Kosinski & Galvez [2025] FedCFamC1F 731 (17 October 2025)

1. Once the children commence kindergarten, they shall spend time with the Applicant as agreed in writing between the parties, but failing agreement:

(a) During the gazetted period of the New South Wales ("NSW") school holidays ("school holiday period") at the conclusion of Terms one, two and three, from 12:00 noon on the first Saturday of the school holiday period until 12:00 noon on the middle Saturday of the school holidays; and

(b) During the NSW school holidays at the conclusion of Term four, from 12:00 noon on the first Saturday of the school holiday period until 12:00 noon on the following Saturday, and thereafter on a week-about basis for the duration of the school holidays.

1. For the purpose of implementing the ordered time during school terms (Orders 6-7 herein), the children's time with the Applicant shall recommence in each new school term as follows:

(a) In the event the children spent the preceding week of the school holidays with the Applicant, on the second Wednesday of the new school term; or

(b) In the event the children did not spend the preceding week of the school holidays with the Applicant, on the first Wednesday of the new school term.

1. Notwithstanding any other order, and unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parents, the children shall spend time with the parents on special occasions, as follows:

(a) With the parent with whom the children are not in the care of on that day, from 3:00 pm or the conclusion of school until 7:00 pm, or if a non-daycare or school day from 11:00 am until 4:00 pm.

(b) In even numbered years,

(i) With the Applicant, from 3:00 pm on Saturday until 3:00 pm on Sunday; and

(ii) With the Respondent, from 3:00 pm on Sunday until the commencement of school, or if a non-school day, at 9:00 am on Monday.

(c) In odd numbered years:

(i) With the Respondent, from 3:00 pm on Saturday until 3:00 pm on Sunday; and

(ii) With the Applicant, from 3:00 pm on Sunday until the commencement of school, or if a non-school day at 9:00 am on Monday.

(d) In even numbered years:

(i) With the Applicant, from 12:00 noon on 24 December until 2:00 pm on 25 December; and

(ii) With the Respondent, from 2:00 pm on 25 December until 5:00 pm on 26 December.

(e) In odd numbered years:

(i) With the Respondent, from 12:00 noon on 24 December until 2:00 pm on 25 December; and

(ii) With the Applicant, from 2:00 pm on 25 December until 5:00 pm on 26 December.

1. Upon the children commencing kindergarten, the Respondent, or an agent appointed by the Respondent, shall facilitate the children engaging in a video call with the Applicant, with the Applicant to commence the video call via the 2Houses application, unless an alternate method is agreed in writing, each alternate Friday at 7:00 pm, commencing the Friday after the Applicant's time with the children in accordance with these orders. The call shall last for as long as the children remain engaged up to a maximum of 15 minutes.
2. Pursuant to Order 11 above, should the children be unable to engage in the video call, the video call will instead occur on the immediately following night at 7.00 pm, unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, with the Respondent to provide the Applicant at least 12 hours' notice that the video call is required to be rescheduled.
3. For the purposes of electronic communication with the children, the Respondent, or an agent of her choosing, shall ensure that the children are available to take the call, notify the children of the identity of the person calling, assist the children where necessary to answer and engage in the call and, from the age of five (5) years, afford the children privacy for the duration of the call.

1. All changeovers at the commencement or conclusion of day-care or school occur at the children's current day-care or school.
2. For the purposes of changeover not occurring on a day that the children attend school or daycare, then changeover is to occur at the McDonald's Restaurant located at Suburb B, NSW.
3. Each parent is permitted to nominate an agent to attend the collection or drop off of the children.

(a) Authorise any medical practitioner, psychologist, dentist, hospital or medical practice of which the children may attend from time to time, to communicate with either parent in respect to the child/ren's medical condition and/or requirements;

(b) Authorise all day care/schools at which the children attend to:

(i) Communicate with each parent, either by telephone, in writing or by personal attendance, in respect to the children's progress at school; and

(ii) Provide to either parent, at the requesting parent's expense, any and all information in relation to the children's schooling including but not limited to notices, letters, disciplinary action, school attendance information, school reports, school photographs and invitations and to attend parent/teacher interviews.

(c) Do all things and sign all documents to enable each party to obtain a Medicare card listing both children on each card;

(d) Each of the parties to communicate with, and obtain information from, each of the children's treating medical practitioners and education providers and for this purpose the parties be at liberty to provide a copy of these Orders to the following:

(i) The Principal, or delegate of the Principal, of the daycare/school attended by the children; and

(ii) Any medical practitioner and/or allied health professional upon which the children have attended.

1. The parents shall, unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing:

(a) Communicate through the 2Houses parenting application, with the Applicant to pay the annual costs associated with the application;

(b) Within 24 hours of the Applicant providing proof of payment of the annual fee each year, the Respondent will pay into the Applicant's nominated bank account 50 per cent of the annual fee.

(c) Limit their communication with each other to the topics of the health of the children, dialogue during medical emergency where either or both children require medical attention, scheduling and the content of medical appointments, location of changeover, or other relevant general child-related topics;

(d) Not send more than one message to the other party within a six (6) hour period prior to receiving a response from the other party, other than in case of emergency;

(e) Keep the other advised at all times of their current residential address and mobile telephone numbers and advise of any change within seven (7) days of that change occurring;

(f) Advise the other immediately if the child/ren suffer/s any serious illness or injury, being hospitalised or being involved in an accident, including details as to any such illness or injury, medical treatment received or hospitalisation necessary as soon as reasonably practicable of such illness or injury occurring and confirm the practitioner, hospital or medical practice attended;

(g) In respect of non-emergency medical, behavioural, psychological or dental appointment:

(i) Keep the other party informed in writing of any treatment plan or prescribed medication administered or recommended as a result of such appointment; and

(ii) Not attend medical appointments or hospital admissions scheduled for the children whilst the children are in the other parent's care, either in person or via teleconference, without the written consent of the other parent.

1. The parents are restrained from enrolling the children into regular extra-curricular activities which would occur while the children are in the other parent's care without the prior written consent of the other parent.
2. Without admissions, each parent is restrained, and an injunction granted, from:

(a) Criticising or denigrating the other parent or the other parents family in the presence of, or within hearing of, the children or allowing a third party to criticise or denigrate the other parent or the other's parent's family in the presence of, or within the hearing of, the children and shall immediately remove the children from the vicinity of any other person doing so;

(b) Posting messages on Facebook or social media which denigrates the other parent;

(c) Showing the children any Court documents from these proceedings;

(d) Discussing these Court proceedings with the children except for the purposes of explaining the terms of the current Orders with them;

(e) Physically disciplining the children or allowing any other person to physically discipline the children;

(f) Permitting or allowing the children to be in the presence of, or exposed to, family violence and shall immediately remove the children from the vicinity;

(g) Attending school functions to which parents are normally allowed when such school functions take place when the children are not in that parent's care, except in the case of a graduation ceremony; and

(h) Attending sporting and extra-curricular activities to which parents are normally allowed when such school functions take place when the children are not in that parent's care, unless in the case of a Grand Final of a sporting event in which the children or one of them are participating.

1. In circumstances where these Orders permit the parents to attend the same event for the children, the parents are restrained from approaching the other whilst in attendance, unless agreed upon by the parties in writing prior to the event.
2. All outstanding applications are dismissed.

1. The parents will cause the children to refer to the Applicant as "mummy" and the Respondent as "mama" and are restrained from allowing or encouraging the children or any third parties to use those terms to refer to any other persons in relation to the children.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Kosinski & Galvez has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These reasons for judgment explain the final orders that the Court has made in relation to twin boys, X and Y born 2021, currently aged four (collectively "the children").

1. The applicant in this matter is the mother ("the applicant") and the respondent is also the mother ("the respondent") (collectively "the parents"). The parents' personal relationship was a tempestuous, volatile one, but as parents for the children they more than adequately meet their needs. Regrettably, the nature of the parental relationship compels the Court to reluctantly make a number of injunctions that it would not normally consider, even in a high conflict case. The parents began cohabitating in September 2016, married in 2018, separated in February 2022 and continued to live under the same roof until June 2022. The applicant is 37 years old, has not re-partnered and is not engaged in paid employment. The respondent is 36 years old, has re-partnered and is presently engaged to Ms C as of 2024 and is employed on a full-time basis with the Defence Force. The respondent and Ms C commenced a relationship in 2023, Ms C was introduced to the children in September 2023 and commenced living with them and the respondent in January 2024.
2. The children were conceived using the respondent's genetic material, together with an anonymous donor. The respondent also carried the pregnancy. The respondent and Ms C are intending to have children together, using the respondent's genetic material.
3. In mid-2022, the applicant physically assaulted the respondent and thereafter the respondent left the former matrimonial home. The applicant was subsequently arrested, and a Provisional Apprehended Domestic Violence Order ("ADVO") was granted for the protection of the respondent. This was made final in early 2023 and expired in early 2025. The children did not spend time with the applicant from June to July 2022.
4. On 12 July 2023, the parents entered into a parenting plan by which the children lived with the respondent and spent five nights per fortnight with the applicant. This remains the status quo to the present day.

1. The matter first came before the Court on 7 June 2024 for an interim hearing before Senior Judicial Registrar Glendenning. On 17 June 2024 orders were made for the children to spend time with the applicant for five nights per fortnight, for half of the school holidays and on special occasions. Further, orders were made which facilitated communication time for both parents when the children are not in their care, and a restraint was placed on each parent to prohibit communication between themselves, other than as expressly outlined in the orders or in an emergency. Additionally, an order was made granting each parent with the first option to care for the children where the other parent was unavailable.
2. On 3 July 2024, Judicial Registrar Bell appointed an Independent Children's Lawyer, ordered the preparation of a Single Expert Report, and listed the matter for a Compliance and Readiness Hearing. It was noted by consent that the applicant had been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), Anxiety, Attention-Deficit-Hyperactivity-Disorder (ADHD), Complex-Post-Traumatic-Stress-Disorder (C-PTSD), Parasomnia, a chronic pain condition, suffers a whole person impairment which totalled 34% and had been declared totally and permanently disabled, and is not currently working due to her pain levels. The applicant receives a disability pension. Additionally, it was noted; again, with consent, that the respondent had been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic-Stress-Disorder (PTSD).
3. On 12 July 2024, the matter came before Judge Parker (as her Honour then was). Orders were made discharging the previous order made 17 June 2024 for each parent to have the first option to care for the children where the other parent is unavailable. An additional order was made which stated that unless the parents were able to care for the children for the entirety of the period of time, they were scheduled to have the children, then the children will remain in the care of the other parent. Her Honour further imposed a restraint on the parents from coming within 250 metres of the other parents' residence.
4. On 14 October 2024, Judge Betts made an order pursuant to s 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), prohibiting the parents from personally cross-examining each other at the final hearing.
5. On 18 December 2024, Smith J transferred the matter to Division 1 of this Court and listed the matter before me for mention on 5 February 2025.
6. On 5 February 2025, I set the matter down for final hearing on 12 May 2025 with an estimated hearing time of five days.
7. Orders were made by consent on 13 May 2025, which provide for the children's names to be changed to incorporate both parents' surnames.
8. On 16 May 2025, the final hearing concluded, and judgment was thereafter reserved. The delay in judgement is regrettable and is attributable to the pressure of judicial work.

1. The applicant provided the Court with her final proposed minute of order on 16 May 2025 ("the applicants proposal") and this has been made annexure one of these reasons. She sought sole major long-term decision-making be granted to the respondent, save for all decisions relating to the children's cognitive, developmental and behavioural health, which ought to be subject joint long-term decision-making. The order sought which provided for major long-term decision-making to be allocated to the respondent was proposed on the condition that the applicant may provide her feedback prior to any decision being made. Additionally, the applicant sought for the children to live with the respondent and spend time with her on five nights per fortnight in line with the current arrangement and for half of the school holidays. An alternate proposal was advanced, which would see the children spend five consecutive nights with the applicant. Further orders were sought which provide the parents with the first option to care for the children should the other parent be unable, for special occasion time between the children and the parents, for electronic communication to be facilitated each Wednesday for up to 15-minutes between the children and the non-live-with parent and that each parent be at liberty to attend the children's activities and for general non-denigration restraints. A mutual restraint was also sought to prevent the respondent from re-locating to an area that would change the parenting arrangements, without consent. Lastly, an order was sought which would cause the children to call the applicant "mummy" and the respondent "mama", and that the parents be restrained from encouraging the children or third parties from use those names for any other person.

1. The respondent provided the Court with her final orders sought on 16 May 2025 ("the respondent's proposal") and this has been made annexure two of these reasons. The respondent provided a detailed set of orders which provided for contingencies based on any permitted relocation. The respondent sought sole major long-term decision-making, and for the children to live with her. Subject to being located within 100 kilometres from the applicant, the respondent sought for the children to spend time with the applicant during the school term for three-nights per fortnight. Upon the children commencing kindergarten, it was sought that during the school holidays the children's time with the applicant progress by one night each holiday period, for example an additional one night during the term one school holidays and an additional two nights during the term two school holiday period, continuing until the applicant receives a maximum of an addition four nights during the term four school holidays.
2. In the event the respondent was permitted to relocate, and the parents reside in excess of 100 kilometres from each other, it was sought that the children spend time with the applicant for three nights during weeks two and eight of the school term, and two nights during week five of the school term. In circumstances where the parents lived in excess of 100 kilometres from each other the respondent sought for the children to spend time with the applicant for one week each school holiday period. Further, it was sought that the respondent be able to relocate with the children interstate from time to time, and that the applicant be directed to provide a brief updating report to the respondent in relation to her mental health written by her regular practitioner every twelve months. Lastly, the respondent sought orders permitting her to travel internationally with the children when they are due to be in her care, and for orders which facilitate the children obtaining passports which are to thereafter be held in her care.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer provided a proposed minute of order on 15 May 2025 ("Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal") and this has been made annexure three of these reasons. The Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal sought for the children to live with the respondent and for the respondent to have sole major long-term decision-making on the condition that she provides the applicant seven days to respond in writing expressing her view prior to any decision being made. The Independent Children's Lawyer further proposed that the children spend time with the applicant five nights per fortnight, for half of the school holidays, and on special occasions. Additionally, the Independent Children's Lawyer sought an identical order to the applicant, such that the parents are to cause the children to call the applicant "mummy" and the respondent "mama", and that the parents be restrained from encouraging the children or third parties from use those names for any other person. A restraint on the children relocating further than a 30-minute drive from the Suburb D Post Office without prior consent was also sought.

1. In support of her case, the applicant relied on the following documents:

(a) Outline of Case Document filed 11 May 2025;

(b) Amended Initiating Application filed 14 April 2025;

(c) Her affidavit filed 28 April 2025;

(d) Affidavit of Mr F filed 14 April 2025;

(e) Affidavit of Mr E filed 14 April 2025; and

(f) Various documents tendered throughout the hearing which became Exhibits A1-A21.

1. In support of her case, the respondent relied on the following documents:

(a) Outline of Case Document filed 7 May 2025;

(b) Further Amended Response filed 15 April 2025;

(c) Her affidavit filed 28 April 2025;

(d) Affidavit of Ms G filed 28 April 2025;

(e) Affidavit of Ms C filed 28 April 2025;

(f) Notice of Child Abuse, Family Violence or Risk filed 13 March 2024; and

(g) Various documents tendered throughout the hearing which became Exhibits R1- R44.

1. In support of their case, the Independent Children's Lawyer relied on the following documents:

(a) Outline of Case Document filed 8 May 2025;

(b) Single Expert Report of Ms H dated 16 September 2024; and

(c) A letter from Dr J dated 18 November 2024 which became Exhibit ICL1.

1. During the trial, the Court heard from several witnesses. In the applicant's case, I heard from the applicant herself, as well as her parents Mr F and Mr E. On behalf of the respondent, I heard from her, Ms C, and Ms G. The respondent did not require Ms K to give evidence. All parties also had the opportunity to cross-examine Ms H, Regulation 7 Family Consultant ("the Single Joint Expert").

1. The applicable law is found in Part VII of the Act. The Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) ("the Amendment Act") came into effect on 6 May 2024 and made substantive amendments to the previous Act which apply to these proceedings. In determining parenting matters under Part VII of the Act the Court must still regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration: s 60CA.
2. The objects and principles of Part VII are set out at s 60B:

60B Objects of Part

The objects of this Part are:

(a) to ensure that the best interests of children are met, including by ensuring their safety; and

(b) to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child done at New York on 20 November 1989.

1. In regard to parental responsibility, the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility as created by the previous s 61DA of the Act has been abolished. Instead, s 61D(3) of the Act provides the Court with the ability to deal with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions in relation to children as follows:

61D Parenting orders and parental responsibility

...

(3) A parenting order that deals with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child (see subsection 64B(3)) may provide for joint or sole decision-making in relation to all or specified major long-term issues.

1. Section 61DAA of the Act provides the Court with an understanding of what joint decision-making about major long-term issues entails:

61DAA Effect of parenting order that provides for joint decision-making about major long-term issues

(1) If a parenting order provides for joint decision-making by persons in relation to all or specified major long-term issues in relation to a child, then, except to the extent the order otherwise specifies, the order is taken to require each of the persons:

(a) to consult each other person in relation to each such decision; and

(b) to make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision.

(2) To avoid doubt, this section does not require any other person to establish, before acting on a decision about the child communicated by one of those persons, that the decision has been made jointly.

1. Subject to any order to the contrary, s 61DAB clarifies that if a child is spending time with a person under a parenting order, the order is not taken to require that person to consult with a person who has parental responsibility about decisions that are made in relation to the child that are not major long-term issues.
2. Because s 60CA and s 60B refer to the best interests of the child, the Court must consider s 60CC which specifies how the Court determines what is in a child's best interests:

60CC How a court determines what is in a child's best interests

Determining child's best interests

(1) Subject to subsection (4), in determining what is in the child's best interests, the court must:

(a) consider the matters set out in subsection (2); and

(b) if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child - also consider the matters set out in subsection (3).

