Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT), ss8, 390, 391, 425, 580, 585,

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 44

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Legislation Amendment Act 2008, Sch 1 Part 1.33

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Legislation Amendment Act (No2) Sch 1 Part 1.64

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Transitional Provisions) Regulation 2009 (ACT), s 30

Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (ACT), rules 39.1, 39.2

The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Veghelyi (unreported, Supreme Court of NSW Common Law Division, Smart J, 6 September 1989)

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

1. The respondent has breached rules 39.1 and 39.2 of the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (ACT).
2. The respondent is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct.
3. The Tribunal reserves its decision concerning any orders to be made pursuant to s 425 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT).

AND IT IS NOTED THAT the order of the tribunal made on 13 February 2009 directing that publication of the identity of the respondent and certain other material be prohibited continues until further order.

1. The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal heard two applications by the Law Society of the ACT (the Law Society) concerning the Legal Practitioner, the respondent, on 11 March 2009. In summary, the Tribunal decides that the respondent has breached rules 39.1 and 39.2 of the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (ACT) (Solicitors Rules) and that the breaches are such that he is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct.
2. The background to the two applications, the particulars of the breaches alleged and accepted by the Tribunal and the Tribunal's reasons for decision are set out below.

1. The respondent is an Australian legal practitioner who was admitted as a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court of the ACT on 16 July 1999.
2. The respondent did not hold an ACT Practising Certificate at the relevant times. He did however hold a Principal with Trust Practising Certificate issued by the Law Institute of Victoria from 1 February 2007 to 30 June 2007. Subsequently from 1 July 2007 the respondent held an unrestricted principal certificate issued by the Law Society of NSW. The respondent continues to hold such a practising certificate. The respondent was, and remains, in practise as a partner, with Mr W, in the law firm. The firm conducts its practise from an address in the Canberra City area and from an address in Queanbeyan, NSW.

1. On 2 July 2007 Mrs Eva Crljenica wrote to the Law Society alleging that the respondent had failed to lodge certain documents and failed to communicate with her in relation to the recovery of a judgment debt obtained in the Small Claims Court in the ACT. A copy of Mrs Crljenica's letter was sent to the respondent under cover of a letter from the Professional Standards Director of the Law Society dated 17 July 2007. The covering letter asked the respondent to respond to the matters raised by Mrs Crljenica by 26 July 2007.
2. The respondent clearly received this letter. He replied shortly after the required date. He referred to the letter of 17 July 2007. He asked for an extension of time to provide his response. The Professional Standards Director wrote to him on 9 August 2007 granting an extension of time to 23 August 2007. The respondent did not respond by the required date.
3. The Professional Standards Director wrote to the respondent on 30 August 2007 and again on 13 September 2007 drawing his attention to rules 41.1 and 41.2 (as they then were) of the Solicitors Rules. Both letters directed him to provide a response in accordance with the rules by a specified date. No responses were received.
4. We note that the reference to the "Solicitors Rules" in these and subsequent letters is accepted to be a reference to the rules of conduct for solicitors made by the Law Society Council pursuant to the power given to it to do so in the Legal Profession Act 2006. The Solicitors Rules are a notifiable instrument titled the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007.
5. All the letters sent by the Professional Standards Director were addressed to the respondent at the document exchange address for his law firm.

1. Mr & Mrs Perho made a complaint concerning the respondent through NSW solicitors to the NSW Legal Services Commissioner in July 2007. The Legal Services Commissioner referred the complaint to the Law Society. The complaint related to work undertaken by the respondent on the instructions of Mr & Mrs Perho connected to the sale of two properties located in the ACT.
2. The Professional Standards Director sent a copy of the complaint to the respondent under cover of a letter dated 6 August 2007. The covering letter asked the respondent to respond to the complaint by 21 August 2007. No response was received.
3. The Professional Standards Director wrote again to the respondent in letters dated 30 August 2007 and 13 September 2007. Both letters recited the provisions of the then rule 41.2 of the Solicitors Rules and directed the respondent to provide a response by a specified date. Again, both letters were addressed to the respondent at his law firm and sent to the document exchange box for that firm. No response was received from the respondent to either letter.
4. However, a letter dated 25 September 2007 was sent by Mr W. Mr W's letter referred to the complaints made by Mrs Crljenica and Mr & Mrs Perho. It indicated that the respondent had taken a considerable amount of leave in the past several weeks and had been unable to respond within the timeframes. Mr W assured the Law Society that the respondent would make a response promptly. He finished his letter with an indication that the respondent 'expects the proper responses will arrive in your office in the next day or so'.
5. No response was received from the respondent. Mr W wrote again on 2 October 2007 enclosing copies of a range of letters and documents relating to the matters raised by Mr & Mrs Perho in their complaint. The enclosures appeared to address the substance of the Perhos' complaint.

