Kohl & Drexler [2025] FedCFamC2F 565 (11 April 2025)

(a) Notify the Applicant Father ("The Father") with forty-eight (48) hours of becoming aware of any long-term decision to be made for X;

(b) Allow the Father at least fourteen (14) days to consider the decision and thereafter seek and consider his views; and

(c) Notify the Father within forty-eight (48) hours of making the decision which has been made.

1. The parents otherwise have joint decision making for all other major long term decisions relating to the care, welfare and development of X, including educational matters, religious matters, matters relating to X's name and any proposed change to X's living arrangements that would make it significantly more difficult for her to spend time with a parent.

1. X spend time with the Father as agreed between the parties in writing and failing agreement as follows:

(a) During the school term, each alternate weekend, from the conclusion of school on the Friday (or 3.00pm if a non-school day), until the commencement of school on the Monday (or 9.00am if a non-school day);

(i) With the weekend time to commence on the first weekend in Term 1 and in Term 4;

(ii) With the weekend time to commence on either the first or second weekend in Term 2 calculated so that the Father's alternate weekends for that Term will not include the Mother's Day weekend;

(iii) With the weekend time to commence on either the first or second weekend in Term 3 calculated so that the Father's alternate weekends for that term will include the Father's Day weekend.

(b) During the school term, each alternate Wednesday, from 5.30pm to 7.30pm on a day that the Father is working and from the conclusion of school to 7.30pm on a day that the Father is not working.

1. By consent, for the purpose of these Orders, the Father is to provide his roster to the Mother, within seven (7) days of receiving his new roster or any changes to his roster.

1. By consent, X shall spend time with the parents during the Term 1, 2 and 3 school holidays as follows:

(a) Mother - from the conclusion of school on the last day of the school term until 1.00pm on the middle point of the school holidays.

(b) Father - from 1.00pm on the middle point of the holiday period until the commencement of school on the first day of the school term.

(c) In the event that the school holiday period comprises an even odd number of nights, the Father shall have the extra night.

(a) In odd years commencing 2025, X spend time with the Mother from conclusion of school in Term 4 until 12.00pm on 4 January, and with the Father from 12.00pm 4 January until 12.00pm the day before the child returns to school;

(b) In even years, X spend time with the Father from conclusion of school in Term 4 until 12.00pm on 4 January, and with the Mother from 12.00pm 4 January until the Father's time commences in accordance with Order 6(a)(i).

1. By consent, changeover will occur by the parties, or their nominees known to X, by meeting at the school on a school day or at McDonalds Suburb B on a non-school day, noting that any desired change to the changeover location or time must be agreed by both parties in writing.

1. By consent, the parties will do all such acts and things necessary to ensure that X attends extra-curricular activities she wishes to participate in.

1. By consent, in circumstances where X needs to attend any general medical, allied health professional specialist medical or educational appointment the Mother/Father must inform the Mother/ Father of the time and date of the appointment, within twenty-four (24) hours. The Mother/Father will do the same.
2. By consent, both parties are permitted to attend any general medical, allied health professional specialist medical or educational appointments X attends, with the parent who made the appointment to attend in person with X and, provided it is in accordance with X's medical, allied health, specialist and educational practitioners advice.
3. By consent, each party shall notify the other of any medical emergency, illness or injury suffered by X whilst in their respective care warranting treatment by a third party and shall authorise any treating health professionals and/or allied health professionals to communicate with the other parent about the condition and treatment of X.
4. By consent, in circumstances that X takes prescribed medication, the parent who buys X's medication will provide the other parent with the medication and instructions for its use, when X goes into the other parent's care. The parents are to ensure they follow the instructions of the medication that has been prescribed.

1. By consent, both parents be permitted to liaise directly with X's school and sporting bodies to receive school notices, information, newsletters, school reports, school photographs and any other necessary information about X's progress. The parties are at liberty to provide a copy of these Orders to any school X attends from time to time.
2. By consent, each party is at liberty to attend X's school or any extracurricular activities for the purposes of any function or activity normally attended by parents.

1. By consent, each parent is restrained from denigrating the other parent or members of their family in the presence or hearing of X and from permitting X to remain in the presence or hearing of another person denigrating the other parent and each parent shall immediately remove X from any location where the denigration is occurring by third parties.
2. By consent, each party is restrained from discussing these proceedings with X and showing X any document from these court proceedings.

1. By consent, the Mother and Father must keep each other informed of:

(a) Their respective residential address.

(b) Any mobile telephone numbers and/or email addresses that each of them has available from time to time.

(c) At least one telephone number at which they can each be contacted at all times.

(d) The Mother and Father must notify the other in writing or by text message of any change of such particulars within 24 hours of change.

1. X is at liberty to contact either parent at all reasonable times and intervals when she and the parent with whom X is living or spending time with shall facilitate and allow all such contact calls.