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), the court must consider the following matters:

(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:

(i) the child; and

(ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);

(b) any views expressed by the child;

(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;

(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;

(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;

(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.

(2A) In considering the matters set out in paragraph (2)(a), the court must include consideration of:

(a) any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the child); and

(b) any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.

(Emphasis in original)

1. The new legislative focus is on promoting the safety of children and carers, whereas the former provisions focused on protection from harm. The legislature must have intended there to be a distinction between the former provisions, which focused on protection from harm, and the current provisions which focus on the promotion of safety, otherwise the amendments would lack utility. As accepted by Parker J in Beumers & Stoica [2025] FedCFamC1F 695 at [44] , following an earlier decision of this Court in Melounis & Melounis (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 778 ("Melounis & Melounis (No 4)"), "the statutory requirement to promote safety involves advancing a positive outcome, which would necessarily include protection from harm but would not be limited to this". Pending guidance from the Full Court, the meaningful body of jurisprudence indicates that the amendments require a more nuanced, proactive and future-focused approach to considering the safety of children and those who care for them. This will be guided by historical risk assessment.
2. Acknowledging this, the Court cautions against lapsing into simplistic binaries such as contending that promoting safety is always different from protection from harm. The reality is much more nuanced. Every case is different. Perhaps in many cases it will make no difference which approach is adopted, but in other cases the nuanced, proactive and future-focused difference is very important to the child and carer.
3. It should further be noted that due to the repeal of the former s 65DAA of the Act, there is no longer the statutory requirement for the Court consider equal time or substantial and significant time. Cases that refer to this section will need to be carefully considered as to whether they still apply in limited ways, if at all.
4. The definition of family violence is found in s 4AB of the Act, reproduced below:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member) or causes the family member to be fearful.

(2) Examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence include (but are not limited to):

(a) an assault; or

(b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour; or

(c) stalking; or

(d) repeated derogatory taunts; or

(e) intentionally damaging or destroying property; or

(f) intentionally causing death or injury to an animal; or

(g) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that he or she would otherwise have had; or

(h) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member, or his or her child, at a time when the family member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support; or

(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with his or her family, friends or culture; or

(j) unlawfully depriving the family member, or any member of the family member's family, of his or her liberty.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, a child is exposed to family violence if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence.

(4) Examples of situations that may constitute a child being exposed to family violence include (but are not limited to) the child:

(a) overhearing threats of death or personal injury by a member of the child's family towards another member of the child's family; or

(b) seeing or hearing an assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family; or

(c) comforting or providing assistance to a member of the child's family who has been assaulted by another member of the child's family; or

(d) cleaning up a site after a member of the child's family has intentionally damaged property of another member of the child's family; or

(e) being present when police or ambulance officers attend an incident involving the assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family.

1. The section is both remedial and protective and as such should not be read down by artificial limitations (Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355).
2. Disputed allegations of family violence must be subjected to the same forensic rigour as any other contested factual issue (Edinger & Duy [2023] FedCFamC1A 194; (2023) 68 Fam LR 55). The party alleging the fact bears the burden of proving it (Wallaby Grip Ltd v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd (2010) 240 CLR 444 at [36]) and the standard of the burden is the balance of probabilities (s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)). The same point was recently made by the Full Court, though perhaps in less robust terms (Leventis & Leventis [2024] FedCFamC1A 141; (2024) FLC 94-204 at [13]-[19]).
3. The words "coerces" and "controls" can be found in the definition of family violence as set out in s 4AB(1) of the Act. However, these words are not defined in the Act.
4. There have been a number of authorities, both in Australia and in comparable jurisdictions, in which these words have been considered both separately and in combination (see, for example, Illgen & Yike [2018] FamCA 17; Ramzi & Moussa [2022] FedCFamC2F 1473; and F v M [2021] EWFC 4).
5. It is clear from these authorities that context is important. As stated by McClelland DCJ and Campton J in Carter & Wilson [2023] FedCFamC1A 9; (2023) FLC 94-129 ("Carter & Wilson") at [17]:

The mere fact that [a party's conduct] could fall within the example provided in s 4AB(2)(i) does not, in and of itself with nothing more, condemn the conduct as being family violence within that subsection.

(Emphasis in original)

1. The combination of the wide definition set out in s 4AB(1) and the non-exhaustive list in s 4AB(2) of the Act conveys the legislative intention of a broad category of potentially unacceptable conduct (Carter & Wilson at [75]). These wide terms catch behaviour that could be seen as either undesirable or necessary depending on the context (Carter & Wilson at [71]). Therefore, findings of fact need to be made and evidence evaluated in order to contextualise the conduct of the perpetrator (Carter & Wilson at [71] and [84]). The more subtle or ambiguous the behaviour is, the more detailed such an enquiry and evaluation must be (Carter & Wilson at [84]).
2. At paragraph 48 of Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249; (2024) FLC 94-230 ("Pickford & Pickford") the majority of the Full Court endorsed the following checklist:

When determining an allegation that a person has engaged in behaviour that coerces or controls a family member, a trial judge will undertake a forensic examination of all relevant evidence to:

(a) identify the behaviour about which complaint is made;

(b) identify the full context of the behaviour including any explanation that may be given by the alleged perpetrator;

(c) identify the impact of the behaviour on the alleged victim (mere assertion by the alleged victim that they feel coerced or controlled is insufficient);

(d) make all relevant factual findings; and

(e) explain why the behaviour in question is or is not family violence that coerces or controls the family member and if the alleged behaviour does not entail a course or pattern of conduct, explain how the behaviour can nevertheless be characterised as behaviour that coerces or controls, if so found.

1. An intention on the part of the perpetrator is not a necessary component of coercive or controlling behaviour under s 4AB of the Act (Carter & Wilson at [80]). In Pickford & Pickford at [46] Aldridge and Carew JJ, with McClelland DCJ agreeing, affirmed that:

In fulfilling the onus of proving an allegation of family violence that involves behaviour that coerces or controls, it is not necessary to prove the alleged perpetrator intended the behaviour to be so. That does not mean that intention is irrelevant, but it is not dispositive. A person who engages in such behaviour may be completely oblivious to the impact of their behaviour or they may believe that they are acting in such a way to protect the other family member. Notwithstanding that subjective belief, the behaviour may nevertheless coerce or control the other family member and fall within the definition of family violence.

1. Of particular relevance to this case are the comments in Pickford & Pickford of Aldridge and Carew JJ at [53] and Austin & Williams JJ at [94]:
   1. It must be recognised that, particularly in parenting matters, parents will often disagree. Matters may be seen as proper or as coercive or controlling depending on the circumstances. For example, a proposal that a child be seen by a particular doctor, that changeovers take place in a particular manner or that a certain person not be alone with the children are all capable of being seen as both reasonable and proper parenting proposals or may also be examples of coercive or controlling behaviour.

...

1. The evidence of parental conflict in this case was abundant, but it is important to observe how parental conflict and family violence are not one and the same thing. Parents can be in conflict without one perpetrating family violence upon the other. Mere disagreement between parties, even if voluble, is not necessarily family violence.

1. This family has been extensively involved with health professionals. In order to understand the vulnerabilities of the parents and children, it is important to understand their various diagnoses.

1. It is uncontroversial that in July 2016, the applicant was diagnosed with a chronic pain condition which manifests in her left ankle. This diagnosis stemmed from a workplace injury which occurred in mid-2016. In late 2016, the applicant was medically retired from her employment as a community worker. Significant medical intervention flowed from the applicant's chronic pain condition diagnosis. Dr L, Orthopaedic surgeon discussed surgery, however due to the developing symptoms of a chronic pain condition such as "colour and temperature changes and spasms" the surgery was delayed (Exhibit R27). The applicant was then referred to Dr M, pain specialist who facilitated various treatments such as "a ketamine infusion, an epidural catheter, local anaesthetic infusion and lumbar sympathectomy on three occasions" (Exhibit R27).
2. In or around August 2016, the applicant advised the respondent that she had been diagnosed with Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("C-PTSD") (Affidavit of Ms Galvez filed 28 April 2025, paragraph 27 ("respondent's affidavit")). During the relationship the applicant advised the respondent that her C-PTSD arose from being sexually assaulted as a child (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 29). Whilst the evidence is unclear as to a specific date of diagnosis and whether the applicant was diagnosed with both C-PTSD or PTSD, or only one specifically, the respondent's evidence aligns with the applicant's evidence during cross-examination such that she was firstly diagnosed with PTSD when she was "...about 25. 26." which would be between 2013 to 2015 (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.21 line 5). Nothing in this case turns on whether the applicant was diagnosed with C-PTSD or PTSD.
3. On 19 September 2016, Dr L was able to conduct the required surgery which the applicant reported gave her "very short-term relief" (Exhibit R27). In late 2016, the applicant had a trial of spinal cord stimulation and in January 2017 a permanent spinal cord stimulator was implanted. The applicant reported to Dr N, General Surgeon that the permanent spinal cord stimulator "did relieve her pain somewhat" and that prior to the implantation she was experiencing "constant, very severe pain" (Exhibit R27).
4. In March 2017, the applicant advised the respondent via text message that Dr O, Psychiatrist opined that she has bipolar disorder (Exhibit R28). The applicant was prescribed lithium but stopped taking this as she did not "like the side effects" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 30).
5. In November 2017, the applicant underwent a ketamine infusion which lasted seven days. This procedure is designed to "[reset] the neural pathways" to reduce the number of opioids taken by the applicant (Affidavit of Ms Kosinski filed 28 April 2025, paragraph 72 ("applicant's affidavit"). On 8 February 2018, Dr N completed an assessment of degree of permanent impairment and opined that the applicant had a whole-body impairment of 34% (Exhibit R27). At the time of her assessment with Dr N, the applicant reported taking "baclofen, gabapentin, Panadol and Coloxyl" in relation to her chronic pain condition and "clonidine, Valdoxan, and Pristiq" in relation to her mental health (Exhibit R27).
6. The respondent expressed concern that the applicant had a binge-eating disorder. The Court notes there has been no formal diagnosis of this, however the applicant confirmed during cross-examination that there have been periods where she would binge eat "in the past...[but is] unable to now, as [she has] a gastric sleeve" which was inserted in September 2019 (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.53 line 25). Further, whilst a date of diagnosis is unclear, it is not disputed that the applicant has been diagnosed with Parasomnia (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.32 line 5; respondent's affidavit, paragraph 31). The applicant described her experience with this condition as "just sleep eating" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.32 line 10) and further that her "psychiatrist thinks that it's very much stress induced" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.32 line 5).
7. In November 2019 the respondent contended that a wire in the applicant's spinal cord stimulator ceased working which led to the applicant increasing her medication intake (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 13). Further, the respondent alleged that between June 2017 to August 2018 and November 2019 to December 2020 the applicant would consume "roughly 40 tablets over four periods during the day, as well as four to eight tablets of Endone and four to eight tablets of Valium throughout the day as she required" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 11). Further, that these medications included "Lyrica, Gabapentin, Baclofen, Panadol Osteo, Brintellix, Pristiq, Endep, Valdoxan, Clonidine, Dexamphetamine, Lithium, Temazepam, Palexia, Endone, and Valium (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 11).
8. During a consultation on 16 December 2019 between the parents and Ms P, Psychotherapist it was noted that the applicant is "frequently suicidal" (Exhibit R16). The applicant did not dispute the assertion that this is what she reported, however she confirmed that "there is no intent" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.52 line 15).
9. In January 2020, the applicant underwent a second ketamine infusion which went for five days. The applicant experienced an adverse reaction to the second ketamine infusion such that she experienced a "drug induced psychosis" as a result and reported "10/10 pain" (Exhibit R7). In early 2020, the applicant was urgently admitted to the psychiatric ward at the Q Hospital due to her psychosis and suicidal ideation. As a result, the applicant was placed on anti-psychotic medication. In an assessment with Dr O dated 17 April 2020, it was recorded that the applicant was "depressed most of the time. She was suicidal after the Ketamine Infusion and tried to throw herself off a balcony" (Exhibit R7). In respect to this, the applicant confirmed that she was "in a psychosis induced by the ketamine infusion" and did not recall saying that she wanted to throw herself off a balcony (Transcript 12 May 2025, p51 line 20). She did not, however, deny stating as such. The applicant further attended upon the psychiatric ward for a period of two months for treatment in May 2020 (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 17).
10. On 20 July 2020, the applicant attended upon R Medical Centre and was provided with a referral for a psychiatrist. The referral noted that "there have been times when suicidal thought has been present in a passing way" (Exhibit R20). During cross-examination, the applicant explained that whilst this is something that she reported, "it is about the fact that it is incredibly hard to live in the way - in the pain that I do... I wish that this wasn't my life" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.53 line 10). The applicant consistently denied ever having any intent to self-harm during cross-examination.
11. In addition to the chronic pain condition, the applicant experiences some mental health conditions. The applicant does not refute her diagnoses of Major Depressive Disorder ("MDD") and Generalised Anxiety Disorder ("GAD") (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 84). A patient assessment and management plan completed by Dr O indicated that the applicant was "first diagnosed with depression aged 14" (Exhibit A20). The evidence did not outline an exact date that the applicant was diagnosed with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"). The respondent suggested that "[Dr O] diagnosed her with ADHD in February 2022" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 30) and a Report of Dr J dated 11 September 2023 indicated that "she was diagnosed with ADHD ~2018" (Exhibit R13). In any event, the applicant does not refute her ADHD diagnosis (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 22).
12. On 26 May 2022, the applicant was the victim of a sexual assault in her home. This resulted in the applicant requiring emergency surgery (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 47).
13. A report of Dr J dated 11 September 2023, indicated that the applicant experienced "intermittent panic attacks" and "fleeting suicidal ideation however denies intention - her children and parents are strong protective factors" (Exhibit R13).
14. The applicant's previous diagnosis of bipolar was rejected by Dr O in a letter to Dr S dated 4 March 2024 (Exhibit R11). Dr O confirmed that the applicant's "psychiatric diagnosis remains Major Depressive Disorder with Anxious Distress, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder caused by a serious assault and Attention Deficit Disorder" (Exhibit R11). It was further noted by Dr O that the applicant has withdrawn "pain medication and Diazepam as her pain has been less and she is coping better" (Exhibit R11). Nothing turns of the presence or absence of a diagnosis of bipolar in this matter.
15. On 12 March 2024, the applicant had a surgery to treat cellulitis (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 78).
16. On 2 September 2024, the applicant advised the Single Joint Expert that she has "an underlying addiction to opiates" (Single Joint Expert Report dated 16 September 2024, paragraph 67 ("Expert Report")). The applicant elaborated on her statement in cross-examination and suggested that she has:

been taking opiate medication since 2016... So I do have an underlying opiate addiction, which means that every time I take this medication for pain, it means that when I stop taking them, there is a couple of days where I am unwell, which means I'm nauseous, I have a headache. That is where my addiction is. My addiction is in not going and sourcing them and using them in a way that I shouldn't be, it is simply that I get nauseous from not taking them because I've been taking them 10 years.

(Transcript 12 May 2025, p.25-26 lines 45-5).

1. The respondent asserted that the applicant has engaged in self-harming behaviours and that she has observed "a series of scars at the top of her thigh" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 46). The applicant refuted this and produced a medical certificate from Dr S dated 24 April 2025 which clarified "there is no evidence of acute self-harm on the thighs of [the applicant]" (Exhibit A11). Despite the medical certificate, the respondent maintained her view that the applicant has scars on her thigh, and she recalled "them to be quite high on her thigh, meaning that depending on what type of underwear she was even wearing, they may or may not have been visible" and "there is a chance they may have been missed, depending on what part of the thighs were examined" (Transcript 13 May 2025, p.176 line 5-10).
2. The Court makes the following observations about the applicant's medical conditions. Her medical conditions, including her mental health, are complex but appear well managed. The respondent commenced the relationship with the applicant in 2016 and was well aware of these medical and mental health issues. They started a family anyway. Prior to separation in 2022, as the respondent was working full-time, most of the parenting was undertaken by the applicant. Notwithstanding all of these medical and mental health issues, the applicant and respondent entered into a parenting plan which broadly reflects the current parenting arrangements in July 2023. The Court finds that historically, none of these medical and mental health conditions prevented the applicant from adequately caring for the children.

1. On 16 May 2022, the respondent underwent a psychiatric evaluation to assess her suitability to return to work, as part of her employment with the Defence Force. A letter from Dr T to Dr U dated 19 May 2022 (Exhibit A12), indicated that the respondent has an avoidant attachment style, was dysregulated and was inconsistent with what she was reporting. It was observed that the respondent "appears to throw her energy into work as a distraction from her personal issues" (Exhibit A12). Dr T did not recommend that the respondent return to work.
2. On 7 June 2022, the respondent attended upon Dr V for a second opinion regarding diagnosis and management following five months of fluctuating mood and anxiety symptoms. The second opinion also extended to a review of her initial fitness to return to work assessment of Dr T. Dr V found no evidence to support a current axis 1 diagnosis which includes a diagnosis of pervasive mood disorder, anxiety disorder or trauma related disorder (Exhibit R22). It was noted that the respondent expressed hyper-vigilance and anxiety in relation to recent events which occurred between the parents. However, it was recommended that the respondent receive a ground posting while she is managing multiple complex social and carer stressors, and further that the respondent engage in domestic violence support services.
3. In November 2022, the respondent was diagnosed with PTSD by her psychologist, Ms W (Transcript 14 May 2025, p.232 lines 5-15). It was reported to the Single Joint Expert by the respondent that the PTSD diagnosis arose as a result of the applicant's violence towards her and that it has been recommended, she cease any face-to-face contact with the applicant (Expert Report, paragraph 72). Symptoms such as "hypervigilance, flashbacks, rumination about the nature of the relationship, and physical symptoms (shaking, heart racing, rapid breathing rate)" are experienced by the respondent (Expert Report, paragraph 72). Despite these symptoms, she maintains that her ability to provide safe and emotionally responsive care is not impeded upon. The Court agrees with this assertion. It is noted that the respondent also received a diagnosis of C-PTSD by Ms W, however, was unable to provide an exact date of diagnosis. It is the respondent's evidence that her diagnosis' of C-PTSD and PTSD existed simultaneously and were both made in November 2022 by Ms W (Transcript 14 May 2025, p.232 lines 5-15).
4. The Court finds, by way of overview, that the conditions the respondent experiences were probably related to the nature of the relationship with the applicant, and its subsequent breakdown. The decision by her employer to ground-post her was probably an exacerbating factor given the respondent's understandable commitment to her career. Like the applicant, the respondent was actively involved in the parenting of the children notwithstanding the medical conditions that she experienced. Moreover, it is uncontested that the children continue to live with her.

