[2025] VCAT 584
General information, not legal advice.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2025-07-08
Mr J, Cavanough J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Review and Regulation List - Racing Act 1958 (Vic) sections 50ZE and 83OH - Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), Schedule 1, clause 66N - the respective roles of the Victorian Racing Tribunal and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal - re-hearing following remittal by the Supreme Court of Victoria - determination of penalty to be imposed.
Laming v Racing Victoria Limited (Review and Regulation) [2025] VCAT 584
(i) The decision to suspend Richard Laming's trainer licence for three months in respect of his breach of Australian Rules of Racing rule 240(2) (AR 240(2)) is affirmed; but
(ii) That suspension is wholly suspended for 12 months subject to no further breaches of AR 240(2).
(1) A person whose interests are affected by a decision made by the [VRT] may apply to VCAT for review of that decision in relation to a penalty imposed on the person by the [VRT].
(2) A Steward may apply to VCAT for review of a decision made by the [VRT] in relation to a penalty imposed by the [VRT].
Despite section 51 [of the VCAT Act], in determining a proceeding for review of a decision of the [VRT] under section 83OH of the [Racing Act] in relation to a penalty imposed by the [VRT], the Tribunal is bound by the findings of fact that were made by the [VRT].
(1) In the determination of any matter before the [VRT], the [VRT] may -
(a) decide all questions of fact; and
(b) make any decision or order that the [VRT] considers is required in the interests of justice, including the imposition of any penalty under the rules.
A written statement of reasons must set out -
(a) the reasons for the [VRT's] determination; and
(b) the [VRT's] findings on material questions of fact that led to the determination, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.
Plainly, Parliament intended that VCAT's jurisdiction in racing disciplinary cases is now to be a strictly limited one; and that, so far as fact-finding in the course of exercising that jurisdiction is concerned, any role for VCAT is subject to that of the highly qualified, independent, powerful, expert tribunal established by the RAIDS Act,[8] namely the VRT.
. . .
Further, it seems to me that, subject to any applicable principles of administrative law, the VRT is to have an exclusive role, and the final say, not only in relation to identifying those alleged facts of which it is or is not comfortably satisfied, but also in relation to the question whether any alleged fact or set of facts is worth investigating or considering at all. In my view, subject to any issue of legal unreasonableness or the like, it may be open to the VRT in a particular case to determine that an allegation, or set of allegations, made by either RVL or the accused person is not sufficiently relevant or significant to warrant investigation or consideration. Again, for reasons similar to those expressed above, I consider that such a determination would be protected by [Clause 66N].
. . .
If VCAT fails to recognise that it must keep away from the area covered by the findings of fact already made by the VRT, and if VCAT proceeds to embark on an examination of the evidentiary material underlying the factual findings made by the VRT, or if, for that matter, VCAT purports to admit in evidence and examine fresh material going to the matters on which the VRT has already made findings of fact, then VCAT plainly errs in law.
. . .
VCAT should treat the relevant findings of fact made by the VRT as a fixed starting point and framework for VCAT's remaining deliberations on penalty.
. . .
VCAT did not appropriately recognise that it was bound by the findings of fact made by the VRT . . . [his Honour's discussion of VCAT Laming's reasons confirmed] that VCAT failed to recognise that it was bound by the VRT's findings of fact; that VCAT wrongly proceeded to make factual findings of its own; that this worked to the disadvantage of [Laming]; that (if it matters) there was at least some direct inconsistency of fact finding;
. . .
Here, VCAT is continuing to paint its own picture of the circumstances of the offences, in its own words, not in the VRT's words.
Of course, VCAT should have been accepting and applying the findings made by the VRT, not examining them;
(a) [Clause 66N] protects more than just 'positive' findings of fact; VCAT is bound by all of the facts found by the VRT; and for the purposes of [Clause 66N], the VRT's findings of fact include any decisions by it as to how particular allegations of fact should be dealt with;
(b) at the very least, VCAT must not make its own findings of fact on matters already covered by the VRT's findings of fact; if VCAT does so, VCAT will err in law, whether or not there is any 'inconsistency' between 'positive' findings of fact;
(c) in any event, there were real and significant inconsistencies in the present case;
(d) VCAT did not appreciate that it was bound by the VRT's findings of fact at all; alternatively VCAT did not appreciate that it was bound by the VRT's findings of fact contained in its decision of 7 October 2020;
(e) VCAT's error of law was material in the various ways mentioned above; in short, VCAT's decision might have been different in the absence of the error of law;
(f) there is no basis for denying [Laming] relief on discretionary grounds; RVL was mainly responsible for VCAT's error of law.
(a) Charge 1 was, in substance, a charge that, contrary to rule 245 of the Rules of Racing (AR 245), Laming had administered, or caused to be administered, a prohibited substance, namely cobalt, to Iam Ekstraordinary and that cobalt in excess of the prescribed maximum had been detected in a sample taken from the horse prior to the running of the race at Ballarat on 23 May 2018. While Laming accepted that excess cobalt had been detected in the sample taken from Iam Ekstraordinary on the day in question, he pleaded not guilty to this charge. I refer to Charge 1 as the 'Administration Charge';
(b) Charge 2 was laid as an alternative to Charge 1. In substance, it alleged that, contrary to rule 240(2) of the Rules of Racing (AR 240(2)), which creates a 'strict liability' type offence, Laming had presented Iam Ekstraordinary at the race meeting on 23 May 2018 with a prohibited substance (namely cobalt in excess of the prescribed maximum) in its system. Laming pleaded guilty to this charge. I refer to Charge 2 as the 'Presentation Charge'; and
(c) Charge 3 was a related charge. It alleged that, in contravention of rule 104(1) of the Rules of Racing (AR 104(1)), Laming had failed to record treatments that had been administered to Iam Ekstraordinary in May 2018. Laming pleaded guilty to this charge. I refer to Charge 3 as the 'Record Keeping Charge'.
The VRT's 7 October 2020 decision on the Administration Charge
1. General background
[Laming], a licensed trainer, has been charged with three offences. The charges arise out of the running of Iam Ekstraordinary at Ballarat on 23 May 2018. He is pleading 'Not Guilty' to a breach of AR 245. He is pleading 'Guilty' to breaches of [AR 240(2)] and AR 104(1).
