November 2020. Second, that both victims observed a change in his behaviour upon his return from Fiji.
I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months in Fiji for assaulting a police officer. He served approximately 10 months of that term in prison before returning to Australia on 11 November 2020. I also accept his account of having been sexually assaulted in the way set out in his affidavit, affirmed on 15 July 2024.

During the hearing of the appeal, some time was spent on the question of the characterisation of the additional evidence.
The applicant contended that the material contained in the applicant’s affidavit and the reports of Dr Furst, constitutes “fresh” evidence, and has the capacity to impact on the sentence in a material way. It was submitted that the evidence was highly relevant to an assessment of the applicant’s moral culpability, his prospects of rehabilitation, the weight to be afforded to general deterrence and the application of special circumstances.
In the event that this Court determines that the evidence is not “fresh” evidence, the applicant contends it is “new” evidence, and it may be admitted on the basis that its absence would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The applicant submitted that the failure to put the additional material before the sentencing judge resulted in a practical injustice to the applicant and as such, the applicant ought to be resentenced.
The applicant relied upon the affidavit of Mr Ross Hill affirmed 5 April 2024 to submit that the applicant was not “recasting a different case” before this Court. There simply was no subjective case put before the sentencing judge.
Mr Hill is the applicant’s solicitor in the present proceedings. Mr Hill stated that upon proceeding with the appeal it became apparent that the applicant was “highly sensitive” about the matter [the sexual assaults] and “reluctant” to discuss it. He ultimately provided instructions to proceed with the severity appeal. Over the course of further conversation, the applicant became “progressively more communicative” and indicated that “bad stuff” had happened to him whilst in custody in Fiji and that this had “altered many aspects of his thinking and behaviour on his return to Australia”. On that basis, a psychiatric report from Dr Furst was requested.
Mr Hill’s affidavit confirmed that no applications for psychological or psychiatric reports were made when the applicant’s matter was in the District Court. Inquiries of the applicant’s legal representatives in the sentence proceedings revealed that: “Mr Lawavou would not provide us with any information as to his subjective background. When questioned he would return to ruminating on the offences”.
The applicant did not contend that the applicant’s legal representatives at the sentence proceedings were incompetent. Rather, the absence of the additional evidence was the result of the applicant’s reluctance to disclose the sexual assaults because he was ashamed and because he did not appreciate the significance of that material to the sentence. In those circumstances, it was argued that the evidence could not be obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence of the applicant’s solicitors. The applicant relied on Hamill J’s remarks in Green v R [2022] NSWCCA 230 (Macfarlan JA and Harrison J agreeing) at [38]-[39] that the relevant question to be addressed is “not whether there was neglect or incompetence but whether, viewed objectively, the events that unfolded gave rise to a miscarriage of justice”.

In Barnes, the applicant appealed his sentence on the ground that the sentence proceedings miscarried because of the absence of the applicant’s Justice Health medical records before the sentencing judge. The applicant had refused to give consent to his legal representatives to access his health records.
The additional evidence was relied on as “fresh” because it was not discoverable with the exercise of due diligence. The respondent characterised the evidence as “new” because it was intentionally withheld by the applicant as a forensic choice, and/or was discoverable by subpoena by the applicant’s lawyers.
Hamill J (Gleeson JA and Ierace J agreeing) characterised the evidence as “fresh” and exercised the discretion favourably to the applicant to admit the evidence, having regard to his “unique psychological factors” which led to the applicant’s decision to refuse access to the health records prior to sentencing. The reference to “unique psychological factors” was a reference to Cornwell v R [2015] NSWCCA 269 at [59] (Hall J, Basten JA and Wilson J agreeing), in the context of the applicant’s schizophrenia.
Hamill J (Gleeson JA and Ierace J agreeing) considered that the circumstances which led to the refusal of access to the Justice Health records were “exceptional” and “[t]here was no deliberate or forensic decision” made not to review and use the records. There was nothing to suggest that the applicant appreciated the potential significance of the materials: at [44].
Hamill J’s characterisation of the type of evidence in Barnes as “fresh” is at odds with Simpson J’s characterisation of “fresh” and “new” evidence (particularly in the context of psychological conditions and reports) in Khoury, where the Court was considering proposed fresh evidence that concerned the level of the applicant’s intellectual functioning, and his mental and/or psychological condition. There was no such evidence before the sentencing judge. Counsel at first instance had great difficulty conferring with the applicant. Counsel suggested to the applicant that he may need medical help because he was incapable of mentally coming to grips with what had occurred. The applicant was offended and responded that he did not think he was “mental”. Counsel felt intimidated by the applicant’s response, which had the effect of deterring him from pursuing the question of “psychiatric assessment and intervention”: at [122]-[123].
Simpson J (Davies J and Grove AJ agreeing) found that “the applicant made a deliberate, though spontaneous, decision not to obtain the evidence”: at [134]. Simpson J held that “the evidence does not qualify as fresh”, noting that the evidence sought to be admitted was evidence of the applicant’s psychological and mental (intellectual) condition, and the condition was said to be in existence at the time of sentencing. Simpson J held that the evidence “plainly could have been obtained in the exercise of reasonable diligence”: at [137]. Despite not being “fresh” evidence, the Court nevertheless held that the evidence ought to be received.
A number of recent decisions of this Court have cited with implicit approval the principles with respect to “new” and “fresh” evidence set out by Hamill J in Barnes: Eden at [32]-[34] (Dhanji J, Gleeson JA and Fagan J agreeing); Stubbings v R [2023] NSWCCA 69 at [35] (Gleeson JA, Davies and Wilson JJ agreeing) and Nosti v R [2024] NSWCCA 158 at [28] (Dhanji J, Harrison CJ at CL and Rigg J agreeing).
Regardless of whether the additional evidence sought to be relied upon is categorised as “fresh” or “new” evidence, the appropriate test to be applied in considering whether the evidence ought to be admitted is whether the admission of the additional evidence would avoid a miscarriage of justice. In Betts at [10] the High Court observed:

