austlii:cth/FedCFamC2G/2025/571
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC2G
2025-04-24
Original judgment source is linked above.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
(a) On 7 June 2023, to not investigate the applicant's complaint under section 36(2) of the Act for 'lacking in substance' pursuant to section 41(1)(d) of the Act, subject of proceedings MLG 1198 of 2023 ('the 1198 decision'); and
(b) On 27 July 2023, to not investigate the applicant's complaint under section 36(1) of the Act on the basis that 'investigation was not warranted having regard to all the circumstances' pursuant to section 41(1)(da) of the Act, subject of proceedings MLG 1390 of 2023 ('the 1390 decision').
The Privacy Act
(1) An individual may complain to the Commissioner about an act or practice that may be an interference with the privacy of the individual.
(2) In the case of an act or practice that may be an interference with the privacy of 2 or more individuals, any of those individuals may make a complaint under subsection (1) on behalf of all of the individuals.
(1) An act or practice of an APP entity is an interference with the privacy of an individual if:
(a) the act or practice breaches an Australian Privacy Principle in relation to personal information about the individual; or
(b) the act or practice breaches a registered APP code that binds the entity in relation to personal information about the individual.
In general, this Part deals with complaints and investigations about acts or practices that may be an interference with the privacy of an individual.
An individual may complain to the Commissioner about an act or practice that may be an interference with the privacy of the individual. If a complaint is made, the Commissioner is required to investigate the act or practice except in certain circumstances.
The Commissioner may also, on his or her own initiative, investigate an act or practice that may be an interference with the privacy of an individual or a breach of Australian Privacy Principle 1.
The Commissioner has a range of powers relating to the conduct of investigations including powers:
(a) to conciliate complaints; and
(b) to make preliminary inquiries of any person; and
(c) to require a person to give information or documents, to attend a compulsory conference; and
(d) to transfer matters to an alternative complaint body in certain circumstances.
After an investigation, the Commissioner may make a determination in relation to the investigation. An entity to which a determination relates must comply with certain declarations included in the determination. Court proceedings may be commenced to enforce a determination.
(1) ... the Commissioner shall investigate an act or practice if:
(a) the act or practice may be an interference with the privacy of an individual; and
(b) a complaint about the act or practice has been made under section 36.
(1) The Commissioner may decide not to investigate, or not to investigate further, an act or practice about which a complaint has been made under section 36 if the Commissioner is satisfied that:
...
(d) the complaint is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance or not made in good faith (emphasis added);
(da) an investigation, or further investigation, of the act or practice is not warranted having regard to all the circumstances (emphasis added);
...
An APP entity must take reasonable steps to protect the personal information it holds:
(a) from misuse, interference and loss; and
(b) from unauthorised access, modification and disclosure.
If an APP entity holds personal information about an individual, the entity must, on request by the individual, give the individual access to the information.
The APP entity must:
(a) respond to the request for access to the personal information:
(i) if the entity is an agency - within 30 days after the request is made; or
(ii) ... and
(b) give access to the information in the manner requested by the individual, if it is reasonable and practicable to do so.
The ANAO's audit of the Department of Veterans' Affairs' 2020-21 financial statements raised a Category B ANAO finding which identified that the Department of Veterans' Affairs had no processes in place to identify users who had access to systems, applications and data repositories that contained personal, and sensitive personal information, after terminations and had no process to monitor activities undertaken by these users.
While the ANAO and the Department of Veterans' Affairs have since consulted over what approach the Department of Veterans' Affairs should take in future, this does not negate the Department of Veterans' Affairs did not take reasonable steps under APP 11.1 to protect the class members personal information from the risk of misuse, interference, loss, unauthorised access, modification or disclosure.
