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[2003] SASC 379
plaintiff. The Full Court ordered that the name of Peter Michael Liddy be struck off the roll of legal practitioners and that he pay the costs of the application [13].
The Law Society applied to the Full Court for Mr Liddy's name to be struck off the roll after his convictions for multiple sexual offences against young boys, committed in contexts where he exploited his standing and position. The Full Court, relying on s 89(3) of the Legal Practitioners Act and characterising the matter as a 'plain case' (because the application rested on the convictions and their seriousness), held that the offences were 'unprofessional conduct' as they were infamous offences punishable by imprisonment. The court ordered that Mr Liddy's name be struck off the roll and that he pay costs, stating the purpose of removal is public protection and maintenance of confidence in the profession, not punishment [3]-[4],[10]-[13].
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1,883 words · generated 27/07/2026
The Law Society of South Australia applied to the Full Court for an order striking the name of Peter Michael Liddy from the roll of legal practitioners. Mr Liddy had been admitted in 1967, and later appointed a magistrate in 1974; he did not hold a practising certificate after that appointment [5]. He was charged in July 1999 and resigned as a magistrate in December 1999 [5]. On 5 June 2001 a jury convicted Mr Liddy of multiple sexual offences: three counts of indecent assault, six counts of unlawful sexual intercourse, and one count of offering a benefit to a witness as inducement to give false evidence; one conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse was quashed on appeal and substituted for indecent assault [5]-[6]. The victims were young boys (aged eight to eleven) whom Mr Liddy had met through his role as a lifesaving club coach; he exploited both his position in the club and his standing as a magistrate to gain trust and opportunity to offend [7]-[9]. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 25 years, with a non-parole period of 18 years [10].
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Proceedings to strike him off were served by substituted service; the solicitor who received service advised the court Mr Liddy did not oppose the order [1]-[2]. The Full Court (Doyle CJ, Perry and Gray JJ) considered the application under the court's inherent jurisdiction and s 89(3) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA). The court characterised this as a "plain case" where the application depended on the fact of convictions and their nature and seriousness, and therefore a hearing before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal was not necessary [3]-[4]. The court held that offences of an infamous nature punishable by imprisonment fall within the statutory definition of unprofessional conduct, even when unconnected with legal practice, and that the number and seriousness of the offences made inevitable a finding of serious unprofessional conduct [10]. The Full Court ordered that Mr Liddy's name be struck off the roll and that he pay the costs of the application [13]. Doyle CJ delivered the reasons, with Perry J and Gray J agreeing [1],[14]-[15].
There are three linked strands to the court's reasoning.
Jurisdiction and procedural appropriateness: The court invoked its inherent jurisdiction and s 89(3) of the Legal Practitioners Act as the statutory vehicle for the disciplinary order [3]. While acknowledging that disciplinary powers are usually exercised after Tribunal proceedings (which allow fuller fact-finding and findings to be made), the court emphasised that where the matter is "plain", that is, where the application is grounded on clear convictions and their nature and seriousness, a Tribunal hearing is not necessary [3]-[4]. The present case met that threshold.
Legal characterisation of the offences: The court treated convictions for offences of an infamous nature, punishable by imprisonment, as meeting the statutory definition of "unprofessional conduct" under the Act, even if the offences were unrelated to legal practice [10]. This is a legal proposition about the scope of "unprofessional conduct" in disciplinary law: the nature and criminal status of the offences are sufficient to bring them within the statutory concept.
Protective purpose of disciplinary orders: The court focused on the protective and public-confidence function of disciplinary removal. Doyle CJ expressly stated that striking off is not for punishment but to protect the public by removing a person unfit to practise and to maintain public confidence in the profession [11]. Given the exploitation of trust and misuse of magistrate status in the offending, removal was necessary for those protective ends [8]-[11].
Combining these, the court found the convictions inevitably established serious unprofessional conduct and that striking off was the appropriate disciplinary response [10]-[13].
Before: The normal process for professional disciplinary action involved proceedings before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, with the court usually acting with the benefit of Tribunal findings, to ensure all relevant facts and appropriate findings were made [3]. That procedure is the ordinary route for determining professional discipline.