1. By consent, within fourteen (14) days of the Mother/Father providing a Passport Application to the Mother/Father for the issue of an Australian Passport or for the renewal of an Australian Passport for X, the Mother/Father shall sign such documents and have the signature witnessed as required in the documents and cause the documents to be returned to the Mother/Father.
2. By consent, the Mother and Father equally pays the costs of having an Australian Passport issued in X's name.
3. By consent, the Mother holds X's Australian Passport.
4. By consent, the Mother shall provide X's Passport to the Father upon receiving notice of the Father's intention to travel internationally with X and not less than three (3) weeks prior to departure.

1. By consent, each party be permitted to take X outside the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Australia for such period or periods consistent with these Orders, provided that such does not otherwise interfere with the other parent's time with X without first having the written consent of the other parent.
2. By consent, to give effect to the aforesaid Order and in relation to X travelling outside of the Commonwealth of Australia, both parties must provide to the other the following:

(a) The party whom intends to travel overseas must give to the other parent at least sixty (60) days clear notice of their intention to travel with such notice to include details as to where X will be travelling to, where X will be accommodated and any particular details in relation to the transportation of X;

(b) At least thirty (30) days prior to the intended date of departure the travelling parent must provide a full itinerary and copy of tickets evidencing return to Australia, contact details for X overseas; and

(c) At least thirty (30) days prior to the intended date of departure or at such other time that is reasonably appropriate the passport is to be made available to the travelling parent and the passport is to be returned to the Mother for safe keeping within seven (7) days of the return.

1. The property proceedings are adjourned part-heard for submissions to 10.00am on 6 June 2025.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These reasons for judgment were delivered orally. They have been corrected from the transcript in order to make them easier to read.

1. These parenting proceedings concern X, born in 2014, who is presently eleven (11) years of age. X is the daughter of the applicant father Mr Kohl and the respondent mother Ms Drexler.
2. The parties commenced a relationship in around 2013, although they did not commence living together until about mid-2014. They separated under the one roof in about March of 2023. The father moved out of their home in mid-2023, following what the mother alleges was an event of family violence, and in respect of which the father was later charged with common assault and an AVO put in place to protect the mother from him. (I note that the father contested the common assault charge and was acquitted of it in early 2024, although he consented to a six (6) month AVO without admissions, protecting the mother, which has since expired).
3. The father was continuing to spend time with the child up until late 2023 when the mother alleges that there was a further incident of family violence which, by and large, the father denies. Effectively it involves an allegation of him trespassing in the former family home and taking property that he should not have; apparently letting the dog loose out of a gate; and tipping out a vase of some dried flowers that were of special significance to the mother. It suffices to say that the father denies any impropriety in this respect.
4. The consequence is that X did not then see the father for the next couple of months until this court made some interim orders on 12 February 2024.
5. The interim orders were very detailed. They provided for the father to spend specific time with X in 2024 during school terms, on very specific days for very specific times. The reason for this is because the father is a tradesperson who works for C Company, and he has, for several years now, worked according to a roster arrangement, which effectively is a rolling sixteen (16) week roster. This involves work both during the day and at nighttime as required, and the orders that were made specifically accommodated that roster arrangement. I should add that the mother, like the father, also works full-time. She is a professional, although has more flexibility in her work and is able to do some of her work from home.
6. Both parties live in Region D. There are no real practicality issues that arise in terms of the geography in this case, and it is fair to say that insofar as the parenting arrangements are concerned, the issues are in fact very narrow.
7. The matter was listed to proceed to hearing before me for three (3) days this week as to both parenting and property matters. The father was represented by Mr Bithrey of counsel, the mother by Mr O'Reilly of counsel. The father relied upon his Case Outline Document filed 8 April 2025; Amended Initiating Application filed 21 March 2025; the father's affidavit filed late on 14 March 2025 (for which he was given leave); and an updated Financial Statement filed the same date which is not presently relevant as the court is only dealing with parenting matters at this time.
8. The mother relied upon her Case Outline Document filed 8 April 2025; the mother's affidavit filed 12 March 2025; and her Financial Statement filed 12 March 2025 (though again, not being relevant for present purposes).
9. The parties tendered numerous exhibits, including various affidavit annexures and other business records such as financial documents and the like, as well as some counselling notes in respect of X. Significantly, the parties also provided the Court with a single expert report of Dr E, a Clinical Psychologist. Her report was dated 7 October 2024 and was marked as exhibit 1.
10. The competing issues in the case are fairly narrow as I have indicated, but the reason that I have had to make a decision about parenting matters now, and effectively leave the property aspect of the proceedings part-heard for submissions on a later date, is because it is simply necessary for the Court to make an order promptly in relation to the welfare of this child.
11. Ever since the orders that were made on 12 February 2024 "expired" - for want of a better word - the mother has had difficulty in getting X to go to the father on occasions, and indeed, his time with the child has to some extent dropped off. X is a complex little girl. She has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. She took her parents' separation very hard, as I am confident from the material that she loves both of her parents very dearly, and she has struggled to some extent with the separation and the subsequent uprooting of her family life as she knew it. X has experienced marked anxiety, both at home and at school. She takes medication during the day. She takes medication to help her sleep at night. She has difficulty regulating her emotions. She has difficulty with distractibility. She has been placed on anti-anxiety medication.
12. Both parties say that X can be difficult to handle, and in each parent's case it is clear enough that there have been occasions when they have needed respite or a break from some of her oppositional or difficult behaviour. This is not intended to be a criticism of X, but rather an observation that she is a child who is somewhat difficult in terms of management, and I consider that both parents in this case, as a general statement, are doing the best they can to parent her in what are difficult circumstances.
13. The fundamental problems in this case, really, are that X does need somewhat delicate handling. She attends upon a psychologist having originally seen a Dr F, then a Ms G, and in more recent times Ms H, with whom she has had fifteen (15) sessions.
14. One of X's biggest problems, in my view, is the sheer difficulty in the co-parenting relationship. While both parents do their best to support her in terms of parenting, as co-parents they have at times, in my view, fallen short. It was obvious to me from seeing the father in the witness box that he has just about no trust in the mother whatsoever. It was equally obvious to me that the mother is deeply suspicious of the father and his motivations, and quick to assume the worst. This is just the way the parents' relationship is. It is regrettable for X that that is so.
15. X's own statements to Dr E were that her parents often argued before they separated. She was worried their arguments might become violent. She said that her parents do not really like each other, and to be precise:

1. Sadly, but as is so common in parenting cases in this court, X told Dr E that she wished her parents would like each other.
2. It is very important in this case to do what can be done to help the parents to move forward in a way that enables them to co-parent cooperatively, transparently, and in a way where each can have an input in the child's life, but the court has to weigh up the risk of future litigation and conflict between these parents, and that is part of the tension in this case.

1. Very helpfully, the legal representatives for the mother provided the court with a document marked as exhibit 5 which sets out the competing proposals of the parents. It is quite apparent from exhibit 5 that there are a great many things that the parents have been able to agree upon and for which the court is appreciative for X's sake.
2. There is agreement about participation in medical and educational appointments and the like, notification about medical emergencies, notification about medication and school-related information. There are agreed orders about non-denigration, and about each parent keeping the other informed of their contact details. There is an agreed handover location which addresses issues of alleged family violence, and particularly the conflict between the parents. There are agreed orders about passports and international travel.
3. It is also agreed that X should be living with the mother. She has always been X's primary carer throughout, and on any view is a totally dedicated mother, and there is no suggestion that that arrangement should be disturbed. Moreover, the father is agreeable to keeping the mother acquainted with his roster and providing her with a copy.
4. So there is a lot of agreement between the parents, but there are some significant disputes, and as I have indicated, it was obvious in the course of this hearing that trust is at a premium between these parents.
5. Fundamentally, the major issues the court has to decide are, firstly, whether there should be an order for the parents to jointly share decision-making as to major long-term decisions, or whether the mother should have sole decision-making responsibility. In the course of the hearing, Mr O'Reilly on behalf of the mother conceded, in my view entirely appropriately, that really the only issues about which any serious contest could arise relate to health and educational matters. In that sense the mother does not seek a sole decision-making order that would cover all 'major long-term issues' as defined in section 4 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cwlth) ("the Act"). The father seeks that the decision-making should be joint as to all aspects.
6. The second, and probably major issue in the case, is whether X's time with the father should run in accordance with his roster or in accordance with a more 'standard' or 'typical' alternate weekend arrangement, with a night in the 'off week' when the father is available (see exhibit 5). This was probably the major point of contention between the parties, although that is not to minimise the other disputes.
7. There is a dispute about Christmas time, and particularly how the holidays should be configured, and there is a dispute relating to specific telephone or FaceTime communication that should occur between X and the other parent who is not caring for her at the time. The father seeks specific communication at 6pm on two (2) days each week but would settle for one (1) day if it came to the crunch. The mother seeks that communication simply be at all reasonable times and intervals, effectively to work in with X's wishes.
8. It is regrettable in some ways that this case was conducted at all. Like a great many parenting cases, this one was eminently able to be settled, but the parties were determined to 'have their day in court' as to these issues. This is entirely their right, but the problem with having their day in court is each of them proceeded to then provide the Court with lengthy, very negative affidavits about the other, and the trial then descended, to a degree, into an element of simply criticising the other's parenting or the other's attitude. I do not think that this is going to assist the parties, and particularly their parenting relationship into the future, but as I have indicated, it is their right to go to court if they wish to. I do think, having regard to all of the issues to which I am about to turn, particularly how narrow the disputes are, that the case should have been able to be settled. I do not criticise the legal representatives in any way; it is up to the parties to reach agreement about these things. And I do not intend, in giving these reasons, to be any more harsh or critical of anyone than I have to be because these parents have to continue to parent this child going forward. Nonetheless, some observations do need to be made by me given the way in which the case was run, including in the affidavit material.