Breach of APP 11.1 does not require evidence of misuse, interference, loss, unauthorised access, modification or disclosure - the legislation is explicit that the obligation is that the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect such personal information. It is prospective not retrospective. As has been consistently stated by the Information Commissioner in s 52 determinations, 'APP 11 is about the APP entity taking reasonable steps to prevent certain events, such as unauthorised disclosure in breach of APP 6, from occurring' not a breach of disclosure itself.
... all Department of Veterans' Affairs clients whose personal information, including sensitive personal information, was accessed by contractors of the Department of Veterans' Affairs between 1 January 2021 and 31 Dec 2021 who have since subsequently ceased working for the Department of Veteran's Affairs without proper and reasonable confirmation that all access to systems containing personal information, including sensitive personal information, of class members had been retracted, and those the Department of Veterans' Affairs failed to take reasonable steps to confirm those contractors (PSPF termination/separation clearance) had agreed not to use their knowledge obtained from prior access obtained from these systems for other purposes.
The Department of Veterans' Affairs ... is committed to the privacy of veterans and their families. There are currently a range of controls in place to support this; including confidential arrangements with contractors and third parties, policies and procedures, and legislative requirements. The applications of each of these controls provides layered protection to veterans information to ensure there is no single point of failure.
DVA believes that these controls meet the Office of the Information Privacy Commissioner's interpretation of 'reasonable steps', and continues to prioritise enhancements where potential improvements are identified.
... If you have evidence or information pertaining to a breach of APP 11 you are encouraged to provide the relevant information so this can be investigated and actioned appropriately.
You allege DVA has interfered with privacy by failing to comply with APP 11.1 in its handling of personal information. You refer to a report published by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) regarding its audit of DVA. Specifically, you state that the ANAO identified that DVA did not have any processes in place, at the time of the audit, to ensure that access to personal information was removed from users/staff after termination.
While we appreciate the concerns you have raised, the report referred to in your complaint states:
4.3.84 After the ANAO identified this issue, DVA investigated activity of users after they had terminated and concluded that neither its data not IT systems had been compromised.
While APP 11.1 is concerned with the security safeguards that an organisation has in place to protect personal information from unauthorised disclosure, it does not prescribe what these steps must be. Rather, the APP Guidelines advise that to meet the requirements of APP 11.1, an APP entity should implement strategies (internal practices, procedures and systems) in relation to such things as ICT security, access security, third party providers (including cloud computing) and data breaches.
The identification of a security risk to personal information is not sufficient in itself to prove a breach of APP 11.1 in the absence of any information to suggest the APP entity has not taken reasonable steps to deal with the risk, or that the risk has been realised resulting in an actual authorised access or disclosure. (emphasis added)
If there is evidence that your personal information has not been protected by DVA failing to restrict systems access to terminated users, the OAIC would then have a basis to review the security steps DVA had in place to consider if these were reasonable in the circumstances as required by APP 11.1 in the handling of your privacy complaint.
However, there is no information or evidence before us to suggest that DVA failed to protect the personal information that it holds. Nor is their (sic) information or evidence to suggest that by lacking processes in place to identify users - who had access to systems, applications and/or data repositories after cessation of employment or contract - this resulted in any unauthorised access or disclosure of your personal information or any other individual's personal information.
As there is insufficient information at this time to establish whether DVA has interfered with your privacy, or any individual's privacy, in the manner alleged, this complaint is currently lacking in substance. (emphasis added)
Generally, please note that representative complaints can only be made on behalf of other individuals where the complainant also alleges that the same respondent has interfered with their own privacy. The alleged interference must arise from the same or similar circumstances and relate to a substantial common issue of law or fact ... As above, there is no information to indicate that your privacy has been interfered with as a result of the lack of processes - identified by the ANAO - in place for DVA to ensure that access to personal information was removed from users/staff after termination.
