Kuksal v Victorian Legal Services Board [2025] FCA 1483

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

VICTORIAN LEGAL SERVICES BOARD (ABN 82 518 945 610)

GORDON COOPER (and another named in the Schedule)

1. The appellants' interlocutory application for a stay of proceedings under the sequestration orders made by Downes J on 27 August 2025 and for a stay on the requirement to comply with various statutory requirements under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and other matters be heard by Beach J at 10.15 am on 21 November 2025.
2. The appellants file and serve any supporting affidavits and submissions (limited to 15 pages) by 1.00 pm on 19 November 2025.
3. The appellants be provided by VIQ Solutions Pty Limited with copies of the transcripts of the hearing today and the various hearings before Downes J in proceeding VID 222 of 2025.
4. To the extent necessary, the appellants as persons subject to sequestration orders, be given leave to prosecute their appeal and any associated interlocutory application.

1. By 4.00 pm on 28 November 2025, the respondents shall submit to the Registrar a draft of:

(a) the indexes to Part A and Part C of the appeal book; and

(b) Part B of the appeal book.

1. Within 14 days after being notified of the Registrar's approval, the respondents file and serve:

(a) Part A of the appeal book, including all documents indexed and ordered according to a unique tab number; and

(b) Part B of the appeal book.

1. Not later than 15 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the respondents file and serve Part C of the appeal book.

1. Not later than 30 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the appellants file and serve:

(a) an outline of their written submissions on the appeal limited to 15 pages; and

(b) a chronology of the relevant events.

1. Not later than 20 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the respondents file and serve:

(a) an outline of their written submissions on the appeal limited to 15 pages; and

(b) a chronology of the relevant events.

1. Not later than 15 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the appellants file and serve an outline of their written submissions in reply to the respondents' submissions limited to 10 pages.

1. Not later than 15 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the appellants file and serve:

(a) a list of authorities to which they intend to refer, with pinpoint references; and

(b) a list of any legislation they intend to refer.

1. Not later than 10 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the respondents file and serve:

(a) a list of authorities to which they intend to refer, with pinpoint references; and

(b) a list of any legislation they intend to refer.

Other Matters

1. The form and filing of Parts A and C, submissions, lists of authorities and the like should otherwise conform with Practice Note APP2 and the eBooks Practice Note.
2. Costs reserved.
3. Liberty to apply.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

VICTORIAN LEGAL SERVICES BOARD AND COMMISSIONER

GORDON COOPER (and another named in the Schedule)

The following orders have been made on the basis of the applicant's statement to the Court that it no longer wished to prosecute this proceeding and that the proceeding should be dismissed.

1. Subject to orders 3 to 5, this proceeding be dismissed pursuant to ss 20(5)(c), 23, 25(2B) and 37P(6) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
2. Costs be reserved.
3. There be liberty to the respondents to make any written costs application or any other written application that the respondents see fit concerning enforcing any undertaking as to damages given to Meagher J on 21 May 2025 or any application concerning any breach of any order made in this proceeding.
4. If any such written application referred to in order 3 is made, it shall be made returnable in the first instance before Beach J who may deal with the application or refer it to another judge of this Court for hearing and determination in consultation with the National Operations Registrar.
5. Any liberty to apply referred to in order 3 shall not be exercisable after 12 months from the date of this order.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

1. On 13 October 2025 I was allocated to sit as a member of the Full Court on two matters, viz, proceeding VID642/2025 and proceeding VID1279/2025.
2. The appellants in proceeding VID1279/2025 have now applied for my recusal in sitting on their appeal against sequestration orders made against their estates by Downes J and from further dealing with any interlocutory applications concerning that appeal.
3. The basis for their application appears to be my conduct on 14 November 2025 in dealing with case management hearings in the two matters, which I will elaborate on in a moment. I should say that at that time I dismissed proceeding VID642/2025 being a proceeding brought by the Victorian Legal Services Board (VLSB) against the appellants.
4. For the reasons that follow I would dismiss their present application for my recusal. But there is the possibility that I may, even without any application by the appellants, review my position if a contingency of the type that I have identified at the end of these reasons becomes a reality.
5. Let me begin by setting out some relevant background.

1. As I have said, I was allocated to sit as a member of the Full Court on two matters, with one of those matters concerning an appeal (VID1279/2025) from Downes J's decision on 27 August 2025 to make sequestration orders against the estates of the appellants, being Mr Shivesh Kuksal, Ms Lulu Xu and Mr Peter Ansell, on the creditors' petition of the VLSB and three other individual petitioners.
2. On 27 August 2025, her Honour made the following orders in the underlying proceeding (VID222/2025):

1. The estates of SHIVESH KUKSAL, LULU XU AND PETER ANSELL be sequestrated under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). 2. The applicant creditors' costs and the costs of the supporting creditor, including reserved costs, be taxed and paid from the estates of the respondent debtors in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). 3. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) and section 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following parts of the following documents filed in this proceeding are to be treated as confidential and not be published, disclosed or accessed except pursuant to an order of the Court for 15 years from the date of this Order:

(a) paragraphs 55.1, 56.1 to 56.14, 144 and 147 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025; > > (b) paragraph 3 (consisting of 11 paragraphs of material across pages 3 to 4) of the Respondents' Notice of Intention to Adduce Tendency Evidence dated 23 July 2025.

1. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) and section 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice:

(a) the person referred to in paragraph 55.1 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025 and filed in this proceeding be referred to in connection with this proceeding only by the pseudonym "Person 1"; > > (b) the person referred to in paragraph 56.7 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025 and filed in this proceeding be referred to in connection with this proceeding only by the pseudonym "Person 2"; > > (c) publication of any information tending to reveal the identities of Person 1 or Person 2 be prohibited for a period of 15 years from the date of this Order.

1. Pursuant to section 37AF(1) and section 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, publication of any information, submission or document in this proceeding that refers to or records the allegations set out in paragraphs 56.1 to 56.14 of the affidavit of Thomas Flitner sworn 21 July 2025 and filed in this proceeding is prohibited for a period of 15 years from the date of this Order. 2. This order is taken to be entered on the day that it is authenticated.

The Court notes that the date of the act of bankruptcy in respect of each of the respondents is 13 February 2025.

1. I note that in her Honour's reasons ([2025] FCA 999) she said (at [7], [8], [19], [25], [28] and [35]):

At the first case management hearing before me on 17 June 2025 and after unsolicited documents had been emailed to my chambers by the respondents, including a proposed interlocutory application, I stated to the respondents that:

So if you want to file something in the court, you've got to file it through the registry.

At that hearing, I also stated to the effect that the way things could be raised in this matter was by filing an affidavit, filing written submissions or making submissions in a hearing.

...

During the hearing of the creditor's petition, I made a number of rulings and stated that I would provide reasons in the judgment. I have also determined that an application for leave to appeal from one of my rulings should be refused (being something which I deferred for consideration). Subject to below, my reasons appear in an Annexure to this judgement.

...

During that six week period, the Court accommodated the hearing of the respondents' interlocutory application before another judge (Lee J), and (apart from the relief which sought my recusal), that application was dismissed. The respondents were advised by Lee J in Kuksal (Interlocutory Matters) at [68] to get legal representation if they are serious about defending the sequestration proceedings. That judgment was also explicit as to what the respondents needed to do - I refer in particular to [41], [45], [70] and [75] of that decision which referred to affidavits needing to be filed by the respondents supporting any grounds of objection.

...

As it transpired, the creditor's petition was heard over four days, not two. Much of the hearing time was occupied by numerous oral applications by the respondents, and repeated requests for reasons. Most, but not all, of these applications were advanced by Mr Kuksal, with Mr Ansell and Ms Xu looking on and, on occasion, assisting him. At no time did Mr Ansell or Ms Xu submit that Mr Kuksal was not speaking for them when he made these applications on behalf of the respondents.

...

During the fourth day, Mr Kuksal again persisted in seeking to interrupt the proceedings. He also alluded to further applications which the respondents wished to have heard that day, including yet another application for my recusal. As the hearing day had been allocated for the purposes of hearing Ms Xu's oral submissions, I declined to hear these applications.

