Kumar v Sydney Western Realty Pty Ltd & Anor - [2021] NSWDC 446 - NSWDC 2021 case summary — Zoe

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Kumar v Sydney Western Realty Pty Ltd & Anor

[2021] NSWDC 446

District Court of NSW|2021-08-05

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

District Court of NSW

Decision date

2021-08-05

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (40 paragraphs)

[1]

243 CLR 361 Kumar v Sydney Realty Pty Ltd & Anor [2021] NSWDC 430 Kyriacou v Kogarah Municipal Council (1995) 88 LGERA 110 March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494 Matar v Jones [2011] NSWCA 304 Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357 Morris v Duke-Cohan & Co (1975) 119 S J 826 Morvatjou v Moradkhani [2013] NSWCA 157 Neal v Ambulance Service (NSW) [2008] NSWCA 346 Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 Provident Capital Ltd v Papa (2013) 84 NSWLR 231 RMS v Grant [2015] NSWCA 138 Russo v Aiello (2003) 215 CLR 643 Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v MasterCard Incorporated [2020] 4 All ER 807 Selig v Wealthsure (2015) 255 CLR 661 Springfield v Duncombe [2017] NSWCA 137 State of NSW v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536 Sykes v Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co Ltd [1971] 1 QB 113 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627 Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 Texts Cited: J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (Lexis Nexis, online version) Jackson & Powell on Professional Liability (8th ed, 2017, Sweet & Maxwell) S Walmsley, A Abadee, B Zipser & G Sirtes, Professional Liability in Australia (3rd ed, 2016, Lawbook Co) Category: Principal judgment Parties: Ms D Kumar (plaintiff) Sydney Western Realty Pty Ltd (first defendant) Mr A Singh (second defendant) Representation: Counsel: Mr R O'Neill for the plaintiff Mr M Klooster for the first defendant Mr M Hutchings for the second defendant

[2]

[3]

BACKGROUND

On 26 May 2019 the plaintiff purchased a residential property in Toongabbie (the 'Property') for the sum of $720,000 as an investment. The property comprised a main house and a granny flat. However, unbeknownst to her at the time that the sale was completed, Council approval had never been obtained for the granny flat.
By this proceeding, commenced on 25 February 2020, the plaintiff sues the first defendant, the vendor's real estate agent, with the trading name Century 21 Eternity (the 'Agent') and the second defendant, the plaintiff's lawyer (the 'Lawyer'), in respect to the purchase of the property, in damages. The plaintiff holds the Agent and the Lawyer responsible for loss and damage arising from the order by Blacktown Council requiring the granny flat to be reinstated as a garage. Those rectification works have not yet proceeded.
As against the Agent, the plaintiff pleads three causes of action: misleading or deceptive conduct, unconscionable conduct, and negligence.
As against the Lawyer, the plaintiff pleads an action in professional negligence, in tort. There was no plea of breach of retainer.
The plaintiff does not distinguish the defendants' respective positions in terms of the loss or damage sustained to her arising from her respective actions against them. In her claim for damages, she identifies, as heads of loss: the diminution in the value of her property, in comparison to the price she paid ($100,000), the cost of rectifying the works to restore it to a garage ($15,675), the fine she paid to Blacktown City Council ($1,500), stamp duty imposed on the price that she paid, which would not have been paid had the property been bought at its true value (ie with an uninhabitable garage) ($14,690) and also a claim for lost rent from December 2020 to the hearing, and into the future.
It is common ground that the search, or searches necessary to ascertain that Council approval was not in place for the habitable use of the garage was, or were, not undertaken. One important question in this case is who was responsible for that position.
Both the Agent and the Lawyer plead a defence of contributory negligence. Both of them say that the plaintiff executed the contract for purchase without legal advice and without making her own inquiry as to the status of the granny flat. Both the Agent and the Lawyer also rely upon proportionate liability, citing each other as a 'concurrent wrongdoer' in the respective claims brought against them, for the purpose of reducing any responsibility each defendant has for loss sustained by reason of its misleading or deceptive conduct (in the case of the Agent) or negligence (in the case of the Lawyer).

[4]

Uncontroversial facts

The following facts were not seriously disputed.
In May 2019, Ms Shaktika Singh (being no relation to the Lawyer, Mr Singh) was the sole director of the Agent. She affirmed an affidavit (22 April 2021). One of the agents within the firm was Mr Robin Dandyan. It appears that in May 2019 Mr Dandyan was approached to sell the Property by the vendor, Ms Lilian Joy Akinyi Owino, as a deceased estate. The agent was informed that the property consisted of a main house and granny flat and that the administrator of the deceased's estate lived in the granny flat and had rented out the main house for more than $440 a week. Ms Owino believed that the granny flat could be rented out for about $440.
Ms Singh and Mr Dandyan inspected the property and found that the main house was rented out to a woman and that Ms Owino was occupying the granny flat. The Agent appraised the property and estimated that the price was between $700,000 and $740,000. Ms Owino engaged the Agent to sell the property and advised her to consult a solicitor or conveyancer to prepare the sale contract. Mr Dandyan was selected to be the agent for the sale.
On 6 May 2019, the Agent signed an exclusive agency agreement to market and sell the property within a price range of $700,000 to $740,000. On 13 May 2019, the exclusive agency period commenced.
On 14 May 2019, the Agent received a copy of the contract for sale from the vendor's solicitors, Kerrisons Legal Services, a firm in Camden Park. The version of the contract annexed to Ms Singh's affidavit contained a Notice from Blacktown City Council (21 August 2013) which incorporated "Advisory Notes", in Part 7, clause 7.1.4, the statement: "The garage is not permitted for habitable uses as the slab floor level has insufficient freeboard protection against flooding."
Ms Singh said, under cross-examination, that she had no 'practice' to read contracts. In her affidavit, she said that the contract was given to Mr Dandyan, who was responsible for the sale to place it in the file. Under cross-examination, she said that it was the practice of the responsible sale agent to read the contract (T 133.22).
By 14 May 2019, the Agent received the marketing contract.
The marketing contract contained a number of special conditions and a development consent issued by Blacktown City Council on 21 August 2013, permitting alteration and additions to the main house, which also contained the Council notice from 21 August 2013 which I have referred to. The most relevant one was Special Condition 52, which contained a cross-reference to the Council's determination.
By 22 May 2019, an advertisement of the property on Real.Estate.com, which Robin Dandyan prepared, advertised the property as being a house (potentially providing rent of $440pw to $460pw) and a granny flat (potentially providing rent of $400pw to $420pw) and the advertisement referred to "this fantastic opportunity for an astute investor to secure a dual income property investment".
Ms Singh said in cross-examination that it was the Agent's practice to merely act as a conduit for the vendor. She said she had not made any inquiries about estimated rental, including that which had been paid to the vendor of the subject property (embracing both the house and the granny flat). Thus, in relation to the advertisement, she said that the Agent had no practice to assess - independently of what the vendor client had informed it - of the accuracy of the information contained therein; other than by conducting its own inspection of the Property. Nevertheless, Ms Singh indicated her belief that Mr Dandyan would 'cross-check' that information (T 138.18). She added that there was no record in her firm's file about any note of the results of any such 'cross-check'. She also said that there was no practice to enquire of the local council the suitability of a property (or part thereof) for approval. Generally, however, she said that after passing on information to a prospective purchaser's solicitor, she would have expected the purchaser's solicitor to conduct such due diligence.
On 22 May 2019, and following the plaintiff's request, Robin Dandyan emailed to the plaintiff a full copy of the contract (including the development consent). A covering email stated a potential rental yield of approximately $850 per week. Ms Kumar said that she had "flipped through" its contents, though she said she did not recall observing the special conditions, the development consent or an architect's drawing.
On 23 May 2019, the plaintiff inspected the Property with the Agent and her mother. The main house and granny flat were observed as being occupied. The occupant of the granny flat was Ms Owino. At the point when she inspected the granny flat, it was obvious to the plaintiff that it had once been a garage. That day, the plaintiff made an offer of $720,000.
On 25 May 2019 (Saturday), the plaintiff decided to purchase the Property after speaking with the Agent at about 4pm. The vendor accepted the plaintiff's offer to purchase for the sum of $720,000. She emailed (at 5:16pm) to Ms Caroline Tsau, of the conveyancing firm, Think Conveyancing, the contract she had received from the Agent. This was for the purpose of obtaining advice.
On 26 May 2019 (Sunday), the Agent effectuated the exchange of contracts, with a sale price of $720,000, and a scheduled completion period of four weeks, or Friday, 14 June 2019 (subject to cl 15). In the event, the Lawyer was able to negotiate an extension of the completion date to 1 July 2019. This reflected the circumstance that the plaintiff had not secured unconditional finance as early as she had hoped for. The contract provided a 5 day cooling off period and the plaintiff paid the deposit. By this stage, the development consent was not attached to the version of the contract signed by the vendor. Ms Kumar said that at the date of exchange, she had not heard back from Ms Tsau, nor had chased her for advice.
On 26 May 2019, the Agent introduced the plaintiff to the Lawyer. This occurred by telephone, with the Agent speaking to the Lawyer during which he put the plaintiff on the call. Following this introduction, Ms Kumar said that she looked to the Lawyer to provide legal advice about the contract, or any (legal) problems about the granny flat.
On 27 May 2019, the Agent emailed a full version of the contract (including the development consent) to the Lawyer.
On 27 May 2019, the Lawyer sent a letter to the plaintiff, a costs disclosure and general advice given to purchasers. These are important documents to the Lawyer's defence. I will return to the content of these documents later in elaboration of the factual narrative.
On 27 May 2019, the Lawyer also corresponded with the vendor's solicitors (Kerrisons Legal Services). Relevantly, the Lawyer raised, as one requisition, the following: "9. Have any renovations or structural improvements been conducted on the property? (a) If so, when were the works undertaken and what type of work was done (b) Does the vendors hold a building certificate and/or received the approval from relevant bodies such as Council or body corporate? If recent renovations or structural improvements have been conducted on the property, kindly please forward us a copy of the home warranty insurance".
The response that was ultimately received form the vendor's solicitor (on 29 May 2019) was: "Yes. Refer to contract in relation to building of granny flat. The Vendor understands that the granny flat was constructed by the deceased previous registered proprietor John Steven Linke, as an owner builder. Further details are not known."
Also on 27 May 2019, the plaintiff obtained a rental appraisal from Ms Jennifer Benny, the property manager at the Agent's office, who opined that the market rental value for the house and granny flat, combined, would be in the vicinity of approximately $850-880 pw.
On 28 May 2019, the plaintiff engaged the Agent to lease and manage the granny flat and main house.
On the same date, the plaintiff and Lawyer exchanged emails about the cost of organising pest and building inspections.
On 30 May 2019, the plaintiff obtained a pest inspection report and a separate building inspection report from Civil Building and Consultancy Pty Ltd (CBC). As recorded in Counsel for the Agent's preliminary written submissions, the building inspection report contained the following statements: "Garage has been converted into a habitable room. Inspector does not know if this has been Council approved" (p 40) There was, thereafter (being the last page of a 55 page report) the following instruction: "Where possible records of the appropriate local authority should be checked to determine or confirm: ….. Whether council has issued a building certificate for the dwelling Where appropriate, legal advice (eg from a solicitor) should be sought to explain title and ownership matters and to deal with matters concerning easements, covenants, restrictions, zoning certificates and all other law-related matters."
At 5:50pm on 30 May 2019, the plaintiff sent the Lawyer the building and pest inspection reports. At 6:06pm, the plaintiff sent the Lawyer a follow up email, asking the Lawyer if he required anything further and indicated that she wanted to "discuss the findings of the building and inspection report ASAP please".
On 31 May 2019, the plaintiff spoke with the Lawyer. The contents of this conversation were disputed.
By 12pm, 4 June 2019, the extended cooling off period expired and the plaintiff became bound to complete the contract.
On 11 June 2019, the Lawyer emailed to the plaintiff information in response to the plaintiff's request for information (in her email of 8 June 2019) regarding the transfer of the warranty for construction defects in her name for the granny flat. The Lawyer's response was to indicate the request for requisition (numbered 9) and the vendor's solicitor's reply to that requisition and stated that she was buying the property in its present condition.
On 18 June 2019, the plaintiff emailed the Lawyer requesting a copy of the tenancy agreement. On the same day, she was informed that there was no written tenancy agreement and, by separate email, that the current tenants had vacated the premises.
On 25 June 2019, the plaintiff received loan documentation from her financier and effected landlord insurance. The Agent located a tenant for the main house.
On 1 July 2019, the contract for purchase was completed.
On 3 July 2019, tenants to the main house moved in. Tenants to the granny flat moved in on 9 August 2019.
On 27 September 2019, the plaintiff received a letter from Blacktown City Council (dated 12 September 2019) attaching a Development Control Order.
On 5 January 2020, the tenant of the main house vacated. Another tenant moved in until that tenant vacated on or about 4 March 2021.
On 13 January 2020, the plaintiff received a $1,500 fine issued by the State's revenue authority for development without development consent.
On 8 December 2020, the tenant of the granny flat moved out.
At no stage did the plaintiff obtain a building certificate from Blacktown City Council or otherwise make enquiries of it.

