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[2003] TASSC 71
procedural. The Society was ordered to pay each respondent’s costs, to be taxed; Betts’s costs were to be taxed on a solicitor-and-client basis, the Richardsons’ on a party-and-party basis, with a certificate...
The Society’s applications to strike the three respondents off the roll had failed, and the Court treated them as adversarial proceedings for costs purposes. It ordered the Society to pay costs for all three respondents. Betts received the higher solicitor and client costs basis because the Court considered there was no evidence supporting the allegation against her and that the case should not have been brought. The Richardsons received ordinary party and party costs because the Court considered the Society had some reason to believe its cases against them might succeed. The judgment explains that solicitor and client costs are unusual, but are not limited to cases involving an improper motive or misconduct by the party who brought the proceedings.
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2,643 words · generated 01/10/2026
This is a costs judgment following three unsuccessful applications by the Law Society of Tasmania to remove Scott Jason Richardson, Anita Betts, and Gregory Arnold Richardson from the roll of legal practitioners. The applications had been filed on 14 March 2002. After a hearing lasting four days, Crawford J dismissed them in reasons delivered on 18 March 2003 ([1]). The judgment analysed here, delivered on 19 August 2003, concerns the respondents’ subsequent applications for costs.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Each respondent sought an order that the Society pay their costs, taxed as between solicitor and client. The Society opposed those applications ([2]). The result was differentiated: the Society had to pay the costs of all three respondents, but only Betts received costs on a solicitor and client basis. Scott and Gregory Richardson received costs on the party and party basis ([14], [21]).
The Society argued that the ordinary costs rule should not apply because its role was not adversarial in the ordinary sense. Its position was that it had brought circumstances concerning practitioners’ fitness to the Court’s attention, assisting the Court in considering whether disciplinary orders were warranted ([3]). Crawford J rejected that characterisation. The applications expressly sought removal from the roll, the Society submitted that the respondents were unfit to practise, and its counsel confirmed that striking off was being sought. Although the Society’s position softened somewhat at the end of the hearing, it maintained that the conduct was capable of attracting that outcome ([4]). In the judge’s view, the respondents had reason to understand that their continued membership of the profession was at stake, and the proceedings bore the hallmarks of adversarial litigation ([5]).
The underlying factual distinctions mattered to the costs basis. The Society’s case against Scott Richardson depended on an academic misconduct determination that had been set aside by the University’s Discipline Appeals Committee because of breaches of natural justice. The committee had failed to give him an opportunity to respond to statements and comments from three major witnesses. No fresh university hearing followed ([6]). The judge considered the determination difficult to understand and the Society’s case weak, including because the Society appeared not to intend to call evidence contradicting Scott Richardson’s account of how the assignment had been prepared ([7]).
The case against Betts was materially different in another way. The Society alleged that she had knowingly, recklessly, or with wilful blindness failed to disclose the finding when appearing as junior counsel at her son’s admission. But it had no evidence available to it supporting those asserted states of mind. It called no evidence contradicting Betts’s explanation, and its counsel did not challenge that explanation in cross-examination ([15]–[16]). The judge considered the case against her baseless and concluded that the Society should have decided not to commence proceedings against her ([17]).
The starting point was the usual rule that a successful party is entitled to costs against the unsuccessful party ([3]). The Court did not treat these applications as a special category in which the Society’s public or professional role automatically displaced that rule. The judge focused on what the Society had actually sought and how it had pursued the proceedings. It had asked for the practitioners to be removed from the roll, and striking off remained a position it actively advanced ([4]–[5]). That substantive character, rather than the Society’s description of its general function, informed the costs decision.
The next question was whether the costs should be taxed on the more generous solicitor and client basis. Crawford J stated that such orders are rare and require a “special or unusual feature” ([11]). The reasons review authorities addressing what may qualify. In discussing Fountain Selected Meats, the judge noted a view that indemnity costs may be appropriate where a properly advised applicant should have known there was no chance of success. But he also noted the qualification that an ulterior motive or wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law might be presumed in such circumstances, and expressly declined to make such a presumption in this case ([12]).
The judgment also records that an order need not depend on a finding of ethical or moral delinquency, or on proof of a collateral purpose or fraud. The authorities discussed at [13] supported the proposition that the discretion may be enlivened where a party persists in a case that should, on proper consideration, have been recognised as hopeless. Crawford J described the discretion as unfettered, while acknowledging guidance from the authorities ([14]). The decision therefore did not establish a rigid checklist. It applied the discretion to the particular evidentiary and procedural circumstances of each case.
