[2026] ACTSC 10
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-01-29
Mossop J
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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: KS v Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd (No 5) Citation: [2026] ACTSC 10 Hearing Date: 20-24 October 2025 Decision Date: 29 January 2026 Before: Mossop J Decision: (1) The proceedings are listed for the making of final orders on 12 February 2026 at 9:15am. (2) The plaintiffs are to provide to the Associate to Mossop J and to the defendant a proposed form of orders and a document setting out the calculations required for the purposes of determining the dollar amount to be included in those orders by 9 February 2026. Catchwords: FINANCIAL SERVICES – STATUTORY UNCONSCIONABILITY – Loan agreements – where defendant created system to insulate it from knowledge of borrowers’ personal circumstances – where defendant did not require information to establish that borrower and guarantor could service loan – where, despite borrower being trustee corporation and loan being labelled a business loan, property being purchased was to be owner occupied – where broker received substantial fees upon borrower’s entry into loan agreement – where defendant could increase interest rate under loan if it suffered increased costs or a decrease in effective return, despite loan not being identified as a variable rate loan – where defendant would receive substantial fees on default – where defendant had no system in place to ensure the borrower was an appropriate one – defendant’s conduct unconscionable EQUITY – UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT – Knowledge – where plaintiff under special disadvantage – where defendant only dealt with plaintiff through broker – where apparent that plaintiff under significant financial pressure – financial pressure not, of itself, a special disadvantage – defendant had no knowledge of plaintiff’s conditions and therefore her special disadvantage – defendant’s conduct not unconscionable in equity CONSUMER PROTECTION – BORROWERS AND GUARANTORS – Whether guarantor under loan agreement a “debtor” for National Credit Code (Cth) – where guarantor termed a “principal debtor” and has significant obligations under loan agreement – where, nevertheless, distinction maintained between borrower and guarantor under loan agreement – guarantor not a “debtor” Legislation Cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), ss 12BAA, 12BAB, 12CB, 12CC, 12GJ(2), 12GM Australian Securities and Investments Commission Regulations 2001 (Cth), regs 2B(1)(a), 2B(1)(f), 2B(1)(g), 2B(1)(h) Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), rr 1617, 1619 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 311, 334 Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), ss 93, 94, 96 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), ss 178, 179, 180, Sch 1 – National Credit Code (Cth), ss 3, 5, 77, 204(1) Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) Cases Cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt [2019] HCA 18; 267 CLR 1 Blomley v Ryan (1954) 99 CLR 362 Canty v PaperlinX Australia Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 309; 9 BFRA 524 CIMC Raffles Offshore (Singapore) Ltd v Schahin Holding SA [2013] EWCA Civ 644; 2 All ER (Comm) 760 Clipper Maritime Ltd v Shirlstar Container Transport Ltd [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 546 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 Con-Stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226 Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; 275 CLR 165 Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; 251 CLR 640 Heald v O’Connor [1971] 1 WLR 497 Integrated Securities No 3 Pty Ltd v Creatrix Web Development and Online Marketing Solutions Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 596 Jams 2 Pty Ltd v Stubbings (No 3) [2019] VSC 150 Lee v ATL (Australia) Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 327 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd [1999] SASC 265; 75 SASR 1 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Burns [2015] WASC 234 Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd v Nusage Pty Ltd [2024] ACTSC 36 Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd v Nusage Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 119 Productivity Partners Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2024] HCA 27; 281 CLR 338 Shannon v Permanent Custodians Ltd (No 3) [2022] WASCA 112 Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 6; 276 CLR 1 The “Juliana” (1822) 2 Dods 504; 165 ER 1560 Parties: KS (by her litigation guardian A Torline) (First Plaintiff) Nusage Pty Ltd in its own capacity and as trustee for the Nusage Trust (Second Plaintiff) Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd (Defendant) Representation: Counsel Z Mason with R Markham (Plaintiffs) B Katekar SC with D Robens (Defendant) Solicitors Adero Law (Plaintiffs) Lexmerca Lawyers (Defendant) File Number: SC 140 of 2024 MOSSOP J: Introduction
These proceedings relate to a loan agreement (Loan Agreement) entered into on 19 July 2021 by the plaintiffs, KS and Nusage Pty Ltd (Nusage), and the defendant, Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd (Prime).
KS, the first plaintiff, has a history of mental illness. She sues by a litigation guardian.
The Loan Agreement was for a short-term loan of an amount of $850,000 to Nusage, a company that had been recently incorporated and of which KS was the sole director and shareholder. The purpose of the Loan Agreement was described in the agreement as “Working capital” but in fact it was to provide the plaintiffs with the funds to purchase a property in Ainslie (Ainslie Property).
Eventually, the plaintiffs fell into default under the Loan Agreement. As a consequence, a higher rate of interest applied and Prime obtained an order for possession of the Ainslie Property, which was the security for the loan. The Ainslie Property was ultimately sold by Prime as mortgagee in possession.
The plaintiffs seek both statutory and equitable relief as follows: (a) Orders pursuant to s 180 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), s 77 of the National Credit Code (Cth) (Code) and s 12GM of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act) that the Loan Agreement is invalid, unenforceable and set aside and that only the principal and limited interest are payable to the defendant (less any amounts already paid by the plaintiffs). Damages were also sought pursuant to ss 178, 179 and/or 180 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act. (b) A declaration that the Loan Agreement is unconscionable in equity. (c) A declaration that the defendant engaged in unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply of financial services contrary to s 12CB of the ASIC Act.
By the time of the hearing, the focus was on three issues: (a) whether, under the Loan Agreement, KS was a “debtor” so that the Code applied to her entry into the Loan Agreement; (b) whether the defendant had engaged in unconscionable conduct in equity; and (c) whether the defendant had engaged in unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply of financial services contrary to s 12CB of the ASIC Act. Evidence
The hearing took place over four days. Much of the evidence in the case was documentary because most of the dealings between KS and other people relating to the real property and financial transactions were documented or recorded in electronic form. Similarly, KS’s medical records and other documents relating to her mental state at various times were also available.
However, four witnesses gave oral evidence, each called by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs called KS to give evidence. The manner in which she gave evidence was consistent with the psychological and psychiatric evidence that was put before the court. She was very anxious, overinclusive in her answers, and keen not to be misunderstood or have her evidence misconstrued. I consider that her evidence was reliable in parts and unreliable in other parts. I have taken care to consider her evidence in the context of contemporaneous documentary materials.
Facts
The findings of fact which follow are largely derived from the extensive documentary material that was put before the court. The findings of fact are organised chronologically, indicating by the description in the headings those facts known to Prime at the time of the transaction and those facts which are now established by the evidence but which were not necessarily known to Prime at the time.
Overall, the process adopted by Prime involved no direct contact with the plaintiffs, and the progress towards the making of the loan is evidenced by the various stages of Prime’s internal processes.
Included in the findings of fact that follow are findings based upon records of KS’s consultations with Dr Marianne Bookallil (KS’s general practitioner (GP)) and a counsellor, and other documents relevant to her mental state at particular times. These are included because they provide contemporaneous information relevant to KS’s mental health throughout the relevant period and provide what is likely to be more accurate evidence as to KS’s mental state than her recollections in the context of litigation several years after the events.
KS and her properties
KS was born in China in 1962. As at the date of the Loan Agreement, she was 59 years old. She completed school and university in China. She moved to Australia as an adult. She received a scholarship to come to Canberra in her twenties. She started but did not complete a PhD. Her first marriage was marred by domestic violence. She remarried but her second husband died in the early 2000s as a result of a degenerative neurological condition. She had some form of employment in the public service but her employment was terminated for underperformance. Her mental health appears to have declined after the death of her second husband.
There are three residential properties relevant to the current case. First, there was a house in Lyons where KS had lived with her second husband until he died in about 2001 (Lyons Property). Second, there was an apartment in a newly constructed residential complex on West Row in Canberra City, the purchase of which was completed in 2016 (West Row Property). Third, there was the Ainslie Property, a house which was purchased using the funds provided by Prime under the Loan Agreement. The Ainslie Property had six bedrooms, four bathrooms, a study, a home office, a kitchen and a kitchenette.
From 2010, KS was in receipt of a disability support pension as a result of her mental health, which is described in more detail below.
The circumstances in which she came to move out of the Lyons Property were not the subject of detailed evidence. KS’s evidence was that, following her husband’s death in about 2001, she commenced hoarding a lot of items at the Lyons Property. She said that she wanted to move out of the Lyons Property because of the hoarding, memories of her husband, two occasions when burglars came to the property, and the fact that she felt unsafe taking the bus from Lyons.
On 22 December 2014, KS entered into a contract to purchase the West Row Property off the plan for $959,900. The settlement date was 9 November 2016, and the transfer was registered on 8 December 2016.
From October 2014, KS had been subject to a psychiatric treatment order. A further order was made on 26 March 2015 but, upon review in August 2015, it was not continued.
KS gave evidence that, in late 2020, she had discussions with four other women whom she had met in refuges about purchasing a large group home together for shared independent living. She only knew those women by pseudonyms: Mary, Susanne, Kylie and Deborah. The group had shared experiences of trauma.
On 8 December 2020, KS entered into a contract to sell the Lyons Property for $830,000. Settlement was anticipated to occur on 22 January 2021. However, it appears that there was a delay and that it was only on 5 March 2021 that settlement in fact occurred. In addition to the $83,000 paid as a deposit, KS received $761,178.85 after payment of her expenses.
KS meets Peter Carew, finance broker
On 28 February 2021, KS met Mr Peter Carew at a farewell party for a friend. He told her that he helped people to obtain finance to buy homes. KS thought that this was fortuitous as she was looking to buy a home to live in with other women with disabilities. It turned out that Mr Carew was the managing director of Realm Property and Finance Pty Ltd (Realm).
On 1 March 2021, KS exchanged emails with Mr Carew. Mr Carew indicated that KS could send him details of the properties she was looking at and that he was looking forward to “progressing funding requirements”.
On 2 March 2021, KS attended a doctor’s appointment, complaining of falls. As part of the notes of her examination of KS, Dr Bookallil recorded: “Nervous breakdown re selling house”. The doctor thought the falls were probably secondary to hypotension and poor diet.
It was in those circumstances that, at some stage on 2 March 2021, KS signed a document entitled “Mandate to Act”, appointing Realm as a broker to make loan applications on her behalf. The indicative loan product was described as “Commercial Loan Facility” and the maximum loan amount was $1,105,000. It was proposed that it be a 12-month facility with interest capitalised. Various fees were payable, including a brokerage fee of 1.1% of the loan amount.
Late that evening, Mr Carew emailed KS with a copy of the executed Mandate to Act for her records. He indicated that the maximum loan amount figure was based upon a 65% loan to valuation ratio of the proposed sale price in relation to the Ainslie Property. The maximum loan approach was adopted because: it provides you with flexibility in respect to the management and utilisation of your future ‘cash’ resources…ie retaining sufficient funds to meet your living expenses and existing mortgage loan commitments and potential future expenditures in respect to proposed residential property acquisition … together with funding of expenses related to the sale of your “West Row” property.
He requested a copy of the contract of sale for the Ainslie Property. He also requested various other supporting documents that he would need. KS provided a copy of the contract for the Ainslie Property at 10:39pm. Mr Carew then set about preparing a loan application to a business trading as IBN Direct (IBN).
On 3 March 2021 at 11am, he emailed KS, saying: “I’m in the process of putting together an initial submission to a lender and need your input”. Then, at 11:23am, he sent a further email with a draft of the application form, including a description of KS, her financial circumstances and the rental potential of the property. He asked her to “check the wording in this loan scenario form and call me to discuss before I email through to the lender”. It is likely that there was some discussion of the terms of the application and then, at 12:22pm, Mr Carew sent KS an amended loan application form. That was targeted at the acquisition of the Ainslie Property and sought a 12-month loan equivalent to 65% of the purchase price. The application form included the following:
Loan Purpose: Acquisition of Residential property for future redevelopment – block subdivision
Repayment / Exit Loan to be approved with 12 months interest capitalized – On Strategy: review at expiry client will review refi options or may seek to finalise loan from own financial resources or refi with a development loan, should she opt for a DA on the subject security.
Loan outline: • Client has 2 residential assets that will be sold over the next 12 months – net value after payout of existing RM1 - $1.7M • Client was a university academic having been employed with the ANU for several years. In addition, client has a private business providing student tutoring services (over past 7 years ). In 2020, client advises that student clientele was significantly reduced / impacted by COVID. Client has decided to redirect her energies into property investment and development and is in the process of establishing a Discretionary Family Trust to facilitate current and future property acquisitions. In the future client advises that the tutoring business will likely resume. In addition, client receives Centrelink disability pension, which is a secondary income source. • Target property has a substantial dwelling on the site and is estimated to generate $92,800 gross rent, producing a yield of 5.12%pa. There is also the option of renovating the site to accommodate a granny flat further improving the rental yield prospects for the asset (NB this option will likely form part of the client’s future review in 12 months time).
This was largely a work of fiction. It was true that KS did have two residential assets, although the contract of sale for one of them was to be completed in a few days. Everything else was, at the least, a very significant elaboration upon the truth. The Centrelink pension was her only significant source of income being, at the time that table was prepared, $841.20 per fortnight.
The same day, 3 March 2021, at 7:36am, Mr Carew emailed KS indicating that she should call Ms Brown (who practised under the name Emma Brown Legal) and engage her to assist with the contract of sale in relation to the Ainslie Property.
At 8:32am the same morning, Mr Carew emailed an accountant, Mr Atif Iqbal (carbon copied to KS). This email said: “We need to go down a commercial path for this acquisition. I have a private lender prepared to do the deal with the borrower being a family trust and corporate trustee”. Mr Iqbal was asked to set up the trust and trustee company.
The prospect of purchasing the Ainslie Property
On 3 March 2021 at 10:49pm, Mr Carew emailed Ms Brown (carbon copied to KS) asking her to assist with the proposed purchase of the Ainslie Property. He indicated that the contract would not be conditional upon finance. He foreshadowed that there would be a settlement date of 3 July 2021 at KS’s request and that an $85,000 deposit would be paid.
On 4 March 2021 at 9:02am, Ms Brown emailed Mr Carew saying she had provided advice to KS about the contract of sale for the Ainslie Property and the possibility of using KS’s other property as security. Mr Carew indicated that he would talk to Ms Brown later that day.
On 4 March 2021, Mr Carew coordinated with Ms Brown, Mr Iqbal and KS the establishment of a purchasing entity and a trust, and the finalisation of the sale price and contract. Mr Iqbal and KS exchanged emails about possible names for the company to be established and whether or not any of those names were available. Ultimately, one of the names identified by KS, Nusage, was found to be available and they proceeded with that name.
Ms Brown was contacted by KS on the morning of Friday, 5 March 2021. Ms Brown was asked to enquire of the sellers of the Ainslie Property whether there could be a flexible settlement date. It appears from the circumstances of the request that KS was seeking to have the contract allow for an earlier (rather than later) settlement date. Ms Brown made that enquiry of the sellers’ agent and replied by email to KS early that afternoon that the sellers had indicated that there could not, at that stage, be flexibility as the sellers did not yet know when they would be able to move out of the property. The request for an earlier settlement date when, as will be seen, finance had not been arranged, is indicative of KS’s anxiety about moving into the Ainslie Property.
The contract to purchase the Ainslie Property
On 5 March 2021 at 11:07am, KS emailed Ms Brown, indicating that the company that would be the purchasing entity for the Ainslie Property was called Nusage Pty Ltd and that the trust was the Nusage Trust. KS signed the documents necessary to establish Nusage (the company) on 5 March 2021. She was the sole director and secretary of the company and held the two $1 shares in the company. The company was registered that day. The trust deed, however, was only executed by KS as the director of Nusage on 28 June 2021.
At 2:44pm on 5 March 2021, Mr Carew emailed KS to make it clear that, if she did not sign the contract of sale for the Ainslie Property that afternoon, she ran the risk of the sellers’ real estate agents finding another prospective buyer who was prepared to pay more than the $1.735 million that KS had offered.
At 4:27pm, Mr Iqbal emailed KS, letting her know that Nusage had been successfully registered.
At 5:41pm, KS emailed Mr Carew, letting him know that the sellers had accepted the offer of $1.735 million and that she had signed the contract of sale. She said: “I now need to focus my energy on obtaining an agreement from RAMS (with your help) to sell the city property”. This was a reference to the West Row Property which was subject to a mortgage to the business trading as RAMS Home Loans (RAMS).
The contract to purchase the Ainslie Property was entered into that day (5 March 2021). It is notable that this occurred on the same day that the sale of the Lyons Property ultimately settled: see [26] above.
Following the entry into the contract of sale for the Ainslie Property, KS sent thank you emails both to Ms Brown and to the real estate agents involved in the transaction.
The deposit of $83,000 on the Ainslie Property was paid in two instalments of $19,416 on 5 March 2021 and $63,584 on 9 March 2021. Receipts were issued by the real estate agent on 9 March 2021.
On 9 March 2021 at 5:18pm, Ms Brown’s assistant emailed KS. The email noted that settlement was due on 5 July 2021, requested that KS call Ms Brown’s office as soon as possible to book an appointment in preparation for settlement, and attached a copy of the exchanged contract and “our initial letter”. The covering email contained a reference to finance in the following terms: If you are obtaining finance for this purchase please send a copy of the exchanged contract to your bank/broker so they can process your unconditional loan approval as soon as possible. Please note any delay in sending this to your banker could result in a delay in completion of the purchase.
The initial letter, signed by Ms Brown on 9 March 2021, advised of the contracts having been exchanged at auction (even though this was not the case) and indicated that the contract was legally binding and that if the contract could not be completed then KS may lose her deposit. The letter also contained instructions about signing and returning the loan documents when sent by “your bank”, the need for a final inspection and the process involved in settlement. The letter indicated the matters that were not covered by the fixed professional fees, impliedly indicating the limited scope of the retainer. After this, the next interaction between KS and Ms Brown was on 23 June 2021.
Nothing happens about finance
Also on 9 March 2021, at 5:25am, Mr Carew emailed KS indicating that he was “back on deck”, asking for payment of his fees, suggesting that they meet to go through the RAMS material and stressing that it was “important that we get the loan application under way as soon as possible”.
Later that day, at 3:57pm, Mr Carew emailed KS an invoice for the work completed to date including negotiations and advice on the purchase of the Ainslie Property, establishing a family trust and trustee company, inspection of alternative property options, assistance with respect to negotiating the “RAMS arrears situation … in relation to WEST ROW unit” and “Assistance with the future sale of West Row unit”. Although it was attached to the email, the invoice itself was not in evidence. Subsequent communications indicate that it claimed a total of $550, being the $330 payable upon KS signing the Mandate to Act and $220 for work done outside the scope of that Mandate.
It is not clear whether KS met with Mr Carew as suggested in his 5:25am email, but it is clear that they had some form of communication either that day or the following day (10 March 2021). KS must have objected to the payment of the invoice that had been sent by Mr Carew because, at 9:23am on 10 March 2021, Mr Carew sent an email to KS expressing his disappointment in relation to her attitude towards paying his invoice and explaining the basis upon which it had been calculated.
On 15 March 2021 at 10:57am, Mr Carew emailed KS, asking her to attend the office of Mr Iqbal to amend the “settler” (i.e., settlor) details for the trust. He also asked her to advise what her position was in relation to the invoice that he had sent. He identified that he would prefer to continue working with her but that, if it was her intention to “walk away”, he asked that his invoice be paid.
On 19 March 2021, there was correspondence from the solicitors acting for the sellers of the Ainslie Property, anticipating the date for completion being 5 July 2021.
After that 19 March correspondence, neither Mr Carew nor Ms Brown heard from KS for several months. In the intervening period, KS attended a number of doctor’s appointments.
On 25 March 2021 (a Thursday), KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. KS said that she was required in court on Wednesday but could not get on a bus because she had severe diarrhoea. Dr Bookallil considered that the diarrhoea was probably secondary to anxiety and would provide her with a medical certificate but one that made it clear that she had not examined KS or seen her on the Wednesday.
On 1 April 2021, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil recording a level of dysfunction in her life. She was not sleeping, had lost her keys and had lost the earlier medical certificate. She remained anxious about the Covid vaccine because of her needle phobia.
The finance panic begins
KS only got back in touch with Ms Brown in response to her email of 18 June on 23 June 2021. On that date, there was a telephone call between Ms Brown and KS. KS indicated that she had not organised finance for the purchase of the Ainslie Property and may need to extend the settlement date. KS said she was friends with the sellers and would speak to them directly. Ms Brown provided her advice which was recorded in a contemporaneous file note: Told her to go [with] whatever bank can get approval through first as if seller doesn’t agree to extension she will be charged interest & may have contract terminated.
On 28 June 2021, the Nusage Trust deed was executed. The settlor was the person with whom KS was temporarily living.
On 30 June 2021, KS requested that Ms Brown’s assistant send her the first page of the contract of sale in relation to the Ainslie Property. Ms Brown must have learned of this and sent an email to KS expressing her concern: I am concerned about the message you just left with my assistant. As discussed last week, it is urgent that you get finance in place as soon as possible. Approval is likely to take 2-3 weeks to obtain and then the bank will need another 3 weeks minimum to be ready for settlement. There is simply not the time to be negotiating on loan terms before you [choose] a lender. I strongly advise that you [choose] whichever lender will be able to settle first and then consider refinancing at a later stage. If you do not settle by the due date the following will apply: 1. The Sellers can charge you interest on the purchase price from 12 July onwards; 2. The Sellers can issue you with a default notice. This notice will give you 14 days to complete the purchase. If you cannot complete the purchase within this time frame the sellers can cancel the contract and keep your deposit. You must apply for finance immediately to try to avoid a situation where you will incur interest or potentially lose the property and your deposit.
KS was completing an application for finance with IBN. This is the one that Mr Carew had intended to use. As soon as KS received the front page of the contract from Ms Brown’s assistant, she forwarded it on to Mr Scott Roberts at IBN. Mr Roberts then sent her an email attaching an application form. Eleven minutes later, KS responded saying that she would advise as soon as she had completed it.
At 3:16pm, KS provided Mr Roberts with information in support of her application for a loan.
The significant features of this information were that: (a) it identified the applicant as being the Nusage Trust with Nusage as the trustee; (b) it identified the reason for seeking the credit as “Acquisition of residential property for future redevelopment – block subdivision”; (c) it identified that credit was $1.075 million or $900,000 or “lower amount (to be discussed)”; (d) it identified that the loan was to be for 12 months with an option to extend for a further 12 months; (e) it identified the “Exit strategy” in the following terms: Loan to be approved with 12 months interest capitalized On review at expiry applicant will review refinance options or may seek to finalise loan from own financial resources or refinance with a development loan, if opt for a DA on the subject security. - Applicant has 2 residential assets, one has been sold and one will be sold [ASAP] –net value after payout of existing RM1 - $1.7M. - Applicant was a university academic. In addition, applicant has a private business providing student tutoring services (over past 25 years). In 2020, student clientele was significantly reduced / impacted by COVID. Applicant has decided to redirect her energies into property investment and development and has established a Discretionary Family Trust to facilitate current and future property acquisitions. The tutoring business is likely to resume soon. In addition, applicant receives Centrelink disability pension, which is a secondary income source. - Target property has a substantial dwelling on the site and is estimated to generate $92,800 gross rent, producing a yield of 5.12%pa. There is also the option of renovating the site to accommodate a granny flat further improving the rental yield prospects for the asset - this option will likely form part of the applicant’s future review in 12 months time.
The notice to complete
Also on 6 July 2021, at 4:33pm, the conveyancer acting for the sellers of the Ainslie Property sent a notice to complete to Ms Brown by email. It was also faxed to her after close of business on 6 July 2021. The notice required completion of the sale contract before 3pm on 21 July 2021.
On 7 July 2021 at 9:41am, Ms Brown emailed KS, telling her that the sellers had issued a notice to complete which required completion of the purchase by 21 July 2021. The email pointed out that, if KS could not complete the purchase by that date, the sellers would have the right to terminate the contract and retain the deposit.
At 9:46am, Ms Brown emailed Mr Fernando. Her email referred to a discussion that she had with him the day before (6 July 2021). She then told him of the notice to complete. Her email continued: “If we cannot meet this settlement date the seller may terminate the contract.”
At 11:10am, KS provided documents to an employee at Mortgage House. Those documents included bank statements, documents in relation to the Nusage Trust and the income statement that had been obtained from the Braddon Centrelink Service Centre on 28 June 2021. It is notable that KS disclosed the fact that she was a disability pensioner.
At 11:31am, Mr Fernando replied to Ms Brown, saying: I strongly believe this will end in termination. Post assessment of documents, I’m no longer confident of the loan approval. There are some serious issues that makes this impossible for me to do. I have referred to a private lender and waiting on him to confirm if he wants to do this loan. Will keep you in the loop. Shame I didn’t get to work with you on something more solid. If you know anyone who is finding it hard to get finance, you can always send them my way, this one unfortunately is one of the most difficult [ones] I’ve seen.
Counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon this message as reflecting Mr Fernando’s opinion that the loan agreement would end in “termination” (due to default by the plaintiffs on any such loan agreement). However, in the context of the communications with Ms Brown in relation to the notice to complete and the provision of documents, including those from Centrelink, by KS, it is reasonably clear that the termination referred to by Mr Fernando was termination of the sale contract as a result of an inability to obtain finance prior to the time required by the notice to complete.
