Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 201(1A) - 201(1B) of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999

1. On 30 September 2025, I dismissed Mr KLPD's application for social services second review pursuant to section 101(1)(b) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (the ART Act) after finding that the application had no reasonable prospects of success.
2. At the time of this present application, the Tribunal has not published my decision and reasons for that dismissal. Nonetheless, I refer to that decision statement to set out the background the current application and to explain why I concluded there was no prospects of success. It is not appropriate for me to reframe, summarise or restate my reasons, and my reasons are as expressed in that document. I have directed the Tribunal's registry to attend to the publication of that statement of reasons.
3. On 21 October 2025, Mr KLPD wrote to the Tribunal's registry requesting that his application be reinstated, fully investigated and reconsidered. Failing that, Mr KLPD stated that he would appeal the decision to the Federal Court.
4. I held an interlocutory hearing to deal with Mr KLPD's application for reinstatement on 20 February 2026. At the hearing, Mr KLPD explained that he had obtained documents under a freedom of information application that he considered supported his case as presented previously in relation when he had first lodged his application for the relevant social security pension. As I understood it, Mr KLPD considered that I had dismissed his application under section 101 of the ART Act in error because he had now obtained documentary evidence that may support an aspect of his case on the merits.
5. Section 102 of the ART Act makes provision for matters that have been dismissed to be reinstated, but it applies only in accordance with its terms.
6. Subsection 102(5) of the ART Act provides for a party to apply for reinstatement of the application on the grounds of error, and subsection 102(6) of the ART Act provides that if the Tribunal considers that the application was dismissed in error, the Tribunal may reinstate the application and make such orders as appear to be appropriate in the circumstances.
7. Section 101 of the ART Act makes further provision for reinstatement in other specified circumstances, but those pertain to dismissals pursuant to sections 95, 99 and 100 of the ART Act, so are not applicable to this matter which was dismissed pursuant to section 101 of the ART Act.
8. The question of the reinstatement of this matter therefore falls to be determined by reference to subsection 102(5) and (6) of the ART Act.
9. In JTBJ and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social security) [2025] ARTA 464 the President of the Tribunal considered the scope of the power to reinstate applications dismissed in error, and posed the question as to what types of error fall within subsection 102(6) of the ART Act.[1]
10. Of note, the jurisprudence considered in JTJB related to circumstances of dismissal arising from an applicant's failure to appear at a hearing[2] or failure to comply with directions[3]. On the topic of the scope of error that might be corrected by reinstatement under subsection 102(5) and (6) of the ART Act, the President said:

[46] It is not possible to comprehensively set out the types of errors that may fall within s 102(5) and (6) of the ART Act. By way of example only, the following errors have been held (expressly or by implication) to fall, or can be regarded as clearly falling, within the predecessor provision of s 102(5) and (6), namely s 42A(10) of the AAT Act: > > (a) Where an application for review is dismissed due to a significant procedural error, such as > > (i) a dismissal without notice to the parties when the statutory provision relied upon required notice to the parties;[50] or > > (ii) a dismissal on the basis that particular information was not included in the application for review where that information is not necessary for the validity of the application for review. > > (b) Where an application for review is dismissed on the basis that the applicant consented to the dismissal, when in fact: > > (i) the applicant did not consent; > > (ii) the applicant communicated consent (including by requesting that the proceeding be withdrawn) in circumstances that objectively demonstrate that, at the time of the communication, the applicant so misunderstood the nature and consequences of that consent that it was not a true consent. This principle would not be engaged, for example, where the ART or a representative of the applicant explained to the applicant the effect of a consent to dismissal or a request for withdrawal, or where the applicant simply changes their mind about whether to continue with the proceeding. > > (c) Where an application for review is dismissed on the basis that the applicant did not appear at a Tribunal case event, and: > > (i) the applicant did in fact appear; > > (ii) a notice of the case event was not received by the applicant and in the circumstances could not be deemed to have been delivered to the applicant; or > > (iii) a notice of the case event was received by the applicant but was defective (such as where the wrong date for the case event was specified).

11. The President rejected submissions contending for a wider meaning of 'error' than as outlined above, noting that subsection 102(5) and (6) do not provide for a second review on the merits. In this regard, the President also observed (in the context to a decision to dismiss as a consequence of a finding of a want of jurisdiction) that if, following the interlocutory hearing, the member makes a decision that there is no jurisdiction, dismisses the application on that basis and gives reasons for that decision, the applicant could not seek reinstatement of the application under s 102(5) and (6) of the ART Act on the ground that the decision contains an error. That is because the applicant participated in the hearing and had an opportunity to present their case on whether the ART had jurisdiction. The dismissal in such a case cannot be described as a 'default decision' or a 'summary dismissal'. The appropriate remedy in such a case is an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia under s 172 of the ART Act.[4]
12. My decision of 30 September 2025, for present purposes, finds most similarity with the observations made in JTJB in relation to the example of a decision made as a consequence of a finding of want of jurisdiction. My decision of 30 September 2025 followed an interlocutory hearing arranged for the express purpose of considering the Secretary's application to dismiss the matter on the grounds provided for in section 101 of the ART Act. It was neither a summary decision nor a default decision.
13. In that sense I did not dismiss Mr KLPD's application in error, I did so deliberately following a hearing and for the detailed reasons and findings expressed in my statement of reasons of 30 September 2025.
14. As foreshadowed by Mr KLPD in his application for reinstatement, and as observed by the President in JTJB, an appeal to the Federal Court lies from my decision to dismiss the application under section 101 of the ART Act. The Court may intervene if it is established that I reached that decision following a procedural error, an error of law or a jurisdictional error. In the same vein that the President observed that an application for reinstatement is not to serve as a second review, in my view it is likewise no substitute for the judicial process.
15. Finally, and in that regard, in JTJB the President applied the Bhardwaj[5] principle to the circumstances of that matter. The Bhardwaj principle is a principle of general law independent of the statutory framework for reinstatement of applications, and permits the Tribunal to treat its purported decision as a nullity. The decision in Mora[6] proposes a range of factors that might suggest treating an earlier purported decision as a nullity as being open to the Tribunal. It is sufficient to note that there is a high bar to be overcome to conclude that a purported Tribunal decision should be treated as a nullity by the Tribunal itself.
16. In light of the analysis in JTJB, I have revisited my decision of 30 September 2025 against the Bhardwaj principal and the discussion in Mora. I identify no error that would give rise to a conclusion on my part that I reached the decision to dismiss the matter pursuant to section 101 of the ART Act following a process or engaging in reasoning so erroneous as to take it outside of my jurisdiction.
17. Ultimately, my assessment in that regard cannot be conclusive and in the event that Mr KLPD makes his application for judicial review, the Tribunal must submit to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court on such questions.
18. Mr KLPD's application to reinstate his application is refused.

[2] Brehoi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [199] FCA 772 and Goldie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 367

[3] Katterns v Comcare [2002] FCA 1366

[5] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11

[6] Mora (Migration) [2016] AATA 4198 per President Kerr, Deputy President Redfern and Senior Member Holmes