After (as clarified in this decision): The Full Court confirmed that the court itself may exercise the disciplinary power under s 89(3) without reference to the Tribunal in cases that are "plain", where the application turns on the fact of convictions and their nature and seriousness so that a Tribunal hearing is not required to elucidate contested factual questions [3]-[4]. The decision exemplifies the court's willingness to proceed directly where the evidence is straightforward and where convictions establish unprofessional conduct as a matter of law [4],[10]. It does not displace the Tribunal process as the default but confirms an exception for clear-cut cases.
This judgment also affirms the proposition that criminal convictions for infamous offences punishable by imprisonment qualify as "unprofessional conduct" under the Act, even when the offences are unrelated to the practice of law [10]. That legal characterisation is central to the court's decision-making.
Passage: "I consider that this is a case in which it is appropriate to exercise the court's inherent jurisdiction under s 89(3) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA)." [3] Plain-English: The court is saying it has the power, under the law, to make the disciplinary order itself.
Passage: "But the present case is a plain case. The application is based on the fact of certain convictions and on their nature and seriousness. Accordingly, the procedure of a formal hearing before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal is not necessary." [4] Plain-English: This matter is straightforward because it rests on clear criminal convictions; there is no need for a full Tribunal hearing to sort out contested facts.
Passage: "Although Mr Liddy's offences were unconnected with legal practice, or the practice of the law, the offences are offences of an infamous nature, punishable by imprisonment, so they come within the statutory definition of unprofessional conduct." [10] Plain-English: Even though the crimes did not involve legal work, because they are serious crimes that attract imprisonment they count legally as professional misconduct.
Passage: "This is not done to punish him. That is not the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. It is done to protect the public, by removing the right to practise from a person who has demonstrated that he is not fit to remain a member of the legal profession, nor to occupy a position of public trust." [11] Plain-English: The reason for removing someone from the profession is to safeguard the public and the integrity of the profession, not to add punishment beyond the criminal sentence.
Based on the court's reasoning, the following factual features will typically trigger the Full Court's ability to act without a Tribunal and to order striking off:
This decision is best read as applying where convictions and their surrounding facts plainly demonstrate unfitness to practise; where factual disputes about conduct are significant, the Tribunal process will remain the appropriate forum [3].
This judgment itself does not canvass subsequent appellate treatment, nor does it record later authorities applying or distinguishing it. Doyle CJ did refer to his earlier remarks in Law Society of South Australia v Rodda (2002) as relevant background on the topic [12], indicating continuity in the court's approach to discipline and removal. To identify how later courts have treated this decision, one must consult post-2003 authorities and citation services. The present judgment should be treated as an authoritative expression by the Full Court of South Australia on (a) the circumstances in which the court will exercise s 89(3) directly, and (b) the legal proposition that infamous crimes punishable by imprisonment amount to unprofessional conduct for disciplinary purposes [3]-[4],[10]. It provides a clear template for direct court action in plain, conviction-based cases.
The judgment is clear on the central issues it decided, but it leaves several practical and doctrinal questions open for future consideration:
The precise boundary of a "plain case": Doyle CJ describes the present matter as a plain case because it rested on convictions and their nature and seriousness [4]. The judgment does not supply a detailed test or list of criteria for what additional factual complexity would require referral to the Tribunal. Future cases will need to delineate how contested factual matrices or partial convictions affect the 'plain case' determination.
The weight to be given to convictions that are subject to appeal: In this case, some appellate adjustment occurred to one conviction, but convictions were effectively final [6]. The judgment does not address situations where convictions are under active appeal or stay. It leaves unresolved whether and when the court should defer to criminal appeal processes before exercising disciplinary powers.
The role of mitigation, rehabilitation, or the practitioner's previous professional record: The Full Court emphasised the protective purpose of striking off [11], but did not undertake a detailed balancing exercise regarding any mitigating features of Mr Liddy's history beyond his long-standing admission and former magistracy [5],[11]. How much weight should be accorded to rehabilitation prospects or prior service in close cases remains open.
Application to offences less obviously 'infamous' or to professional misconduct short of criminal conviction: The judgment establishes that infamous criminal convictions are sufficient for disciplinary removal, but it does not provide a map for handling serious non-criminal misconduct or criminal offences of lesser stigma. The interplay between different degrees of criminality and the statutory definition of 'unprofessional conduct' is an area for further clarification.