At 4:05pm, an employee of a business trading as Mango Credit emailed KS, indicating that the entity could not offer a loan as “it is unlikely the loan can be cleared from 70% of the estimated sale price less the existing bank debt”. That appears to have been based on a proposal to attempt to clear the loan taken out on the Ainslie Property with the proceeds of the sale of the West Row Property.
At some point that day (7 July), a business development manager at LJ Hooker in Dickson provided the rental appraisal for the “Granny Flats located out the back” of the Ainslie Property (referred to above at [66]), saying that they could “each” expect to achieve between $500 and $600 rental income per week. The floor plans of the Ainslie Property which were in evidence did not indicate that the Ainslie Property had any granny flats. The appraisal was given on the assumption that the two areas identified as granny flats (which, I infer, were the split-level storeys on the northwest wing of the property) were “self-contained”. That assumption is not borne out by the evidence. In particular, one of those areas had no kitchen or kitchenette.
KS commences dealing with Mr Taneski
On 8 July 2021 at 10:46am, Mr Taneski, the managing director of Universal Financial Group, sent KS an unsolicited email indicating, “I’m able to secure and settle private funding with the following term[s]”. The emailed provided details of a loan of $900,000 with an interest rate of 4.95% per annum.
KS was referred to Mr Taneski by a Mr Ken Sayer from Mortgage House (it will be recalled that Mr Fernando also worked for Mortgage House). Mr Taneski rented a desk in the same office as Mortgage House. He had access to the Mortgage House computer system and obtained basic information about the loan application from that computer system. At some stage, he printed out information from that system on the letterhead of his business, Universal Financial Group.
KS then dealt in parallel with both Mr Roberts (of IBN) and Mr Taneski.
KS’s affidavit evidence was that, following Mr Taneski’s email on 8 July 2021, she had a conversation with Mr Taneski (recounted in detail in her affidavit) in which she said that she disclosed “a combination of physical and psychiatric disabilities which are considered very severe and permanent”, that her case for a loan was not a strong one, that she had no proof of regular income and that she “had a formally diagnosed disability and that Centrelink’s assessment of [her] disability was that it was of the highest category of severity and considered permanent”.
I do not accept KS’s affidavit evidence about the substance of any such conversation. There is no contemporaneous documentary record which is consistent with those matters being disclosed at that point in time. Indeed, there is no record of KS responding to Mr Tanesky until 14 July.
Having regard to the carefully-formulated manner in which KS ultimately presented her claim for a loan to the various potential lenders (derived from what Mr Carew had drafted earlier), it is unlikely that, at this late stage, such complete disclosure would have been made.
The search for finance continues
Notwithstanding her mental health conditions, KS remained focused upon urgently obtaining a loan so as to not lose her deposit.
Also on 8 July 2021, at 1:14pm, KS sent a text message to Mr Roberts, saying that she had been “unwell for a few days” and asking him to return her call. A subsequent text at 6:24pm referred to an email that she said she had sent to him and recorded that she had decided to go with Option 1 but with a loan amount of $600,000 not $650,000. There was then a text message exchange reflecting some difficulty that KS had receiving an amended loan offer document sent to her by email.
At 2:08pm, Mr Taneski sent a text message to KS, saying, “new email sent … we really need to lodge your application by this afternoon to make sure we can settle by the 19th [of] July ok”.
At 2:45pm, Mr Roberts emailed to KS a spreadsheet comparing the three options for loans including the fees payable for those loans.
At some point that day, there was a telephone call between Ms Brown and KS. In that conversation, as recorded in a file note of Ms Brown, KS said she had been going to proceed with Mortgage House, but as that would not be possible, she would need to go with IBN. Ms Brown told KS that the interest amount would be $475 per day from 12 July. KS asked whether it would be possible to get the sellers to waive it and Ms Brown said they probably would not agree. KS said she was trying to open a bank account in the trust’s name but did not yet have an ABN. Ms Brown told her to get her accountant to do that for her. The file note records: “She mentioned she didn’t want to put the cheque in her bank [account] as she was on a disability pension & didn’t want to lose the pension. Told her she needed to get the cheque banked as it needed 3 days to clear. She is aware of the time frame for the notice to complete”.
At 7:51pm, KS sent an email to Mr Roberts confirming her intention to proceed with Option 1 for an amount of $600,000 and indicating that she would pay the $2,200 consultancy fee to IBN (see [90] above) the next day.
On 9 July 2021 at 7:46am, Mr Roberts emailed to KS indicative terms for a $600,000 loan.
At 9:23am, KS indicated by reply email to Mr Roberts that she was on her way to the bank to pay his consultancy fee. There were then text messages exchanged between KS and Mr Roberts.
At 9:53am, another employee of IBN sent KS an email (copied to Mr Roberts), stating: “Please find attached the updated terms with amended expiry date as per request.” It is not clear whether a document was in fact attached to that email. At 12:26pm that day, KS sent a text message to Mr Roberts saying that she had not received that email. Mr Roberts forwarded her the email at 12:29pm, and that email records that it contained an attachment entitled “Indicative Terms V4- NuSage Pty Ltd atf NuSage Trust [KS].pdf”.
A $600,000 loan is approved
Early on Sunday, 11 July 2021, at 7:52am, Mr Roberts emailed KS saying that the formal approval had been sent in a separate email. KS gratefully responded at 9:52am, saying that she still wished to proceed and asking him to “process my application as a matter of extreme urgency”. She said that, as a result of a “sudden illness”, she had been out of action for a few days the previous week. She said that she had been advised that the sellers would be charging “exorbitant (daily) penalty fees” if the settlement was delayed beyond 12 July, the following day.
At 10:43am, Mr Roberts emailed KS, saying that he needed her to accept the formal offer and return it and then she needed to pay the fee to the lender directly so that they could start preparing mortgage documents.
At 12:01pm, KS received the offer of a loan from Winscourt. The letter of offer was dated 9 July 2021. This was an offer of an amount of $600,000 at a rate of 15% per annum for a period of 12 months. At 3:08pm that afternoon, KS emailed Mr Roberts questions about the loan offer received from Winscourt.
On 12 July 2021 at 7:59am, Mr Roberts emailed KS providing some answers to the questions that she had asked in her email the day before. He also indicated that he needed the offer accepted and payments made to the lender that morning so as to be able to complete the mortgage documents.
At 2:48pm, a director of Winscourt emailed KS saying that no funds had been received into its account and hence no instructions had been given to prepare mortgage documents.
Early in the afternoon of 12 July 2021, KS had a telephone conversation with a Ms Shanta Lobo, an employee of the business trading as Private Mortgages Australia (PMA). As a result of that, KS forwarded the contract of sale for the Ainslie Property to PMA and completed an online application form on PMA’s website. That application was completed by 2:59pm. The information provided in support of the application contained the same description of KS’s employment and business background as had been provided with earlier applications. Further, it described the principal activities of Nusage as “E-learning, life coaching, meditation & yoga workshop/retreat”. It estimated that the property would generate $100,000 gross rental income per annum. As to why bank finance was unavailable, it contained the following: The bank lending specialist who was looking after my application left the bank unexpectedly. His colleague who took over my case advised that, due to her heavy workload, there would be considerable delay in processing my application with no guaranteed outcome, and I do not wish to risk losing the large deposit I have already paid plus losing the property.
This explanation was a false one.
In relation to an “exit strategy”, the application provided: “I plan to sell my residential property in the highly sought after location of Canberra CBD for $1,400,000 – 1,500,000 and pay off the mortgage completely.” The statement as to the value of the West Row Property was substantially in excess of the appraised value which KS had obtained from real estate agents: see [109] above. Further, this statement did not disclose the extent of any loan that would be required to be paid in order to discharge the mortgage over the West Row Property.
The offer from Prime
Also on 14 July 2021, at 10:35am, Mr Taneski emailed KS, saying “I received your message and I’m able to secure and settle private funding with the following term[s]”, being a $550,000 loan at a 4.95% interest rate. The message from KS referred to by Mr Taneski was not in evidence, but it may have been a voicemail message left for him by KS. Mr Taneski indicated that he needed “Borrowing entity information”, a copy of the executed trust deed, a copy of the contract of purchase and a copy of her driver licence or passport.
At 10:50am, KS forwarded to Mr Taneski the email from Valuations ACT, including the CV of the valuer, which she had obtained the previous day (see [143] above).
At 10:59am, Mr Taneski sent KS an updated email, saying “I’m able to secure and settle private funding with the following term[s]” and then setting out the details, including an interest-only loan of $850,000 for up to 3 years at a 4.95% interest rate, with a “facilitation fee” of 2.2%. The email requested the same documents noted above at [147].
At 11:12am, KS emailed Mr Taneski documents relevant to her application. These documents included: (a) the contract for the purchase of the Ainslie Property; (b) the Nusage Trust deed; (c) the Nusage certificate of incorporation; (d) certain other documents about Nusage; (e) identification documents for KS; (f) the rental appraisals for the Ainslie Property (including the appraisal for the “granny flats”); and (g) the Comparative Property Analyses for the Ainslie Property and the West Row Property.
At 11:45am, KS emailed Ms Brown’s contact details to Mr Taneski. KS also emailed him, at about the same time, proof of the two payments comprising the deposit on the Ainslie Property as well as an account summary from her NAB accounts showing a net position of $1,001,250.61.
At 3:34pm, KS emailed Mr Taneski and asked him to pass on to the lender the details of the valuer that she had forwarded earlier that day. She emphasised that Mr Taneski’s urgent help would be greatly appreciated because her solicitor had indicated that settlement had to happen by 20 July or she would lose the deposit on the Ainslie Property. She asked him and the lender to “view my case as a matter of extreme urgency” and fast track the application. She also asked whether Mr Sayer from Mortgage House had provided Mr Taneski with her Mortgage House loan application, including her exit strategy. She said, “If not, I am happy to provide so you can pass it on to the lender for assessment”. At 3:49pm, Mr Taneski replied simply: “I will have the approval letter this afternoon.”
Notwithstanding Mr Taneski’s response, at 4:42pm KS forwarded to Mr Taneski the “exit strategy” that she had provided to Mr Sayer of Mortgage House. This repeated what was said in earlier applications. It was in the following terms: Exit strategy At loan expiry applicant will review refinance options or may seek to finalise loan from own financial resources or refinance with a development loan, if opt for a DA on the subject security. - Applicant has 2 residential assets, one has been sold and the other one (located in the highly sought after location of Canberra CBD) will be sold asap. - Applicant was a university academic. In addition, the applicant has a private business providing student tutoring services (for over 25 years). In 2020, student clientele was significantly reduced/impacted by COVID. Applicant has decided to focus her energies on property investment and development and has established a Discretionary Family Trust to facilitate current and future property acquisitions. The tutoring business will resume very soon with 90% of the teachings conducted online. In addition, applicant receives Centrelink disability pension, which is a secondary income source. - Target property has a substantial dwelling on the site and is estimated to generate $100,000 gross rent, producing a solid income. There is also the option of renovating the site to accommodate another granny flat, further improving the rental yield prospects for the asset - this option will likely form part of the applicant’s future review in 12 months time.
Dealings with Ms Brown that day
Meanwhile, at 11:56am that day (14 July), KS forwarded Mr Taneski’s 10:59am email (see [149] above) to Ms Brown.
At 12:03pm, Ms Brown responded by email, saying: “We are really running out of time for you to be swapping lenders at this stage”. She said that it was unlikely that they would be in a position to settle by the following Tuesday (20 July).
At 12:29pm, KS replied to Ms Brown by email, saying that the lender said “he would do his best to help me settle this coming Wednesday 21 July”. KS asked various other questions in that email, including whether she should transfer the available funds into Ms Brown’s trust account.
At 12:40pm, Ms Brown sent another email to KS, pointing out that 20 July was the deadline for settlement and that, although a request could be made for an extension to 21 July, it was unlikely to be granted. Ms Brown noted that the broker had not guaranteed settlement, only saying that he would “do his best” to settle by 21 July. Ms Brown indicated that settlement would require a bank cheque. She said: As mentioned, you really don’t have time to be shopping around for loans. At this stage if you have not accepted a loan offer it is unlikely that any of the banks will be in a position to settle by Tuesday. I understand your difficulty and that you want to get the best possible deal however these delays are putting you at a very high risk of losing the deposit. It has been three weeks since we first discussed the urgency of getting the finance ready for settlement and we seem to be no closer than we were at that stage. I cannot stress the urgency of this enough, if you don’t put the finance in place with whichever bank can guarantee settlement on Tuesday you will lose your deposit and the property. The additional costs that you will incur with unfavourable loan terms will be less than the loss of the deposit.
A few minutes later, Ms Brown sent an email clarifying that the settlement date specified in the notice to complete was in fact Wednesday 21 July 2021 (it will be recalled that settlement was due at 3pm on that day: see [101] above) but that this did not affect her earlier advice that “it is very unlikely that any new bank you approach now will be able to settle given that is less than a week away”.
In response to a question from KS at 3:50pm, at 3:57pm Ms Brown again confirmed that a bank cheque was required for settlement and electronic funds transfer was not acceptable.
At 5:53pm, KS emailed Ms Brown indicating that she had signed and returned the loan approval form and that “They advised me that they would be able to get everything done by 21 July”. In fact, assuming the timestamps on all emails are consistent, it appears that KS only subsequently forwarded a scanned copy of the signed loan approval to Mr Taneski at 6:09pm that evening, thanking him for his time and kind assistance.
The Taneski “Discussion Paper”
At some stage, Mr Taneski prepared a document entitled “Discussion Paper”. This was th a typed document with the date “14 July 2021” in the top left corner. Mr Taneski’s evidence was that he had handwritten the document on 14 July in the form of illegible notes. His oral evidence left open the possibility that the typed document was only prepared at some point after 14 July, but that possibility was not explored. He no longer had the original handwritten notes.
This Discussion Paper was prepared for his own internal purposes and the evidence does not establish that it was provided either to KS or to Prime. I infer that it was prepared in order to be able to prove that there was some justification for him suggesting to Nusage and KS that the loan provided by Prime might have been suitable for their circumstances.
The Discussion Paper provided an outline of the circumstances as follows: KS had exchanged on purchase of a property in 139 Duffy Street, DICKSON, ACT 2602 on th rd the 5 March 2021 with an extended settlement to occur on the 3 July 2021. She th approached my company on the 14 July 2021 claiming that she was issued a notice to st complete & had to settle on the 21 July 2021 or she would lose her deposit of $173,500.00. As she purchased the property in her company Nusage Pty Ltd ATF Nusage Trust, the borrower via any lending body must be in the company name which was registered in March 2021. She had inherited funds overseas of over $1M to complete the purchase & required the balance plus interest & fees. She only required the loan for a short term as she was preparing to place her existing property at 172/45 West Row, CANBERRA CITY, ACT on the market to be sold with the sale proceeds to reduce the new loan & lease the new properties 2 granny flats for $600pw each to continue to service the new loan. In the meantime, her existing unit in West Row was to be leased to cover the existing loan payments until sold. … Repayments (This Loan) $4,356.25pm Existing Loan $2,304.17pm Total Payments $6,660.42pm Proposed Rentals $8,666.67pm Surplus $2,006.24pm Additional income being derived from her business also.
There is no evidence that indicates that KS inherited funds from overseas. It is not clear where this understanding on Mr Taneski’s part came from. I do not find that KS told him that. It is likely that there was some misunderstanding of what KS told him. So far as the figure of $1 million is concerned, KS had provided Mr Taneski with a copy of a bank statement showing that she had in excess of $1 million in the bank: see [151] above.
The statements about an intention to put the West Row Property on the market and rent the “granny flats” are likely to reflect statements made by KS to Mr Taneski. She did not disclose the fact that the West Row Property was filled with hoarded material and that the loan in relation to that property was in arrears. Nor did she disclose that one of the “granny flats” had no kitchen or kitchenette.
Final dealing with IBN Direct
Final dealings with PMA
Notwithstanding her dealings in relation to the offer received from Mr Taneski, KS had continued dealing with Ms Lobo from PMA.
At 1:43pm on 14 July 2021, KS had emailed Ms Lobo at PMA, asking for clarification of a couple of matters, including how the $27,720 approval fee was calculated. Ms Lobo replied with answers at 3:29pm.
At 4:51pm, Ms Lobo emailed KS saying that, because KS had not accepted the indicative offer, Ms Lobo assumed there was no further urgency with the loan.
On 15 July 2021 at 9:21am (after she had accepted the loan offer from Prime: see [164] above), KS replied to Ms Lobo, saying that the urgency had not changed but she was waiting for some advice and would advise Ms Lobo as soon as possible.
On 16 July 2021, Ms Lobo emailed KS, again noting that she had not received the accepted indicative offer. Ms Lobo asked KS to confirm urgently whether or not she was proceeding with PMA. There is no evidence of further communication by KS with Ms Lobo.
Prime’s internal processes: Loan Power approval
Prime processed loan applications using its internal software system called Loan Power, which defined and controlled its internal processes leading to the making of a loan offer and, ultimately, its entry into a loan agreement.
Because of his closeness to Prime, Mr Taneski had been given access to Loan Power so as to allow him to enter information into that system for the purposes of commencing the loan application process. Mr Henderson gave evidence that, “Most [brokers] weren’t given access to the - the [Loan Power] portal. That was a bit of a trial for a time.” Mr Henderson confirmed that Mr Taneski had direct access to the Loan Power system, and said Mr Taneski “writes a lot of business”. Sometime after KS sent documentation to Mr Taneski at 11:12am on 14 July 2021 (see [150] above), Mr Taneski entered sufficient information into the Loan Power system to trigger activity by employees of Prime. Although the process by which some of the documents were uploaded to the Loan Power system or otherwise came into the possession of Prime was not clear, Prime came to have documents about the incorporation of Nusage, the basic details of the contract for the Ainslie Property, identification details for KS, details of payment of the deposit for the Ainslie Property, the Nusage Trust deed and a completed Universal Financial Group document providing details relevant to the loan application.
At 3:20pm on 14 July 2021, a credit report was obtained by Prime in relation to Nusage, disclosing that it had been incorporated on 5 March 2021, had a share capital of $2, and had a “neutral” risk level. It also identified that KS was the sole director and shareholder of the company.
At 4:09pm, Mr John Zhang, who worked in the credit team at Prime, emailed another employee of Prime trying to rectify a technical issue relating to the generation of loan documents. This issue was rectified and the loan approval documentation sent to Mr Taneski. As pointed out above (at [156]), Mr Taneski sent the approval to KS at 4:53pm.
The Loan Power system identified that the Ainslie Property provided a security for the loan as a residential house or townhouse that would be owner occupied.
Basic features of the loan approval
The loan approval commenced as follows: Loan Approval for $850,000 Thank you for your application. We are pleased to confirm that your application has been approved on the terms and conditions outlined herein. Your interest rate is 4.95% pa. As an alternative to slow bureaucratic bank funding, it’s our business to provide fast, flexible solutions so you can get back to business and own tomorrow. We have helped thousands of Australian SME’s just like you, and we look forward to showing you why we are one of Australia’s fastest growing non-bank lenders. (Emphasis in original.)
The loan approval was for a “Business Basics” loan. The facility limit was $850,000. The approval was subject to satisfactory valuation. The purpose of the loan was described as “Working Capital”. The interest rate applicable if there was no default was 4.95% per annum (referred to as the “Lower Rate”). In the event that there was a default, then the “Higher Rate” was 1.5% per month. Nusage, as trustee for the Nusage Trust, was the borrower and KS was the guarantor. The security was the Ainslie Property. The offer would expire on 18 July 2021. The approval document indicates that amongst the information required prior to the first drawdown would be financial statements for the borrower, a bank statement for the borrower, and the complete assets and liabilities for all guarantors.
The acceptance of the offer
In order to accept the offer contained in the loan approval, KS was required to sign on behalf of Nusage and on her own behalf. Both signatures were witnessed. In addition, an application fee of $2,950 needed to be paid. A credit card authorisation for the amount of $3,009 (the application fee plus credit card fees) was signed by KS.
As noted above, at 6:09pm on 14 July 2021, KS emailed the signed loan approval form back to Mr Taneski. At 6:18pm, she texted Mr Taneski, thanking him, letting him know that the signed loan approval had been sent to his email and recording that her solicitor was very concerned about the lender being in a position to transfer funds by 21 July 2021.
Events following approval
On the morning of 15 July 2021, Mr Taneski suggested, in an email to KS, that he could have the loan documents prepared and sent to her solicitor in parallel with, and subject to, the completion of the valuation so as to speed up the process.
KS responded at 9:19am, asking Mr Taneski to instruct the lender to prepare mortgage documents and indicating that she had spoken to the assistant of the real estate agent who would do his best to help with the valuation. KS expressed gratitude for Mr Taneski’s assistance and asked him to update her on any progress.
On the same day, the credit card payment to Prime which had been authorised on the signed loan approval was declined. Mr Taneski got in contact with KS and she successfully transferred $2,950 to Prime by electronic funds transfer.
Prime’s internal processes: 15-16 July 2021
On 15 July 2021 at 9:01am, Mr Taneski emailed Mr Henderson (a business development manager at Prime) saying that the client had authorised him “over the phone” to request that urgent loan documents be prepared and emailed to her solicitor.
On 16 July 2021 at 7:43am (a Friday), Mr Taneski sent Mr Henderson a follow up to his earlier email (commencing, “Hey Mate!”), asking Mr Henderson to confirm once the loan documents had been emailed to the client’s solicitor as settlement was due on Wednesday, 21 July 2021.
At 9:29am, Mr Henderson emailed others within Prime to ask that they approve ordering documentation before receiving the valuation of the property.
At 10:02am, Mr Henderson asked Mr Taneski to respond to a query from someone in Prime seeking that a mandatory field, namely the income of the guarantor, be completed in Loan Power. This appears to have resulted from Mr Henderson being prevented by an error message from advancing the Loan Power process to allow the preparation of loan documents. The query asked how the loan had been approved in the first place if the mandatory field was not completed and raised the possibility that the guarantor income had been entered by Mr Taneski and then removed by him after approval. At 10:23am, Mr Taneski emailed Mr Henderson, advising that KS’s income was $150,000 by saying simply: “Net income $150K”.
At 10:49am, Mr Henderson emailed Ms May Cai, Chief Risk Officer at Prime, indicating that a net income figure of $150,000 had been entered into Loan Power. That led Ms Cai to allow the loan process to proceed to the preparation of loan documents. She asked Mr Zhang to order the preparation of documents on an urgent basis (“express docs”). By 11:42am, Mr Zhang had ordered the preparation of documents on an urgent basis.
At 11:23am, a search of the National Personal Insolvency Index was made showing no entry for KS. At the same time, an ASIC company search and a CreditorWatch search were done in relation to Nusage. The ASIC extract showed that Nusage was a two-dollar company of which KS was the sole director, secretary and shareholder and that it had been incorporated on 5 March 2021, with no documents lodged apart from its application for registration. The CreditorWatch report showed that the company had what was described as a “Neutral” risk level and that three credit enquiries had been made since May 2021. A “Risk and Compliance Report” prepared by InfoTrack was also ordered at 11:23am in relation to KS. This report described KS as a “Former Magistrate of Heping District, Shenyang Liaoning Province” in China and also as a “Director of Economy and Information Technology Department, Shenyang City Government, Liaoning Province” in China. Having regard to the dates of at least one of these reports, it is unlikely that they relate to KS and there was no evidence to suggest that these entries were correct.
Where did the $150,000 figure come from?
The $150,000 figure Mr Taneski recorded as KS’s income was not contained in the information recorded by Mr Taneski in his Discussion Paper.
In examination-in-chief by counsel for the plaintiffs, Mr Taneski gave evidence that he was provided with this information by KS. He said, “that’s the total income that was advised to me”. As to the components of the income, Mr Taneski said “That would have been the client’s income, plus the rental income that was coming from the properties”. He said that, by “client”, he meant Nusage.
However, when asked about the $150,000 figure later in his evidence-in-chief, he made reference not to Nusage’s income but instead to that of KS. He described the $150,000 figure as including “rental incomes and so forth, as well as her declared - self-declared income”. He was asked whether he made telephone inquiries with KS about this and said: “Yes, telephone, and also documentary as well. She emailed me information regards - in regards to her income and also rental income and so forth”. He was asked what information she had emailed him, and said: “Just confirm[ation of] what her income was”. He referred to the documents provided at 11:12am on 14 July, but he said that KS had told him over the phone that her income was $100,000. He then said that he added “rental incomes” to reach the figure of $150,000.
At no point did Mr Taneski ask KS how that $100,000 was earned: [Q:] And tell us what … you say KS said about her business incomes?--- [A:] Her business income was, I believe, $100,000 gross, at the time. [Q:] And this was the business, of Nusage? … [A:] Correct, yes. [Q:] And can you remember what she said about the business of Nusage? … [A:] I’m not sure exactly how much was said. But I believe $100,00[0] was the figure that was given to me over the phone.
He was not asked questions by either party which would clarify how he reconciled a gross business income of $100,000 with KS being a disability pensioner.