1. Subject to what I will return to in a moment concerning possible contempt proceedings raised in VID222/2025, as best as I can tell from the Court's electronic court file, at the time her Honour made the sequestration orders there were no outstanding interlocutory applications that her Honour needed to determine. I state that in terms of written interlocutory applications that had been accepted for filing by the Registry.
2. I should also note at this point that if there is a complaint that Downes J did not deal in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding before her (VID222/2025) with any outstanding interlocutory application, then that is a matter to be raised as a ground of appeal in the bankruptcy appeal (VID1279/2025).
3. This appeal is listed to be heard before myself and Justices Shariff and Stelios in the March 2026 Full Court sittings.

1. On 14 November 2025, after a case management hearing, I made inter-alia the following orders in the bankruptcy appeal:
   1. The appellants' interlocutory application for a stay of proceedings under the sequestration orders made by Downes J on 27 August 2025 and for a stay on the requirement to comply with various statutory requirements under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and other matters be heard by Beach J at 10.15 am on 21 November 2025.
   2. The appellants file and serve any supporting affidavits and submissions (limited to 15 pages) by 1.00 pm on 19 November 2025.
   3. The appellants be provided by VIQ Solutions Pty Limited with copies of the transcripts of the hearing today and the various hearings before Downes J in proceeding VID 222 of 2025.
   4. To the extent necessary, the appellants as persons subject to sequestration orders, be given leave to prosecute their appeal and any associated interlocutory application.

Appeal Book

1. By 4.00 pm on 28 November 2025, the respondents shall submit to the Registrar a draft of:

(a) the indexes to Part A and Part C of the appeal book; and

(b) Part B of the appeal book.

1. Within 14 days after being notified of the Registrar's approval, the respondents file and serve:

(a) Part A of the appeal book, including all documents indexed and ordered according to a unique tab number; and

(b) Part B of the appeal book.

1. Not later than 15 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the respondents file and serve Part C of the appeal book.

Submissions and Chronology

1. Not later than 30 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the appellants file and serve:

(a) an outline of their written submissions on the appeal limited to 15 pages; and

(b) a chronology of the relevant events.

1. Not later than 20 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the respondents file and serve:

(a) an outline of their written submissions on the appeal limited to 15 pages; and

(b) a chronology of the relevant events.

1. Not later than 15 business days before the hearing of the appeal, the appellants file and serve an outline of their written submissions in reply to the respondents' submissions limited to 10 pages.

1. As is apparent from these orders, I adjourned over the appellants' interlocutory application for inter-alia a stay of proceedings under the sequestration orders until 10.15 am on 21 November 2025 (order 1). I should say that as a result of the appellants' application that I should disqualify myself from hearing the appeal and any further matters, that application has not yet been disposed of.
2. And as is apparent, I also made orders giving the appellants access to various transcripts so that they could properly prosecute their appeal (order 3). Further, and to the extent necessary, I gave them leave to prosecute their appeal (order 4).
3. Now before proceeding further, I should set out her Honour's statements in her reasons underlying the sequestration orders to the extent that they referred to the separate proceeding VID642/2025.
4. In opposition to the creditors' petition, the appellants had raised before her Honour what they asserted to be general and arguable claims against the VLSB and the other petitioners as potentially giving rise to a set off or counter-claim against the creditors' debts. Her Honour discussed these aspects at [127] to [148] of her reasons. One aspect of these claims concerned proceeding VID642/2025.
5. At [145] to [148], her Honour said the following:

The final claim is a "claim for the economic loss and expenses incurred due to the Applicants' commencement of the "misconceived" proceeding VID 642/2025".

As to the proceeding being "misconceived", reliance is placed on the observation by Lee J in Kuksal (Interlocutory Matters) at [27] and [29]. However, the application for final relief in proceeding VID 642 of 2025 has not yet been determined, Lee J made orders that certain parts of identified documents remain confidential for five years, and the interlocutory application by the respondents for a determination of their application "seeking compensation for economic loss" was dismissed by Lee J. These events detract from a conclusion that the posited claim is a genuine and arguable one.

In any event, the claim in VID 642 of 2025 is only brought by the Board, and not by the other applicants. This means that, at best for the respondents, they might have a viable claim against the Board alone for economic loss in relation to the specific aspects of the Board's claim identified in the reasons of Lee J. However, this would be insufficient to lead to the result that the sequestration order should not be made on the application of the creditors other than the Board, whose judgment debt exceeds the statutory minimum.

In any event, the evidence did not establish that the respondents have a genuine and arguable claim for compensation which exceeds the quantum of the costs orders made against each of them and which are the subject of the bankruptcy notices.

1. What her Honour noted was that the application for final relief in proceeding VID642/2025, that is, the final relief sought by the VLSB had not been disposed of. She also noted that the interlocutory application of the appellants, who were the respondents in VID642/2025, "for a determination of their application 'seeking compensation for economic loss' was dismissed by Lee J".
2. Now two points can be made here. First, her Honour did not perceive that there was any outstanding interlocutory application before her Honour in proceeding VID642/2025. I will return to the bankruptcy proceeding in a moment. Second, the only interlocutory application that her Honour identified of any conceivable relevance to the bankruptcy proceeding was an application "seeking compensation for economic loss". This would seem to be a reference to a possible application of the appellants seeking to enforce an undertaking as to damages given in favour of the appellants in VID642/2025. I will return to this later.
3. Now as to any contempt proceedings, her Honour said (at [207] to [213]):

Contempt of court

On the second day of the hearing, the respondents pressed that their application for contempt be heard and determined prior to the determination of the creditor's petition.

By order dated 9 July 2025, Lee J ordered that:

By 4.00pm on Tuesday, 29 July 2025, the respondents file and serve any application alleging a contempt in accordance with r 42.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), including:

(a) a statement of charge in accordance with Form 137, specifying the contempt with sufficient particularity to allow the person to answer the charge; and

(b) the affidavits on which the person making the charge intends to rely to prove the charge.

This order was not complied with. On 25 July 2025, the respondents attempted to file an interlocutory application which included, as part of the relief sought, the following order:

The Court hear and determine the Respondents' interlocutory application in the proceeding VID 222/2025 that the Applicants have committed a contempt of court before hearing the Applicants' creditors' petition.

The attached statement of charge made a number of allegations concerning the Board, identified the respondents as the applicants and listed the Board as well as Mr Anstee, Mr Heath and Corrs Chambers Westgarth as the respondents. That is, the parties identified in the statement of charge are not the same as the parties to this proceeding.

Having regard to the content of the statement of charge, it is apparent that it contained aspects of the Flitner Allegations and so fell within the scope of the following order of Lee J dated 9 July 2025:

Absent prior leave by a judge of the Court, any further documents filed or otherwise relied on by the Respondents in this proceeding are not to contain or refer to the Flitner Allegations, any part of them, or their substance.

For the following reasons, the allegations concerning contempt of court as sought to be raised in the interlocutory application were not determined prior to the determination of the creditor's petition:

(1) leave of the court was not obtained prior to filing (or attempting to file) the statement of charge;

(2) the interlocutory application did not comply with rule 42.12 of the Federal Court Rules;

(3) there was no evidence that the application and associated statement of charge, and any supporting affidavits, were served on all of the respondents identified in the statement of charge by 29 July 2025 or at all.

In any event, the interlocutory application which contained as part of the relief an order that the applicants to this proceeding have committed a contempt of court (which conflicted with the parties identified in the statement of charge) was not accepted for filing and so was not filed by 29 July 2025. Even if it had been, I would not have entertained this application prior to the determination of the creditor's petition having regard to the lack of any connection between the substance of the contempt allegations, the different parties involved and the need to determine the creditor's petition expeditiously.