Procedural fairness where the practitioner is absent or incapacitated: The court accepted substituted service and a letter from a solicitor indicating no opposition [1]-[2], but did not explore minimum procedural safeguards in such default contexts. Future authorities may need to specify what steps ensure fairness when a practitioner cannot meaningfully participate.
Interaction with national or interjurisdictional disciplinary frameworks: The decision is framed by the South Australian Act and court practice. Questions remain about how similar principles apply in other Australian jurisdictions with different statutory schemes, and how this Full Court approach interfaces with any national registration or mutual recognition arrangements.
Conclusion on open questions: the Full Court provided a principled application of s 89(3) in a clear, grave case of criminal conduct that destroyed public trust. The decision supplies a durable example of when the court may act directly, but invites future cases to articulate finer thresholds on 'plain cases', handling of appeals, mitigation, and procedural safeguards.
1 DOYLE CJ: This is an application for an order that Mr Liddy's name be struck off the roll of legal practitioners. The proceedings have been served on Mr Liddy, who is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment.
2 The court has been informed by a letter from a solicitor on whom the proceedings were served by way of substituted service, that Mr Liddy does not oppose the making of the order.
3 As will appear, I consider that this is a case in which it is appropriate to exercise the court's inherent jurisdiction under s 89(3) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA). Usually the court will exercise its disciplinary powers only after proceedings before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, and with the benefit of a finding by the Tribunal. In that way, all relevant facts can be brought out and appropriate findings made. This ensures that all aspects of the practitioner's conduct are before the court.
4 But the present case is a plain case. The application is based on the fact of certain convictions and on their nature and seriousness. Accordingly, the procedure of a formal hearing before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal is not necessary.
5 Mr Liddy was admitted in 1967. After practising as a practitioner he was appointed as a magistrate in 1974. He has not held a practising certificate since about the time of his appointment. In July 1999, Mr Liddy was charged with a number of serious offences. He resigned from his appointment as a magistrate as from December 1999. On 5 June 2001, a jury convicted Mr Liddy of a number of offences. First, three counts of indecent assault. Second, six counts of unlawful sexual intercourse. Third, one count of offering a benefit to a witness as an inducement to give false evidence in proceedings against Mr Liddy.
6 One of the convictions for unlawful sexual intercourse was quashed on appeal and a verdict of guilty of indecent assault was substituted.
7 The indecent assaults were committed on boys of nine or ten years of age. The offences of unlawful sexual intercourse were committed on boys aged between eight years and eleven years.
8 The victims of all of the sexual offences were young boys with whom Mr Liddy became involved in Mr Liddy's capacity as a coach at a life saving club. He exploited his standing in the community as a magistrate, and his position in the club, to gain the trust of the boys' families. In this way he was able to commit the offences.
9 The offences are very serious in themselves. The breach of community trust, and the misuse of his position as a magistrate, add to their seriousness.
10 Mr Liddy is now serving a sentence of imprisonment for 25 years, a non-parole period of 18 years having been fixed. Although Mr Liddy's offences were unconnected with legal practice, or the practice of the law, the offences are offences of an infamous nature, punishable by imprisonment, so they come within the statutory definition of unprofessional conduct. The number of offences and their seriousness make inevitable a finding that Mr Liddy is guilty of unprofessional conduct, and unprofessional conduct of a serious kind.
11 I am satisfied that Mr Liddy's name should be struck off the roll. This is not done to punish him. That is not the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. It is done to protect the public, by removing the right to practise from a person who has demonstrated that he is not fit to remain a member of the legal profession, nor to occupy a position of public trust. In addition, the public could not be confident in a profession which allowed a person who has committed such serious offences to remain within its ranks.
12 I refer to the remarks that I made on this topic in Law Society of South Australia v Rodda [2002] SASC 274; (2002) 83 SASR 541.
13 I would order that the name of Peter Michael Liddy be struck off the roll and I would order that he pay the costs of the application.
LAW SOCIETY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
LIDDY No. SCCIV-03-1143 [2003] SASC 379
(2002) 83 SASR 541
The Full Court ordered that the name of Peter Michael Liddy be struck off the roll of legal practitioners and that he pay the costs of the application [13].