On this issue, I considered that Mr Taneski’s evidence was unreliable. Notwithstanding the caution with which I have treated the evidence given by KS and the fact that she was prepared, in other respects, to make false or misleading statements in order to obtain a loan, I do not consider that she would, as suggested by Mr Taneski’s evidence, have advanced such a blatant falsehood so as to represent to Mr Taneski that her business income was $100,000. Further, there is no record in the Discussion Paper of any income of KS not derived from possible property rental. There is nothing in the documentary material provided by KS to Mr Taneski that makes a representation that her income was $100,000, other than from renting the “granny flats” at $600 per week each, which he recorded in his Discussion Paper. There is no reference in any email communication between 8 July 2021 and 16 July 2021 to any quantified amount of her non-rental income. Mr Taneski had no other record of the alleged conversation in which that information was said to have been obtained.
Preparation for settlement
On 16 July 2021, there was a series of text messages sent between KS and Mr Taneski, particularly in relation to the availability of documents for KS to sign. Mr Taneski reassured her in relation to the documents. There is the following exchange: [Mr Taneski:] Hi [KS] we’ve just learned that Pexa is acceptable in the ACT which is great news! [KS:] hi tony, thank u so much for the good news. r loan docs ready to sign? ]Mr Taneski:] Not yet hopefully soon … [Mr Taneski:] They will be ready Monday morning I’ll make sure of it [KS:] thank u tony. everyone is stressed out inc my large extended family overseas so your help would be greatly appreciated! wishing you a good w’end. [Mr Taneski:] thank you we’ll make it happen together ok [KS:] thank u tony. if this works out, i’d be very happy to provide testimonials and recommend u to all my friends, and of course i’ll keep my credit record pristine.
The same day, the valuers who were engaged by Prime, JPM Valuers & Property Consultants (JPM Valuers), generated an invoice which was sent to Prime for the valuation fee.
Between 16 and 19 July 2021, KS made enquiries of Ms Brown as to whether or not a “Buyer Verification Declaration” was necessary and whether the PEXA settlement process was available in this case.
On 19 July 2021 (a Monday), Nusage took out insurance over the Ainslie Property and KS forwarded the certificate of currency to Ms Brown.
At 10:23am, KS emailed Ms Brown to enquire as to the time on Wednesday 21 July 2021 that the settlement would occur. Ms Brown replied at 10:42am, saying that settlement would start at 2:30pm on the Wednesday and asking whether KS had received the loan documents. KS replied that she was still waiting for the mortgage documents but she had been advised they would be available that morning. There were subsequently some emails about the buyer verification form, the address for rates notices and the availability of PEXA settlements. Ms Brown had informed KS that PEXA was unavailable for ACT land titles on Sunday 18 July 2021 at 2:34pm. In response to KS’s email on 19 July, Ms Brown again advised that PEXA was unavailable.
At 10:33am, KS informed Mr Taneski by email that Ms Brown had advised her that PEXA was unavailable for ACT land titles. Mr Taneski responded at 10:36am saying he was “urgently following up the loan documents & will update you shortly ok”.
At 11:43am, KS again emailed Mr Taneski, asking when the documents would be available and whether or not the valuation had been conducted. Mr Taneski responded at 11:51am, saying that the valuer would contact the real estate agent shortly and that he would update her on the loan documents. KS responded at 12:20pm with a tone of anxiety, asking who the lender was and saying that she was very concerned that the property valuation was yet to be conducted. Mr Taneski responded at 12:23pm that the lender was Prime and that the valuer would have the report by “tomorrow afternoon” (that is, the afternoon of 20 July 2021). He also said: “Please wait for my update ok”.
Prime’s internal processes: 19 July 2021
Meanwhile, on 19 July 2021 at 11:28am, in response to a request from Mr Taneski, Mr Henderson was following up the preparation of loan documentation from those within or engaged by Prime who were responsible for that process in light of the absence of PEXA settlements being available.
At 12:05pm, Prime performed a title search in relation to the Ainslie Property. It also searched for securities given by Nusage and the Nusage Trust. No encumbrances or securities were disclosed.
Also on 19 July, JPM Valuers performed a valuation of the Ainslie Property for Prime. The property was valued at $1.735 million with a forced sale value of $1.475 million. JPM Valuers assessed the unfurnished rental potential of the property as being in the range of $1,100 to $1,200 per week. The JPM Valuers valuation made no reference to any granny flat. It described the Ainslie Property as a “part two level dwelling” with a kitchen, a kitchenette, six bedrooms, two bathrooms (one with a separate water closet) and two ensuites. Information from the valuation report was uploaded to the Loan Power system.
The same day, Dentons, the solicitors acting for Prime, forwarded the documentation that needed to be executed by KS and Nusage to Ms Brown. This included the Loan Agreement and the mortgage over the Ainslie Property as well as identification documents.
Dentons also carried out a process of reviewing the terms of the Nusage Trust deed in order to ensure the trust was a suitable recipient for a loan. It provided a “Trust Review Report” which contained a checklist confirming the existence of certain relevant provisions in the trust deed.
Loan documentation executed
Although the precise time at which the documents were sent by Dentons to Ms Brown is not clear, they were sent on the afternoon of 19 July 2021. The documents were: (a) Loan, Security and Guarantee Deed (that is, the Loan Agreement); (b) the mortgage over the Ainslie Property; (c) a direct debit authority; (d) “AML / CTF and VOI Verification Forms”; and (e) a “Tip Sheet” on how to settle the loan quickly.
After the close of business on 19 July 2021, each of the documents (a)-(d) were signed or completed by KS. Where relevant, Ms Brown witnessed KS’s signature or certified copies of documents.
The evidence of KS and Ms Brown makes it clear that Ms Brown did not give legal advice to KS about the terms of the documents provided by Dentons which KS was signing. Ms Brown received them from Denton’s shortly before they were signed by KS and had not read them in full. Rather, her role was limited to identifying the documents that were required to be signed, witnessing KS’s signature at the various points at which it was required, and certifying those documents which needed to be certified. Significantly for the purposes of the present case, Ms Brown simply witnessed KS’s signature on the guarantor signature page (page 6), the security provider signature page (page 7) and the statutory declaration pages (pages 10 and 11) of the Loan Agreement. She was not required to certify that she had given any legal advice about the terms of the documents and did not, in fact, give any such advice. Ms Brown said that the process of execution took less than one hour. It probably took somewhat longer than KS’s estimate of 10 to 15 minutes.
I accept KS’s evidence that she did not read or properly understand the terms of the Loan Agreement when she signed it and that she may have skimmed the first few pages looking for where to sign without fully comprehending the ramifications or her obligations. I accept that she was desperate to get finance and not lose her deposit and as a consequence did not take the care that one might have taken in reading the documents or obtaining legal advice in relation to their contents and the obligations that they gave rise to.
At 6:36pm on 19 July 2021, Ms Brown emailed the signed loan documents, certified copies of KS’s identification, a certificate of currency for the home and contents insurance for the Ainslie Property (which named Prime as an interested party) and the Nusage Trust deed back to Dentons. Ms Brown indicated that she would have some of the documents couriered to Dentons the next day. She emailed the executed transfer to Dentons on the morning of 21 July 2021. Prime’s internal processes: telephone call to KS
At an unknown time on or about 19 July 2021, an employee or agent of Prime rang KS and confirmed that she understood her obligations as guarantor. The call made reference to KS having already signed the loan documents as a guarantor. The caller confirmed that KS knew about the loan application, that the repayments were $4,356.25 per month, that if the repayments were not made on time by the borrower then she would be personally liable for them, and that if the borrower defaulted on the loan then it was possible that the Ainslie Property may be sold to repay the loan. The caller also had KS confirm that she freely and willingly provided the guarantee and did not feel under pressure from anyone else.
Prime’s internal processes: 20 July 2021
On 20 July 2021 at 10:39am, Mr Taneski emailed Mr Henderson, copied to a solicitor at Dentons, indicating that the loan documents had been signed and emailed to Dentons and the originals were being couriered to Dentons. He asked Mr Henderson to make sure that Prime would be in a position to settle the next day by 2:30pm.
This prompted a response from the solicitor at Dentons, who indicated that a 40% “urgency fee” would need to be charged in order to turn around the “Certification” in time. Mr Taneski responded that Dentons should proceed as a matter of urgency and charge the urgency fee.
As a result, on 20 July 2021, Dentons was able to provide to Prime a “Settlement Certification”, which involved certification of certain matters relating to the transaction documents including that, subject to stamping and registration, they were “valid, binding and enforceable in accordance with their terms”. Under the heading “Transaction Documents”, those documents are described and then the following sentence appears: “All Guarantors have received legal and financial advice by an independent solicitor.” Precisely what this statement is intended to be is not clear from the form of the document. It does not appear to be a certification by the solicitor. It seems to be a statement as to the content of the statutory declaration that forms part of the Loan Agreement. The letter also contained a statement by Dentons that it had contacted the lawyer representing the borrower and guarantor and confirmed that the lawyer witnessed each transaction document and that “the independent legal advice certificate was sworn before them”. It also included the following statement in relation to the application of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act: “Given that the Borrower is a company, the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) does not apply to this transaction (irrespective of how the proceeds of the loan are applied by it).” These statements by the lawyer are likely to be required by Prime’s agreements with the entity that provided funds to it for the purposes of its lending business.
Also on 20 July 2021, there was further consideration by Prime of the valuation that had been provided the previous day. This was done by way of a “valuation review” by an employee of Prime which was something required by the Loan Power system. That review generated some questions for the valuer, but these were quickly resolved so that, by 6:14pm on that day, the review had been completed and Loan Power had been updated to record that fact. A settlement statement was also prepared by Prime and provided to Dentons.
KS thanks Ms Brown
Prime’s internal processes: settlement statement
On 20 July 2021, there was email correspondence between the solicitor at Dentons and Ms Brown in order to confirm that Prime would be in a position to settle as required by the notice to complete and in relation to cheque directions for the settlement.
At 4:10pm that day, the solicitor at Dentons emailed Mr Taneski and Mr Henderson indicating that all the documents had been uploaded to Loan Power and asking for a settlement statement. The solicitor indicated she would need approval to settle first thing the next morning to be able to get the cheques drawn. Following an email from Mr Henderson, Ms Cai asked the accounts team at Prime to prepare a settlement statement. She noted that it was a “broker portal deal”.
Prior to settlement, a final decision had to be made by Prime as to whether to advance the funds. Mr Henderson’s evidence was that this was a decision made by the CEO of the company, Mr Scanlon. It required the approval by Mr Scanlon of a “Credit Proposal”.
The proposal recorded that the Ainslie Property would be owner occupied (consistently with what appeared earlier in Loan Power). It identified that the borrower was incorporated on 5 March 2021 and that the guarantor was the 100% shareholder. In relation to the guarantor, next to the heading “independent advice”, the entry was “N/a”. This appears to reflect a requirement in the Loan Power system that, in some cases, the guarantor receive legal advice separate to that given to the borrower. Credit scores for KS and Nusage were recorded in the Credit Proposal document.
It is not clear where the credit score for KS came from in that no other document in evidence showed where this was derived from. A credit report was obtained by Prime in relation to Nusage: see [183] above. It is likely that a credit report for KS would have disclosed that she was in arrears on her West Row Property loan, but no such credit report was disclosed by Prime in these proceedings and there was no other evidence to indicate that Prime had obtained a credit report in relation to KS.
A “Combined Servicing Calculator” was recorded as “2.0x”. The sign off on the Credit Proposal by Mr Scanlon appears to have occurred at 10:03am on 21 July 2021.
The evidence as to how the serviceability figure was derived was limited. If it was reliant upon Mr Taneski’s statement as to KS’s income, then the figures used in the servicing calculator involved double counting. That is because, even if Mr Taneski’s evidence as to the derivation of KS’s income was accepted, it involved a substantial income derived from rental of the security property. It was that income which also formed the basis of Nusage’s income and no other source of Nusage’s income had been disclosed to Mr Taneski or to Prime. That double counting was in addition to the problem that the income figures for Nusage and KS assumed the property was fully rented when the information available to Prime was that the property would be owner occupied.
Establishment fee $18,700.00
Interest (1st Month) $1,268.01
Loan Management Fee $850.00
Mortgage Insurance $1,980.00
Legal Fees $3,891.48
Valuation Fees $1,100.00
Broker fees $18,700.00
The settlement
On 21 July 2021 at 9am, KS conducted a pre-settlement inspection.
At 9:32am, Ms Brown emailed to KS a settlement statement and her invoice for acting on the conveyance. She indicated that she would call KS once settlement had occurred. At 1:39pm, Ms Brown responded to a query from KS about differences between the Prime settlement statement and the statement that Ms Brown had emailed.
At 12:48pm, KS asked Mr Taneski to provide an itemised breakdown of the total fees and charges deducted from the $850,000. She also asked, “how much is your commission?” She asked him to confirm that the first month’s mortgage repayment would be deducted at settlement and asked how much the monthly repayment was and when the due date was. Mr Taneski responded at 1:02pm, providing a copy of the settlement statement and saying that the second monthly payment of $4,357 would be due on 31 August 2021.
At 3:38pm, KS texted Mr Taneski that she was “back in hospital” but did not provide any details of why that was the case. He said that he would confirm when settlement had occurred.
Settlement was effected sometime around 4pm on 21 July 2021. At 4:43pm on 21 July 2021, an assistant to Ms Brown emailed KS saying that the purchase of the property had settled. Mr Taneski texted with the same news at 5:07pm. KS responded: “thank u so much tony - your kind assistance is greatly appreciated! as mentioned, i’ll not hesitate to recommend u to all my friends.”
The settlement statement shows that the loan amount plus the payment of the application fee by KS was $852,950. After fees of $49,439.49 were deducted, this gave net funds available of $803,510.51.
Following the settlement, there was $142,655.78 remaining in Ms Brown’s trust account. Shortly after 5pm that day, there were text and email exchanges between Ms Brown and KS about returning excess funds to KS and the payment of Ms Brown’s fees out of those excess funds. KS also asked whether stamp duty could be paid from the surplus funds held by her solicitor or whether it should be paid by herself. Ms Brown indicated that it was best KS pay it directly.
As a result of the email and text message exchange, Ms Brown transferred the surplus funds back to KS’s account by two payments, being a transfer of $80,000 on the afternoon of 21 July 2021, and a second transfer of the balance (less Ms Brown’s fees) the following day.
The Loan Agreement
The Loan Agreement is entitled “Loan, Security and Guarantee Deed”. Nusage in its own capacity and as trustee of the Nusage Trust is identified as the “Borrower”. KS is identified as the “Guarantor”. Prime is identified as the “Lender”.
Part 1 contains the “Key Details”, including the parties and other key aspects of the loan. Amongst the matters disclosed are: Limit $850,000.00
Higher Rate 1.5% per month
Lower Rate 4.95% per annum
Establishment Fee 2.2% of the Limit
Default Fee $500
There is no reference in the key details to any capacity to vary the Lower Rate. Nor is there any reference to the “Capital Reserve Fee” or the monthly loan management fee of 0.1% ($850 per month) chargeable under the agreement (see [262] and [267] below).
Part 2 deals with “Execution”. KS executed the document as a deed on behalf of Nusage. She then executed it as Guarantor, witnessed by Ms Brown. Immediately prior to the place where she executed as Guarantor, there is an “Important Notice to Guarantor” which includes: This is a serious and important obligation and you should make sure you understand your obligation before you sign this loan and security deed. You should consider obtaining independent legal or financial advice (or both) on the effect of the Guarantee and Indemnity before signing it. … Before you sign, remember that there are financial risks involved in signing the Guarantee and Indemnity.
There is then a place where the agreement was executed by KS on behalf of Nusage and on her own behalf as a “General Security Provider” under the agreement. Finally, she signed the agreement on behalf of Nusage as the “Land Mortgagor”.
So far as the Lender is concerned, the agreement was signed by Ms Cai as an attorney of Prime under a power of attorney and witnessed.
Part 3 contains a statutory declaration by KS as Guarantor. That required her to attest that the Loan Agreement had been “freely and voluntarily executed by me and without undue influence or pressure from any third party”. Significantly for the present case, it also involved her attesting to clause 4, which provides: I have had the opportunity to obtain, and have obtained, legal advice from an independent Australian Legal Practitioner before whom this declaration was sworn, prior to executing this Loan, Security and Guarantee Deed and Security as to the nature and effect of the documents and my obligations under them.
The statutory declaration was signed by KS and witnessed by Ms Brown.
Next, there is an interpreter certificate which is blank as it was not necessary in the circumstances.
Part 4 of the Loan Agreement is headed “Term and Conditions”. Clause 2 describes the facility. Clause 3 provides conditions precedent to the drawdown on the facility. Clause 4 makes the “Advance” amount repayable by the Borrower on the “Termination Date”, which was identified in the Key Details as 36 months from the date of the initial advance. Early repayment is permitted, although if that were to occur within one month of the first interest payment date, then the amount of monthly interest and fees that would have been payable for the period up to the end of that month would be payable.
Clause 5 relates to the payment of interest. The interest rate is defined to be the Higher Rate, but if there is no default then the Lower Rate is payable. There is no reference in clause 5 to any capacity to vary the Lower Rate as defined by reference to the Key Details.
Events following settlement
On 3 August 2021, KS had a phone consultation with Dr Bookallil arising out of a fall that she had at a supermarket in early July. She complained of pain in her knees, elbow, back and shoulder, and was told to come in for a face-to-face consultation. KS reported that she had managed to get the Pfizer Covid vaccine on 16 July. She reported suffering from unusual headaches. KS was worried that she had a brain tumour or a clot. The doctor advised that she should be seen for the headache within 24 hours.
On 9 August 2021 at 5:48pm, Ms Brown emailed KS what Ms Brown described as a stamp duty notice of assessment which provided information on how it should be paid. The attached notice headed “Conveyance Duty Notice of Assessment” showed a total amount payable of $78,769. The payment was due by 23 August 2021.
On 17 August 2021, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. By this stage, KS had been given both doses of the Pfizer Covid vaccine and her headache was intermittent. The doctor recorded that she was still couch surfing. The doctor said that the Next Step counselling program would take her on if she followed through with the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). KS recorded that she had heard voices “once or twice” but was not taking the olanzapine because she was not sure where it was. The plan was that she take paliperidone. The doctor’s notes record that KS had abdominal pain, that she was only eating bread and was not eating carrots or apples due to dental pain.
On 14 September 2021, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. KS told Dr Bookallil that she was taking olanzapine but not paliperidone. The plan was to send a prescription for paliperidone to a pharmacy, but the doctor recorded that it was “very difficult to get her to agree a pharmacy as has shoplifted from pharmacies in past”. As a result, the prescription was to be left at the front desk of the medical practice.
On 22 September 2021, another telephone conversation with Dr Bookallil occurred. KS indicated that she needed another form to be completed. The doctor recorded that KS was scared to go out and, as a result, had not collected her prescription. The doctor recorded that she was “very anxious”, “scared to [go] out” and “I think schizophrenia is deteriorating due to non compliance with medication”. The doctor also recorded that her incontinence was getting worse and that she needed a face-to-face appointment. At a face-to-face consultation on 6 October 2021, KS collected the prescriptions.
On 1 October 2021, KS emailed Mr Henderson at Prime, asking Prime to stop direct debits as the money in the account in question had been moved to a different account. She said that she would make a manual payment each month. This request was passed over to the Prime customer service team. Somebody from the customer service team responded that day to indicate that the direct debit had been cancelled and that KS was expected to make manual repayments.
Default on the loan
By notice dated 22 April 2022, the ACT Revenue Office notified Prime of Nusage being in arrears of conveyancing duty, land tax and rates totalling $92,863.23 and of the existence of a charge for that amount on Nusage’s interest in the Ainslie Property, with priority over a mortgage. The ACT Revenue Office also sent a copy of the notice to KS’s email address.
On 26 April 2022, Prime notified KS that the “ATO” had placed a charge on the security property and that this was an Event of Default under the Loan Agreement. The email asked her to urgently advise Prime of her intentions in relation to the payment of “the ATO debt”. It appears there was no response to this email and there was a follow-up email on 25 May 2022 seeking advice about her intentions.
On 23 June 2022, KS had a phone consultation with Dr Bookallil about a variety of issues.
On 24 June 2022, the ACT Revenue Office sent an email to KS’s email address indicating that, as at the date of the email, the total amount owing was $98,154.54. It indicated that further debt recovery actions would start shortly.
On 24 June 2022, Mr Taneski sent an (apparently unsolicited) email to KS saying: Hi [KS]! Your loan is well conducted with no arrears, however the ATO have notified the lender Prime Capital of an outstanding ATO debt of approx. $90,000.00. May I suggest that we refinance the existing loan add the ATO debt plus fees as follows … There then followed a proposed new loan totalling $1,020,000. This included $55,000 worth of loan fees and an interest rate of 5.65% per annum.
On 25 June 2022, KS responded saying: Will discuss options with family and friends before making a decision. The ATO debt will be paid before the due date.
On 27 June 2022, a formal loan approval was prepared by Prime for a loan of $1,030,000, which showed Mr Taneski as the broker. It appears to have been sent to KS at 9:52am that day.
On 28 June 2022, the ACT Revenue Office rejected KS’s request for remission of interest on the conveyancing duty that was owed and indicated that an amount of $84,126.72 was due and payable immediately. Along with outstanding rates and land tax, the total amount owing was $98,317.04.
On 6 July 2022, KS paid the ACT Revenue Office $78,769.
On 11 July 2022, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. The doctor recorded: not doing very well denies [thoughts of self-harm] nervous breakdown - suicidal thoughts, everything too difficult couldn’t do anything, couldn’t boil the kettle no plan no hope
borrowed lots of money - from friends - want money back now borrowed from 3rd tier lenders - stopped paying back [threatened] foreclosure multiple crisis recent court case - young lawyer dropped unconditionally - almost doesn’t feel like it is real so nervous she didn’t hear magistrate magistrate recommended NDIS
The doctor administered the DASS21 Assessment (KS scored “Extremely Severe” for depression, anxiety and stress), changed KS’s medication and provided a GP mental health care plan.
On 13 July 2022, Dr Bookallil made a referral to the Next Step program, which appears to be a “high intensity counselling service” run by CatholicCare. The referral from Dr Bookallil provided: Thank you for seeing [KS] in your high intensity counselling service. [KS] has a complex mental health history with diagnoses of schizophrenia, PTSD, OCD, depression. Her schizophrenia is characterised by negative symptoms though she has some auditory halluciations at present and I have changed her medications to try to treat those symptoms. Her psychosis symptoms are usually fairly responsive to medication so hopefully will settle down soon. Her OCD is severe and if she has a shower, she stays in for a couple of hours and she reports that she rubs her skin off. She manages this by not showering and washing in basins. She has multiple stressors including homelessness, legal matters and illnesses. Please work with her to help her manage her OCD and depression and allow her to debrief about her stressors. I have referred her to ACT Mental Health and have asked that they assign her a case worker and psychiatrist to help with the schizophrenia.
The referral also included a summary of KS’s medical history taken from the doctor’s computer records system.
On 14 July 2022, solicitors acting for Prime sent Nusage a notice of default and demand based upon the failure to pay the ACT Revenue Office. On the same day, a notice of demand was sent to KS as guarantor requiring her to remedy Nusage’s default.
On 18 July 2022, KS’s referral to the Next Step program was rejected. KS was assessed as not suitable for the service as she needed longer-term supportive counselling rather than a structured cognitive behaviour therapy approach.
On 20 July 2022, solicitors acting for Prime sent by email to KS notices pursuant to ss 93, 94 and 96 of the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) directed to Nusage.
On 21 July 2022, KS saw Dr Bookallil again. She had a flu injection and discussed a variety of issues with the doctor, including a recommendation from a psychiatrist that she have a blood test. KS also said that she had been told that she needed to have all of her bottom teeth removed.
On 29 July 2022, KS wrote to the solicitors acting for Prime, stating that payment of $78,769 was made to the ACT Revenue Office and received on 6 July 2022. On 2 August 2022, the solicitors for Prime noted that the amount outstanding was greater than that and sought confirmation that all of the money set out in the demand had been paid.
On 1 August 2022, KS emailed the accounts team at Prime asking them to telephone her. The response indicated that “Your loan is in the process of recovery” and she should direct all communications to the solicitor who was acting for Prime.
The increases in the Lower Rate
Although the Lower Rate identified in the Loan Agreement was 4.95% per annum, and the loan was not identified as being a variable rate loan, from June 2022 notices were given to Nusage of increases to the Lower Rate payable pursuant to the Loan Agreement, with the reason given being changes in the Reserve Bank of Australia’s official cash rate.
Those notices did not state pursuant to which provision of the Loan Agreement the rates were changed, but the increase in rates and hence repayments was reflected in the monthly amounts required to be paid to Prime. In fact, the increases were made pursuant to clause 12 of the Loan Agreement, which is headed “Administrative provisions”. Clause 12.21 of the Loan Agreement, entitled “Reserve requirements” (set out at [269] above) provides, for the careful reader, a power to the Lender to unilaterally increase the interest rate payable under the Loan Agreement if there is an increase in the “BBSW” (the initials refer to the Bank Bill Swap Rate, but the term is specifically defined in clause 17) or any other cost or expense, or a decrease in the effective return from the loan to Prime.