1. Pursuant to s 61C of the Act, I note that each parent has parental responsibility subject to court orders. Section 61B defines parental responsibility as "all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children". Pursuant to s 61C of the Act, parents are encouraged to consult on 'major long-term issues' which term is defined in s 4 of the Act. Pursuant to s 61D of the Act, the court may make orders which confer parental responsibility on a parent or other person, or take a person or parent's parental responsibility away.
2. In terms of the parenting orders that are in dispute in this case, the Court is, of course, mindful that it is the child's best interests which are the paramount, though not the sole consideration: see s 60CA. The relevant considerations which go to the issue of a child's best interests are set out in s 60CC(2)(a) - (f) and also relevantly in this case, in s 60CC(2A).

1. I begin by observing that there is no serious safety issue in this case.
2. I do not propose to traverse in any detail the family violence allegations that have been made as I do not consider it necessary to do so. In this respect I should say that it was clearly the case that counsel elected not to explore family violence issues at any real length at all, and I appreciate that. I do not think that those matters would have done anything other than make this case more difficult and stressful than it already is for the parties.
3. I merely observe that there has been an AVO in place, that there were allegations made and that each party has a different version of events. But given the form of the orders proposed by the parents, no-one can sensibly argue that any safety issue arises in this case, nor, for that matter, any serious family violence risk. That is not to say that issues of family violence can simply be, or should be, swept under the carpet or put to one side as inconvenient to a court; rather it is an acknowledgement that on the facts of this particular case, and given the way in which the case was run, there is no need for me to do any more about the family violence allegations.
4. In relation to X's views, I have indicated already that X very much wishes her parents would stop fighting. She loves both of them dearly.
5. I am satisfied that the mother has disparaged the father in X's presence, seemingly on numerous occasions, by referring to him as the "Disney Dad". The child said as much to Dr E. The mother conceded doing so in the witness box, and on any view, this was at best an unfortunate thing for the mother to say. It is something that should not have happened. That said, I accept the mother's evidence that she has not done so since August of last year and that she realises that she did the wrong thing and in that sense has 'moved on'. I accept her evidence about that. I consider that she was credible and being honest with the court.
6. The child does not give any relevant views in this case that would assist, save for me observing that it would be plainly her view, I am sure, that she does not want her parents to get into any more arguments about her. She certainly does not want to be exposed to the dispute between them, and on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that she has been so exposed and that both parents have contributed to a greater or lesser extent, that I need not further delve into.
7. X wants to be able to have a relationship with both of her parents, but I also accept that she is more emotionally connected with the mother as her primary carer. This is not in any way intended to be a criticism of the father; it merely reflects the different relationship that they have. X loves him, but in a different way. They do different things together. I accept the mother's evidence at paragraph 155 of her affidavit that, when she recently asked X why she did not want to go to the father's place, X said:

"I'm just more of a mummy's girl. I just want to be with you when I feel sad. You always make me feel better. It's not the same with Dad. Plus needing to go from one house to the other just reminds me how my life is broken. I just want to live in one house and stay here with you."