[6]

The plaintiff's evidence

Ms Kumar swore an affidavit (26 March 2021). She is a product analyst. She was about 25 years of age at the time of the events the subject of this proceeding. Ms Kumar did not profess any prior experience as a property investor, nor was it suggested to her that she had such experience.
She deposed to being interested in a period of two years up to the middle of 2019 in purchasing a property which she could rent out in the short term, for 6 months, before occupying it.
In April 2019, she approached a conveyancing firm in Blacktown (Think Conveyancing) and asked it to represent her when she located a suitable property. In May 2019, she read the advertisement referred to. She was attracted to the idea of a granny flat, as this could generate additional rental income.
After the inspection that occurred on 23 May 2019, Ms Kumar deposed to Ms Dandyan saying to her words to the following effect: "It will be very easy to find tenants for both the main house and the granny flat as this is a very busy main road within walking distance to Toongabbie train station and is also close to Parramatta. There's a lot of interest in the property. I'm a close friend of the owner who has just lost her husband and I'm just helping her out."
At or about the time that she signed the contract for purchase, on 26 May 2019 (Sunday), Ms Kumar deposed to Mr Dandyan asking her whether she had a conveyancer. Ms Kumar informed him that she intended to use Think Conveyancing, from whom she had received a quote and she informed him of the amount of the quote. Ms Kumar deposed to Mr Dandyan suggesting an alternative lawyer, who might charge at a lesser rate and Mr Dandyan making a call on his mobile phone. Ms Kumar heard on Mr Dandyan's phone that this lawyer was Ajay Singh, and she deposed to hearing Mr Dandyan informing Mr Singh that she was purchasing the property as an investment property. After Mr Singh was put on to her, Ms Kumar deposed to informing him on the call that she was purchasing the property as an investment property and that the agent was helping her to source tenants, for both the main house and the granny flat. They then had an exchange on the amount of the quote that the conveyancer had supplied and the Lawyer provided his own quote. Amongst other things, Ms Kumar deposed to discussion about the Lawyer ensuring that there was a sufficient cooling off period in place to enable her to obtain finance. She also deposed to the Lawyer informing her that the Agent had already sent the contact to her and his telling her that he would ring her on Monday (27 May) after reading through it and getting a proposal form for her to sign.
After the conversation, Ms Kumar recalled paying the deposit, which triggered the commencement of the cooling off period. The contract was exchanged the following day. On its face, the contract specified that it was subject to a tenancy, although that was not specified. Improvements were listed on the front page as including a house, a garage and "other: granny flat".
In cross-examination, the Plaintiff was asked why she wished to receive legal services from the Lawyer, rather than Think Conveyancing. The Plaintiff said that the Lawyer had referred to his good relationship with the Agent; that he would take care of her; and that he 'knew' the property. The plaintiff was challenged on this last part of her evidence, as it had not been a matter specifically identified in her affidavit. The plaintiff justified this omission by indicating that she did not consider it relevant at the time that she prepared her affidavit. When it was suggested to her, in effect, that she was emphasising or exaggerating Mr Singh's reference to his knowledge of the property in an attempt to make him appear responsible, the plaintiff said that she placed no significance upon that statement (when she made her affidavit). She mentioned that there was also discussion about the cheaper rate that the Lawyer said he could charge; relative to Think Conveyancing.
On 27 May 2019, the Lawyer called her. She deposed to him saying that he had read through the contract and that "Everything looks like it's standard", her asking him whether a survey was needed and him informing her that this was not required. She deposed to asking him whether pest and building inspections were needed; and that his response was that it was not required but was "recommended". She deposed to the Lawyer informing her that he could refer Ms Kumar to someone would could arrange such inspections.
That same day, another person from the Lawyer's office (Dinusha Perera) sent an email attaching three documents, including a costs disclosure, a general advice and an initial letter.
The plaintiff was cross-examined on all three documents.

[7]

The letter of 27 May 2019

The letter from the Lawyer to the plaintiff, dated 27 May 2019 was explanatory of "the Conveyancing process" for purchasers of property like the plaintiff. Amongst other things, it was pointed out that "Post Exchange", the Lawyer would send any requisitions to the vendor's solicitors about title. The letter suggested that the plaintiff should also ensure that her finance was in order.
Under the sub-heading "What Happens Next" the following passage appeared: "We ask that you please confirm if you want us to order the following [1] : Survey Report - A Survey Report confirms the boundaries of a property and provides a detailed sketch of the land…. A Building Certificate (not to be confused to a pre-purchase building inspection) - is a certificate issued by the Local Council, who, after attending the property to inspect the physical structures on the land, issues a certificate confirming that all improvements are satisfactory to the Council, or issues a work order (Notice) requiring work to be done to remedy any non-compliant structures. Please note that the costs associated with obtaining a Survey Report and Building Report are in the vicinity of $1,000. Further, an application for a Building Certificate must be accompanied by an update to date Survey Report, which means purchasers cannot just apply for a Building Certificate only. (emphasis supplied) Building & Pest inspection report - is also known as pre-purchase building inspection. Is there an alternative to above report? [2] Not really, but you can take out Title Insurance. Title insurance is a specialised type of insurance available to purchasers, and covers a range of issues such as: Building approval was never issued Structures modified and no longer comply …… The downside of Title Insurance is that it doesn't cover 'known risks'. For example, if the seller of property discloses in the Contract that there has been illegal building work, then Title Insurance may not cover those works and may only provide limited coverage. Having said this, we are seeing an increasing number of clients take out Title Insurance as opposed to obtaining Survey Reports and Building Certificates, providing at least some form of coverage should a problem present itself at a later stage.

[9]

General advice to purchasers

In the document titled "General Advice to Purchasers" the following statements were made: "We will seek to the transfer of ownership to you and make sure that you get a good title to the property. We will make or recommend all necessary enquiries about the property and generally advise you and look after your interests." (emphasis supplied) The following is a brief overview of points of interest. PLEASE READ CAREFULLY AND FEEL FREE TO CONTACT US IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTION. … Contract …. In practice 10 days have passed by the time loan approvals are obtained, pest and building reports completed, contracts issued negotiated and signed and the parties are ready to exchange. During this time either party may change their mind. ….. Pest and building reports We will ensure that there are no adverse issues with the title to the property. You need to be sure that you are informed and happy with the condition and state of repair of the buildings. …… Statutory warranties for residential property Under the Conveyancing Act and the Home Building Act some protection is afforded to purchasers of residential property in relation to faulty buildings.. The warranty under the Conveyancing Act, amongst other things, provides a warranty that the building work was performed in a proper and workmanlike manner and in accordance with the plans and specifications, that all new materials supplied were good and suitable for the purpose for which they were used and were new and that the construction complied with the law, and the dwelling is reasonably fit for occupation… Council matters Zoning certificates are attached to all contracts. These disclose the uses that are permitted without consent, those permitted with consent and those prohibited .. … As a major shortcoming of the council certificate required to be attached to all contracts is the lack of information on approvals relating to the construction and use of the property. Not only does the construction of the buildings need approval but their use following construction also needs approval. If, as is usually the case, the vendor does not have a building .. certificate from council, then there is no way of knowing from the contract whether the buildings were built with approval and passed for occupation for their intended use. Inspection of the council file will normally provide the information that is necessary to assess the compliance of the building… (emphasis supplied) …… Stamp duty Stamp duty is payable on the transfer of land and is a significant expense when buying a property. By way of an example on a price of $720,000 the duty payable is approximately $27,910.00. However, if you are a first home buyer, there will be savings of $13,200 … … First Home - Buyers Assistance Scheme The First Home Buyers Assistance scheme commenced from 1 July 2017. The First Home Buyers Assistance scheme provides eligible purchasers with exemptions on transfer duty on new and existing homes valued up to $650,000 and concessions on duty for new and existing homes valued between $650,000 and $800,000. (emphasis supplied)
Under cross-examination, the plaintiff confirmed that she read these documents, or at least the parts of the documents referred to above, to the best of her ability. When the proposition was put to her that there was nothing complex about the 'General Advice' document, the plaintiff answered that its "implications" were "not clear to me", by which she meant the ramifications of its contents to her particular situation.
Mr Singh's affidavit account of his informing Ms Kumar, on 27 May 2019, that to get a Building Certificate in order to obtain a fee and that there would likely be a delay in obtaining it was put to the plaintiff, but she disputed his account.
The plaintiff also accepted that after having paid a premium for landlords' insurance and the earlier pest and building inspection reports, given the purchase price, and the maximum amount that she could obtain for finance to acquire the property, she depended upon her obtaining a concessional benefit under the First Home Owners scheme; and, that, even then, she had only a small sum $2,600 remaining.
Also, on 27 May 2019, Ms Kumar deposed to obtaining a rental appraisal from Mr Dandyan for the two dwellings: the house and the granny flat and was given an appraisal of $850 to $880 per week.
On 28 May 2019, she engaged the Agent to provide exclusive rights to lease and manage the two dwellings.

[10]

CBC's Building inspection and pest inspection reports & discussion with Mr Singh on 30 May

On the same date there was an exchange about organising for the pest and building inspections to be carried out. The Lawyer referred her to CBC for this purpose.
She received both reports on 30 May 2019 (Annexure E to Ms Kumar's affidavit). The pest report ran to 35 pages. The building inspection report ran to 55 pages. She deposed to asking the Lawyer whether he had read the building and inspection reports. After this, she recalled referring to the building and pest inspection reports and also recalled discussing with the Lawyer whether the purchase price might be negotiated downward to deal with the condition of the windows. She recalled the Lawyer telling her that he had read the reports and there were no major concerns, and, further, that it was too late to negotiate for the variation in the price.
At 5:50pm on 30 May 2019, the plaintiff emailed the Lawyer the reports and asked that she could discuss the reports with him. A follow up email was sent at 6:06pm. Mr Singh later gave evidence that he did not recall receiving these emails. He recalled that a telephone conversation with Ms Kumar had occurred between 4 and 5pm that day.
On 31 May 2019, Ms Kumar deposed to Shontel Singh, of the Lawyer's office, advising her that the Lawyer had requested from the vendor's solicitors an extension of the cooling off period, to 5:00pm on 3 June 2019. This was to enable the plaintiff time to obtain unconditional loan approval. At 4:42pm, the Lawyer emailed her indicating that the vendor had agreed to extend the cooling off period to 5:00pm, 3 June 2019. However, it is common ground that the Lawyer procured a further extension of the period to 12:00pm the next day.
Mr Singh's account of his conversation with the plaintiff was put to her in cross-examination. She denied his account of informing her that the only way to work out the status of the granny flat was to seek a building certificate and that he sought her instructions to request getting a certificate, but she had not provided them. She accepted that, at this point, what was uppermost in her mind was ensuring that she had unconditional loan approval. She maintained that to the extent that she discussed the granny flat with the Lawyer at all, it was limited to discussion of the need to obtain rental income from it and that she wanted to get in a tenant as soon as possible. She also added that she had no discussion with Dinusha Perera, the Lawyer's assistant, on obtaining a building certificate and the lawful occupation of the granny flat. It was Ms Perera who provided her with information about the concessional benefits on stamp duty for first home buyers.
On 3 June 2019, Ms Kumar spoke to Mr Tariq Sherzai, author of the pest and building inspection reports, but only essentially about the condition of the window sills.
On 4 June 2019, she paid the balance of the (5%) deposit to the Agent. The plaintiff accepted that by this time, she was aware of the architectural drawings and content of the development consent from August 2013; although she disputed having discussed them with her Lawyer. She said she did not understand what the drawings represented and had no real understanding of the content of the contract for sale, more generally, other than the covering page. By 12:00pm, the cooling off period had expired.
The next day, she received unconditional loan approval from her financier. She also received from the Lawyer's office the 'First Home Buyer concession Application and Purchaser Declaration'.
On 8 June 2019, the plaintiff sent an email to the Lawyer requesting the warranty for the construction defect to transfer to her name for the granny flat (and certificate of completion).
Ms Kumar deposed to reading (on 11 June 2019) the Lawyers' requests for requisitions that had been made on 27 May 2019, including requisition 9, and the vendor's solicitor's response; whose respective terms I have indicated elsewhere and the content of the reply by the vendor's solicitor. Ms Kumar deposed to no further explanation being supplied to her about the granny flat and that she was not made aware at that time of the implications of the vendor's solicitor's response. She complains that, as at 11 June, the Lawyer did not point out to her any issues concerning the granny flat and that she was not advised by him that she needed to make inquiries of Blacktown City Council nor that the garage was not approved as a granny flat.
It was put to Ms Kumar, but she disputed, that she had understood, when reading the requisition and reply by this date, that no building certificate had been obtained. She said that she interpreted the correspondence she had received on that date as signalling no cause for alarm. She accepted that when she informed the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner that she read this documentation on 8 July 2019, that date was erroneous.