In this judgement, we will be dealing with [the contested Administration Charge]. The penalties in relation to the other charges will be dealt with at a hearing on a date to be fixed.
Pursuant to Section 50X of the [Racing Act], questions of law have been determined by the Chairperson [Judge John Bowman]. However, invaluable assistance has been provided by Deputy Chairperson, His Honour Judge Hicks, and by Member, Mr Des Gleeson. Whilst the word 'we' is used throughout this Decision, the ultimate responsibility for answering questions of law or mixed fact and law rests with the Chairperson.
2. The dispute
The dispute in relation to the contested charge could be summarised as follows.
The [Administration Charge] relates to the detection of a prohibited substance - in this case, cobalt - which was found in a pre-race urine sample. A person must not administer, or cause to be administered, cobalt to a horse which is detected in a sample taken from the horse prior to or following the running of a race.
In this particular case, there is no argument concerning the sampling or testing procedures. As stated, cobalt is a prohibited substance. Whether or not it should be is not for [the VRT] to determine.
The key arguments concern the meaning of 'administer or cause to administer' as used in AR 245, and particularly, given the evidence in this case, of 'cause to administer'.
Mr Hooper, who appeared on behalf of the Stewards, submitted that the word 'cause' in AR 245 incorporates a sliding scale of knowledge that includes negligence or carelessness.
Mr Sheales who appeared on behalf of [Laming], submitted that it did not.
As we note later in this judgement, there is a specific rule relating to negligence - see Rule AR 16(b)(iii). [Laming] was not charged with a breach of this rule.
What do the words 'cause to administer' mean? For instance, do those words embrace a failure to supervise staff properly or at all, as asserted by the Stewards? Do they include a failure to keep any relevant records covering the period of the offence? In broad terms, can the situation of a trainer effectively doing nothing, leaving to the staff the administering of substances and not even realising that no records were being kept for the relevant period, constitute administering or causing to be administered? To what extent can a trainer pass on responsibility to staff for the purposes of [AR 245]?
Such issues seem to us to be at the heart of this aspect of the contest.
3. The findings of fact
We make the following findings of fact.
At the relevant time, [Laming] conducted two training establishments. These matters arose at Clyde. [Potgieter] was his licensed assistant trainer, or foreman. [Mercer] was a licensed stable hand employed by [Laming]. She had been so employed for four or five years at the relevant time, and indeed was so employed before the arrival of [Potgieter]. Her duties included the administration of injections and the written recording of these.
Iam Ekstraordinary was to run at Ballarat on Wednesday, 23 May 2018. Approximately three months earlier, the stable had been involved with the Stewards in relation to the use of a nebuliser on a horse on race day. Thus, [Laming, Potgieter and Mercer] should have been on full alert as to the importance of ensuring that treatment was not given immediately before or on race day.
Approximately one week before the commencement of this hearing the Stewards reinterviewed [Mercer]. As a result, the Stewards accepted that [Mercer] had made an honest mistake in injecting the horse with cobalt on race day.
We say now that we are quite satisfied that, in the present case, cobalt was administered on Wednesday 23 May 2018 by means of a vitamin injection, albeit one given in error. Associated with that error was a virtually complete absence of records at that time and the lack of any adequate means of indicating which horse or horses were to race on a particular day. Nothing seems to have been learned from the nebuliser incident three months previously. Further, neither [Laming] nor his foreman, [Potgieter], were present at the Clyde stables prior to Iam Ekstraordinary being removed from the stables, put in the float and taken to Ballarat races on the day in question. Neither attended at Ballarat. When interviewed by the Stewards almost four weeks later, [Laming] did not even seem to realise that no relevant records had been kept for about six weeks.
[Mercer] gave evidence that she could not rule out the possibility that she had given Iam Ekstraordinary a vitamin injection on the morning of 23 May 2018 at some time before the horse was placed in the float and taken to Ballarat. She had some computer problems which she said explained the lack of any records. Ultimately there was no challenge to the proposition that the positive reading probably emanated from a vitamin injection erroneously administered by [Mercer] on the morning of 23 May 2018 and, as stated, we accept this.
We also find that on that morning neither [Laming] nor his foreman was present; that the computer programme in relation to the administration of substances and the like was not working and had not for some time; that there was a totally inadequate system, if you could call it that, in relation to indicating which horses were about to race and when; and, given the contents of his interview of 20 June 2018 and his evidence, there was a high degree of ignorance on the part of [Laming] as to the particulars of what was going on in his stables.
We also find that, early in her employment with [Laming] and even before the arrival of [Potgeiter] as foreman, [Mercer] had been instructed by [Laming] not to administer injections on race days. She remained aware of this. She was familiar with the injection process and, over the years, had administered thousands of injections.
We say at the outset that we consider the stable practices of [Laming] to be careless, inadequate and marked by indifference as to what was happening. The term employed by Mr Hooper - "shambolic" - is appropriate.
However, the issue is whether that is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of AR 245, particularly in light of the observations of McLeish JA and Cavanough AJA in Kavanagh.
. . .
That [Mercer] knew that there was to be no administration to a horse on a day that it was racing seems beyond dispute. We accept that she had been instructed by [Laming] concerning this early in her employment, if not virtually at the outset. In her initial interview on 20 June 2018 she stated that there was 'no way' she would have treated a horse on race day and '. . . I just make sure that I do the clear day . . . If it's too close to race day, I just don't do it.'
Whilst [Mercer's] perception of her authority might be useful, it does not necessarily answer the important question of the authority in fact invested in her. In his evidence before the Tribunal, [Laming] stated that he had no direct contact with [Mercer]. He did not speak to her about treatments. He did not check back with [Potgieter]. He did not check the treatment diary. [Laming] gave [Potgieter] open licence. He was aware that [Potgieter] delegated work to [Mercer]. He did not engage in active supervision of them and had confidence in their abilities. [Laming] knew that [Potgieter] would be absent on the Wednesday in question and that he left instructions when he was not at work.