For Betts, the decisive circumstance was the lack of evidence for the allegation that her omission was deliberate, reckless, or wilfully blind. Her account was that she had accepted a last-minute invitation to appear as junior counsel, had not seen the admission papers, and had not considered the disclosure issue. The Society had received that explanation during its investigation. It did not contradict it with evidence or challenge it in cross-examination ([15]–[16]). On the assumption that no other evidence was available to the Society, Crawford J concluded that the case was “doomed to fail from the outset” and that the only decision reasonably open to the Society after completing its investigation was not to proceed ([17]). That finding made her case the special one warranting solicitor and client costs ([14]).
Scott and Gregory Richardson were treated differently. Scott knew of the misconduct finding and the committee’s stated expectation that it be disclosed in his admission process. Gregory also knew of that expectation, advised Scott that disclosure was unnecessary, and swore an affidavit supporting Scott’s good fame and character and fitness for admission without mentioning the finding ([18]–[19]). Crawford J recorded that the Society had no ulterior motive, had taken senior counsel’s advice, and believed it had a duty to the profession and public. More importantly for the distinction in costs basis, he considered that the Society had some reason to believe the cases against the Richardsons might succeed ([20]). That was insufficient to justify solicitor and client costs, but not to defeat their ordinary costs entitlement as successful respondents.
The judgment is a costs decision, not a comprehensive account of professional discipline or the law of admission. Its legal contribution within the text is its treatment of the ordinary costs rule and the discretion to order solicitor and client costs.
Before the decision, the judgment describes the ordinary position as one in which the successful party is entitled to costs against the unsuccessful party ([3]). The Society argued that this should not apply because it was assisting the Court in a disciplinary process rather than litigating in an ordinary adversarial way. Crawford J did not accept that submission on these facts. The Society’s applications sought a concrete adverse order, and its advocacy pursued that order. As a result, the proceedings were treated as adversarial for costs purposes ([4]–[5]).
For the higher costs basis, the judgment describes solicitor and client costs as rare and requiring a special or unusual feature ([11]). It refers to Fountain Selected Meats, Colgate Palmolive, connect.com.au, Crockett, and Electrona Carbide Industries as relevant authorities ([11]). It also discusses the propositions in Council of the Municipality of Botany and J-Corp that moral or ethical delinquency, collateral purpose, or fraud are not indispensable conditions ([13]). The judgment does not purport to replace those authorities with a comprehensive test. It says the discretion is unfettered and that the authorities provide guidance ([14]).
The application of that guidance shows that the absence of an improper motive did not end the inquiry. The Court made no finding that the Society had brought proceedings for an ulterior purpose. It nevertheless awarded Betts solicitor and client costs because the case against her lacked evidentiary support and should not have been brought ([12], [17], [20]). Conversely, the Court did not order solicitor and client costs for the Richardsons merely because the Society’s applications had failed. It considered that the Society had some reason for believing those cases might succeed ([20]).
The “after” position established by this judgment should therefore be stated narrowly. It confirms, in this case, that an unsuccessful professional body could be ordered to pay costs where it had pursued proceedings seeking removal from the profession, and that the costs basis could differ among respondents according to the merits and evidence relating to each one. The supplied judgment does not establish a broader rule that all unsuccessful disciplinary applications are adversarial or that every weak case attracts solicitor and client costs.
At [5], Crawford J said: “Throughout their course, the proceedings bore all the hallmarks of adversarial litigation.” In plain English, the Court looked beyond the Society’s description of its role and considered its actual case. Because it sought to remove the respondents from the roll, the litigation was not merely a neutral request for assistance.
At [11], the judgment states: “There must be some special or unusual feature in a case to justify the exercise of the discretion to order costs on a solicitor and client basis.” This marks solicitor and client costs as exceptional compared with the ordinary party and party basis. It does not itself specify an exhaustive list of qualifying features.
At [12], Crawford J considered the proposition that indemnity costs may be appropriate where an applicant, properly advised, should have known there was no chance of success. He also recorded the associated qualification concerning an ulterior motive or wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law, but said he would not make that presumption in this case. The passage is important because the Court did not treat the proposition as an automatic rule.