Changes to the interest rate occurred in June, July and September which had the effect that, by the end of September 2022, the Lower Rate payable was 7.45% per annum and the minimum monthly repayments required under the loan were $6,127.08. It appears that one notice is absent from the evidence, namely the Lower Rate increase from 6.2% to 6.95% per annum. I infer that this was the increase effective from 1 September 2022, given that the notices (dated 21 and 30 September 2022) increasing the Lower Rate effective from 1 October 2022 refer to the “Existing Lower Rate” as being 6.95% per annum. The 21 September notice increased the Lower Rate to 8.45%, but this was subsequently corrected on 30 September so that the Lower Rate from 1 October 2022 was 7.45% per annum. From 1 November 2022, the Lower Rate rose again to 7.7% per annum and the minimum repayment rose to $6,369.74. The changes are summarised in the following table.
Date Interest Rate (per Monthly repayment annum)
Initial rate 4.95% $4,356.24
1 July 2022 5.7% $4,887.49
1 August 2022 6.2% $5,241.66
1 September 2022 (likely) 6.95% Unknown
1 October 2022 7.45% $6,127.08
1 November 2022 7.7% $6,369.74
It will be observed that these changes had the practical effect of increasing KS’s monthly repayment (in the absence of any default) by over $2,000. KS’s situation further deteriorates
On 14 October 2022, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. She reported additional dental problems which she could not afford to have fixed, a variety of physical conditions and worsening OCD.
On 27 October 2022, she had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil which dealt with a variety of issues including her anxiety about the data leaks from Optus and Medibank even though she was not a client of either.
On 7 November 2022, the solicitors for Prime emailed two letters to KS. The first related to payment of legal costs owed pursuant to the Loan Agreement, requiring those costs to be paid down by instalments. The second required Nusage to remedy the default relating to rates, land tax and conveyancing duty arrears of $24,680.30 (of which Prime had been given notice by the ACT Revenue Office) by 7 December 2022.
On 14 November 2022, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. The doctor recorded that KS demonstrated “paranoia about people finding out about her past”. She also addressed a number of physical conditions. On 18 and 25 November 2022, KS spoke to a social worker at Dr Bookallil’s practice to get assistance with her NDIS application.
On 23 November 2022, KS emailed Prime to enquire as to why she had been sent a default notice, saying that she had telephoned the customer service team well over 60 times but had received no response. KS was told that, because of the unpaid legal fees of $2,747.68, the Higher Rate would apply from the end of October 2022. It appears that KS had requested a “Discharge/Release Authority” form and that was also provided.
On 30 November 2022, KS made her final payment on her loan account, an amount of $6,369.74. She was again advised that, because her loan was in default, she should deal with the solicitor who was acting for Prime.
On 13 February 2023, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. The doctor’s notes record: “not doing well”, “gone backwards”. KS was severely depressed. She said that her bank account had been hacked, she was no longer paying her debt, she was receiving strange phone calls, she was losing more teeth but had no money to pay a dentist, and her incontinence had worsened.
On 21 February 2023, the solicitors for Prime sent by email to KS a notice of default and demand addressed to Nusage and a notice of demand for payment addressed to her (as guarantor) arising from a failure to pay monthly interest, Loan Management Fees and Default Administration Fees totalling $55,639.16.
On 31 March 2023, the solicitors for Prime sent letters terminating the Loan Agreement and making demands upon Nusage and KS. At that stage, the amount owing was the initial advance of $850,000 plus “Interest, Loan Management Fee, Default Administration Fee, Capital Reserve Fee, and Termination Fee” of $108,593.20, giving a total of $958,593.20.
Possession of the Ainslie Property granted to Prime
On 14 July 2023, Prime commenced proceedings against Nusage seeking possession of the Ainslie Property. On 30 January 2024, Prime obtained a Supreme Court order giving it possession of the Ainslie Property and requiring Nusage to give vacant possession of the property by 16 March 2024: Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd v Nusage Pty Ltd [2024] ACTSC 36.
Following a hearing in April 2024 (see Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd v Nusage Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 119), on 3 May 2024, I made orders staying the order for possession up until 14 July 2024.
The West Row Property gets sold
The Ainslie Property gets sold
Accrual of additional liabilities up until the date of the hearing
Although this calculation does not include all the fees charged, it totals $1,021,219.22. These fees comprise most of the amounts attributable to the loan account, in addition to the amount of $923,743.20 which was payable as at the date of termination.
Money transfers between the plaintiffs’ accounts
Between March and July 2021, KS had her disability support pension of $841.20 per fortnight deposited into an account ending **56. Amounts paid into this account were then transferred across to another account ending **38, leaving only a nominal balance in the account ending **56. On 31 March 2021, account ending **38 had a balance of $54,266.66. By 30 June 2021, that had increased to $58,631.05.
On 6 July 2021, Nusage opened a bank account with an account number ending **21. On 8 July 2021, Nusage received $72,875 from Hayman Partners, a real estate business. The payment represented the balance of the deposit monies for her sale of the Lyons Property.
On 9 July 2021, KS deposited the cheque that she had discussed with Ms Brown on 5 July 2021 (see [96] above) into her account ending **38. That was an amount of $868,282.05, producing a balance of $927,766.10.
On 14 July 2021, KS withdrew $927,700 from her account ending **38, producing a balance of $66.10. That withdrawal was then deposited into Nusage’s account ending **21, resulting in a balance of $1,001,175 in the latter account. KS then printed an account summary showing a balance of in excess of $1 million in the account ending **21, and this was one of the documents provided by her to Mr Taneski on that day: see [150] above.
In anticipation of settlement of the purchase of the Ainslie Property, on 20 July 2021 $998,035 was withdrawn, all but $35 of which was paid into Ms Brown’s trust account, effectively emptying Nusage’s account. The amount transferred was well in excess of that which was required, in combination with the funds to be received from Prime, in order to settle on the Ainslie Property.
As pointed out earlier (see [250] above), following the settlement of the sale, Ms Brown transferred a total of $140,874.23 into KS’s account ending **38 in two transactions on 21 and 22 July 2021. Those amounts were then used to make payments, including two payments of interest on the Prime loan totalling $8,712.50 and unit title fees relating to the West Row Property. The balance of the account, being $132,709, was then withdrawn on 2 September 2021.
On 1 September 2021, Nusage opened an account ending in **70. On 2 September 2021, Nusage received payment of $132,896.47 into that account. That amount was gradually run down, principally by monthly payments to Prime and then, on 6 July 2022, the payment of $78,769 to the ACT Revenue Office. An interest payment was made to Prime from this account on 1 September 2022.
It is not clear how the four subsequent interest payments up to the final payment on 30 November 2022 were made, but it is clear that, by this stage, KS and Nusage had effectively run out of money.
Prime’s policies at the time
The plaintiffs sought disclosure by Prime of all manuals, guidelines, procedures or other such documents relating to applications for, or the processing or approval of, loans or credit with Prime. The evidence of Mr Henderson was that, as at 2021, any such policies were built into the Loan Power system and did not exist separately.
The evidence indicated that there was only very limited training or guidance given to brokers prior to them being “accredited” by Prime. Mr Henderson gave evidence that they received a product guide that was available on the website and were required to do a quiz. The evidence indicated that there was not any system forming part of the broker accreditation process designed to ensure that Prime: (a) assessed the suitability of borrowers for loan products offered by Prime; (b) obtained reliable information from borrowers about their circumstances; (c) did not promote loans to persons with special disadvantages; and (d) did not allow the substantial incentives offered to brokers when loans were placed to lead brokers to act in the interests of the lender rather than the borrower.
Having regard to the evidence of Mr Henderson as to the limited nature of the accreditation process, and the fact that information about any accreditation process would have been peculiarly within the knowledge of the senior management of Prime, the failure to produce documents relating to that process on discovery or pursuant to the notice to produce at the hearing, and the failure of Mr Scanlon to give evidence, satisfies me that no process or system to address these issues formed part of the accreditation process.
The same is true in relation to internal guidelines and policies. The system adopted was structured around the Loan Power system which, so far as the evidence disclosed its contents, did not address issues related to the suitability of the loan, reliability of the information provided or the personal circumstances of the borrower or guarantor.
For example, there were not policies or guidelines for use internally or by brokers: (a) to reduce the risk of loans purporting to be business loans being made in circumstances where a corporate entity had been artificially interposed in order to avoid the operation of the Code; (b) to reduce the risk of income assessments of borrowers and guarantors being made on an unduly favourable basis, for example, through double counting corporate income as income of the guarantor; (c) to reduce the risk of serviceability being assessed only by reference to the interest rate identified in the approval rather than being assessed by reference to the potential for variation of that rate pursuant to the power to do so under clause 12 of the Loan Agreement; or (d) to reduce the risk of a broker’s approach to gathering evidence in support of the loan application being unduly influenced by the very substantial “facilitation fee” payable to a broker incorporated into Prime’s loan approval.
Other aspects of Prime’s system or conduct
There was only limited evidence about Prime. Its business is substantial. As at the date of the hearing, Prime promoted itself as having approved 17,000 loans, totalling in excess of $3 billion, to small-to-medium enterprises over 25 years.
As made clear by the terms of the loan approval in the present case, Prime advertises its speed of loan approvals.
Mr Scanlon, the director and CEO of Prime who was responsible for approving entry into the Loan Agreement, is director of a large number of other companies described in Exhibit 9.
The plaintiffs tendered search results from the County Court of Victoria and the District and Supreme Courts of Queensland for the period 2020 to 2025. For Victoria, the search yielded 68 cases, mostly brought by Prime or a related company (Capital Securities Mortgages Pty Ltd). For Queensland, the search yielded 20 cases, most of which were proceedings brought by Prime. It is not possible to place any significance on the evidence of the existence of these cases. There was no evidence to indicate whether the proportion of cases requiring court enforcement of agreements and the obtaining of possession of property the subject of mortgages was different to other comparable lenders or indeed to the rates amongst bank lenders.
KS’s mental health
Dr Edward Wims, psychiatrist (8 December 2011)
KS was assessed by Dr Wims, a psychiatrist with the Forensic Community Outreach Service run by ACT Health, in the context of KS facing charges of burglary which had been dismissed under s 334 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). Dr Wims had been looking after KS since she had been detained on remand at the Alexander Maconochie Centre. He wrote a letter on 8 December 2011 describing KS’s condition.
Dr Wims described KS as having “a long history of mental health difficulties and intermittent involvement with ACT Mental Health”. He identified that she had been involved with ACT Mental Health since 2002 when she was assessed in similar circumstances. She had a history of childhood and ongoing trauma. She had several periods of psychosis in the past, bouts of depression, and ongoing OCD. Her compliance with medication had “proven challenging” and at several points there had been “difficulty with engagement”.
While detained on remand, she presented in “an extremely anxious state that could have been described as hysterical”. She was found to have been suffering an acute psychotic episode marked by paranoid delusions about people monitoring her, watching her and being out to harm her. She was also having visual and auditory hallucinations. She was treated with antipsychotic medication. She was described as having multiple underlying anxiety disorders including generalised anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and OCD. These were complicated by dissociation when under extreme stress and anxiety. Dr Wims also thought she “quite possibly” had kleptomania as described in the DSM-5.
He described that she had made excellent progress, was a model patient and her psychosis had almost completely resolved. She had been treated with cognitive behaviour therapy and medication. She revealed to Dr Wims “a very significant hoarding problem”, which he thought was related to obsessive-compulsive personality features.
The charges that she had faced were for the theft of many thousands of dollars’ worth of goods. Dr Wims concluded that, although it was possible that the theft was a result of delusional beliefs, he also felt that kleptomania combined with dissociation was likely.
He considered that she was likely to steal again and that she would require long-term management with antipsychotic medication. So far as her anxiety conditions were concerned, these were to be treated with cognitive behaviour therapy.
He summarised her diagnoses as including: Recurrent Psychotic Disorder (most likely Schizophrenia), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Hoarding (most likely related to Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder), Dissociative Disorder, and Recurrent Depressive Disorder, currently in remission. Dr Olav Nielssen, psychiatrist (15 September 2013)
On 15 September 2013, Dr Nielssen prepared a report at the request of Legal Aid ACT. KS had been charged with possession of stolen property. Dr Nielssen described KS as having a high level of anxiety that affected her ability to communicate in a clear and orderly way. She demonstrated “what seemed to be either a disabling degree of memory impairment, or an inability to settle on the correct version of the events to convey in response to questions put to her”. That was reflected in her inability to describe the facts relating to the offences which she had committed.
Next Step counselling (2021-2022)
Notwithstanding her discharge from the service in September 2020, KS received counselling with the Next Step counselling program from August 2021 until June 2022 after a referral from her GP. The notes of the counsellor provide a useful insight into the pervasive way in which KS’s underlying mental health conditions manifested themselves. The picture presented is of a person with no family support or contact, and no contact with friends anymore, who is constantly overwhelmed and struggling to undertake day-to-day activities.
She was not, at that stage, suffering from positive symptoms such as hallucinations or delusions and was taking her antipsychotic medication. However, during this period of counselling, her functioning was described as poor. Although she had some intellectual insight into some of her behaviours and thoughts, she could not stop them. She remained overwhelmed and depressed. The nature of the goals of counselling indicate her level of dysfunction. The goals were to eat at least twice a day, to go for a walk every second day, to have a consistent bedtime routine and to recognise that her thoughts were just thoughts.
She was caught shoplifting in this period and had an altercation with police. She found pleasure in watching a children’s television channel, in particular, the program Shaun the Sheep. She had difficulties getting dental work done, seeing a podiatrist and going to court for the shoplifting. Her anxiety led her to have adverse interactions at Legal Aid, where she was trying to get assistance. She was often verbose and difficult to interrupt. She reported feeling panicked, chaotic and overwhelmed. Her memory appeared impaired, making it difficult to attend appointments.
Ultimately, she was discharged from the service because she required long-term mental health support, regular psychiatric reviews and case management rather than a counselling service. A summary of her position at the end of the period is provided by two passages from the clinical notes.
On 3 June 2022, the counsellor recorded: [KS] is currently struggling to manage daily life events e.g. self care, eating regularly, sleeping routinely, engaging socially and attending regular GP and psychological appointments due to chronic health issues that can be unpredictable. Despite this, there are pressing demands on [KS]’s situation including an upcoming court date and organising necessary documentation for this. She reflects that she can ‘bury my head in the sand’ re: problem solving tasks and initiating engagement with services (no credit, fear of answering unknown callers) which can further exacerbate her difficult situation.
The final entry on 6 June 2022 included: [KS] presents with complex mental health issues with complex PTSD, schizophrenia and personality disorders queried by past forensic psychiatrists. She presents as highly anxious and distrustful of others however also feels helpless and unable to manage her mental health symptoms without ongoing support from services. As such, she can oscillate between being dependent on services i.e. GP, Next Step and also struggling to trust health professionals and feeling that she is not receiving enough support from others ‘I am in a very fragile position and there is no one to help me’. As such, this can cause conflict between [KS] and support services, with many services reporting she has attended maximum sessions offered or not accepting referral at all.
Dr Bookallil, GP (2018-2024)
Dr Bookallil had been KS’s GP since June 2018.
In a letter written for the purposes of Magistrates Court proceedings on 1 May 2024, Dr Bookallil recorded that she had not seen KS since September 2023 and her last consultation was a telephone consultation in February 2024. She said: In the past, when [KS] has disengaged from services it is often due to a deterioration in her mental health and has resulted in an arrest or hospitalisation. As I have not assessed [KS] in months, I am unable to comment on her current mental health status. [KS] has a long mental health history including schizophrenia, complex PTSD, anxiety and depression which at times is severe and she has required hospitalis[ation] in the past. The severity of each condition varies over time. Schizophrenia is a significant condition and [KS] has more negative than positive symptoms (ie hallucinations/delusions) of schizophrenia so that she struggles with organisation and planning. Due to poor organisation [KS] at times forgets medication, struggles to organise her activities of daily living such as food, housing and finances. … [KS] also has hoarding disorder …
Records indicate that, after this letter was written, from June 2024 KS was seeing Dr Bookallil regularly on an approximately fortnightly basis.
KS’s appointments with Dr Bookallil are described extensively above.
Dr Lim, psychiatrist (4 November 2024)
Dr Lim assessed KS on 24 October 2024 by audiovisual means. She prepared a report dated 4 November 2024.
The history portion of the report described KS’s mental health issues which commenced from a young age, with KS only accessing professional help as an adult after leaving a violent marriage. Her history included physical abuse from her father, trauma observed during the Cultural Revolution, emotional abuse from her parents and a violent ex-partner.
Dr Lim reviewed the reports and clinical notes that were available to her. KS’s symptoms at the time of the examination included feeling depressed, sad and extremely anxious. She was obsessively cleaning and checking whether the doors were locked over 20 times per day. She described having several panic attacks a week, characterised by breathlessness, dizziness and an imminent sense of doom. She described her energy and appetite as very low. She said that she was extremely forgetful and struggled to fall asleep. She only showered every few weeks and ate one very simple meal per day. She continued to take medication for depression and hallucinations. The employment history given to Dr Lim indicated a decline after the death of her husband in the early 2000s. She was terminated from her employment in the public service due to underperformance and began hoarding.
Dr Lim recorded the results of her examination of KS’s mental state, describing that rapport was difficult to achieve and that KS presented as depressed, anxious and very emotionally charged. Consistent with the manner in which KS gave evidence in court, Dr Lim described KS as highly proficient in English but extremely overinclusive of details and difficult to curtail, interrupt or redirect toward the question being asked.
Dr Lim described KS’s diagnoses as: (a) recurrent major depressive disorder; (b) OCD; (c) hoarding disorder; and (d) PTSD.
Dr Lim said that KS’s mental health conditions were “chronic, severe and profoundly disabling” and that they “have compromised all aspects of her functioning including her personal care, social relationships and vocational capacity”.
So far as the disabilities suffered between January and July 2021 were concerned, Doctor Lim said: • She was experiencing increased stress, lowered mood, fatigue, distractibility, reduced appetite and poor sleep. • Her traumatisation symptoms were exacerbated including hypervigilance, hyperarousal, nightmares, intrusive memories. • Her obsession and compulsions were more pronounced and difficult to control. • She was hoarding more. • She was struggling to reliably attend appointments with her general practitioner.
So far as the impacts of those conditions were concerned, Dr Lim said: I believe [KS’s] decision making would have been significantly compromised during the relevant period, including making large financial decisions. Her stress was further exacerbated by feeling pressured to return to China to see her unwell, elderly father. She described significant guilt about her inability to do this as she was unable to afford the travel costs. This stress would have likely worsened her impairments further. Ms Morris, forensic psychologist (11 August 2025)
The distorted thinking of KS
A larger picture of disordered thinking
In light of the expert evidence referred to above, it is possible to state some conclusions about the effect of KS’s mental health on the events the subject of her claim.
At every stage of the purchase and ownership of the Ainslie Property, KS suffered the effects of distorted thinking, contributed to by her mental health conditions. Although the evidence did not provide great detail about the circumstances of KS in relation to the other properties in the period prior to entry into the contract to purchase the Ainslie Property, it is clear that she had very distorted thinking in relation to property, her financial circumstances and her accommodation. It must be remembered that, prior to the acquisition of the West Row and Ainslie Properties, KS owned the Lyons Property which was, at the time of its ultimate sale, unencumbered.
Her course of conduct in relation to the Lyons, West Row and Ainslie Properties was contributed to by her lack of trust in people, a difficulty getting on with them, her major depressive disorder, her anxiety and the consequences of her schizophrenia. Although she was a person with significant underlying intelligence, she remained an isolated woman suffering the effects of relative poverty, poor health and mental illness. The acquisition of the West Row Property
As a result of various factors (see above at [22]), KS decided she could no longer live in the Lyons Property. The evidence did not disclose when she reached that conclusion, but her subsequent conduct indicated a less-than-prudent approach to the acquisition of further property.
Notwithstanding that her principal, or only, source of income was a disability pension, she somehow managed to acquire the West Row Property in which she then lived from 2016. Yet it was only in 2020 that she took sufficient steps to be able to sell the Lyons Property. The financial consequences of her failure to promptly sell the Lyons Property were not described in the evidence.
While she was living in the West Row Property, she continued her hoarding behaviours. It is clear that, between late 2020 and early 2021, the loan on the West Row Property was in default. While the evidence was limited, there was evidence that, in addition to her hoarding, there were other maintenance issues with the property.
KS also gave some evidence of having had adverse interactions with real estate agents in relation to her attempts to sell the West Row Property. Having regard to her interactions with Mr Carew, her high level of anxiety and her distrust of people, it would not be surprising if she had great difficulty in pragmatically managing a relationship with a real estate agent sufficient to allow her to sell a property that she had filled with hoarded materials.
The decision to purchase the Ainslie Property
With the Lyons Property about to be sold, a reasonable course of conduct would have been to use the proceeds of that sale to remedy any default on the West Row Property and take whatever steps were required in order to have the West Row Property sold too, so as to be able to put in place accommodation arrangements that were consistent with her financial circumstances. KS described that she was already “experiencing enormous financial difficulty … enormous mental … psychological, emotional distress” and that, until the West Row Property could be sold, she would not have any ability to generate “any real cash to then put down as a deposit”. However, she did not adopt a reasonable course that was consistent with her means. Instead, she became incredibly anxious about her housing circumstances and obsessed with the need to acquire further property so that she had a roof over her head and avoid, in the future, “constant harassment from the bank” in relation to foreclosure.
I accept her evidence that, at about the time she contracted to sell the Lyons Property, she had discussions with four other women whom she met through a women’s refuge. The discussions related to the possibility of living in some form of a shared house and sharing ownership and expenses. These discussions could only have occurred in a tentative and preliminary way. KS only knew these women by their pseudonyms. KS and the women had developed no realistic structure for such a plan. So far as the limited evidence goes, it can only be inferred that what occurred were general discussions without any commitment. It is unlikely that, having regard to her mental health problems, including her hoarding behaviour, her anxiety and her distrust of people, KS would have been able to successfully manage the relationships involved in any such cooperative living arrangement. However, the dream of such an arrangement, combined with her underlying anxiety about having a roof over her head, created a strong impulse to purchase the Ainslie Property.
Although the evidence was limited, it appears that, at the time that she was dealing with Mr Carew, she had fixed upon the Ainslie Property as being suitable for her dream project. It was, in many respects, suitable for shared living, having multiple bedrooms, multiple bathrooms, a kitchen and a kitchenette. However, anybody acting reasonably and prudently in KS’s precarious financial circumstances would not have rushed in and purchased the house without having worked through issues relating to the funding of the balance of the payment due. That would also have involved resolving the financial situation in relation to the West Row Property. Rather, encouraged by the assistance given by Mr Carew, she purchased the Ainslie Property (for $1,735,000) on the very day that she settled the sale of the Lyons Property (which sold for $830,000).
The falling out with Mr Carew
KS’s immediate falling out with Mr Carew over his modest claim for payment was very counterproductive and indicative of her poor judgment at that point. She had signed the “Mandate to Act” which made reference to the charging of fees: see [31] above. She knew that obtaining finance was not straightforward, having previously unsuccessfully approached banks for finance. There is no evidence that she knew any other broker or had any other way of obtaining finance at that point. Whatever else might be said about Mr Carew’s assistance to her, he did at least have some appreciation that it was necessary to do something to rectify KS’s default in relation to the West Row Property and have that property sold. The period after the contract to purchase the Ainslie Property
From the point at which she fell out with Mr Carew (9 or 10 March 2021) until being contacted by Ms Brown on 18 June 2021, KS appears to have done nothing about the urgent issue of obtaining finance for the purchase of the Ainslie Property and made no useful progress in relation to the West Row Property. Precisely what was going on in her life during that period is not made clear by the evidence.
However, she had multiple problems which affected her mental state. Compounding her baseline mental health problems were: (a) the “disappearance” (as she described it) of the women that she had contemplated would be involved with the Ainslie Property; (b) her ongoing default on the home loan for the West Row Property; (c) the other difficulties relating to the West Row Property arising from actions of the body corporate, her own hoarding behaviour and her difficulty in finding an agent to sell the property; (d) her lack of secure accommodation, the need for couch surfing and her anxiety about her future accommodation; (e) her falling out with a couple with whom she had been couch surfing, resulting in the police being called, her being evicted from the property and her leaving her prescriptions behind: see [61] above; (f) that she was sleeping poorly and was losing things: see [59]-[60], [62] above; (g) that she was not eating properly and suffered abdominal symptoms as a consequence: see [63] above; (h) her anxiety about upcoming court appearances in March and June arising from her stealing and the physical consequences secondary to that anxiety such as disabling diarrhoea: see [58], [67], [69] above; (i) notwithstanding the Covid pandemic, she remained very anxious about having Covid and flu vaccines because of her needle phobia: see [59], [65] above; (j) she was “staring at [a] blank wall, crying non-stop”: see [61] above; (k) she was recorded in May as engaging in “magical thinking” and had poor insight into the consequences of her behaviour for others: [62] above; and (l) she was regularly forgetting to take her medication, with the result that her doctor contemplated the need for depot injections: see [64] above. The focus on finance after 23 June 2021
Following 23 June 2021, when KS responded to Ms Brown’s email of 18 June in relation to finance, KS was able, notwithstanding her difficulties, to focus upon the issue and act relatively logically in relation to obtaining finance.