In closing, the ANAO report is explicit in that reasonable steps to prevent misuse, interference, loss, unauthorised access, modification or unintended disclosure of the representative complainants (DVA clients) were not taken by the Department of Veterans' Affairs, and therefore your intention to recommend dismissal of the representative complaint under s 41(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is untenable, as the basis of your recommendation is factually incorrect and wholly misrepresents the basis of APP 11 (which does not require any evidence of breach to find a breach of APP 11, just that reasonable steps that could have been taken were not taken to prevent the likelihood of such an event).
Systematically failing to remove, for an extended period of years, terminated and separated contractors and employees from Departmental systems with access to the representative complainants' identified sensitive personal data is a breach of APP 11.1.
...
What is reasonable is proportionate and appropriate to the possible risk of a security breach and the level of harm that could result from a breach, as well as the capacity of the APP entity to fund such steps. Some steps may require more stringent protections, based on the sensitivity or extent of the personal information.
If a system contains extremely sensitive personal information, such as health records, agencies must take more steps in protecting the information.
The primary safeguard in protecting documents containing personal information is to limit access only to those who need to access it in order to do their jobs.
In this regard, the ANAO report identified a critical failure of such reasonable steps by the Department of Veterans' Affairs.
While I agree with you that APP 11.1 requires APP entities to have reasonable steps in place to protect personal information, which then allows the APP entities to mitigate risk of harm to personal information, the OAIC will not conduct an investigation into whether an entity is complying to its obligations under APP 11.1 unless there is sufficient information to suggest that there may be interference with an individual's privacy.
Section 36(1) of the privacy states (sic):
An individual may complain to the Commissioner about an act or practice that may be an interference with the privacy of an individual.
From the information provided, the ANAO has already conducted an investigation into the situation have described in your complaint, being the DVA's alleged failure to systematically remove terminated and separated contractors and employees from its systems. It was noted in the ANAO's report that the DVA found that neither its data nor IT systems had been compromised.
...
Further, you have not provided any information or evidence to demonstrate that the DVA's alleged failure to remove its terminated and separated contractors and employees from its system has led to an interference of your privacy under APP 11.1. You have only provided a claim that the ANAO's report explicitly shows that the DVA did not have reasonable steps in place to protect personal information under APP 11.1, at the time of the ANAO's audit.
Your reference to the ANAO's report is not sufficient evidence for the OAIC to use in considering whether the DVA has interfered with your privacy in this instance.
Therefore, from the information before me, I remain of the view that your complaint is lacking in substance and the OAIC will not be conducting preliminary inquiries with, or investigating the DVA about your complaint.
However, as previously advised, we referred your concerns to our CII team for consideration.
The Commissioner has a number of regulatory powers, including the ability to undertake investigations of her own initiative, known as Commissioner Initiated Investigations (CIIs). ...
...
You claim that our response to you of 8 March 2023, was not consistent with the APP Guidelines.
I appreciate your concern in this regard and your view that the OAIC has misapplied APP 11.1 in its assessment of an aspect/s of your complaint. However, the OAIC assesses each privacy complaint received based on the Commissioner's views on the practical application of the legislation. In this instance, we have considered all of the information provided in your complaint received based on the Commissioner's views on the practical application of the legislation. In this instance, we have considered all of the information provided in your complaint, when forming our decision, including that there is no information or evidence before us to support your allegations that the DVA has failed to keep your personal information secure.
As previously advised, representative complaints can only be made on behalf of other individuals where the complainant also alleges that the same respondent has interfered with their own privacy. The alleged interference must arise from the same or similar circumstances and relate to a substantial common issue of law or fact ... As stated above, there is no information before us to indicate that your privacy has been interfered with due to the lack of processes in place, identified by the ANAO's audit, for the DVA to ensure that access to personal information was removed from users/staff after termination.
(1) An act or practice of an APP entity is an interference with the privacy of an individual if:
(a) the act or practice breaches an Australian Privacy Principle in relation to personal information about the individual; or
...