In this regard, [Mercer] told the Tribunal that [Laming] originally gave her instructions and [Potgieter] instructed her to perform them. She gave the injections for [Laming] and it was something that she could do 'with her eyes closed'. She gave approximately five thousand injections per annum and had been doing that for four or five years at the relevant time. She dealt with [Potgieter] in relation to treatments, but not with [Laming].
[Potgieter] did not give evidence, but the transcript of his interviews with Stewards was placed before us. In his first interview of 20 June 2018, he stated that he did not normally work on a Wednesday and was not at work on Wednesday 23 May 2018. He and [Mercer] were 'mainly' responsible for the treatments to the horses and 'mainly' under the guidance of [Laming]. It was only himself, [Mercer] or [Laming] who would treat the horses. Injections would only be given by 'the main staff' - the three people just mentioned. [Laming] would not know whether vitamin injections had been administered or not. He would not know on which day. He is not on the list of people who have access to the record of vitamin administrations - 'If he wants to know something, he will just ask us.' [Mercer] is supposed to record administrations.
By the time of [Potgieter's] second interview one day later on 21 June 2018, [Mercer] had apparently reconstructed from memory the relevant missing diary entries in relation to weekly injections. These included injections to Iam Ekstraordinary on Monday 21 May 2018. For the month of May there still seemed to be two missing weeks. The injections are given on random days 'whenever we've got some spare time'. It was pointed out to [Potgieter] that, if the relevant injections had been given on the Monday, two days before the race day testing, the test would not have shown the positive return which it did.
We've gone into the interviews with [Potgieter] at some length because they give some idea of the haphazard 'random' regime of injection giving that existed and the apparent absence of any direct control or intervention provided by [Laming]. This is consistent with his absence of anything like adequate knowledge of what was occurring in his stables, particularly as demonstrated in his original interview, not that his level of knowledge seemed to improve greatly thereafter.
The question which we have to decide is whether this shoddy and careless way of running stables constitutes a breach of AR 245. Has the requirement of the words 'caused to be administered' been satisfied?
We are satisfied that [Laming] invested authority in [Mercer] to administer injections and that he instructed her not to administer such injections on race day. This occurred at the time of, or shortly after, the commencement of her employment. She understood it. Thereafter, he effectively left her to her own devices, and she administered thousands of injections over the years. This occurred before and after the arrival of [Potgieter].
In the present case, there is no suggestion that [Laming] authorised [Mercer] to administer the injection on race day. There is no suggestion that he exerted a capacity of control or influence in order to direct [Mercer] so to do. There is no suggestion that he intended, contemplated or desired that any such authority or direction, if it existed, would be acted upon. The evidence is to the contrary. However dated it may have been, any general direction given to [Mercer] was not to administer injections on race day. As for the particular injection on 23 May 2018 (race day), there is no suggestion that [Laming] even knew of the injection being administered, much less authorising or exerting a capacity of control or influence so as to direct [Mercer] so to do. Explicitly and by inference, [Mercer] had been vested with authority to administer injections, but specifically not on race days.
...
What occurred in the present case was a clear instruction as to non administration on race day. There is no suggestion that [Mercer] did not understand or appreciate this. The contrary is quite clear. What seems to have occurred is a wilful administration, but one performed accidentally on a race day. That seems to us to fall within the exclusion referred to by McLeish JA.
DECISION - CHARGES 2 and 3
[Laming], you have pleaded 'guilty' to a breach of [AR 240(2)], which could be described as a presentation charge. It relates to the horse Iam Ekstraordinary, which was trained by you and which ran in a 1200 metre race at Ballarat on 23 May 2018. A pre-race urine sample taken from the horse proved positive to cobalt in excess of the prescribed limit. We have already dealt with the particulars relating to the administration charge in considerable detail in our decision of 7 October 2020, in which you were found not guilty of administration. We shall not go through those details again.
You are also pleading guilty to a breach of AR 104(1). This, in essence, relates to your failure to keep adequate treatment records.
Dealing first with the breach of [AR 240(2)], we would refer to our observations concerning your stable practices. We would repeat that they were careless, inadequate and displayed indifference. They have been rightly described as 'shambolic'. Of course, you are not to be penalised for an offence (negligence) with which you have not been charged. However, the circumstances surrounding this charge are relevant. There was a real lack of checks and balances in your system. This includes your lack of record keeping, to which we shall return.
The above matters place your breach of [AR 240(2)] in a realistic contextual setting. This is not a situation of one slip made in otherwise a well-run carefully operated stable.
You have pleaded guilty, and that is a fact in your favour which we take into account. In relation to your personal situation, you are aged 38 years. You have been a licensed trainer for most of your adult life. You do not have an unblemished record. You already have had a substantial disqualification, namely three years, in relation to a prohibited substance (EPO[14]). That was imposed in November 2010. You also received a two month suspension in September 2018.
Accordingly, you are entitled to little or no discount in relation to your record. Principles of both specific and general deterrence apply in relation to penalty. Rules such as [AR 240(2)] are made for good purpose. Horses demonstrated to be presenting with a prohibited substance in their systems are bad for the image of racing. They damage the important perception of a level playing field. That is bad enough in the best of circumstances. When it is contributed to by careless and slipshod stable practices, it warrants the imposition of an appropriate penalty.
In our opinion, that penalty should be one of suspension for three months. In addition Iam Ekstraordinary is disqualified from Race 1 at Ballarat on 23 [May] 2018 and the placings amended accordingly.
We turn now to the breach of AR1 104(1). The keeping of proper stable records is most important. It assists the Stewards in the performance of their duty. In the present case, the failure so to do was particularly pronounced.
In this regard, the penalty is a fine of $1,000.