[11]

Expert opinion evidence

The plaintiff adduced (without objection by Mr Singh) expert opinion evidence from Mr Roger Harkin, being a report dated 24 August 2020. Mr Harkin is a solicitor who practises in the Sydney CBD and has been a practitioner since he was admitted in 1986. He has been an accredited specialist in Property Law since 1997. He has substantial experience with in the 'Property' section of a range of law firms. His expertise was not challenged.
In his report, Mr Harkin noted that one of his instructions was that although Special Condition 52 referred to the document, neither the development approval ('DA') nor the plans were received by the Lawyer on 27 May 2019. That instruction was wrong: as will be indicated, Mr Singh's affidavit evidence indicates that he did receive the DA.
At any rate, Mr Harkin opined that reasonable practice would have seen the Lawyer requesting a copy of the DA and the plans to ensure that the plaintiff was aware of their contents and was satisfied about them before the end of the cooling off period. Reasonably competent practice would have also been that the Lawyer would point out to the client any provisions in the contract which s/he should be aware adversely affecting the use of the property and to explain to the client that she should satisfy herself as to the contents of the contract before the end of the cooling off period. Reasonably competent practice would have seen the Lawyer advise the plaintiff of cl 7.1.4 of the DA.
Mr Harkin also noted that the front page of the contract noted the crossing of the box, that the purchase was subject to existing tenancies. He opined that reasonably competent practice would have seen the Lawyer ask for copies of the tenancy agreements.
Mr Harkin considered the requisition number 9 and the replies by the vendor's solicitor. Mr Harkin opined that reasonably competent practice would have required the solicitor, before the end of the cooling off period, to relay its content to the client and have prompted the Lawyer to have another look at the contract for what it said about the 'granny flat' and instructions sought from the client prior to the expiry of the cooling off period.
Mr Harkin said that in circumstances where the improvement had been relatively recent and in the light of the reply from the vendor's solicitor to requisition 9, common practice would have seen the Lawyer alert the client to that fact and to warn her that she may be purchasing a property which did not meet the requirements of Council's approval. (emphasis supplied)
In summary, Mr Harkin considered that it would have been common practice for the Lawyer to have advised the plaintiff, prior to the end of the cooling off period, about the provisions of the contract regarding the DA and the plans, as referred to in the report, and the risk that she was taking if she proceeded with the purchase.
Mr Harkin was not required to attend for cross-examination.

[13]

27 May 2019 conversation - the introduction

Mr Singh disputed several parts of the plaintiff's account of her conversation with him on 27 May 2019 in the latter's affidavit. He disputed the (implicit) suggestion that he was trying to undercut the price offered by Think Conveyancing. His recollection was that the plaintiff was only looking for a conveyancer and he had indicated to the plaintiff that his firm could supply that service. After she had informed him that she had already signed a contract, Mr Singh quoted fees of $900 plus any disbursements, such as building and pest inspections plus any compulsory searches, water rates, or council rates.
Mr Singh did not, however, dispute that he became introduced to the plaintiff through the Agent. He deposed in his affidavit that, during his first conversation with the plaintiff, the Agent (Robin Dandyan) said that the Agent had secured a 5 day cooling off period but that the plaintiff's lawyer could always ask for an extension. He indicated that the firm's clients had often been provided with the Lawyer's contact details.
In this initial (telephone) conversation with the plaintiff, Mr Singh said that he asked her to email the contract under the apprehension that it had not yet been executed, so he could 'go through it' before she paid the deposit; but the plaintiff had said that she had already signed it.
Mr Singh deposed that he received the email from the Agent enclosing the contract on 27 May 2019. He disputed saying to the plaintiff that he had read the contract and that everything appeared as if it was standard. But he accepted, in cross-examination, that, consistently with his usual practice when acting for a purchaser, he read the contract. He said in his evidence that his practice was to look "at everything". He also said that if he discovered something unusual, he would write to the client, give advice and provide options. His practice was such that he would do this before he corresponded with the vendor's solicitor (T 143-144).
In his affidavit, Mr Singh attached an email from Robin Dandyan on 27 May 2019 (11:01) which email featured two attachments. The first was the contract. The contract incorporated, as a Special Condition (cl 52) two attachments, being a Notice of Determination of a Development Application of Blacktown City Council dated 21 August 2013 and Council approved plans.
One of the attachments to Mr Dandyan's email was the Notice of Determination of Blacktown City Council of 21 August 2013 which, to repeat, contained the following statement: "7.1.4 The garage is not permitted for habitable uses as the slab floor level has insufficient freeboard protection against flooding."
He said that he read the Notice of Determination (and clause 7.1.4) on 27 May.

[14]

Mr Singh's account of his explaining the contract - 27 May 2019

Mr Singh deposed that in a telephone conversation with the plaintiff which he says occurred on 27 May 2019, he informed her that "we" had gone through the contract, identified certain other matters (a missing sewer location diagram, the absence of an easement and a missing survey report) and also had some discussion about a survey. Then, more materially, Mr Singh deposed to the following discussion: "Me: There is a clause in the Contract that states that you are buying the property in its current state of repair. We strongly suggest that you obtain a Building and Pest report. Look, Dinusha will email you our costs disclosure today, and letter of advice which explains the conveyancing process. Please go through that letter and general advice and let us know what you want to do. It explains the Survey, Pest and Building Report Plaintiff: Thank you Ajay, I will go through the email, but I can only respond to your email tonight Me: Please, if you can because we only have 5 days cooling off period, so we need to act fast. I need your instructions in writing please. Plaintiff: I will email you tonight."
Mr Singh accepted under cross-examination that there was no reference in his affidavit to any indication supplied by him, on 27 May 2019, about cl 7.1.4 and what it might mean, but he maintained that he did in fact discuss this with the plaintiff on that date. He also said that he spoke to the plaintiff about the content of the letter he was proposing to send to the vendor's solicitor.
He was referred to a 'file note/progress' (Exhibit 2D2), a document which appeared to summarise all conversations that Mr Singh had with the plaintiff in connection with the conveyancing matter. In answer to a question from myself, Mr Singh agreed with the proposition that the Court could infer that matters that were material for the protection of the plaintiff's interests which were the subject of communications between himself and the plaintiff would be expected to be referred to in this document (T 165.50). He said, more than once, that in it, he would record "important things".
This file note is of sufficient general significance to warrant being set out: FILE NOTE/PROGRESS CLIENT NAME: Dilasha Veshnavi KUMAR ADDRESS: ……. RE: RE: KUMAR purchase from Owino as Administrator of the Estate of the Late John Steven Linke PROPERTY: 75 Cornelia Road, TOONGABBIE NSW 2146 - Folio 4/1146635 Date Description Staff Spoke to client-explained the Contract. • Explained no easement • Sewer diagram and missing location diagram • Explained amendments seeking from O/S 27/5/19 • Explained the metal fence b/w the boundary AS • Need for Building and pest inspection report • Informed her to contact the consultant directly to explain the reports and payment terms • Survey report is not included and we can make enquiries - client does not want us to do that. • Explained that buying property in its current state. Needs to be satisfied with the condition now. 27/5/19 Letter to O/S with request for amendments AS 31/5/19 Spoke to client. She wants extension-cooling off period AS 3/6/19 Spoke to client - reminded of exchange date and explained the process. DP 11/6/19 Spoke to client regarding Granny flat. Explained the buying in its present status. AS 24/6/19 Spoke to client - ok to release deposit DP 26/6/19 Spoke to client about early access and insurance AS 28/6/19 Spoke to client and discussed the funds required at settlement - as per settlement stat AS 1/7/19 Spoke to client -raised issue regarding the condition of the house AS 1/7/19 Order on agent sent AS

[18]

Mr Singh's account of a telephone conversation with the plaintiff on 31 May 2019

Mr Singh then deposed to his recollections of what was said in a telephone conversation with the plaintiff on 31 May 2019. He deposed to calling her on his mobile phone and having a conversation in the following terms: "Me: Dilasha, do you still want to proceed in absence of this approval of granny flat. Plaintiff: What option do I have? Me: The only way to find out if the Garage is to be approved to be converted to a granny flat is to order a building certificate and survey report. We have explained this in our initial letter to you. Plaintiff: Yes, I know. No, it's okay it doesn't matter don't worry about those reports. I want an extension of the cooling off period so I can speak to Tariq regarding the building and pest inspection Me: Are you sure? Plaintiff: Yes, Ajay, thank you."
Counsel for the plaintiff challenged the content of this conversation in its entirety, but Mr Singh adhered to it. He accepted that on this version of a conversation that day, no reference had been made to the conversation on the afternoon of 30 May; nor any inquiry by him of the plaintiff as to whether she had learned anything more about the garage, and its status, from Mr Sherzai.
Mr Singh accepted that its content was not the subject of any confirmatory written advice or communication with the plaintiff. His explanation for not confirming the exchange in writing was that he had received a verbal authority from her. He also accepted that in the general note (Exhibit 2D2), there was no additional record of the plaintiff's instruction recorded.
Mr Singh deposed to preparing a typed note of that verbal authority, which he said was prepared on his computer 'Notepad'. He explained that the note recorded only part of the conversation that he said he had with the plaintiff. The file note stated: "File Note - 31/5/2019 Spoke to client - she does not want to order Building certificate and Survey report. Advised her that this is the only way to find out if the Garage was approved to be converted to Granny flat. She advised not to order those. It is okay it doesn't matter. She wants extension of cooling off period so she can speak to Tariq regarding Building and Pest inspection Ajaya"
Counsel for the plaintiff put it to Mr Singh that the note was not created on 31 May 2021, but only later. Mr Singh denied this proposition. Over the objection of Counsel for the plaintiff, leave was granted to Mr Singh to adduce evidence of a prior consistent statement, made by Mr Singh's solicitor, on 15 September 2020 that he had created a note of a conversation with the plaintiff on that date [3] .
It was suggested to Mr Singh that in lieu of suggesting that the plaintiff obtain a Building Report, he could have attended the Council to inspect its file in relation to the matter. Mr Singh explained that, to his understanding, even if he had done so, he would have been asked to apply for a certificate.
At 1:55pm on 31 May 2019, the plaintiff sent an email to Mr Singh. The main point of the email was to ask him to check with the vendor's solicitor if the vendor had accepted her request for an extension of the cooling off period. More materially, however, the plaintiff indicated that "Re the building & pest report - I will liaise directly with the builder."
Mr Singh disputed the plaintiff's assertion that it was not until 11 June 2019 (when the Lawyer alluded to the vendor's solicitor's reply to requisition 9) that any explanation was given to her about the granny flat, and/or that at no stage did the Lawyer point out any issues or advise to her that the granny flat may not have been approved.
The notification of the requisition and reply from the vendor's solicitor was made, by email, by the plaintiff. Mr Singh accepted that he spoke to the plaintiff before the email went out. There was no reference in that email to any earlier advice given to the plaintiff on the subject of the status of the garage/granny flat. When it was suggested that he did not speak to the plaintiff about the granny flat on 11 June, Mr Singh responded that he did. He accepted, however, that this was not referred to in his affidavit.
Mr Singh relied upon his accounts of telephone conversations on 27 and 30 May 2019, referred to above. (Curiously, in his affidavit, he did not also refer to his account of his conversation with the plaintiff on 31 May 2019).