1. The above, of course, is not a complete statement of the child's wish. She also clearly wants to see and spend time with her father and have a relationship with him.
2. X has significant psychological needs, as is evidenced by the past history of the matter, including her attendance upon medical and/or allied health professionals to which I have made reference. The evidence establishes that the mother has been the primary parent taking X to her psychological appointments, but the father has also participated regularly as well. The evidence also establishes that, from time to time, the father has been more willing to cancel or put off an appointment if he felt, based on things that the child has said to him, that an appointment was not necessary, and this has been the source of some conflict between the parties.
3. I am troubled by the child's mental health, particularly in recent times. It is quite apparent from the mother's affidavit (which I accept) that X has: kicked a hole in a bedroom wall; banged her head against walls at home; and self-harmed.
4. A particularly concerning event happened in late 2024 when X verbally threatened another student's life at school and told the school chaplain she wanted to kill herself because of this girl. She talked about wanting to murder the girl and hide the body parts so she would not get caught.
5. In my view, X is a child who has been really struggling in the social setting at school in particular, and seemingly struggling with friendship groups and social issues, which can be very important to a child of this age. The mother gives evidence about X becoming quite dysregulated at home and acting out there as well, including when they were decorating the Christmas tree and X was grabbing pencils to poke herself in the eye, pens to poke her own skin, and belts to wrap around her own neck.
6. X has an older sibling in her mother's home, J, who is seventeen (17) and in Year 12 at the same school (K School). Neither the mother nor J could calm X down on this latter occasion. The mother ended up calling the an emergency helpline and, after only getting an automated message, she then called another mental health line. She ended up taking X to L Hospital where X saw a paediatrician in the Emergency Department. I accept the mother's evidence that the paediatrician told her that it would be better not to have X at the hospital, that she was not a risk of suicide as such, and that X was 'too vocal' about these issues for it to be a seemingly genuine concern, and that it was more of a cry for help and attention on X's part.
7. Whatever may have been the position with X, the very next day X had another 'meltdown', this time when the mother could not get her to clean her room. After attempting to discipline X entirely appropriately, and no criticism intended, the child yelled at the mother: "You can't make me. What are you going to do if I don't? No!" The mother ended up telling X that if she didn't clean her room, then an upcoming party would be cancelled.
8. To be fair to the mother, I accept her evidence that she was tired and exhausted having been at the hospital with X the night before. X called the mother's bluff, only to find that the mother was not bluffing. I accept that the mother fairly promptly provided X to the father on this occasion.
9. And I pause here to say that this example highlights the bigger problem in the case. While the mother could fairly be criticised for the "Disney Dad" comments, one has to look at the bigger picture and to see that the mother also promotes the relationship between the child and the father as well, and this is an example of where that did occur and where the mother provided the child to him.
10. Relevantly, it would seem that at the time the father was unaware of these events happening, particularly at school, because X did not feel comfortable enough to tell him about them. Again, I do not say this to be critical of the father; it just reflects the different relationship that the child has with the mother compared to what she has with him when it comes to issues of mental health. Put shortly, the child the court has to make orders about is more comfortable to go to her mother about such matters than to the father.

1. The issue of parental responsibility looms large in this respect because, as I have indicated, the debate really relates to educational and health-related matters. The single expert, Dr E, was of the view that the parents do not communicate or co-parent well. She was troubled about the likely implications for X's emotional wellbeing. She recommended that the parents communicate using a parenting communication software application. The opinion of Dr E was that the parents were not a particularly good candidate to share parental responsibility.
2. There is also another issue that arises in the case, namely the nature of the father's relationship with his daughter at different times, and in particular, the child complains that the father "guilt bombs" her. This has been a more recent problem in the father/daughter relationship, arising out of the child's time with him diminishing in more recent times. The evidence before me establishes that the child has complained about the father putting pressure on her to spend time with him and "guilt bombing" her about such matters.
3. I have before me as exhibit 3, a counselling session with Ms H from 14 November 2024 in which the child said to her that the father would "guilt bomb" her by asking her things such as: "How come you haven't texted me or called me? You always forget. You never come see me. Do you know how that upsets me?"
4. The father agrees that he said some, but not all, of these things to X. But I accept that from his daughter's perspective that is how she views their interactions.
5. The father conceded that he had said things of that nature to the child, and I am satisfied that, from time to time, in what have been difficult circumstances for the father, that he has said the sorts of things to the child about which she complains, and that, not necessarily intentionally, he has put pressure on her to spend time with him and to make sure that she doesn't "let him down" as it were. Such things are understandable on a human level, particularly in the context of disappointed parents who want to see their children. The relevance of the issue is not so much to be critical of the father's interactions as to observe that the child is, in my view, much more attuned to the mother in terms of her emotional/psychological needs than she is for the father, which is what brings me to the question of parental responsibility.
6. While it is true that the mother has denigrated the father to the child by referring to him as "Disney Dad", it is also true that when she has wanted to talk about matters that concern her, including in relation to the father "guilt bombing" her, X has gone to the mother.
7. X is a child who has been experiencing significant problems and difficulties, including at school. Given that the parents have just had a three (3) day hearing in this Court arguing about relatively narrow matters that are all in dispute, the concern I have is that I do not want a situation to arise where there is a debate about X's need for psychological treatment or support in particular.
8. The father does not trust the mother. So much is obvious. For example, so much is clear from his suggested order - albeit abandoned late - that the mother not move further than 50 kilometres from the child's current school. Indeed, it is also clear from his current proposed order that the parents be obliged by way of injunction to keep the child at the current school. He does not trust her. He would not make that concession in the witness box, but I have little doubt that he just does not trust the mother to promote his relationship with X.
9. Some of his concerns are legitimate, based on things such as the "Disney Dad" reference. But by the same token, the mother tends to assume the worst about the father as well. So much is obvious from the event in early 2024. On that occasion, despite the father having not seen the child for two (2) months in the December/February period leading up to the interim orders, when X rang the mother up from the father's house asking to spend an extra night with him, the mother said no. The reason she said no, is because she thought the father was manipulating X. She accepted in the witness box that she ought to have facilitated the extra time; the point is that there is a lack of trust.
10. When the parties attended for a joint counselling session with the psychologist on 4 December 2024 at a time when X was with the father, they were talking about parenting issues and X's difficulties, and the mother was taking notes. The father took umbrage to that, and both parties give somewhat different accounts of what was said and how they behaved. Again, in a word: conflict.
11. X has complex needs. What the court does not want to see happen is for her to need particularly psychological or mental health treatment and for the parents to be at an impasse because either:

(a) X does not want to talk to her father about her problems, therefore he will not believe she needs the help; or

(b) the father does not trust what X is telling him or what behaviours of hers are being reported to him because he does not experience those problems at his house. Again, this is a trust issue that would require faith in the truth of what the mother is telling him.

1. X is a child who has been crying out for help and needs a lot of support from these parents. She is a child whose welfare must be paramount. In my view, her emotional needs, her psychological and developmental needs militate very strongly against her parents ever coming back to this court to argue about her.
2. The mother has the capacity to make appropriate decisions about parenting issues related to the child's health, and indeed any issues really. She would, if given sole parental responsibility or decision-making as to health, make appropriate decisions for X, as she has done to date. The orders that are proposed by the parties permit and provide for both of them to have input as to medical and educational matters, so it is not as though if I made the order the mother seeks, that the father would be completely shut out of such matters. The mother's own orders propose that there be consultation.
3. It might be said that an order which takes away the father's parental responsibility as to health might be seen as a negative on the father/daughter relationship which has been under some pressure in more recent times. But overall, on balance I consider that it would be in X's best interests that the mother have sole decision-making as to medical issues so as to avoid the risk - in my view, the real risk - of the parents ending up in a gridlock about major decision-making as to medical and allied health related issues, particularly in the sphere of X's psychological and mental health treatment.
4. Education is a more difficult question. X attends K School with her sister J, but J will be leaving there next year. X is presently in Year 6. There is no reason to believe that X will be changing schools. Obviously, the parents agreed for X to go to K School in the first place. Obviously, it is a school that the mother has confidence in, or she would not have sent J there.
5. The argument that is advanced by Mr O'Reilly in support of giving the mother sole decision-making for education is that the child could potentially be expelled or have to leave that school perhaps for some other reason related to behaviour or mental health or the like.
6. Expulsion was very much the focus of the submission. There is some risk that this could occur. It is impossible for me to quantify that risk, beyond saying that it would seem much less likely than not, but given her past experience at the school certainly there must always be a risk that something might happen in that respect.
7. So, the question is, ought I to vest in the mother sole decision-making about educational matters?
8. Logically, having regard to the finding about health, there is something to be said for so doing because the gridlock to which I just referred can be avoided. It may also be possible in this case that there will be an overlap or an interplay between X's mental health conditions, such as they are, and the child's attendance at school. I do not want to have a situation arise where, for example, the mother were to receive mental health advice that the child should be changing school, but for the parties to be in a position where they have equal decision-making or joint decision-making about education, and therefore they run the risk of the gridlock to which I referred.
9. I see this as a much less pressing risk, however, than the risk of gridlock related to psychological treatment.
10. I am also mindful of X's close relationship with her father and of some of the pressures that their relationship has been under in more recent times, which are complex and cannot be laid at the feet of any one party.
11. In a difficult balancing act I have ultimately come to the view that the parties, in my view, can jointly make decisions about education. The agreed orders provide for there to be consultation between the parties in this respect, and also provide for both parents to be involved in meetings at the school and the like. So, an element of the father's participation is already 'baked into' the agreed orders. I am also mindful that, from X's perspective, she needs to know that her dad is involved in her life in major decision-making, and that, to put it in plain English, he cares about her, and he is adopting a serious parental role.
12. So by a whisker - and that is how close it is - I come to the view that I should make an order that the parental responsibility for education should be joint.
13. I otherwise consider the mother should have parental responsibility for health-related matters, but that all other aspects of parental responsibility should be shared equally.