1. This application relates to a complaint similar to the two referred to above. Ms Zaat wrote to the Law Society on 4 July 2007 complaining about a number of the aspects of the conduct of a matter in respect of which she had given instructions to the law firm in June 2007.
2. The Professional Standards Director sent a copy of her complaint to the respondent by letter dated 18 July 2007. It requested a response by 1 August 2007. As with the earlier letters this letter was addressed to the respondent care of his law firm and sent to that firm's document exchange box in Canberra.
3. The respondent provided a detailed response in a letter dated 1 August 2007. The respondents' response was sent to the complainant. She was asked if she had any further comments. Ms Zaat replied by letter dated 16 August 2007. She challenged some of the information provided by the respondent. The Chair of the Law Society's Professional Conduct Committee wrote again to the respondent by letter dated 4 October 2007 asking for his further response by 18 October 2007. There was no response.
4. Further letters were sent to the respondent on the 23 October 2007 and on 8 November 2007. These letters referred to rule 39.2 of the Solicitors Rules and directed the respondent to provide a response to the Law Society by a specified date. No response was received.
5. In relation to all three complaints it should be stressed that the applicant does not allege that the actual matters complained of are substantiated or give rise to a concern about the respondents' professional conduct that would justify an application to this Tribunal. These applications relate solely to the respondents' failure to respond as directed by the Law Society to the various letters referred to above.

1. The legislative provisions that authorise the Tribunal to determine this application are found in the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT). The following sections are relevant to these applications:

(1) This chapter applies to an Australian legal practitioner in relation to conduct to which this chapter applies.

_(2) This chapter applies - _

1. whether or not the Australian legal practitioner is a local lawyer; and

2. whether or not the practitioner holds a local practising certificate; and

3. whether or not the practitioner holds an interstate practising certificate; and

4. whether or not the practitioner lives or has an office in the ACT; and

5. whether or not the person making a complaint about the conduct lives, works or has an office in the ACT.

391 Conduct to which ch 4 applies - generally

(1) Subject to subsection (3), this part applies to conduct happening in the ACT.

_(2) This part also applies to conduct happening outside the ACT, but only - _

1. _if it is part of a course of conduct that has happened partly in the ACT and partly in another jurisdiction, and either - _
   1. the corresponding authority of each other jurisdiction where the conduct has happened consents to its being dealt with under this Act; or
   2. the complainant and the person about whom the complaint is made consent to its being dealt with under this Act; or
2. _if it happens in Australia but completely outside the ACT and the person about whom the complaint is made is a local lawyer or a local legal practitioner, and either - _
   1. the corresponding authority of each jurisdiction where the conduct has happened consents to its being dealt with under this Act; or
   2. the complainant and the practitioner consent to its being dealt with under this Act; or
3. _if - _

   1. it happens completely or partly outside Australia; and

   2. the person about whom the complaint is made is a local lawyer or a local legal practitioner.

_(3) This part does not apply to conduct happening in the ACT if - _

1. the relevant council consents to its being dealt with under a corresponding law; or

2. the complainant and the person about whom the complaint is made consent to its being dealt with under a corresponding law.

(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if the conduct cannot be dealt with under the corresponding law.

(5) The relevant council may give consent for subsection (3) (a), and may do so conditionally or unconditionally.