The facts relevant to the penalty for the Presentation Charge
The Judgment and VRT's findings on the circumstances surrounding the Charges
. . . [Laming] also submitted to VCAT that it was not bound by findings of the VRT that were irrelevant to the offence charged; and that all or most of the VRT's findings about 'shambolic' practices at his stables and about related matters were in fact irrelevant to VCAT's task in assessing penalty on [the Presentation and Record Keeping Charges]. However, in my view, the VRT's findings of fact on those matters were relevant to the task at hand, and plainly so, notwithstanding that the offence the subject of [the Presentation Charge] was of the 'strict liability' kind. Both in the criminal law and in the field of professional discipline, the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of a 'strict liability'- type offence will frequently be relevant to penalty. Contrary to the submissions made by [Laming] to VCAT (and made also, for a time, to this Court), the case of Currie v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission was rightly decided in this regard. In the present case, it would have been entirely appropriate - indeed it was mandatory - for VCAT to take into account the VRT's findings of fact about the circumstances surrounding the offences. [Laming's] submissions to the contrary were wrong and may have compounded the distracting effect of RVL's submissions on the facts and the evidence.
It is true that, in his written submission, in addition to his erroneous principal contention at VCAT (to the effect that the circumstances surrounding the offences were irrelevant), [Laming] himself sought to rely on certain asserted facts that were not covered by the findings of fact made by the VRT. In particular, [Laming] submitted that the vitamin regime 'was a health and wellbeing regime that was being undertaken upon the advice of extremely experienced equine vet Dr Tim Roberts'; that 'the products administered pursuant to the vitamin regime were wholly supplied by Dr Tim Roberts'; that all horses received vitamins in accord with the vitamin regime; and that [Laming] 'was in the process of putting in a new computer system that would enable access by app on smart phones to all staff'. However, these were relatively minor submissions; and they are either not reflected, or are only faintly reflected, in what was later said by VCAT in its reasons ...
While [Laming's] submissions to VCAT about asserted irrelevance would have induced VCAT to go astray had VCAT accepted them, the fact is that VCAT did not accept them. VCAT's actual (legal) error (as I have identified it) is traceable to the submissions made to it by RVL to a far greater extent than it is traceable to the submissions made to it by [Laming].
The parties' submissions in the re-hearing on the relevant facts
(a) Any VRT finding of shambolic practices or the like etc;
(b) [Laming's] breach of AR 104(1); [and]
(c) [Laming's] prior matters.
As at 2020, Laming was 38 years old and had been a licensed trainer for most of his adult life. He was the trainer of Iam Ekstraordinary in May 2018.
A prohibited substance, being cobalt at a mass concentration in excess of 100 micrograms per litre in urine, was detected in a pre-race urine sample taken from Iam Ekstraordinary prior to the race on 23 May 2018.
Approximately three months before the Horse was to run at Ballarat, the stable had been involved with the Stewards in relation to the Nebuliser Incident. Thus, Laming, Potgieter and Mercer should have been on full alert as to the importance of ensuring that treatment was not given immediately before or on race day.
Cobalt was administered on Wednesday 23 May 2018 by means of a vitamin injection, albeit one given in error by Mercer who was extremely experienced and proficient in the administration of substances by injection.
Associated with that error (the administration of cobalt) was a virtually complete absence of records at the time and the lack of any adequate means of indicating which horse or horses were to race on a particular day.
Nothing seemed to have been learned from the Nebuliser Incident three months previously.
Neither Laming, nor his foreman, Potgieter, were present at the Clyde stables prior to the Horse being removed from the stables, put in the float and taken to Ballarat races on the day in question. Neither attended at Ballarat. When interviewed by the Stewards almost four weeks later, Laming did not even seem to realise that no relevant records had been kept for about six weeks.
There was a totally inadequate system, if it could be called that, in relation to indicating which horses were about to race and when.
Given the contents of his interview on 20 June 2018 and his evidence, there was a high degree of ignorance on the part of Laming as to the particulars of what was going on in his stables.
The stable practices of Laming were careless, inadequate and marked by indifference as to what was happening. The term 'shambolic' is appropriate.
In his evidence before the VRT, Laming stated that he had no direct contact with Mercer. He did not speak to her about treatments. He did not check back with Potgieter. He did not check the treatment diary. Laming gave Potgieter open licence. He was aware that Potgieter delegated work to Mercer. He did not engage in active supervision of them and had confidence in their abilities. Laming knew that Potgieter would be absent on the Wednesday in question and that he left instructions when he was not at work.
The interviews with Potgieter give some idea of the haphazard 'random' regime of injection giving that existed and the apparent absence of any direct control or intervention provided by Laming. This is consistent with his absence of anything like adequate knowledge of what was occurring in his stables, particularly as demonstrated in his original interview, not that his level of knowledge seemed to improve greatly thereafter.
This way of running stables was shoddy and careless.
This is not a situation of one slip made in otherwise a well-run carefully operated stable.
The High Court's decision in Australian Building and Construction Commission v Pattinson
make any decision or order that the [VRT] considers is required in the interests of justice, including the imposition of any penalty under the [Rules of Racing].
The foundational purpose of the [Rules of Racing] is to regulate the horse-racing industry and its integrity, which is 'necessary both to ensure fair and open competition in racing, and to maintain the health and wellbeing of horses and their jockeys'.
The purpose of the Rules and the objectives that the Rules seek to achieve are of fundamental importance to the racing industry. They should be upheld at all times.
Rules such as AR 240 are made for good purpose. Horses demonstrated to be presenting with a prohibited substance in their systems are bad for the image of racing. They damage the important perception of a level playing field. That is bad enough in the best of circumstances. When it is contributed to by careless and slipshod stable practices, it warrants the imposition of an appropriate penalty.
Disqualification is a very severe penalty (substantially different in character and effect to suspension) the effect of which is banishment from the industry, in that a disqualified person (amongst other prohibitions):
(d) cannot attend any licensed premises;
(e) cannot bet on horse racing;
(f) must divest themselves of any interest in racehorses by arm's length transaction; [and]
(g) must disperse and divest of any racing stock physically and by way of interest of any type.
Disqualification affords no presumption of resuming licensed activities on the expiration of the period of disqualification. Having completely divested themselves of any interest in horses and disbanded their training business, a person who has been disqualified must, should they desire again to engage in licensed activities, on the expiry of the disqualification period apply for a licence, which process can be time consuming, and unsuccessful.