1. In terms of the time arrangements, as I have indicated this was the major dispute between the parties.
2. I have before me various rosters which have been tendered and which have a rather 'Frankenstein-like' quality to them from where I sit. They are inherently complicated. They move. They have to move because 16 [weeks] does not go into 52 [weeks], and so the roster is a moving feast, albeit that it perhaps moves in a more predictable and understandable way for the parties than it does for any of even the lawyers in the case.
3. But on any reasonable view, it is a messy document. Nobody looking at exhibit 2 or any of the exhibits tendered in this respect could think that it is a straightforward arrangement; it just is not. And that is really the critical point that I have to consider in terms of what I should do about the 'week-to-week 'arrangements for spending time.
4. Mr Bithrey's argument effectively is that the parties understand the roster, the parties can make the roster work, the roster is not inherently confusing to them and that it will maximise the opportunity for the father to be involved in an ongoing significant relationship with his daughter.
5. Dr E, in cross-examination, accepted that there is a benefit to X in being able to see her father during the weekdays, which opportunities will be inevitably rather limited on the mother's proposal, though not entirely absent. Dr E accepted that X having some time with the father during the week does help to emphasise to X that her father is emotionally attuned to her and can meet her day-to-day needs, as well as insulating the child against any potential pressure or difficulty in her relationship with the father.
6. However, Dr E was fairly clear in her report in recommending that there ought to be time in a more predictable weekend pattern. While perhaps somewhat diminished in its force, this opinion was nonetheless maintained in the witness box. I am not bound by her opinion, but equally, the father's proposed orders would see the child and the mother - who also works full-time as Mr O'Reilly very properly submits - having to contort and twist and organise their lives around his roster. Now, that might be in the child's best interests, but it would involve a degree of sacrifice and I would think, also, disruption for this child, even though she has some familiarity with the arrangement from when she was younger.
7. The father receives his rosters well in advance and says he can give the mother what he anticipates to be his roster about a year out. But there is some degree of uncertainty in that, as was apparent from the fact that he originally wanted the orders to accommodate a former roster which he worked in 2017 on the basis of an EBA which is still apparently in force, and which, theoretically at least, could be imposed. Mr Bithrey sought to remove that proposed roster, and understandably so, but the point remains that proceeding on the basis of a calendar offers certainty in a way that by definition a roster cannot.
8. Working off a calendar has enormous advantages on a practical level for parties because they can plan things well in advance.
9. Part of the difficulty in the father's argument is that in the witness box it was quite apparent from him that he has substantial long service leave available, some three hundred and thirty-five (335) hours. On the basis of 'average' ten (10) hour shifts, that is 33.5 days' worth of leave.
10. In the current year, 2025, the father only needs to take a handful of days' leave in order to be able to spend the same time amount of time with the child as he would pursuant to the mother's proposal. That is to say, for the sake of a matter of some days' leave, he can spend pretty much the same amount of time with the child.
11. The father also has the potential to be able to take carer's leave, though I accept he would need to ask his employer. I do accept his evidence that he is committed to asking for leave and would make the requests. He has clearly been an employee of that organisation for some time. On the mother's proposed orders I am confident that the father would be able to make arrangements to spend:
    • if not all of the time with X, then
    • an overwhelmingly high percentage of the time.
12. He may not be able to take up all of the time, but in my view, he would be able to take up so much of the time that his relationship with the child would not be in any risk.
13. In the witness box, the father was challenged about his available leave and about taking the time off so as to accommodate the mother's orders. He gave a telling answer when he said: "I'm not taking eight (8) days off to suit [Ms Drexler]'s orders." It was one of those moments in a case where a penny drops, and it is obvious that conflict between parents is trumping a child's best interests.
14. I have no doubt the father considers it better to work with his roster. I have no doubt it suits him. I have no doubt there are advantages to the child in such an order. But in my view, and I agree with Dr E in this respect, it would be in the best interests of the child to have a much more predictable arrangement and for the father to make some arrangements with his employer to get the time off work and to make it happen, which I believe he will. He is a committed father, and I am confident he will do what he has to do to make his time with X happen.
15. As I have said, the mother's proposal also offers the distinct advantage of, in my view greatly, reducing confusion, particularly for a child who has been through a lot of chaos and instability since her parents separated, who has been caught in the middle of some pretty unpleasant experiences, and frankly, who needs stability.
16. I regard stability for X and the risk of litigation as trumping, for want of a better word, the argument raised by the father that it will be more difficult for him to be able to spend the full amount of time with the child if I make the mother's orders. In my view the appropriate course, which meets X's needs, is to put in place an order that provides for the father to spend predictable weekends with the child. He will have plenty of time to talk to his employer because he can literally go to his employer months or years, potentially, in advance and say: "I want to have this weekend off, or this period of time off, so I can see my child under the orders."
17. There are no guarantees in life, but I consider that if I were to make orders based on the father's roster, there is a much bigger problem for X in terms of the 'jumping around' of days on a calendar. Having regard to her particular needs and her particular emotional vulnerabilities, it is my view that stability and predictability are the trump cards on this issue.
18. I would propose to make orders that the mother's weekends in Term 2 align with Mother's Day and that the father's weekends in Term 3 align with Father's Day.
19. I am satisfied that the child will be able to have a relationship with both parents that is significant, loving and supportive in this context and that her needs can properly be met.
20. The order also will provide for the child to spend the alternate Wednesdays with the father when he is available; they can have dinner. This will also give the father the opportunity to reinforce to his daughter his involvement in her life which, I would add, is also 'baked into' some of the agreed orders in any event in terms of participation in the child's life.
21. Term 4 Christmas holidays were the subject of some debate. The mother has a longstanding arrangement of going to Town M with her daughter J and staying at some fairly cheap accommodation in what is, on any view, a pretty desirable and very popular location for holidaymakers. She seeks to be able to continue that, and in so doing, her proposed order effectively means that she has the first two (2) weeks of the Christmas holidays every year and that there would be a handover to the father at 6.00 pm on Christmas Day.
22. To be fair, the father's initial proposal for Christmas holidays also involved the parties having the child on some sort of fourteen (14) night rotation.
23. I do not see the need for any of that.
24. Being consistent with the other time orders that I make and which are based on a calendar arrangement, I do not see a need or a benefit to this child in making an order as the mother seeks.
25. I am aware that this Town M holiday is something she enjoys. There are plenty of places the mother can take the child on a holiday. It is fact of life: these parents are separated. It would be an unfair division for the child in terms of holiday time to make the mother's order. It would involve Christmas Day handovers, which I do not think are a good idea for this child. While I can see the advantages to the mother in this arrangement and some advantages to the child, to be fair, I do not consider that it would be in X's best interests to put in place that order which would make Christmas rather lumpy and see the mother end up with the bulk of Christmas Day.
26. I accept that the mother enjoys the holiday period at Town M with J, and I am sure they have had lots of good times. There is no reason that cannot continue this year; it should. Those arrangements are no doubt already in place, and I would not remove them this year, but as of the following year, it is time for a new arrangement to be generated.
27. In my view, predictability and the need to avoid dispute strongly militates in favour of the father having the first half of holidays in one year, the second half of holidays in the other. It cannot be fairer for the child. It gives her every opportunity to spend quality time, not just with the mother's family, but also with the father's family.
28. This court will not make orders that suit the mother's convenience any more than it will make orders that suit the father's convenience. There will be one rule applied to both. But more fundamentally, it is a simpler, more straightforward, and in my view, much better order for the child, which also gives both parents the opportunity to have a decent solid block of holiday time with her, including overseas trips if they want to, and which clearly are envisaged by the agreed orders in any event, which accommodate passports and overseas travel.