1. What is important to note here is that the "Statement of Charge" was filed or attempted to be filed in the bankruptcy proceeding (VID222/2025). One can see this from the attachments to the appellants' amended notice of appeal, which contains a statement of charge and purported interlocutory application in VID222/2025.
2. It is also to be noted that if the appellants are asserting that her Honour failed properly to deal with this "Statement of Charge", at most that point might conceivably be raised in the grounds of appeal in the bankruptcy appeal; I say nothing as to its merits. Moreover, the Full Court is dealing with the bankruptcy appeal and is not, at least presently, hearing and determining the merits of the "Statement of Charge" filed in the bankruptcy proceeding (VID222/2025).
3. Now as I have said, this "Statement of Charge" was not filed in VID642/2025, although "Charge 2" asserts that:

All Respondents conspired with one another and commenced the collateral proceeding, VID642/225, to obstruct the Kuksal Parties from filing and relying upon the VLSB Corruption Evidence.

1. As I say, the Full Court in the bankruptcy appeal is unlikely to be ruling on the merits of the "Statement of Charge" as part of the bankruptcy appeal and nor was it part of VID642/2025.
2. Let me at this point draw some threads together.
3. First, as I have indicated, any contempt proceeding raised by the appellants has been raised in proceeding VID222/2025 and not VID642/2025. Its significance to the appeal (VID1279/2025) is another matter.
4. Second, there was no application on foot in proceeding VID642/2025 concerning the enforcement of any undertaking as to damages. This had been floated before Lee J, but was left as an intention to make such an application in VID642/2025. I will elaborate on these matters in a moment.
5. Third, the possibility of making such an application was raised before Downes J in VID222/2025 during the hearing of the bankruptcy proceeding, and particularly on 30 July 2025 (T420 to 424 and T488 to 491). But it seems well apparent that her Honour did not consider that she had such an application before her, and nor had one been made in proper form and supported by evidence in proceeding VID642/2025. Now the appellants raised before me on 21 November 2025 some other transcript references on 28 July 2025 (T4, T120 to 121), but these related to the contempt proceedings in VID222/2025.
6. Further, as the VLSB has correctly submitted, at the hearing in VID222/2025 held on 28 to 30 July 2025 and 15 August 2025, there was no oral application made for costs or damages in VID642/2025 occasioned by the VLSB's undertaking as to damages.
7. First, VID642/2025 was not listed or called on those dates. The only case before the Court at the hearing of the creditors' petition was VID222/2025. And it would seem that each of the respondents recognised during the hearing that VID222/2025 was before the Court and not VID642/2025.
8. Second, in the hearing before Downes J, references to claims for damage/economic loss arising from VID642/2025 were not raised for the purpose of making an application for damages, but in pursuit of either tendering evidence on the creditors' petition of the existence of a potential offsetting claim for the purpose of opposing the petition, or amending the grounds of opposition to include such matters.
9. And I agree with the VLSB that the fact that the appellants were not pressing an application for damages but merely seeking to file additional evidence of an asserted offsetting claim in opposition to the creditors' petition was acknowledged by Mr Kuksal. He told Downes J on 30 July 2025:

No, but we want to give evidence about what that would amount to. I'm not saying that you need to listen to or decide that [a potential application to enforce the undertaking as to damages].

1. Fourth, if Downes J made an error concerning the point just mentioned, that is a matter to be raised in the bankruptcy appeal as a ground of appeal.
2. Let me turn then more directly to proceeding VID642/2025. This was the second matter referred to the Full Court.

1. The Chief Justice under s 20(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) made on 10 October 2025 the following direction:

I, the Chief Justice, considering that a matter coming before the Court in its original jurisdiction, namely the matter of:

Victorian Legal Services Board v Shivesh Kuksal & Ors

VID 642 of 2025

is of sufficient importance to justify the giving of a direction under s 20(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), direct that the original jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the whole of this matter shall be exercised by a Full Court.

1. A copy of this direction was forwarded to the appellants on 14 October 2025 by the National Judicial Registrar - Full Court and Appellate, under cover of an email which stated:

VID1279/2025 SHIVESH KUKSAL & ORS v VICTORIAN LEGAL SERVICES BOARD & ORS

This appeal has been triaged in accordance with Practice Information Note APP 1: Case Management of Full Court and Appellate Matters.

The matter will be listed for a full day hearing before Beach, Shariff and Stellios JJ in the March 2026 Full Court and appellate sitting period. The Court will be in contact shortly in relation to possible listing dates.

VID642/2025 VICTORIAN LEGAL SERVICES BOARD v SHIVESH KUKSAL & ORS

This proceeding has been removed from the docket of Justice Downes on the basis that the Chief Justice is satisfied that there may be a reasonable apprehension of bias were Her Honour to continue to hear and determine the matter, given the findings made in the judgment that is now the subject of the appeal.

The Chief Justice has made the attached Direction that the proceeding be referred to the Full Court, to be heard in the original jurisdiction by the same bench who are hearing the appeal. This matter will be heard instanter with the appeal.

CASE MANAGEMENT HEARING

A case management hearing in each matter will be held before Beach J at 10:15 AM AEDT on 14 November 2025, to address any procedural questions. The Court will be in contact in due course about arrangements.

1. Clearly, on the face of the direction and email, the Chief Justice envisaged that something substantive was left to adjudicate in VID642/2025, but that it was inappropriate for Downes J to deal with the matter given that she had made sequestration orders and made underlying findings concerning the appellants in VID222/2025 which are now the subject of the bankruptcy appeal.
2. Now I should make two short points here given how Mr Kuksal sought to construe the referral. He made the point that the referral was somehow an endorsement or recognition of his complaints made to the Chief Justice concerning Downes J. Further, he said somehow that the reference under s 20(1A) reflected some type of "Djokovic importance" to the matter. I was firm with Mr Kuksal on 14 November 2025 concerning his speculation (see the transcript of the hearing on 14 November 2025 at T6, 12 to 21). As I explained at T20 lines 33 to 45:

HIS HONOUR: The point I was trying to communicate to you, obviously not very well, was the basis for the Chief Justice's referral to the Full Court was that there was this live proceeding, VID642 of 2025, that had been before Downes J, and Downes J couldn't continue to deal with the matter because of the sequestration order that she had made, which you were appealing. So, it wasn't appropriate that she continue as a docket judge in 642. That's why it was thought appropriate to refer the matter to the Full Court.

Now, I'm not going into the entrails of what other complaints you might have had against Downes J or any other judge, for that matter. I'm just talking about the basis for the referral. And it seems clear what the basis of the referral is by reference to the email of the registrar attaching the direction. There's really nothing more to say about it. It's actually quite clear.

1. It is appropriate at this point to make some observations concerning VID642/2025.
2. First, it was an application by the VLSB against the appellants seeking the following orders:

1. Injunctions (interim, interlocutory and permanent) restraining the respondents, their officers, servants, employees and agents from: 1. engaging in conduct that is calculated or has a tendency to intimidate, harass or otherwise bring improper pressure to bear on the applicant (including its officers, employees or agents including its legal representatives) in respect of the conduct of any legal proceeding, such as to deter them from prosecuting, defending, acting in or giving evidence in any legal proceeding or influencing their evidence in any legal proceeding; 2. alternatively to A(i) above, uploading, disclosing, disseminating or otherwise publishing or causing to be published, any matter, content, statement, threat or allegation that is calculated to intimidate, harass or otherwise bring improper pressure to bear on the applicant (including its officers, employees or agents including its legal representatives) in respect of the conduct of any legal proceeding, such as to deter them from prosecuting, defending, acting in or giving evidence in any legal proceeding or influencing their evidence in any legal proceeding; and 3. without limiting A(i) [alternatively, A(ii)] above, communicating to the applicant, its officers, employees or agents (including its legal representatives), whether directly or indirectly, any threat to engage in conduct the subject of A(i) [alternatively, A(ii)] above. 2. Alternatively to A., injunctions (interim, interlocutory and permanent) restraining the respondents, their officers, servants, employees and agents from: 1. uploading, disclosing, disseminating or otherwise publishing or causing to be published, the 'Flitner Allegations' (as defined in the Concise Statement) or any part of them; and 2. communicating to the applicant, its officers, employees or agents (including its legal representatives), whether directly or indirectly, any threat to engage in conduct the subject of B(i) above.

1. A mandatory injunction requiring the respondents, their officers, servants, employees and agents to remove any matter or material uploaded, disclosed, disseminated or otherwise published or made available for publication by the respondents, their officers, servants, employees or agents, which contains, records or refers to the Flitner Allegations (or any part of them) or their substance.

