Kralj & Kralj [2025] FedCFamC1F 781 (5 November 2025)

1. The interim Orders made 21 October 2025 remain in force.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These proceedings concern X, aged 15, and Y, aged 13. Their parents are Mr Kralj and Ms Kralj. These Reasons deal with the parents' respective applications for interim parenting orders.
2. Pursuant to final parenting orders made by consent on 14 November 2022 ("the final parenting orders"), X and Y live with Ms Kralj. The final parenting orders provide for them to spend time with Mr Kralj five nights a fortnight and half of the school holidays. Unusually, notwithstanding that X and Y live with Ms Kralj, Mr Kralj has sole parental responsibility in respect of medical decisions for them. The final parenting orders also provided for the family to engage in family therapy. That family therapy occurred.
3. The final parenting orders were made by consent, but after long-running proceedings and the preparation of three family reports by Ms B.
4. Neither X nor Y are currently spending regular time with Mr Kralj. This has been the case for X since mid-2023, although she has spent time with Mr Kralj on some special occasions. After X stopped spending regular time with her father, Y continued to do so. However, Y stopped spending time with Mr Kralj in June 2025. Both X and Y have some telephone communication with their father.
5. After she was on notice that Mr Kralj intended to commence proceedings, Ms Kralj filed an Initiating Application on 18 August 2025, in which she sought final orders that she have sole decision making with respect to major long-term decisions for X and Y, that the girls live with her and spend no time with their father, and that Mr Kralj be restrained from contacting or approaching X and Y. She filed a Notice of Risk in which she alleged risks including that the children had been subjected to sexual abuse and physical abuse by their father. In his Response, Mr Kralj seeks an equal time arrangement. He is currently self-represented. On 27 August 2025, orders were made by consent for the final parenting orders to be reconsidered.
6. X's and Y's interests in the proceedings are represented by an Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL"). The ICL, Ms Bedford, also represented the girls' interests in the 2022 proceedings, and last met with X and Y on 16 October 2025.
7. The matter first came before me for case management on 21 October 2025. On that occasion, the parents and the ICL reached an agreement about certain matters, including for Ms B to be reappointed as the single expert. I am told that she will conduct interviews in the matter in mid-December, and that a report is likely to be available by late January 2026. In those circumstances, and given the history of the matter, I have listed the matter for final hearing commencing on 2 March 2026.
8. On 21 October 2025, interim orders were also made by consent dealing with some critical matters for X and Y - including in relation to their school attendance and therapy. That is in circumstances where they have both engaged in self-harming behaviours, suicidal ideation and attempts, and have very poor school attendance. The interim orders made on 21 October provide for the possibility of home schooling and attendance by Y at the School for Specific Purposes.
9. The remaining substantial issues that I need to determine at this stage are:

(1) Whether to the suspend the final orders so far as they deal with parental responsibility and what, if any, orders about parental responsibility to replace them with.

(2) Whether I should suspend the "spend time" orders and what I should replace them with.

1. The ICL seeks that the "spend time" orders be suspended and that X and Y spend time with and communicate with Mr Kralj in accordance with their views. The ICL did not, however, support the suspension of the parental responsibility orders. Ms Kralj now seeks "spend time" orders in the same terms as those sought by the ICL - notwithstanding the serious allegations of risk which she has made.
2. To his credit, Mr Kralj has recognised that the immediate reinstatement of the arrangements under the final orders is not realistic. On 27 October 2025, he filed an Outline of Case in which he sought that "[t]he children's current treating therapist shall oversee and guide a gradual reintroduction of communication and time between the children and their father, consistent with the children's therapeutic needs and best interests" and that "[t]he therapist shall determine the timing, format, and pace of re-engagement ... with the objective of restoring ordinary time arrangements consistent with the Final Orders ... by 2 March 2026." At the commencement of the hearing, I drew his attention to the fact that I could not make orders delegating the decision about the spend time arrangements to a therapist, and to other difficulties with his orders sought as drafted. He provided an amended minute which provided for an order that "A gradual reintroduction of communication and time between the children and the father shall occur under the oversight and facilitative guidance of the children's current treating therapist, having regard to the children's therapeutic needs and best interests." Such orders would not be enforceable.
3. Mr Kralj made clear, however, that the gravamen of his application was for orders for time with X and Y to be recommenced irrespective of their wishes because he believes that they will not spend time with him unless Ms Kralj is told that she must make them. I dealt with his application on that basis, and explored with the parties and the ICL the possibility of spend time orders which provided for at least Y to spend some short periods of time with Mr Kralj (perhaps for dinner or so that Mr Kralj can take Y to extra-curricular activities). The ICL did not support such orders on the basis that X's and Y's views are strong and clear and that if orders are made for specific time, they will not comply. She also did not support orders for family therapy in circumstances where the family has already engaged (apparently unsuccessfully and at times very painfully) in family therapy with two different therapists, and where Y is rejecting even the individual therapy which she so plainly needs.