[20]

Case against the Agent

As indicated, by her pleading, the plaintiff brings three actions against the Agent: misleading or deceptive conduct, unconscionable conduct and negligence.
As to the two statutory actions, the plaintiff's complaint is substantially the same: the Agent became aware from 14 May 2019, when it received the Notice of Determination of a DA from the vendor's solicitors, that the granny flat was not permitted for habitable use. With that knowledge, it was misleading and unconscionable for it to continue to represent the garage area as a granny flat and, further, to continue to represent: 1. The purported granny flat had a potential rental return of $400 - 420 per week; and 2. It would be very easy to find tenants for the main house and the granny flat.
As to the action in negligence, the plaintiff alleges that the Agent was under a duty of care in making representations to her as to the capacity of the said garage area to be used as a granny flat and as to its rental capacity. She says that the risk of harm that she would suffer loss in the event that the granny flat was not approved as habitable was foreseeable (in the sense of being actually or constructively known) to it.
If not expressly pleaded in so many words, it is clear that the plaintiff alleges that the Agent did not take reasonable precautions to avoid the risk of harm by failing to advise her that the granny flat/garage was not habitable. As I read her pleading, it appeared that part of the case on the negligence action is that the Agent failed to advise her appropriately in the light of its knowledge of the content of the Notice of Determination.
In his closing submissions, Counsel for the plaintiff accepted that no matter how the action was framed, his client's complaint, in substance, was that representations made in the advertisement were unqualified, when they should have been qualified as to avoid the risk of the plaintiff being misled or deceived.
Counsel for the plaintiff further accepted in closing oral argument, that the Court could proceed on the basis that the result of the claim of misleading or deceptive conduct would also be dispositive of the actions of unconscionable conduct and negligence (and, to the extent that it is different from the action in negligence, negligent misstatement) [4] . By her pleading of her complaint about unconscionable conduct, no reference was made to any general equitable doctrine of 'unconscionable conduct' or any or all of ss 20, 21 or 22 of the Australian Consumer Law ('ACL') and no particulars were, so far as was made known to the Court, furnished by the plaintiff as to what made the Agent's conduct 'unconscionable'. Further, in her closing written submissions, the plaintiff made no reference to a statutory action for unconscionable conduct. It is appropriate, in the circumstances, to treat that particular statutory action as being abandoned. I will therefore proceed to deal first with the action for misleading or deceptive conduct.
No point is taken that the Agent's conduct was not "in trade or commerce".
Whether conduct is misleading or deceptive is to be determined by deciding whether the conduct, when viewed in all of the circumstances, could be characterised as misleading or deceptive. This is a question of fact, determined objectively. Thus, there is no fault element in proof of an action for misleading conduct. Further, and what makes the action even more attractive to a claimant in comparison to an action in negligence based upon a misrepresentation (or omission to disclose information), there is no requirement to prove any duty of care, nor the foreseeability of outcome [5] . Because of the objective nature of the inquiry, when characterising the advertisement, the question is not how the plaintiff interpreted it, but how a reasonable person in her position would have interpreted it; and, further, it matters not what the Agent's state of mind was when engaging in the conduct.
As I construe the plaintiff's case, the Agent represented, or more accurately, opined, that the granny flat had rent potential between $400 to $420 per week that the purchase of the property as providing a fantastic opportunity for an investor to secure a dual income property investment. In substance, the Property, comprising both a house and a granny flat was promoted and marketed as providing a revenue stream, individually, from the house and, separately, the granny flat.
This, it was said, was misleading because of a combination of circumstances. Mr Dandyan was aware that a prospective purchaser interested in acquiring the property for investment purposes would be attracted to the advertisement and be induced to think that if the property was purchased, a dual income stream would be earned. But consistent with Ms Singh's description of the usual practice of the agency to read contracts supplied by a vendor before passing them on to a prospective purchaser, Mr Dandyan probably read the contract and, probably also read cl 7.1.4 of the Council's Notice of Determination. Although not himself a lawyer, as a real estate agent, having seen the reference, he would have understood that the provision cast doubt, at least at the date of the Council's determination (24 August 2013) that the garage area could legally be used for any habitable purpose, let alone rented out to provide the owner with a potential income stream. With that knowledge, to avoid the plaintiff being misled, it was incumbent upon Mr Dandyan to indicate, in effect, that the Agent had information in its possession to suggest that there was doubt about the legality of the use of the granny flat for the purpose that the plaintiff desired and, that being so, she should obtain legal advice on the point.
Insofar as the plaintiff complains about a misrepresentation in the advertisement, it would be erroneous to simply commence inquiry with the representation itself. As the Court of Appeal determined in Ireland v WG Riverview Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 307 at [74], following a survey of relevant authorities, such as Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592 and Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304, s 18 of the ACL requires consideration of the whole of the circumstances, including amongst other things, the nature of the parties, the character of the transaction and the contents of the document said to contain the misrepresentation. In Ireland, the Court of Appeal also drew a distinction, when the focus is upon the content of a documentary representation, between a statement of fact and a statement of opinion, or belief. In the latter case, it is usually understood that expressions of belief or opinion are not misleading or deceptive in the absence of reasonable grounds for the opinion.
As to the nature of the parties, the plaintiff, then aged in her mid-20s, was, as I have said, an intelligent and articulate woman; with strong analytical skills and also a confidence in her ability to make decisions. However, as a matter of fact, she had no prior experience of purchasing property generally, or, specifically, for investment purposes and she did not represent this to the Agent. There is nothing to suggest that the Agent had a contrary view of her absence of prior experience. The Agent was experienced in forming market appraisals about rental streams from properties in the Toongabbie area. This included not only market appraisals of a house, but also a property comprising a home and a granny flat.
The character of the transaction was the prospective sale of a residential property for investment purposes. The advertisement was not 'pitched' towards owner-occupiers, but rather to an 'astute investor', ie a particular subset of purchaser. The content of the advertisement was not addressed solely to any particular individual. That being so, it is appropriate to identify some criteria of a representative member of the class to whom the advertisement was directed [6] . In my view, relevant criteria would include not only the practical certainty that the prospective purchaser would obtain legal advice about the contract, but also the likelihood that the hypothetical purchaser either had the benefit of financial advice or was sufficiently knowledgeable in financial matters to make their own decisions without it, about the prudence of making the investment. I consider that the Agent could reasonably consider that a reader of the advertisement, in those circumstances, would read the advertisement in its entirety, and rely upon it when deciding whether to make the form of the investment. I do not, however, consider that the plaintiff could reasonably have formed a view that the Agent was equipped to provide advice about the legality of the use of the granny flat, or the suitability of the property to meet the plaintiff's financial circumstances; nor that the Agent could reasonably understand that an interested and prospective purchaser would expect the Agent to supply any such advice. On the plaintiff's account, what I regard as the parties' mutual expectations, were confirmed when she indicated to the Agent that she was proposing to speak to Think Conveyancing.
As to the contents of the advertisement, the two matters to which I have referred are the marketing of an investment opportunity to secure a dual income property and the rent potential, specifically, for each of the main house and the granny flat. Both statements are, in my view, expressions of opinion about the prospects of purchasers obtaining a revenue stream; and not a statement of fact.
Much of what I have indicated, so far, points against the plaintiff. However, unusual or unexpected circumstances may arise in the course of a transaction which gives rise to an expectation of disclosure of a qualifying fact affecting a representation, lest someone be misled, in the sense explained by French CJ and Kiefel J in Miller at [23]: "When a document contains a statement that is true, non-disclosure of an important qualifying fact will be misleading or deceptive if the recipient would be misled, absent such disclosure, into believing that the statement was complete. In some cases it might not be necessary to invoke non-disclosure at all where a statement which is literally true, but incomplete in some material respect, conveys a false representation that it is complete."
Two matters present difficulty for the Agent. The first difficulty was the absence of an express disclaimer in the advertisement. In this regard, it was beside the point that, Ms Singh, the Agent, subjectively considered that her firm was a mere conduit for the vendor. It is one thing to suggest, as Counsel for the Agent argued, that a person in Ms Kumar's position would expect that the vendor was the source of information. However, what was attractive to Ms Kumar was the estimate of rental in the advertisement, for both the main house and the granny flat. That was an opinion from an agent who expressly or implicitly professed the expertise to supply an opinion. The position is distinguishable from one of the authorities cited by the Agent, being Hyder v McGrath Sales Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 223, where what was misleading was a representation of fact (the availability of parking) and there was a disclaimer.
In conveying an opinion, the Agent was deploying its own expertise, doubtless informed by facts supplied by the vendor, but nevertheless remaining the Agent's opinion. Although Ms Singh said that the vendor was the source of information, in my view, part of the opinion would also have been based upon the Agent's understanding of rental returns for comparable properties within the Toongabbie area. Ms Singh herself deposed in her affidavit that it was not just what the vendor had told her and Mr Dandyan, that informed the rental appraisal, but their own viewing of the Property as well. In any event, nothing was done by the Agent to expressly convey to someone like the plaintiff that the Agent was merely passing on the vendor's opinion. I consider that cases like Butcher, Hyder and Ireland v WG Interview, and what they say about the significance of disclaimers, are distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case.
I find that it is probable that Mr Dandyan read the contract and was aware of what was said about the use of the garage. I rely, in this regard, partly upon Ms Singh's evidence about the practice of the sales agents in her firm to read the contracts supplied by the vendor (or the vendor's solicitor) (T 133.19 - 133.21), even if there was no documentary record of his reading it (T 138.47). She also said that she expected that Mr Dandyan would have cross-checked the accuracy of the information (T 138.18). No evidence was elicited from Ms Singh in re-examination to suggest any circumstance she was aware of which might suggest that Mr Dandyan did not read the contract or cross-check the information imparted by the vendor. The Notice of the Council's determination was a prominent part of the contract (being the subject of a special condition) and, from the point of view of the accuracy of the advertisement, what was most pertinent was what that determination had to say about the prohibited use of one of the two buildings which the advertisement represented could be exploited to obtain rental.
Though Ms Singh said Mr Dandyan was no longer employed by the Agent, no suggestion was advanced by the Agent that he was not available to give evidence, to disclaim having actually read it, or cross-checked information to assist with the rental appraisal or to suggest that what he read was limited. When weighing Ms Singh's evidence of the practice of real estate agents within her firm to read contracts, the Court is entitled to take into account the Agent's capacity to call him. If the Agent's position was that Mr Dandyan read the contract, but not that particular part of it, the Agent was the party best able to adduce evidence of that position [7] . It could not be expected that the plaintiff could have called him: she had no basis for knowing what he had read other than Mr Dandyan informing her of what he read. Ms Kumar was not asked about what Mr Dandyan had said to her on the topic of which parts of the contract Mr Dandyan had read by Counsel for the Agent. This reasoning is, in my view, consistent with the rule in Blatch v Archer [8] .
But a further way of looking at the matter is whether I can go further and draw the Jones v Dunkel [9] inference that the Agent's unexplained failure to call Mr Dandyan would not have assisted the Agent's case. The Agent submitted that no such inference could be drawn whilst the plaintiff submitted that it should.
In Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191, Glass JA (at 201-2) identified three conditions for the operation of the principle: (1) the missing witness would be expected to be called by one party rather than the other; (2) the witness' evidence would have elucidated a particular matter; and (3) the witness' absence is unexplained.
I am comfortably satisfied that the second and third conditions to the operation of the principle are satisfied. Mr Dandyan's evidence would be expected to elucidate whether he read the contract and what part of it he read and whose content was appreciated by him; and his absence was unexplained. In the latter regard, the only evidence relevant was the statement in Ms Singh's affidavit (affirmed on 22 April 2021), just short of two years after the material events in question, that Mr Dandyan was "no longer working for us". That may be a statement of Mr Dandyan's employment status, but it is not an explanation for his absence.
The real question is whether it would be expected that Mr Dandyan would be called by the Agent, rather than by Ms Kumar. As Glass JA elaborated in Payne v Parker, there are different ways of framing the question (citations omitted): "..where it would be natural for one party to produce the witness … the witness would be expected to be available to one party rather than the other ..where the circumstances excuse one party from calling the witness, but require the other party to call (him) .. or where he might be regarded as in the camp of one party, so as to make it unrealistic for the other party to call him .. or where the witness' knowledge may be regarded as the knowledge of one party rather than the other .. or where (his) absence should be regarded as adverse to the case of one party rather than the other .."
Counsel for the Agent drew the Court's attention to two authorities which indicated that just because a witness was a former employee of an employer (the latter being a party in litigation) did not, of itself, mean that the former employee was in the camp of the employer [10] . (emphasis supplied) However, much depends on the circumstances. This includes, for example, where the absent witness stands in the structure or confidence of the employer and the passage of time between the event which the witness could have given evidence about and the exit of the witness from employment. More significantly, as was noted by both Glass JA in Payne v Parker and Gleeson JA in Doppstadt, with reference to the observations of Lush J in Earle v Castlemaine District Hospital [1974] VR 722 ("Earle") at 734, is whether the knowledge of the absent witness is of the kind which an employee (present or former) would be unlikely to disclose to the opposing party: in this case, Ms Kumar.
There was little inquiry of where Mr Dandyan stood in the Agent's structure, but the period between the event and his exited departure (taking Ms Singh's vague indication as the latest reference point - ie 22 April 2021) was not very significant. I consider that what is most material is the point raised by Lush J in Earle.
It could hardly be supposed that the information about whether Mr Dandyan read the contract and what parts of it he read and appreciated would likely be disclosed to Ms Kumar. To the contrary, I find that it would be highly unlikely that it would be disclosed to her. It would be unlikely since in the context of the potential application of the ACL, Mr Dandyan's conduct was conduct engaged in on his personal behalf, but was also engaged by him on behalf of his employer. To the extent that he made a representation, or expressed an opinion, he did so on behalf of his employer and his employer would be jointly and severally liable with him for that conduct if it was found to be misleading [11] . In other words, Mr Dandyan and the Agent had a common interest in the evidence. The question whether he had a reasonable basis for his opinion turned upon whether he had read information which might put his expression of opinion into question. It would hardly be supposed that he would answer any potential inquiry of Ms Kumar since in doing so, he could not only expose himself to personal liability; but also potentially, his (then) employer.
The plaintiff's pleading (paragraph 31) clearly conveyed that an issue in this case was the Agent's 'awareness' of the content of the Notice of Determination by Blacktown City Council. By its defence, the Agent admitted that it had received the Notice. That admission, however, did not amount to an admission of the Agent's 'awareness' of its content. Aside from indicating that the practice in her firm was for agents to read contracts provided to them by the vendor's solicitor, Ms Singh said that she had not read the contract. The only person, therefore who could meaningfully address the allegation that the Agent was aware of the contents of the contract was Mr Dandyan. In my view, in order to fully traverse the plaintiff's allegation that the Agent was aware, the Agent, and its lawyers, would very likely have had sought out Mr Dandyan. Any information he gave to the Agent's lawyers would have been privileged. The privilege would have been common to himself and the Agent [12] .
In the circumstances, I find that virtually all of the descriptions given by Glass JA to this material condition are satisfied. It was to be expected that Mr Dandyan would be called by the Agent rather than by Ms Kumar.
I infer that the uncalled evidence on whether Mr Dandyan read the contract and, more particularly, whether he read the contract, seen special condition 52 and would likely have observed the Notice of Determination and cl 7.1.4, would not have assisted the Agent's case. Alternatively, I draw greater confidence from Ms Singh's evidence about the reasonable practices of agents within her firm to read contracts, in inferring that Mr Dandyan read it, appreciated the import of the Council notice, given that he was in a position to cast light on whether that inference should be drawn [13] .
I do not consider that the significance of an attached Notice of Determination from a local council would have been insignificant to a real estate agent, even if the agent was not a lawyer. As already indicated, the suggestion that one of the two buildings the subject of the opinion about rental might be subject to a prohibition upon use struck at the heart of the extent of the investment opportunity generally promoted in the advertisement; and the specific estimate for rental on the granny flat in particular.
That being so, in the way that the plaintiff ultimately put her case, it was not a complaint that the Agent did not provide legal advice, information or opinion. It was simply a complaint that it might have been expected that someone in Mr Dandyan's position would, with his awareness that the plaintiff had seen the advertisement, and was apparently attracted to buying it on the faith of the opinion as to a dual income stream, and with his additional awareness of an issue about the use of the granny flat, should have qualified the opinion about the rental potential of the granny flat by saying that it depended upon the circumstance that the granny flat was legally habitable; a matter about which the plaintiff should seek legal advice about. Until that was ascertained, there was no reasonable basis for the unqualified expression of opinion about the rental income to be derived from the granny flat or the holding out that a prospective purchaser like the plaintiff might, upon purchase, acquire a 'dual income' stream.
This obligation was not relieved by the circumstance that Mr Dandyan and Ms Singh inspected the granny flat and saw that it was occupied by the vendor herself. The vendor had, apparently, a plain interest in the sale of the property and, unless pressed to do so, had no incentive to make such inquiry herself. Further, contrary to a submission advanced for the Agent, this was not a case of some sort of equivalence in information (or lack thereof) between the Agent and the prospective purchaser. Mr Dandyan had the information and it was the Agent who conveyed an unqualified opinion.
In my view, by failing to qualify the opinion in the advertisement in his communications with the plaintiff, Mr Dandyan, and the Agent, had no reasonable basis for expressing it in the unqualified way that it did. In this way the Agent engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct.
As indicated, it is not necessary to separately consider whether the Agent engaged in unconscionable conduct or was liable under the general law of negligence (or negligent misstatement).