Breaches of AR 240(2) comprising an elevated TCO2 level have always been considered as a very serious example of a breach of AR 240(2) as elevation of the TCO2 level can only be achieved per medium of the drenching of the horse (introducing a bicarbonate saturated solution directly into the horse's stomach through a nasogastric tube) 4 - 8 hours before the horse is due to race, self- evidently a deliberate race day administration.
The trainer pleaded guilty to the breach of AR 245 and the alternative charge was withdrawn. The VRT noted the trainer 'had done nothing wrong' and further there was 'no negligence, no lack of supervision and no turning of a blind eye to less than adequate stable practices'. There was 'no question of some third party, such as a veterinary surgeon or a dietician, being involved or being left to their own devices without consultation or supervision'. There was nothing in the case that required the VRT to send a message to the industry or to the public. In the 'unusual circumstances' of the case and in particular given the absence of any warning on the relevant packing or otherwise, the absence of any negligence, supervision or the like on the part of the trainer, no penalty was imposed additional to the disqualification of the horse; and
The trainer was back before the VRT in April 2023 after being charged with a breach of AR 240(2) during the 24 month suspension period after a horse was found to have a prohibited substance (Naproxen) in its system.[42] The VRT found the most likely explanation for its presence was the result of transfer from a staff member who was taking the medication for their own injury. When it came to penalty, the VRT found the breach triggered the operation and implementation of the suspended period of suspension. The six week suspension was ordered to come into operation. In respect of the AR 240(2) charge itself, the RVL submitted that a fine of between $3,000 and $5,000 ought to be imposed. The VRT imposed $3,000.
As was stated by the [RADB], the onus was on you to have in place a system that eliminated risk and it is apparent that you failed so to do. However, again bearing in mind all of the circumstances, we have reached the conclusion that you should be suspended for a period of six weeks.
An inspection was made of the feed room where medicine cabinets were sighted, photographs were taken and treatment records sought. There is no suggestion of any laxness or impropriety in respect of any of these matters being detected during this unannounced inspection;
culpability in presentation cases will generally, and he emphasised the word generally, fall into one of three categories. The first category is that in which, whether through investigation, admission or other direct evidence, it is possible to establish a positive culpability on the part of the trainer or other person involved.
The second, and most commonly occurring category, involves those cases in which the relevant Tribunal is left with no real explanation as to how the horse acquired the prohibited substance. An explanation may be rejected, or there may simply be no provable explanation available - the administration may have occurred accidently, or mistakenly.
The third category of case is that in which the trainer, or other relevant person, is able to provide an explanation which the Tribunal accepts, and which demonstrates no personal culpability at all on trainer's part.
Although this categorisation of presentation cases does provide some guidance, the distinction between categories is not always a matter of clear demarcation and there are some circumstances which sit between the second and third categories in particular. For example, the evidence may not reveal how the administration of the prohibited substance occurred, but the evidence establishes that strict procedures were in place, designed to prevent such an occurrence . . . What really matters is some assessment of the degree of blameworthiness involved in the particular case, some conduct being more culpable that other conduct.
It is clear that his stables are well maintained, that his medications are properly stored, and that treatment records are also carefully maintained. No suspicious or prohibited substances or procedures were detected on the occasion of the unannounced visit by officials on 8 October 2024. It is unsurprising in the circumstances that he is unable to identify any particular cause for the presence of the prohibited substance in the urine sample. The Panel notes also the concession by [the Queensland Racing Integrity Commissioner] that there is no evidence to establish moral blameworthiness on the part of [Hatch].
. . . is a man of good character who maintains thorough treatment records for horses in his stable. Importantly, the consequences for him of activating the suspended penalty and effectively destroying his livelihood would be totally disproportionate to the offending.
In the view of the panel, it would be unjust to now order the activation of the suspended penalty imposed for an offence which occurred more than six years earlier.
. . . a breach of AR 240(2) is an objectively serious breach of the [Rules of Racing]. It is always a terrible look for racing when any horse races and is subsequently found to have had a prohibited substance in its system. While there is no finding made that the cobalt in this horse's system had a performance-enhancing effect, it is an even worse look for racing when a horse runs in a race with a prohibited substance in its system and wins.
Deterrence is relevant in circumstances where there has been no intent to breach AR240(2) - for example, where a licensed person has breached the rule not by any intent to do the wrong thing, but because they have failed to maintain proper stable practices, or heed the warnings of the Stewards in relation to certain products where there is a risk of a breach of the Rules through lax practices and cross-contamination. Penalties are imposed to deter that kind of conduct - and protect the sport and the racing public from it - as well of course for more deliberate cheating (which is not involved in this case).
Consistency in the imposition of penalties by this Panel is important. The imposition of inconsistent or erratic penalties will result in a loss of confidence by all concerned in the industry in the process of imposing penalties for breaches of the [Rules of Racing]. That is why the Panel must follow Sprague and other decisions of the Racing Appeal Tribunal unless we are very strongly satisfied that they are wrong for some reason.
... had observed consistency in sentencing means that like cases are to be treated alike and different cases are to be treated differently. Regard is had not just to what has been done in other cases but why it was done.
... the prohibition of cobalt has no greater or lesser importance in Victoria than it does in other Australian racing jurisdictions (such as NSW). The same contention can be advanced for other prohibited substances founding a contravention of AR 240(2). The point is that the integrity of the racing industry as a whole is affected by such conduct. The rule is an Australian Rule. Consequently, there should be consistency in outcomes of interstate contraventions of AR 240(2) involving the relevant prohibited substance. Such a notion is consistent with fairness.
In striking contrast to the administration offences, the offences resting solely on proof of detection do not carry a fixed or minimum penalty. This is doubtless because the degree of blameworthiness attaching to the trainer (and 'any other person who was in charge') will vary according to the circumstances under which the prohibited substance came to be in the horse's system . . .
A horse shall be presented for a race free of prohibited substances. If a horse is presented for a race otherwise then in accordance with sub-rule (1) the trainer of the horse is guilty of an offence.
This is not a situation of one slip made in otherwise a well-run carefully operated stable.
Within that category the culpability may be in the class of deliberate wrongdoing or it may be through ignorance or carelessness or something similar.