1. The children have had numerous interactions with medical professionals relative to their short lives. This began when the children were born with bilateral talipes (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 155). Three months after their birth they underwent surgery, as well as a series of plaster casts to correct their physical development. For three months following their surgery, the children were required to wear boots with a bar held between their feet for 23-hours per day. Thereafter and until the children reached the age of two and a half years, they wore their boots with the bar for 14-hours per day (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 155).
2. The children experience eczema, particularly when they were newborns, however this was appropriately managed with prescription steroid creams. Further, the children have both been diagnosed with perioral dermatitis which is managed with prescription topical cream (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 157).
3. In October 2021, Dr Z diagnosed the children with a lactose intolerance. In December 2021, their diagnosis was updated to also include a Cow's Milk Protein Intolerance ("CMPI"). Although, it is noted, that "at present the children appear to have grown out of their CMPI" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 158).
4. On 23 December 2022, Y was diagnosed with an eye infection, and this was treated with antibiotics (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 149).
5. Y has also been diagnosed with an immune system reaction. This diagnosis arose after an incident in February 2023 where he experienced hives across his body after being prescribed medication for an ear infection (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 160).
6. Within the children's first 18-months of life they regularly attended upon the emergency room at AA Hospital BB Clinic due to respiratory issues. Despite not having a formal diagnosis, both children have active asthma action plans and are on a preventor puffer due to their symptoms. This is managed by their general practitioner and paediatrician (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 159).
7. On 28 July 2023, the children were assessed by CC Disability Service Provider. Based on this assessment, the children were referred to CC Disability Service Provider's Early Supports department for further assessment and observation (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 167).
8. The children have also suffered from re-occurring ear infections. In September 2023, the children commenced attending upon Dr DD, ENT specialist due to a fluid build-up in their ears. The children attend upon Dr DD every three-months to have their fluid levels checked.
9. In December 2023 and January 2024, CC Disability Service Provider's Early Supports department conducted observations of the children. A "developmental concern regarding expressive language" for the children was observed (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 167).
10. On 15 March 2024, X was diagnosed with cellulitis in his foot, and this was managed with antibiotics (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 152).
11. On 23 and 24 September 2024, the children attended speech assessments. It was concluded that the children display traits in line with Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD") and it was recommended that further assessment be undertaken (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 173). The children attended upon Ms EE at FF Clinic in December 2024 for further assessment. The respondent received a letter on 6 December 2024, which stated that "in one home significant traits of autism are reported, while in the other home, these have not been observed" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 166). The ASD assessment remains ongoing.
12. The children met with Ms GG, physiotherapist in December 2024 when they were approximately three and a half years old, and it was noted that the children had a neurological condition in both legs that would have typically disappeared by 3-months of age. This was followed up with Dr HH, paediatrician in January 2025, however it was not of urgent concern and a non-urgent referral to neurology was made (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 156).
13. On 28 January 2025, the children attended upon Dr DD for the purpose of having their ears checked. Unfortunately, their fluid levels had significantly increased, and surgery was recommended (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 162).
14. On 29 January 2025, the children attended upon Dr HH. Y was diagnosed with "developmental delays including expressive language delay, sensory processing and emotional regulation concerns", additionally, it was noted that Y suffers from bilateral ear effusions (Exhibit A3). Dr HH noted that Y experienced challenges with "engagement and interactions, communication skills, postural control and stability, praxis, coordination and activities of daily living" (Exhibit A3). X received the following diagnosis': "developmental delays, mild receptive and moderate expressive language delays, speech sound disorder, bilateral ear effusions, sensory processing, emotional regulation, engagement and interaction concerns, postural control, stability, praxis and coordination concerns" (Exhibit A3).
15. In early 2025, the children underwent surgery, and they had grommets implanted and X also had his adenoids removed (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 162).
16. It is noted that the children "have NDIS funding of $30,000 to fund their occupational speech therapy and psychologist appointments" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p15 line 45).
17. The Court observes that all conditions experienced by this family would have placed strain on the parenting capacity of both the applicant and the respondent and yet, they have both managed well under the circumstances. This resilience was hindered, no doubt, by the parents declining ability to communicate as their relationship headed towards breakdown. After separation, the parental conflict likewise hindered and distracted both parents from their primary task which was to focus on the best interests of their children. Notwithstanding the formidable challenges that these children faced, and notwithstanding the personal challenges confronted by both their parents, on any objective basis it is clear that the needs of the children have always been met.

1. The issues that remain to be determined by the Court are as follows:

(1) Whether an order for sole major long-term decision-making ought to be made, and whether this ought to be subject to any conditions;

(2) What time the children ought to spend with the applicant;

(3) Whether the respondent should be permitted to relocate interstate with the children;

(4) Whether a first option to care order should be made;

(5) Whether orders should be made which permit the respondent to travel internationally with the children;

(6) Should both parents be permitted to attend the children's activities;

(7) What restraints, if any, should be made for these parents.

1. The Court notes what Austin and Williams JJ said in Pickford & Pickford at [87]:

Even if the parties did inadvisedly challenge one another about disputed allegations of historical family violence, either in cross-examination or by duelling submissions, given how the disputed allegations did not seem genuinely material to the outcome of the narrow parenting issue left to decide, one wonders why it was necessary for his Honour to appease the parties by engaging with their debate. It is apposite to observe how judges need not make findings to resolve contested facts unless the findings authentically influence the outcome. In fact, the High Court of Australia has expressly cautioned against unnecessary factual findings in the context of risk assessment (M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 at 76-77) ("M v M"). So has this Court (Eastley & Eastley [2022] FedCFamC1A 101; (2022) FLC 94-094 at [18] and [31]) ("Eastley").

1. Despite the relatively minor differences between the parties' proposals of time between the applicant and the children (being some two nights per fortnight), it is nevertheless necessary to make findings of family violence in this matter. This is consistent with s 60CG of the Act. The findings in these circumstances offer context for the attitudes and behaviour by the parties which flowed from family violence between the parents. The issues in relation to the safety of the children are nuanced and best understood in all of the available context.
2. To make a finding of fact the Court "must feel an actual persuasion" as to its existence (Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361) ("Briginshaw")). Actual persuasion should not be produced by "inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences" (Briginshaw at [362]). Actual persuasion is a state of subjective belief or state of mind held by the tribunal of fact, which may be unattainable if the material for decision is "slight, general or scanty" (Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [255] ("Hellicar")). In reaching a state of actual persuasion, it is necessary for the Court to assess the combined weight of all evidence, including circumstantial evidence, as a unified whole (Wei & Xia [2024] FedCFamC1A 65; (2024) FLC 94-186 at [163]).

1. In mid-2022, after the applicant was released from hospital following a violent sexual assault which required emergency surgery, there was an altercation between the parents. The applicant alleged that the respondent had told her and others that she would be "removing the children from [the applicant's] care" (applicant affidavit, paragraph 51), and then later denied saying this. Further, the applicant alleged that she told the respondent she should temporarily take the children into her care to allow the applicant time to process her recent sexual assault.
2. Seemingly, this prompted the respondent to contact the applicant's father to return to the former matrimonial home to provide care for the applicant. It was conceded by the applicant that she threw the respondent's phone onto the floor tiles (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 53). The Court notes that a photograph of the phone taken after this event was tendered and the glass screen appears shattered (Exhibit R31). The applicant contended that this behaviour was "out of character" for her and was contextualised by her being "traumatised and in pain". Nevertheless, the applicant conceded that her behaviour was "completely unacceptable" (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 54).
3. The respondent presented a far more heightened version of events. On the respondent's version she raised the seriousness of the danger that the children were put in by the applicant's conduct of inviting a stranger into their home (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 116). Further, the respondent seemingly challenged the applicant as to her version of events from the night of the sexual assault, contrasting between what the applicant reported to the respondent and to Ms K.
4. The respondent alleged that the argument escalated throughout the day resulting in the applicant being "curled up in the foetal position on her bed rocking back and forth, alternating between screaming and sobbing" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 118). It was at this point that the respondent contacted the applicant's father, so that she would not be alone after the respondent left the former matrimonial home. It is alleged that the applicant became angered by the respondent's choice to contact her father, and she thereafter grabbed the applicant's phone and threw it at the tiles (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 118).
5. The Court accepts the version of events of the respondent. It is consistent with a contemporaneous text message exchange between the parents on 28 May 2025 (Exhibit R32). A text message from the applicant reads "that has sent me into a spiral that could have been avoided" which is consistent with the respondent's recount of the applicant "alternating between screaming and sobbing" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 118). Further, another message from the applicant reads "You called me a liar. You told me you don't believe me" which is consistent with the respondent challenging the applicant's version of events in relation to the sexual assault (Exhibit R32). The respondent's version of events is further confirmed by the text message exchange between the applicant and Ms K relating to this incident (Exhibit R43). The applicant expressed to Ms K "I am so angry at her. She just kept going... And that I can't be trusted with the boys. And I just snapped. She called my dad" (Exhibit R43). The messages sent by the applicant suggest that she was in an aggravated and perhaps aggressive state, as described by the respondent in her evidence and that this caused, in whole or in part, the respondent to contact her father on this occasion. Further adding to the likely veracity of the respondents account is the applicant's concession that this event happened in front of the children and that she was "probably raising [her] voice" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.73 lines 5-10).
6. The Court finds that this episode of physical family violence occurred. The violence must be understood in the context of the highly traumatic events that occurred on two days prior. Nonetheless, the respondent was acting in a child focused, protective manner, by removing the children and herself from the home. Credit must also be given to the applicant for suggesting to the respondent "it might be best to temporarily take the children and herself to the residence of her parents so that [she] would be able to process the events" (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 52). This suggests that the applicant is capable of reflecting on her own situation and to prioritise the children's need for safety when processing traumatic events.

1. In mid-2022, the parents engaged in an altercation. On the applicant's version of events an argument became heated when the respondent found out that she, the applicant, had recently seen her ex-girlfriend, Ms JJ, which led to the respondent accusing the applicant of "lying about the sexual assault... [and] then she told me that I would never see the children again" (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 56). The applicant asserted that she physically attempted to stop the respondent from leaving the house and conceded that she pushed her to the ground. The applicant's explanation for this conduct was that she was "terrified that the children would be taken from [her]" (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 56). Whilst on the ground the respondent conceded that she "deliberately kicked" the applicant's left leg which "aggravated [her] [chronic pain condition]" (applicants' affidavit, paragraph 59; respondent's affidavit, paragraph 122). Some twenty-minutes later, the New South Wales Police Force ("the police") arrived at the former matrimonial home.
2. Once again, the respondent's version of events differs from the applicants. The respondent alleged that the altercation escalated due to her acknowledging that she was aware that the applicant slept with her ex-girlfriend Ms JJ the night after the parents separated. After this acknowledgment, the applicant conceded that she repeatedly asked, "who told you?" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 122; Transcript 12 May 2025, p. 79 line 15-20). The respondent alleged that the applicant physically blocked her exit from the former matrimonial home, pushed her "backwards and pinned [her] against the back door", "threw [her] to the ground" on multiple occasions, "kicked [her] repeatedly on the ground", "threw" a bag at her, and tried to prevent her from calling the police (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 122). During this incident, the respondent asserted that she was fearful that the applicant would sexually assault her (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 122). The respondent screamed "HELP!" and "HELP ME!" when attempting to leave the premises (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 122). The applicant confirmed that the respondent said "let me go. Let me go" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p. 79 line 5). Upon getting out the house, the respondent called the police.
3. During cross-examination, the applicant conceded that she pushed the respondent on more than one occasion and that she did kick the respondent (Transcript 12 May 2025, p. 80-81, lines 15-40). Indeed, the applicant also conceded that her version of events was "incredibly minimising" but offered an alternate perspective that her version of events could be seen as a "summarised version" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p. 84-85 lines 40-5).
4. Following the event, the police arrived at the former matrimonial home and arrested the applicant. A provisional ADVO was taken for the protection of the respondent (Exhibit R33). The application for the provisional ADVO contains a version of events which corroborate the respondent's version (Exhibit R33). The Court finds that an episode of physical domestic violence occurred on 1 June 2022 which was perpetrated by the applicant upon the respondent. Consistent with this finding, the applicant plead guilty to the charge of assault, and a final ADVO was issued on 14 February 2023 and expired on 13 February 2025 (Exhibit R34).
5. The applicant expressed deep regret for her actions, accepting that "there is no excuse for the behaviour that occurred" and she offered the context that the altercation occurred "after an incredibly physically and psychologically traumatic event" (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 57). The Court reiterates that an explanation is not an excuse, nonetheless, it provides context for this physical assault.

1. The respondent made allegations that the applicant "often would continue sex after I had asked her to stop". She asserted that she would "physically push her away" and told her to "stop" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 84). The applicant categorically denied that she ever sexually assaulted the applicant (Transcript 13 May 2025, p.124 lines 10-15). The available evidence presented in relation to this particular allegation is insufficient for any finding to be made.

Preventing the respondent from keeping connections with her family

1. The respondent alleged that the applicant "systematically isolated" her from her family, and that this commenced from April 2018 after their marriage (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 80). The respondent provided some examples of issues the applicant had with the respondent's mother including; Ms G allegedly saying that she "doesn't want [the applicant] on the birth certificates [of the children]" and sharing the applicant's medical information with the respondent's cousin (respondent's affidavit, paragraphs 81-82). The applicant denied that she didn't want the respondent to have a relationship with her family and clarified that she herself did not want a relationship with the respondent's family. Additionally, the applicant conceded that at the time of the Expert Report interviews, being 2 September 2024, she also did not wish for the children to have a relationship with respondent's family (Transcript 13 May 2025, p.126 lines 35-45). The applicant explained to the Single Joint Expert that she did not wish to pursue a relationship with the respondent's family because they were "incredibly intrusive" and had "no respect for [the applicant's] personal boundaries" (Expert Report, paragraph 43).
2. The respondent tendered an array of text messages between the parents from 27 May 2021 in relation to the respondent's comment of saying that the children are "[Galvez] babies" (Exhibit R30). It is clear from the text messages that the applicant is very hurt and offended by Ms G's comment and that she wanted the respondent to cease contact with Ms G. The applicant persisted with this view despite the respondent saying she has "made enormous changes" in her relationship with her family but nonetheless is content to try and find a path forward with them.
3. During cross-examination the respondent alleged that prior to and post relationship with the applicant her relationship with her parents was strong. Yet, she also admitted to ceasing contact "for a number of months" with her father post separation and utilising formal therapy to repair such relationship (Transcript 14 May 2025, p. 201 line 5).
4. The Court does not have enough evidence to make a finding that the applicant systematically isolated the respondent. It is clear however, that the relationship between the applicant and the respondent's family was volatile.

1. The respondent alleged that the applicant was emotionally and psychologically abusive and weaponised her thoughts of suicidal ideation. One example was that at some point between late 2016 and early 2017, the applicant commented to the respondent "if you didn't come home for lunch each day, I probably wouldn't still be alive by the time you got home after work" (Expert Report, paragraph 78). The applicant took responsibility for saying this, however denied any intent to follow through on this seeming threat. Nonetheless, the Court finds, her statement was manipulative and sought to control the respondent.
2. Another example is in December 2017, where the applicant said "I don't know if I'll still be alive when you get back" in the context of her undergoing a medical procedure and the respondent being required to travel for work (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 39). Whilst the applicant asserted that her comments are "all a figure of speech" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.56 line 5), these comments must be viewed in the context of the prior example and in the shadow of the applicant allegedly saying to the respondent during their time living in City KK Victoria from 2017 to 2019 "Look, if I ever actually wanted to do it, I would just take all my meds at once. I've got enough in the drawer to take care of it" (Transcript 13 May 2025, p.170 line 45). It is uncontroversial that the applicant reported feeling suicidal throughout the relationship to both the respondent and her various treaters. The statements made by the applicant have an undertone of control designed to have the respondent adjust to her preferences. The Court finds that the applicant did have a tendency to emotionally manipulate the respondent, whether or not her intent was to do so (Pickford & Pickford at [51]).
3. The evidence points to a finding that the applicant did perpetrate family violence on the respondent. Nonetheless, the Court reiterates that this family is vulnerable. A determination in the best interests of the children can only be achieved by assessing the broader detailed context of this family. This includes the history of parenting arrangements which, the Court will find, is inconsistent with any concern of the respondent about the applicant's parenting capacity.