(1) The law society council may make rules for or in relation to practice as a solicitor...

Note Rules must be notified, and presented to the Legislative Assembly, under the Legislation Act.

(1) Legal profession rules are binding on Australian legal practitioners and locally-registered foreign lawyers to whom they apply.

(2) Failure to comply with legal profession rules can be unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.

1. Provisions of the Solicitors Rules are also relevant. Rules 41.1 and 41.2 of the Solicitors Rules were renumbered following an amendment to the Rules on 21 June 2006 and after that date became rules 39.1 and 39.2. The wording of the rules is identical, namely:

39.1 Subject only to his or her duty to the client, a practitioner should be open and frank in his or her dealings with the Law Society.

39.2 A practitioner should respond within a reasonable time and in any event within 14 days (or such extended time as the Society may allow) to any requirement of the Society for comments or information in relation to the practitioner's conduct or professional behaviour and in doing so the practitioner should furnish in writing a full and accurate account of his or her conduct in relation to the matter.

1. Section 8 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) includes the following definition:-

Australian legal practitioner means an Australian lawyer who holds a local practising certificate or interstate practising certificate.

Other relevant legislative provisions are referred to in the body of these reasons.

1. Application LP 8 of 2007 was filed with the former Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal of the ACT (the replaced tribunal) on 1 November 2007. Application LP 2 of 2008 was filed with the replaced tribunal on 22 April 2008.
2. The Chairman of the replaced tribunal made directions in relation to the first application on the 17 December 2007. Neither party complied fully with the directions. Both applications were then listed for further direction before the Chairman on 8 May 2008.
3. The respondent appeared in person before the replaced tribunal that day. He filed a notice of motion with the leave of the Chairman. The notice of motion sought three orders namely:
   1. That matter LP 2 of 2008 be joined with [LP 8 of 2007].
   2. That the Council of the Law Society of the ACT is not a proper body to prosecute these proceedings.
   3. That Mr John Buxton is not a fit and proper person to prosecute this matter on behalf of the Council of the Law Society of the ACT.
4. The Tribunal was advised by Mr Buxton who appears for the applicant that the first order sought by the respondent was made by consent.
5. The Chairman directed that the respondent file and serve affidavits in support of his notice of motion in relation to orders 2) and 3) by 6 June 2008 and otherwise stood the applications over to a further call over on 12 June 2008.
6. Both applications came before the Chairman again on 12 June 2008. The respondent was represented by his partner, Mr W. The directions had not been complied with. The respondent was again directed to file and serve material on which he sought to rely in response to his notice of motion. This was to occur by 4 July 2008. The Chairman ordered that the applications be listed again for further directions on 7 August 2008.
7. The respondent did not comply with the directions and made no further contact with the replaced tribunal. There was no appearance by or for the respondent on 7 August 2008.
8. On 7 August the applicant was directed to file written submissions as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and as to compliance with s 391 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 so that the Respondent's notice of motion could be dealt with on the basis of the papers filed.
9. The replaced tribunal received submissions on behalf of the applicant on 27 August 2008.
10. On 18 November 2008 Chairman Harper ordered that the respondent's notice of motion of 8 May 2008 be dismissed and that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of that notice of motion. The order was accompanied by detailed reasons for decision in which the Chairman concluded that the replaced tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the applications, that the Council of the Law Society of the ACT was the proper body to bring the proceedings and that therefore Mr Buxton was a fit and proper person to prosecute the matter on behalf of the Law Society.
11. The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) (ACAT Act) commenced operation on 2 February 2009. Consequential amendments to the Legal Profession Act 2006 made by the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Legislation Amendment Act 2008 Schedule 1 Part 1.33 and the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Legislation Amendment Act (No2) Schedule 1 Part 1.64 commenced operation on the same date.
12. The combined effect of these amendments was to replace the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal of the ACT with the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT). Provision was made for the transition of applications lodged with the replaced tribunal to the ACAT in the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Transitional Provisions) Regulation 2009 (ACT) (the ACAT Regulation). The Regulation also commenced operation on 2 February 2009.
13. Section 30 of the Regulation provides:

Application to legal practitioners disciplinary tribunal - no hearing

_(1) This section applies if, before the commencement day - _

1. an application was made to the legal practitioners disciplinary tribunal under the Legal Profession Act 2006; and

2. the tribunal had not begun hearing the application.