1. Orders that: 1. the affidavit of Lulu Xu affirmed 13 May 2025 and filed in proceeding VID 222/2025 (Xu Affidavit) be removed from the Court's file in that proceeding; 2. the Victorian District Registrar place, or cause to the placed, the Xu Affidavit in a sealed envelope marked "VID 222/2025, Victorian Legal Services Board and Commissioner v Kuksal and Ors, Affidavit of Lulu Xu Affirmed 13 May 2025 removed from court file. Not to be opened or made available for inspection by the public other than by leave of the Court"; 3. the envelope referred to in D(ii) above be sealed and stored by the Victorian District Registrar in the Victorian District Registry in a manner and location as decided by the Victorian District Registrar; and 4. the respondents file and serve forthwith in proceeding VID 222/2025 a redacted version of the Xu Affidavit (Redacted Xu Affidavit) with the following pages redacted in their entirety (references are to the red page numbering in the top right-hand corner of each page of the Xu Affidavit): 209 to 221, 243 to 255.
2. Second, although a concise statement had been filed by the VLSB, it would seem that no concise response had been filed. Certainly this was not shown on the electronic court file. The proceeding does not seem to have been progressed very far, although there were various interlocutory applications that were heard and disposed of with orders made by Justices Lee, Downes and Meagher from time to time.
3. Third, I have said something about an undertaking as to damages. The undertaking can be identified in Meagher J's orders of 21 May 2025 in VID642/2025 which provided:

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

Orders 1 and 2 below are made upon the applicant's undertaking to:

(a) submit to such order (if any) as the Court may consider to be just for the payment of compensation (to be assessed by the Court or as it may direct) to any person (whether or not that person is a party) affected by the operation of Orders 1 and 2 or any continuation (with or without variation) of those orders; and

(b) to pay the compensation referred to in (a) above to the person affected by the operation of Orders 1 and 2.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Pursuant to s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act) and r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), until the hearing and determination of the applicant's interlocutory application filed in this proceeding on 21 May 2025 (Interlocutory Application) or further order, the respondents, their officers, servants, employees and agents are restrained from:

   1. uploading, disclosing, disseminating or otherwise publishing or causing to be published, the 'Flitner Allegations' (as defined in the applicant's concise statement filed in this proceeding) or any part of them; and
   2. communicating to the applicant, its officers, employees or agents (including its legal representatives), whether directly or indirectly, any threat to engage in conduct the subject of Order 1(a) above.

2. Pursuant to s 23 of the Act and r 1.32 of the Rules, until the hearing and determination of the Interlocutory Application or further order, the respondents (or any of them), their officers, servants, employees and agents shall remove any matter or material uploaded, disclosed, disseminated or otherwise published or made available for publication by the respondents, their officers, servants, employees or agents, which contains, records or refers to the Flitner Allegations (or any part of them) or their substance and, refrain from re-uploading, re-disclosing, re-disseminating or re-publishing such matter or material.

...

1. The VLSB's interlocutory application dated 21 May 2025 was dismissed by Lee J on 9 July 2025. The result is that the undertaking as to damages concerned a narrow time window in terms of the effect of orders 1 and 2 made by Meagher J, being 21 May 2025 to 9 July 2025.
2. The transcript of what occurred before Lee J on 8 July 2025 in proceedings VID642/2025 and VID222/2025 is as follows:

HIS HONOUR: I direct the applicant to deliver to my chambers short minutes of order tomorrow morning reflecting the orders that I've made. Is there any other application that is made?

MR KUKSAL: Yes, your Honour. We seek application for the economic costs that we've incurred pursuant to the injunction. The injunction entitled us to restitution in relation to the orders that have been made. That was part of Meagher J's orders. We seek restitution in relation to the economic costs that we've incurred in the preparation of the case.

HIS HONOUR: Preparation of what - - -

MR KUKSAL: The six - - -

HIS HONOUR: Preparation of what case?

MR KUKSAL: The interlocutory proceeding in the 642 proceeding. The interlocutory application in the 642 proceeding.

HIS HONOUR: When you say the economic - you're asking for a costs order, are you?

MR KUKSAL: No, we're seeking for economic costs.

HIS HONOUR: Well, how can I - - -

MR KUKSAL: So - - -

HIS HONOUR: How can I deal with that?

MR KUKSAL: Because, your Honour, that was an injunctive measure. It was made on the basis that any party who incurs any economic costs pursuant to the operation of those orders is entitled to seek those costs once the matter - - -

HIS HONOUR: If you're seeking - if you're seeking to recover any loss because of an undertaking as to damage given, there's an orthodox way of doing that. That's not to make an application now on the basis of no evidence.

MR KUKSAL: No. So we - your Honour, we're saying that we intend to make that application, and we would like to get directions in terms of the filing of the material for the - - -

HIS HONOUR: You can seek that from Downes J in due course. Yes. Any other applications that the - that the - - -

1. No application had been made before Lee J seeking to enforce any undertaking as to damages. All that was said was that there was an intention to make such an application. Lee J also indicated that Mr Kuksal et al could seek directions from Downes J on that matter. No such directions were ever given.
2. The appellants' transcript references as to what occurred on 8 July 2025 do not support the existence of any actual application in proper form seeking to enforce an undertaking as to damages in VID642/2025, let alone one supported by evidence including quantification of loss. Moreover, as at 14 November 2025 there was no application on file supported by any affidavit material.
3. Now it is convenient to make one other point here. As I have indicated, Lee J did not consider there to be such an application in proper form before him supported by evidence; this is consistent with the electronic court file. But Downes J at [146] in her reasons (VID222/2025) expressed the matter differently in describing Lee J as having dismissed such an application. But howsoever one looks at it, the result is that at the time of her Honour making the sequestration orders and indeed at the time of my dismissal orders, there was no extant application in proper form supported by evidence seeking to enforce any undertaking as to damages in VID642/2025. But as I stipulated in my dismissal orders, I reserved liberty to apply for the appellants to make such an application if they so wished, and so long as they exercised that liberty within 12 months.

1. Now prior to 14 November 2025 I perused the originating application and all other documents shown as filed documents on the electronic court file in VID642/2025. There were no written interlocutory applications shown as outstanding or not having been disposed of in proceeding VID642/2025. And as I say, any contempt proceedings brought or attempted to be brought by the appellants were only shown as having been brought in the separate bankruptcy proceeding (VID222/2025) and identified by the appellants as part of their amended notice of appeal in the bankruptcy appeal (VID1279/2025). Further, there was no written application filed concerning enforcing any undertaking as to damages, let alone one supported by any affidavit evidence; there was nothing on the court file to that effect.
2. Now on 14 November 2025 in proceeding VID642/2025 I made the following orders:

OTHER MATTERS:

The following orders have been made on the basis of the applicant's statement to the Court that it no longer wished to prosecute this proceeding and that the proceeding should be dismissed.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Subject to orders 3 to 5, this proceeding be dismissed pursuant to ss 20(5)(c), 23, 25(2B) and 37P(6) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
2. Costs be reserved.
3. There be liberty to the respondents to make any written costs application or any other written application that the respondents see fit concerning enforcing any undertaking as to damages given to Meagher J on 21 May 2025 or any application concerning any breach of any order made in this proceeding.
4. If any such written application referred to in order 3 is made, it shall be made returnable in the first instance before Beach J who may deal with the application or refer it to another judge of this Court for hearing and determination in consultation with the National Operations Registrar.
5. Any liberty to apply referred to in order 3 shall not be exercisable after 12 months from the date of this order.