At [13], the judgment records that an order of this character need not be restricted to cases involving an ethically or morally delinquent party, or require proof of collateral purpose or fraud. In plain English, the absence of bad faith is relevant context but does not necessarily prevent a higher costs order if other circumstances justify it.
At [17], Crawford J concluded that, once the Society had completed its investigations, “the only decision reasonably open to it was to decide not to take proceedings against Mrs Betts.” This is a strong, fact-specific assessment based on the lack of evidence supporting the alleged state of mind and the unchallenged account before the Court.
At [20], the Court explained the different treatment of the Richardsons: the Society “had some reason for believing that its cases against Scott Richardson and Gregory Richardson might succeed.” That distinction explains why they received ordinary costs rather than solicitor and client costs, despite succeeding in resisting the original applications.
The judgment is most directly relevant to costs arguments following unsuccessful proceedings brought by a professional body where the body’s stated role is said to be regulatory, protective, or supportive of the Court. The Court’s approach was to examine the relief actually sought and the way it was pursued. Where proceedings seek a serious adverse order against an individual and the applicant actively advances that relief, this judgment illustrates that the case may be treated as adversarial for costs purposes ([3]–[5]).
It is also relevant where a party seeks solicitor and client costs after the opposing party’s case failed. The decision suggests that the inquiry is not confined to proof of an improper motive. A particularly weak case, assessed against what the applicant knew or should have appreciated, may be relevant to whether there is a special feature justifying the higher costs basis ([11]–[14]). The judgment does not say that any unsuccessful or weak claim necessarily meets that threshold.
The contrast between Betts and the Richardsons is especially useful for fact comparison. Betts’s case involved an allegation about her state of mind without supporting evidence, together with an explanation known to the Society and left uncontradicted at trial ([15]–[17]). The Richardson cases involved knowledge of the academic misconduct finding and the committee’s disclosure expectation, followed by decisions not to disclose it. The Court regarded those circumstances as giving the Society some reason to believe its cases against them might succeed ([18]–[20]).
The judgment also highlights the importance of the evidentiary record available when proceedings are commenced. The Society’s case against Betts was assessed by reference to what it knew from its investigation and what evidence it did, and did not, present in Court ([15]–[17]). A lawyer assessing a later matter by analogy would likely want to distinguish the evidence supporting the allegations, the applicant’s knowledge at the time of filing, the relief actually sought, and whether the applicant persisted after weaknesses became apparent. Those are points for comparison, not a separate checklist declared by the Court.
The supplied judgment does not identify any later decisions applying, distinguishing, following, or criticising Law Society of Tasmania v Richardson (No 2). It therefore does not support a reliable account of how later courts have treated this costs decision.
The authorities it discusses are earlier authorities, not later treatment. At [11]–[13], Crawford J refers to decisions concerning indemnity or solicitor and client costs, including Fountain Selected Meats, Colgate Palmolive, connect.com.au, Crockett, Electrona Carbide Industries, Council of the Municipality of Botany, and J-Corp. The judgment uses those authorities as guidance when describing the costs discretion. It does not state that any later court has adopted its distinction between Betts and the Richardsons.
The underlying disciplinary decision, Law Society of Tasmania v Richardson [2003] TASSC 9, is mentioned at [1] as the earlier decision dismissing the applications. It is not a later authority on costs within this judgment. Any account of subsequent citation history would require sources beyond the supplied text.
The judgment leaves several matters unresolved within its own text. First, it does not formulate an exhaustive test for what counts as a “special or unusual feature” justifying solicitor and client costs. It expressly describes the discretion as unfettered and treats the cited cases as guidance ([11], [14]). The decision is therefore strongest as an illustration of applying the discretion to particular facts, not as a closed formula.
Second, the judgment does not specify precisely how weak a case must be before solicitor and client costs are justified. It refers to the possibility of a case that should have been recognised as hopeless on proper consideration ([13]), but the distinction between a weak case and a hopeless one is not comprehensively defined. The assessment against Betts depended on the absence of evidence supporting the alleged state of mind and the Society’s failure to contradict her explanation ([15]–[17]).
Third, the judgment does not establish how much weight should generally be given to an applicant’s reliance on counsel’s advice. Crawford J noted that the Society took advice from senior counsel and acted on it, but still ordered costs against it ([10]). The advice did not remove the distinction between the baseless case against Betts and the cases against the Richardsons, for which the Society had some reason to believe it might succeed ([17], [20]).