(2) The application is taken on and after the commencement day to be an application to the ACAT under the Legal Profession Act 2006.

(3) An order made by the legal practitioners disciplinary tribunal in relation to the application is taken on and after the commencement day to be an order of the ACAT.

1. Section 30 applies to the two applications now before this Tribunal. They were applications that had been made to the replaced tribunal under the Legal Profession Act 2006. In both cases the replaced tribunal had not begun to hear the applications. The orders made by Chairman Harper on 18 November 2008 in relation to the applications is taken, by virtue of s30 (3), to be an order of this Tribunal.
2. This Tribunal sent listing notices to the applicant and the respondent on 21 January 2009 advising that the applications were listed for conference in order to review them and make arrangements for the future conduct of the application at 9.30am on 13 February 2009. The applicant requested that the applications be adjourned to 4pm that same day. The request was agreed to, provided that the applicant's representative notified the respondent of the change of time.
3. The applicant's representative subsequently provided the Tribunal with a copy of a letter addressed to the respondent dated 29 January 2009 that advised him that this Tribunal had, at the applicant's request, agreed to reschedule the conference for 4pm. The letter requested that the respondent indicate whether he agreed to the change.
4. The respondent did not respond to the letter and did not appear before the Tribunal at 4pm on 13 February 2009. The Tribunal ordered that the applications be listed for hearing on 11 March 2009. A listing notice was sent to the respondent addressed to both the Canberra and Queanbeyan offices of the law firm on 25 February 2009.
5. The respondent sent a facsimile to the Tribunal on 26 February 2009. It said that he had attended at 9.30am on 13 February 2009 but that the applications had not been listed. He said that he had made enquiries of people in the Court precinct concerning the conference of Tribunal staff either by telephone or at the Tribunal registry counter on the day. Such enquiries would have elicited the information he was seeking.
6. The respondent was reassured by letter dated 3 March 2009 that his absence at the conference had not prejudiced him. The listing of the two applications for hearing on 11 March 2009 at 10am was confirmed.