1. The Court has the benefit of a Child Impact Report dated 16 October 2025, which was prepared by Court Child Expert Ms C. The Court Child Expert conducted video interviews with the parents on 13 October 2025, and spoke to X and Y in-person on 14 October 2025.
2. X is recorded as having expressed her wish to spend time with her father in accordance with her wishes:

she is willing to spend time with and communicate with her father on her own terms, she is of the view that she is old enough to make her own decisions and she said she wants her own independence to choose how she spends her time, rather than having set days and times that she is required to spend time with her father. [X] said she is willing to keep in contact with her father and that she occasionally spends time with him and will be willing to do so on special occasions. She indicated concern about being restricted to Orders particularly now that she is older.

1. Y is recorded as having said she wants to spend time with her father on her own terms, such as on special occasions:

[Y] does not want to have prescribed days or time that she has to spend time with her father, because she does not want to feel pressured by her father to spend time with him.

1. I was told that X's and Y's views expressed to the ICL were consistent with what they told the Court Child Expert.
2. The Court Child Expert recommends that X and Y spend time with Mr Kralj in accordance with their wishes, and highlights the risks to their mental health of being forced to spend time with Mr Kralj against those wishes. The Court Child Expert opines that "the priority for the children right now is ensuring that they are engaged with psychological support, particularly [Y] as she is not currently engaged in ongoing psychological support, and a structured routine including regular school attendance." As is almost always the case at an interim hearing, the expert (and other) evidence is relatively circumscribed, limited and untested. The Court and the parents will have the benefit of a full Family Report by an expert who knows this family well within a fairly short period of time.

1. In deciding what interim orders are in X's and Y's best interests, I am required to consider the matters set out in s 60CC(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). As these are interim proceedings and the evidence is untested, I must be cautious about making findings where matters are in contest. I must also adopt a cautious approach to issues of risk.
2. I was provided with a very helpful Chronology drafted by the ICL which summarised the substantial material tendered and the other evidence.

1. This is a matter in which issues of safety (s 60CC(2)(a)) and of the girls' views (s 60CC(2)(b)) are inextricably linked.
2. There is a very troubling history for each of X and Y. The extent of the difficulties, where they occurred, and the reasons for them are contested between the parents and unable to be determined by me - at least at this stage. On the basis of the evidence, including documents tendered, I am satisfied that:

(1) In March 2023, X overdosed and was admitted to emergency at D Hospital.

(2) In mid-2023, X took an overdose.

(3) In August 2023, Y self-harmed by cutting and was taken by Ms Kralj to D Hospital.

(4) In October 2023, Y was referred to E Health Service due to self-harm.

(5) In April 2025, D Hospital observed that Y "opened up about stressors and self-harm".

(6) In May 2025, Y reported self-harm to Dr F at E Health Service.

(7) In mid-May 2025, Y was admitted to D Hospital having cut herself.

(8) In late-May 2025, Y was admitted to emergency at D Hospital.

(9) In June 2025, Y was admitted to emergency at D Hospital with suicidal ideation and having cut herself.

(10) In July 2025, Y was admitted to emergency having overdosed and saying that she wanted to kill herself.

(11) Y told the Court Child Expert on 14 October that she had experienced suicidal ideation as recently as "'a few weeks ago'".

(12) Y is diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder and lives with dyslexia. She has tried taking Ritalin but experienced side effects and chose to cease the medication.

(13) X is prescribed anti-depressants.

1. As to the causes of these difficulties, Ms Kralj appears to link them to behaviour by Mr Kralj. Mr Kralj says that this is parental alienation of him and that poor parenting by Ms Kralj is the cause. I am unable to make any relevant findings at this stage, but it is unlikely that either of these accounts is anywhere near an adequate explanation. Y told the Court Child Expert that her father was a "contributor to her self-harming when they argue with each other or when her father causes her stress by contacting her about past issues" and the discharge summary from D Hospital for Y in May 2025 records her as having told the Emergency Department that she was "triggered by an argument with her father". But, as Mr Kralj pointed out, records around one of the most serious incidents for Y provide that it occurred after she had argued with her mother. X is recorded as having told the Department of Communities and Justice ("DCJ") in August 2025 that "pressure of my dad" led to her suicide attempts, but again an incident of her overdosing occurred after an argument with her mother. Both X's and Y's school attendance have worsened since she they stopped spending time with their father.
2. It is likely that a significant factor is the history of conflict and animosity between the parents, and the continuation of that conflict and animosity to today. The reports of Ms B in the previous proceedings highlighted concern about the impacts of entrenched parental conflict on the children's mental health, as well as their relationships, and the Court Child Expert in these proceedings opined that:

[T]he history of this matter lends strong support to the likelihood that [X] and [Y] have experienced a decline in their mental health at different periods of time, and in other areas of their overall wellbeing such as school performance, as a result of the entrenched parental conflict that they have been exposed to over a number of years.