The conduct of the trainer during the investigation of the charges
AR 104(1): failing to record in the treatment diary a calcium drip administered.
AR 178: positive sample for Triamcinolone Acetonide (corticosteroid). AR:178F(1): failing to record injection in treatment diary.
Fine: $4500 ($3,500 for AR 178 breach; $1,000 for AR178F breach)
AR 178E: administered Accent (an antibiotic commonly used in racing stables for the treatment of lower respiratory tract infection) by inhalation with a nebuliser on race day.
AR 178A: possession of a needle which could be used to administer a prohibited substance.
AR 177B: Out of competition positive samples for EPO.
Processes For Prevention Of Treatment On Race Days
The role of penalties for strict liability offences on integrity and general deterrence
should be sufficient to convey a strong message to the industry and wider public that licensed trainers cannot divest themselves of their responsibilities. It is important that racing is perceived as being conducted fairly, uninfluenced by prohibited substances.
Any penalty should also send the message that licensed trainers must take an active interest in the maintenance of treatment records. As the wording of AR104 denotes - it is the trainer who is responsible for the keeping of treatment records.
The correct or preferable penalty should act in emphatic denunciation of the shambolic stable practices in which the contraventions occurred.
Any person who takes part in the industry agrees to be bound by the [Rules of Racing] and to comply with them. [Laming] is an experienced trainer. His ongoing participation in the industry is a privilege and subject to his compliance with the [Rules of Racing]. His overarching obligation as a licensed trainer is to take responsibility at all times for the operations of his stables. The circumstances in which these contraventions occurred are positively inconsistent with that obligation.
the question of specific deterrence is informed most obviously by the lack of further contraventions since the instant contraventions. By the same token, it is not eliminated. [Laming] has contravened five prohibited substance rules or associated offences with penalties ranging from fines to periods of suspension and disqualification. He has relevant failures to record treatment. He was disqualified for three years in relation to a prohibited substance. Further, the VRT made powerful findings about his shambolic practices at the time of his contraventions
There is another way, too, in which VCAT's legally erroneous approach in this case is likely to have contributed to the adverse outcome that befell [Laming]. Under the more conventional 'de novo' style of administrative review, VCAT may or may not be entitled to give weight to the decision below, although VCAT should not treat the decision below as presumptively correct. However, the 2019 amendments to the [Racing Act], which included the introduction of [Clause 66N], would clearly justify VCAT giving weight to the decision of the VRT, as an expert tribunal, by whose findings of fact VCAT is bound. In the present case, there is no indication in VCAT's reasons for decision that it even considered whether or not to give weight to the conclusion of the VRT. In any event, the vast increase in severity of the penalties imposed by VCAT suggests strongly that VCAT, having made its own findings of fact, gave no weight whatsoever to the VRT's conclusion on penalty. Had VCAT adopted the correct legal approach, it may well have considered the VRT's conclusion and given it considerable weight.
Suspension for three months is in the interests of justice
Suspension of the penalty is in the interests of justice
At the relevant time, Mr Laming conducted two training establishments. These matters arose at Clyde.
Mr Marnu Potgieter was Mr Laming's licensed assistant trainer, or foreman. Ms Amy Mercer was a licensed stable hand employed by Mr Laming. She had been so employed for four or five years at the relevant time, and indeed was so employed before the arrival of Mr Potgieter. Her duties included the administration of injections and the written recording of these.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 6 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
The Horse was to run at Ballarat on Wednesday 23 May 2018.
Approximately three months before the Horse was to run at Ballarat, the stable had been involved with the Stewards in relation to the use of a nebuliser on a horse on race day. Thus, Mr Laming, Mr Potgieter and Ms Mercer should have been on full alert as to the importance of ensuring that treatment was not given immediately before or on race day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 6 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
Approximately one week before the commencement of the hearing of Charge 1, the Stewards reinterviewed Ms Mercer. As a result, the Stewards accepted that Ms Mercer had made an honest mistake in injecting the horse with cobalt on race day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 6 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
Cobalt was administered on Wednesday 23 May 2018 by means of a vitamin injection, albeit one given in
Associated with that error (the administration of cobalt) was a virtually complete absence of records at the time and the lack of any adequate means of indicating which horse or horses were to race on a particular day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 6 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
Nothing seemed to have been learned from the nebuliser incident three months previously.
Neither Mr Laming, nor his foreman, Mr Potgieter, were present at the Clyde stables prior to the Horse being removed from the stables, put in the float and taken to Ballarat races on the day in question. Neither attended at Ballarat. When interviewed by the Stewards almost four weeks later, Mr Laming did not even seem to realise that no relevant records had been kept for about six weeks.
VRT Dismissal Decision, pp 6-7 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
Ms Mercer gave evidence that she could not rule out the possibility that she had given the Horse a vitamin injection on the morning of 23 May 2018 at some before the horse was placed in the float and taken to Ballarat. She had some computer problems which she said explained the lack of any records. The positive reading probably emanated from a vitamin injection erroneously administered by Ms Mercer on the morning of 23 May 2018.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 7 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
On the morning of 23 May 2018 the computer program in relation to the administration of substances and the like was not working and had not for some time.
There was a totally inadequate system, if it could be called that, in relation to indicating which horses were about to race and when.
Given the contents of his interview on 20 June 2018 and his evidence, there was a high degree of ignorance on the part of Mr Laming as to the particulars of what was going on in his stables.
Early in her employment with Mr Laming and even before the arrival of Mr Potgieter as foreman, Ms Mercer had been instructed by Mr Laming not to administer injections on race day. She remained aware of this. She was familiar with the injection process and, over the years, had administered thousands of injections.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 7 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
The stable practices of Mr Laming were careless, inadequate and marked by indifference as to what was happening. The term 'shambolic' is appropriate.
Ms Mercer knew that there was to be no administration to a horse on a day that it was racing. She had been instructed by Mr Laming concerning this early in her employment, if not virtually at the outset.