- Properly applied, a standard of legal reasonableness does not involve substituting a Court's view as to how the discretion should be exercised for that of the decision-maker. Accepting then, that there are limits on the Court's supervisory jurisdiction and that a 'standard of reasonableness' is not applied as a mechanism for merits review (or a vehicle for the Court substituting its own view of the manner of exercise of the discretion), but rather a feature of legality in decision making, leaves open the question of how the standard 'is to be applied and how it is to be tested' (Li, per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [66]).
...
- ... it is not for this Court to exercise the discretion in s 41(1) of the Privacy Act for itself so as to determine whether or not the Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner should investigate the applicant's complaint... The only question for this Court is whether the discretion has been exercised by the Assistant Commissioner according to law.
"The requisite state of mind should be one which has been formed logically and rationally upon findings of fact. Further, even if it cannot be detected that an error has occurred in the application of law or consideration of the relevant matters, if the conclusion is one which is wholly unreasonable, it can, nevertheless, be inferred that error has occurred..."
The state of satisfaction under section 41 of the Act
(a) to promote the protection of the privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information; and
(aa) to recognise the public interest in protecting privacy; and
(b) to recognise that the protection of the privacy of individuals is balanced with the interests of entities in carrying out their functions or activities; and
(c) to provide the basis for nationally consistent regulation of privacy and the handling of personal information; and
(d) to promote responsible and transparent handling of personal information by entities;
(g) to provide a means for individuals to complain about an alleged interference with their privacy; and
(h) to implement Australia's international obligations in relation to privacy.
"If he does not address himself to the question which the [statute] formulates, if his conclusion is affected by some mistake of law, if he takes some extraneous reason into consideration or excludes from consideration some factor which should affect his determination, on any of these grounds his conclusion is liable to review. Moreover, the fact that he has not made known the reasons why he was not satisfied will not prevent the review of his decision. The conclusion he has reached may, on a full consideration of the material that was before him, be found to be capable of explanation only on the ground of some such misconception. If the result appears to be unreasonable on the supposition that he addressed himself to the right question, correctly applied the rules of law and took into account all the relevant considerations and no irrelevant considerations, then it may be a proper inference that it is a false supposition. It is not necessary that you should be sure of the precise particular in which he has gone wrong. It is enough that you can see that in some way he must have failed in the discharge of his exact function according to law."
- The reference by Dixon J to "unreasonable" did not suggest the existence of a ground of unreasonableness, rather it suggested that if the conclusion was unreasonable in the circumstances, that would evidence the existence of one of the other errors which was not, of itself, patent.
Representative complaint under section 36(2) of the Act?
(a) APP 11.1 as the portal to which the secure link connected required and tracked user logins, thereby capturing unordinary information about users;
(b) APP 12.4(a)(i) as the DVA's response time exceeded 30 days;
(c) APP 12.4(b) as the sending of the document by secure link was contrary to the applicant's request; and
(d) APP 11.1 as the document was sent by unencrypted email (this ground of complaint was later added by the applicant by email to the respondent on 11 December 2021).
...
On 15 June 2023, I wrote to advise you of my intention to exercise the Commissioner's discretion under s 41(1)(da) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) not to investigate your complaint because I was of the view that an investigation was not warranted having regard to all the circumstances. I invited you to comment before making my decision.
I have carefully considered your detailed submission of 22 July 2023.
Review of your submission
I accept that you did not decline to attend the scheduled conciliation conference and that the decision not to proceed with the conciliation conference rested with the OAIC. Upon further review, it is evident that:
the OAIC emailed you on 23 December 2022 advising you that your complaint had been listed for a 3 hour conciliation teleconference on 20 February 2023. You were asked to confirm your attendance and contact details, advise whether you wished to nominate a support person and provide details of the resolution you were seeking by 16 January 2023.
you responded to the OAIC on 23 December 2022:
- stating that the OAIC had repeatedly refused to correct claims it allegedly made about you
- questioning why the OAIC considered conciliation suitable and requesting that the OAIC elaborate on its decision to proceed with a conciliation conference
- requesting that the OAIC correct the IMM/DLM used when sending correspondence to you and citing the Protective Security Policy Framework.
the OAIC emailed you on 3 February 2023 advising that the scheduled conciliation conference had been vacated and that your complaint would be assessed to determine whether an investigation should be commenced.