1. The Expert Report was based on interviews with the parents and Ms C. Observations conducted took place on 2 September 2024. All references within this section should be construed as referring to the Expert Report unless explicitly stated otherwise.
2. The Single Joint Expert opined that sole long-term decision-making ought to be granted to the respondent, with the requirement that the applicant be given the opportunity to express her views and provide information prior to any long-term decision being made (paragraph 124). She accurately noted that the co-parenting relationship for these parents is "non-existent" as per the applicant (paragraph 17) and that the co-parenting relationship is "generally characterised by high conflict" as per the respondent (paragraph 18). The Single Joint Expert opined that the applicant's "lack of empathy" towards the respondent has implications for the co-parenting relationship (paragraph 116). During cross-examination, the Single Joint Expert stated that the during the interview the applicant commented words to the effect of "considering [the respondent] has dropped bombs on people, it's a pretty extreme reaction that she has had" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.328 line 40). This comment was made in reference to the respondents PTSD allegedly caused by the applicant. This provides context to her earlier statement impugning the applicant's empathy.
3. The Single Joint Expert agreed that where the parents had attempted to share the long-term decision making in the post-separation period there had been "quite a bit of conflict" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.327 line 45). On this basis, the Single Joint Expert concluded that it is not anticipated that the co-parenting relationship will develop to be "fluid and flexible" and the parents require "clear orders... about communication which does not occur face to face" (paragraph 110).
4. The Court agrees and accepts the evidence above, as it is entirely consistent with the totality of the evidence before the Court. The prognosis for co-parenting is extremely poor. The Court is cognisant of the applicant's proposed 'carve out' of decision-making in relation to the management of the children's medical conditions. But, as the Single Joint Expert has identified, and as is plainly evident, the parents are unable to make joint decisions.
5. In relation to whom the children ought to live with, the Single Joint Expert recommended that the children live with the respondent (paragraph 125). The Single Joint Expert opined that the respondent "has the greater capacity to provide for the needs of the children and that the children are provided with safe and appropriate parenting in her care" (paragraph 119). An order for the children to live with the respondent is uncontested in this case. The Court does have some reservations, however, about the Single Joint Expert's assessment about the superiority of the respondent's parenting capacity.
6. The Single Joint Expert recommended that the children spend time with the applicant three nights per fortnight from Friday to Monday (paragraph 126). If the respondent is permitted to relocate outside of City RR, it was recommended that the children spend time with the applicant on four occasions per school term, with two occasions occurring in City RR (paragraph 127). The Single Joint Expert agreed that reducing the number of changeovers and consecutive nights that the children were to spend with the applicant would assist in minimising the respondent's anxiety (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.328 lines 10-15). Further, it was stated that "minimising contact and communication between [the parents] is likely to be in [the respondent's], and subsequently, the children's, best interest" (paragraph 107). Once again, whilst the Court has reservations about the Single Joint Expert's recommendations to time, the principles stated above are accepted.
7. In relation to school holiday time, the Single Joint Expert supported the children spending week about time with the applicant so as to not overextend "the coping capacity" of the respondent (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.330 lines 40-45). The Single Joint Expert further proffered that this arrangement would provide "opportunities to go camping or do holiday-based experiences with that parent, but it's not overextending it, so they get the best of each parent" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.331 line 5). It was noted, however, that the time the children spend during the school holidays with the applicant should "increase gradually" to "allow the children the greatest opportunity to adjust to any changes" (Transcript 15 May 2025. P.331 lines 15-20). The Court agrees.
8. A 'first option care' order for the non-caring parent to assume care of the children when the other parent is unable to do so, was not supported by the Single Joint Expert. This is attributable to the "limitations identified in relation to [the applicant's] capacity to care for the children for extended periods of time" (paragraph 122). When put to the Single Joint Expert, she agreed that any order for the first option care would limit the "opportunities for extended family members to spend time with those children" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.327 line 30). The Court wholeheartedly accepts this recommendation. To make the order proposed by the applicant only increases the opportunity for parental conflict.
9. The Single Joint Expert did not provide a recommendation in relation to the respondent's potential re-location due to its inherent logistical uncertainties (paragraphs 111-112). However, the Single Joint Expert clarified during cross-examination that "the priority, in my view, would be for [the children] to live with [the respondent]" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.332 lines 5). This is interpreted as meaning, where safe to do so, the children ought to have the opportunity to have a meaningful relationship with the applicant. Further during cross-examination, the Single Joint Expert confirmed that she was not opposed to any re-location but rather commented that the children's time with the applicant would "look different" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p. 331 line 35).
10. The Court notes both that the Single Expert Report writer did not have the benefit of any of the applicant's filed documents at the time of the report and, of course, did not have the benefit the Court enjoys of access to the totality of the evidence at the hearing, including the cross-examination of both parents. She conceded that the former was a limitation (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.316 line 20).

How should parental responsibility and authority pertaining to major long-term issues be allocated?

1. The Court has been asked to determine whether the respondent should hold sole parental responsibility for all long-term decisions for the children or whether this ought to be subject to certain conditions as proposed by the applicant. The applicant proposed that major long-term decision-making should be shared jointly in relation to the children's cognitive, developmental and behavioural health (the applicant's proposal, Order 3), and that any other long-term decisions made solely by the respondent be subject to the applicant expressing her views in writing (applicant's proposal, Order 2). In determining this question, the Court must view the evidence broadly whilst considering what arrangement would be in the children's best interests.
2. The applicant contended that her proposal ought to be made as she holds serious concerns that the respondent "is not attuned to the children's developmental needs". She asserts that identified "the children's delayed speech" and the respondent "does not [take] action unless specifically directed by a doctor or medical professional" (Transcript 16 May 2025, p. 356-357 lines 45-5). The Court accepts that the applicant has had a very active role in managing the children's diagnoses and appointments despite the formidable challenges she has experienced with her own physical and mental health. However, when the Court queried how the applicant's proposal would work in reality, counsel for the applicant asserted that:

whilst there has been back-and-forth and disagreements on how it does work, it clearly has worked, because the children are engaged in speech pathology, occupational therapy, and are now being assessed for autism. It's not ideal by any means, but they can do it.

(Transcript 16 May 2025, p.358 lines 25-30).

1. The Court agrees that the communication and conduct between the parents has not been "ideal". Nonetheless, the children are admirably engaged in the appropriate services to support them. The applicant was unable to identify any methods which would provide the Court with any reassurance that the proposal would not only work but be in the best interests of the children.
2. The respondent does not oppose an order which requires her to consult with the applicant in relation to long-term decision-making. However, the respondent sought an order be crafted which limits the applicant from sending multiple communications in respect to a decision to "avoid and remove any residual conflict" (Transcript 16 May 2025, p.372 lines 25-30).
3. The Independent Children's Lawyer has indicated that they do not support the orders as proposed by the applicant in relation to decision-making. The orders proposed by the applicant could not be endorsed due to the parents "inability to constructively communicate", the "profound lack of trust" between them, and the likelihood that the parents will never develop a "flexible" relationship (Transcript 16 May 2025, p.348-349 lines 35-5).
4. Where there is such a profound lack of trust and communication between these parents, the Court is not satisfied that an order for shared decision-making would be in the children's bests interests, and as such the Court has declined to make order three of the applicant's proposal. The Court does, however, support the requirement for the respondent to allow the applicant to provide a response within seven days to express any opinion or support for a long-term decision. This order, of course, does not apply in the case of a genuine emergency which does not permit enough time to allow the applicant to be appraised of the issue and respond prior to any decision being made. The Court also supports the request of the respondent to have any written communication in relation to each long-term issue to be limited to one communication. In the context of this case, the Court supports an order being made so as to limit the opportunity for further conflict.
5. The parents agreed that the final orders should be sufficient authority to enable each parent to discuss the children with any treaters or schools that they attend upon (applicant's proposal, Orders 25-26; respondent's proposal, Orders 10.7-11.2; Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal, Orders 13(a) and (b)). The respondent's proposal at Orders 10.7 to 11.2 will be adopted for this purpose.

Should the respondent be permitted to re-locate?

1. It is a well-established principle that parenting proceedings involving relocation are to be determined in the same method in which all parenting proceedings are determined. Otherwise put, there is no 'special' category of parenting cases distinguishable by 'relocation' alone, all matters under Part VII of the Act must follow the same legislative framework and craft orders that are, principally, in the best interests of the children. In Zahawi & Rayne [2016] FamCAFC 90 at [47]-[48]; citing U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238 at [92], the Full Court noted:

[47] All applications for parenting orders before the court involve a situation that, axiomatically, is not in the children's best interests. What is best for children is that their parents co-parent by agreement and without conflict and as selflessly as circumstances reasonably allow. When parents are unable to agree, the parents' proposals embraced in competing applications involve, again axiomatically, advantages and disadvantages for the children, each and all of which have ramifications for the children's best interests. Concomitantly, Gummow and Callinan JJ said in U v U:

...The reality is that maternity and paternity always have an impact upon the wishes and mobility of parents: obligations both legal and moral, the latter sometimes lasting a lifetime, restrictive of personal choice and movement have been incurred.

[48] "Relocation cases" are no different from other applications for parenting orders in that respect. Like all applications for parenting orders, an application to have the children live with a parent significantly geographically remote from the other parent is to be determined by the children's best interests. However, the issues in a "relocation case" are, by reason of the proposed geographical separation of parents from their children, often significantly more acute and all the more so in cases of proposed international relocation. And, of course, that same factor will usually render more acute the burden or burdens to be borne by one parent or the other, including restrictions on their freedoms.

1. In Adamson & Adamson [2014] FamCAFC 232; (2014) FLC 93-622 at 79,700 the Full Court said:

[65] It follows from the decisions of the High Court in AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160 and U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238 that in parenting proceedings there is no requirement for a parent to demonstrate "compelling reasons" to live where the parent proposes to live, be that a proposed new location or, axiomatically, in their current place of residence. Here, the mother was no more required to demonstrate "compelling reasons" for her choice to remain living in Town S than was the father to so do with respect to his choice to live in Town C or for either to not live anywhere else. The same may be said of their respective choices of employment, the mother's in Town S and the father's in Sydney. The Court must be sensitive to the wishes and rights of parents to live and work wherever they desire. (U v U at [82] citing AMS v AIF).

[66] These rights, and the right of freedom of mobility of a parent, only defer to the paramount consideration of a child's best interests where those interests would be so adversely affected as to justify such interference; and then the interference is legitimate only to the extent that it is necessary to avoid such adverse effects.

1. In Sayer & Radcliffe and Anor [2012] FamCAFC 209; (2012) 48 Fam LR 298, the Full Court said:

[48] A requirement in relocation cases is that judges faced with a parent wanting to relocate must consider the competing proposals of both parents: see Palmer (No 2) at [76]; Morgan at [80] - [81]. It is not simply a matter of comparing the relocating party's proposal against the status quo and allowing or denying relocation. Rather the court must consider each party's proposal on its merits, in accordance with the prescribed legislative pathway.

1. In the present case, the respondent sought an order which would permit her to "relocate and change the residence of the Children interstate, from time to time, if required to relocate as a result of her employment with the Australian Defence Force" (respondent's proposal, Order 14). This order is opposed by the applicant and the Independent Children's Lawyer.
2. The applicant expressed concerns that the respondent struggles to promote a relationship between the applicant and the children, and that the effect of any lack of positive endorsement of a relationship would be exacerbated in circumstances where re-location is permitted. On this belief, the applicant sought a mutual restraint that neither parent be permitted to relocate to an area that would require any change to the parenting orders (applicant's proposal, Order 29). The Independent Children's Lawyer contended that an order, as proposed by the respondent, in such ambiguous terms ought to not be made due to the lack of evidence which is proximate to the proposed course of action. Consequently, the Independent Children's Lawyer sought a restraint that the respondent be injuncted from re-locating the "children's residence further than 30 minutes driving time from the Suburb D Post Office without the prior written consent of the applicant" (Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal, Order 16). The Court shares the concerns of both the applicant and the Independent Children's Lawyer in relation to the proposed re-location.
3. The Court holds serious concerns in relation to the respondent's capacity to actively support and encourage a continued relationship between the children and the applicant. The evidence underpinning the Court's concern will be discussed below. The lack of active support for a relationship between the applicant and children is important not just in the context of the respondent's proposed relocation, which will axiomatically create further geographical and potentially emotional distance between the children and the applicant. These concerns also reflect poorly on the respondent's capacity to provide for the emotional needs of the children, as well as her attitudes to the children and to the responsibilities of parenthood.

1. On 14 May 2025 the respondent was cross-examined about her proposal to relocate the children (Transcript 14 May 2025, p.227-228). She agreed with the following propositions:
   • It was unlikely that she would have family to assist her when she re-located;
   • The respondent and Ms C planned to have more children;
   • She could not tell the Court how her further children would be cared for in circumstances where Ms C would be responsible for changeover of her current children;
   • She could not tell the Court where or when she would be re-locating;
   • Given the medical needs of the children, she could not tell the Court who their medical practitioners would be, or how their current diagnoses would impact on their ability to cope with the change of a relocation; and
   • When asked whether she was able to advocate for herself within the DEFENCE FORCE to remain in City RR, she explained that she had limited power as "is service requirements will always trump personal preference".

1. The respondent was then taken to paragraph 57 of her affidavit of 11 March 2024, which became Exhibit A21. The paragraph is reproduced below:

I work 32 hours per week for the [Defence Force] in a headquarters role, which provides stability for local living, as indicated in a letter from my employer which is annexed and marked "D". I work a non-deployable role that allows me to only work four days a week, with significant flexibility afforded to allow me to take the children to appointments during work hours when required. My non-deployable role has been offered to me until January 2027. At this time, I do not expect to deploy for years, and it may be that once my current non-deploying posting is complete that I re-negotiate another posting of a similar nature, or that I leave Defence and commence work as a Contractor for [...] or [...]. My work history and experience will enable me to continue to live in the [Region SS] region and care of the children. My work is extremely flexible with my workdays and my start and finish times.

(Emphasis in original)

1. When the respondent was confronted with the evidence she had given on oath just over a year before the present hearing, she accepted that she may be able to negotiate a posting similar to the current one, but "it's not a guarantee though" (Transcript 14 May 2025, p.228 line 30). The respondent was reminded about her evidence in relation to external work as a contractor, and she explained that in her opinion, leaving the Defence Force could significantly decrease her ability to provide for her children and was, in any event, not her preference due to her alignment with the values of serving in the military. She agreed, however, that she had not given any evidence about the potential income she could earn as a contractor. She also agreed that the children's relationship with the applicant could be impacted by a relocation (Transcript 14 May 2025, p.229 line 10).
2. The Court agrees that the respondent's evidence on this issue is inconsistent. In paragraph 57 of her affidavit of 11 March 2024, she was content to paint a picture of stability for the children notwithstanding her posting. She emphasised how her work history and experience would enable her to continue to live in the Region SS and care for the children. In substance, this is inconsistent with her current highly unspecified proposal, which could be anything but stable for the children.