In his evidence before the Tribunal, Mr Laming stated that he had no direct contact with Ms Mercer. He did not speak to her about treatments. He did not check back with Mr Potgieter. He did not check the treatment diary. Mr Laming gave Mr Potgieter open licence. He was aware that Mr Potgieter delegated work to Ms Mercer. He did not engage in active supervision of them and had confidence in their abilities. Mr Laming knew that Mr Potgieter would be absent on the Wednesday in question and that he left instructions when he was not at work.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 12 Supreme Court Reasons, [80]
The interviews with Mr Potgieter give some idea of the haphazard 'random' regime of injection giving that existed and the apparent absence of any direct control or intervention provided by Mr Laming. This is consistent with his absence of anything like adequate knowledge of what was occurring in his stables, particularly as demonstrated in his original interview, not that his level of knowledge seemed to improve greatly thereafter.
VRT Dismissal Decision, pp 12-13 Supreme Court Reasons, [80]
This way of running stables was shoddy and careless.
Mr Laming invested authority in Ms Mercer to administer injections and instructed her not to administer such injections on race day. This occurred at the time of, or shortly after, the commencement of her employment. She understood it. Thereafter, he effectively left her to her own devices, and she administered thousands of injections over the years. This occurred before and after the arrival of Mr Potgieter.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 13 Supreme Court Reasons, [80]
There is no suggestion that Mr Laming authorised Ms Mercer to administer the injection on race day. There is no suggestion that he exerted a capacity of control or influence in order to direct Ms Mercer so to do. There is no suggestion that he intended, contemplated or desired that any such authority or direction, if it existed, would be acted upon. However dated it may have been, any general direction given to Ms
Mercer was not to administer injections on race day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 14 Supreme Court Reasons, [81]
As for the particular injection on 23 May 2018, there is no suggestion that Mr Laming even knew of the injection being administered, much less authorising or exerting a capacity of control or influence so as to direct Ms Mercer so to do. Explicitly and by inference, Ms Mercer had been vested with authority to
administer injections, but specifically not on race days.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 14 Supreme Court Reasons, [81]
There was a clear instruction as to non-administration on race day. There is no suggestion that Ms Mercer did not understand or appreciate this. The contrary is quite clear. What seems to have occurred is a wilful
administration, but one performed accidentally on a race day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 14 Supreme Court Reasons, [81]
Mr Laming's stable practices were careless, inadequate and displayed indifference. They have been
There was a real lack of checks and balances in Mr Laming's system (including a lack of record-keeping).
This is not a situation of one slip made in otherwise a well-run carefully operated stable.
Mr Laming had been a licensed trainer for most of his adult life.
The failure to keep proper stable records was particularly pronounced.
The 'wrong-box incident' of February 2018 did not involve a breach of the Rules.
Ms Mercer had mistakenly injected the Horse with vitamins on 23 May 2018.
The Horse was trained by Mr Laming and ran in the Race on 23 May 2018.
A pre-race urine sample taken from the horse proved positive to cobalt in excess of the prescribed limit.
At the relevant time, Mr Laming conducted two training establishments. These matters arose at Clyde.
Mr Marnu Potgieter was Mr Laming's licensed assistant trainer, or foreman. Ms Amy Mercer was a licensed stable hand employed by Mr Laming. She had been so employed for four or five years at the relevant time, and indeed was so employed before the arrival of Mr Potgieter. Her duties included the administration of injections and the written recording of these.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 6 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
The Horse was to run at Ballarat on Wednesday 23 May 2018.
Approximately three months before the Horse was to run at Ballarat, the stable had been involved with the Stewards in relation to the use of a nebuliser on a horse on race day. Thus, Mr Laming, Mr Potgieter and Ms Mercer should have been on full alert as to the importance of ensuring that treatment was not given immediately before or on race day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 6 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
Approximately one week before the commencement of the hearing of Charge 1, the Stewards reinterviewed Ms Mercer. As a result, the Stewards accepted that Ms Mercer had made an honest mistake in injecting the horse with cobalt on race day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 6 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
Cobalt was administered on Wednesday 23 May 2018 by means of a vitamin injection, albeit one given in error.
Associated with that error (the administration of cobalt) was a virtually complete absence of records at the time and the lack of any adequate means of indicating which horse or horses were to race on a particular day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 6 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
Nothing seemed to have been learned from the nebuliser incident three months previously.
Neither Mr Laming, nor his foreman, Mr Potgieter, were present at the Clyde stables prior to the Horse being removed from the stables, put in the float and taken to Ballarat races on the day in question. Neither attended at Ballarat. When interviewed by the Stewards almost four weeks later, Mr Laming did not even seem to realise that no relevant records had been kept for about six weeks.
VRT Dismissal Decision, pp 6-7 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
Ms Mercer gave evidence that she could not rule out the possibility that she had given the Horse a vitamin injection on the morning of 23 May 2018 at some before the horse was placed in the float and taken to Ballarat. She had some computer problems which she said explained the lack of any records. The positive reading probably emanated from a vitamin injection erroneously administered by Ms Mercer on the morning of 23 May 2018.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 7 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
On the morning of 23 May 2018 the computer program in relation to the administration of substances and the like was not working and had not for some time.
There was a totally inadequate system, if it could be called that, in relation to indicating which horses were about to race and when.
Given the contents of his interview on 20 June 2018 and his evidence, there was a high degree of ignorance on the part of Mr Laming as to the particulars of what was going on in his stables.
Early in her employment with Mr Laming and even before the arrival of Mr Potgieter as foreman, Ms Mercer had been instructed by Mr Laming not to administer injections on race day. She remained aware of this. She was familiar with the injection process and, over the years, had administered thousands of injections.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 7 Supreme Court Reasons, [77]-[78]
The stable practices of Mr Laming were careless, inadequate and marked by indifference as to what was happening. The term 'shambolic' is appropriate.
Ms Mercer knew that there was to be no administration to a horse on a day that it was racing. She had been instructed by Mr Laming concerning this early in her employment, if not virtually at the outset.