1. In terms of the risks raised by Ms Kralj in her Notice of Risk - which relate to alleged conduct by Mr Kralj - the evidence does not support a conclusion that Mr Kralj has sexually or physically abused X or Y nor that they are at risk of abuse from him. Y and X have talked to a significant number of professionals and have referred to very limited matters. They have said that they have at times felt uncomfortable about comments Mr Kralj has made about their bodies. Y has said that she has been patted on her bottom once and that Mr Kralj had touched her breast (apparently by accident). Both girls say that they used to sleep in the same bed as Mr Kralj and that he would sometimes sleep with his hand resting on their bodies. A police investigation has been closed and a decision was made by police not to apply for an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order, and I am satisfied from what I was told by the ICL and from the documents tendered that a DCJ investigation will soon be closed with no further action. Notwithstanding the cautious approach to risk which is mandated in interim proceedings, I expect that, were it not for their ages and their poor mental health, I would be satisfied that X and Y would be safe from harm if I made orders for them to spend time with Mr Kralj. Ms Kralj essentially makes this concession by taking the position that X and Y should spend time with their father in accordance with their views.
2. I am left, however, with the risks to X's and Y's mental health if I make orders that they spend time with Mr Kralj contrary to their clearly expressed wishes, the evidence of the Court Child Expert that making such orders carries the risk that they will be less willing to restore their relationships with their father, and the likelihood that X and Y will simply refuse to attend any ordered time.

Benefit to X and Y of a relationship with their father

1. I am required to consider the benefit to X and Y of being able to have a relationship with their father where it is safe to do so (s 60CC(2)(e)).
2. I am very troubled that if I make the orders sought by the ICL and Ms Kralj, that may mean that X and Y will not spend time with their father and therefore may not benefit from a relationship with him. Although the evidence is untested, it is my sense at this stage that he probably has much to offer X and Y if he can reengage with them. The Court Child Expert highlighted the importance of the children repairing their relationship with their father. To make an obvious point, that may be of particular importance if, in the future, Ms Kralj's health deteriorates further. The only expert evidence I have at this stage is to the effect that the best prospect of X and Y benefiting from their relationships with their father is if they are able to determine when they spend time with him.

1. X and Y both have significant needs. Their parents' capacity to meet those needs is a relevant consideration for me (s 60CC(2)(d)). There are questions raised on the evidence about Ms Kralj's capacity to meet those needs. Mr Kralj raises reasonable concerns about the boundaries and parenting practices that are in place in Ms Kralj's household; for example, to the Court Child Expert, Y described a "typical day for her" as including "sleeping until the mid-afternoon as she usually goes to bed in the early hours of the morning." A recent D Hospital record also notes that Y has "limited structure or routine (particularly regarding school attendance, diet and sleep)" and "typically sleeps during the day."
2. From what I have seen of Mr Kralj (who represented himself), he appears to be appropriately motivated in relation to these proceedings and to be genuinely concerned about X's and Y's welfare in circumstances where they are not attending school regularly, have mental health difficulties, and where first X and now Y are refusing to spend regular time with him. A Family Report prepared by Ms B in the previous proceedings identified that he was more likely to support a relationship for the girls with their mother than she was to support the girls' relationships with him, and it was recommended that X and Y live with him. A subsequent report identified progress made and the girls' views contrary to any change to the parenting arrangements and recommended that, while he should have sole parental responsibility, the girls should live primarily with their mother. That recommendation was reflected in the final orders that were ultimately consented to.
3. It would likely assist the progress of the matter if Mr Kralj recognises, acknowledges and addresses any difficulties in his own responses to the various situations which have arisen and takes on board what X and Y have said (including to the Court Child Expert) about their discomfort with some of his behaviour. While the evidence is untested at this stage, some of his communication with Ms Kralj comes across as officious and unhelpful. It is unlikely that things will improve so long as he finds that the only explanation for X's and Y's views lies in Ms Kralj alienating them from him. Similarly, by focusing only on his criticisms of the Child Impact Report, he will not take into account what X and Y are recorded as having said and reflect on what he can do differently. Significant interviews with X and Y were conducted by police and DCJ staff in August 2025 and they are recorded as having told the interviewers about aspects of Mr Kralj's behaviour that made them feel uncomfortable. Those records should also help Mr Kralj to understand the matters which, from the girls' points of view, have led to the current situation, and improve his capacity to meet their emotional and psychological needs.