Mental health after the purchase
The evidence indicates that KS was inconsistent in her taking of antipsychotic medication in the period from settlement until 22 September 2021 at which point Dr Bookallil recorded that her schizophrenia was deteriorating. She was scared to go out and her incontinence had worsened. She was recorded by Dr Bookallil as staying at someone else’s house in November. It is not clear why that would have been the case given that she had just acquired the Ainslie Property. She had been caught shoplifting again. Dr Bookallil’s records indicate that she remained very anxious and was not sleeping in January 2022 as she awaited her court case’s progress and remained anxious about Covid.
Even though KS could respond to immediate crises such as the demands for payment of the conveyancing duty by the ACT Revenue Office from April 2022 (even if that was only paid in part), and she could correspond with Prime, she remained incapable of addressing the fundamental issues with her financial situation and her health.
The absence of action after the purchase
The failure to sell the Ainslie Property
What did Prime know?
Even in circumstances where Prime was only dealing with the borrower via a broker and the broker’s knowledge could not be attributed to Prime, Prime was aware of the following features of the borrower, guarantor and the loan. (a) The loan was being sought at the last minute in circumstances where a notice to complete had been issued. (b) The property being purchased was a residential home. (c) The date of the contract was the same date as the date of incorporation of the company that was to be the borrower. (d) Notwithstanding that the contract had been entered into by the trustee corporation, the deed of trust was only executed subsequently on 28 June 2021. (e) There was no evidence (such as any financial statements, business plan or anything else) that the borrower in fact undertook any business. (f) Because there was no information about any business, there was necessarily no information as to whether the “Working Capital” description in the agreement (see [187] above) was realistic. (g) The guarantor was a 59-year-old woman who was the sole director and shareholder of the borrower. (h) Nobody other than the guarantor was involved with the borrower. (i) The guarantor had no other directorships which might have suggested business activity. (j) No financial statements had been required for the borrower even though that was stated to be a requirement in the loan approval documents. (k) The residential property was to be “owner occupied” (despite the owner being a trustee corporation). (l) If rented out, the potential gross income from the property was assessed by a valuer at between $1,100 and $1,200 per week: see [217] above. (m) The Loan Agreement did not require a lawyer to certify that the lawyer had given the advice which KS was required to say had been received. (n) Mr Taneski, the broker, was to receive a very substantial payment if the loan was approved (unconnected to how much time he spent actually scrutinising the loan proposal) and hence had an interest in achieving its approval even in circumstances where there was an inability to service the loan, and there was no policy, process or guideline put in place by Prime to guard against that risk. (o) There was no policy or guideline which Prime required the broker to adhere to in relation to methods for or approaches to assessment of the capacity of the corporate borrower or the guarantor to service the relevant loan. (p) The only source of information about the guarantor’s capacity was an unsupported statement provided by the broker about her income. (q) The capacity of Prime to vary the Lower Rate of interest was, by reason of the structure and drafting of the Loan Agreement and the terms of the approval of the loan, unlikely to have been appreciated by the borrower or the guarantor. (r) The terms of the Loan Agreement, in particular, the operation of the Higher Rate, the Termination Fee, the Capital Reserve Fee (and ultimately the addition of legal costs) would make it very difficult for many borrowers in default to remedy the default.
The terms of the Loan Agreement itself indicate that very large amounts became payable to Prime as fees or interest in circumstances where the borrower defaulted. The impression given by the interest and fee structure is that, so long as the security was sufficient to repay the loan, Prime would benefit from loans where the borrower defaulted, as distinct from loans where the borrower complied with the terms of the loan and repaid it successfully.
The Code
The plaintiffs sought relief under various provisions of the Code and the National Consumer Credit Protection Act.
In order for the Code and National Consumer Credit Protection Act to apply, each of four elements must be met: Code, s 5. In summary, these are (relevantly to this case): (a) the debtor in relation to the loan is a natural person; (b) the credit was provided, or was intended to be provided, wholly or predominately: (i) for personal, domestic or household purposes; or (ii) to purchase, renovate or improve residential property for investment purposes; (c) a charge is or may be made for providing the credit; and (d) the credit was provided in the course of a business of providing credit carried on in this jurisdiction.
The principal reason why the Code does not apply in the circumstances of the present case is that the borrower, Nusage, was a company and not a natural person. The plaintiffs sought to overcome this difficulty by characterising KS as a “debtor” for the purposes of the Code. This was by reference to the terms of the Loan Agreement, in particular the terms of clause 14.5, which provided that the liability of both the borrower and guarantor was “the liability of a principal debtor and not merely as a surety”.
Plaintiffs’ submissions
The plaintiffs submitted that whether or not KS, as a natural person, was a “debtor” within the meaning of the Code — despite being named a “guarantor” — was a question of the terms and construction of the Loan Agreement.
Pursuant to s 3 of the Code: 3 Meaning of credit and amount of credit (1) For the purposes of this Code, credit is provided if under a contract: (a) payment of a debt owed by one person (the debtor) to another (the credit provider) is deferred; or (b) one person (the debtor) incurs a deferred debt to another (the credit provider).
Pursuant to s 204(1) of the Code: debtor means a person (other than a guarantor) who is liable to pay for (or to repay) credit, and includes a prospective debtor. … guarantor includes a prospective guarantor.
The plaintiffs submitted that a debtor within the meaning of the Code must mean any person who is liable to pay for (or to repay) credit, other than as guarantor.
The plaintiffs pointed to clause 14.5 of Part 4 the Loan Agreement, which states: 14.5 Principal liability The liability of each Obligor under this deed is the liability of a principal debtor and not merely as a surety. Each obligation of each Obligor under this clause 14 is unconditional and irrevocable.
“Obligors” is defined in clause 17.1 of Part 4 to mean “the Borrower and each Guarantor”, such that KS would have then had a principal and not just secondary liability.
In addition, the plaintiffs pointed to the following parts of the Loan Agreement: (a) Clause 5 of Part 2, which states: By signing this deed each Obligor … agrees that the Lender may accept and disburse the Advance or any part thereof or any further amounts drawn down in accordance with any direction provided by the Obligor, its solicitor and/or broker. Where there are two or more Obligors, a direction from any one Obligor is binding on all Obligors. (b) Clause 10(a) of Part 4, which states: If an Obligor is named as a General Security Provider in Item 9 of the Key Details, by signing this deed, the Obligor hereby charges and grants a security interest (as defined in the PPS Law) in the General Security Property to the Lender: (i) for payment of the Secured Money; and (ii) to secure performance of the obligations imposed on the Obligor under the Finance Documents, on the terms set out in Part 5 of this deed.
The plaintiffs submitted that the terms of clause 14.5 of Part 4 of the Loan Agreement impose a primary liability upon each of the Obligors (being both plaintiffs) as a principal debtor. This obligation is also supported by the terms of clause 10(a). The plaintiffs submitted that it is not open to Prime to insert obligations into the Loan Agreement which give Prime the benefit of all Obligors being a principal debtor but then for Prime to avoid the statutory consequences of doing so.
The plaintiffs submitted that the Loan Agreement has the effect whereby each Obligor is a principal debtor who otherwise guarantees the primary liabilities of each other Obligor. To the extent that there is true ambiguity, the contra proferentem rule applies in the plaintiffs’ favour.
Prime’s submissions
The defendant submitted that the Loan Agreement should not be interpreted so as to make KS a “debtor” for the purposes of the Code.
The defendant pointed to the following parts of Part 4 of the Loan Agreement: (a) Clause 2.1 provides that the cash advance facility is to be made available to the Borrower by the Lender. (b) Clause 2.3 indicates the purposes for which the Borrower must apply the funds. (c) Clause 4.1 imposes on the Borrower (but not the Guarantor) the obligation to repay the aggregate of the loan outstanding at the termination date. (d) Clauses 5.1, 6.1 and 6.2 provide that the obligations to pay interest, the establishment fee and the variation fee are on the Borrower. (e) “Obligors” means the Borrower and each Guarantor. That feeds into clause 14. Clause 14 provides that each Obligor guarantees and indemnifies to the lender the payment of money and the performance of obligations. Pursuant to clause 14.2, if there is a failure to pay by “any Obligor”, then “each other Obligor” is obliged to pay whether or not there has been a demand. The defendant characterised clause 14.2 as guarantee and clause 14.3 as an indemnity, both being contingent on there being a default.
The defendant contended that KS was a guarantor for the purposes of the Code and that clause 14.5 of Part 4 of the Loan Agreement did not change that.
Decision
The Loan Agreement is a commercial document. It must be interpreted in accordance with the usual principles of contractual interpretation outlined in Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; 251 CLR 640 at [35], namely: (a) the meaning of the terms of a commercial contract is to be determined by what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean; (b) a court is entitled to approach the task of giving a commercial contract a businesslike interpretation on the assumption that the parties intended to produce a commercial result; and (c) a commercial contract is to be construed so as to avoid it making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience.
Clause 14 of Part 4 of the Loan Agreement provides: 14. Guarantee and Indemnity 14.1 Guarantee and Indemnity Each Obligor jointly and severally and irrevocably Guarantees and Indemnifies to the Lender: (a) the due and punctual payment and delivery by each other Obligor of the Secured Money; and (b) the due observance and punctual performance by each other Obligor of the Secured Obligations. 14.2 Guarantee and Indemnity payment If any Obligor fails to pay all or any part of its Secured Money when due, each other Obligor will pay that Secured Money to the Lender, whether or not demand for payment has been made on the relevant Obligor or any other person. 14.3 Guarantee and Indemnity obligations If an Obligor defaults in the due and punctual observance or performance of all or any part of the Secured Obligations, each other Obligor indemnifies the Lender in respect of any loss suffered by the Lender, directly or indirectly, as a result and will pay to the Lender on demand the amount of such loss. 14.4 Indemnity Each Obligor indemnifies the Lender against, and must pay on demand amounts equal to, any loss of the Lender arising out of: (a) any of the Secured Money (or any sum which, if recoverable, would have formed part of the Secured Money) not being recoverable from any Obligor by the Lender; or (b) any transaction relating to any Secured Money, or any Secured Obligations, being or becoming at any time void, voidable, defective or otherwise unenforceable and any other circumstances whatsoever which may allow any Obligor to avoid paying any Secured Money, in whole or in part, in each case, for any reason (whether or not within the Lender knowledge) including any legal or equitable limitation, disability or incapacity of or affecting an Obligor or any other person except where such liability arises from fraud or wilful misconduct of the Lender. 14.5 Principal liability The liability of each Obligor under this deed is the liability of a principal debtor and not merely as a surety. Each obligation of each Obligor under this clause 14 is unconditional and irrevocable. 14.6 Liability not prejudiced The liability of each Obligor under this document will not be affected or diminished, nor will any other Guarantee and Indemnity or security provided by an Obligor be released or discharged, by any act, indulgence, omission or matter which, but for this clause 14.6, would have operated to release an Obligor wholly or partly from its liability to the Lender, including: (a) the granting of any time, credit, indulgence, waiver or other concession to an Obligor or any other person, whether by the Lender or any other person (whether or not at the request of any Obligor or other person); [(b)-(i) omitted] 14.7 Continuing Guarantee and Indemnity … 14.8 No competition … 14.9 Hold on trust … 14.10 Suspense account … 14.11 Waiver … 14.12 Lender may enforce …
Equitable unconscionability
There are three essential elements for finding unconscionable conduct in equity: (a) there exists a special disadvantage affecting the weaker party’s ability to make a judgment in their own best interests; (b) the stronger party knows of this disadvantage, and (c) the stronger party unconscientiously or unfairly takes advantage of that disadvantage. See Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 459-460, 461, 474; Stubbings v Jams 2 Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 6; 276 CLR 1 at [39].
As a majority of the High Court in Stubbings made clear (at [39]), these components should not be simply examined as discrete elements. Whether or not unconscionable conduct is established involves scrutiny of the exact relations between the parties and the three components should be examined in a comprehensive way in order to determine the real justice of the case.
Special disadvantage
Special disadvantage means something that “seriously affects the ability of the innocent party to make a judgment” as to the party’s own best interests: Stubbings at [40]. The factors relevant to an assessment of special disadvantage have not been exhaustively listed (Stubbings at [40]), but include illness, ignorance, inexperience, impaired faculties and financial need: Blomley v Ryan (1954) 99 CLR 362 at 415.
KS combined both significant intelligence with chronic mental health problems which distorted her thinking. That makes the assessment of whether there was, relevantly, special disadvantage more difficult than in a case like Stubbings or Amadio. In Stubbings, the borrower was manifestly incapable of understanding the risks involved in the transaction, being unable to perform simple calculations such as 10% of $130,000 (Stubbings at [41]). In Amadio, the guarantors were elderly, had not received much formal education and had only a limited grasp of written English (Amadio at 450-451, 470).
KS had the capacity to compare, at a superficial level, the loans which she was being offered. However, I have found earlier that she had a long history of distorted thinking in relation to her dealings with real property arising, most acutely, out of her hoarding behaviour. By the time she first came into contact with Prime, she was in a position of urgency, being locked into Nusage’s purchase of the Ainslie Property and subject to the notice to complete. Her distorted thinking about real property which led her to that position and her overwhelming anxiety about having a place in which to live both meant that she was in a position of special disadvantage in relation to the obtaining of finance to complete the purchase of the Ainslie Property. Given that she was the sole director and shareholder of Nusage, her position of special disadvantage also affected the position of Nusage. Knowledge
In Amadio, Mason J found (at 467) that the following may be sufficient to permit a finding of unconscionable conduct: (a) actual knowledge that the other party occupies a situation of special disadvantage in relation to the intended transaction; (b) awareness of the possibility that the situation of special disadvantage may exist; or (c) awareness of facts that would raise the possibility of a special disadvantage in the mind of a reasonable person.
Earlier, his Honour had described the requirement as being that “the other party knows or ought to know of the existence of that condition or circumstance and of its effect on the innocent party”: Amadio at 462. Similarly, in Stubbings, the majority judgment referred to Mason J’s reasons in Amadio and, applying that approach to the circumstances of the case before it, said (at [46]): A case for relief against an unconscionable attempt to enforce legal rights is established in this case because Mr Jeruzalski had sufficient appreciation of the appellant’s vulnerability, and the disaster awaiting him under the mortgages, that his conduct in procuring the execution of the mortgages is justly described as unconscientious.
Statutory unconscionability
Statutory framework
The provision of credit by Prime to Nusage and KS was a “credit facility” within the meaning of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Regulations 2001 (Cth): see reg 2B(1)(a). So too were the associated mortgage and guarantee: see regs 2B(1)(f)-(h). As a result, the provision of credit was a “financial product” within the meaning of s 12BAA of the ASIC Act: s 12BAA(7)(k); Jams 2 Pty Ltd v Stubbings (No 3) [2019] VSC 150 at [321], [325]. This meant that Prime provided a “financial service” within the meaning of s 12BAB of the ASIC Act: ss 12BAB(1)(b), (7)(b).
Section 12CB of the ASIC Act provides: 12CB Unconscionable conduct in connection with financial services (1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with: (a) the supply or possible supply of financial services to a person; or (b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of financial services from a person; engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. … (4) It is the intention of the Parliament that: (a) this section is not limited by the unwritten law of the States and Territories relating to unconscionable conduct; and (b) this section is capable of applying to a system of conduct or pattern of behaviour, whether or not a particular individual is identified as having been disadvantaged by the conduct or behaviour; and (c) in considering whether conduct to which a contract relates is unconscionable, a court’s consideration of the contract may include consideration of: (i) the terms of the contract; and (ii) the manner in which and the extent to which the contract is carried out; and is not limited to consideration of the circumstances relating to formation of the contract.
In determining whether Prime has engaged in unconscionable conduct within the meaning of the ASIC Act (statutory unconscionability), the court may take into account the non-exhaustive list of factors in s 12CC(1) of the ASIC Act. Most relevant to this matter are the following factors: (a) the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the supplier and the service recipient; and (b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the service recipient was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the supplier; and (c) whether the service recipient was able to understand any documents relating to the supply or possible supply of the financial services; and … (j) if there is a contract between the supplier and the service recipient for the supply of the financial services: (i) the extent to which the supplier was willing to negotiate the terms and conditions of the contract with the service recipient; and (ii) the terms and conditions of the contract; and (iii) the conduct of the supplier and the service recipient in complying with the terms and conditions of the contract; and (iv) any conduct that the supplier or the service recipient engaged in, in connection with their commercial relationship, after they entered into the contract; and … (l) the extent to which the supplier and the service recipient acted in good faith.
Submissions
The plaintiffs’ submissions were based upon systemic unconscionability. The submissions identified: (a) the reliance upon an intermediary broker network; (b) the avoidance of the Code by lending to corporate entities; (c) the lending for “working capital” or “business purposes”, notwithstanding that the actual purpose of the loan was for purposes that would be covered by the Code; (d) deliberate avoidance of receiving information from borrowers as to their financial and personal circumstances, focusing only upon the sufficiency of security to repay capital and interest upon default; and (e) the application of high interest rates and fees upon default resulting in borrowers being unable to remedy that default.
Overall, Prime’s system was characterised by the plaintiffs as providing high risk loans in such a way that there was real likelihood that the borrowers and guarantors would not have an ability to meet payments under the loan, with Prime deliberately avoiding that information so as to immunise itself from any knowledge of those vulnerabilities.
Prime relied upon the evidence of Ms Morris (the forensic psychologist) that, even though KS had a long history of mental illness, there was no indication in her correspondence of any thought disorder and nothing in the telephone interview (see [225]-[228] above) that would indicate that KS suffered from those psychiatric disabilities.
Prime submitted that KS was aware of the need to repay the loan and the potential to sell the West Row Property in order to pay down the loan relating to the Ainslie Property. Prime submitted that it obtained sufficient information about KS and her capacity to repay the loan, pointing to the information that was obtained by Mr Taneski about her income, assets and potential exit strategy. It relied upon the declaration in the Loan Agreement that KS had obtained legal advice. It submitted that it was not at all inevitable that KS would lose the equity in the Ainslie Property as a result of taking the loan.
Prime denied that it deliberately avoided receiving information from borrowers as to their financial and personal circumstances. It pointed to the information provided by Mr Taneski as well as the specific enquiries made about the income of KS when that had not been included in the Loan Power system. It pointed to the valuation conducted in relation to the Ainslie Property and the internal credit-related processes that were undertaken prior to making the loan. Prime emphasised that it was presented with a business loan application and a request to settle urgently, and it took steps to meet that request. It emphasised KS’s evidence that she was focused on making statements that were needed in order to obtain the loan and that any further enquiries would have only received information from KS supportive of the making of the loan.
Decision
The system adopted by Prime was to offer a fast turnaround on loan applications based on minimal requirements for documentation. Prime insulated itself from knowledge of borrowers as a result of dealing with those borrowers through brokers. Those brokers obtained significant rewards for placing loans with Prime by reason of commissions which were built into the offer of a loan by Prime (in this case, in the form of the 2.2% brokerage fee which was paid out of the funds provided by Prime: see [252], [262] above). The interests of Prime were secured by a mortgage over the Ainslie Property and the high fees under the Loan Agreement (which would increase, as would the interest rate, in circumstances where there was a default).
I have found earlier that Prime was not aware of KS’s special disadvantage, nor was it aware of circumstances which meant that it ought to have been so aware.
Features suggesting the system was not unconscionable
Features suggesting the system was unconscionable
In Stubbings, when assessing a similar system of lending, Gordon J described the exercise as follows (at [77], [80]): What can be significant is that the conduct targeted a group to take advantage of their likely, although not certain, vulnerability or, as in this case, that the lenders recognised a likely, although not certain, vulnerability and yet designed a system of lending against a guarantor’s property, suspecting that they had no income or capacity to service the loan, and deliberately avoiding information as to the guarantor’s financial or personal circumstances in order to “immunise” themselves from knowledge of the vulnerability. … Here, the lenders’ system – their “internal method of working” – did not, and was not designed to, prevent the lenders acting unconscionably contrary to s 12CB of the ASIC Act. The lenders’ system was designed to do the opposite – to hide from the lenders any information which might later be said to make the loan, the guarantee or the taking of security unconscionable. The system sought to “immunise” the lenders from claims by borrowers or guarantors to set aside loans as unconscionable by studiously avoiding any inquiry about why or in what circumstances the individual guarantor provided their property as security despite the lenders recognising that a loan of the kind they were offering “could be a dangerous product in the wrong hands and wreak significant damage on the guarantor” (emphasis added). And the lenders’ system was not reasonably necessary to protect the lenders’ legitimate interests. (Citations omitted.)
The features of the system operated by Prime which tend to indicate that it was a system of lending which amounted to unconscionable conduct are as follows. (a) Prime only dealt with potential borrowers via broker intermediaries. Those brokers earned significant fees when a loan was placed with Prime. Those fees were built into Prime’s agreements with the borrowers and were reflected in the terms of the loan approval that the borrower was required to sign. The existence of those fees provided significant incentives for brokers to act in a manner that resulted in loans being made in circumstances where: (i) there was an unnecessary interposition of a company in order to avoid the operation of the Code; (ii) the loan was not suitable for the borrower; and/or (iii) the borrower was likely to default and lose their security. (b) It must have been obvious that there was, at the very least, a significant risk that the interposition of the company was in order to avoid the application of the Code. The company was a two-dollar company that had only been incorporated on the same date as the contract for the purchase of the property. (c) Consistent with a recognition that the interposition of a company was for the purpose of avoiding the operation of the Code, it was not part of the system to require that there be any evidence available to Prime that the company had any actual business. (d) The information that Prime had was that the property was to be owner occupied. That would be inconsistent with a capacity to rent out the property so as to generate income to contribute towards loan repayments. That made the absence of information about the business of Nusage or the basis for the assertion that KS had a substantial income more significant. (e) The product was a dangerous one which posed very significant risks to the borrower. In addition to the high initial fees, it had the following additional features: (i) the potential that the Lower Rate would be increased in a manner similar to a variable interest loan in the event that there was a change in Reserve Bank interest rates (but could also be increased if there was “any increase in costs to the Lender” or “decrease in the effective return of the Lender”); (ii) the application of the Higher Rate once there was a default; and (iii) the imposition of a range of other fees (including substantial legal fees) to the loan once it was in default. (f) The certification required as to the obtaining of legal advice, which only required a statement by the guarantor and not the lawyer giving the legal advice, making it more likely that a vulnerable guarantor would sign it notwithstanding that it was not true. (g) There was no system to verify any statement made as to the income of the borrower (or a guarantor), or to identify whether the income of a corporate borrower was independent of the income of the natural person standing behind the corporation. The figure provided by the broker, whether or not it was accurately or responsibly sourced, would be accepted. (h) In circumstances where Prime insulated itself from dealing directly with the borrower, it had no system in place to ensure that the borrower was an appropriate one to whom to make a loan from any perspective other than its own potential to make a profit. That was illustrated by its subsequent approval of a further loan (which Mr Taneski organised, apparently unsolicited) to the plaintiffs following their default without prompting or further information from KS: see [297] above.
Conclusion
The circumstances of the present case are very similar to those addressed by Gordon J in Stubbings. Her Honour said of the system in that case (at [81]-[84]): Vulnerability With knowledge of the significant risks associated with the financial product he was providing, Mr Jeruzalski’s system facilitated the making of interest-only loans to companies (avoiding the operation of the National Credit Code), where the loans were guaranteed by persons who he assumed had no income and were otherwise unbankable, whilst deliberately avoiding any knowledge that might enliven the court’s equitable or statutory jurisdiction to set aside unconscionable transactions. It may be inferred that the system assumed that some borrowers and guarantors would be vulnerable in a sense capable of enlivening that jurisdiction. But the lenders’ system sought to “immunise” the lenders against that assumption being known to be true because knowledge of its truth would inevitably attract the court’s equitable or statutory jurisdiction to set aside the transactions. That was unconscionable. Unconscientious taking advantage Mr Jeruzalski’s system used “unfair tactics” and lacked good faith. Developing and applying a system that seeks to avoid the application of statutory and general law protections is contrary to s 12CB of the ASIC Act. Taking advantage of vulnerable borrowers and guarantors reveals a clear power imbalance built into the system, reflected in Mr Jeruzalski’s refusal even to meet or communicate (let alone negotiate) with prospective borrowers and guarantors. As explained, he acted only through intermediaries. The system was also characterised by a lack of transparency, which was exacerbated, not ameliorated, by the certificates of independent advice. The certificates were crafted by Mr Jeruzalski to avoid any meaningful disclosure not only to the lenders but also to the borrowers and guarantors. The certificates of advice were “part of the system of conduct adopted by AJ Lawyers to immunise the [lenders] from knowledge that might threaten the enforceability of the loan”. The lenders’ system of conduct is outside the societal norms of acceptable behaviour so as to warrant condemnation as offensive to conscience. It does not reflect values that can be recognised by a court to prevail within contemporary Australian society. It is a system of conduct that is unconscionable contrary to s 12CB(1) of the ASIC Act. (Footnotes omitted, emphasis in original.)
In the present case, the designer of Prime’s system, the owner of the Loan Power software, the person required to ultimately approve the making of the loan and the CEO of Prime, Mr Scanlon, swore an affidavit, but that affidavit was not ultimately read and he did not give evidence at the hearing.