[21]

Causation

Mr Klooster, Counsel for the Agent, submitted that the test of causation for an action for damages for misleading or deceptive conduct did not substantially differ from the statutory test for causation for an action for negligence under s 5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ('CL Act'). He also conceded that if, contrary to his primary submissions and as I have found, that the Agent engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, 'factual causation' was made out [14] .
Mr Klooster contended, however that, to the extent that the causation test for the contravention of s 18 of the ACL carries a 'scope of liability' or, to use a synonym, 'legal' test for causation, the plaintiff has not discharged it. This is because of the circumstance that both the Agent and the plaintiff mutually contemplated that the latter would receive legal advice and the Agent was entitled to expect that whoever that lawyer was would, in the exercise of reasonable care and skill, have ascertained the legal status of the granny flat in connection with whether habitable use was permissible. If the Lawyer did not exercise that care (a subject I will return to at length), then such voluntary, deliberate and unreasonable conduct served as a 'break in the chain' of causal connection between the Agent's own misleading conduct and loss sustained by the client. If the Lawyer did exercise care, then the risk would have been identified to the client with the prospect that she would have had an informed opportunity to take steps to ascertain the position and determine that she was prepared to take the risk of relying upon occupation of an illegal structure to generate rental income.
I am not convinced about the limitation suggested by Mr Klooster which assimilates the test for causation under the statutory regime which has, as one of its main objects, the protection of 'consumers', with the test for causation in the general law [15] . The action for damages (for contravention of s 18) lies in s 236 of the ACL. It is enough that loss or damage is suffered "by" the contravention.
The Agent's submissions overlooks the circumstance that in a misleading or deceptive conduct case, it is rarely the case, and it is not necessary for a claimant to prove, that a wrongful party's misleading conduct is the sole cause of a claimant's loss [16] . As Gleeson CJ noted in Henville v Walker: "The purpose of the legislation is not restricted to protection of the careful or the astute. Negligence on the part of a victim of a contravention is not a bar to an action under s 82 unless the conduct of the victim is such as to destroy the causal connection between contravention and loss and damage".
In the same decision, Gaudron and McHugh JJ approved of the statement of Wilson J in Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 at 236 that: "The representation need not be the sole inducement. It is sufficient so long as it plays some part even if only a minor part in contributing to the formation (of the contract)"
The statutory objects would be undermined should a party infringing the prohibition escape liability by reference to novus actus principles in the general law; particularly in view of the regime for proportionate liability which is predicated upon two or more wrongdoers being legally responsible for causing the same loss or damage. No authority was cited on the Agent's behalf to support the submission that any negligence by the Lawyer could be treated, for the purposes of s 236, as an intervening event breaking the causal nexus in an action for damages for misleading or deceptive conduct. However, even if, as a matter of law, the novus actus doctrine can apply to an action for damages under s 236, the argument fails on the facts: the doctrine requires the intervening wrongful conduct to not only be voluntary but also deliberate. [17] The Lawyer's wrongful conduct here was not deliberate.
The Agent also complains that neither the plaintiff nor the Lawyer verified the opinion in a way that may have illuminated the qualification that should have been imposed. However, liability for contravention of s 18 has not been excused in this way. As Hill J said in Argy v Blunts & Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 112 at 137-138: "... recovery under s 52 (of the former Trade Practices Act) is founded by the applicant's reliance upon the misleading or deceptive conduct of the respondent... although the applicant did not seek to verify the representations or did so inadequately and so failed to discover their falsity."
To the extent that the loss would not have been caused but for the conduct of other wrongdoers, this is a matter which properly falls to be assessed in the Agent's proportionate liability defence. So too is the Agent's other point about causation. It is that, on the assumption that the Lawyer gave proper advice, the likelihood was that the plaintiff would have walked away from the transaction and lost her deposit.

[23]

Ms Kumar

The plaintiff impressed me as an intelligent and mature woman (for her age) who took a very 'hands on' approach in relation to the subject transaction. She struck me as someone with well-developed analytical skills, which appeared to be consistent with her occupation. She listened very carefully to and had a full understanding of questions specifically raised of her. Her answers were precise. Sometimes, she even picked up herself certain erroneous premises in questions raised of her. She was not embarrassed about making corrections in her affidavit or in earlier evidence; of which there were a few. She made many concessions; not all of them necessarily significant themselves, but in a way which led me to consider that she was doing her best to answer the questions raised of her as honestly as she could, without reference to the implications to her case. In these respects, she was a good witness.
It was true, as Counsel for Mr Singh emphasised, that there was a certain incongruity between a person with the plaintiff's qualities and her case which, to a substantial degree, depended upon professions of ignorance, or lack of understanding, about the content of documents supplied to her; or how they impacted upon her objectives in proceeding with the transaction. However, I did not consider that this circumstance, alone, rendered her account implausible. Just as there is an artificiality in claimants giving evidence after a harmful event about what they would have done if proper advice had been supplied (explaining the prohibition upon such evidence in s 5D(3)(b) of the CL Act) there is also an artificiality in the process of cross-examination of a claimant about what she understood about features of a transaction, before entry into it, after the harmful event. In both instances, the claimant's testimony is susceptible to hindsight bias. For someone like Ms Kumar, I expect that since July 2019, when she received the notice from Council, she would have racked her brains about all the circumstances in which she acquired the Property and, through such process, would very likely have acquired a greater understanding of such matters as to council approval processes and the purpose of building certificates than that which she had when she received Mr Singh's legal services in May and June 2019. In this way, it is not incompatible with proof of her case that she may have been able to articulate certain concepts when giving evidence in August 2021 but did not appreciate certain matters in May and early June 2019. A related point is that it is not unknown for clients, who present as confident or self-assured, to be mis-informed. Especially is that so where they are inexperienced. That is why reasonably competent solicitors do not take the appearances of clients who come to them for advice at face value but generally make inquiry of objective facts concerning their background, including the level of their prior experience.
My positive impressions of Ms Kumar as a witness are not without qualification. I consider that her evidence about her application to obtain a benefit on stamp duty and her obligations, in terms of repayment of some of the benefit she received on stamp duty, and also her obligations regarding liability for land tax, as reflecting discreditably upon her. Nevertheless, as has been recognised in some cases regarding actions for personal injuries, where claimants illegally do not declare income to revenue authorities, this does not, of itself, render the balance of the claimant's testimony unreliable [18] . In fairness to her, she did not deny that misrepresentations of a kind had been made; even if certain unacceptable excuses were supplied.
With that qualification, I generally regarded her as being unshaken in her evidence. Nevertheless, and no differently to Mr Singh in this particular respect, I weigh her evidence primarily with reference to the objective probabilities and the contemporaneous correspondence and documentation.