Promoting the relationship between the applicant and the children

1. Ms G facilitates changeovers and telephone communication between the respondent and the children. During cross-examination she was asked if she ever spoke about the applicant with the children, to which she indicated "I don't, because I don't know what she's called. If I had a name for her, maybe I could, but I don't." (Transcript 14 May 2025, p. 282 line 35). The Court finds this evidence both surprising and perplexing. A reasonable inference and expectation is that this was something that needed to be discussed between the respondent, and her own mother, given the latter's trusted role.
2. When asked what Ms G thought an appropriate name for the applicant was, she indicated that "Well, [Ms Galvez] is mama. [Ms C] is mummy. I'm not sure what another name would be... Maybe ma... Or even, I don't know, mummy [Ms Kosinski]" (Transcript 14 May 2025, p.283 lines 15-25). This insouciant approach is disconcerting. Regrettably, it reflects a view about the applicant's role in relation to the children that is, amongst other things, subservient to the role of Ms C, as a stepparent. The respondent's evidence is that she has been in a cohabiting relationship with Ms C since January 2024. It is, thus, a relatively new relationship.
3. The applicant's reaction on hearing this evidence, was one of intense visible distress. Indeed, the Court adjourned immediately after this evidence was given. No criticism is made of the applicant for her emotional response. The applicant's evidence, which the Court accepts, is that the children call her "mummy" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.296 line 5). The respondent disagreed about this proposition, but the Court does not accept her evidence on this issue, as it arose only after Ms G's damaging evidence referred to above.
4. Two recent Mother's Day cards sent to the applicant were received into evidence. The 2024 card refers to her as "mummy" (Exhibit A5), and the 2025 card refers to her as "mum" (Exhibit A6). It was an agreed fact that the 2024 card was written by Ms C, and the 2025 card by the respondent (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.301 lines 15-25). It is curious that the 2024 card was written by Ms C, and not by the respondent. One inference that the Court draws is that this is yet another responsibility that was delegated by the respondent to her partner. Further, the Court is curious as to why Ms C would write "mummy" if the respondent did not agree that this was the name the applicant was known by to the children.
5. The respondent herself acknowledged that the children called Ms C "mummy", and they often still do so. This is notwithstanding her attempts to discourage and correct them. When the respondent was asked if she saw any problem with the children calling Ms C "mummy", she firstly sought to acknowledge that this was something that the children commenced doing by their own volition. When asked for a second time if she saw any problem with this, she responded "I can understand that it causes confusion if there are lots of mums involved" (Transcript 14 May 2025, p.288 line 45). Rather than directly acknowledging that this behaviour would ultimately cause confusion for the children, the respondent's answer sought to place a collective blame of the children's confusion on there being multiple "mothers".
6. In cross-examination, the Single Joint Expert agreed that it was inappropriate for the children to be calling someone who was not one of them mothers "mummy" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.315 line 20). She agreed that any promotion, encouragement or use of the word "mummy" or "mum" with reference to Ms C would cause confusion for the children. Further, it was agreed that ceasing calling Ms C "mummy", would reinforce the importance of the relationship as between the children and the applicant (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.315 lines 20-25).
7. The Court finds that the respondent's inaction in relation to allowing the children to call Ms C "mummy" manifested a lack of commitment to reinforcing the applicant's relationship with the children.
8. The same can be said about the respondent's inaction as to the approach taken by Ms G and Ms C in relation to facilitating the children's electronic communication with the applicant. The Court makes no criticism of the respondent for relying on her family to assist with facilitating the calls. However, criticism is directed to her passive role in ensuring the assistance provided was in a manner that promotes the best interests of the children.
9. Ms G was asked if she takes any steps in anticipation of the electronic communication to explain to the children what is about to occur. She replied "No, I don't. No. I don't think we do. We just try and position them on the couch so they've got things around them that will keep them amused and busy until the call takes place" (Transcript 14 May 2025, p. 283 lines 5-10). Similarly, when Ms C was asked if she assists the children during their electronic communication with the applicant, she responded "my understanding is that calls are for as long as the children remain interested, and it's not my responsibility to do that. We redirect them back to the room if they try to leave, and encourage that" (Transcript 14 May 2025, p270 lines 20-25). The Court acknowledges the inherent difficulties in telecommunication for these children, given their ages and the developmental challenges they experience. However, the manifest attitude taken by the representatives on behalf of the respondent is sub-par, particularly in the context where the children experience "developmental delays including expressive language delay, sensory processing and emotional regulation concerns" (Exhibit A3). The respondent's representatives' attitudes and behaviour towards facilitating a relationship as between the children and the applicant have not been child focused. One inference the Court has drawn by these responses is that the respondent's representatives have let their own feelings towards the applicant override the best interests of the children having a positive relationship with her. Nonetheless, the Court questions the value of this communication to the children before they progress developmentally including enhanced communication skills.
10. Another basis for the Court's concern about the respondent's commitment to encourage the children's relationship with the applicant arises out of the carte blanche nature of the orders sought by her, such as proposing the children only spend time with the applicant on three occasions per school term if they were to re-locate (respondent's proposal, Order 4) and the 'blank cheque' orders to re-locate (respondent's proposal, Orders 14-15). It is self-focused, rather than child focused. The proposed orders are insensitive to the need for the children to travel. It paid insufficient regard to the impact on the children's relationship with the applicant of a potentially drastic reduction in time with her. It potentially would bring about not just drastic, but sudden, changes in the children's living arrangements which would not only potentially inhibit their relationship with the applicant but also jeopardise friendships formed at school and in communities. It was a proposal that is, ultimately, fundamentally at odds with her own evidence about the special needs of the children and the continuity of care required. It manifests a deep lack of insight into the needs of the children.
11. A related concern held by the Court is the willingness and capacity of the respondent to try to portray the applicant in the worst possible light in all her evidence. An issue that she raised in this case was the abuse/overuse by the applicant of prescription medication. For example, in cross-examination reference was made to paragraph 48 of the respondent's affidavit which refers to a text message from the applicant stating, "I literally am stuck chewing Valium and Endone like they are Tic Tacs". The respondent would not accept that the applicant was using hyperbole, insisting that it caused her "genuine concern" (Transcript 13 May 2025, p.160 line 30). By contrast, when the respondent was challenged about her role in delivering forty (40) Endone tablets disguised in a box of Oreo biscuits to a mutual friend who had broken her leg, she insisted that she was unaware of what was in the box. In fact, at paragraph 51 of her affidavit, the respondent explained that the applicant essentially forced the mutual friend to have the Endone tablets after they had politely declined the applicant's offerings. On 14 May 2025, the respondent was shown a screenshot of a group chat dated 2 May 2021, where she acknowledged that the Endone was hidden in the box of Oreo biscuits, there was also a message from the respondent which said "SURPRISE" (Exhibit A1). The text messages suggest that the respondent condoned the giving of the applicant's Endone despite the mutual friend "politely declin[ing]" (respondent's affidavit, paragraph 51).
12. Whilst explaining, and apologising, for the inconsistency of her role in supplying the Endone tablets, in the context of this case, the manner in which the respondent delivered her evidence manifests a willingness to say whatever it takes to cast the applicant in the worst possible light. The Court also pauses to note that notwithstanding the active role that the respondent played in providing a mutual friend with a drug which she was not prescribed, she was critical of the applicant to the Single Joint Expert for using her sister's Valium "to manage a crisis she was experiencing in her mental health". This use of Valium occurred, in fact, when this was a drug that the applicant was prescribed but did not have physical access to her tablets at the time of requiring one (Family Report, paragraph 66; applicant's affidavit, paragraph 192). Once again, this is an example of the respondent having double standards and painting the applicant unflatteringly.
13. In cross-examination the respondent did not accept that since June 2022 she had increasingly struggled to support the boys' relationship with the applicant. This non-acceptance must be viewed with concern in light of the evidence that has fallen in this case. For example, there was an instance where the applicant was travelling to Suburb LL with the children to spend Christmas with her family. The applicant sought the respondent's consent to sign the children out of daycare a few hours early to facilitate the trip. The respondent refused to consent to the children being signed out early despite the applicant explaining the benefit that would accrue to the children from having the opportunity to settle into a new place earlier providing them time to adjust and play prior to a meal. The respondent maintained that she did not perceive it to be in the children's best interests to have additional time with the applicant.
14. The evidence suggests that even relatively minor proposals to deviate from parenting orders are refused on the basis of perceived risk that has little objective foundation. The care arrangements involved the applicant's extended family, whilst changeover was facilitated by third parties. The respondent was inflexible, and rigid in following the orders, seemingly even when it would benefit herself. A further example of this occurred when the applicant offered the respondent for the children to spend time with her on Mother's Day where there was no obligation to do so under the orders. The respondent accepted that offer. In cross-examination, however, the respondent explained that she would not in a similar situation reciprocate, as she would simply follow the current orders (Transcript 14 May 2025, p. 206 line 10). She even indicated that she would not facilitate a telephone call on Mother's Day that was not provided for in the orders. This gives the Court little confidence about the respondent's capacity to facilitate the potential long-distance relationship that she herself advances in her proposal.
15. Of further concern to the Court is evidence about the respondent telling the children's treating anaesthesiologist that she had an ADVO protecting her from the applicant, when that order had lapsed. This resulted in a note being put on the file that "[respondent] has an ADVO against [applicant]. [Applicant] has been asked not to attend during the hospitalisation" (Exhibit A15). The respondent's rationale for making this false representation was so that the hospital the children may be having surgery at "understood the family situation" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.209 lines 42-43). When it was suggested, she made the representation about the ADVO so that the hospital staff would think negatively about the applicant mother she explained, "no. I told them so they were informed if there were to be any disagreements or conflict if [Ms Kosinski] were to present at the hospital" (Transcript 14 May 2025, p.210 line 5.) There was no objective basis for what seems like the respondent's hypervigilance about this. There was no reasonable basis for expecting that the applicant would attend the hospital given that she was unaware what time the surgery was to take place (applicant's affidavit, paragraphs 138-140), and the respondent did everything she could ensure that the applicant was not told. In fact, it was a hospital worker by the name of Ms MM who kept the applicant apprised with updates during the day of the children's surgery (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.98 lines 20-25). This incident again hardly engenders the Court's confidence in the respondent's capacity to facilitate a long-distance relationship, let alone keep the applicant informed about important events in the children's lives.
16. In late 2024, the applicant attended the children's Little Athletics' Carnival event. The events which transpired merely add to the Court's above stated concerns. On the applicant's evidence, she sat on the ground "about 50 metres or more away so that [the respondent] wouldn't feel threatened" (applicant's affidavit, paragraph 123). The respondent contended that she was distressed by the applicant's attendance at this event. Even allowing for the respondent's hypervigilance about the applicant, the former's capacity to rationalise the event is deeply disconcerting to the Court. In cross-examination she was taken to Order 12 made 17 June 2024 which states:

"Each party is to do all acts and things to a) permit the other party to attend all day care, school and extracurricular activities that parents are invited to".

1. The respondent's previous evidence about adhering to the Court orders must be remembered. She agreed recalling the order. In cross-examination the respondent made the following concessions in relation to this event:
   • That Little Athletics is an extracurricular activity;
   • That the applicant attended, and sat on the ground, and did not approach her or the children;
   • That she didn't know how long the applicant had been there until the children saw her;
   • When she and Ms C abruptly left with the children, she didn't see the applicant move; and
   • The applicant neither approached her, nor called out to the children.

1. Notwithstanding all of these concessions, the respondent gave evidence that the very next day she went to the police and complained that there was a breach of the ADVO, as well as instructing her solicitors to write and criticise the applicant for attending the extracurricular event. Indeed, in that letter there was a threat that this event could constitute a significant change in circumstances warranting a revision of the order in question (Transcript 14 May 2025, p.213 lines 5-20).
2. The Court asked the respondent mother if she believed she followed the interim orders on this occasion. She explained that she thought she was following orders. Eventually, when it was suggested to her that a submission might be made that she chooses to follow the orders that she wants to, she conceded that it is possible that she misunderstood the order and applied it incorrectly. This concession was only made as a result of direct judicial intervention. This incident reflects poorly on the respondent, even allowing for hypervigilance. The Court cannot be satisfied that the respondent will comply with orders that do not suit her. The evidence as explored by the Court paints a pattern of selective compliance with orders to the detriment of the applicant and disregard to the substance of orders that are designed to aid the applicant. In either event, the respondent's overreaction to the presence of the applicant on the facts of this incident is concerning.
3. The final example that will be given arises out of the applicant's contention that the respondent frequently failed to identify and respond to health concerns relating to the children, whether in her care, or in the applicant's care. Examples that arose from the evidence included breathing difficulties, dental issues, conjunctivitis, loss of consciousness, cellulitis, autism diagnosis and an ear infection. The respondent's cross-examination about these issues minimised the nature and extent of the children's health issues, obfuscated and minimised the role taken by the applicant to attend to these issues, and raise concerns for the Court in terms of the respondent's capacity to manage these health issues, and communicate and consult with the applicant, particularly with any additional challenges such as long distance.
4. The totality of this evidence leads the Court to conclude that relocation is not in the best interests of the children. The respondent currently struggles to support and encourage the children's relationship with the applicant. Creating a potentially substantial geographical distance between them would only facilitate the diminishment of the applicant's relationship with the children.

1. The respondent raised the risk of re-litigation in support of making her proposed re-location order. It was suggested that the refusal to make her order would create an "anxiousness" and the respondent would "have to start saving money in anticipation of further litigation. And so there's that ongoing lingering concern that the children will inevitably be exposed to and then have to deal with by way of further family reporting" (Transcript 16 May 2025, p. 386 line 30-35). Further, it was suggested that the extra hurdle of a s 65DAAA issue would be present should the respondent choose to re-litigate in the future. The Court finds that the risk of further litigation is real, but ultimately the parent's control this, not the Court. This is not a determinative consideration.
2. Submissions were made by the respondent that the Court should place significant weight on the parallels between the present case and that of Wendland & Wendland [2017] FamCAFC 224 ("Wendland"), and in doing so be satisfied that the making of a "blank cheque" order is within the Court's remit.
3. The Court agrees that it is entirely within power to make the order sought by the respondent. However, the most obvious difference between these cases is the fact that the parents in Wendland "by and large, ... had been able to agree on appropriate arrangements for [the child]" (Wendland at [15]). The present parents do not have the co-parenting relationship which would enable the respondent to re-locate and preserve the relationship as between the children and the applicant. The Court has given consideration to the types of matters raised at [22] of Wendland which are relevant but nevertheless exercises its discretion independently and on the present unique set of facts.
4. The risk of re-litigation in this matter is regrettably real. This is the responsibility of the parents, not the Court. They need to look inwardly and reflect deeply on their own attitudes and feelings towards each other, and how such attitudes and feelings manifest in actions that adversely affect their children.
5. The Court acknowledges that the Single Joint Expert did not provide a definitive answer as to the question of re-location because it would be a predictive exercise that does not have a clear answer (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.333 line 5).
6. In circumstances where the Court holds little confidence about the respondent's capacity to actively support and encourage a continued relationship between the children and the applicant, the re-location order sought is so imprecise such as to prevent the Court from reaching the level of satisfaction required to condone such an order. Simply, the order sought by the respondent is not in the best interests of the children.

What time should the children spend with the applicant?

1. The applicant and Independent Children's Lawyer contended that the children ought to spend five nights per fortnight with the applicant in the pattern of Friday to Monday in week one, and from Wednesday to Friday in week two. An alternate proposition is put forward by the applicant was that the time occur from Wednesday to Monday each alternate week. In contrast, the respondent sought for the children to spend from Friday to Monday with the applicant each alternate week. The Single Joint Expert's recommendation aligns with that of the respondent (Expert Report, paragraph 126).
2. The Court has declined the respondent's proposal for re-location. This limits the issues in relation to the time arrangement. The Court is left to decide whether the children ought to spend three nights or five nights per fortnight with the applicant.
3. In respect to time arrangements, the Single Joint Expert opined at paragraph [120] of the Expert Report:

While the children will benefit from a relationship with [the applicant], the limitations identified in [the applicant's] parenting suggest that it is likely to be in the children's best interests to spend shorter periods of time with [the applicant] to ensure that [the applicant's] coping resources are not over stretched. Given the history of family violence and the need to ensure that [the respondent's] coping capacity is bolstered, less frequent transitions and changeovers which do not involve face-to-face contact between [the parents] are likely to be in the children's best interests. School holiday time could be considered when the children attain school age, however a maximum of one-week blocks would be recommended.

1. Muldoon & Carlyle [2012] FamCAFC 135; (2012) FLC 93-513 at [105] plainly sets out that:

It is not in doubt that the evidence of an expert, suitably qualified and based on an appropriate foundation, will carry substantial weight. Departure from it in such circumstances requires careful consideration; however the ultimate decision must be that of the trial judge: Friscioni & Friscioni [2010] FamCAFC 108, Hall and Hall [1979] FamCA 73; (1979) FLC 90-713 at 78,819, D & P [2006] FamCA 170, Andrew & Delaine [2009] FamCAFC 182, and Hannigan & Sorraw [2010] FamCAFC 257 at [136].

1. This notion was further confirmed in Wendland at [62]:

...the opinion of an expert, even a single expert, is not determinative of proceedings. It is up to the court whether or not to accept that opinion and, if accepted, what weight is to be given to it. Even a "firm" recommendation therefore does not necessarily carry the day.

1. The respondent contended that "the importance of healing from trauma and living a life without anxiety and fear are matters of relevance that loom large in this matter" (Transcript 16 May 2025, p. 370 lines 5-10). Subsequently, in support of her proposal the respondent sought to rely on Re Andrew [1996] FamCA 43; (1996) FLC 92-692 ("Re Andrew") and Keane & Keane (2021) FLC 94-166. These cases do not assist the respondent. There was no evidence that her caregiving capacity has been discernibly impaired in the past, even despite the highly conflictual relationship with the applicant. There is no evidence to suggest that this could happen in the future. Indeed, this case is an opportunity to make parenting orders that may mitigate the potential for conflict both for the benefit of the parents, and the children.
2. The respondent asserted that the applicant has a lack of insight into the effect her behaviour has on those around her, and that this lack of insight may be a catalyst for violent behaviour to continue in her future relationships. The Court accepts the former proposition, but not the latter, which is unsupported by the available evidence.
3. Further, the respondent asserted that the applicant has "an incapacity or inability to judge safe situations at times" (Transcript 16 May 2025, p.374 line 5). In support of this proposition, the respondent raised the lack of disclosure by the applicant in obtaining an ADVO for her protection from a previous male partner. A police report recorded on 30 October 2023, noted that the applicant and the male partner were "in an intimate relationship for 12 months ending in August 2023" (Exhibit R21). During cross-examination, the applicant confirmed that this male partner was never present in her home when the children were in her care. The applicant accepted that her interactions with this male created a threat to her safety, which prompted her to apply for the ADVO. However, the applicant was of the firm view that she did not have to disclose this information to the respondent because "it wasn't relevant to her" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.63 line 10). Given the lack of trust between the parties, the Court notes this response hardly surprising. The applicant acted protectively of the children in this situation.
4. The second example provided by the respondent was relation to the events leading up to the applicant being sexually assaulted. The Court will not repeat the details of the sexual assault in this judgment. However, what must be canvassed are the actions taken by the applicant prior to this horrific experience. The applicant had met the offender on a dating application and had spent time with the offender on three occasions prior to inviting them into her home where the children were sleeping. The applicant deliberately turned off the cameras outside of her home so that the respondent "was unaware of what [she] was doing in [her] own private life" (Transcript 12 May 2025, p.68 lines 15-20). Whilst it is not in dispute that the applicant is entitled to pursue her own private relationships without the respondent's approval, one inference that the Court draws is that the cameras were turned off because the applicant knew that the respondent would take an issue with a stranger entering a home in which the children were present. This inference is supported by a text message sent by the applicant to Ms K saying that she turned the cameras off because she "didn't want another thing to fight [with the respondent] about" (Exhibit R44).
5. The vicious assault was not the applicant's fault. The Court accepts that turning off the security cameras was a significant lapse in judgment by the applicant. She potentially exposed the children to a violent act, but there was no reason for her to foresee this. The Court makes no adverse finding against the applicant, arising out of this incident.
6. Another concern held by the respondent is the emotional dysregulation experienced by the applicant and the potential for the children to be exposed to this. In support of this concern, the respondent raised the example of the outburst the applicant had during the hearing when questioned about her sexual assault. The Court does not accept this proposition. There is no significant evidence to indicate that the applicant's emotional dysregulation has been directed to, or displayed before, the children on any sustained basis.
7. Lastly, the respondent raised the applicant's need for prescription medication as potential threat to her parenting capacity. The evidence does not support that contention.
8. In support of the children's time with the applicant being reduced to three nights per fortnight, the respondent argued that "by reducing the time [with the applicant], it reduces the chance of exposure [to risk] while still allowing for the facilitation of a meaningful relationship" (Transcript 16 May 2025, p. 375 line 5). The Court disagrees. There is no evidence of the risk to the children that will be reduced. Although based on different facts, the statement of Austin & Williams JJ in Pickford at [90], rings true_:_

Implicitly, the mother's case was posited on the basis that neither she nor the children were at any risk of harm from family violence committed by the father provided the children only spend four nights per fortnight with him in school terms, so it is entirely unclear how she could have conversely contended the children were at risk of such harm if they instead spend five, six or seven nights per fortnight with him in school terms. It may be wondered: what danger could emerge on the fifth night to threaten the children's safety which danger would be absent on the previous four nights? The question is incapable of a rational answer.