This case does not have the personal involvement by an individual such as Mr Jeruzalski in Stubbings. That is only because the system put in place in a larger operation like Prime was designed to avoid placing any one person in an equivalent position, and the one person with an overview of the whole of the system, Mr Scanlon, did not give evidence. The clinical process by which the loan was assessed and processed by the different persons responsible at Prime means that there is no one person upon whom the moral opprobrium of engaging in exploitative conduct will fall. That is a product of the design of Prime’s system for making such loans.
Orders
I certify that the preceding five hundred and thirty-two [532] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Mossop. Associate: Date:
************** Amendments 12 February 2026 Replace all instances of the name of the first plaintiff with “KS” on the cover sheet and within the judgment.
KS
Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd
(1954) 99 CLR 362
(1983) 151 CLR 447
(1986) 160 CLR 226
The plaintiffs then called three other witnesses who appeared pursuant to subpoenas and had not prepared affidavits: Mr Tony Taneski, Ms Emma Brown and Mr Travis Henderson.
Mr Taneski was the broker who arranged the loan with Prime. His evidence was given with a ring of straightforwardness. However, I was not confident that it was reliable in all respects. There were quite a number of matters which he could not recall. He had a long-term relationship with Prime and Mr Henderson (who was also called as a witness), and did a lot of business with Prime. Mr Taneski stood to gain very significantly from Nusage and KS entering into an agreement with Prime. My impression was that, as a broker, he was keen to get the deal done, justified on the basis that KS was very clearly desperate to obtain the loan, and that he did not dig too deeply into her circumstances where they might demonstrate that she was a person who may be an unsuitable candidate for his assistance.
Ms Brown was the solicitor who acted for Nusage and KS in relation to the purchase of the Ainslie property. She gave evidence in a straightforward manner, largely based upon her documentary records and contemporaneous file notes. I accept her evidence as reliable. While she did respond to KS’s requests for advice about loan agreements at various points, Ms Brown took care to stay within the scope of her retainer, which related to the conveyancing transaction. Ms Brown did not give KS advice about the contents of the Loan Agreement.
Mr Henderson was a business development manager at Prime. He was responsible for thousands of brokers who provided potential customers to Prime. He had no direct dealings with KS. His evidence was generally reliable as it was largely confined to describing the processes followed within Prime in relation to the loan application generated by Mr Taneski. His focus was very much on the business side of the deal, shepherding it between the various parts of Prime so as to turn it around in the time required in order for settlement to occur. As his focus was on Prime’s interests and getting the deal done, he responded to what Mr Taneski put forward and operated within the framework provided by Mr Paul Scanlon, the CEO of Prime, and Prime’s systems as reflected in its software system, Loan Power. His financial incentives within the business were focused on the volume of loans being made to borrowers and he was well remunerated as a result.
An affidavit was sworn by Mr Scanlon, the CEO and underlying owner of Prime. However, the defendant ultimately did not call him to give any evidence.
In addition to the contemporaneous documentary records and the oral evidence of witnesses, two expert reports were tendered expressing opinions about KS’s mental health over time and, in particular, at the time of the entry into the Loan Agreement with Prime. They were the report prepared by Dr Lyn-May Lim, a psychiatrist, tendered by the plaintiffs, and the report of Ms Leesa Morris, a forensic psychologist, tendered by the defendant. Neither expert was required for cross-examination.
The evidence did not directly disclose why it was only in 2020 that KS sold the Lyons Property, although the failure to sell it promptly was likely contributed to by her mental health conditions, described later in these reasons.
On 9 March 2021 at 5:25pm, Ms Brown’s assistant also sent a copy of the exchanged contract of sale for the Ainslie Property to Mr Carew and asked Mr Carew which bank KS was using.
On 15 April 2021, KS attended a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. Various abdominal symptoms were recorded as well as “not eating regularly because of finances”.
On 11 May 2021, KS attended a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. At this stage, KS told Dr Brookallil that she was “Couch surfing” as her house had been sold. She had been staying with a couple but was required to leave by police, leaving her prescriptions for antipsychotic and antidepressant medication (olanzapine and fluoxetine) at the house. She spent her days staring at a blank wall and crying.
On 12 May 2021, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. The doctor recorded an absence of hallucinations but “some magical thinking, tangential thought, rapid speech”. KS had not been taking her medication because she had been “kicked out” of her earlier accommodation and could not take anything with her. The doctor recorded “poor insight into behaviour and her impact on others - never thinks she is in the wrong and doesn’t see how her behaviour is perceived”. The doctor recorded that KS was “in debt”, with her “house repossessed and sold”, and that she “still has debts and [is] now homeless - couch surfing”. The doctor recorded that counselling would help but that KS had offended most psychologists who were prepared to bulk bill and she did not want to return to Next Step (a counselling service that she had seen between March and September 2020: see [390] below). The doctor attempted to get assistance for KS with accommodation. A subsequent follow-up by the accommodation service to which KS was referred indicated that they could organise a room at a refuge but that KS was “very distrustful, declined to give any personal details and was falling asleep during [the] meeting”.
On 25 May 2021, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. She was late for her appointment. Her presenting complaint was diarrhoea and increased pain. KS had complaints about staff at the doctor’s medical practice and about police, mental health staff and the accommodation service to which she had been referred. KS was “feeling dark”. Dr Bookallil recorded the reason for the visit as “Depression”.
On 7 June 2021, Dr Bookallil rang a mental health advisory line and spoke to another doctor there. The conclusion reached was that KS may be forgetting to take medication and the plan was to start a depot injection.
On 8 June 2021, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. KS admitted that she missed her medications about twice per week. After a long discussion of side-effects, her medication was changed so that she reduced her olanzapine prescription and took paliperidone. KS did not want a depot injection because of her needle phobia. There was also a discussion of flu and Covid injections and a fall that she had in a supermarket three weeks previously.
On 11 June 2021, a business development manager at LJ Hooker in Dickson prepared a letter providing a rental appraisal for the Ainslie Property of between $1,200 and $1,350 per week. Another letter in similar terms, dated 7 July 2021, provided a rental appraisal for the “Granny Flats” said to be located at the back of the Ainslie Property (see [108] below). As there is no explanation as to the circumstances in which the 11 June document was requested and there was no other activity relating to obtaining finance for the purchase at that time, it is likely that the 11 June document was in fact provided only on 7 July when the other letter was produced.
On 16 June 2021, Dr Bookallil wrote a letter for the purposes of an upcoming court case in New South Wales on 22 June 2021. This related to one or more criminal charges against KS.
On 18 June 2021 at 2:58pm, Ms Brown emailed Mr Carew asking how the finance was progressing for KS’s purchase of the Ainslie Property, given settlement was due on 5 July. Mr Carew responded saying that, in March 2021, KS had “baulked at the idea of paying the fee” and he had told her that he would not provide any further assistance unless his invoice was paid. He had not heard back from her since that exchange. He said: “I would be wary of this client, she seems to take advantage of people, including myself, as I found out.” On the same day, Ms Brown emailed KS reminding her that settlement was due on 5 July 2021, noting that Mr Carew had no instructions from KS and enquiring whether KS still required finance for the purchase of the Ainslie Property and, if so, asking KS to provide Ms Brown with the contact details for her broker or banker.
KS attended a New South Wales court hearing on 22 June 2021. The next day, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. KS described her court experience as “quite traumatic”. She said that her lawyer was sick and attended by video link, that the case was dismissed under mental health legislation, and that she “was [a] nervous wreck yesterday” and suffered from multiple panic attacks.
On 25 June 2021, KS tried to get another doctor at Dr Bookallil’s practice to sign a copy of her passport so that she could open a bank account. As the medical practice only had a scanned copy on file and KS had lost the original passport and could not show it to the doctor, the doctor said that he could not certify a copy.
On 28 June 2021, KS obtained from the Braddon Centrelink Service Centre an income statement showing that she was in receipt of a disability support pension and indicating that she had assets of approximately $100,000.
This document adopted the same false or drastically exaggerated statement of KS’s position as had been articulated in the document prepared with Mr Carew’s assistance. If what was said in relation to the “Exit strategy” was true and KS had, as suggested, a substantial earning capacity, then she might have been a reasonable candidate for a loan. However, even if otherwise true, the reference to a disability pension being a secondary source of income would have raised a red flag for a potential lender.
At 4:55pm that afternoon, KS sent another email to Mr Roberts. KS noted that she had left multiple voice messages for him and asked him to return her calls. She also sent him messages asking that he call her. Her email indicated that she wished to submit the application form that day. Mr Roberts responded by email at 7:41pm saying that he had enough information to provide a loan offer to her the next day.
On 1 July 2021 at 8:10am, KS emailed Mr Roberts, saying: “I would like to reassure my solicitor who is getting anxious about the imminent settlement date, i.e., Monday 5 July, and would really appreciate it if you could give me a call this morning (as soon as you can).”
At 9:14am, Mr Roberts replied, saying that he had three different funding options and outlining the features of each of those options. In particular, the options identified the respective rates of interest (9.5%, 7.5% and 4.5% per annum), the fees, whether or not a valuation was required and how quickly settlement could be achieved. Option 1 had the highest interest rate (9.5%) but the fastest settlement, and financial information and a valuation were not required. The other options had lower interest rates but more significant documentary requirements and a longer time until settlement.
At some point that day, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. KS asked her to certify documents relating to KS’s identity. There was a discussion of arrangements for her Covid vaccine and the doctor thought that, because of KS’s needle phobia, vaccination would not be possible unless she was holding KS’s hand.
At midday, a real estate agent from LJ Hooker in Dickson provided KS a “Comparative Market Analysis” for the Ainslie Property. The email attaching that document stated: “As discussed on the phone, this is not a valuation for bank purposes.” This detailed document provided an “Appraisal price range” of $1.85 million to $1.95 million and noted that the market had increased significantly since KS had purchased the property (on 5 March 2021).
At 5:03pm, KS emailed Mr Roberts the appraisal for the Ainslie Property. She asked, naïvely, whether the appraisal would be acceptable in lieu of a bank valuation and hence whether it was possible to pursue Option 3 listed in his earlier email (the option with the lowest interest rate, but which required a valuation).
At 6:13pm, Mr Roberts received an indicative letter of offer for a loan to Nusage from a business trading as Winscourt Investments & Loans (Winscourt). It is not clear whether this offer was then communicated to KS, although on 11 July 2021, an offer from Winscourt dated 9 July 2021 was sent directly to KS (see [132] below).
On 2 July 2021 at 7:16am, Mr Roberts emailed KS, indicating that he would have an “Indicative Offer” to her by 9am and that, once the offer was returned and accepted, he would have a formal approval within a couple of hours. He said that, if she accepted the formal offer that day (Friday), then mortgage documents would be issued and available to her on Monday or Tuesday. Therefore, a one-week extension would give her some breathing space, aiming for a settlement “late next week”. KS responded saying that her preference was for Option 3 and enquired whether the indicative offer was for Option 3 or Option 1. She again asked whether the property appraisal provided to him the day before was acceptable.
At 8:15am, KS emailed Mr Roberts indicating that Ms Brown was going to contact her that morning and hence she requested a response to her earlier email about the appraisal and the possibility of pursuing Option 3.
At 8:29am, Mr Roberts emailed KS indicating that only Option 1 would accept the LJ Hooker appraisal. He said that Option 3 required a valuation from a registered valuer.
At 8:36am, Mr Roberts again emailed KS, saying: Yesterday when we spoke you asked me to get an offer to settle this next week (Option 1) and then look at the cheaper rate longer term. Option 2 & 3 cannot settle next week. Mr Roberts indicated that he could get a formal offer for Option 1 that day with the LJ Hooker appraisal. He went on to elaborate upon what was required for Options 2 and 3, each being more onerous.
At 10:02am, Mr Roberts sent an email to KS attaching a loan brokerage agreement and an invoice from IBN for $2,200 for Option 1, which would be able to settle the next week, and reiterated that the other options would not be able to settle for between two and four weeks. He invited her to sign and return the documents so that it would be possible to proceed to a “formal offer and ordering mortgage documents”. The loan brokerage agreement, which was with IBN, required the payment of a consultancy fee of $2,200.
On the afternoon of 2 July 2021, there was a telephone conversation between KS and Ms Brown. At 4:07pm, KS forwarded to Ms Brown the IBN loan brokerage agreement and the invoice for the non-refundable consultancy fee of $2,200. Ms Brown responded by email at 5:15pm, pointing out that what was provided was not a loan agreement but only an agreement for IBN to act as a broker to find her a loan. Ms Brown identified the main points that KS should note, focusing upon the (very significant) fees that would be charged even if KS decided not to go ahead with a loan that IBN had found (and even if the loan IBN found was not on the same terms as requested). Ms Brown also pointed out that there was nothing in the document confirming that finance would be available to KS by the end of the next week.
Ms Brown sent a follow-up email a few minutes later saying: I should also mention, obviously the type of loan you will be getting is a short term, high cost loan. These loans, by their nature, carry a higher risk [than] standard loans.
KS responded by email expressing her gratitude, indicating that she would try to borrow a lower amount and also referring to the possibility of a later settlement date.
On the same day, KS also exchanged emails with Mr Roberts. At 5:38pm, he provided indicative terms for a loan of $900,000 and at 5:59pm she thanked him and indicated that she would confirm the new loan amount by 7am on Monday, the next business day (which was 5 July 2021, the day the purchase of the Ainslie Property was supposed to settle).
On 5 July 2021 (a Monday) at 9:08am, Mr Roberts emailed asking about KS’s consideration of loan amounts, asking: “How did you go?”
At 10:04am, KS emailed Ms Brown, asking whether it was possible to change the name of the purchaser on the contract of sale for the Ainslie Property from Nusage to her own name. Ms Brown responded promptly by email at 10:12am, saying that this would require the contract with Nusage to be cancelled and a new contract to be entered into, which would require permission from the sellers and would alert the sellers to the difficulty with funding. KS and Ms Brown then spoke to each other on the phone. Ms Brown made a detailed contemporaneous file note. KS said that she should be able to settle by next week. She said that she had a cheque from the sale of her previous unit which she could drop in (this appears to have been a reference to the proceeds of the sale of the Lyons Property). Ms Brown advised her that she needed to bank the cheque before she could pull it out for settlement of the upcoming purchase. Ms Brown was instructed to let the sellers know that settlement should be able to occur by the end of the week.
At 3:11pm, in response to an email and voicemail messages from KS, Mr Roberts emailed KS, indicating that she would need to make a decision because he needed to let the short-term lender know whether she was proceeding. Later that afternoon and the next morning, there was another exchange of emails between KS and Mr Roberts about the fees associated with each of the options.
At 6:37pm on 5 July 2021, KS replied to Ms Brown’s 10:12am email of the same day (which related to the possibility of changing the name of the purchaser on the contract). KS’s reply said that she had been working hard to find a solution to settle the property within “the grace period” and indicated that she would advise by close of business the next day (6 July 2021) whether that would be possible.
On 6 July 2021 at 2:39pm, Mr Mevan Fernando, a mortgage broker at a business trading as Mortgage House, emailed Ms Brown saying that he was assisting KS with a loan for the purchase of the Ainslie Property and asking to speak to Ms Brown about that.
At 3:48pm, KS emailed Ms Brown certain documents. Although not in evidence, the documents appear to have included a loan agreement or a brokerage agreement as, at 9:44am on 7 July 2021, Ms Brown responded saying that the agreement “looks much more standard than the previous one”. Ms Brown noted that the initial fee was quite high, but observed that the agreement did not have many of the clauses that she was concerned about in “the other agreement” (the “other agreement” may have been a reference to the IBN loan brokerage agreement discussed at [91] above).
As pointed out earlier, it is likely that, at the same time, KS was provided the rental appraisal dated 11 June 2021 for the principal residence on the Ainslie Property (see [66] above). Also on 7 July, a real estate agent from LJ Hooker in Dickson provided a “Comparative Market Analysis” of the West Row Property, giving an appraisal price range of $1.15 million to $1.225 million.
Following receipt of this document, KS had a conversation with Ms Brown, the details of which were documented in a contemporaneous but undated file note made by Ms Brown. That file note provided: [S]he received her letter of offer from the broker and isn’t happy as it is not on the same terms as first planned, the interest rate is 15% and the fees are quite high. [S]he will send it to me to check. … [S]he again noted that the loan terms were not favourable and that it was quite expensive however I pointed out that right now her choices were to go with the finance on these terms or lose her deposit.
The reference to the rate of interest being 15% is consistent with the offer being based upon the loan terms provided by Winscourt (see [85] above) rather than the 9.5% rate contemplated in Mr Roberts’ initially-stated Option 1.
Ultimately, at 4:22pm, KS texted Mr Roberts that she had paid his “consult fee” of $2,200 and that an “Indicative Terms” document had been returned to him. Mr Roberts replied a few minutes later, saying that it had not come through.
At 4:45pm on 9 July 2021, KS emailed Mr Roberts a document entitled “Indicative Terms 9 July 2021.pdf”. She then texted him at 4:47pm, saying that she had resent the document. Mr Roberts confirmed receipt.
On 10 July 2021 (a Saturday) at 6:42pm, KS emailed Mr Roberts asking him to send through the formal approval either that night or on Sunday. KS anxiously texted Mr Roberts on Sunday, 11 July at 7:01am with the same request.
Following the making of this application, there was an email exchange between KS and Ms Lobo. KS asked Ms Lobo to fast track the assessment and advise that day whether the company could assist her or not. KS referred to an earlier discussion between them and said: “As we discussed, I will lose the large deposit plus the property if I can’t settle by this Thursday or Friday”. As a result of these communications, later that day an indicative offer was made for a loan for an initial period of nine months of up to $700,000 with an interest rate of 9.5% per annum. If KS was to proceed with this loan, she would be required to pay a $1,100 assessment fee and sign and return the letter of offer. She would also be required to pay an approval fee of 3% of the facility limit upon acceptance of the formal offer and prepay nine months’ interest.
On 13 July 2021 at 7:57am, Mr Roberts emailed KS to ask if she was still proceeding with the loan as he did not hear anything back from her the previous day. KS forwarded that email to Ms Brown (it appears that the email forwarded to Ms Brown also included Mr Roberts’ responses to KS’s questions referred to at [133] above).
At 9:30am, KS sent both the PMA offer and the Winscourt offer to Ms Brown, asking her to review them and asking her to advise whether the PMA offer was better than the Winscourt offer. As a result of this email, Ms Brown examined the offers and then had a telephone conversation with KS. Ms Brown discussed the loan offers with KS and made a file note of their conversation. Ms Brown told her that she could not give KS financial advice. The documentation provided by PMA included a “Declaration as to Purpose of Credit” which required the borrower to declare that the credit was to be applied wholly or predominantly for business purposes or investment purposes other than investment in residential property. The file note records what Ms Brown and KS said about that: discussed the purpose clause as I was worried it didn’t correspond with her reason for buying and she said she planned on using the property for her business. told her that the reason they add this clause is so she doesn’t have the protection of the consumer credit code.
There was then discussion as to the amounts that KS would need for settlement. Ms Brown advised that the loan amount would not be sufficient for the settlement. She advised KS not to sign any of the documents until the loan amount was that which she required for settlement after costs (including taxes) were taken out.
At 9:38am and 9:50am on 13 July, there was an exchange of emails between KS and Ms Lobo relating to queries about the indicative offer.
At 11:14am, a business trading as Valuations ACT emailed a quote for a valuation of the Ainslie Property for pre-mortgage purposes to KS.
At 3:59pm, KS sent an email to Ms Lobo saying she had paid the assessment fee and was happy to sign the indicative offer, but asking if she could have a revised letter of offer increasing the amount available — consistent with Ms Brown’s advice — so as to allow within the loan amount sufficient funds for the payment of fees and taxes (including PMA’s 3% approval fee) and the nine months’ prepaid interest.
At some time on 13 July 2021, KS had a phone consultation with Dr Bookallil because she had been coughing for a few days. There was further discussion of the Covid vaccination and the doctor recommended AstraZeneca so that it could be administered in the surgery with people assisting KS with her needle phobia.
On 14 July 2021 at 8:12am, Ms Lobo emailed KS, providing a revised indicative offer, offering a loan of up to $840,000 at an interest rate of 9.75% per annum. Ms Lobo indicated that, if the offer was accepted, KS needed to return the signed copy and pay the assessment fee.
Significantly, this included disclosure of the fact that KS was a disability pensioner and, as indicated in her earlier email, was provided by KS on the basis that it would be provided to the lender.
As indicated earlier, I do not accept KS’s evidence that she made complete and unqualified disclosure of her financial circumstances to Mr Taneski or the other brokers with whom she dealt. She did not attempt to hide the fact that she was a disability pensioner as this had been included in the formulation prepared by Mr Carew in March 2021 (see [34] above). However, she did not provide documentary evidence of her Centrelink income in the form of the Centrelink statement to all brokers. In particular, I find that she did not provide that document to Mr Taneski as there is no evidence of any email which attached that document or any other contemporaneous record from which an inference might be drawn that it was provided.
At 4:53pm (one minute after KS’s email), Mr Taneski emailed KS a loan approval from Prime.
In his oral evidence, Mr Taneski initially denied reading KS’s email, but later in his evidence admitted that he had read the words “Applicant received Centrelink disability pension”. It is likely that he did read this around the time it was sent to him, even though it is not clear whether he read it in the short time between KS sending it and him forwarding the loan offer from Prime to her at 4:53pm. There is no evidence that he communicated to anyone at Prime that KS was a disability pensioner.
There were calculations in the Discussion Paper designed to demonstrate that the loan was one which could be serviced by Nusage or KS. The calculations were very much of a “back of the envelope” type. They involved an assessment of gross rent based upon the rental appraisals which had been provided to him by KS (see [150] above), and Mr Taneski appears to have adopted an assumed gross rental figure of $2,000 per week. It is not clear on what this assumption was based. The calculations then involved comparing the gross annual rental with the interest payments required under the Loan Agreement (assuming no default and no increase in the interest rate). The calculations took no account of the costs that would be incurred in earning rental income such as agent’s fees, rates, land tax, repairs, maintenance and Prime’s 0.1% monthly administration fee for the loan (mentioned in the loan approval). By that means, Mr Taneski reached the conclusion that there would be a monthly surplus income in excess of $2,000 after expenses.
Because of Mr Taneski’s failure to take account of: (a) the risk that the property might not be fully rented out; (b) the risk that, if the property were rented out, that the estimated rents would not be realised; (c) any expenses incurred in relation to the property (including fees and taxes); and (d) the potential that the “Lower Rate” interest rate under the Loan Agreement (see [318]-[321] below) may increase; the calculation was inaccurate in a manner that favoured a conclusion that the loan could be serviced.
More fundamentally, because the calculations assumed that the Ainslie Property would be rented out, it was inconsistent with the proposition recorded by Mr Taneski using the Mortgage House information provided to him (see [111] above) and inserted by him into Prime’s Loan Power system that the property was to be “owner occupied”: see [185] below. It could not be both owner occupied and, at the same time, fully rented out so as to obtain income to repay the loan.
The calculation was not a reasonable one if its purpose was to accurately assess the likelihood that the loan could be serviced. If the purpose was, however, to provide a superficial justification for recommending the loan product, it did so.
At some stage on 14 July 2021, Mr Taneski generated an invoice for his “facilitation fee” (i.e., his commission) of $18,700. This was an amount that was required to be paid as a result of sections 1 and 6 of the loan approval, once accepted.
It is possible that Mr Taneski somehow derived the figure from something said during the course of a conversation with KS. It may have been a conversation in which Mr Taneski, conscious of the need not to impede the prospects of the loan proceeding, suggested what figure he might provide to Prime and KS agreed or acquiesced. Ultimately, however, it is not possible, on the evidence before the court, to reach a positive conclusion as to how the figure was arrived at, other than to say that it was not a figure independently and falsely provided by KS to Mr Taneski.
At 1:43pm, KS asked to be told when the mortgage documents were sent to her solicitor. KS also reiterated Ms Brown’s response concerning the unavailability of PEXA for ACT land titles.
At 4:29pm, KS provided scanned copies of the trust deed, a certificate of incorporation for Nusage and other Nusage company documents to Ms Brown.
This was all consistent with the requirements of the Loan Power system, which required positive answers to the following questions that were included in a checklist in the system: Spoke English clearly? Knew of this transaction? Contact card complete? Aware of monthly repayment amounts? Knows security may be sold if default? Confirms freely and willingly signing?
On the Loan Power system, there was what appears to be either a drop-down menu or a text field next to the words “Vulnerable guarantor policy applied?”, but this was blank. Mr Henderson’s evidence was that the printout of the Loan Power page relating to the purchase of the Ainslie Property available to the court was a printout from the current version of the software package so that there was a possibility that the reference to the “Vulnerable guarantor policy” was something which had been included in an upgrade of the Loan Power software after the making of the loan in question. That would mean that the blank entry relating to it would not be indicative of part of the required process having been overlooked but instead a subsequently-included requirement in the software, and hence Prime’s processes, which did not exist at the time of the Loan Agreement.
The conversation with KS was sufficient to ensure that she knew about the guarantee, and understood its basic effect and her liability if the loan was not repaid. The tone of the conversation was very much like any other call centre call, with a lot of focus on preliminaries such as name, date of birth, email address and telephone number before coming to the essential substance of the call. The essential substance of the call was delivered in the same manner as all of the preliminaries, suggesting that the answers were a mere formality rather than any matter of significance.