Fourth, the judgment does not determine the broader costs treatment of all disciplinary proceedings brought by a professional body. Its conclusion that these proceedings bore the hallmarks of adversarial litigation followed from the Society’s particular applications and advocacy ([4]–[5]). It leaves open how costs might be treated in proceedings with a different form, purpose, or degree of active contest.
Finally, the text does not provide later judicial consideration of its reasoning. Its subsequent significance cannot be assessed from this judgment alone.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
CITATION: Law Society of Tasmania v Richardson (No 2) [2003] TASSC 71
Procedure - Costs - Departing from the general rule - Order for costs on indemnity basis - Whether costs should be ordered on solicitor and client basis - Unsuccessful application by Law Society to remove practitioner from roll - Whether a special case.
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd [1988] FCA 202; (1988) 81 ALR 397; Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 536; (1993) 118 ALR 248; connect.com.au Pty Ltd v GoConnect Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1148; (2000) 178 ALR 348; Crockett v Roberts [2001] TASSC 106; Electrona Carbide Industries Pty Ltd v Baillieu Bowring (Tas) Pty Ltd B9/1987, applied.
Respondents: Scott Jason Richardson: K B Procter SC
Respondents: Scott Jason Richardson: Murdoch Clarke
Judgment ID Number: [2003] TASSC 71
THE LAW SOCIETY OF TASMANIA v SCOTT JASON RICHARDSON
THE LAW SOCIETY OF TASMANIA v GREGORY ARNOLD RICHARDSON
1 On 14 March 2002, the Society filed originating applications seeking orders that the names of the respondents be removed from the roll of legal practitioners of the Court. Following a hearing that extended over four days, I published reasons for judgment on 18 March 2003 and made orders that each of the applications was dismissed. See Law Society of Tasmania v Richardson [2003] TASSC 9.
2 In each of the proceedings, the respective respondent applied for an order that the Society pay his or her costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed as between solicitor and client. The Society opposed each of the applications for costs.
3 The usual rule is that the successful party to litigation is entitled to an order for costs against the unsuccessful party. The Society argued that the rule should not apply in this case because the nature of the respective proceedings was not adversarial in the ordinary sense. It was submitted that by bringing the applications, the Society was fulfilling an obligation to bring to the attention of the Court circumstances bearing on the fitness to practise of three members of the profession and that the proceedings had as their purpose the provision of assistance to the Court to ascertain the facts and if necessary, to exercise its discretion to make disciplinary orders. However, I am not persuaded that the role of the Society in the proceedings deserves to be categorised merely in that way.
4 Not only do the originating applications seek to remove the respondents' names from the roll, but in a written outline of submissions handed to me by counsel for the Society at the outset of the hearing of them, it was submitted that the conduct of all of the respondents demonstrated that they were not fit and proper persons to be held out by the Court as legal practitioners and more explicitly, it was stated that "the applicant seeks an order removing the respondent's name from the role [sic] of practitioners". In the course of senior counsel's opening address, I enquired whether she was instructed to seek such an order and she said that she was. At the end of the first day's hearing, senior counsel returned to the subject and confirmed that she was instructed to seek striking off. At the very end of her closing address, the position of the Society appeared to have modified a little, for she emphasised that it was a matter for me to decide whether a less severe order might be more appropriate, such as suspension from practice. Nevertheless, she maintained the line, obviously with respect to each respondent, that the conduct was such as to be "capable of attracting" a striking off order.
5 The respondents therefore had every reason to consider that the Society was seeking to terminate their membership of the legal profession. It was not a case, as the Society's counsel has maintained, of the Society seeking simply to bring to the Court's attention possible breaches of rules of conduct applying to those who wished to continue to practise law. The Society actively pursued what each application stated was sought. Throughout their course, the proceedings bore all the hallmarks of adversarial litigation.
6 By the time the Society filed the originating applications, the determination of academic misconduct that had been made against Scott Richardson by the University's academic misconduct committee, had been set aside by the University's Discipline Appeals Committee, because of breaches of the rules of natural justice by failing to give Scott Richardson an opportunity to respond to statements and comments received by the academic misconduct committee from three major witnesses. Thereafter no attempt was made within the University to have an academic misconduct committee conduct a fresh hearing of the allegation of academic misconduct. Knowing of those matters, the Society nevertheless actively sought to have the names of the three practitioners removed from the roll for failing to disclose a determination that it knew had been reached by a process that was apparently unfair.