1. The Court has considered the arguments raised by the respondent in respect to the risk that the applicant could present to the children. Given the plethora of issues raised, the Court is perplexed as to why the respondent did not actively seek to change the current arrangement of the children spending five nights per fortnight with the applicant, which was entered into by consent back in July 2022. In any event, the focus is no longer specifically on risk, but rather it is to promote the safety of the children.
2. For the purposes of s 60CC(2)(a) of the Act, to promote safety means "to advance the interests of, and move to a stronger or more prominent position, the safety (i.e. to be free from hurt, damage, harm or danger) of children and those who care for them" (Melounis & Melounis (No 4) at [151]). The statutory requirement to promote safety involves advancing a positive outcome, which would necessarily include protection from harm but would not be limited to this.
3. The Independent Children's Lawyer advanced that "the children's safety will be enhanced by making as few changes as possible to the existing time routine" and that any reduction in time between the children and the applicant is "likely to destabilise [the children's safety]" (Transcript 16 May 2025, p.351 lines 5-10). The Court accepts this submission, noting that acceding to the respondent's proposal would represent a substantial change in the children's relationship with the applicant without any objective justification.
4. The applicant reiterated to the Court that she is compliant with her prescription medication and this is appropriately managed by a team of treaters who not only speak to the applicant but also converse between themselves in relation to her medication. The applicant's compliance with medication was confirmed by a recent letter of March 2024 by Dr O which stated that she had been "very compliant with her psychotropic medication" (Exhibit A8). The applicant was challenged about having an addiction to her medication, which she was entirely forthcoming about. The applicant appears to have a keen insight into how her medication affects her. Indeed, the applicant ceases taking temazepam when the children are in her care (Exhibit A9).
5. Much of the evidence presented in this case was focused on the applicants chronic pain condition and the challenges that this may present for the applicant when caring for the children. However, the Court was not taken to any examples of how the applicant's disability negatively affected the care the applicant provided to the children. In fact, the Single Joint Expert commented that during her observation that "she moved around the room with ease, and there was no evidence she was experiencing pain whilst doing so" (Expert Report, paragraph 101).
6. The Court does not agree with the Single Joint Expert that it is in the children's best interests to spend shorter periods of time with the applicant. The Single Joint Expert did not have access to the totality of the evidence before the Court and was indeed limited by not receiving the applicant's written evidence. Moreover, the Single Joint Expert was unaware that the Court would find that the respondent was inclined consistently to paint the applicant in the worst possible light and struggled to support the ongoing relationship between the children and the applicant. Thus, the Court cannot accept the Single Joint Expert's recommendation in relation to time.
7. The Single Joint Expert noted that a "critical consideration in [her] view" is that the respondent is the victim of family violence (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.321 line 10). The Court acknowledges the impact of family violence on parents generally, and on the respondent. The respondent has been able to parent adequately, and to perform in the course of her Defence Force service. This speaks highly of her resilience. Her experience of violence is something that can be mitigated by way of the orders the Court makes on a final basis. It does not, however, indicate a need to reduce the children's time with the applicant. The Court's view aligns with that of the Independent Children's Lawyer that these children require routine, consistency and stability. This will become particularly apparent as the children commence school and continue to navigate their developmental delay. The Court has concerns as to the amount of change experienced by these children relative to the short lives. Since the parents separated in February 2022 and the respondent left the home in June 2022, the respondent has had two relationships. The first with a woman named Ms TT from September 2022 to February 2023, the second with Ms C from June 2023. The applicant's ex-partner Ms TT stayed with the respondent in her home even whilst the children were present. Further to this, the children have experienced various health issues requiring interactions with different medical professionals, as well as meeting with the Single Expert. The Court is concerned about the respondent's lack of sensitivity for the children to have stability with their arrangements.
8. The Court is not satisfied with the current arrangement for the children, as it requires four changeovers per fortnight. Indeed, moving forward, as the children age and commence school and extra-curricular activities, the potential for conflict arises due to the general barriers for children living across two households. The Court is inclined to make the alternate proposal of the applicant save that the children are to be returned by 9:00 am on Monday regardless of a non-school day (applicant's proposal, Order 5). This allows the children to understand a fixed routine, returning to the respondent on Mondays. Having five consecutive nights allows the applicant to establish her own separate routine with the children providing them with an opportunity to comfortably settle into her home. It also provides the possibility for the applicant to have the care of the children during extra-curricular events and to be meaningfully involved in their day-to-day lives. Given that the children already spend one three-night, and one two-night block with the applicant, and have done so for such a long time, and accepting that the applicant is attentive to their needs, the Court is satisfied that the children will be able to satisfactorily transition to a five-night block each fortnight. The obvious benefit to them, and to the parents, is the reduction of changeovers which means the reduction in opportunities for tension and conflict.

1. The applicant and Independent Children's Lawyer both propose that the school holidays being shared equally between the parties. However, the key differences are that the Independent Children's Lawyer does not support any "school holiday" time commencing until the children start kindergarten, and the term four holidays are to be shared in alternating weeks. By contrast, the applicant proposes a seven-day block of time in January prior to the children commencing kindergarten and for the term four holidays to be divided in half; which would essentially result in her having at least two consecutive weeks with the children. The respondent's proposal aligned with the Independent Children's Lawyers in terms of school holiday time only starting once the children have commenced kindergarten. Otherwise, the respondent proposed a graduate increase of time for the applicant dependent on which term of school holidays were being taken. The proposal of the respondent is not of assistance in circumstances where the Court has determined that the applicant ought to have block time of five nights per fortnight with the children. Therefore, to adopt the proposal of the respondent would reduce the term one school holiday time to four nights in a fortnight block. This would simply be confusing for the children. In a similar vein, the recommendation by the Single Expert for school holiday time with the applicant to "increase gradually" to "allow the children the greatest opportunity to adjust to any changes" (Transcript 15 May 2025. p.331 lines 15-20), carries less weight when the children will already be spending five consecutive nights with the applicant and at a maximum will spend seven consecutive nights during the school holidays.
2. The Court does not support the applicant's request for school holiday time prior to the children commencing kindergarten. The focus is on keeping the children's arrangements consistent.
3. Once the children commence kindergarten, the applicant will spend time with the children during the school holidays in accordance with the proposal of the Independent Children's Lawyer (Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal, Orders 5(b)-(c) and 6). This ensures that the applicant does not spend more than one consecutive week with the children, so as to not overextend her capacity.
4. Sharing the school holidays provides the parents with equal opportunities to be present with the children and undertake activities which are not feasible during the school term. It is important for the children to see both parents in times of work and in times of leisure. The Court is satisfied that both parents are sufficiently attuned to the needs of their children, and the children are so strongly attached to both parents, that they will cope with the orders proposed by the Court.

1. The applicant and the Independent Children's Lawyer sought orders in relation to spend time arrangements for Mother's Day, Easter and Christmas. In addition, the applicant sought orders for the children's birthdays, Father's Day, and the parents' birthdays. By contrast, the respondent only sought orders in respect of Mother's Day and the children's birthdays.
2. There is no magic in splitting up special occasion time for these parents, it is a matter of discretion based on a wholistic impression from the evidence. No arguments were advanced that one particular event was more important or sentimental to a particular parent.
3. The Court adopts the respondent's order in relation to the children's birthdays (respondent's proposal, Order 6.1.1). This order allowed for a contingency in the events that the children's birthday does not fall on a school day.
4. The Court otherwise adopts the Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal for special occasions, save for Order 7(b). This proposal alternates the time arrangements between the parents based on odd or even years and ensures that special occasions are shared equally.
5. In relation to Order 7(b) of the Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal, the proposed order does not mesh suitably with the arrangements during the term one school holidays and will create numerous unnecessary changeovers for the children. The Court was not taken to any evidence that suggested that either parent had a particular religious or personal reason to celebrate Easter. For example, should the applicant be returning the children on 30 March 2026, the children would spend four nights with the respondent, then one night with the applicant; that being Easter Friday, then seven nights with the respondent, followed by seven nights with the applicant; being the term one school holiday period, and then eleven nights with the respondent prior to re-entering the standard routine. This would place the children out of routine for almost four weeks for the benefit of one night with each parent over the Easter public holidays. To prevent this scenario from occurring, Easter time will not be treated as special occasion time, and will occur with either parent in accordance with either regular term time or school holiday time; subject to when Easter falls on any given year.
6. The Court is not inclined to make orders in respect to Father's Day or the parent's birthdays as additional changeovers may be inadvertently added. This is a step necessary to avoid the potential for conflict.

Should an order be made providing the parents with the first option to care for the children when the other is unable?

1. The applicant sought an order that would permit the parents to have the first option to care for the children where the other is unable to for "more than half of the period when the children are scheduled to be in their care" (applicant's proposal, Order 6). This order is not endorsed by the respondent, Independent Children's Lawyer or the Single Joint Expert.
2. It is noted that on 12 July 2024, Judge Parker (as her Honour then was), discharged a previous order for each parent to have the first option to care for the children. An additional order was made which stated that unless the parents were able to care for the children for the entirety of the period of time, they were scheduled to have the children, then the children will remain in the care of the other parent. This order remains in place to date, however, will be discharged by the Orders I have made herein.
3. The Court reiterates that the Single Joint Expert expressed a concern with this order due to the applicant's "capacity to care for the children for extended periods of time" (paragraph 122). The Court echoes these concerns in the sense that, the order would extend to the respondent being "deployed or posted as part of her service with the Australian Defence Force" (applicant's proposal, Order 6) and could see the children living with the applicant full time. The respondent and the Independent Children's Lawyer endorse that each parent should be able to make their own arrangements for the children when they are in their care.
4. The respondent led evidence that the children enjoy a relationship and consistent time with Ms G, as well as with their aunt, uncle and cousin on the respondent's side (Affidavit of Ms G filed 28 April 2025, paragraph 47- 48 ("[Ms G]'s affidavit")). Moreover, the applicant has historically expressed a willingness and preparedness to rely on her extended family when necessary. The respondent and Independent Children's Lawyer submit that the parents should both have the opportunity to rely on their extended family where they are unable to care for the children during their allocated time. The Court agrees.
5. An order for the first option to care for the children requires a co-parenting relationship which is founded on trust and strong positive communication skills. These attributes are absent in this matter. The Court declines to make an order which provides the parents with the first option to care for the children.

Where should changeover of the children take place?

1. The parents and the Independent Children's Lawyer agree that changeovers should be conducted at the commencement or conclusion of day-care or school. This approach minimises contact between the parents and therefore the potential for in-person conflict. All parties suggest that where changeover ought to occur outside of day-care or school time it should occur at McDonalds. The applicant proposed a McDonalds located in Suburb NN, the respondent proposed one located in Suburb OO and the Independent Children's Lawyer proposed one in Suburb B. It is noted that the applicant resides in Suburb NN and the respondent in Suburb PP. The Court adopts the Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal of Suburb QQ McDonalds as this appears to be the centre point between the parents' residences.

What arrangements, if any, should be in place to facilitate video contact for the children and the applicant?

1. The applicant sought that a FaceTime be facilitated for the parent without the care of the children on Wednesdays at 6:45 pm for a period of 15-minutes (applicant's proposal, Order 19). A specific order requiring the parent to notify the children as to who is calling and provide assistance where necessary was also sought. On an ancillary basis it is also requested that privacy be afforded to the children upon attaining the age of five (applicant's proposal, Order 20). The respondent sought a similar order, save for the call to commence at 7:00 pm and via the 2Houses application (respondent's proposal, Order 12). The respondent sought for some flexibility when calling, such that should an event arise which conflicts with the scheduled call, it could instead take place on the immediately following Friday (respondent's proposal, Order 13). The Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal was silent on this issue.
2. The issues surrounding electronic communication with the applicant have been expressed earlier in this judgment and will not be re-stated here. It is accepted that during the calls the children "become distressed" (Transcript 13 May 2025, p.125 line 25). The reason for the children's distress is in dispute. It is common ground that the children experience "developmental delays including expressive language delay, sensory processing and emotional regulation concerns" (Exhibit A3). Regardless, of the reason for the children's distress, the present orders for electronic communication are not in the children's best interests.
3. The Court adopts Orders 12 and 13 of the respondent's proposal, save for the re-occurring day which the communication will occur. This essentially suspends electronic communication for the children until they commence kindergarten. This allows the children to become familiar with the new spend time arrangements and be at a more suitable age to participate in electronic communication. Further, it encompasses a contingency plan in the event that the children are unavailable due to an extra-curricular commitment. This should reduce any potential conflict that may arise due to the children's unavailability in the future and ensures that they still get to experience electronic communication with the applicant.
4. The Court notes that despite both parents seeking for electronic communication to occur on the Wednesday that the children are not in the care of the applicant, the Court has made orders which were not either of the parties' primary proposals. The impact of the block time arrangement were not thoughtfully considered when seeking electronic communication on Wednesdays. Should the children continue with the Wednesdays, it would create a scenario whereby seven days passes without any communication between them and the applicant. This would be detrimental to their relationship with the applicant. Further, these amendments therefore necessitated the amendment of Order 13 of the respondent's proposal, such that any makeup call ought to occur the following day. Order 20 of the applicant's proposal will also be made. This ensures that whoever is assisting the children will alert the children as to who is calling, which is a strategy that is attuned to their needs. Further, it affords the children privacy with the applicant upon attaining the age of five.

What arrangements should be implemented relating to the communication between the parents?

1. The applicant sought orders that the parents keep each other updated as to their residential address and mobile numbers, affording 30 days' notice prior to changing address. Further, she sought that the parents immediately contact each other in the event of an emergency, that each parent be able to attend specialist appointments and be at liberty to be dialled into specialist appointments. The respondent sought more rigid orders. The respondent sought that the parents communicate via the 2Houses application and limit their communication to the health of the children or general child related topics with no more than one message to be sent within a six-hour period. The respondent sought a similar order as to providing immediate contact in the event of an emergency. The Independent Children's Lawyer supported the use of the 2Houses application and the notion of keeping each parent informed as to their residential address, email address and mobile number. Additionally, the Independent Children's Lawyer sought that the respondent keep the applicant informed of the children's treaters.
2. It is uncontroversial that the parents do not share a positive co-parenting relationship. The Single Joint Expert opined that "clear orders would need to be made about communication which does not occur face to face" (Family Report, paragraph 110). The Court agrees.
3. The orders sought by the applicant are not appropriate in the circumstances of this case. There is no justification as to why the respondent should have to provide 30-days' notice to the applicant prior to changing her residence. Providing notice within seven-days before any change is sufficient. Further, the attendance of both parents at any specialist appointments is not in the children's best interests. The justification for this is the same as not allowing both parents at the children's extra-curricular events. The Court has no confidence that these parents could navigate a specialist appointment without conflict which is detrimental to the children's interests. Orders have been made which allow the parents to contact the children's treaters. They both have the ability to obtain information and discuss any of the children's conditions with any treaters.
4. The order sought by the respondent, which places a limitation on the frequency of the messages between the parties, will be made. The Court was taken to various text-message exchanges between the parents which evidence a tendency for both parties to engage in copious amounts of messages back and forth (Exhibit R29; Exhibit R30). Notably, on 24 May 2022, even after the respondent expressed that she didn't "feel safe around [the applicant]", the applicant proceeded to call the respondent no less than 15 consecutive times (Exhibit R29). The Court adopts Orders 10-10.6.2 of the respondent's proposal.

Should the parents be permitted to travel internationally with the children, and should the children obtain passports?

1. The applicant did not seek orders in respect of international travel and passports in her Amended Initiating Application filed 14 April 2025, but nonetheless sought orders in her proposal before the Court. The respondent sought final orders for international travel and passports in her Amended Response filed 9 May 2025 and her proposal before the Court. Neither parent included evidence in relation to international travel or passports in their trial affidavits, nor was it a topic arising during cross-examination.
2. In circumstances where the evidence in relation to this topic is "slight, general or scanty" (Hellicar at [255]), the Court is unable to adjudicate this issue. The Court raised this dilemma during closing submissions to the parties. It is the Court's (perhaps forlorn) hope that these parties will be able to reach agreement in the future in relation to the children travelling internationally.

Should the Applicant be required obtain a report from her treaters each 12 months?

1. The respondent sought orders that the applicant comply with all directions of, and treatment with, her mental health practitioners, as well as source and supply a report from her psychiatrist every 12-months (respondent's proposal, Orders 17-18). The Court acknowledges that the applicant suffers from an array of both physical and mental health conditions. Further, it must be acknowledged that the applicant has shown a propensity to genuinely engage and value treatment for these conditions. The applicant continuing to engage with mental health treaters would be in the best interests of the children, and so too would the respondent continuing to seek assistance in relation to her C-PTSD and PTSD. However, making such an order requiring the applicant to do this and to produce a report to the respondent would be unenforceable (see Oberlin & Infeld [2021] FamCAFC 66; (2021) FLC 94-017 [51]-[52] ("Oberlin & Infeld (2021)") and Lainhart & Ellinson [2023] FedCFamC1A 200; (2023) FLC 94-166 [11]-[36] ("Lainhart & Ellinson (2023)")). The Court declines to make an order as proposed by the respondent.