The settlement statement dated 21 July 2021 provided by Prime showed that, of the $850,000 loan, only $803,510.51 was available for settlement of the property. In addition to the $2,950 paid as an application fee by KS earlier, the following deductions were made from the loan amount at settlement:
Clause 6 relates to fees, a summary of which is as follows: Establishment fee: 2.2% of the Limit Variation fee: 1.1% of the Limit Loan Management Fee: 0.1% of the Limit, payable monthly Default Administration Fee: $500 (where a default occurs) Discharge Fee: Nil Termination Fee: 1.1% of the Limit (if the facility is cancelled or terminated by the Lender)
There is no reference in this clause to the Capital Reserve Fee addressed in clause 12.
Clause 7 is entitled “Representations and Warranties and Undertakings”. Clause 7.1 includes a variety of representations and warranties by the “Obligors”, defined to include both the Borrower (Nusage) and the Guarantor (KS). One representation and warranty is that “all information provided by or on behalf of each and any Obligor to the Lender (including, without limitation, information in any financial statements) is true, complete and accurate and not misleading in any respect (including by omission)”. Clause 7.2 makes it clear that “The obligations of the Lender to each Obligor are limited to those which are expressly set out in this deed and any Security.” There are significant obligations upon each Obligor to give notice of certain things to the Lender.
Clause 8 outlines “Events of Default” which, unsurprisingly, include failure to pay or repay any monies when payable under the Loan Agreement. Clause 9 relates to “Rights on default”.
Clause 10 requires both Nusage and KS to grant a security interest — as defined in the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) — in the terms set out in Part 5 of the Loan Agreement. Similarly, clause 11, entitled “Real Property Mortgage”, contains provisions relating to the mortgage required to be signed by Nusage.
Clause 12 is innocuously headed “Administrative provisions”. As its title suggests, it includes a variety of administrative provisions. It includes a provision by which both the Borrower and Guarantor indemnify the Lender against a variety of costs, charges expenses and fees, including the Lender’s “reasonable internal administration costs” and its legal costs. Clause 12.10 is headed “Capital Reserve”. This requires the Borrower to pay the Lender the “Capital Reserve Fee on or before the earlier of the Initial Advance Drawdown Date and the first Advance Date”. The definitions of these terms mean that the payment had to be made on or before either the date of the first advance of money or 10 September 2021, whichever was earlier. In the present case, the earlier date was 21 July 2021, the date of the first advance of money. The Capital Reserve Fee was defined as 3% of the Limit. The clause continued: If no Event of Default has occurred at any time prior to the Termination Date and all other monies are paid on the Termination Date the Lender will provide a rebate to the Borrower of the Capital Reserve Fee or may waive the requirement for payment of the fee.
The fee ($25,500) was not in fact paid prior to the initial drawdown on 21 July 2021 as required by clause 12.10 as it was not demanded by Prime. However, no waiver of the obligation occurred as any such waiver would have needed to be in writing: clause 12.5. (The fee was subsequently charged to the loan account on 30 March 2023 when the agreement was terminated.)
Clause 12.21 is an apparently innocuous and technical provision. It was in the following terms, the terms of significance in the present circumstances being italicised: 12.21 Reserve requirements If at any time the Lender determines that there has occurred or may occur any introduction of or variation to any capital adequacy requirement, reserve requirement, official directive, statutory reserve deposit, special deposit, or any other imposition, restriction, or requirement in respect of assets held by, deposits in or for the account of, or loans by or liabilities (whether direct or contingent) of the Lender, its parent, or any Related Body Corporate of, or successor in title to, the Lender, whether or not having the force of law, or there is a substantial change in the operation of the relevant financial market in which the Lender funds itself, the result of any of which in the Lender’s reasonable opinion makes it illegal, undesirable, or impractical for the Lender to make or continue the Facility, or there is any increase in costs to the Lender, in the BBSW or decrease in the effective return of the Lender (and the Lender opinion will be final in relation to all these matters) then: (a) in cases other than solely increased cost or decreased effective return, the Lender by written notice to the Borrower may terminate the Facility and require repayment of the Secured Money in full on or before the expiration of 30 days from the date of the notice; (b) in the case of increased cost or decreased effective return, the Lender may notify the Borrower in writing, in which case the Borrower may elect to repay the Secured Money in full within 30 days from the date of the notice (which election once made will be irrevocable and binding on the Borrower); and (c) in any case notwithstanding any other term of this deed the amount of any cost, expense, or decrease in effective return suffered or incurred by the Lender because of any of these matters, and, if repayment occurs, any expense, loss, damage, or liability which the Lender may incur as a consequence of prepayment, must be paid to the Lender by the Borrower and the Relevant Interest Rate is increased by the increased cost, increased BBSW or reduction in effective return.
Clause 13 is headed “Power Of Attorney”. It relevantly provides: “The Obligors … each irrevocably appoint the Lender and each Authorised Officer of the Lender … to be their attorney” for particular purposes and allows that attorney to delegate that power.
Clause 14 is headed “Guarantee and Indemnity”. Its most relevant terms are set out at [469] below.
Clause 15 relates to confidentiality. Clause 16 addresses anti-money laundering and sanctions laws. Clause 17 provides definitions and rules relating to interpretation.
Part 5 of the Loan Agreement provides the terms of the “General Security Deed” over “Circulating Assets” and “Other Property” as defined.
Part 6 provides the terms of the real property mortgage, securing the obligations to the Lender.
The text of the Loan Agreement comprises a total of 85 pages.
On 6 October 2021, KS emailed Prime indicating that she wished to pay down the principal immediately and complaining about having to wait to be provided instructions from Prime as to how the principal could be paid down. She said in her email that she had intended, and was ready, to pay down the principal “immediately” after the first month. On 8 October 2021, somebody from the accounts team at Prime spoke to KS and followed up by email indicating how a payment of $70,000 or $80,000 would affect the required monthly repayments.
On 12 October 2021, KS had a phone consultation with Dr Bookallil in relation to incontinence and hay fever.
On 29 October 2021, a telephone call occurred between KS and somebody from the Prime accounts team about the possibility of paying down the principal.
On 24 November 2021, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. The issues dealt with suggest a decline in her mental health. She was staying in someone else’s house. She had trouble sleeping at night and was experiencing some paranoia. She sometimes missed her medication. She had been caught shoplifting food again, was arrested and was kept in the watchhouse overnight. Her diet was poor.
On 1 December 2021, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. Amongst the issues dealt with, the doctor recorded that KS had restarted olanzapine, but her obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) was exacerbated.
On 19 January 2022, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. At that stage, she was “very very anxious”, not sleeping and had a court case coming up in two days’ time. She remained very anxious about Covid.
KS had consultations with Dr Bookallil by telephone on 2 February 2022 and face-to-face on 17 February 2022. These addressed KS’s physical conditions.
On 2 March 2022, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. Dr Bookallil was concerned that KS had run out of medication, although KS denied that. The doctor was worried about KS’s mental health. KS declined depot injections of her antipsychotic medication. The consultation also involved other physical issues.
On 7 March 2022, the ACT Revenue Office sent Nusage a letter of demand for conveyance duty in the sum of $82,167.42. The notice stated that an 8.04% interest rate “is now being charged daily”.
KS saw Dr Bookallil again on 16 March 2022 for symptoms of angina. She had another consultation on 19 April 2022. In addition to angina, she told the doctor that the police were calling her about an issue from years ago and that she “owes money to people + bank, can’t service loan”.
She had further telephone consultations with Dr Bookallil on 9 and 26 May 2022. In the latter consultation, the doctor recorded that KS’s mental health was “not great”. The interaction appears to have involved KS being very difficult and demanding in relation to a letter provided by Dr Bookallil for court purposes. Her physical complaint was of chest pain, headaches and panic attacks.
On 3 August 2022, KS spoke to the solicitor acting for Prime and said that she had applied for waiver or review of the interest on the conveyancing duty and that she was negotiating payment plans in relation to rates and land tax.
On 4 August 2022, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. They discussed issues of incontinence, panic attacks and the fact that CatholicCare (which ran the Next Step program) had declined further counselling because they said City Mental Health was a better fit for her condition.
On 23 August 2022, the solicitor acting for Prime emailed KS, seeking an update in relation to payment of the amounts that had been discussed in his conversation with KS on 3 August 2022.
On 9 September 2022, the solicitors acting for Prime sent Prime a bill for the work done to date in relation to Nusage’s default in the sum of $2,747.68. Although the loan account was otherwise paid up-to-date, the amount of the legal fees was added pursuant to clause 12.2 of the Loan Agreement, and this amount was required to be paid if the loan was not to be in default. KS made a request for an extension to pay the outstanding legal fees and was granted a four-week extension. In response to a request for assistance with her monthly loan payments, she was told that she would need to provide: 1. Any proof that shows that your business has been impacted by some unforeseen circumstances 2. 3 month Income Statement 3. Any other documents that would help support your case in the attached Hardship list
There is no evidence that she provided any such material. Obviously, she was not able to provide anything relating to her business because there was never, in any relevant sense, any such business.
On 15 September 2022, KS had a consultation with Dr Bookallil. They discussed a variety of issues consistent with poor self-management and sleep, mental health difficulties and a fall down stairs that had occurred which involved her losing four teeth. Dr Bookallil sent a referral letter to a government dental clinic. KS saw Dr Bookallil again on 29 September 2022 about a range of physical issues.
On 12 April 2023, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. The notes taken by the doctor indicate that KS’s mental health was poor and her anxiety was deteriorating. The notes include: her [account] was hacked into and money was removed had ‘nervous breakdown’ - stopped eating, sleep all over the place slept 6-10pm, then awake until 3am and slept for 2 hours not thinking straight falling asleep on bus or sitting in public place cut off from phone as hadn’t topped up missed that it was Easter weekend - was surprised has lost structure to day
On 21 July 2023, Westpac, the first mortgagee of the West Row Property, repossessed that property.
In July 2023, a psychiatrist, Dr Angus Finlay, wrote a letter in support of an NDIS application which recorded that KS was “expected to continue to have a severe and enduring psychosocial disability that will substantially impact her ability to function across several domains”. Dr Finlay also wrote a joint letter with Mr Jack Hardy, a registered nurse, in support of KS’s application to the NDIS.
On 11 September 2023, Mr Hardy completed a form for the purposes of an NDIS application describing in some detail the consequences of KS’s schizophrenia upon her everyday functioning. The pervasive nature of the disabilities are described as including: Ms [KS] experiences positive symptoms of schizophrenia including severe paranoia and visual and auditory hallucinations that impede her capacity to trust people, feel safe in many environments, build rapport, read social cues and therefore respond and initiate conversation. This makes gaining employment, maintaining relationships and engaging in further education very difficult. Her lack of capacity to socially interact causes her to isolate making essential tasks such as attending appointments very difficult. When she does manage to engage, [KS] experiences extreme frustration when attempting to interact with people, often engendering verbal aggression and behavioural disturbances. Negative symptoms of her mental illness have reduced her motivation and her ability to find pleasure in activities, again driving [KS] to isolate and reducing her ability to interact within the community. … [KS]’s mental illness impacts her everyday life. Her delusions, impulsivity and extreme paranoia negatively impact her capacity to make sound decisions and judgements, problem solve, maintain her tenancy and manage finances. She has considerable debt and is currently couch surfing. Making decisions in general and specifically every-day decisions, planning meals, making shopping lists, shopping itself and accessing information about and connecting to public transport is extremely problematic for [KS]. This is due to [KS]’s fluctuating moods and an inability to respond functionally to early declines in her mental health and seek support she may need. Her inability to maintain a tidy, clean environment due to her inability to retain focus, trying to manage a surplus of competing priorities and issues managing her time effectively has thwarted her wish to retain many tenancy/accommodation arrangements.
On 15 September 2023, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. KS told the doctor that her house had been repossessed in July, that she “had [a] nervous breakdown - couldn’t go out” and that she was couch surfing. The doctor found her to be quite agitated. KS reported that she was taking her medication, but the doctor recorded that KS’s prescriptions were “overdue - about 6 months”.
On 27 September 2023, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil, complaining of hand pain, dizziness and incontinence.
On 29 November 2023, KS was given notice by the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) of its approval of her NDIS plan. This included an annual budget of $94,824.84. This was in addition to her disability support pension which, as at January 2024, paid her $1,002.50 per fortnight.
On 11 December 2023, KS had a face-to-face consultation with Dr Bookallil. She told Dr Bookallil about the approval for access to the NDIS. She presented with bilateral oedema in her legs. Dr Bookallil recorded that KS “had a meltdown when waiting for [an] oral surgeon” and the advice that she received was to have all of her teeth removed and get dentures. Relevant to the present case, the doctor recorded: wanting me to write letter for court as has place but is not paying back loan - being fussy about what I include -plan – [KS] write email to me explain what to include/exclude
On 20 December 2023, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. This included discussion of blood test results and a variety of other issues.
On 22 February 2024, KS had a telephone consultation with Dr Bookallil. This addressed ongoing abdominal difficulties and her diet. KS reported that she was depressed and claimed to be taking both olanzapine and fluoxetine.
By March 2024, KS’s recent hoarding behaviour had resulted in the Ainslie Property, where she was living, being filled with property to a point where it was practically unusable. Photographs which were tendered show living spaces, a stairway and the shower piled high with boxes, bags and books, as well as a kitchen piled high with materials so that there was no usable floor space.
On 1 May 2024, Dr Bookallil wrote a letter for the purposes of Magistrates Court proceedings. The medical records from Dr Bookallil which were tendered did not extend past that day.
Although by 2024 there was in place a policy relating to vulnerable guarantors, as at 2021 there was no such policy. Mr Henderson’s evidence was, “it was really at the call of - of the owner of the company as to what - what was deemed that. I don’t believe we had a written policy at the time, but it was a judgment call”. The owner of Prime was Mr Scanlon, whose ultimate approval was required before each loan was settled.
KS reported to Dr Nielssen that she lived on her disability support pension and that she had performed some part-time work looking after pets, usually without payment. As part of her history, she reported ongoing hallucination of voices. Although Dr Neilssen recorded in some detail KS’s answers to questions that he asked, the doctor recorded that he was not able to elicit a detailed personal history in the time allowed because KS “was so digressive in her responses and vague about dates and other details”. He recorded a variety of prior diagnoses by other doctors including delusional disorder, chronic major depression, OCD, and schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder.
Dr Nielssen diagnosed three conditions: (a) probable psychotic illness; (b) depression; and (c) anxiety disorder (OCD).
The reasons for each of these diagnoses were explained. Dr Nielssen expressed the opinion that KS was unfit to plead in accordance with the criteria set down in s 311 of the Crimes Act. That was because she would be incapable of entering a reliable plea, would be unable to follow the course of the proceedings and would be unable to provide reliable instructions to her lawyer.
Although her condition was treatable, Dr Nielssen was not able to obtain sufficient information about her regime of psychotropic medication to ascertain whether she was receiving adequate treatment for her condition. Although he was unable to establish a clear link between symptoms of her disorder and her offending behaviour, he considered that “the more bizarre aspects of her repeated offending suggests that her behaviour is at least partly due to ritualistic acquisition and hoarding associated with her mental illness”. Dr Stephen Allnutt, forensic psychiatrist (10 April 2014)
On 10 April 2014, Dr Allnutt prepared a report because KS had been charged with multiple counts of unlawful possession of stolen goods and minor theft. These offences occurred between April 2012 and September 2013. Dr Allnutt assessed whether KS was fit to stand trial. Dr Allnutt was provided with a variety of reports dated from 2002 to 2013. He interviewed KS multiple times.
Like Dr Nielssen, Dr Allnutt reported that KS presented as anxious and moved off topic easily. He recorded that obtaining a history was difficult and required frequent interruptions in order to get KS to stay on topic. KS described hearing voices which sometimes came through the door or through the television. She had visions of people who would follow her around. She described obsessive activities like checking the windows 40 or 50 times a day and repetitive cleaning because she was concerned about contamination.
She had great difficulty giving a personal history. She was born in China but could not recall when she came to Australia. She recorded having problems at school and being bullied. She said she had been badly abused but was stressed talking about it. Her work history was a “blur”. She could not recall the details but said she had generally worked for the government. She could not say how long she had been married.
Dr Allnutt interviewed her again in person and observed that her presentation was “markedly different”. He said she was calmer and less likely to go off topic, but she remained anxious. She described experiencing panic attacks almost every day. She continued to describe hearing voices and persecutory thoughts. She described periods of racing thoughts and an inability to sit still when her energy level would increase. She would “have multiple ideas, wanting to help people, to go to Africa and set up an NGO for homeless children”.
Dr Allnutt spoke with a worker at ACT Mental Health, as well as a doctor who had previously assessed KS. He also conducted a review of documentation from 2002 up until Dr Nielssen’s September 2013 report.
Dr Allnutt expressed the view that “Diagnosis in this case is difficult”. Having considered individually the various conditions which the evidence disclosed, he summarised the position as follows: Overall she presents as a highly disturbed individual manifesting depression that fluctuates, anxiety symptoms, obsessional and compulsive behaviour (with associated hoarding) along with a serious personality disorder. Diagnosis would include recurrent depressive disorder, OCD, hoarding disorder, panic disorder and borderline personality disorder. I am less certain [of] a diagnosis of psychosis, however notably there have been ongoing concerns raised by a variety of clinicians that she has in the past experienced psychotic symptoms; my impression is that these relate to her anxiety, obsessionality and personality, and that they are pseudo-psychotic. I do not believe she is currently psychotic.
When assessing her fitness to stand trial, he recorded that she was an intelligent woman. He expressed the view that his main concern was that “she variably becomes disengaged, distracted or avoidant due to her anxiety and this raises concern about her capacity to give evidence herself, and follow proceedings adequately so as to instruct counsel during a trial”.
Notwithstanding his suggestion that provision should be made for frequent breaks, short hearing times and a support person, he concluded: In my view she is a severely emotionally disturbed woman. I would regard her capacity as fluctuating, influenced by circumstances, and marginal; but overall she would best be dealt with as unfit to stand trial on balance of probabilities. Dr Ben Smith, psychiatrist, and Ms Michelle Champagne, social worker (1 September 2015)
On 26 March 2015, a psychiatric treatment order was made for a period of six months in respect of KS.
On 1 September 2015, Dr Smith (a psychiatrist) prepared a report with Ms Champagne (a social worker) for the purposes of the review of that order. The report recorded that, in November 2014, KS had been hospitalised for a week as a result of her behaviour. It recorded that she was charged with stealing in March 2015 but the criminal charges did not proceed. The report recorded that she had been reviewed by a different psychiatrist to whom she reported hearing voices. It recorded that she recognised the need to take medication voluntarily. It was in that context that Dr Smith expressed the following opinion: [KS] has multiple diagnoses including paranoid schizophrenia, obsessive compulsive disorder, hoarding, dependent personality disorder, borderline type and kleptomania. She is actively engaged in counselling and in group therapy to help her manage her hoarding behaviour. [KS] also demonstrates insight into the need to continue to adhere to oral medication. WMHS feels a PTO will not improve recovery for [KS] at this time and recommends [KS] is not subjected to a further Psychiatric Treatment Order. Ms Anna Weatherly, psychologist (14 November 2016)
On 14 November 2016, Ms Weatherly, a psychologist at the Women’s Health Service, provided a report “To Whom It May Concern”, which appears to have been prepared for the purposes of some court proceedings. It recorded that KS had been a client of the Women’s Health Counselling service since October 2014. It recorded that Ms Weatherly has observed symptoms consistent with a history of severe developmental trauma, major depression, OCD and hoarding disorder. She recorded that KS experienced severe anxiety symptoms and reported dissociative symptoms which Ms Weatherly had observed. She concluded: In relation to anticipated criminal justice processes, I am concerned about KS’s capacity to function effectively. Due to her history of trauma, KS is likely to experience severe symptoms of hyper-arousal and/or dissociation. Under these circumstances her perception of people’s intentions becomes distorted. She has extreme difficulties with trust and her ‘fight/flight’ system is activated. Under this level of stress, she is unlikely to take in and comprehend important information, or think clearly enough to make a rational decision. Next Step counselling (2020)
KS received counselling from the Next Step program between March 2020 and September 2020. She was discharged from the program as a result of cancelling three consecutive appointments. The notes from KS’s counselling sessions give an impression of the pervasive mental health difficulties that KS had at the time.
The goals of the counselling were very limited, such as trying to get KS to make sure that she eats instead of going days without food and that she takes walks to improve her mood. Basic things such as going to sleep in a bed rather than in a chair appear to have been difficult to achieve. The notes record consistent unsuccessful attempts by KS at decluttering. They record very anxious behaviour resulting in angry responses, making it difficult to interact with services like the Next Step program. They record difficulties with incontinence, an inability to get to or participate in appointments on time, and adverse interactions with police arising from shoplifting. They describe fundamental difficulties with basic planning and KS spiralling into rumination and negative thoughts about herself. They record difficulties with filling out paperwork. They also record disabling anxiety about an upcoming court case in New South Wales relating to shoplifting which led her to be unable to focus on her mental health generally.
KS was discharged from the counselling service in September 2020. The reason given was that she had failed to attend appointments. However, it is also clear that the counsellor considered that KS needed assistance from a psychologist rather than a counselling service.
Interestingly, although there was reference to financial difficulties, there was no record of any specific issue in relation to the ACT Revenue Office or Prime. KS was reluctant to disclose her living arrangements except for the fact that she was not paying rent.
Ms Morris, a forensic psychologist, conducted a documentary review and answered questions posed by the solicitors for the defendant. In addition to the reports referred to above, Ms Morris’ report discussed a July 2023 report relating to an application to the NDIA and records from KS’s GP. These records disclose that KS had been banned from various courses and institutions due to her behaviour and either referred on or denied service by multiple psychologists and specialists due to her behaviour.
Ms Morris reviewed the documentation which she had been provided, including documents relating to financial dealings, which Ms Morris described as demonstrating “intact executive functioning”. Ms Morris’ conclusion was that, in relation to the purchase of the Ainslie Property, “There is no indication in any of the exhibits of KS’s affidavit that her communication, understanding or engagement with the process of purchasing the Ainslie property wavered at any time.”
So far as diagnoses are concerned, Ms Morris raised, for the first time, that “there is a very strong likelihood that KS would meet criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder”. Ms Morris said that this would explain many of KS’s challenges and the fact that those difficulties do not respond to medication. So far as the period associated with the taking out of the loan was concerned, Ms Morris said: 3.8 There is no indication in the provided documentation that [KS] was dysregulated or in a state of deteriorated psychological health. She has completed paperwork on time and coordinated multiple documents in what was a stressful time. Her communication was extremely polite, and she has clearly endeavoured to build respectful and helpful relationships across organisations. [KS]'s presentation during the recorded telephone call demonstrated no indications that are associated with psychological deterioration. 3.9 Thus, while [KS] would have still met criteria for complex Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and possibly Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder at the Relevant Time, neither condition appears to have been at a disabling level. Her level of activity indicates that [KS] was not in a depressive episode, assuming that Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent and not Persistent Depressive Disorder is the correct diagnosis. There is evidence that she experienced some stress at the time, however it was not sufficiently severe to interrupt her functioning and was consistent with the circumstances.
Ms Morris noted that, in May 2021, KS suddenly ceased her antipsychotic and antidepressant medication without titrating down. In relation to the Relevant Time (defined for the purposes of her report as the period when KS organised the loan with Prime, namely 14 to 19 July 2021), Ms Morris concluded that it was “extremely difficult to draw any conclusions about her functioning” in the absence of contemporaneous notes.
Ms Morris did indicate that there was nothing in the correspondence or behaviour of KS that would have alerted those dealing with her to the disorders: There is no indication of thought disorder in the correspondence provided. … While there is some evidence of [KS] being under some pressure due to the timelines she was facing, she remains polite and professional in her correspondence. The correspondence shows no indication of poor mental health that could be identified by a professional, much less a lay person. Conclusions as to the medical evidence
The doctors and psychologists who have examined KS have determined that her mental functioning can be described by reference to a variety of diagnostic labels. There has been general agreement that she suffers from an anxiety disorder, PTSD and OCD. There is also agreement that she suffers from a psychotic disorder, most commonly described as schizophrenia. Her schizophrenia has mainly negative symptoms rather than positive ones. Her history of theft was suggested to satisfy the definition of kleptomania, associated either with delusions or dissociation. Whether or not it satisfies the definition in the DSM-5, her history of theft is a product of her mental health conditions.
In the period leading up to entry into the Loan Agreement, KS was prescribed an antidepressant and an antipsychotic. However, her compliance with her medication regime was variable. Her conditions led her to not eat properly and to be anxious, and that anxiety manifested itself in difficulties dealing with people. She had difficulties with basic planning and tended to ruminate and panic. She had a variety of physical conditions as well. She was recorded as being highly anxious and distrustful of people, panicked, chaotic and overwhelmed. The negative symptoms of schizophrenia manifested themselves in difficulties organising and planning activities of daily living, including her failure to eat or sleep properly. Her hoarding behaviour continued over the whole of the period. Notwithstanding all of this, she remained an intelligent person.
I accept Dr Lim’s summary of her mental health conditions as “chronic, severe and profoundly disabling” and that they have “compromised all aspects of her functioning including her personal care, social relationships and vocational capacity”.