1. I am satisfied that the family engaged in family therapy in the aftermath of the making of the final orders and that such therapy was very difficult and did not result in the parents building an effective co-parenting alliance. Things apparently worsened, and X stopped spending time with her father within a few months of the making of the final orders. I am also satisfied that Y is currently resistant to engaging in her own therapy and that such therapy is a priority for her.

1. Given the seriousness of the risks to X and Y associated with their mental health and their views, particularly in the context of previous suicide attempts and significant suicidal ideation, I have reluctantly decided that it is in X's and Y's best interests to suspend the "spend time" aspects of the final orders.
2. I have considered whether spend time orders should be made which require further engagement with X's and Y's therapists and/or a family therapist predicated on a restoration of time. I accept the ICL's submissions that the evidence shows that Y is resistant even to the therapy that she needs individually, and that family therapy has been tried after the making of the final orders, was difficult and ultimately ended without any significant progress having been made. It is important that X's and Y's therapy progresses as their therapists deem appropriate, and that the therapeutic relationships not be interfered with by orders of this Court which prescribe an outcome - as Mr Kralj's proposed orders do.
3. I am satisfied that the "spend time" orders which promote X's and Y's safety from emotional and psychological harm and which provide the best prospects of X and Y reengaging with their father and benefiting from a relationship with him are orders as sought by the ICL and Ms Kralj.
4. The current orders for parental responsibility provide that Mr Kralj has sole parental responsibility in relation to medical decisions for X and Y. Notwithstanding that there was no evidence about any difficulties with X and Y accessing medical treatment, I am concerned that such difficulties may arise in circumstances where the parent with whom they are living has no power to make long-term medical decisions. I accept, however, the submission of the ICL that it is important that both parents have visibility in relation to decisions for these vulnerable young people. For that reason, I have suspended the order for sole parental responsibility and made an order for the parents to have joint decision-making responsibility. For that order to be found, on a final basis, to be in X and Y's best interests, it will be important for the parents to demonstrate that they can cooperate effectively in making any major long-term decisions which arise, so that X and Y are not caught in further conflict or their best interests are otherwise compromised.
5. Mr Kralj sought a range of orders which mandate good co-parenting behaviour. If the parents need to be ordered to engage in such behaviour, then it is unlikely the orders will have any impact. Making such orders also carries the risk that they provide opportunities for further conflict about whether they have been complied with or not - which would not be in X's and Y's best interests. There is necessarily a limited role for the Court; as the Full Court stated in Lainhart & Ellinson [2023] FedCFamC1A 200; (2023) FLC 94-166, at [34]:

if litigants are genuinely motivated to improve their parenting capacity, they will do so without the need for any order to regulate their decision. On the other hand, if they do not genuinely desire any such improvement, any order intended to cajole such an outcome is likely to be unsuccessful at best and disregarded at worst.

1. Mr Kralj has sought further assessment of Ms Kralj and her parenting capacity - I have made orders for Ms B to prepare a further Family Report and that will necessarily address the parties' respective parenting capacities. I am not prepared to make any further orders for assessments at this stage. If Ms B opines that any further assessment is necessary, the relevant application can be made then.
2. Mr Kralj also sought that there be certain conditions with respect to reporting about risk. With the evidence being untested at this stage, I am not satisfied such orders are in X's and Y's best interests - even if I do have the power to make them.

1. X and Y are unlikely to agree to spend time with Mr Kralj unless he approaches them in a considered and careful way. Y is recorded as having complained to police and the DCJ in an interview in August 2025: "I know I'm not seeing him but the amount of times he texts me a day. Sometimes it's nice but sometimes it gets annoying and yeah." Mr Kralj may well benefit from receiving professional advice about how best to approach Y and X, as well as from participating in courses which focus on parenting teenagers. As set out above, there appears to be cause for him to reflect on at least X's and Y's reported perceptions of his behaviour and parenting style. Clearly Ms Kralj has a role as well, and this would be a timely opportunity for her to reflect further on her approach in the very difficult circumstances involved in addressing X's and Y's needs.
2. It is completely understandable that Mr Kralj is not willing simply to "walk away" and that, in his words, he sees this litigation as "protective". He will no doubt bear in mind that the Court Child Expert has opined that "[c]ontinued litigation may be more detrimental to the children's mental health and significantly impact opportunity in the future for reparation of their relationship with their father if they feel as though their views have been ignored and invalidated". I expect that he also recognises that there are limits to what the Court can (and should) do as children reach middle adolescence and where they are expressing strong views. Currently Ms Kralj formally seeks final orders for no time or communication, and Mr Kralj formally seeks final orders for equal time. The Court Child Expert opines to the effect that neither of those outcomes are in X's and Y's best interests. I expect that, after the parents and the ICL have the benefit of a fourth report from Ms B, they will engage in discussions to see if the continuation of the litigation can be avoided.

I certify that the preceding forty (40) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Behrens.