1. Now as to the Chief Justice's reference under s 20(1A), as I have said, her Honour directed, in terms of the whole of the proceeding, "that the original jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the whole of this matter shall be exercised by a Full Court". So, that entailed the whole proceeding including any outstanding interlocutory applications that had been before Downes J. But as I say, as to this latter point there appeared to be none.
2. It is in this context that I should say something more about the case management hearing on 14 November 2025.
3. The case management hearings in both the bankruptcy appeal (VID1279/2025) and proceeding VID642/2025 were listed to begin at 10.15 am, although they started at 10.19 am because an unrelated matter that I had started at 9.30 am had run over (VID647/2025).
4. The case management hearings concluded at 11.45 am, thereby allowing me to then deal with two Queensland proceedings (QUD791/2025 and QUD802/2025) that commenced at Noon.
5. Now before I went down to Court for the 9.30 am unrelated matter, I had not been aware of any document filed by the appellants or emailed to my chambers concerning the case management hearing. As is apparent from the Registrar's email that I have set out earlier, the parties had been told of the 14 November 2025 case management hearing exactly one month earlier, but had not filed any material prior to 14 November 2025. But the following email traffic occurred between my executive assistant and the appellants on the morning of 14 November 2025.
6. At 9.17 am, Ms Xu emailed my chambers and said:

Please find attached some documents on which the Appellants will rely in support of their proposed course.

1. Attached to this email were the following documents:

• Ÿ The Plaintiff's Submissions in Opposition to the VLSB's Suppression Order Application (21.10.25)
• Ÿ The Plaintiff's Submissions Re VLSB Suppression Application Hearing on 17.10.25 (16.10.25)
• Ÿ 07.10.25 - SK to [Justice X] - Evidence Obstructed by the Prothonotary
• Ÿ 07.10.25 - SK to Ratcliffe - Chastising the Prothonotary
• Ÿ 30.09.25 - LX to CJ FCA and Dep Pres ART - Complaint Against Downes J and Other Submissions copy
• Ÿ IBAC Outcome Letter (13.10.25)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808 (08.10.25) (transcript)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808 (17.10.25) (transcript)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808 (27.10.25) (transcript)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808 (29.10.25) (transcript)
• Ÿ 28-29.10.25 - LX, FCA and ART - 2025_2925 Adjournment Request and Response

1. These electronically provided documents were approximately (in total) 1,233 pages in length.
2. At 9.35 am my executive assistant, whilst she was in Court assisting me on another matter and where I did not have an associate, responded to the parties as follows:

We are presently sitting in Court in another matter.

Please bring copies of the documents to Court.

1. At 10.08 am, and despite my executive assistant's email sent at 9.35 am, Ms Xu emailed to my chambers the following further documents:

• Ÿ The Respondents_ Submissions on Downes J_ Disqualification, Suppression Orders and the VLSB_s Abuse of the Bankruptcy Jurisdiction (25.07.25)
• Ÿ Submissions - Suppression Orders (12.08.25)
• Ÿ The Respondents_ Second Submissions on Suppression Orders and Downes J_s Disqualification (25.07.25)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808_ S ECI 2022 05407_ S ECI 2023 00183 Kuksal & Ors v State of Victoria & Ors (Ruling)(1)
• Ÿ 03.11.25 - SK to [Justice X] - Application to Reopen Heard Case to Consider Additional Authorities
• Ÿ Issues Before the FCAFC in the Current Proceedings (14.11.25)
• Ÿ The Federal Court's Improper Interference in the Appellants' Statutory Rights (14.11.25)
• Ÿ The Applicants' Outline of Submissions (03.11.25)

1. The second tranche of documents were approximately (in total) 205 pages in length.
2. Now at the start of the case management hearings at 10.19 am I had neither seen nor read any of these documents.
3. I have set this all out in detail because in the disqualification application made on 21 November 2025, Mr Kuksal asserted that I had seen or read these documents on 14 November 2025 or at least that a reasonable bystander might conclude that I had done so. He then used such a problematic foundation to build a narrative that I had somehow favoured the VLSB and made a comment directed against another judicial officer, who I have identified as Justice X and not of this Court.

The disqualification application made on 21 November 2025

1. There were many and varied grounds raised concerning my conduct on 14 November 2025 which it was said gave rise to actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias such that I should not sit on the bankruptcy appeal or deal with any further interlocutory application in the bankruptcy appeal.
2. The application for my disqualification was supported by an affidavit of Ms Xu on 20 November 2025 and emailed to my chambers at 5.00 pm that evening. The email attached the affidavit only (7 pages) and no exhibits. The affidavit was filed on the electronic court file at 4.59 pm and again on 5.06 pm on the same evening. The affidavit's exhibits were lodged on the electronic court file at 9.06 am on 21 November 2025 by way of a compressed (zipped) folder; some of these documents were encrypted and unreadable, although readable forms could eventually be accessed elsewhere. There were a substantial number of documents that amounted in total to 1272 pages. The folder was made of 5 parts and included documents:

• Ÿ Appeal Grounds Summary
• Ÿ 14 November Transcript
• Ÿ Beach J orders

• Ÿ Beach J (14.11.25) - VID 642:2025
• Ÿ Beach J (14.11.25) - VID 1279:2025

• Ÿ 05.11.25 - SK to ART and CJ Mortimer - Complaint About the FCA Inciting the ART to Render Interlocutory Applications Nugatory copy
• Ÿ 14.10.25 - FCA to SK - Case Management of Bankruptcy Appeal and Escalation of 642 to the Full Court
• Ÿ 28-29.10.25 - LX, FCA and ART - 2025_2925 - Adjournment Request and Response
• Ÿ 30.09.25 - LX to CJ FCA and Dep Pres ART - Complaint Against Downes J and Other Submissions copy
• Ÿ Amended Notice of Appeal (SK v VLSB) (VID 1279_2025) (25.09.25)
• Ÿ Issues Before the FCAFC in the Current Proceedings (14.11.25) (revised)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808 (29.10.25) pages 99 - 175 (transcript)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808' S ECI 2022 05407' S ECI 2023 00183 Kuksal & Ors v State of Victoria & Ors (Ruling) (1)
• Ÿ The Federal Court's Improper Interference in the Appellants' Statutory Rights (14.11.25)
• Ÿ The Plaintiffs' Submissions - Public Interest in Disclosure of VLSB Misconduct (17.10.25)
• Ÿ The Plaintiffs' Submissions in Opposition to the VLSB's Suppression Order Application (21.10.25)
• Ÿ The Plaintiffs' Submissions Re VLSB Suppression Application Hearing on 17.10.25 (16.10.25)

• Ÿ 14.11.25 - SK to VLSB - Appeal against Justice Beach's orders and contempt application against the VLSB, Mr Silver and Corrs Lawyers
• Ÿ Full Courts in the original jurisdiction
• Ÿ IBAC Outcome Letter (13.10.25)
• Ÿ The Plaintiffs' Submissions Re VLSB Suppression Application Hearing on 17.10.25 (16.10.25)
• Ÿ VLSB's Perversion of the Course of Justice

• Ÿ 03.11.25 - SK to [Justice X] - Application to Reopen Heard Case to Consider Additional Authorities
• Ÿ 05.11.25 - SK to ART and CJ Mortimer - Complaint About the FCA Inciting the ART to Render Interlocutory Applications Nugatory copy
• Ÿ 07.10.25 - SK to [Justice X] - Evidence Obstructed by the Prothonotary
• Ÿ 7.10.25 - Purported Reasons for the Prothonotary's Obstruction of the Plaintiff's Summons
• Ÿ 07.10.25 - SK to Ratcliffe - Chastising the Prothonotary
• Ÿ 28-29.10.25 - LX, FCA and ART - 2025:2925 Adjournment Request and Response
• Ÿ 30.09.25 - LX to CJ FCA and Dep Pres ART - Complaint Against Downes J and Other Submissions copy
• Ÿ Issues Before the FCAFC in the Current Proceedings (14.11.25)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808 (08.10.25) (transcript)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808 (17.10.25) (transcript)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808 (27.10.25) (transcript)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808 (29.10.25) (transcript)
• Ÿ S ECI 2022 04808_ S ECI 2022 05407_ S ECI 2023 00183 Kuksal & Ors v State of Victoria & Ors (Ruling)(1)
• Ÿ Submissions - Suppression Orders (12.08.25)
• Ÿ The Applicants Outline of Submissions (03.11.25)
• Ÿ The Federal Court's Improper Interference in the Appellants' Statutory Rights (14.11.25)
• Ÿ The Plaintiffs' Submissions - Public Interest in Disclosure of VLSB Misconduct (17.10.25)
• Ÿ The Plaintiffs' Submissions in Opposition to the VLSB's Suppression Order Application (21.10.25)
• Ÿ The Respondents_ Second Submissions on Suppression Orders and Downes J_s Disqualification (25.07.25)
• Ÿ The Respondents_ Submissions on Downes J_s Disqualification, Suppression Orders and the VLSB_s Abuse of the Bankruptcy Jurisdiction (25.07.25)
• Ÿ VID 642:2025 (14.11.25) (transcript)

1. Mr Kuksal made very detailed oral submissions. These were supplemented by short oral submissions by Ms Xu. Mr Silver for the VLSB made few oral submissions on the disqualification question and said that it was a matter for me; he did not provide any written submissions. The hearing commenced at 10.23 am and concluded at 4.05 pm with a 10 minute recess during the afternoon.
2. In terms of the relevant applicable principles, little by way of authority needs to be cited. I am well familiar with Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 as counsel in that case, and it is necessary to do no more than refer to and apply what was said by Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, who endorsed the "double might" test (at [6]) and then stipulated a two steps approach in the following terms (at [8]):

The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an "interest" in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.

