The Personal Injury Commission (Commission) determines:

1. David John Lambkin (the deceased worker) died on 20 March 2025 as a result of injury sustained in the course of his employment with the respondent.
2. Annette Mary Lambkin (the applicant) was a dependant of the deceased worker who was partly dependent for support upon the deceased worker at the date of his death.
3. There were no other persons wholly or partly dependent for support upon the deceased worker at the date of death.
4. The lump sum death benefit payable in accordance with s 25(1)(a) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 is $938,600.
5. Pursuant to s 29(1A) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, the whole of the lump sum death benefit is payable to the applicant.

By and with the consent of the parties, the Commission orders:

1. Pursuant to s 85A(1)(a) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, the respondent to pay the lump sum death benefit of $938,600 to the applicant.
2. The respondent to pay the applicant's costs as agreed or assessed.

A brief statement is attached setting out the Commission's reasons for the determination.

1. Mr David John Lambkin (the deceased worker) died as a result of injury arising out of or in the course of his employment with State of New South Wales - Fire & Rescue NSW (the respondent) on 20 March 2025. The deceased worker was 52 years old at the time of his death.
2. Liability to pay compensation in respect of the death has been accepted by the respondent's insurer.
3. The deceased worker's spouse, Ms Annette Mary Lambkin (the applicant) lodged an Application in Respect of Death of Worker (the Application) in the Personal Injury Commission (the Commission) on 19 November 2025 seeking orders for apportionment and payment of the lump sum death benefit payable under s 25(1)(a) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) as well as funeral expenses pursuant to s 26 of the 1987 Act.

1. The parties appeared at a preliminary conference on 6 February 2026.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr Tony Chow. The respondent was represented by Ms Brooke Dyson. A representative from the insurer was also present.
3. At the conference, the respondent confirmed that liability to pay compensation in respect of the death had been accepted. The parties agreed that the applicable lump sum benefit amount was $938,600.
4. The parties confirmed that there was no dispute in relation to the applicant's dependence on the deceased worker. Other than the deceased worker's sons, Daniel Lambkin and Ryan Lambkin, the parties confirmed that no other potential dependants had been identified.
5. I was informed that funeral expenses had already been reimbursed pursuant to s 26 of the 1987 Act and no order in that respect was sought.
6. No application for discretionary interest was made.

1. The parties agreed that the following matters required determination:

(a) identification of any family members who were wholly or partly dependent for support on the deceased worker in accordance with s 4 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act);

(b) apportionment of the lump sum death benefit of $938,600;

(c) orders for payment of compensation, and

(d) orders with respect to costs.

1. The following documents were in evidence before the Commission and considered in making this determination:

(a) the Application and attached documents;

(b) the Reply lodged by the respondent, and

(c) documents lodged under cover of an Application to Lodge Additional Documents by the applicant on 29 January 2026.

1. The evidence before me includes the New South Wales Death Certificate of the deceased worker, which identified the applicant as his spouse and Daniel and Ryan Lambkin as his children. The deceased worker's will identified the applicant as his wife and appointed her as executor and trustee.
2. A signed written statement has been lodged by the applicant confirming that she was married to the deceased worker in 1997 and was financially dependent upon him. They had two children together, Daniel born in 2000 and Ryan born in 2004.
3. Statutory declarations have been provided by Daniel Lambkin and Ryan Lambkin stating that they were not dependent upon the deceased worker at the date of death.
4. An additional statement was provided by Daniel Lambkin, dated 28 January 2026. Mr Lambkin stated that he moved out of his parents' house in 2020 after joining the Australian Royal Air Force. Since then, Mr Lambkin considered himself independent from his parents and did not require their financial help or assistance with daily living.
5. Mr Lambkin said he had had discussions with his brother Ryan with regard to the claim and they had both made a decision to not claim against the benefit and wished for the applicant to receive the full benefit.

1. The term, 'dependants' is defined in s 4 of the 1998 Act as:

"...the members of the worker's family as were wholly or in part dependent for support on the worker at the time of the worker's death, or would but for the incapacity due to the injury have been so dependent."

1. In TNT Group 4 Pty Limited v Halioris (1987) 3 NSWCCR 10; 8 NSWLR 486, McHugh JA stated (at [489]):

"Dependency is a question of fact: Potts v Niddre & Benhar Coal Co Ltd [1913] AC 531 at 539, 542; Aafjes v Kearney (1976) 50 ALJR 454 at 456, 457 and 459. It is concerned with actual and not theoretical support. A person claiming dependency need not be in actual receipt of support at the date of death. It is enough that, as at that date, he or she had a reasonable expectation of support in the future. Dependency may exist at the date of death although actual support cannot or is unlikely to occur until a future time."

1. In Richardson v Turfco Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWWCCPD 43 (Richardson), Keating P identified a number of general statements of principle for determining dependency at [65]:

"(a) dependency is not limited to the class of persons actually in receipt of financial assistance (Sadiq);

(b) dependency refers to a state or condition of being dependent, to having been in this relationship to the deceased (Amaca Pty Ltd v Novek [2009] NSWCA 50);

(c) although dependency is not limited to financial dependency, it does involve one person being beholden to another for some material or physical help or succour, emotional dependency is not enough (Skinner);

(d) 'dependent' in the ordinary sense of the word, means the condition of depending on something or on someone for what is needed (Petrohilos);

(e) a mother's services to a young child may satisfy the test of dependency. To suggest that, in a money sense they are valueless, is simply wrong (Petrohilos);

(f) while one of the commonest forms of dependence might be financial dependence, the word used in the statute (which I infer is the Conveyancing Act 1919) is not limited to financial dependence (Williams), and

(g) the word 'partly' in the phrase 'partly dependent', whilst a word of 'some elasticity', does not mean 'substantially', but means 'more than minimally', or perhaps, 'significantly' (Bremner v Graham [2016] NSWSC 633 at [34] citing Priestley JA at [4] (with whom Hope AJA agreed) in McKenzie v Baddeley [1991] NSWCA 197) (McKenzie)). Meagher JA, in McKenzie at [6], commented that '[c]ommon sense requires that certain trivial activities should be disregarded'."

1. I am satisfied on the uncontradicted evidence before me that the applicant was the deceased worker's spouse. I am also satisfied on the uncontradicted statement evidence before me that the applicant was partly dependent for support on the deceased worker at the date of his death.
2. While Daniel Lambkin and Ryan Lambkin were also members of the deceased worker's family, I am satisfied on the evidence that they were not dependent upon the deceased worker and do not wish to make a claim for a portion of the death benefit.
3. I am further satisfied that appropriate enquiries have been made and there is no evidence of any other person, who may have been dependent on the deceased worker at the time of his death.
4. I am satisfied that the applicant was the only member of the deceased worker's family who was wholly or partly dependent for support upon the deceased worker at the date of his death. Pursuant to s 29(1A) of the 1987 Act, the whole of the lump sum death benefit is to be paid to the applicant.
5. The applicant has sought, and I am satisfied that it is appropriate, that the lump sum death benefit be paid to her directly pursuant to s 85A of the 1987 Act.
6. The parties have advised me that funeral expenses have now been met. Accordingly, there will be no order pursuant to s 26 of the 1987 Act.
7. There was no application for discretionary interest on the lump sum.
8. As the deceased worker was an exempt worker, orders with respect to costs are required. The parties agreed that the usual order ought to be made. There was no application for an uplift due to complexity.