I otherwise maintain the views expressed in my letter of 15 June 2023, namely that:
whilst unfortunate, the timeframe of approximately 2.5 months to address your access request was not unduly excessive
there is no information before me that would suggest that the respondent sought to withhold the requested information from you or intentionally delayed actioning your applications
it is difficult to accept that the respondent's attempt to disseminate the requested information via a Secure Email link to an online portal is contrary to the respondent's privacy obligations
to the extent that the respondent did not strictly comply with its obligations under the APPs, the nature and impact of that non-compliance is relatively minor
any loss or harm you suffered as a result of the respondent's actions appears to be minimal
it is unlikely that an investigation will result in a different or more favourable outcome for you.
In response to your submission, I wish to add that:
the OAIC Privacy Regulatory Action Policy relates to the use of regulatory powers conferred on the Commissioner by the Privacy Act and other legislation and outlines the principles to be considered when exercising those powers. In the case of your complaint, I do not consider that regulatory action is warranted. Paragraph 16 of the Policy states that '[w]hen dealing with an alleged contravention of the Privacy Act or other legislation, the OAIC will give individual consideration to that alleged contravention and have regard to all relevant circumstances.' The Policy does not preclude the Commissioner or her delegate from properly exercising the discretion under s 41(1) of the Privacy Act to decide not to investigate a complaint.
in my view, ss 41(1) and (2) of the Privacy Act are expressed in a manner which contemplates that the Commissioner may decline to investigate or investigate further a complaint that involves a prima facie interference with an individual's privacy.
the fact that matters previously reviewed by the courts relating to the exercise of s41(1)(da) concern complaints about entities not subject to the Privacy Act, or involve relief in relation to other matters, does not in my view preclude me from exercising the discretion in the current circumstances.
in respect of your reference to the matter of 'VU' and 'VV', 'VW' (Privacy) [2020) AICmr 52, an investigation was commenced and a determination made under s 52 of the Privacy Act in circumstances where the respondents had not provided the complainant with access to the personal information she had requested and to which she was entitled. The Acting Commissioner declared that the respondents send copies of the complainant's records to the complainant, but did not make any declarations in relation to the payment of compensation because the complainant had not suffered any loss. That matter differs from your complaint in that the respondent actioned your access request, albeit not within a period of 30 days or in the specific manner you had requested.
Decision
For the above reasons I am satisfied, in accordance with s 41(1)(da) of the Privacy Act, that an investigation of your complaint is not warranted having regard to all the circumstances. Consequently, in my capacity as the Commissioner's delegate, I have determined to exercise the discretion under s 41(1) of the Privacy Act to decide not to investigate your complaint.
I understand that you are familiar with your review rights. Nevertheless, I have outlined those rights in the attachment to this letter for ease of reference.
I will now close our file. Thank you for your complaint.
...
Because the delegate made this s41(1)(da) decision before any s 40 investigation or any s 42 preliminary inquiries in the Department of Veterans' Affairs, the burden of due care referred to by the respondent ... in exercising this power is higher than may be the case if the decision was made later in the privacy complaint process.
...
- ... the delegate in mischaracterised (sic) the nature of the matters they were required to have regard to in assessing whether they had reached the state of satisfaction that s 41(1)(da) required, applied tests other than that to be found in the APPs and the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Privacy Act (the delegate basing their views, without any investigation of the matters raised, as to their feeling as to the severity of the breaches of the APPs).
- The delegate in mischaracterising what was required to be taken into account in assessing what state of satisfaction s 41(1)(da) requires, ... did not reach the requisite state of mind in the manner required by the Act, and that failure amounts to a jurisdictional error. ...