It is not possible to reach any conclusion as to Ms Morris’ suggested diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder in circumstances where none of the several doctors who examined KS over the 10-year period prior to the Loan Agreement identified that as a possible diagnosis and Ms Morris only conducted a documentary review.
While many of KS’s communications have a frantic or panicked tone, it is possible to accept Ms Morris’ assessment of the documentary material that there is nothing in the written communications which would indicate that KS was suffering from disabling mental health conditions.
The important point to note about the impact of KS’s mental health conditions upon her behaviour and cognition is that the picture is a more complicated one than simply identifying whether, at the relevant times, she was suffering from delusions or disabling depression. The range of different diagnoses is reflective of a variety of different impairments of her thinking and cognition. The fact that she was able to focus upon securing a loan and do so in a manner which involved pursuing multiple lines of enquiry with a degree of sophistication does not demonstrate that her functioning was not impaired at a more general level. That is illustrated by her approach to housing and real property over the period up to, including, and beyond the entry into the Loan Agreement.
That initially took the form of arranging relevant documentation such as her identification documents (see [70] above) and proof of her income from Centrelink (see [71] above). She then took steps to contact IBN and, following that, a number of other potential lenders, in order to obtain finance.
The evidence indicates that KS approached the exercise in a logical but unsophisticated manner and considered the merits of the respective offers that she obtained as best she could. She also demonstrated a capacity to pursue multiple finance enquiries at once and to keep those options in play for as long as necessary in order for her to come to a final decision (notwithstanding that her lawyer consistently impressed upon her the urgent need to secure finance first so as to not lose her deposit and then look to refinance later).
The evidence displays a capacity to function that tended to mask her various mental health conditions and their consequences. I accept her oral evidence that she was able to intensely focus upon solving the finance problem.
However, the intense focus on solving the problem and her capacity to pursue that focus effectively does not indicate that her underlying mental health conditions had temporarily resolved or receded. To reach that conclusion would be to adopt a too-simplistic approach based upon the proposition that her mental health conditions were either “on” or “off”. The evidence is consistent with a more complicated picture which involves her anxiety and disordered thinking continuing to operate while at the same time she was able to focus upon solving her immediate and urgent problem in a manner that obscured her underlying conditions.
In the period from 23 June 2021 to 19 July 2021, KS dealt with those multiple finance options largely by email or text message. None of the brokers ever met her. Because of her intelligence and good manners, she was able to effectively respond to the brokers who were motivated by the potential for financial reward to assist her. She would have appeared to the brokers as being anxious, but that would not be unusual for a person in a position where finance was urgent and the loss of a substantial deposit was imminent. This meant that, so far as those brokers were concerned, there was the potential that they would have had no appreciation of the disordered thinking that underlay the circumstances in which KS found herself. Nor would they necessarily have appreciated the disordered thinking that underlay her decision to proceed to enter any loan agreement.
KS was also intelligent enough to recognise that her only prospect of obtaining finance was to pursue the same strategy that had been outlined to her by Mr Carew. It is for that reason that she continued to deploy the fictional or exaggerated explanation of her financial position and intentions. She justified this in her own mind, as she did in her oral evidence, by saying that there was at least some truth in each of the statements made and that, so far as statements about her future intentions were concerned, they were ideas which she either hoped to pursue or would, at least, contemplate. I accept her evidence that she had no significant understanding of the reason for the interposition of a company as the vehicle for the acquisition or the use of a trust. Those features were, however, already baked in to her circumstances as a result of the advice received from Mr Carew immediately prior to entry into the Ainslie Property contract of sale on 5 March 2021, which meant that it was Nusage acting as trustee that was the buyer.
It may have been open to the plaintiffs to prove (albeit as a more complicated case) that the overall structure of this aspect of Prime’s business made the failure of loans more profitable for Prime and hence provided Prime an incentive to enter into loans that would result in defaults. That would have been a factor significantly supporting the existence of a course of unconscionable conduct. However, the evidence in this case did not extend that far. There was no expert analysis of the structure of the loan either on its own or compared to other loan products on the market that would demonstrate that a profit incentive lay with the loan falling into default. Nor was there any consequential analysis of the overall structure of this aspect of Prime’s business. The evidence concerning court proceedings brought by Prime or a subsidiary in Victoria and Queensland was not sufficient to allow any finding to be made about Prime’s state of knowledge about this aspect of its system of lending.
The artificial interposition of a corporate entity would be an obvious indicator to those familiar with the making of loans following the enactment of the Code that the transaction was structured to avoid the Code’s requirements. The circumstances in the present case mean that Prime was at least reckless in the sense of being aware of a substantial risk that the loan application was structured in that way for the purpose of avoiding the operation of the Code.
The plaintiffs submitted that KS is a “guarantor” in name only as it would be inconsistent with the rights and duties otherwise set out in the Loan Agreement for her not to be a principal debtor. Relying upon what was said by Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1; 275 CLR 165 at [58], [63] — which made clear that courts need not accept a label given by parties to a relationship which is “inconsistent with the rights and duties otherwise set forth” — the plaintiffs submitted that the label of “guarantor” given to KS in the agreement was not determinative.
The plaintiffs submitted that the proper construction of the Loan Agreement is one where KS is, in truth, a debtor with primary liability for the purposes of the Code.
The inclusion of a clause similar to the first sentence of clause 14.5 is not uncommon in a guarantee. In Heald v O’Connor [1971] 1 WLR 497, Fisher J was dealing with a case in which it was in the plaintiff’s interest to characterise a guarantee as, instead, an indemnity. His Honour said: In the present case, the instrument was given pursuant to clause 7 of the agreement which calls for a personal guarantee. The word “guarantee” is used in it time and again. The obligation is to pay the principal moneys to become due under the debenture if and whenever the company makes default. The statement of claim refers to it as a guarantee and pleads the company’s default and the consequent liability of the guarantor. The only straw for the plaintiff to clutch is the phrase “as a primary obligor and not merely as a surety” but that, in my judgment, is merely part of the common form of provision to avoid the consequences of giving time or indulgence to the principal debtor and cannot convert what is in reality a guarantee into an indemnity.
The decision in Heald has been accepted in both the UK and Australia: CIMC Raffles Offshore (Singapore) Ltd v Schahin Holding SA [2013] EWCA Civ 644; 2 All ER (Comm) 760 at [57]; Lee v ATL (Australia) Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 327 at [97].
The drafting of clause 14 is not without its faults. The confusing use of the capitalised but undefined verb “Guarantees and Indemnifies” in clause 14.1 (as distinct from the noun defined in clause 17.1) is one example.
So far as the contention that clause 14.5 has only the limited operation described in Heald is concerned, two points can be made: (a) The clause in the present case makes specific reference to liability as a “principal debtor” as distinct from the expression used in Heald (“primary obligor”). (b) The purpose said to be fulfilled by such a clause in Heald, namely avoiding the consequences of giving time or indulgence to the principal debtor, is specifically addressed by clause 14.6(a).
Neither the guarantee nor the indemnity given in the balance of clause 14 involve KS becoming a debtor at the point at which the contract is entered into. The guarantee is a secondary liability to the creditor for the default of the debtor who remains primarily liable to the creditor. The indemnity is a primary liability, being a contract to keep the creditor harmless against loss and is not dependent upon the continuing liability of the principal debtor. The obligation does not arise from the debt of another: Canty v PaperlinX Australia Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 309; 9 BFRA 524 at [37]-[40] (Gleeson JA, Barrett and Emmett JJA agreeing); Clipper Maritime Ltd v Shirlstar Container Transport Ltd [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 546 at 555 (Staughton J).
Therefore, the statement that KS, as an Obligor, is to become a “principal debtor” is of significance. Having regard to the other provisions of the contract, it is not out of character to give the clause a substantive effect. The other provisions of the contract reflect the fact that the Loan Agreement is very heavily favoured towards protecting every conceivable interest of the Lender and contains every conceivable clause that might achieve that goal.
However, the first sentence of clause 14.5 operates only upon “the liability of each Obligor under this deed”. It is therefore necessary to look elsewhere for what those obligations are.
The provision relating to drawdown of the loan (clause 3) operates between Lender and Borrower. The obligation to make repayment in clause 4 is one binding upon the Borrower, as is the payment of interest in clause 5 and fees in clause 6. Clause 7 relates to representations and warranties made by the Obligors collectively. Clause 7.2 limits the obligations of the Lender and each Obligor to those which are expressly set out in the Loan Agreement or any security identified in item 10 of Part 1 of the Loan Agreement. Clause 7.3, which relates to the general undertakings of each Obligor, does not impose any liability for debt upon a Guarantor. In clause 8, which defines “Events of Default”, non-payment of amounts payable under the deed by an Obligor is an Event of Default but is confined to payment of “any monies payable by it”, allowing a distinction to be drawn between the obligations of the Borrower and that of the Guarantor. Clause 9 relates to rights upon default. Clauses 9 and 10 both relate to the General Security Deed and Real Property Mortgage. Clause 12 contains a wide variety of significant provisions, but these do not make the Guarantor liable in the same way as the Borrower. Clause 13 grants to the Lender a power of attorney. Clauses 15 and 16 are not presently relevant. Clause 17 contains definitions.
Overall, these provisions do not indicate that the “liability of [the Guarantor] under this deed” is based upon the existence of a deferred debt owed by it. It is therefore difficult to give the effect for which the plaintiffs contend to the statement that any such liability is that of a “principal debtor and not merely a surety”. It can, however, be read as creating a relationship of “principal debtor” upon the Borrower defaulting on its obligations so as to have the effect described in Heald.
Having regard to the other provisions of the Loan Agreement which maintain the distinction between the positions of Borrower and Guarantor, I do not consider that it is possible to read the first sentence of clause 14.5 as altering the status of the Guarantor so as to make her, ab initio, a principal debtor. Although, unlike in Heald, it is clear that the Guarantor is giving both a guarantee and an indemnity, I do not consider that the language used is sufficient to give KS the same obligations as the Borrower, notwithstanding the use of the words “principal debtor”. To allow those words to have that effect would completely undermine the distinction between Borrower and Guarantor that is elsewhere maintained in the Loan Agreement. The consequences of such a declaration as to the status of the Guarantor may be debatable (see, eg, Lee at [99]) and at least some of the effects may be achieved, in any event, by the specific provisions favouring the Lender in clause 14.6. However, those factors are not sufficient to warrant giving to the sentence the more dramatic meaning contended for by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, KS is not a “debtor” for the purposes of the Code.
In this case, most information given to Prime prior to entry into the Loan Agreement was provided by Mr Taneski. Unlike the position of Mr Jeruzalski in Stubbings, Mr Taneski was not the agent of Prime. He had a substantial relationship with Prime, being a broker who wrote a lot of business for Prime. He had an ongoing business relationship with Mr Henderson. Amongst the thousands of brokers who referred business to Prime, he was given direct access during this period to the Loan Power system that allowed him to enter information directly into that system in order to make the loan approval process easier and faster. Mr Taneski had strong incentives to arrange for his clients to enter loan agreements with Prime because he received very substantial payments when they did so. In the case of KS, he earned $18,700 for what amounted to no more than a few hours’ work. However, the prima facie position is that the broker is the agent of the borrower, not the lender: Con-Stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 226 at 234-5; see also Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd [1999] SASC 265; 75 SASR 1 at [632]. Notwithstanding that Mr Taneski’s interests were more aligned with those of Prime than those of KS, that is not sufficient to alter the legal character of the relationship. In any event, the plaintiffs did not directly submit that Mr Taneski was the agent of Prime as distinct from the plaintiffs’ agent.
I have found earlier that KS did not make the detailed disclosures to Mr Taneski of the severe and chronic nature of her mental health conditions. However, I have found that she did provide to Mr Taneski the email on 14 July 2021 which made reference to the fact that she was a disability pensioner: see [153] above. I have also found that it is likely that Mr Taneski read and understood that email: see [155]-[157] above. Were the Amadio test for knowledge to apply to Mr Taneski, rather than Prime itself, this would be sufficient to constitute, at least, awareness of facts that would raise the possibility of the existence of a situation of special disadvantage. However, given Mr Taneski’s knowledge cannot be imputed to Prime as he was not Prime’s agent, the focus must be upon Prime’s knowledge.
The system adopted by Prime was to have no direct dealings with the plaintiffs but instead to deal only through the broker. The information about the plaintiffs was only that provided by Mr Taneski. That information was limited and focused upon those aspects of the transaction relevant to the protection of Prime’s position rather than the suitability of the loan for Nusage or KS. Parts of that information were also either fictitious or exaggerations of the truth (for example, the figure of $150,000 recorded as KS’s income: see [199]-[205] above).
The matters of which Prime had knowledge are set out at [447] above. There can be no doubt that Prime had a clear appreciation that the plaintiffs were under very significant pressure to obtain finance so as to avoid termination of the contract for the purchase of the Ainslie Property. Prime therefore had a very clear appreciation that, notwithstanding that its loan product contained many terms that were unfavourable to the borrower and that it stood to profit in the event of a default by the borrower so long as its security was sufficient, Nusage and KS may nevertheless have been willing to enter into such an agreement. Financial pressure of itself is not a special disadvantage, and the existence of such pressure of itself is not a disabling condition or circumstance which seriously affects a borrower or guarantor’s ability to assess their own best interests.
In the absence of knowledge of KS’s psychiatric disabilities, although Prime had knowledge of the features of its own loan product that would make it dangerous for most persons to enter into such a contract, it did not have sufficient knowledge of a condition or circumstance which seriously affected KS’s ability to make a judgment as to her own best interests to make the enforcement of its legal rights unconscientious.
As Prime did not have knowledge of KS’s special disadvantage, its conduct was not unconscionable in equity.
While the court must consider these factors to the extent that they apply, they non-exhaustively provide examples of norms and values that are relevant to and inform the content of the term “unconscionable” in s 12CB: Productivity Partners Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2024] HCA 27; 281 CLR 338 at [100]. Those norms and values include “certainty in commercial transactions, honesty, the absence of trickery or sharp practice, fairness when dealing with customers, the faithful performance of bargains and promises freely made’ and the protection of the vulnerable”: Productivity Partners at [100], quoting Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt [2019] HCA 18; 267 CLR 1 at [14]. The statutory concept of unconscionable conduct refers to “conduct that is so far outside societal norms of acceptable commercial behaviour as to warrant condemnation as conduct that is offensive to conscience”: Kobelt at [92]; see also at [234]; Stubbings at [57]-[58]. The court should only take the serious step of denouncing conduct as unconscionable when it is satisfied that the conduct is “offensive to a conscience informed by a sense of what is right and proper according to values which can be recognised by the court to prevail with contemporary Australian society”: Kobelt at [93]; Stubbings at [58].
Significantly, for the purposes of statutory unconscionability, there is no requirement to prove a special disadvantage or knowledge of such a disadvantage: Stubbings at [55]. Mere conduct, a system of conduct or a pattern of behaviour is sufficient where such conduct is “so far outside societal norms of acceptable commercial behaviour as to warrant condemnation as conduct that is offensive to conscience”: Kobelt at [93]; see also Stubbings at [58].
The court must make an evaluative judgment as to whether the conduct is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. The court is not confined to a mere balancing of the mandatory factors: Productivity Partners at [105]. The assessment calls for a “precise examination of the particular facts” and for the court to look to “every connected circumstance that ought to influence [the court’s] determination upon the real justice of the case”: Productivity Partners at [105], quoting The “Juliana” (1822) 2 Dods 504; 165 ER 1560 at 1567. The circumstances include not only the conduct at the relevant time, but also the circumstances and consequences that were reasonably foreseeable at the relevant time: Productivity Partners at [98].
Section 12CB(4) makes it clear that the section is capable of applying to a “system of conduct or pattern of behaviour”. This is significant because corporations “think” and act through systems which are inherently purposive and are objectively designed to achieve certain ends: Productivity Partners at [108].
Evidence of such systems and conduct can be both internal, by way of a corporation’s internal policies, practices, and procedures, or external, as to the ultimate impact on customers. It is the totality of the circumstances that must be considered: Productivity Partners at [110].
A system of conduct or pattern of behaviour may be unconscionable, even though not every individual affected by the conduct or behaviour is or has been disadvantaged by the conduct or behaviour. There does not need to be loss or disadvantage for a system to be unconscionable: Stubbings at [76].
Having regard to the terms of s 12CC of the ASIC Act, it is also relevant to take into account: (a) the disparity in the relative strength of the bargaining positions of the parties; (b) the onerous terms of the Loan Agreement, particularly in relation to the fees chargeable initially and in the event of any default; and (c) the conduct of Prime in unilaterally varying the terms of the Loan Agreement so as to increase the Lower Rate notwithstanding that the loan entered into was not identified as variable except as a result of a default.
The system established by Prime undoubtedly captures those who are its target market, businesspeople seeking short term loans who are prepared to risk the adverse terms upon which such loans are offered. However, the system established also produces a lucrative bycatch of persons for whom there is an artificial interposition of a company in order to avoid the restrictions and protections of the Code and for whom any realistic assessment would indicate that the loan was unlikely to be able to be serviced. The system relies upon intermediaries who are given strong financial incentives to place loans with Prime, yet it was no part of Prime’s system to moderate the distorting effect of those incentives through any policy, guideline or training which would reduce the risk of making loans that were structured to avoid the protections of the Code or to ensure that loans were only made where there was a realistic assessment of the borrower’s capacity to service and repay them.
The system put in place has been successful in denying to Prime knowledge which would allow its conduct to be characterised as unconscionable in equity. But in circumstances where the legislature has enacted the Code, to design a system to avoid the Code and catch this class of person and their artificially-interposed corporate entity while at the same time carefully insulating the lender from knowledge of the circumstances which make clear the exploitative nature of the lending is unconscionable within the meaning of s 12CB. Relief
In the Further Amended Originating Claim, the plaintiffs relevantly sought that, pursuant to s 12GM of the ASIC Act: (a) the Loan Agreement between Prime, Nusage and KS be declared invalid and unenforceable and set aside; and (b) only the principal of the loan amount advanced to the plaintiffs by Prime be repayable by the plaintiffs, less any funds already repaid by the plaintiffs, or in the alternative, only the principal and either interest at the rate set by the Reserve Bank or alternatively at a rate pursuant to r 1619 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) be repayable, less any funds already repaid by the plaintiffs.
In the plaintiffs’ final submissions, the claim for relief was put on the basis that the Reserve Bank interest rate should be applied. Having regard to the realisation of the security in February 2025, the plaintiffs then contended that a net amount was owing to the plaintiffs from that date and that pre-judgment interest should be allowed on that amount from 6 February 2025 until the date of judgment.
The defendant submitted that if relief was granted the principal should be repayable plus interest at court rates, pointing to the approach taken in Integrated Securities No 3 Pty Ltd v Creatrix Web Development and Online Marketing Solutions Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 596.
The plaintiffs relied upon s 12GM as the statutory foundation for the granting of relief. Relevantly, that section provides: (2) Without limiting the generality of section 12GD or 12GNB, the Court may, on the application of: (a) a person who has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage by conduct of another person that was engaged in in contravention of a provision of this Division; or (b) ASIC in accordance with subsection (3) on behalf of such a person or persons; make such order or orders as the Court thinks appropriate against the person who engaged in the conduct or a person who was involved in the contravention (including all or any of the orders mentioned in subsection (7)) if the Court considers that the order or orders concerned will: (c) compensate the person who made the application, or the person or any of the persons on whose behalf the application was made, in whole or in part for the loss or damage; or (d) prevent or reduce the loss or damage suffered, or likely to be suffered, by such a person or persons. … (4) An application may be made under subsection (2) in relation to a contravention of this Division notwithstanding that a proceeding has not been instituted under another provision of this Part in relation to that contravention. … (6) For the purpose of determining whether to make an order under this section in relation to a contravention of Subdivision C (sections 12CA to 12CC), the Court may have regard to the conduct of parties to the proceeding since the contravention occurred. (7) Without limiting the generality of subsections (1) and (2), the orders referred to in those subsections include the following: (a) an order declaring the whole or any part of a contract made between the person who suffered, or is likely to suffer, the loss or damage and the person who engaged in the conduct or a person who was involved in the contravention constituted by the conduct, or of a collateral arrangement relating to such a contract, to be void and, if the Court thinks fit, to have been void ab initio or at all times on and after a date before the date on which the order is made; … (c) an order refusing to enforce any or all of the provisions of such a contract; (d) an order directing the person who engaged in the conduct or a person who was involved in the contravention constituted by the conduct to refund money or return property to the person who suffered the loss or damage; (e) an order directing the person who engaged in the conduct or a person who was involved in the contravention constituted by the conduct to pay to the person who suffered the loss or damage the amount of the loss or damage; …
Jurisdiction is given to this court to grant relief pursuant to that provision by s 12GJ(2).
Had the plaintiffs not entered into the Loan Agreement, it is more likely than not that the purchase contract for the Ainslie Property would have been terminated and KS would have lost her deposit. That is notwithstanding that, as at 14 July 2021, KS was keeping alive the possibility of alternative financiers. The likelihood is that those financiers would not have agreed to make the loan or would not have had systems as efficient as Prime and would not have been able to settle prior to the date set in the notice to complete. The failure to complete by that date would have meant that the contract for the purchase of the Ainslie Property would have been terminated.
The losses suffered as a result of the entry into the Loan Agreement included the fees paid upon settlement (see above at [241]), the liability to stamp duty arising from the completion of the sale contract and all of the fees subsequently incurred which are recorded in Exhibit 11 and summarised for the period post-termination at [347] above.
The focus of s 12GM is, relevantly, upon compensation of the affected person and the reduction of their loss and damage. While it is necessary to take into account the reasonable interests of the lender in determining what order to make, s 12GM is a flexible remedial provision designed for the benefit of affected persons.
The plaintiffs identified that the approach to making orders relating to interest on amounts advanced when the underlying agreements are set aside for being unconscionable or unfair has generally been to order that only the principal is repayable along with only a nominal rate of interest (such as the official Reserve Bank cash rate). They referred to previous decisions in which the amount advanced has been repayable along with a nominal rate of interest. That approach is reflected in Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Burns [2015] WASC 234 at [276], Shannon v Permanent Custodians Ltd (No 3) [2022] WASCA 112 at [128], and the first-instance decision in Stubbings. In each case, the court contemplated or applied the Reserve Bank’s cash rate as the rate of interest to be applied to advanced funds.
In written submissions provided at the commencement of the hearing and repeated in written submissions provided at the conclusion of the hearing, the plaintiffs set out the calculations for which they contended which were based upon the application of the Reserve Bank cash rate. Those calculations applied the cash rate during the relevant month to the outstanding balance, taking into account any repayment received during that month and the interest accrued from the previous month. From the date of 6 February 2025 when the proceeds of the sale of the Ainslie Property ($1,671,373.82) were received by Prime, a net surplus of $1,003,911.40 was calculated to be owed by Prime. The plaintiffs then sought pre-judgment interest at the rates established pursuant to the Court Procedures Rules on that amount up until judgment, yielding an amount payable by the defendant of $1,061,394.27 as at 20 October 2025 (the first day of the hearing).
In my view, the approach contended for by the plaintiffs reflects an available order in the circumstances. It would be within the scope of s 12GM(2). However given the lack of any focus during the course of the hearing on the precise quantification of the losses that would have been incurred by KS in any event, and hence the quantum of the loss and damage suffered as a result of the conduct of the defendant, it is appropriate to adopt the alternative course suggested by the plaintiffs and contended for by the defendant. This is to simply adopt the approach that would be adopted under the Court Procedures Rules in relation to both the amounts owed to Prime and, after 6 February 2025, the amounts owing to the plaintiffs. The calculation of the interest on the amount owed to Prime will need to take into account amounts paid to Prime by the plaintiffs. Consistently with the approach taken under the Court Procedures Rules, interest will not be payable on any amount of interest accruing from time to time.
The orders will include an order declaring that the Loan Agreement is invalid, unenforceable and set aside. I consider such an order to be within the scope of ss 12GM(2), (7)(a), (7)(c). An order will be made requiring the defendant to pay money into court. The payment of money will constitute a combination of a refund of money to the plaintiffs and the payment of interest on that money from 7 February 2025 (the day after the receipt of the net proceeds of the Ainslie Property by Prime) until the day judgment is delivered: ss 12GM(7)(d), (e). The money will be required to be paid into court because KS is a person under a disability: Court Procedures Rules, r 1617. Liberty to apply will be granted in relation to an application for an order to permit the money to be paid out of court.
The orders that will be made in due course will be to the following effect: (1) The Loan, Security and Guarantee Deed dated 19 July 2021 between the defendant as lender, the second plaintiff as borrower and first plaintiff as guarantor is declared invalid and unenforceable, and is set aside. (2) The defendant is to pay into court the amount of (figure subject to calculation in the manner set out earlier) within 28 days. (3) The defendant is to pay the plaintiffs’ costs of the proceedings. (4) Liberty to apply on two days’ notice in relation to any application for payment out of the money paid into court pursuant to order 2.
Given the necessity for calculation of amounts for the purposes of the second order to be made, and the possibility that the parties may wish to be heard in relation to costs or consequential orders, the proceedings will be adjourned for 14 days to allow that to occur and listed for the making of final orders on 12 February 2026.