7. This resulted in the applicant having been overpaid in the period between 15 June 2016 when the notification was made and 12 May 2017 when the determination was made. The overpayment was subsequently waived and never recovered.
8. On 30 January 2025 the applicant requested that the Commission review his entitlement to incapacity payments. On 13 February 2025, the Commission reviewed the entitlement and concluded as follows:

I have determined that there is no change to your entitlement and your current rate of your incapacity payment to be $565.88 pre-tax per week for the period from 13 February 2025 to 24 July 2040.[2]

1. That is the original determination.
2. The applicant sought review by the Veterans' Review Board ('VRB').
3. In its decision of 5 June 2025, the VRB recorded the following:

You explained your grounds of review at the hearing. Essentially, your grounds of review amounted to a challenge to the validity of the s 10 determination made by the delegate of the CDF on 15 June 2016.

There is no dispute that you applied for incapacity payments prior to 1 July 2013. You contend that the s 10 determination was ineffective and that the date of your discharge from all forms of ADF employment was 28 October 2019 (the actual date of your discharge) rather than 15 June 2016 (the date you were taken to have ceased being a member of the Defence Force, pursuant to s 10 of the MRCA).

At the hearing you confirmed that you did not dispute the amounts of incapacity payments and superannuation payments received by you and used by you in the calculations in the determination of 12 May 2017 and 13 February 2025. You did not allege any arithmetical errors in the Commission's calculations. You confirmed that your case was that your incapacity payments should not have been reduced by the amount of your pension until 29 October 2019 and that your incapacity payments should not have been reduced to 75% of the full amount until 45 weeks after that, 7 September 2020.[3]

1. The VRB concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review the s 10 determination or the determination assessing entitlement to incapacity payments made on 12 May 2017 and there was no application before the Board for a review of that determination. The VRB noted that the only application before the board was for review of the determination of 13 February 2025. That determination determined the applicant's current and ongoing entitlement to incapacity payments as at 13 February 2025. The VRB noted that the 'current and ongoing entitlement as at 13 February 2025 would be the same, regardless of whether a s 10 determination had been made' in the applicant's case.[4]
2. The VRB affirmed the decision under review.
3. The applicant then applied to this Tribunal for review.
4. In his application for review the applicant stated as follows:

I am submitting this application for review of a decision made by the Veterans' Review Board concerning the Department of Veterans' Affairs Section 10 determination issued on 15 June 2016 and then reopened in February 2025.

...The use of Section 10 in this instance was defective and has caused ongoing financial and psychological harm, as well as unlawful offsets contrary to MRCA policy.

My application to DVA 19 Feb 2025 & then to VRB was solely focussed on the Section 10 determination made by DVA and that I believe it was unlawful, to which was my appeal. For some unknown and very confusing reason, the VRB stated in their determination

19. The s 10 determination was made on 15 June 2016 and there is no application before the Board for a review of that determination. We therefore do not have jurisdiction to review that determination.

(All the evidence and the application to DVA appeal that was reopened by DVA and accepted by DVA was in Feb 2025, was solely about the section 10).

1. At the point when the application was made the applicant was focussed on seeking review of the s 10 notification. The applicant may not have understood at that point that while a s 10 notification alters the basis on which a compensation determination is made, it is not in and of itself an 'original determination' as defined in s 345 of the MRCA and thus susceptible to VRB and Tribunal review.
2. Following receipt of the applicant's application to the Tribunal, the respondent made an application to dismiss the application under s 101 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 ('ART Act').
3. The Tribunal can dismiss an application made to the Tribunal if it is satisfied that the application is 'frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance'. The respondent contends that this application is of that kind. The respondent contends that an application is frivolous, misconceived and lacking in substance because the Tribunal is unable to assist the applicant in a meaningful way. The authorities support that approach to the phrase.[5]
4. The respondent accepts:

(a) its determination dated 13 February 2025 was an 'original determination' under s 345(1)(a) under the MRCA; and > > (b) the VRB decision was a 'reviewable determination' as defined under s 345(1)(c) of the MRCA; > > and that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the VRB's reviewable determination dated 5 June 2025 that affirmed the respondent's original determination dated 13 February 2025.