1. The respondent appeared in person on 11 March 2009. He indicated that he had not, and the Tribunal accepted, received the letter of 29 January 2009 from the applicant's legal representative advising him of the changed time of the Tribunal's conference. That letter appears to have been addressed to him at a former residential address. The respondent agreed, however, that he had received both the original notice of listing of the conference and of the hearing itself.
2. At the commencement of the hearing, the respondent made two applications. In essence, his first application was that the Tribunal should be reconstituted because the existing members were either actually biased in respect of him or alternatively, an observer might reasonably apprehend that the members of the Tribunal were biased.
3. The respondent objected to the General President presiding over the Tribunal on the basis that he believed she may have been a member of the Council of the Law Society of the ACT when the matters were 'brought for prosecution'. Further, he objected to Mr Watch and Mr Van Arkel sitting as members of the Tribunal because both had been involved in a previous matter concerning him and had made a finding of fact that the respondent said was based on no evidence whatsoever. The respondent indicated that he was concerned that Mr Watch and Mr Van Arkel made the finding because 'somebody from the Law Society, passed information, under the table, to that Tribunal'.
4. The generally accepted test for apprehended bias is set out in the decision of the High Court of Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 344-45. The test is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker would not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the issues.
5. The respondent's application was rejected on the basis that:
   1. The General President was a member of the Council of the Law Society for approximately 4 years from about September 2003 to August 2007. Her membership of the Council had ceased when that body was asked to consider what action should be taken in respect of the matters set out above. She had no actual knowledge of the complaints with which these applications are concerned until her appointment to this Tribunal in November 2008. There is no actual bias. Nor is it possible that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the General President's previous membership on the Council of the applicant association would prevent her from bringing an impartial mind to the determination of the question of whether the respondent breached the professional rules of conduct that apply to him;
   2. The respondent conceded that he was unable to establish that Mr Watch and Mr Van Arkel had received any information concerning him 'under the table' or in any other improper way. Put at its highest, his complaint was that Mr Watch and Mr Van Arkel had been participants in a decision made by the replaced tribunal in another matter. The respondent contended that their decision contained an error of fact and consequently, a fair-minded person could apprehend that they would not bring an impartial or unprejudiced mind to the determination of this matter. Allegations that decision makers make errors of fact are not uncommon. Participants to hearings have rights of appeal that can be exercised to correct such errors. The making of an error does not mean that the decision maker is actually biased or that a fair-minded person could apprehend bias. The respondent told this tribunal that he had indeed appealed against the decision of the replaced tribunal in the earlier matter and that his appeal was successful. The fact that decision makers sitting on a body hearing a matter have made and have been found to make errors of fact does not disqualify those decision makers from participation in a decision making body dealing with other matters concerning the same parties at a later date.
6. The respondent's second application was a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In summary, the respondent said that he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the notice of motion made to the replaced tribunal on 8 May 2008. He requested that this Tribunal give him that opportunity before proceeding further. The respondent said that he had not been sent any document from the replaced tribunal notifying him of when or how his notice of motion would be dealt with. He agreed that he had not contacted the Tribunal in relation to his non-compliance with the Chairman's directions or made any enquiry about the progress of the Tribunal's consideration of his notice of motion himself.
7. He said that he received a telephone call from a person from the replaced tribunal 'in December some time'. He was told that Chairman Harper had made a decision in relation to his notice of motion. He received a copy of the decision. He said that he was surprised to receive the decision and was unhappy about it. He agreed that he made no attempt to have the matter re-listed by the replaced tribunal, nor did he lodge an appeal. The respondent said that he intended to wait until the applications were dealt with by this Tribunal before making any application in relation to the notice of motion or the Chairman's decision.
8. This Tribunal rejected the respondent's second application. Section 30 of the ACAT Regulation makes it clear that the order made by Chairman Harper on 18 November 2008 is taken to be an order of this Tribunal. It is not open to this Tribunal to revive or revisit that earlier order. It is too late to do so. The respondent's remedy given his unhappiness on learning of the decision of Chairman Harper was to use the then relevant process to appeal from that decision.
9. The Tribunal told the parties that, on the basis of the decision made by Chairman Harper on 18 November 2009 it was satisfied that it had jurisdiction to proceed with these applications and it intended to do so.
10. At this point, the respondent left the hearing despite the President of the Tribunal telling him that his presence was required. He said that the Tribunal was wasting his time. On being told that he would have an opportunity to answer the applicant's case through oral evidence, he said that he doubted the Tribunal would give him a proper and fair opportunity and left the hearing room.
11. The Tribunal considered whether it should proceed with the hearing in the absence of the respondent by referring to the criteria in s 44 of the ACAT Act. The Tribunal was satisfied that adjourning the applications or setting them down for hearing at another time would not necessarily secure the respondent' participation in the hearing in light of his response. The Tribunal decided pursuant to s 44(2)(d) to proceed with the hearing in his absence. Consequently, the respondent provided no evidence in relation to the allegations that he failed to respond to the Society's correspondence.

1. The Tribunal gave leave to the applicant to make minor technical amendments to the two applications. The word 'requested' in paragraph 10 of application LP 8 of 2007 was replaced with the word 'directed'. The reference to s 430 in paragraph 26(b) of the application was amended by substitution of a reference to s 425 to reflect the renumbering of the sections following the amendment of the Legal Profession Act 2006. The provisions of the former s 430 are identical to those of the current s 425. An identical amendment was made by leave to paragraph 18(ii) of application LP 2 of 2008.
2. The Tribunal heard submissions from the applicant's representative and accepted into evidence copies of the various letters referred to earlier in these reasons as well as an affidavit sworn by Robert Reis, Professional Standards Director of the Law Society, on 11 March 2009. In his affidavit Mr Reis deposed to forwarding the letters referred to above to the respondent. Copies of the letters were annexed to the affidavit.
3. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds as follows:

1. Accepting the findings made by Chairman Harper in his reasons for decision dated 18 November 2008, the respondent was, at all relevant times, an Australian lawyer holding an interstate practicing certificate and accordingly, and Australian legal practitioner. Further, the conduct complained of in these applications was conduct happening in the ACT for the purposes of s 391 of the Legal Profession Act 2006. The Law Society is empowered to investigate complaints made in respect of the respondent. 2. The respondent was required by rules 39.1 and 39.2 of the Solicitors Rules to respond to letters forwarded to him by the Law Society

• (i) in relation to the complaint made by Ms Crljenica on 30 August 2007 and 13 September 2007, and;
  • (ii) in relation to the complaint made by Mr & Mrs Perho on 30 August 2007 and 13 September 2007, and;
  • (iii) in relation to the complaint by Ms Zaat dated 23 October 2007 and 8 November 2007.

The Tribunal notes that these letters specifically drew the respondent's attention to the provisions of rules 39.1 and 39.2 (or rule 41.1 and 41.2 for the earlier letters) and directed him to respond by a specified date.

1. The respondent received and was aware of the letters and of the requirement that he respond. The letters sent to the applicant by Mr W concerning the complaints of Ms Crljenica and Mr & Mrs Perho on 25 September 2007 makes that clear as does the respondent's own response to the initial letters concerning the complaint by Ms Crljenica and the complaint by Ms Zaat. All letters were addressed to the respondent at the same address. That address is the same as the current address for the law firm and it continues to be shown as the address of that firm on the firm's letterhead. There is no basis for deciding that some letters were received and others were not.
2. The respondent did not respond to the letters and in doing so failed to comply with rules 39.1 and 39.2 of the Solicitors Rules.
3. Section 585(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2006 provides that failure to comply with the Solicitors Rules can constitute either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. The applicant submitted that in this case the respondent's breach of rules 39.1 and 39.2 amounted to unsatisfactory professional conduct rather than the more serious charge of professional misconduct.
4. Mr Buxton for the applicant submitted, and the Tribunal accepts, that the obligation to respond to the Law Society when directed is an important part of the regulatory framework in which the legal profession operates. Smart J in The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Veghelyi (unreported, Supreme Court of NSW Common Law Division, 6 September 1989) stated at [16]:

It is important that solicitors respond promptly to the Society when it asks for a reply in response to complaints which have been made. It will be an unusual and complex case when a delay of more than 14 days is acceptable and often the reply should be delivered within a shorter period such as 7-10 days. Replies to the Law Society in respect of complaints warrant a high priority. Such replies should be full and complete and deal directly with the complaints made.

1. There is a public interest in ensuring the integrity of the disciplinary process of professionals. The integrity of the process can only be maintained if practitioners respond when required to do so, so that the regulatory body may properly and thoroughly consider complaints it receives. If that were not the case, regulatory powers would not be fully effective. That is so whether or not in a particular case the complainant was adversely effected by the matters complained of or sustained some loss or damage. Section 585 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 is clear that a breach of rules can constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct per se. There is no further requirement that the substance of any complaint be made out.
2. In this case although there is no evidence that any of the complainants suffered loss or damage or that there was sufficient substance to any of the complaints to warrant any disciplinary action on part of the Law Society in respect of the respondent, the respondent's continuing failure to cooperate with the Law Society and provide responses when directed is by itself sufficient to constitute a breach of rules 39.1 and 39.2. The fact that some response was made to one complaint and that the complaints themselves were not substantiated leads the Tribunal to conclude that the breaches constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct rather than professional misconduct.
3. The Tribunal will hear submissions from the parties concerning any orders that they say should be made by the Tribunal pursuant to s 425 of the Legal Profession Act 2006.

I certify that the preceding sixty (60) numbered paragraphs

are a true copy of the Reasons for Decision herein of the

DATE/S OF DECISION: 1, 3 APRIL 2009 PLACE: CANBERRA

FULL REPORT ( ) CASE NOTE ( ) UNREPORTED DECISION ( )