1. Now before proceeding further, I should address various matters.
2. First, the appellants have challenged whether I had the statutory power to order a dismissal of proceeding VID642/2025. Indeed, they have now filed a notice of appeal challenging my dismissal order. Now my order made on 14 November 2025 identified what I considered to be the source of my power, notwithstanding the Chief Justice's reference to a Full Court under s 20(1A). I do not propose to elaborate further. But in any event, if I had no power, this does not fall under the umbrella of a reasonable apprehension of bias ground in the terms put by Mr Kuksal. But the fact that I am now the subject of an appeal is itself separately relevant to whether I should continue to sit on the bankruptcy appeal. I will return to this question later.
3. Second, the appellants have asserted that I failed to accord them procedural fairness on 14 November 2025 by first raising the question of dismissal and then not giving them adequate time to address that question. Now it does not follow that any denial of procedural fairness necessarily gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. But in any event I do not agree that there was a denial of procedural fairness on 14 November 2025. Moreover, and perhaps as a cross-check, on 21 November 2025 the appellants made more extensive submissions which in my view just confirmed that my decision to dismiss VID642/2025 on 14 November 2025 was the correct one. And as a double check I permitted the parties to file further aides memoire after the hearing.
4. Third, the appellants complained that I failed to allow them to issue subpoenas to obtain documents that were not before Downes J, and which Downes J had not permitted to be issued. But if Downes J made an error in this respect, and I do not say that she has, this would be embraced by a relevant ground of appeal. Moreover, given how the matter was raised before me, the application was not in proper form. Now Mr Kuksal asserted that he was making an "oral application", but I did not consider this satisfactory in the circumstances. It is worth setting out my discussion with Mr Kuksal on 14 November 2025:

HIS HONOUR: Yes. So what documents do you then need? You've got the application for a subpoena. You've got her Honour's order refusing to issue the subpoena.

MR KUKSAL: But we say that the refusal did not follow a judicial determination of the issues. Her Honour simply dismissed them for convenience.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. So what documents - - -

MR KUKSAL: So the documents that we seek are - - -

HIS HONOUR: These are documents that you never got under subpoena because her Honour didn't give you leave to issue the subpoenas?

MR KUKSAL: No. Her Honour gave us the leave too late and then said that we didn't serve the subpoena on time. So we had applied on time. The court was late in issuing the subpoena, and then the court said that we were late by a day in serving the subpoena on the Board. The documents that we seek are documents that concern the Board's correspondence with the Supreme Court to interfere - - -

HIS HONOUR: If that wasn't before - that material was not before Downes J at the time that she made her judgment on the sequestration order?

MR KUKSAL: She did not view - no. Those documents were not before her.

HIS HONOUR: No. Well, then, that's not material that's going to be the subject of the appeal. What's going to be the subject of the appeal is the material that was before her Honour, under which she then decided to make the sequestration order. That was the evidence before her Honour.

MR KUKSAL: No, but we had applied - we are challenging - - -

HIS HONOUR: I know, but - - -

MR KUKSAL: - - - the decision to improperly dismiss the subpoena, and I have an authority for the court. It's Victoria v Brazel. Essentially, when an appeal is raised in relation to - - -

HIS HONOUR: But if her Honour has made an error - - -

MR KUKSAL: Your Honour - - -

HIS HONOUR: Do you follow what I mean? In other words, if you turn up and say her Honour made a sequestration order, but denied you procedural fairness, because she didn't allow you to get all of these other documents under subpoena, then that's one of your grounds of appeal, and that will either be good or bad. Do you follow what I mean?

...

HIS HONOUR: - - - if it's a good argument, it will be dealt with as part of your grounds of appeal, that you were denied relevant documents to undermine the bankruptcy notice, to undermine the sequestration order.

MR KUKSAL: Okay. So am I correct, then, in understanding that your Honour is of the view that no application for disclosure should be dealt with before the hearing?

HIS HONOUR: I - - -

MR KUKSAL: In that if we wanted to issue a subpoena ourselves in this proceedings to get those same documents - - -

HIS HONOUR: For the purposes of putting them before the Full Court.

MR KUKSAL: Yes, and also to get - those documents are relevant, obviously. We say that we would get a forensic advantage - - -

HIS HONOUR: Look, we're talking at the moment - you've got a ground of complaint. It's in the notice of appeal. It will be dealt with as part of the appeal. I can't stop you making whatever application you want to make, including any application for leave to issue a subpoena to get documents, but - - -

MR KUKSAL: It's made orally during the hearing - is the rule.

HIS HONOUR: Yes.

MR KUKSAL: We're making that application now.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, well, I'm not going to entertain that application at this stage without you being a bit more precise and the board having the opportunity to hear precisely what you're going to say about that. So perhaps, we should put that as the fourth topic on the agenda for next Friday. All right?

MR KUKSAL: Thank you.