In Shortland v R [2024] NSWCCA 174 the Court was concerned with the admission of additional evidence after sentence. Stern JA (Cavanagh and Sweeney JJ agreeing) stated that it was clear that sentence proceedings “may give rise” to a miscarriage of justice where material evidence was available and relevant to sentence, but the offender was deprived of the opportunity to have that material considered in mitigation. The Court concluded that had a psychological report of the nature of that which was tendered as additional evidence been before the sentencing court, there would have been a material prospect of the applicant receiving a lesser sentence: at [50].
The relevant enquiry to be made when determining whether to admit additional evidence (irrespective of whether it is “new” or “fresh” evidence) is a consideration of whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred in depriving the applicant of the opportunity to have material considered which could have a real bearing on the sentence. In considering that test, the Court is to consider whether the additional material had the capacity or potential to materially impact the sentence. It is not whether the Court can conclude with any certainty that the material would have made a material difference to the sentence.
The sentencing judge was not provided with any material relating to the applicant’s subjective case. As noted earlier, the sentencing judge made some brief findings about the applicant’s subjective case on the very limited material available to him. Other than the applicant’s age, his citizenship of Fiji and the fact that he had “a problem with alcohol” that had escalated over the year that the offences were committed, there were no other details about the applicant’s subjective case.
The absence of relevant subjective material impacted upon the sentencing judge’s capacity to assess moral culpability; to consider whether the applicant was a suitable vehicle for general deterrence; to properly assess the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation; and to inform the question of whether there should be a finding of special circumstances. Had the new evidence been before the sentencing court, there could have been a material prospect of the applicant receiving a lesser sentence.
The applicant’s legal representatives at the sentence hearing attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain from the applicant a history of his background and subjective case. Although the occurrence of the sexual assaults was obviously known to the applicant, it was not known to his legal representative at the time of the sentence proceedings. In circumstances where it may be accepted that the applicant did not disclose the sexual assaults because he was embarrassed and ashamed, the question as to whether the evidence was discoverable with the exercise of reasonable diligence requires a nuanced approach.
I am persuaded that the additional evidence falls into the category of “fresh” evidence. I am not of the view that the evidence was discoverable with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Even if the evidence is characterised as “new” evidence, it had the capacity to have a real bearing upon the exercise of his Honour’s sentencing discretion: R v Goodwin (1990) 51 A Crim R 328 at 330 (Hunt J, Grove J agreeing); Kaveh v R [2017] NSWCCA 52 at [33] (Latham J, Basten JA and Campbell J agreeing); Elali v R [2025] NSWCCA 9 at [134] (Price AJA, Ierace and McNaughton JJ agreeing).
I am satisfied that the absence of the additional evidence at the sentence proceedings resulted in a miscarriage of justice. I would therefore uphold Ground 2.