[25]

The advisory obligation

By his defence, the Lawyer admitted that he owed the plaintiff a duty of care and skill. However, the admission was qualified by the statement that the duty of care was that which was reasonably expected of a solicitor with his knowledge and expertise. Ultimately, however, Mr Singh's Counsel accepted that the test is objective.
In the conveyancing context, when acting for purchasers there have been cases where a solicitor has been liable for failing to advise upon unusual risks that are reasonably foreseeable [19] , and cases where liability has resulted from a failure to explain material matters arising from the contract for sale [20] . Cases turn, however, on their own facts. Nevertheless, as is generally the way with the common law, they illuminate points of principle in relation to responsibility for the provision of advice on conveyancing transactions.
The plaintiff came to deal with Mr Singh only after she had executed the contract for the purchase of the property; but she came to deal with him during the subsistence of a cooling off period. Ms Kumar and Mr Singh did not meet face to face: their only communications were by phone, or by email. Mr Singh gave no evidence, and there is no contemporaneous note, recording any appraisal by him of the plaintiff, in terms of his personal impressions about her background including, notably, any prior experience that she had had in acquiring property; and particularly property for investment purposes. Certainly, he had no basis for any assumption that he may have made that she was no less deserving of proper advice than he would ordinarily have given to novice purchasers of property for investment purposes.
I accept Ms Kumar's account (paragraph 11) in her affidavit when she says that she told Mr Singh that she was purchasing the Property as an investment property and the Agent would help her source tenants for both the main house and the granny flat (emphasis supplied). Although Mr Singh, in response to Ms Kumar's account, in his affidavit (at paragraph 7) indicated his position that Ms Kumar's recollections were inconsistent with his own recollections, the only 'inconsistency' Mr Singh identified was Ms Kumar's reference to the fees that he might charge: he did not dispute his awareness of Ms Kumar's statement of purpose and intention to utilise both buildings on the Property to obtain rental income.
It would have been immediately obvious to Mr Singh, from his reading of the contract, that the property that the plaintiff had contracted to purchase comprised two buildings: the main house and the granny flat.
I find that during the course of his dealings with her, from 27 May to 4 June 2019 (the last date being the date that she became committed to the purchase), he understood that she was a first home buyer (a circumstance which itself signified an absence of prior experience), and that she was seeking to acquire a property for an investment purpose.
It is not without significance that Mr Singh's quote for the services that he was offering to supply to the plaintiff was only $1,430 (incl GST) and that Mr Singh characterised the services that he was supplying to the plaintiff as 'conveyancing' services. Those matters might be indicative of a more streamlined service that his firm was supplying to the plaintiff. However, Mr Singh professed expertise and experience, as a solicitor, in property matters and he did not adduce evidence in contradiction to the views of Mr Harkin, the plaintiff's expert solicitor, about the obligations and practices reasonably expected of solicitors, and their application to him, when he supplied his services to the plaintiff. There was nothing to suggest, in short, that Mr Singh did anything to indicate that the nature and standard of services he was offering to supply to the plaintiff was attenuated in the circumstances; and was therefore anything other than the standard of a reasonably competent solicitor assisting a client on a purchase of property.
Mr Singh did not raise any point that the quality or substance of any advisory obligation that he had to the plaintiff was affected by the circumstance that, by the time the plaintiff came to him, she had already executed the contract. I consider that this position was sound. The fact that contracts had already been exchanged occurred in a context where the plaintiff still had the benefit of a cooling off period. Although to some extent, Mr Singh placed some emphasis upon the relative brevity of that period, he did not ultimately suggest that his obligation to provide appropriate advice was hampered by time constraints. (The point about time was relied upon in his argument on the causation issue) As was indicated shortly below the title of the 'General Advice to Purchasers' document, he represented that his firm would "generally advise you and look after your interests".
Further, there was no suggestion that the content of the standard costs disclosure (p 64 of Mr Singh's affidavit) operated as some constraint upon the content of Mr Singh's advisory obligation that would otherwise be required in law.
It is well-established that solicitors advising a client about a conveyancing or financial transaction are not required to opine on the wisdom of the transaction. But in Provident Capital Ltd v Papa (2013) 84 NSWLR 231, Macfarlan JA (Allsop P and Sackville AJA agreeing) said (at [80]): "A solicitor's obligation is not simply to explain the legal effect of documents but to advise his or her client of the obvious practical implications of the client's entry into a transaction the subject of advice."
This statement of principle show that when a solicitor is obliged to advise, or assumes a responsibility for advising, a client about a transaction, the content of the requirement for advice is contextual; not to be supplied in a vacuum. Consideration should be given not only to the existence of any written retainer (present in this case), but also the other circumstances in which a client sought legal services from the solicitor, and, very importantly, what the solicitor knows about the client's circumstances and objectives in entering into a transaction. Within that broad context, however, legal advice is not helpful if it is abstract; and untethered from the client's need for the services: it should, in other words, be suitable for purpose.
It was not for Mr Singh to provide financial advice to Ms Kumar about the wisdom of the transaction, or even to inquire into her financial capacity to pay for the property. I agree, also, with Counsel for Mr Singh's submission that it was not part of his duty to prevent Ms Kumar from binding herself to the contract for purchase. But he was clearly aware of her intention to use both buildings on the property for habitable purposes; and he was aware that the purchase was for investment.
In my view, and I did not understand that any submission was made to the contrary by Mr Singh, an important part of his duty of care was to read and consider the contract for sale that his client had executed, identify features within the contract that were unusual or inimical to the purposes of his client's acquisition of the property and which might be detrimental to her interests and to provide advice to the plaintiff. Only in this way could the plaintiff effectively enjoy the contractual benefit of the opportunity to utilise the cooling off period to get out of the transaction.

[26]

"Risk of harm"

In the plaintiff's pleading, the 'risk of harm' was identified as being the risk that the plaintiff would "suffer" in the event that the granny flat was not approved. The second defendant did not articulate its own version of the risk of harm.
I do not accept that this adequately articulates the risk of harm. In my view, whilst there may be different ways of describing the risk, in substance, the risk of harm was the risk that the plaintiff would suffer financial loss if the building described in the contract for sale as a "granny flat", that she had entered into, was not approved for habitable use by Council.
I regard that risk as foreseeable. In the circumstances that the Council's determination was incorporated in the contract for purchase, I also regard the risk of harm as being not insignificant. Contrary to his submission, it is not to the point as to whether Mr Singh was unaware of the approval status. The contract, through special condition 52 and the incorporation of the Councils' notice, indicated that the risk of harm could not be dismissed as insignificant.
Mr Singh did not rely upon s 5O of the CL Act as effectively determining the standard of care. When weighing the reasonable precautions that Mr Singh was required to take in response to this risk of harm, I consider first, the matters in ss 5B(2) and 5C.
However, the 'Shirt calculus [21] ' indicated in s 5B(2) is not exhaustive of the proper inquiry. The factors in s 5B(2)(a)-(d) (incl) are to be considered "amongst other relevant things". One of those other relevant things, pertinent in a case of professional negligence, is evidence of reasonably competent practice, such as the evidence of Mr Harkin. That evidence is no less relevant simply because the Lawyer did not invoke s 5O.
I accept Counsel for Mr Singh's submission that the overall question of what was required is to be considered prospectively. I also accept Counsel's submission that the test is objective, in the context of the "relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and characteristics of the plaintiff".
Although there may be cases where the reasonable response of a defendant to a foreseeable and not insignificant risk of harm is to do nothing, this is not such a case. The circumstance that the Notice of Determination was incorporated in the contract not only identified a risk for a person in Mr Singh's position, but also indicated that there was a strong possibility, if not probability of harm, in the sense of financial loss to Ms Kumar if care was not taken. That harm was serious: Ms Kumar might be purchasing a property which the contract indicated was a granny flat (and, by necessary implication, a habitable building) when there was a real doubt that it could be so utilised. This necessarily would have signified to a reasonable person in his position, that the Property would be likely less valuable than if she went on to acquire a property where it was certain that two buildings could be utilised. The harm was likely to be even more serious in that if it remained the position, since 2013, that the granny flat was not habitable, then the owner was exposed to further risk that Council might make a reinstatement order.
The precautions to avoid the risk were primarily advisory and, consequent to the provision of proper advice, appropriate enquiries. These were not unduly burdensome relative to the sum of money that Ms Kumar was required to outlay to complete the purchase.
I do not consider that matters referred to in s 5C have any real work to perform.
The real question, when determining whether reasonable precautions were taken in response to the foreseeable and not insignificant risk of harm is an evaluation of what the second defendant did, by way of the provision of advice and, where appropriate, enquiries pursued on the client's behalf in the light of that advice.

[27]

Context

I have already referred to some of this when identifying the content of the scope of Mr Singh's duty of care. For reasons indicated in that part of these reasons, the most important part of the duty was its advisory component.
At the risk of repetition, in the light of his awareness of the Notice of Determination comprised within the contract, it was, or should have been, apparent to Mr Singh that there was (at least) a doubt about whether the 'granny flat' was habitable. That, necessarily, meant that unless the steps were taken to ascertain whether it remained the Council's position that the garage was not habitable and could not be used, Mr Singh could not be sure that the granny flat could be used in the way that Ms Kumar had conveyed to him that she intended to use it. Further, it was, or should have been, apparent to Mr Singh that if she could not use that building as she intended to, then she would not receive the rental income from that building that evidently formed part of her assumptions underlying her decision to purchase the Property. Further still, it was, or should have been, apparent to Mr Singh that if Ms Kumar proceeded with the purchase of an unlawfully erected granny flat, she would be exposed to the risk that ultimately materialised: of her being subject (amongst other things) to a reinstatement order by Council; with only the capacity to derive rental income from one building.
All of this, in my view, should have been brought home by Mr Singh to Ms Kumar in fulfilment of his obligation to provide advice to her. In my opinion, it was not enough to supply a dry legal discourse about the conveyancing process or explanation for the process by which inquiries might be made of council about the legality of structures on the property.
Mr Singh argued that he was dealing with an intelligent, articulate and ostensibly confident client who had demonstrated sufficient acumen to execute a contract for sale without reference (at least) to him and who had taken her own steps independently to procure finance. Being the intelligent woman that she was, he inferred from the absence of questioning by the client of any aspect of the three documents he emailed to her on 27 May 2019, that she fully understood the conveyancing process and, most materially, fully understood the issue about council approval for buildings on land.
But as indicated in the section on credit above, his assumption of her understanding was not verified in any way, by his asking questions of her about her background or understanding, including most relevantly, the extent of her experience in purchasing properties (generally or for investment purposes). Without that information, he was not entitled, in effect, to abdicate, or divest himself of the responsibility usually accepted (or imposed) upon solicitors when advising prospective purchasers of property to bring home to the client the risk of proceeding to purchase a property with a huge question mark hanging over about the lawfulness of one of the two buildings from which he knew she was intending to derive rental income. I doubt that he would be relieved of such responsibility even with a prospective purchaser who, objectively, had much greater experience in property transactions than Ms Kumar.

[28]