5. However, the respondent contends that the scope of the review that the Tribunal can undertake is limited as to the period of incapacity that the original determination and the reviewable determination covers - i.e. the applicant's entitlement to incapacity payments from 13 February 2025 and following. In that period, even if the Tribunal takes a different view of the effectiveness of the s 10 notification, it makes no material difference to the calculation of the applicant's incapacity payments in the period the subject of review and the applicant has never suggested any other basis on which he contends that the calculation of his incapacity is not correct. As a consequence there is no meaningful remedy that the Tribunal can give the applicant.
6. The applicant accepts that he can only challenge the 13 February 2025 determination, but contends that the Tribunal should look at the effectiveness of the s 10 notification as it is an important background fact that should be examined. Alternatively, there could be other errors with the determination which may be uncovered by undertaking full merits review.
7. At the hearing it became clear that the applicant does not raise any issue with the calculation of his current entitlements and entitlements covered by the decision of 13 February 2025. The applicant, in the course of the hearing, was unable to identify any error in the determination of his incapacity payments for the period 13 February 2025 and following. He accepts that the Tribunal only 'has jurisdiction to review the determination made on 13 February 2025 as identified by the Veterans' Review Board'.[6] He does appear to accept that from 13 February 2025 onwards he has no currently known basis for contending that his incapacity compensation is being wrongly calculated. At the hearing, the most he could say was that sometimes determinations are not right and he is entitled to merits review.
8. In my assessment that is not an appropriate way of approaching the matter. When an application to dismiss has been made, more is required than raising the possibility that an error might be identified if the matter proceeds to hearing. The respondent has given cogent reasons why the review is unlikely to result in any practical benefit to the applicant even if he were able to establish as a matter of fact that the s 10 notification was ineffective. The applicant cannot resist that contention merely by suggesting that if full merits review takes place there is a chance a mistake has been made.
9. It is clear from the history of the matter and the material lodged in this application, that what the applicant wants re-examined is the s 10 notification and it impact on the calculation of his incapacity payments between 15 June 2016 when the s 10 notification was made, and 45 weeks after he in fact ceased service in the RAAF reserve in 2020. If the applicant is right in his contention that the s 10 notification is invalid or ineffective, then his pension calculation in this period may be affected. However, that is not the period of incapacity the subject of the original determination. The original determination covers the period from February 2025 onwards. There is no dispute that in that period, whether the applicant became a former member in 2016 or 2019, the incapacity calculations are reduced to 75% after applying the 45-week adjustment and do take into consideration his weekly pension amounts. Consequently, there is no reason to suspect that they have not been calculated correctly.
10. No application for review of the determination dated 12 May 2017 has ever been made, or any application for review of the calculation of incapacity in the period up to 45 weeks after the applicant formally left the RAAF Reserve.
11. Review of the original determinations was not sought in 12-month period specified in the MRCA for seeking review. Instead, it appears that the applicant asked the Commission to consider whether his current payments should be redetermined. That is what the Commission did and that has confined the subsequent review by the VRB and the Tribunal. The practical consequence is this. The issues that the applicant now raises - namely whether he should only be treated as a former member at the point at which he actually ceased to be a reservist in 2019 as opposed to in 2016 when the s 10 notification was given - will not affect the calculation of his incapacity payments in the period from February 2025 onwards. If the applicant persuades a Tribunal member that the correct approach is to delay treating him as a former member until he formally separated from the RAAF reserve in 2019, it will have no impact at all on the calculation of his pension in the period covered by the original determination which is the only period that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to reconsider.
12. In these circumstances I accept the respondent's contention that the application is misconceived in that a review cannot result in any practical alteration of the decision to the benefit of the applicant. In those circumstances, an order dismissing the application under s 101 of the ART Act should be made.

1. The application is dismissed pursuant to s 101(1)(a) of the ART Act on the basis that it is misconceived. In the circumstances it is appropriate to exercise the discretion to dismiss.

[5] See for example Re Christopher Paul Williams and Australian Electrical Commission and the Greens [1995] AATA 160 at [38]

[6] Applicant's Jurisdiction Submission dated 1 January 2026, [1].