1. As will be apparent, I was not ruling out the possibility of the appellants making such an application.
2. Fourth, the appellants said that I had made observations concerning a particular judicial officer of another court as to a permissive approach taken to the appellants making allegations against the VLSB and others. It was said that this was to be inferred because I had transcripts of hearings before that judicial officer.
3. But as I have said, on 14 November 2025 I had no such documents properly before me, let alone read them. I explained this to Mr Kuksal on 21 November 2025, who then said that a reasonable bystander might have concluded that I was making such a reference. But of course the reasonable bystander is taken to have knowledge of the circumstances relating to these documents on 14 November 2025 as I have outlined earlier. Generally, my point to Mr Kuksal on 14 November 2025 was that I would not allow him to use the case management hearing as a forum to make the sort of allegations that he was making. Further, they were irrelevant to the context, which was a case management hearing.
4. Fifth, it is said that my conduct on 14 November 2025 gave rise to "institutional protection and systemic bias", "protection of the VLSB", "protection of Justice Downes", protection of another judge, and generally favouring the VLSB. But a review of the transcript of the 14 November 2025 hearing demonstrates the problematic nature of those assertions.
5. Sixth, it is said that I somehow engaged in "jurisdictional usurpation" and "effectively over-ruled the Chief Justice's statutory determination of sufficient importance" given under s 20(1A). But of course the question on 14 November 2025 was what was left of proceeding VID642/2025 given that the VLSB had said that it did not want to prosecute that proceeding further and was content for that matter to be dismissed. So, if there had been something of "sufficient importance" at the time of the Chief Justice's determination, it had ceased to exist. And that is, no doubt, why provisions such as s 20(5) were available to dispose of the matter. Further, and as I have said, in VID642/2025, there was no other formulated application on foot. The contempt proceeding had been "filed" in VID222/2025 and referred to in the appellants' amended notice of appeal in VID1279/2025.
6. Seventh, I accept that I criticised Mr Kuksal, who had previously made a complaint to the Chief Justice, for speculating as to the basis for the Chief Justice's s 20(1A) determination of VID642/2025. But my point to him was that what was important was to construe her instrument of direction and the accompanying email from the Registrar rather than his speculation as to why she acted and how she may have reacted to his complaint.
7. And when one does construe the instrument of direction and email, what was being made clear was that it was thought desirable that Downes J should not continue to deal with and hear VID642/2025 given that she had made sequestration orders against the appellants and had made findings against the appellants in her underlying reasons in VID222/2025. That is all that one could sensibly glean, and I indicated as much to the appellants.
8. Now clearly from the instrument of direction one can infer that it was thought that there was something substantive left in VID642/2025 that was appropriate to refer to the Full Court.
9. But on my perusal of the electronic court file and given the VLSB's attitude on the morning of 14 November 2025, there was nothing of substance left to be adjudicated on. The VLSB did not wish to proceed with its proceeding. And of course the Chief Justice would not have been aware of this when she made the s 20(1A) direction. Further, as I have said, the contempt proceedings/"Statement of Charges" had been filed in the bankruptcy proceeding (VID222/2025) and not VID642/2025.
10. So, at the time of my dismissal order there was no unresolved formulated application in VID642/2025 supported by evidence, let alone one that had been properly formulated such that the Full Court could deal with it. But as the appellants had raised the possibility, I preserved to them liberty to apply to make any relevant application in my orders of 14 November 2025 which I have set out earlier.
11. Generally, the appellants have said that I was unwilling to hear them on 14 November 2025 with an open mind. No doubt I may not have been as user friendly as they might have liked. And no doubt I was occasionally short with them and robust in expressing preliminary views. But none of this rises to the level of actual bias or an apprehension of bias.
12. As to the appellants' assertions of my preferring the VLSB's interests over their own and not assisting them as self-represented litigants, my review of the transcript of the hearing on 14 November 2025 and the orders that I made in both matters on that day demonstrates that this is not a fair reflection.
13. Further, I have reviewed the 8 pages of Ms Xu's "Appeal Grounds Summary" addressed to my conduct and the dismissal order, many topics of which I have discussed in these reasons. To the extent that I have not done so, this should not be taken as an acceptance, but merely that I have considered it not appropriate to elaborate further.
14. Finally, on 14 November 2025 itself, Mr Kuksal made an oral application that I should disqualify myself. At that time I declined to accept that invitation and to give written reasons. The transcript of that hearing speaks for itself. But if separate written reasons were necessary, what I have said here concerning the 21 November 2025 application provides sufficient reasons.

1. Yesterday morning I indicated to the parties that I would be handing down judgment today. I then received a further flurry of material from the respondents, the vast majority of which was not within my contemplated directions to the parties last Friday.
2. At 9.57 am yesterday, my chambers received a 1½ page email from Mr Ansell attaching a 40 page document titled "Analysis of Beach J's Admissions of Judicial Misconduct". There was no leave given to file such a document. But I have looked at this material. It adds nothing to my analysis of the key questions and facts which I have distilled and discussed elsewhere in these reasons.
3. Mr Ansell also wrote seeking time to file further evidence. His email said (emphasis in original):

...

I therefore request that Justice Beach grant us until the end of tomorrow (28 November 2025) to file the foreshadowed evidence through my affidavit.

I clarify that I adopt Mr Kuksal's position that Justice Beach no longer has jurisdiction in the proceedings. His Honour's decision to make the interim suppression orders on 21 November 2025 (which he has also unreasonably failed to provide to the parties) gives rise to an unmistakable apprehension that His Honour has dishonestly abused his office to provide corrupt VLSB officials with an unlawful cover against accountability measures. In the process, His Honour has further impeded our efforts to seek relief against the unjust and oppressive measures the VLSB has taken against us to permanently suppress evidence of the severe corruption we have endeavoured to expose.

As Mr Kuksal had clarified during the hearing on 21 November 2025, the Appellants have no confidence in Justice Beach's ability to adjudicate the matter fairly. We are simply seeking to assist the Court by providing evidence that may assist His Honour in grasping the truth.

Please also find attached a copy of a recently generated Perplexity report, which Mr Kuksal produced by providing the AI software with a copy of the transcript of the hearing on 21 November 2025, in addition to the documents that he had already uploaded to its interface to generate the report exhibited to Ms Xu's affidavit, affirmed on 20 November 2025.

I have personally reviewed the content produced by Perplexity and confirm that the attached report was generated exclusively by the software. No alterations have been made to it other than minor grammatical and formatting changes.

As part of a control group analysis, Mr Kuksal fed the same information and raised the same queries to ChatGPT (5-Extended Thinking), Google Notebook, and Google Gemini. All software concurred about the substantive matters raised in the report.

The Appellants intend to file this into evidence and provide details regarding the method through which the report was produced when we file the evidence of the VLSB's and Mr Silver's alleged contempt of court.

1. I refused leave to file such evidence.
2. Further, at 10.52 am yesterday, my chambers also received an email from Mr Kuksal in the following form (emphasis in original):

I write on behalf of the Appellants and clarify that:

1. The evidence that the Appellants seek to file includes the excerpts of the transcripts of the hearings before Justice Downes that capture our attempts to make the oral application for compensation pursuant to the VLSB's undertaking, in stark contradiction to the misrepresentative claims made by Mr Silver; and

2. Excerpts of the transcripts of the hearings before [Justice X] that demonstrate the falsity of Mr Silver's assertions to the Court, including in respect of the purported extant interim suppression order that the VLSB claims [Justice X] has made.

We were preparing to file the documents in evidence yesterday and had waited for the VLSB's filing so we may include a response to their representations to the Court. This was especially necessary after Mr Silver made the misrepresentative claims about the proceedings before [Justice X] in his submissions.

On 27 October 2025, [Justice X] made oral orders setting aside the interim order in accordance with what His Honour had always represented (please see pages 324 to 327 of the attached transcript of the hearing before [Justice X] on 27 October 2025 (pages 155-158 of the PDF), pages 11-13 of the transcript of the hearing on 17 October 2025 (pages 12-14 of the PDF) and pages 159-170 of the transcript of the hearing on 8 October 2025, all attached to this email, for context). The orders were made after Mr Silver conceded that he was "plainly wrong" in seeking that the Court do otherwise. A copy of Mr Silver's submissions is also attached to this email.

As we had anticipated, Mr Silver persisted in making fraudulent misrepresentations about the proceedings before Justice Downes in yesterday's submissions.

It would have been remiss for us not to raise the point and seek to file evidence in support of our allegations as soon as we identified the misconduct.

There can be no legitimate basis for His Honour to obstruct the filing of such evidence, and to ensure that there is a record of it, we will file an affidavit today that includes the excerpts of the transcripts where we raised our application for compensation before Justice Downes (it was also referred to in our revised Notice of Objection filed in the proceeding VID 222/2025, and I had read out one instance when we had raised the application on 28 July 2025 from the respective transcript during the hearing on 21 November 2025), along with the copies of our correspondence with Justice Beach's Chambers today to protect our rights.

The Perplexity report provided to Justice Beach's Chambers earlier today (attached to this email), and the foreshadowed affidavit also serve as evidence of the additional grounds for Justice Beach's disqualification that have arisen following the last application we made for His Honour's recusal on 21 November 2025.

I have copied the Chambers of Chief Justice Mortimer to this correspondence to include it in the record of our ongoing complaint.