1. Pleasingly, the parties were agreeable to a restraint which prohibits the parents from allowing the children to call any person other than the applicant "mummy" and any person other than the respondent "mama" (Transcript 16 May 2025, p.352, line 40).
2. The parents sought similar restraints in relation to non-denigration. The respondent seeks restraints which the Court would hope are normal practices for the parents, however for abundant caution the Court adopts Orders 23.1 to 23.6 of the respondent's proposal.
3. There is contention surrounding whether the parents should be permitted to attend the children's extra-curricular events. The respondent sought a restraint upon the parents from attending events which occur when the children are not in their care (respondent's proposal, Orders 23.8 - 23.9), whereas the applicant sought an order that the parents be permitted to attend all day-care and extra-curricular events provided that neither parent approach each other (applicant's proposal, Order 26). The Independent Children's Lawyer sought a similar order to that of the applicant, however, goes a step further that in circumstances where one of the children approach the parent who does not have the children in their care, they are required to encourage the children to return to the parent with care (Independent Children's Lawyers proposal, Order 14). Respectfully, the Court declines to make the order as proposed by the Independent Children's Lawyer as it is likely to be a source of conflict between the parents and confusing for the children.
4. Unfortunately, these parents do not have the co-parenting relationship required to both attend at the children's various events. This is evidenced by the conduct displayed at the Little Athletics event. The concept of both parents attending extra-curricular and sporting events was put to the Single Joint Expert, and she opined that the focus ought to be "about what the children's experience will be" (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.316 line 5). The events of X being stopped from seeing the applicant at the Little Athletics event was specifically put to the Single Joint Expert and she stated "I think he would have been confused... [his] language capacity is not developed, he wouldn't understand what was happening. So I think it wouldn't have been a positive situation for the children." (Transcript 15 May 2025, p.314 line 5). The conflict between these parents must be reduced. The Court has little confidence that these parents will be able to navigate nuances such as the children speaking to the parent who does not have them in their care. As such, the Court adopts Orders 23.8 and 23.9 of the respondent's proposal and further requires that in those situations where both parents are permitted to attend an event that the parents not approach each other, without prior written consent.
5. The Independent Children's Lawyer proposed that the parents be restrained from enrolling the children into extra-curricular activities which would occur during the other parents care without consent (Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal, Order 14(b)). Given the nature of the block time the children will be spending with each parent it is likely that any sporting commitments or otherwise would run across periods where the children are in both parent's care. Therefore, it is most sensible that each parent consent to such activities. Order 14(b) of the Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal will be made.
6. The Court notes that the respondent also sought an order that each parent be restrained from coming within 250 metres of the other parent's residence (respondent's proposal, Order 23.7). The Court has a wide discretion under s 68B, which includes orders in the form of an injunction for the personal protection of a parent (s 68B(1)(b)(i)). Although an injunction under s 68B is not a "parenting order" as defined by s 64B of the Act (Hedlund & Hedlund [2021] FedCFamC1A 84; (2021) FLC 94-065 at [118]), the Court may nevertheless give careful consideration to the paramountcy principle where the orders sought to be made intimately concern the welfare of the children. This was confirmed by the Full Court in Bennett v Bennett [2001] FamCA 462; (2001) FLC 93-088 (See Attwood v Attwood [2022] FedCFamC1F 6 at [32]). I have made findings that the respondent was the victim of family violence perpetrated by the applicant. It is likely that restraining the applicant from coming within 250 metres of the respondent's residence would be beneficial to the respondent's mental health and likely specifically her C-PTSD and PTSD. The respondent reported to the Single Joint Expert that "coming into contract with [the applicant] triggers a trauma response" (Expert Report, paragraph 72), which is supported by the respondent's refusal to facilitate changeover or the electronic communication for the children with the applicant.
7. Nonetheless, the respondent gave clear evidence is that she is not present at changeovers, or when communication between the children and the applicant takes place. There is no evidence of further incidents giving rise to the need for an ADVO order. No submission was made that a s 68B order would be more effective than a state order. Nothing was said about why a 250 m distance is the appropriate scope of the injunction. In the circumstances, the Court is disinclined to make Order 23.7 of the respondent's proposal.
8. The Court notes that the Independent Children's Lawyer proposed that the respondent be restrained from relocating further than a 30-minute drive from the Suburb D Post Office without prior consent (Independent Children's Lawyer's proposal, Order 16). Whilst a pragmatic suggestion, there was no evidence before the Court that would enable it to assess the viability and practical impact of such a proposal. It does appear somewhat restrictive. The absence of evidence means the Court cannot make this order. Similarly, the Court declines to make the mutual restraint sought by the respondent that neither parent be permitted to relocate to an area which would require any change to the parenting arrangements (respondent's proposal, Order 29). This order is too ambiguous, and the Court was not provided with any clarity as to what was meant.

1. The Court has done the best it can to formulate orders which will minimise the conflict between the parties and alleviate the potential for parental conflict to detriment the children.
2. The only major change that the Court is prepared to make in relation to the parenting orders is that instead of the current five nights per fortnight time with the applicant being in two blocks of two and three nights, it should be a single block of five nights. This minimises travel for the children, and difficult transitions from one household to the other.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and fifteen (215) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli.

FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

FILE NO: (P)NCC545/2024

BETWEEN:

MS KOSINSKI

(Applicant)

AND:

MS GALVEZ

(Respondent)

AND:

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

APPLICANT MOTHER MINUTE OF ORDER SOUGHT

(1) That all previous Orders be discharged.

(2) That the Respondent mother have sole decision making in relation to all major long- term issues, but for developmental and behavioural health and for the children X, born 2021 and Y, born 2021 ("the children"), on the condition that:

(a) Before she makes solely any long term decision for the children she advise the Applicant mother in writing of the decision needing to be made and her proposal for this,

(b) Within 7 days the Applicant mother shall advise in writing her view of the decision that should be made

(c) Within 7 days of receiving the reply the Respondent advise of the decision made.

(3) That the parents share long term decision making responsibility for the children's cognitive, developmental and behavioural health and will both liaise with all allied health professionals.

(4) That the children live with the Respondent Mother and spend time with the Applicant Mother as follows:

(a) Week 1: From 3:00pm Friday to 3:00pm Monday; and

(b) Week 2: From 3:00pm Wednesday to 3:00pm Friday each alternate week.

THAT IN THE ALTERNATIVE

(5) That the children live with the Respondent Mother and spend time with the Applicant mother each alternate week from 3:00pm or after school Wednesday until 9:00am or return to school Monday, or 9:00am or return to school Tuesday should Monday be a non-school day.

(6) If either party is unable to care for the children for more than half of the period when the children are scheduled to be in their care, the children will remain in the care of the other party. This order is to apply in circumstances that include but are not limited to when the Respondent is deployed or posted as part of her service with the Australian Defence Force.

(7) Notwithstanding any other Orders, that the children spend time with the parties at Christmas as agreed upon by the parties in writing or failing agreement as follows:

(a) With the Applicant Mother from 2pm on 24 December to 2pm on 25 December in all odd-numbered years, and from 2pm on 25 December to 2pm on 26 December in all even numbered years; and

(b) With the Respondent Mother from 2pm on 25 December to 2pm on 26 December in all odd-numbered years, and from 2pm on 24 December to 2pm on 25 December in all even numbered years.

(8) Notwithstanding any other Orders, that the children spend time with the parties during the Easter period as agreed upon by the parties in writing or failing agreement as follows:

(a) With the Applicant Mother from after daycare/school or 3pm on Easter Thursday to 3pm on Easter Monday in all odd-numbered years; and

(b) With the Respondent Mother from after daycare/school or 3pm on Easter Thursday to 3pm on Easter Monday in all even-numbered years; and

(9) Notwithstanding any other Orders, that the children spend time with the parties on the mother's and Father's Day weekends as follows:

(a) With the Applicant Mother from 3:00pm the day before Mother's Day and Father's Day until 3:00pm Sunday and with the Respondent Mother from 3:00pm Mother's Day and Father's Day until 9:00am or return to school/daycare the day following Mother's Day and Father's Day in even numbered years and

(b) With the Respondent Mother from 3:00pm the day before Mother's Day and Father's Day until 3:00pm Sunday and with the Applicant Mother from 3:00pm Mother's Day and Father's Day until 9:00am or return to school/daycare the day following Mother's Day and Father's Day in odd numbered years

(10) Notwithstanding any other Orders, that the children spend time on their birthday with the non-residential parent as agreed upon by the parties in writing or failing agreement from after daycare/school or 3pm until 6pm on a weekday or from 1pm to 6:30pm on a weekend.

(11) Notwithstanding any other Orders, that the children spend time with each parent on the parent's birthday as agreed upon by the parties in writing or failing agreement from after daycare/school or 3pm until 6pm on a weekday or from 1pm to 6:30pm on a weekend.

(12) That until the children commence primary school, they spend one 7 day block of time with the Applicant mother each January, with the Applicant mother to notify the Respondent mother of the dates no later than 1 December each year.

(13) That the children spend time during the school holiday periods commencing from the end of Term 1 in the children's first year of primary school as follows:

(a) With the Applicant Mother for half of the Terms One, Two and Three school holidays, such halves to be agreed between the parties and in the absence of agreement for the first half of each of these school holiday periods.

(b) With the Respondent Mother for half of the Terms One, Two and Three school holidays, such halves to be agreed between the parties and in the absence of agreement for the second half of each of these school holiday periods.

(c) With the Applicant Mother for half of the Christmas school holiday period, such half to be agreed between the parties and in the absence of agreement, for the first half in odd numbered years and the second half in even numbered years.

(d) With the Respondent Mother for half of the Christmas school holiday period, such half to be agreed between the parties and in the absence of agreement, for the second half in odd numbered years and the first half in even numbered years.

(14) That for the purpose of these Orders, the school holidays are deemed to commence at the conclusion of the last day of student attendance for the term, and changeovers shall occur at 6:00pm on the day in the middle of the school holiday period, and to conclude at 9:00am or return to school on the first day of student attendance the following term.

(15) That the alternate weekend time will recommence after the school holidays in the first week of term when the Applicant mother has had the children in the first half of the school holidays and in the second week of term when the Applicant mother has had the children during the second half of the school holidays.

(16) That all changeovers at the commencement or conclusion of day-care or school occur at day-care or school.

(17) That for the purposes of changeover not occurring at school or daycare changeover occur at the McDonald's Restaurant located at Suburb NN NSW.

(18) Each party is permitted to nominate an agent to attend the collection or drop off of the children.

(19) That the parties each have and facilitate reasonable FaceTime communication with the children when they are not in their care as agreed, but failing an agreement on the week the children are not spending with the other party on Wednesday 6:45pm for a period that the children are engaged, but to maximum of 15 minutes.

(20) That for the purposes of FaceTime communication with the children, the party caring for the children shall ensure that the children are available to take the call, notify the children of the identity of the person calling, assist the children where necessary to answer and engage in the call and, from the age of 5 years, afford the children privacy for the duration of the call.

(a) keep the other advised at all times of their current residential address and mobile telephone numbers and notify the other not less than 30 days prior to any change of address and 24 hours prior to or immediately upon change of mobile telephone number.

(b) advise the other immediately in the event that either child suffers any serious illness or injury including details as to any medical practitioner, hospital or medical practice attended, the diagnosis and treatment required.

(22) That both parties be permitted to attend any specialist health appointments.

(23) That in the event one party is not in physical attendance at a special health appointment but wishes to be dialled into the appointment, the other party shall do all things possible to ensure that the specialist practitioner facilitates the telephone attendance of the other parent.

(24) That these Orders be sufficient authority to allow both the parents to communicate with any medical practitioner or allied health professional, hospital or medical practice upon or at which either child may attend from time to time, in respect to the child's medical condition and/or requirements.

(25) That these Orders be sufficient authority to allow both the parents to communicate directly with any daycare, preschool, school, educational provider or extracurricular activity provider at which the children my attend from time to time, to:

(a) Obtain all information regarding the children including but not limited to copies of all school reports, school notices and newsletters, school photographs and examples of schoolwork in relation to the children, obtain updates on their progress or remedial or correctional treatment required by either child as soon as is practicable, and attend any interviews regarding the children.

(b) To contact each parent in the case of any emergency,

(26) That each party is entitled to attend all day-care, school and extra-curricular activities involving the children, including:

(a) sporting fixtures;

(b) extra-curricular activities that allow for parental attendance;

(c) pre-school and school functions and events that allow for parent attendance including but not limited to concerts, school assemblies, sports days, parent and teacher interviews and canteen duties.

(d) That the parties are restrained from approaching the other whilst in attendance at the same event unless agreed upon by the parties in writing prior to the event.

(27) That both parties shall be permitted to travel internationally with the children at such times as the children are in their care pursuant to these Orders, subject to the following:

(a) The parties, their servants and their agents shall be restrained from removing or attempting to remove the children from the Commonwealth of Australia to any country which is not a signatory to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction signed at the Hague on 26 October 1995, or which falls within a region for which there is a current travel advisory warning against all non-essential travel issued by the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs, without the authenticated written consent of the non-travelling party or without a Court Order;

(b) The party who intends to travel with the children shall provide to the other party, the following, no less than twenty-one (21) days prior to the date of departure:

(i) An itinerary for such intended travel;

(ii) Contact telephone numbers and address for all places at which the children will stay during such travel; and

(iii) Copies of all travel tickets or bookings and in particular, a copy of return travel tickets for the children and the travelling party.

(28) That each party is restrained by injunction from making negative, derogatory or disparaging comments about the other parent or members of the other parent's family or household in the presence or hearing of the children, and from permitting the children to remain in the presence or hearing of any third party doing so.

(29) That each party is restrained by injunction from relocating to an area that would require any change to parenting arrangements, unless consented to and agreed upon in writing by both parties.

(30) That the parties are restrained by injunction from referring to or encouraging the children to refer to anyone other than the Applicant Mother as "Mummy" and anyone other than the Respondent Mother as "Mumma", and that if the children use those terms for other persons they be corrected.

(1) The Respondent shall have sole parental responsibility and decision-making for the Children:

• 1.1. X born 2021; and
• 1.2. Y born 2021 ("the Children").

(3) Unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing and subject to the parties' primary residence being located within 100km of each other, the Children shall spend time with the Applicant, as follows:

• 3.1 From the date of these Orders each alternate weekend from 3.00pm Friday until 9.00am the immediately following Monday.
• 3.2 For the purpose of Order 3.1, when the time the Applicant spends with the Children falls on a long weekend where Monday is a public holiday or a staff development day at the day care or school the Children are attending, the Applicant's time with the Children is extended until 5.00pm, instead of 9.00am on the Monday.

• 3.3 From the date of these Orders, until the children commence Kindergarten, the children shall spend time with the Applicant pursuant to Order 3.1.
• 3.4 In term 1 school holidays when the children are in Kindergarten, the children shall spend time with the Applicant pursuant to Order 3.1, with an additional 1 night, with such time commencing at 3.00pm Friday and concluding at 9.00am on the immediately following Tuesday.
• 3.5 In term 2 school holidays when the children are in Kindergarten, the children shall spend time with the Applicant pursuant to Order 3.1, with an additional 2 nights, with such time commencing at 3.00pm Friday and concluding at 9.00am on the immediately following Wednesday.
• 3.6 In term 3 school holidays when the children are in Kindergarten, the children shall spend time with the Applicant pursuant to Order 3.1, with an additional 3 nights, with such time commencing at 3.00pm Friday and concluding at 9.00am on the immediately following Thursday.
• 3.7 Commencing in term 4 school holidays when the children are in Kindergarten and on an ongoing basis, the children shall spend time with the Applicant pursuant to Order 3.1, with an additional 4 nights, with such time commencing at 3.00pm Friday and concluding at 9.00am on the immediately following Friday and each alternate week thereafter.
• 3.8 Changeover shall occur by the parties or their representative known to the Children collecting the children from school or day care at the commencement of time and delivering the children to school or day care at the conclusion of time. If the children are not attending school or daycare on a changeover day, changeover shall occur by the parties, or their representative known to the Children, meeting at the service register of Suburb OO McDonalds.

(4) Unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing and subject to the parties' residence being located in excess of 100km of each other, the Children spend time with the Applicant, as follows:

• 4.1 During Terms 1, 2, 3 and 4, on weeks 2, 5 and 8 of each Term:
  • 4.1.1 In the location that they reside with the Respondent, in Weeks 2 and 8, when the Applicant travels to the Children in weeks 2 and 8, from 3.00pm Friday until 9.00am the immediately following Monday.
  • 4.1.2 For the purpose of Order 4.1.2, when the time the Applicant spends with the Children falls on a long weekend where Monday is a public holiday or a staff development day at the day care or school the Children are attending, the Applicant's time with the Children is extended until 5.00pm, instead of 9.00am on the Monday.
  • 4.1.3 In the area of the Applicant's residence, when the Children travel to the Applicant in week 5, from 6pm Friday until 6pm Sunday.
  • 4.1.4 For the purpose of Order 4.1.3, when the time the Applicant spends with the Children falls on a long weekend where Monday is a public holiday or a staff development day at the day care or school the Children are attending, the Applicant's time with the Children is extended until 6.00pm, instead of 6.00pm on the Monday.
  • 4.1.5 For the purpose of Order 4.1.3, should the Children be required to travel by aircraft, the Children shall travel on the flight with the closest available landing time to 6pm on Friday and on the flight with the closest available landing time to 6pm on Sunday.
• 4.2 During the Terms 1, 2 and 3 school holiday periods, in the first week of the school holiday period, commencing from 12pm Saturday until 12pm on the immediately following Saturday.
• 4.3 During the Term 4 school holiday period:
  • 4.3.1 In even years, in the first week of the school holiday period commencing from 12pm Saturday until 12pm on the immediately following Saturday, and each alternate week thereafter.
  • 4.3.2 In odd years, in the second week of the school holiday period commencing from 12pm Saturday until 12pm on the immediately following Saturday, and each alternate week thereafter.
• 4.4 Changeover shall occur as follows:
  • 4.4.1 When the Applicant travels to the location to where the Children reside with the Respondent in weeks 2 and 8, by the Applicant collecting the children from school or day care at the commencement of time and delivering the children to school or day care at the conclusion of time. If the children are not attending school or daycare on a changeover day, changeover shall occur by the parties, or their representative known to the Children, meeting at the service register of McDonalds closest to the Respondent's ordinary place of residence.
  • 4.4.2 When the Children travel to the location where the Applicant spends time with the children in week 5, changeover shall occur by the parties, or their representative known to the Children, meeting at the service register of McDonalds midway between the parties' respective residences.
  • 4.4.3 When the parties live in excess of 500km of each other and the Children travel to the Applicant by aircraft changeover shall occur by the parties, or their representative known to the Children, meeting at the baggage carousel of the arrival airport. For the return flights changeover shall occur with the Applicant to deliver the children to the Airport to meet the Respondent or their representative known to the children, at the check-in desks of the departure airport 90 minutes prior to the Children's scheduled flight time.
  • 4.4.4 For the purposes of Order 4.5.3, until the children are of an age where they can travel as unaccompanied minors, the Respondent, or a nominee, shall travel with the children on flights.