7 The prospects of success ought to have appeared slim to the Society and its advisors. An obvious weakness in its case against the practitioners was that the determination of the academic misconduct committee was difficult to understand. In my reasons for judgment, I pointed out that the committee did not state its findings of fact, did not explain the basis upon which Scott Richardson's conduct had amounted to academic misconduct, did not explain what it had meant when it found that he was "in error", did not identify what the expectations of the School of Law were when it held that he "did not meet the expectations of the School of Law" and did not explain why those expectations were material. I also pointed out that the committee had made a finding that was significantly in his favour, by acknowledging that he believed that what he had done was acceptable to the School. In my view, the Society and its advisors ought to have realised that the Court might well have experienced considerable difficulty determining what the undisclosed academic misconduct was in fact. Further, it should have been apparent that Scott Richardson's version of how the assignment had come to be prepared by him was likely to be accepted by the Court, for the Society had no intention, so it would appear, of calling evidence that contradicted what he maintained, that much of student X's assignment must have been copied from his draft assignment, that he had not entered into an arrangement for that to occur and that he had no reason to expect that it would.
8 At a directions hearing on 9 April 2002, I made it clear to the Society that I was very much troubled about what the findings of the academic misconduct committee had been and in particular, what Scott Richardson's misconduct had in fact been found to have been. I concluded the directions hearing by suggesting that the Society give serious consideration to that.
9 In my opinion, from the outset the Society's case against each of the respondents had little merit. The proceedings should not have been instituted. The decision to institute them amounted to an error of judgment on the part of the Society and its advisors.
10 I am conscious that the Society took advice from senior counsel and acted upon it by commencing the proceedings. Nevertheless, the making of an order for costs in favour of the respondents is the only appropriate order. In my view, it would be unjust and unfair not to make orders in their favour.
11 I next deal with the question whether the costs should be payable between solicitor and client. It is rare for an order to that effect to be made. There must be some special or unusual feature in a case to justify the exercise of the discretion to order costs on a solicitor and client basis. Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd [1988] FCA 202; (1988) 81 ALR 397 at 400, 401; Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 536; (1993) 118 ALR 248 at 254-257; connect.com.au Pty Ltd v GoConnect Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1148; (2000) 178 ALR 348 at 360, 361; Crockett v Roberts [2001] TASSC 106. In Electrona Carbide Industries Pty Ltd v Baillieu Bowring (Tas) Pty Ltd B9/1987 at 2 it was said that the case should be "very special", relying for that proposition on Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (No 2) [1980] Ch 515 at 547 and Bowen-Jones v Bowen-Jones [1986] 3 All ER 163 at 165.
12 What makes a particular case sufficiently special to justify other than the usual order has been discussed in a number of cases. In Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (supra) at 401, Woodward J thought it would be appropriate to award "solicitor and client" or "indemnity" costs whenever it appeared that a proceeding had been commenced or continued in circumstances where the applicant, properly advised, should have known that there was no chance of success. However, his Honour appeared to modify the force of that statement by adding that "in such cases the action must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive, or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts or the clearly established law". I would not make such a presumption in this case.
13 Subsequently, in Council of the Municipality of Botany v Secretary Department of the Arts, Sport, The Environment, Tourism and Territories (1992) 34 FCR 412 at 415, Gummow J rejected a requirement that an order of this character can only be made against an ethically or morally delinquent party. In J-Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federation Union of Workers - Western Australian Branch, Federal Court of Australia_,_ 19 Feb 1993 unreported, at 5, French J said that it is not a necessary condition for the making of the order that there be established that there was a collateral purpose or some species of fraud. His Honour considered that the discretion could be enlivened if for whatever reason, a party persisted in what should have been, on proper consideration, to be a hopeless case.
14 The exercise of the discretion is of course, an unfettered one, although I have received guidance from a number of reported cases, including some to which I have not referred. The conclusion I have come to is that Mrs Betts should have her costs on a solicitor and client basis but Scott and Gregory Richardson should have them only on a party and party basis. Her case, which I consider to be a special one, can be distinguished from their cases.