The Information Commissioner's task is a difficult one. The Commission appreciates the OAIC's preference for educative and preventative action by conducting assessments under the Privacy Act. However, as noted in the ALRC Report, the OAIC needs to be prepared to adopt a more formal regulatory posture where there is a "reasonable" apprehension of possible interferences with the privacy of an individual.
"A compromise needs to be made between addressing individual complaints and addressing systemic issues. The compromise recommended by the ALRC is to give the Commissioner more discretion not to investigate individual complaints in certain circumstances. First, the Commissioner should be given a discretion not to investigate an act or practice if he or she is satisfied that an investigation, or further investigation, of the act or practice is not warranted having regard to all the circumstances. This discretion would enable the Commissioner to dismiss trivial complaints, or complaints that have no prospect of a practical or satisfactory resolution. ..."
- The scope of s 41(1)(da) of the Privacy Act starts with its text, while at the same time having regard to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at the first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense:... Here, the extrinsic material in the form of ALRC Report is part of that context. As I remarked at the outset, the Privacy Act does not create a directly-enforceable action by individuals for the infringement of privacy. The Act provides for a means of complaining about an alleged interference with privacy. The role of the Commissioner is as an administrative gatekeeper of complaints about interferences with privacy. The Commissioner has powers of investigation, but a discretion on a number of grounds not to investigate, or not to investigate further. The powers of investigation include powers to obtain information and documents, the power to hold a hearing, the power to conduct a compulsory conference, and the power to examine witnesses: ss 43-45. However, unlike a court, the Commissioner has no duty to adjudicate rights: the statutory powers of investigation are tempered by the discretion to terminate the investigation.
- The words of s 41(1)(da) must therefore be construed in light of the gatekeeping role given to the Commissioner. There is nothing in the text, structure, or purpose of the Act that detracts from giving s 41(1)(da) the broad meaning that the text of the provision bears on its face. The factors upon which the Commissioner may rely in reaching the state of satisfaction provided for by s 41(1)(da) are therefore wide, and it is axiomatic that the weight to be ascribed to such factors is a matter for the Commissioner. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that I consider that the words "having regard to all the circumstances" in s41(1)(da) are broad enough to entitle the Commissioner to take into account:
(a) the strength of the evidence concerning a claimed interference with privacy advanced by the applicant in his s 36 complaint;
(b) the weight to be given to any legal arguments;
(c) the practical utility of pursuing an investigation; and
(d) the efficient allocation of the Commissioner's resources and powers.
"Decision-making is a function of the real world. A decision-maker is not bound to investigate each avenue that may be suggested to him by a party interested. Ultimately, a decision-maker must do the best on the material available after giving interested parties the right to be heard on the question."
- It cannot be expected that the delegate will conduct the most searching of inquiries with respect to each and every argument or allegation put by a complainant. Such a dogged search for truth would be inapposite to the function of real world administrative decision-making. This is especially so where the discretion exercised here, in respect of which it is alleged that an error has been made, is one related to whether to investigate further a complaint or, instead, to terminate the complaint.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and ten (110) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Deputy Chief Judge Mercuri.
[1] Orders of Judge Forbes dated 30 August 2023.
[18] Court book at pages 57 to 60, 62 and 64.
[20] Court book at page 177 and following.
[22] See Jaworski v Australian Information Commissioner [2022] FCA 1400, [81].
[23] Applicant's outline of submissions filed in proceeding MLG 1198 of 2023 on 19 February 2024, paragraph 10.
[33] Court book at page 348; Court book at pages 350 to 351.
[34] Court book at page 353 and following.
Knowles
Australian Information Commissioner [2025] FedCFamC2G 571
I reject your suggestion that I have not formed, or am not reasonably able to form, the requisite state of mind to exercise the Commissioner's discretion under s 41 of the Privacy Act.