Other matters including Facetime communication:

1. I do not need to make the order in relation to X staying at K School because I am putting in place an order for joint parental responsibility as to education, so I do not need to make the father's proposed order 28.
2. Last, but not least, the father was seeking specific orders about communication with X on Sundays and Wednesdays. Such an order was not included in the interim orders of 12 February 2024, which, while not binding in any way on the court, are instructive in the sense that there really is not any evidence since then of any particular problem with telephone or electronic communication.
3. The risk I run is that if I put in place a specific order that now obliges people to make calls at specific times, the timing might coincide with some other problem X is having, perhaps a 'meltdown', perhaps a behavioural issue, perhaps something else, or perhaps she just does not want to talk to mum or talk to dad. And neither parent can entirely control the child. That is obvious at times. That is obvious from the evidence before me when the mother handed the child over to the father on 30 November 2024 and when the father handed her back to the mother on 10 March 2025.
4. I do not want to set this young girl up for failure. She has enough difficulties in her life without me putting in place a specific communication order at the request of the father. I do not question his intention, I just do not consider that it would be in the best interests of the child to force such an arrangement.
5. Now if the child wants to talk to the other parent, she will. I have little doubt of that from what I read about her. By the same token, I do not see a net benefit to her in putting in place such an order. The parents have a good relationship with her, as I have indicated. They do not need that specific order for the purposes of continuing or maintaining their relationship with the child, and I think such an order would only create pressure and tension, which no-one really wants to put on their daughter, and the mother does not seek the order in any event.

1. There are a lot of matters that I could descend into about various dates and various specific things that have happened in the case. I really do not think it is helpful or necessary that I do so. There are many disputed facts in the matter as I have indicated, but I do not consider it helpful to go into those subjects. I merely observe that both parents could fairly be accused of being hypocritical on numerous topics, and I say both parents, but I see little value in descending into such matters.
2. I think that these parents can make the orders I propose to make, work. Do I think they will be necessarily easy for anyone? No, but there are limits to what the Court can do to fix what is really a human problem between two people who do not really get on that well and who need to get on better than what they do.
3. The child said it more eloquently than I could say, and that is, she just wished her parents liked each other. And if there is one thing out of this case I would urge the parents to think about, it is think about what your daughter wants, because you can spend thousands and thousands of dollars on psychologists, and maybe you will, but do not be part of the problem in that room with the conflict that is here.
4. I accept the mother may be a bit unhappy about Christmas. The father may be a bit unhappy about the other orders, perhaps about the health decision-making as well. But it is the decision I believe, having sat here, is in the best interests of your daughter.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and six (106) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge Betts.