15 The Society's case against Mrs Betts was that at the time she appeared as junior counsel for Scott Richardson, at the hearing of his application for admission as a legal practitioner on 18 August 2000, she knew of the finding of academic misconduct that had been made against him but failed to draw the attention of the Judge to the finding. The Society alleged that her failure to do so amounted to professional misconduct because it was advertent, reckless or made with wilful blindness. It had no evidence available to it that her failure could be categorised in any of those ways. In the course of the Society's investigations, prior to its decision to make the applications to the Court, it was explained by Mrs Betts that she had no intention or expectation of appearing as junior counsel for her son until she received a telephone call from Gregory Richardson a few minutes before she was intending to leave to collect her mother to take them both to the Court to witness the hearing as spectators. While discussing what drinks they would provide at a celebratory function after the hearing, Gregory Richardson invited her to sit at the Bar table with him while he moved their son's admission. Mrs Betts informed the Society that understandably, she accepted that invitation, took up her robes, collected her mother and arrived at the Court, where the hearing commenced within minutes of her arrival. She explained that at no time prior to the admission being moved did she see the papers filed in support of the application or discuss their contents with either Gregory or Scott Richardson, and she did not turn her mind to the question whether the finding of academic misconduct should be disclosed to the Court. She pointed out that her role as junior counsel was very much a formal one and that she only accepted it because of the last minute invitation. She said: "I was very proud to appear as junior counsel on my son's admission. It was a day of such pride and joy for me as Scott's mother."
16 The Society called no evidence contradicting any of Mrs Betts' pre-application assertions, which she has since continued to maintain. In the course of cross-examining her, the Society's counsel did not challenge them. It relied on no evidence to establish that at any time she had advised her son to withhold disclosure of the finding of academic misconduct.
17 It was particularly because of the matters to which I have referred, that I expressed in my reasons for judgment that it had shocked me that the Society had determined to have Anita Betts' name removed from the roll. Assuming that the Society had no evidence available to it that was not put before me, the Society's case against her was doomed to fail from the outset and in my judgment, the Society and its advisors ought to have realised that. There was absolutely no basis upon which she could be criticised for what she did on the relevant afternoon. Once the Society had completed its investigations, the only decision reasonably open to it was to decide not to take proceedings against Mrs Betts.
18 The position of Scott and Gregory Richardson is different for the following reasons. The finding of academic misconduct had been made against Scott Richardson personally. He was aware that the academic misconduct committee had expressed its expectation that he would disclose the determination to the Court when he applied for admission in order to fulfil an obligation of complete candour at that time. He was aware that the committee had cited a High Court decision, The New South Wales Bar Association v Davis [1963] HCA 31; (1963) 109 CLR 428, as the basis for the expression of its expectation. Of course, it cited the wrong authority, but there were other authorities that it could more correctly have cited. Scott Richardson did not research the law on the point. He decided, albeit on the advice of others, particularly his father, not to make the disclosure. Subsequently he prepared the papers in support of his application for admission without referring to the determination.
19 Gregory Richardson was also aware of the determination and of the expression by the committee of its expectation that there should be disclosure to the Court. He conducted no research concerning whether the expectation was correct. He advised Scott Richardson that he did not have to make the disclosure. He swore an affidavit in support of the application for admission, attesting that Scott Richardson was of good fame and character and a fit and proper person to be admitted as a practitioner. He made no mention in his affidavit of the finding of academic misconduct.
20 There is no evidence to suggest that the Society commenced or continued the proceedings for some ulterior motive. It was advised by senior counsel to take the course it did and it believed that it had a duty to the profession and to the public to do so. It believed that it was in fact appropriate in all three cases. Although I regard its case against Mrs Betts as baseless and for that reason have determined to award her costs on a solicitor and client basis, the Society nevertheless had some reason for believing that its cases against Scott Richardson and Gregory Richardson might succeed. In all the circumstances, I am unpersuaded that it should be condemned to pay their costs on a solicitor and client basis.
21 Accordingly, in each application there will be an order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs to be taxed. In the proceedings against Anita Betts it is ordered that the costs be taxed on a solicitor and client basis. In the proceedings against Scott Richardson and Gregory Richardson, such an order will not be made. In each proceeding there will be a certificate for counsel.
Law Society of Tasmania
Richardson
(1988) 81 ALR 397
(1993) 118 ALR 248
(2000) 178 ALR 348
(1992) 34 FCR 412
(1963) 109 CLR 428
The Society was ordered to pay each respondent’s costs, to be taxed; Betts’s costs were to be taxed on a solicitor-and-client basis, the Richardsons’ on a party-and-party basis, with a certificate for counsel in each proceeding.