Having determined that Ground 2 should be upheld, it is not necessary to deal with Ground 1: C v R [2022] NSWCCA 285 at [67] per Mitchelmore JA (Bell CJ and Yehia J agreeing). I have, however, had regard to the submissions made in respect of Ground 1, on resentence.
Error having been established, it is necessary to resentence the applicant unless, in the separate and independent exercise of my discretion, I conclude that no different sentence should be passed: Kentwell v R (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37 at [35] per French CJ, Hayne, Bell and Keane JJ; Young (a pseudonym) v R [2021] NSWCCA 163 at [88]-[95] per Beech-Jones J (Basten JA agreeing).
In the absence of any challenge by the parties to the sentencing judge’s summary of the facts and his assessment of the objective seriousness of each offence, I adopt that summary and agree with his Honour’s assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences. The offending conduct was grave. The offences involved sexual touching and sexual assaults on a child, in circumstances where on occasion the applicant used threats and physical violence.
The child victim suffered greatly as a result of the offending. Not only must the offending be denounced, but the applicant must also be held to account for his appalling crimes which call for condign punishment.
In resentencing the applicant, I have had regard to the applicant’s subjective case which is before this Court by way of the fresh evidence. The additional material provides an overview of the applicant’s subjective case which was almost entirely absent in the sentence proceedings. The report of Dr Furst dated 26 January 2024, provides a summary of the applicant’s psychiatric, drug and alcohol history and documents the results of the mental state examination, which gave rise to the making of several diagnoses, including alcohol use disorder, paedophilic disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Dr Furst states that after returning to Australia in November 2020, the applicant suffered “symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder in the form of frequent nightmares, insomnia, increased anxiety and increased drinking. It was in this context that the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter commenced and then continued, often whilst he was intoxicated”. Dr Furst states that “[a]lthough not directly causal of his actions, his PTSD and increase[d] abuse of alcohol probably contributed to his poor decision-making and disregard of the consequences of his actions when he initiated inappropriate sexual contact with his stepdaughter and continued to abuse her thereafter.”
The difficulty that sometimes exists in identifying whether a mental health condition or an alcohol addiction is causative of offending, was acknowledged by N Adams J (Ierace and Sweeney JJ agreeing) in Aiga v R at [97]:

Although the applicant’s increased consumption of alcohol related, at least in part, to the trauma he experienced when he was sexually assaulted, his intoxication at the time of the offending is properly characterised as “self-induced”. The applicant drank alcohol from his early to mid-teens, often to excess. This was before the sexual assaults upon him occurred and prior to the onset of PTSD symptoms. I cannot find that the applicant’s alcoholism was the result of his PTSD.
By virtue of s 21A(5AA) of the CSPA, the applicant’s self-induced intoxication at the time of the offending could not therefore be taken into account as a mitigating factor.
The sexual assaults experienced by the applicant and the resulting condition of PTSD are matters relevant to the applicant’s subjective case which must be factored into the equation of the proportionate sentence. It is of some note that both victims observed a change in the applicant’s behaviour upon his return to Australia in November 2020. He was “argumentative, withdrawn and seemed angry”. Although not “directly causal” of his offending, his decision making and disregard for the consequences of his actions were at least in part due to his PTSD and it is therefore relevant to an assessment of his moral culpability and a reduction in the weight to be afforded general deterrence. However, the extent of any reduction must be assessed in the context of the gravity of the offending.
The primary importance of the new evidence relates to two related but discrete aspects of the sentencing exercise. First, in relation to an assessment of the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation. Second, as to whether there should be a finding of special circumstances.
Dr Furst provides recommendations regarding the applicant’s future treatment. The applicant would likely benefit from treatment with psychotropic medication and engagement in drug and alcohol counselling. Although an assessment of the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation must remain guarded, his disclosure of the sexual assaults committed against him, the diagnoses that have been made and the recommendations regarding future treatment, are matters that paint a more positive picture of the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation and unlikelihood of reoffending. They are also factors that give rise to a finding of special circumstances.
I am satisfied that there should be a variation of the statutory ratio to allow the applicant a longer period on parole to receive counselling and treatment for his mental health conditions.
Notwithstanding the new evidence, the objective seriousness of each offence warrants lengthy periods of imprisonment. Applying a 25% discount to reflect the utilitarian value of the plea, the indicative sentences are as follows:

Lawavou v R

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment

HEADNOTE

JUDGMENT

Procedural History and Grounds of Appeal

Circumstances of the Offending

Sequence 1

Sequence 2

Sequence 3

Sequence 5

Sequence 8

Sequence 10

Sequence 11

Sequences 13 and 18 (and sequence 12 on the Form 1 attaching to sequence 13)

Sequences 20, 21 and 22 (and sequence 17 on the Form 1 attaching to sequence 21)

Remarks on Sentence

Victim Impact Statement

Subjective considerations

Ground 2

A preliminary evidentiary question

The evidence in this Court

“Fresh” or “new” evidence

Applicant’s submissions

Crown Submissions

The additional material

Determination

Fresh or new evidence?

Resentence

Orders

Parties

Legislation Cited (12)

Cases Cited (7)

Cited By (1)