In his evidence before the Tribunal, Mr Laming stated that he had no direct contact with Ms Mercer. He did not speak to her about treatments. He did not check back with Mr Potgieter. He did not check the treatment diary. Mr Laming gave Mr Potgieter open licence. He was aware that Mr Potgieter delegated work to Ms Mercer. He did not engage in active supervision of them and had confidence in their abilities. Mr Laming knew that Mr Potgieter would be absent on the Wednesday in question and that he left instructions when he was not at work.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 12 Supreme Court Reasons, [80]
The interviews with Mr Potgieter give some idea of the haphazard 'random' regime of injection giving that existed and the apparent absence of any direct control or intervention provided by Mr Laming. This is consistent with his absence of anything like adequate knowledge of what was occurring in his stables, particularly as demonstrated in his original interview, not that his level of knowledge seemed to improve greatly thereafter.
VRT Dismissal Decision, pp 12-13 Supreme Court Reasons, [80]
This way of running stables was shoddy and careless.
Mr Laming invested authority in Ms Mercer to administer injections and instructed her not to administer such injections on race day. This occurred at the time of, or shortly after, the commencement of her employment. She understood it. Thereafter, he effectively left her to her own devices, and she administered thousands of injections over the years. This occurred before and after the arrival of Mr Potgieter.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 13 Supreme Court Reasons, [80]
There is no suggestion that Mr Laming authorised Ms Mercer to administer the injection on race day. There is no suggestion that he exerted a capacity of control or influence in order to direct Ms Mercer so to do. There is no suggestion that he intended, contemplated or desired that any such authority or direction, if it existed, would be acted upon. However dated it may have been, any general direction given to Ms Mercer was not to administer injections on race day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 14 Supreme Court Reasons, [81]
As for the particular injection on 23 May 2018, there is no suggestion that Mr Laming even knew of the injection being administered, much less authorising or exerting a capacity of control or influence so as to direct Ms Mercer so to do. Explicitly and by inference, Ms Mercer had been vested with authority to administer injections, but specifically not on race days.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 14 Supreme Court Reasons, [81]
There was a clear instruction as to non-administration on race day. There is no suggestion that Ms Mercer did not understand or appreciate this. The contrary is quite clear. What seems to have occurred is a wilful administration, but one performed accidentally on a race day.
VRT Dismissal Decision, p 14 Supreme Court Reasons, [81]
Mr Laming's stable practices were careless, inadequate and displayed indifference. They have been rightly described as 'shambolic'.
There was a real lack of checks and balances in Mr Laming's system (including a lack of record-keeping).
This is not a situation of one slip made in otherwise a well-run carefully operated stable.
Mr Laming had been a licensed trainer for most of his adult life.
The failure to keep proper stable records was particularly pronounced.
The 'wrong-box incident' of February 2018 did not involve a breach of the Rules.
Ms Mercer had mistakenly injected the Horse with vitamins on 23 May 2018.
The Horse was trained by Mr Laming and ran in the Race on 23 May 2018.
A pre-race urine sample taken from the horse proved positive to cobalt in excess of the prescribed limit.
[1] In these Reasons definitions are shown through the bolding of names or terms. Italics and bold are used to define cases.
[3] Laming v Racing Victoria Limited [2022] VSC 813.
[6] Introduced by the Racing Amendment (Integrity & Disciplinary Structures) Act 2018 (Vic) (RAIDS Act).
[7] Judgment [37], [41], [54], [60], [104], [131] and [132], italics in original and footnotes omitted.
[8] The RAIDS Act 'effected a substantial revision of the pre-existing integrity and disciplinary regimes governing thoroughbred racing, harness racing and greyhound racing in Victoria. It made large and important amendments to the [Racing Act], which came into operation, relevantly, on 1 August 2014' (Judgment [12]). One of those changes was to establish the VRT and give VCAT only the review powers contained in section 83OH of the Racing Act (Judgment [20], [31]-[33]).
[14] Erythropoietin, a naturally occurring hormone that stimulates red blood cell production. It is used to enhance performance.
[15] Judgment [99]-[102], footnotes omitted.
[18] Laming's Written Submissions [28] which included reference to R v Di Simoni [1981] HCA 31 and DPP v Newman & Turnbull [1997] 1 VR 146.
[19] See discussion in Laming's Written Submissions [8]-[12].
[23] RVL's Written Submissions [32] and Laming's Written Submissions [45]-[65].
[27] Laming's Written Submissions [66].
[28] Kavanagh No 2 [18]-[19], footnotes omitted.
[29] Laming's Written Submissions [6]-[7].
[30] RVL's Written Submissions [68]-[70].
[31] Laming's Written Submissions [37]-[44].
[32] RVL's Written Submissions [71]-[72].
[33] Laming's Written Submissions [21]-[22].
[34] RVL v Gelagotis, VRT 12 November 2021.
[35] Racing Victoria Stewards v McPherson, RADB, 22 August 2018.
[36] Corstens v Racing Victoria Ltd [2010] VCAT 1106. Altrenogest is a progestin which is widely used in veterinary medicine to suppress or synchronize estrus in horses and pigs.
[37] That earlier version applied until 1 October 2002 - Laming's Submissions [18].
[38] Laming's Written Submissions [23].
[40] RVL v Mitchell Freedman, VRT 16 December 2021.
[41] RVL v Archie Alexander, VRT 1 February 2022.
[42] RVL v Archie Alexander, VRT 9 May 2023.
[43] Liability decision given on 25 February 2021.
[44] RVL v Keating VRT 5 September 2023.
[46] [2008] VRAT 6 (6 June 2004).
[47] Kavanagh No 2 [15]-[16] and [47].
[55] Relevantly summarised at [10] in Kavanagh No 2.
[58] There was also a breach of AR 104(1) with a fine of $300. That was not the subject of the review.
[66] RVL's Reply [27], referring to Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520.
[68] [2017] VSCA 334 [45].
[69] McDonough, quoted in the first paragraph.
[70] RVL's Written Submissions [44]-[48].
[75] They were also described in VCAT Laming [39]-[51].
[77] Laming's Written Submissions [11]-[17] and [24].
[80] RVL's Written Submissions [51]-[52].
[81] Ibid [54]-[56], italics in original.
[86] Laming's Written Submissions [67]-[71].
[88] Laming's submissions on penalty filed with the VRT - TB 7-14.
Laming
Racing Victoria Limited
(2010) 242 CLR 520