Identifying and characterising the advice that was given

I have indicated my general preference for Ms Kumar's account of conversations over Mr Singh's account. According to Ms Kumar's account, during the conveyance, she did not receive advice about the legal status of the granny flat; but that is only a starting point.
All of the documents that Mr Singh emailed to the plaintiff at 12:31pm on 27 May 2019 were 'standard' or 'template' type documents. None were tailored in any way reflecting the purchaser's subjective circumstances. Thus, when reference is made to the standard costs disclosure (p 64 of Mr Singh's affidavit), one can find reference to Mr Singh's responsibility to "arrange exchange of contract" notwithstanding that this had already occurred by the time that he was introduced to the plaintiff. So too, in the letter of advice of 27 May 2019, within the description of the 'conveyancing process' his firm was offering to the plaintiff, reference is made to the need to ensure that the plaintiff could enter into a "binding contract". As a further example, the 'General Advice to Purchasers' was just that - general.
In his affidavit, Mr Singh identified, as the correct sequence, that he read the contract before he emailed these documents or that he had observed the Notice of Determination and identified the issue regarding the granny flat. In none of the documents that were emailed to the plaintiff was the issue about the granny flat which he said he identified, raised.
At its highest on Mr Singh's case, when consideration is given to the documents he supplied to the plaintiff on 27 May 2019, at page 3 of the 'General Advice to Purchasers' document (which ran to 9 pages) was the description under the sub-heading 'Council matters', where reference was made about buildings on a property built without council approval. There was no indication, however, in the accompanying letter of the same date that this reference in the document warranted the plaintiff's attention any differently to all the other information (which was quite voluminous) in the 'general advice'. There was no indication in that 'general advice' or the accompanying letter that identified any problem with the granny flat.
As to the verbal advice supplied by Mr Singh to Ms Kumar on 27 May, Mr Singh gave a vague account of it. Ms Kumar identified (in paragraph 16 of her affidavit) as matters for discussion whether the plaintiff should obtain a survey report, or pest and building inspections and how to obtain one. The limited extent of Mr Singh's challenge (paragraph 11 of his affidavit) was her attributing to him the statement that he had read the contract (even if he had in fact read it) and his opinion that "Everything looks standard". But nowhere in this exchange was there any reference to the granny flat.
Mr Singh generally identified Exhibit 2D2 as the document in which he recorded "important things" or matters "material" to the plaintiff's interests. In my view, there is nothing in the notations of conversations up to 4 June 2019 in which any reference was made to Ms Kumar that the presence of a Notice of Determination annexed to the contract, presented a potential matter of concern which might prejudice her purposes in deciding whether to become bound by the extant contract. I do not accept Mr Singh's evidence that the third and last dot points for the entry for 27 May 2019 reflected any discussion with the plaintiff about this particular problem: the third dot point was confined to the topics which were ultimately reflected in the specific requests for amendment to the contract in the requisitions letter to the vendor's solicitor on 27 May 2019. There was no reference therein to any request to amend Special Condition 52. The last dot point in Exhibit 2D2 for the entry for 27 May 2019 spoke of the 'condition' of the property; not any part of the use of it. As I indicated earlier, I did not regard Mr Singh's invocation of those two points as an indication that the problem of the status of the garage as convincing, but rather considered that his resort to those points did not reflect well upon his credibility.
There was no further entry on this document referring to any conversation with the plaintiff until 31 May 2019 (by Mr Singh) and 3 June 2019 (by Ms Purera), prior to the expiry of the cooling off period. Neither of those notes referred to any advice given about the potential implications or ramifications for the client's objectives of the status of the garage.
The content of requisition numbered 9 (made on 27 May 2019) and the reply to that requisition by the vendor's solicitor does not make it any more probable or not whether Mr Singh advised and explained the issue to the plaintiff. Indeed, Mr Singh did not dispute Ms Kumar's evidence that these documents were only brought to her attention after she became committed to the contract, on 11 June 2019. As indicated, there was nothing in Exhibit 2D2 recording any conversation which Mr Singh had with the plaintiff on 29 May 2019 after the reply to the requisition had come in from the vendor's solicitor. There was no express (or implied) reference to the status of the garage in the requisition. The relevant requisition itself was in stock standard terms. The reply from the vendor's solicitor contained the succinct suggestion that the solicitor refer back to the contract, for what it said about the granny flat. Then it provided further information about the vendor's understanding; which said nothing about the legal status about the garage.
I do not accept that Mr Singh spoke with the plaintiff on 30 May 2019 on the subject of CBC's building report. The contemporary correspondence indicated that the plaintiff had forwarded the report by email to Mr Singh late in the afternoon (5:50pm) (Annexure F to Ms Kumar's affidavit) and pursued him further into the early evening (6:06pm) of 30 May 2019. Mr Singh said that he did not see those emails. He could only estimate a conversation between 4 and 5pm, but there is no contemporaneous indication confirming the reliability of that estimate; and it is contrary to the timing of the plaintiff's emails to him. As indicated before, there is no entry in Exhibit 2D2 of any conversation that Mr Singh had with the plaintiff on 30 May 2019. An email from Ms Kumar to Mr Singh at 1:55pm on 31 May 2019 indicated that Ms Kumar intended to liaise directly with the builder herself (Mr Sherzai), but if Mr Singh's account was true, there would have been two conversations with Ms Kumar, on 30 May and 31 May, referring to discussion about the building inspection report, when Ms Kumar indicated her intention to speak to Mr Sherzai herself. That strikes me as improbable. Accordingly, I do not accept Mr Singh's account of the conversation, in his affidavit, where he made a reference to Mr Sherzai referring to the conversion of garage to the granny flat. In his closing written submissions, Counsel for Mr Singh did not urge the Court to find that a conversation occurred on 30 May 2019.
So far I have spoken only about the timing of Ms Kumar's discussion with Mr Singh about Mr Sherzai's building inspection report. I find that this occurred on 31 May 2019. More material is the content of that conversation. Ms Kumar's account of this was in her affidavit (paragraph 21). Mr Singh's account of this was in his affidavit (paragraphs 16 [22] and 17) and he relies upon the file note (p 84 to his affidavit). Ms Kumar gave evidence in reply to Mr Singh's account as a witness (T 20.42).
The best evidence for the Lawyer's case is, of course, the separate file note of 31 May 2019 (p 84 to Mr Singh's affidavit). I accept that the note was created when Mr Singh said that it was. I also accept that there was a conversation between Mr Singh and Ms Kumar on that day.
I find that, at least, Ms Kumar and Mr Singh spoke about Mr Sherzai's building inspection report and that Ms Kumar agreed with Mr Singh's suggestion that she speak directly to Mr Sherzai about the contents. I also consider it most likely that when speaking to Ms Kumar, Mr Singh was referring (if not expressly in his conversation) to page 40 of Mr Sherzai's report, which dealt with the garage/carport and Mr Sherzai's reference to the garage being converted into a habitable room and Mr Sherzai's statement that he did not know whether it had been Council approved. I also consider that it is probable that Mr Singh did say that an avenue that Ms Kumar could pursue to determine the point raised by Mr Sherzai was by obtaining a building certificate from Council. I am not convinced that he said that this was the "only" way, of finding out, but I do not regard that point as material. What was important was that he was suggesting some means, other than by reference to Mr Sherzai, to make enquiry. Further, I find that Ms Kumar declined Mr Singh's suggestion. I consider that Ms Kumar thought that Mr Sherzai might be the person best equipped to advise her about the issue with the granny flat and she would speak to him herself, rather than using Mr Singh as her intermediary. Her main focus, during the discussion, was upon extending the cooling off period.
I accept that it follows from this that on 31 May 2019, for the first (and only) time during their dealings, Mr Singh disclosed with Ms Kumar an issue relating to whether the local council had approved the conversion of the garage to a granny flat. I also accept that he raised for her consideration obtaining a building certificate and survey report as a means of determining whether council had approved such conversion.
What Mr Singh did not, however, do on 31 May 2019, or on any other occasion, was to advise her of the practical consequences to Ms Kumar of the possibility that the granny flat had ever been illegally converted from being a garage. He had not referred her to his own reading of the contract and understanding that a Notice of Determination, incorporated within the contract, actually showed a prohibition upon the use of the garage for habitable purpose. This objectively would have indicated a much stronger cause for concern than what Mr Sherzai's report had indicated. Mr Singh did not inquire of Ms Kumar whether she herself was aware of that Notice of Determination from her own reading of the contract; or whether she had received advice about that from some other quarter. He did not advise her that, on the assumption that Council had not approved the use of the building as habitable, Ms Kumar left herself exposed to an order, which later materialised, that Council could order the reinstatement of the building into a non-habitable garage; which would mean that not only would she be unable to accomplish her purpose of deriving a rental stream from two buildings, but she would have to bear the additional expense of reinstating the granny flat to its original condition. He did not, in short, say anything to indicate the potential risk of an unlawful granny flat on the property affecting her investment purpose.
Mr Singh's disclosure on 31 May 2019, such as it was, was not an adequate fulfilment of his advisory obligation, which required him to bring home to Ms Kumar material risks associated with the transaction, or the practical consequences on the subject of a potentially illegal building erected on the property for her purpose.

[29]

Considering the effect of Ms Kumar's instruction on 31 May 2019

It does not assist Mr Singh that Ms Kumar shut off the line of enquiry of obtaining a building certificate and survey. Adequate advice would have involved Mr Singh inviting Ms Kumar to reconsider her position as to whether those documents should be obtained in the light of the advice which he should have given to her, as indicated above.
There are cases where a solicitor has been found not be in breach of duty if the solicitor acts upon a client's instructions. However, a problem arises where the client's instructions are not properly informed and that circumstance is explicable because of the solicitor's negligence. In Morris v Duke-Cohan & Co (1975) 119 S J 826 [23] , a solicitor exchanged a contract on behalf of a purchaser client. It was no defence for the solicitor to say that it exchanged on the client's instructions where it was found that the solicitor had failed to warn the purchaser of the risk of the conveyance.
In this case, such 'instructions' as Ms Kumar supplied to Mr Singh on 31 May 2019 to refrain from seeking a building certificate and a survey were not the instructions of a properly informed client with an appreciation of consequences to her if she did not obtain the certificate and survey. That result was a consequence of Mr Singh's inadequate advice to Ms Kumar.
This is not to say that Mr Singh was required unilaterally to conduct such searches irrespective of Ms Kumar's wishes. He could only recommend that they be made. He did recommend the relevant search from Council and a Building certificate, but it was a recommendation unaccompanied by adequate advice or explanation about the risk of financial loss to her should she proceed to bind herself to the contract for purchase without it.
I find that Mr Singh's failure to properly advise Ms Kumar was such that he did not take reasonable precautions that a reasonable person in his position would have taken in response to the foreseeable and not insignificant risk of harm she faced.

[30]

CAUSATION

The test for causation for this claim for damages for professional negligence is in s 5D of the CL Act. As Counsel for Mr Singh emphasised, Ms Kumar bears the onus of proof on "any fact relevant to the issue of causation" (s 5E).
On the issue of factual causation, the critical question is a counterfactual: what would Ms Kumar have done if she had received the advice that she should have received, prior to becoming committed to the contract after the expiration of the cooling off period on 4 June 2019 - a past hypothetical. In terms of requirement of proof, Kiefel J (as her Honour then was; Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ agreeing) said in Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 at [111] that: "All that is necessary is that, according to the course of common experience, the more probable inference appearing from the evidence is that a defendant's negligence caused the injury or harm. "More probable" means no more than that, upon the balance of probabilities, such an inference might reasonably be considered to have some greater degree of likelihood; it does not require certainty."
In RMS v Grant [2015] NSWCA 138, Emmett JA (McColl JA agreeing, Basten JA not deciding) said at [180], said that: "… the evidence should be such that it is more probable that it exists than it does not. A fact cannot be regarded as established unless its existence is at least a reasonable inference from some matter provided in evidence. It is not sufficient that there be some ground for conjecturing that the fact exists. There must be evidence affording ground for treating it as existing as a matter of inference, and not of conjecture. The existence of a fact may be inferred from other facts, when those facts make it reasonably probable that it exists. However, if they go no further than to show that it is possible that the fact may exist, the existence of the fact does not go beyond mere conjecture. If there is no piece of evidence that, taken at its highest, is more than equally consistent with the existence and with the non-existence of a fact, then it cannot be treated as established."
By reason of s 5D(3)(b), Ms Kumar was prohibited from giving evidence on the question. In such circumstances, a court can only infer what a claimant would likely have done. In Neal v Ambulance Service (NSW) [2008] NSWCA 346, Basten JA (Tobias JA and Handley AJA agreeing) said at [40], that the Court could have regard to: 1. the plaintiff's conduct at or about the relevant time; 2. evidence of the plaintiff as to how she might have felt about particular matters; 3. evidence of others in a position to assess the conduct of the plaintiff and his or her apparent feelings or motivations; and 4. other matters which might have influenced the plaintiff.
Counsel for Mr Singh submitted that the Court should find that the plaintiff was 'hell-bent' upon proceeding with the purchase; that she had been searching for an investment property for two years and had already been making inquiries of financiers and that she settled, in effect, upon this particular property. For Ms Kumar, it was an opportunity too good to pass up.
I reject that submission. Ms Kumar gave evidence in her affidavit as to her thoughts and attitudes towards this property. She deposed (paragraph 6) that what attracted her to the Property was the presence of not one, but two buildings, on the property. She was not challenged on that account, at least directly, by Counsel for either defendant. She thought it a 'wonderful idea' that the granny flat would generate extra income. She also deposed (paragraph 9) that her offer of the purchase price was tied to the expectation of the rental income she expected to receive from both the house and the granny flat. She was not challenged on that aspect of her evidence either. As I have found, she conveyed to Mr Singh that the purpose of the acquisition was an investment.
Cross-examination of Ms Kumar indicated that her finances were tight. Her interest was in obtaining a positively geared investment. There was no indication as how she could accomplish that for this property if the granny unit was not habitable. It became a requirement for her to obtain unconditional loan approval to demonstrate tenancy agreements of both the house and the granny flat.
But for the rental stream from occupancy of a habitable granny flat, the evidence suggests that she could not have obtained financial accommodation for the purchase price of $720,000 she was willing to pay for both buildings on the property. That would leave her with the alternative possibility of acquiring the property with only the main house and an added exposure of having to rectify an illegal building on a property where only the main house was fit for single use.
Ms Kumar said that she had been looking for an investment property for 2 years. Without the capacity to rely upon the habitable use and occupation of the granny flat, there was no suggestion by either of the defendants that the main house itself, without an habitable second building (and an added exposure to liability to rectify the granny flat) was so appealing that, had the plaintiff been advised of the true situation regarding the lawful use of the building, she would nonetheless have proceeded to become bound to acquire the property. There was no exploration when she was cross-examined, on the premise that only the main house could yield rental income, about how this property was so much more superior than any other property she had considered in the previous two years to indicate why she would be 'hell-bent' on going ahead with the purchase.
As an alternative submission, Counsel for Mr Singh argued that it was essential for the plaintiff to prove that there would have been enough time, within the period for completion, to have inquired of the Council what the true position with the status of the granny flat was; and, absent proof of that, she could not establish factual causation.
Counsel's submission struck me as too literal a statement of the statutory test for causation. Section 5E speaks of the 'persuasive' onus of proof [24] . It does not eliminate the possibility that an evidentiary onus may fall upon the defendant, in certain circumstances [25] . Mr Singh did not depose in his affidavit that he anticipated any time constraint upon obtaining a building certificate from 27 May 2019 to 3 June 2019. There had been no pleaded allegation, as there probably should have been, to avoid surprise in the plaintiff, that at all times up to 3 June 2019, it would have been no use for Mr Singh to have made enquiry if that was what the duty required of him following the supply of proper advice.
In any event, it takes the second defendant down a cul-de-sac. It might have supplied an answer where the breach was a failure to inquire of Council. But the breach of duty, as I have determined it to be, was the failure to advise. A reasonable solicitor in Mr Singh's position, knowing, from 27 May 2019 that there was an issue with the granny flat, if he considered that there was an insufficiency in time to investigate the issue with Council, would have warned the plaintiff of that circumstance. As I have indicated, it was no part of Mr Singh's case, and certainly not the subject of evidence from him, that he did not have enough time to ascertain the position from Council. There was nothing in any of the documents he provided to Ms Kumar on 27 May 2019 to indicate any shortness of time, in the circumstances in which Ms Kumar came to him, in receiving information from Blacktown City Council, should that have enabled him to properly advise her. He did not say, on 31 May 2019 or any later time, that without the information from Blacktown City Council, Ms Kumar was at risk of loss if she proceeded to bind herself to a contract where the lawful use of the property was confined to one, but not two of the buildings referred to in the contract.
There is also an element of artificiality. Mr Singh's case was effectively that he assumed that she knew about the problem, or expected that she knew about it. If, as occurred, the plaintiff shut off the inquiry as of 31 May 2019, that was, as I have said, the result of his own negligence in properly advising her before and up to that instruction.
Factual causation is, accordingly made out against Mr Singh. That being so, it is unnecessary to consider s 5D(2).
Mr Hutchings, Counsel for Mr Singh, did not submit that if factual causation was established, then there would be any reason why the scope of liability element of the causation test would not also be established. In this regard, and as is usually, if not necessarily universally, the case, the scope of liability is co-extensive with the scope of the duty of care [26] . For reasons previously indicated, in my consideration of the content of the duty, I am satisfied that this element of causation is also established.