(5) That for the purpose of these Orders:

• 5.1 the school term is defined as commencing on the first day of the school term that the children are required to attend and concluding on the last day of the school term of the school the children are attending. If the children have not yet commenced primary school, in accordance with the public school term dates in the state the Children are living.
• 5.2 the Term 1, 2 and 3 school holiday period and Term 4 or Christmas school holiday period is defined as commencing at the conclusion of school on the last day of the school term that the children are required to attend and concluding on the first day of the school term of the school the children are attending. If the children have not yet commenced primary school, in accordance with the public school holidays in the state the Children are living.

(6) Notwithstanding any other order, and unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, the Children spend time with the parties on special occasions, as follows:

• 6.1 On the Children's birthday:
  • 6.1.1 Subject to the parties' primary residence being located within 100km of each other, with the parent with whom the Children are not in the care of on that day, from the 3.00pm or the conclusion of school until 7.00pm, or if a non-day care/school day from 11.00pm until 4.00pm.
  • 6.1.2 Subject to the parties' primary residence being located in excess of 100km of each other, and the Applicant travelling to the city in which the Respondent's primary residence is located, from 3.00pm or the conclusion of school until 7.00pm, or if a non-day care/school day from 11.00am until 4.00pm.
  • 6.1.3 Should the Children's birthday fall on a changeover day, then Order 6.1 shall be suspended and changeover shall take place as usual.
  • 6.1.4 In the event that the Applicant cannot travel to the children's location on their birthday, the Respondent, or an agent appointed by the Respondent, shall facilitate the Children to engage in a video call with the Applicant, with the Applicant to commence the video call via the 2Houses application at 7.00pm. The call will last for as long as the Children remain engaged up to a maximum of 15 minutes.
• 6.2 On Mother's Day:
  • 6.2.1 Subject to the parties' primary residence being located within 100km of each other, with the parent with whom the Children are not in the care of on that day, from the 3.00pm until 9am or the commencement of school the following day.
  • 6.2.2 Subject to the parties' primary residence being located in excess of 100km of each other, and the Applicant travelling to the city in which the Respondent's primary residence is located from 11.00am until 4.00pm.

(7) For the purpose of effecting Order 4.1.1, the Applicant will book and pay all flights associated with the Applicant's travel to and from the airport closest to the Respondent's residence no less than 14 days prior to the date of travel and will provide the itinerary to the Respondent within 24 hours of booking, and will book and pay for all accommodation.

(8) For the purpose of effecting Order 4.1.2, the Respondent will book and pay all flights associated with the Children's travel to and from the airport closest to the Applicant's residence no less than 14 days prior to the date of travel and will provide the itinerary to the Applicant within 24 hours of booking.

(9) Within 24 hours of the Applicant providing the itinerary and receipt to the Respondent, pursuant to Order 8, the Respondent will pay into the Applicant's nominated bank account 50 per cent of the cost of the flights, providing such flights are economy fares or otherwise 50 per cent of the equivalent economy fare for the same flight.

(10) The parties shall, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing:

• 10.1 Communicate through the 2houses parenting application, with the Applicant to pay the annual costs associated with the application;
  • 10.1.1 Within 24 hours of the Applicant providing proof of payment of the annual fee each year, the Respondent will pay into the Applicant's nominated bank account 50 per cent of the annual fee.
• 10.2 Limit their communication with each other to the health of the Children, medical emergency where either or both Children require medical attention, medical appointments, changeover, or general child-related topics;
• 10.3 Not send more than one message to the other party within a 6-hour period prior to receiving a response from the other party, other than in case of emergency;
• 10.4 Keep the other advised at all times of their current residential address and mobile telephone numbers and advise of any change within 48 hours of that change occurring;
• 10.5 Advise the other immediately if the Child/ren suffer/s any serious illness or injury, being hospitalised or being involved in an accident, including details as to any such illness or injury, medical treatment received or hospitalisation necessary as soon as reasonably practicable of such illness or injury occurring and confirm the practitioner, hospital or medical practice attended;
• 10.6 In respect of non-emergency medical, behavioural, psychological or dental appointment:
  • 10.6.1 Keep the other party informed in writing of any treatment plan or prescribed medication administered or recommended as a result of such appointment; and
  • 10.6.2 Not attend medical appointments or hospital admissions scheduled for the Children whilst the Children are in the other parent's care, either in person or via teleconference, without the written consent of the other parent;
• 10.7 Authorise any medical practitioner, psychologist, dentist, hospital or medical practice of which the Children may attend from time to time, to communicate with the other parent in respect to the Child/ren's medical condition and/or requirements;
• 10.8 Authorise all day care/schools at which the Children attend to:

  • 10.8.1 Communicate with each parent, either by telephone, in writing or by personal attendance, in respect to the Children's progress at school; and

  • 10.8.2 Provide to either parent, at the requesting parent's expense, any and all information in relation to the Children's schooling including but not limited to notices, letters, disciplinary action, school attendance information, school reports, school photographs and invitations and to attend parent/teacher interviews.

(11) These Orders shall be sufficient authority for:

• 11.1 Each party to do all things and sign all documents to enable each party to obtain a Medicare card listing both Children on each card.
• 11.2 Each of the parties to communicate with, and obtain information from, each of the Children's treating medical practitioners and education providers and for this purpose the parties be at liberty to provide a copy of these Orders to the following:
  • 11.1.1 The Principal or delegate of the Principal of the daycare/school attended by the Children.
  • 11.1.2 Any medical practitioner and/or allied health professional upon which the Children have attended.

(12) Subject to the Children commencing primary school, the Respondent, or an agent appointed by the Respondent, shall facilitate the Children to engage in a video call with the Applicant, with the Applicant to commence the video call via the 2Houses application, unless an alternate method is agreed in writing, each alternate Wednesday commencing the Wednesday after the Applicant's time with the Children, at 7.00pm. The call will last for as long as the Children remain engaged up to a maximum of 15 minutes.

(13) Pursuant to Order 14 above, should the Children be unable to engage in the video call due to participation in extra-curricular activities, the video call will instead occur on the immediately following Friday at 7.00pm, unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, with the Respondent to provide the Applicant at least 24 hours' notice that the video call is required to be rescheduled.

(14) The Respondent may relocate and change the residence of the Children interstate, from time to time, if required to relocate as a result of her employment with the Australian Defence Force ("a posting order").

(15) Within 7 days of the Respondent receiving a posting order requiring relocation of the Children, the Respondent will notify the Applicant in writing of the Defence Force base location of the posting order.

(16) The Respondent will inform the Applicant at the earliest opportunity, and no later than 7 days after relocation, of the residential address of the Respondent and the Children, together with any other relevant contact details as required by Order 10.4, in addition to the day care or school the Children will be enrolled.

(17) The Applicant is to comply with all directions of, and treatment with, her mental health practitioners.

(18) The Applicant shall obtain a report from her current treating psychiatrist regarding the Applicant's mental health, compliance with treatment every 12 months. The Respondent shall pay into the Applicant's nominated bank account any costs associated with the production of the report, within 24 hours of being provided with the receipt.

(19) Within 28 days from the date of these Orders, the parties to do all acts and sign all documents necessary to apply to the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages for the State of New South Wales to change the child registered as:

• 19.1 X to be registered as X Kosinski-Galvez; and

• 19.2 Y to be registered as Y Kosinski-Galvez.

(20) Pursuant to section 28(5) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Act NSW 1995, IT IS REQUESTED that the Registrar register the Children's names in the form specified in Order 21 of these Orders.

(21) The Respondent mother shall serve a sealed copy of these Orders upon the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages for the State of New South Wales contemporaneously when lodging the application to change the Children's names pursuant to Order 19.

(22) The Respondent to pay all costs of and incidental to the name change application.

(23) Without admissions, each parent is restrained, and an injunction granted, from:

• 23.1 Criticising or denigrating the other party or the other parties' family in the presence of, or within hearing of, the Children or allowing a third party to criticise or denigrate the other parent or the other's parent's family in the presence of, or within the hearing of, the Children and shall immediately remove the Children from the vicinity of any other person doing so.
• 23.2 Posting messages on Facebook or social media which denigrates the other parent.
• 23.3 Showing the Children any Court documents.
• 23.4 Discussing Court proceedings with the Children except for the purposes of clarifying the terms of the current order with them.
• 23.5 Physically disciplining the Children or allowing any other person to physically discipline the Children.
• 23.6 Permitting or allowing the Children to be in the presence of, or exposed to, family violence and shall immediately remove the Children from the vicinity.
• 23.7 Coming within 250 metres of the other party's place of residence.
• 23.8 Attending school functions to which parents are normally allowed when such school functions take place when the Children are not in that parent's care, except in the case of a graduation ceremony.
• 23.9 Attending sporting and extra-curricular activities to which parents are normally allowed when such school functions take place when the Children are not in that parent's care, unless in the case of a Grand Final.

(24) Unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties:

• 24.1 The Respondent is permitted to travel internationally with the Children when the Children are ordinarily in the care.

• 24.2 Upon the Children commencing high school, the Applicant is permitted to travel internationally with the Children when the Children are ordinarily in the care of the Applicant on 1 occasion per calendar year for up to 7 days.

(25) Pursuant to Section 65Y(2)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and Order 26 should either party wish to travel outside the Commonwealth of Australia with the Children, they shall, write to the other party, and include the following details, if relevant:

• 25.1 At least 42 days prior to the intended departure date, an itinerary of the proposed travel, including:

  • 25.1.1 Details of departure and return dates;

  • 25.1.2 List of countries to be visited with proposed dates;

  • 25.1.3 Where applicable, details for forward and return flights, including airline details; and

  • 25.1.4 Where applicable, name of ship and organisation or entity operating any cruise.

  • 25.1.5 Return tickets for the children and travelling party must have been booked and paid for; and

  • 25.1.6 Copies of certificates of travel insurance which include medical cover for the Children and the travelling party.

(26) Where changes occur outside the control of the travelling party that will impact on departure or return dates, the travelling party is to inform the other parent as soon as reasonably practicable.

(27) The parties are restrained from travelling overseas with the Children to:

• 27.1 Any country that is not part of the Hague Convention;

• 27.2 Any location which has been listed as either "Reconsider your need to travel" or "Do not travel" on the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Smart Traveller website; and

• 27.3 The People's Republic of China.

(28) The travelling party shall ensure that the Children are fully vaccinated as recommended by the Children's treating general medical practitioner for each travel destination.

(29) Within 14 days from a written request from the other party, the parties will do all acts, sign all documents and share equally the costs:

• 29.1 For the Children to be issued with an Australian Passport;

• 29.2 To replace or renew the Children's passport.

(30) In the event that either party fails to comply with Order 29 above, then pursuant to section 11 of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) the Minister forthwith issue an Australian passport in the Children's names without the necessity of obtaining the consent of the non-compliant party for that purpose.

(31) The Children's passports shall be held in safe custody by the Respondent.

(32) The Respondent must release the Children's passports to the Applicant within 30 days of a written request from the Applicant, for the purposes of agreed travel by the Applicant with the Children.

(33) Within 30 days of the Applicant returning from travel, the Applicant must return the Children's passports to the Respondent.

1. The parents acknowledge that the Children shall remain on video calls for as long as the Children are interested and that neither parent shall force the Children to remain on the video call for a set time.

IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1)

AT NEWCASTLE

(P)NCC545/2024

BETWEEN: MS KOSINSKI

(Applicant Mother)

AND: MS GALVEZ

(Respondent Mother)

AND: INDEPENDENT CHILDRENS LAWYER

BEFORE: JUSTICE ALTOBELLI

Proposed Minute of Order - Independent Children's Lawyer

(1) The children X (born 2021) and Y (born 2021) ("the children") will live with the respondent.

(2) The respondent will have sole decision-making responsibility for all major long-term issues for the children.

(3) Prior to exercising her decision-making responsibility in relation to major long-term issues in relation to the children, other than in a genuine emergency the respondent will contact the applicant in writing, and

(a) Identify the issue requiring decision

(b) Set out her proposal

(c) Invite the applicant to respond in writing within 7 days

(d) After considering the applicant's response (if any), advise the applicant of her decision.

(4) Until the children commence kindergarten the children will spend time with the applicant as agreed in writing between the parties, but failing agreement on a two-week basis as follows:

(a) In week one, from 3:00pm on Friday until 3:00pm on Monday; and

(b) In week two, from 3:00pm on Wednesday until 3:00pm on Friday.

(5) Once the children commence kindergarten the children will spend time with the applicant as agreed in writing between the parties, but failing agreement:

(a) During the school term:

(i) In week one, from 3:00pm on Friday until the commencement of school on Monday (or 3:00pm if a non-school day); and

(ii) In week two, from the conclusion of school (or 3:00pm if a non-school day) on Wednesday until the commencement of school (or 3:00pm if a non-school day) on Friday.

(b) During the NSW school holidays at the conclusion of Terms 1, 2 and 3, from 12:00 noon on the first Saturday of the school holiday period until 12:00 noon on the middle Saturday of the school holidays.

(c) During the NSW school holidays at the conclusion of Term 4, from 12:00 noon on the first Saturday of the school holiday period until 12:00 noon on the following Saturday, and thereafter on a week-about basis for the duration of the school holidays.

(6) For the purpose of implementing order (5)(a) above, the children's time with the applicant shall recommence in each new school term as follows:

(a) In the event the children spent the preceding week of the school holidays with the applicant, on the second weekend of the new school term.

(b) In the event the children did not spend the preceding week of the school holidays with the applicant, on the first weekend of the new school term.

(7) Notwithstanding any other order, the children will spend time with the parties on the following occasions:

(a) On Mother's Day weekend:

(i) In even numbered years,

1. With the applicant, from 3:00pm on Saturday until 3:00pm on Sunday; and
2. With the respondent, from 3:00pm on Sunday until the commencement of school (or 9:00am) on Monday.

(ii) In odd numbered years:

1. With the respondent, from 3:00pm on Saturday until 3:00pm on Sunday; and
2. With the applicant, from 3:00pm on Sunday until the commencement of school (or 9:00am) on Monday.

(b) At Easter:

(i) In even numbered years,

1. With the applicant, from 12:00 noon on Good Friday until 5:00pm on Easter Saturday; and
2. With the respondent, from 5:00pm on Easter Saturday until 5:00pm on Easter Monday.

(ii) In odd numbered years:

1. With the respondent, from 12:00 noon on Good Friday until 5:00pm on Easter Saturday; and
2. With the applicant, from 5:00pm on Easter Saturday until 5:00pm on Easter Monday.

(c) At Christmas:

(i) In even numbered years:

1. With the applicant, from 12:00 noon on 24 December until 2:00pm on 25 December; and
2. With the respondent, from 2:00pm on 25 December until 5:00pm on 26 December.

(ii) In odd numbered years:

1. With the respondent, from 12:00 noon on 24 December until 2:00pm on 25 December; and
2. With the applicant, from 2:00pm on 25 December until 5:00pm on 26 December.

(8) For the purposes of these orders, whenever changeover is unable to occur directly to or from day-care, preschool or school, the parent then having care of the children or their nominee known to the children will deliver the children to the other parent or their nominee at Suburb B McDonalds or at such other place as agreed in writing between the parents.

(9) The parties shall utilise the "2houses" parenting application for all communication between them, with any costs associated with the application to be shared equally, and such communication shall be limited to matters regarding the health, welfare and development of the children, and the implementation of these Orders.

(10) Each party must keep the other advised of their current address, mobile telephone number and email address, and advise any change to those details within 7 days of such change occurring.

(11) The respondent must advise the applicant of the name and contact details of any medical practitioner, specialist, mental health practitioner or allied health practitioner which the children may attend from time to time.

(12) Each party or their nominee must contact the other as soon as practicable upon the happening of any of the following:

(a) A child becoming seriously ill;

(b) A child becoming hospitalised;

(c) A child being placed on ongoing medication;

(d) A child becoming involved in any event to which Police or any other emergency services are called.

(13) Both parents are authorised (and a copy of these orders shall be sufficient authority):

(a) To receive (at their own expense) such notices, newsletters, invitations, photographs, reports, school software / app / website login details and other documents or information normally provided to parents from any day-care, preschool or school which the children may attend from time to time.

(b) To attend all functions to which parents are normally invited or attend (whether or not specifically invited) by any day-care, preschool or school, or any extra-curricular activity which the children may attend from time to time, including but not limited to concerts, awards ceremonies, assemblies, sports days and parent-teacher evenings, subject to order (14)(c) below.

(c) To receive (at their own expense) such medical reports, test results, medical notes and other similar documents normally provided to parents from any medical practitioner, specialist, mental health practitioner or allied health practitioner which the children may attend from time to time.

(a) Denigrating the other parent or member of a parent's family in the presence or hearing of the children, or permitting the children to remain in the presence or hearing of any other person doing so.

(b) Enrolling the children into regular extra-curricular activities which would occur while the children are in the other party's care without the prior written consent of the other party.

(c) Approaching the other party or the children then in that party's care at any event, appointment or extracurricular activity except in accordance with any prior agreement in writing between the parties, and should the children independently approach the parent not currently caring for the children, that parent must encourage the children to return to the party who then has care of the children.

(15) The parents will cause the children to refer to the applicant as "mummy" and the respondent as "mama" and are restrained from allowing or encouraging the children or any third parties to use those terms to refer to any other persons in relation to the children.

(16) The respondent is restrained from relocating the children's residence further than 30 minutes driving time from the Suburb D Post Office without the prior written consent of the applicant.