1. Attached to the email were extensive transcripts. As to the relevant transcripts of the proceedings before Downes J, I have already reviewed these. As to the transcripts of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to review these in detail given how I have dealt with the confidentiality orders. It would seem that the confidentiality questions are still not finalised in the Supreme Court.
2. Further, at 12.33 pm yesterday, Ms Xu sent to my chambers an email with many attachments some of which were in zip folders. At 12.41 pm she sent a further email, attaching what she said was a "corrected" version of one of the documents. The vast majority of this material was outside the terms of what I indicated to the parties on 21 November 2025 concerning aides memoire on transcript references that I would receive following that hearing. But much of the material was transcripts of hearings before Downes J that I have already reviewed. Further, there is a 23 page document titled "The Appellants' Submissions Identifying the Instances on Which They Made/Sought to Make Their Application for Compensation Before Downes J" which I have reviewed. It does not change my analysis. And if it is relevant, it goes to the question of the bankruptcy appeal (VID1279/2025) and whether Downes J made an error. Further, there is an elodgment ID attempt document. But this relates to the contempt proceeding in VID222/2025; it was not filed or attempted to be filed in VID642/2025. There is other material in zip files, particularly the zip file named "VLSB's Application to Commence VID642_2025" which contains material that could not be opened by my executive assistant. Having said that, some of the material was identifiable and has been accessed elsewhere, including the originating application and concise statement in VID642/2025. At 1.11 pm my chambers sent an email requesting this material in accessible form. At 1.30 pm yesterday, Ms Xu sent a further email with this material in an accessible form.
3. One of the documents was an email dated 25 July 2025 from Ms Xu to the Registry attaching an "interlocutory application and statement of charge". This was a few days before Downes J commenced the hearing of the creditors' petition. One of the orders sought was to adjourn the proceedings before Downes J on various grounds including seeking directions about filing material in VID642/2025 concerning a claim seeking "recovery for economic loss". None of this changes what I have said. I note that Downes J made reference to this interlocutory application in her reasons (at [209]) concerning the contempt aspect. Further, I have set out earlier what her Honour said (at [212] and [213]) about it not being accepted for filing prior to 29 July 2025 and problems in form and lack of evidence.
4. None of the material sent by Ms Xu changes my analysis.
5. Further, at 1.55 pm yesterday, Mr Kuksal sent me another lengthy email. I do not propose to be drawn into a detailed discussion of its contents. Most of it is tendentious, inaccurate and seeking to raise new matters. But there is one matter I should note. Mr Kuksal correctly refers to the late service of an affidavit by the VLSB and says that he has not had time to respond to it. I have put that affidavit to one side and not relied on it. But I have relied on the VLSB's general assertion that the confidentiality issues in the Supreme Court have not been finally resolved.
6. Further, at 3.14 pm yesterday, Mr Kuksal sent me another email with an attachment. This adds nothing to what I have said.
7. Last night at 9.29 pm, and notwithstanding that the appellants were aware that I was to hand down judgment at 9.15 am this morning, my chambers received an email from Ms Xu attaching a 6 page affidavit sworn by Mr Ansell with some electronic exhibits in what was said to be a Dropbox link. He has described himself as a lawyer in the affidavit. This was the affidavit referred to earlier that I refused him leave to file. Both Mr Ansell and Ms Xu were aware via yesterday's email from my executive assistant that I had so refused. In any event the affidavit appears to be a submission by Mr Ansell in the form of an affidavit. I have addressed the various questions already to the extent necessary. And by the description in the affidavit, the electronic folder would seem to include all of the relevant documents that I already have and reviewed. I confirmed this aspect this morning with my executive assistant. Finally, at 8.51 am this morning Mr Kuksal emailed through a further affidavit. No leave has been given to file this affidavit. In any event I have already seen the two emails and transcript attached.
8. Let me turn to the confidentiality questions.

1. On 21 November 2025, the VLSB and the other respondents objected to the tender and reliance on parts of the affidavit of Ms Xu on the grounds that some of the annexures include references to matters described as the Flitner allegations, which allegations the VLSB says are irrelevant to the recusal application, scandalous and inadmissible. At the hearing on 21 November 2025, I made an interim confidentiality order over all of Ms Xu's annexures pending the receipt of further submissions from the parties during this week.
2. Now material containing the Flitner allegations was the subject of confidentiality and suppression orders made by Downes J having been admitted into evidence by her Honour in proceeding VID222/2025 on a provisional basis, but later being ruled inadmissible. They concern personal allegations against two VLSB employees who have been described by the pseudonyms, person 1 and person 2.
3. Moreover, attempts by the appellants to raise the Flitner allegations in proceedings between the appellants and the VLSB in this Court have been the subject of judicial criticism, and have been described as scandalous and vexatious by both Meagher J and Lee J.
4. The specific parts of the annexures to Ms Xu's affidavit which record the Flitner allegations have been identified in annexure A of the VLSB's draft minute of orders which were provided to me on 25 November 2025 at 12.03 pm.
5. In my view the Flitner allegations are irrelevant to the issues in the recusal application. At the hearing on 21 November 2025, the appellants did not advance any proper basis to explain how the Flitner allegations were relevant to the recusal application.
6. I note that during the course of the appellants' submissions, I was taken to a number of electronic sub-folders which comprised the annexures to Ms Xu's affidavit and which contained documents recording the Flitner allegations, but I was not taken specifically to any particular document or part of a document that was used to draw to my attention or to rely on the Flitner allegations.
7. I agree with the VLSB that the Flitner allegations do not meet the threshold of relevance, and on one view would appear to be vexatious and scandalous. Accordingly, I reject the admission into evidence of parts of various annexures to Ms Xu's affidavit that have been identified by the VLSB.
8. Given that the Flitner allegations are irrelevant to the recusal application, it is appropriate to make a confidentiality order over those parts of Ms Xu's annexures that record the Flitner allegations so as to prevent public inspection of those parts.
9. It is also appropriate to make suppression orders so as to prevent any reporting of the Flitner allegations by the appellants or non-parties under the guise of fair and accurate reports of information that relates to the proceedings.
10. Further, I agree with the VLSB that it would be prejudicial to the administration of justice if evidence filed and provisionally deployed by the appellants but ultimately ruled inadmissible, irrelevant and potentially scandalous and which therefore ought not to have been before me, is able to be published by the appellants or inspected or published by non-parties.
11. Further, the fact that the Flitner allegations may previously have been published by the appellants in other courts, or arguably may have entered the public domain, does not detract from the necessity or at least desirability of not permitting this material to be further used or published.
12. Now some of the annexures to Ms Xu's affidavit which record the Flitner allegations are transcripts of hearings in the Supreme Court of Victoria. But the airing of the Flitner allegations in the Supreme Court does not dictate my approach to the admissibility of such material in the recusal application, and what confidentiality or suppression orders ought be made if the Flitner allegations are irrelevant. Further and in any event, the confidentiality questions relating to the Flitner allegations in the proceeding in the Supreme Court are apparently yet to be finally resolved.
13. I will make the necessary confidentiality and suppression orders under ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the FCA Act on the basis of the foregoing matters. But I will only do so for an interim period until the hearing and determination of the bankruptcy appeal. At that time the Full Court can then deal with all confidentiality and suppression issues consistently and finally concerning all the material sought to be relied upon by the appellants.

1. For the foregoing reasons, I would refuse the appellants' present recusal application. But I will review my position in the light of the following circumstances.
2. As I understand it, the appellants have now sought to appeal my dismissal order in VID642/2025. Clearly I could not continue to sit on the bankruptcy appeal (VID1279/2025) if that needed to be heard at the same time and by the same Full Court as heard any appeal from my dismissal order in VID642/2025. But would such a scenario necessarily or likely arise? I cannot say at the present time.
3. Ms Xu in her submissions on 21 November 2025 seemed to assume that the same Full Court would have to deal with both the bankruptcy appeal and the appeal from my dismissal order in VID642/2025. But this is not clear.
4. First, there may be an argument that leave to appeal needs to be sought. If so, there remains the possibility that this could be dealt with by a single judge. I will not speculate on the possible outcomes.
5. Second, even if an appeal from my dismissal order was required to or did come before a Full Court, it is not clear to me that the same Full Court needs to deal with the matter and at the same time as the bankruptcy appeal. Why do I say that? Even assuming that my dismissal order was set aside, that does not bring into existence any interlocutory application seeking to enforce an undertaking as to damages in VID642/2025 in a form that could be dealt with by the Full Court. There is none, let alone one supported by evidence.
6. Moreover, whatever the outcome of any appeal from my dismissal order, the Full Court in the bankruptcy appeal is still dealing with the same question as to whether Downes J was correct in making the sequestration orders given the possibility or prospect of the appellants having or making a claim to enforce an undertaking as to damages.
7. Anyway, I will not discuss this further as the question of the disposition of an appeal from my dismissal order in VID642/2025 is a matter for others. For the moment, I will not disqualify myself from hearing the bankruptcy appeal or any associated interlocutory application.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and seventeen (117) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Beach.