[33]

Rectification works

The plaintiff relied upon a quote from Mr Khan, a licensed builder trading under the name Wishful Constructions and Maintenance, which I admitted (Exhibit F) over the objection of the second defendant. Mr Khan quoted a sum of $15,675 (incl of GST) to reinstate the granny flat into a garage conforming with the Council's requirements.
Counsel for the second defendant, without (directly) cavilling with my ruling admitting the quote, attacked the weight of this evidence in multiple ways: there was no evidence tendered to indicate the information communicated to Mr Khan; the plaintiff gave evidence that she did not have in her possession the drawings that he relied upon; a call that Counsel for the second defendants made for architectural drawings relied upon by Mr Khan elicited a 'nil' response; and it was not apparent on the face of the quote whether Mr Khan inspected the property for himself. It would be 'unfair' to the defendants to make an award on this basis in the circumstances.
It accords with general principle to work from the basis that where a plaintiff can establish loss, but struggles to prove the extent of it, the Court should do the best that it can [28] . Here the plaintiff has been furnished proof of a quote which has now lapsed and which is far from perfect in terms of proof.
Nevertheless, as was implicit in my decision to admit Mr Khan's quote, I reject the suggestion of unfairness raised by the second defendant (and apparently adopted by the first defendant). Mr Khan's quote was served last year. The defendants had the opportunity, if they were inclined to do so, to put on evidence to meet it.
On its face, the quote refers to architectural drawings and Counsel for the second defendant made a call on the plaintiff to produce it during the trial and elicited a 'nil' response. That was hardly surprising in the circumstances in which the call was made. The call was made two years after the quote. Ms Kumar gave evidence at trial that she did not keep certain documents. There is no indication on the face of the quote whether Ms Kumar, or her solicitor, engaged Mr Khan to provide the quote. No compelling inference arises from the plaintiff's response to the call that the documents were not produced.
If the defendants were serious about refuting its content, and having regard to their generally combative approach to most issues in this litigation, I expect that the requirement for production could have been made much earlier than it was. If the second defendant was serious about a complaint of 'unfairness', it would have been required to explain, by ordinary proof, why it did not respond to it when it had the opportunity to respond; rather than relying upon assertions made by its Counsel from the (nominal [29] ) Bar Table.
It does not materially matter whether Mr Khan physically attended to inspect the property or relied upon drawings. Having regard to certain parts of the quote, where he refers, amongst other things, to the "IXL bathroom", the kitchen splash back tiles, I am inclined to think that he would have observed these matters through personal inspection.
This being so, I accept the evidence. Allowance is made for $15,675 (incl GST).

[37]

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Counsel for the second defendant submitted that the plaintiff failed to act reasonably to protect her interests by executing a contract before seeking legal advice, with a short period for completion and with only a five day cooling off period. He also submitted that she failed to protect her interests when, on 3 June 2019, she instructed Mr Singh not to apply for an extension of the cooling off period. The latter submission developed the matters referred to in the second defendant's defence, which simply contained a cross-reference to the documents that were sent to the plaintiff on 27 May 2019 and the content of the conversation with Mr Singh on 31 May 2019.
I have already explained why the documentation of 27 May 2019 and the conversation which Mr Singh had with Ms Kumar on 31 May 2019 did not adequately fulfil Mr Singh's advisory obligation towards her. That being so, I reject the proposition that any lack of responsiveness on the part of the plaintiff in reply to those communications represented a falling short of the standard of care expected of someone in her position. There is simply no evidence to suggest that with any greater time than that which was available, the content of Mr Singh's advice to the plaintiff would have been any different to what it actually was.
This still, however, leaves the second defendant's point about the plaintiff not having obtained legal advice before she signed the contract.
Counsel for the first defendant adopted the second defendant's submissions. But the first defendant added in its pleading, that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to rescind when she knew, or ought to have known, that it was not habitable when she executed the contract. It was not established that the plaintiff actually knew of cl 7.1.4 in the notice when she executed the contract and Counsel for the first defendant did not explore in any developed way with Ms Kumar when she gave evidence circumstances which suggested that she should have discerned the point. Nevertheless, as I indicated when considering the plaintiff's case on liability, the plaintiff did execute a contract in circumstances where the Agent was reasonably entitled to think that she would obtain legal advice.
Thus the main point for considering contributory negligence is to consider the significance of her not obtaining legal advice before executing the contract.
Counsel for the plaintiff did not defend his client's conduct of failing to seek legal advice before executing the contract, in terms of the question of whether she did not look after her interests. His retort was simply that the particulars of contributory negligence which the defendants cited in their arguments had no causative effect.
I accept that a purchaser contemplating the purchase of a property for investment purposes would reasonably be expected to obtain legal advice before executing it. This applies as much as to the plaintiff's reaction to the advertisement (which affects the first defendant) as it does to her conduct in proceeding with the contract after it was entered until she became bound (which affects the second defendant). The plaintiff's failure to do so represented a falling short of the standard of care which a person in her position would have taken.
However, at the level of culpability, the plaintiff's default does not take the second defendant very far. As I have said, there was no suggestion that Mr Singh ran out of time, as it were, to identify a problem and provide appropriate advice to Ms Kumar to respond to it. Mr Singh was, or should have been, on to the problem from 27 May 2019. He did not adduce evidence to indicate that a reasonably competent lawyer in his position would have regarded his predicament as unduly onerous. Any suggestion that he did not have much time is an expedient rationalisation after the event.
Further, in effect, because of the cooling off period, Mr Singh was in a similar position to a lawyer who was advising the plaintiff prior to her entering the transaction, since at the time that she obtained services from him, she still had the capacity to opt out: she was not bound to proceed with the transaction. In other words, her own lack of reasonable care was not very consequential.
In relation to the Agent's culpability, as I have found, it is likely that Mr Dandyan knew about the clause and therefore the existence of a problem regarding the unqualified nature of the opinions in the advertisement. It was culpable for him, and the Agent more generally, to express an unqualified opinion than for the plaintiff to rely substantially upon it and proceed to execute the contract on the faith of it. Although neither Mr Dandyan nor the plaintiff were lawyers, I find that his experience with property transactions was far more extensive than hers and, further, that the issue about the use of a building would have registered more significantly to him than to her.
I consider it appropriate to reduce damages because of contributory negligence by 15%. This means that the plaintiff's damages will, on my calculations, be $101,631.22.

[40]

Endnotes

This was written in red colouring, distinguishing it from the colouring of the main part of the content
This line was also coloured red
Leave was granted to Mr Singh to rely upon only part of Mr Haslam's email on the issue of the creation of the file note, on terms that the evidence be limited only to his credit. Reasons for the ruling were published on the same date as the publication of these reasons and appear on Caselaw in Kumar v Sydney Realty Pty Ltd & Anor [2021] NSWDC 430 (31 August 2021).
See Clayton v Bant (2020) 385 ALR 41; [2020] HCA 44 at [34] on the similarity between the action for statutory misleading or deceptive conduct and negligent misstatement.
Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357 ("Miller") per French CJ and Kiefel J at [5]; Selig v Wealthsure (2015) 255 CLR 661 at [20]
Campomar v Nike International (2000) 202 CLR 45 at [102]
Russo v Aiello (2003) 215 CLR 643 per Gleeson CJ at [10]-[11], cited by Heydon J in his concurrence in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [258]
(1774) 98 ER 969
(1959) 101 CLR 298
Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 158 ("Doppstadt") per Gleeson JA (Ward JA and Emmett JA agreeing) at [86]-[89]; Cape Byron Power I Pty Ltd v HSB Engineering Insurance Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1081 per Parker J at [58]
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 139B
Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 at 608; also J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (Lexis Nexis, online version) at [25265]
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [63]
Evidence of what the plaintiff would have done if the qualification to the opinion was pointed out to her is admissible on this statutory count, even if it is inadmissible in common law by reason of s 5D(3)(b) of the CL Act: Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Ltd v Kerr [2021] NSWCA 5 per Gleeson JA (Leeming JA and Emmett AJA agreeing) at [290]. But it is well accepted that an inference of reliance may be drawn, without direct evidence from the claimant, having regard to the nature of the misleading or deceptive conduct: Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 at 236
Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627 [30], [45], [49]; Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 568 at [96], [99]
Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459 per Gleeson CJ at [14] and McHugh J at [106]
March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 per Mason CJ at 517.
Morvatjou v Moradkhani [2013] NSWCA 157 per McColl JA at [60], following Matar v Jones [2011] NSWCA 304 per Macfarlan JA at [16]
Kyriacou v Kogarah Municipal Council (1995) 88 LGERA 110
Fox v Everingham (1983) 76 FLR 170 and Sykes v Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co Ltd [1971] 1 QB 113
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 per Mason J at 47-8
Mr Singh deposed that the conversation deposed to in this paragraph occurred on 30 May 2019 but, as indicated, I reject that evidence. That does not discount the possibility that it occurred on 31 May 2019.
Cited in Jackson & Powell on Professional Liability (8th ed, Online version) [11-125] fn 576; S Walmsley, A Abadee, B Zipser & G Sirtes, Professional Liability in Australia (3rd ed, 2016, Lawbook Co) [3.1230]
Springfield v Duncombe [2017] NSWCA 137 per Adamson J at [69] (Basten JA and Emmett JA agreeing)
Cellarit Pty Ltd v Cawarrah Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 213 per McColl AP (Macfarlan JA agreeing) at [289]
Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375 at [22]-[26]
Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 (at 412) per Gibbs CJ and Wilson J; Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1 at (11-12) per Mason J, Wilson J and Dawson J; Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351 (at 355) per Mason CJ; Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd & Ors v MasterCard Incorporated [2020] 4 All ER 807 at [194]
Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127 at 143; State of NSW v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536 at [72]
The entire hearing was conducted by audio-visual link.
Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society (1986) 160 CLR 1; Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494
s 34(1) of the CL Act; s 87CB of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
Selig v Wealthsure (2015) 255 CLR 661 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 31 August 2021

Kumar v Sydney Western Realty Pty Ltd & Anor

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