Kirkham v Monash University [2026] FCA 453

Cashin v Craddock [1876] 3 Ch D 376

Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; 273 CLR 289

Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [2024] HCA 32; 419 ALR 212

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Hongkong Xinhe International Investment Company Ltd v Bullseye Mining Ltd (No 3) [2021] WASC 260

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; 170 CLR 70

Legal Aid Commission (WA) v Edwards (No 2) [1982] FCA 103; (1982) 42 ALR 154

Legal Practice Board v Said (unreported, WASC, Library No 940003, 12 January 1994)

Manolakis v District Registrar, South Australia District Registry, Federal Court of Australia [2008] FCAFC 162; 170 FCR 426

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507

Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75; 261 FCR 164

Peruvian Guano Company v Bockwoldt (1883) 23 Ch D 225

Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342

Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502

Von Reisner v Commonwealth [2009] FCAFC 97; 177 FCR 531

Counsel for the First and Third to Twentieth Respondents:

Solicitor for the First and Third to Twentieth Respondents:

ANN NICHOLSON (and others named in the Schedule)

1. Paragraph 1 of the interlocutory application filed 23 March 2026 be dismissed and, otherwise, the application be listed on a date to be fixed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

1. The appellant (applicant) filed an interlocutory application in the appeal on 23 March 2026 by which, amongst other things, he seeks an order that I recuse myself on the ground of actual bias and (or) a reasonable apprehension of bias.
2. I take it to be an application that I recuse myself from hearing the balance of the orders sought in that application, his application for an extension of time to apply for and for leave to appeal, and the appeal, if there be a right of appeal without leave, or, if leave to appeal is necessary, the appeal if leave be granted.
3. The principles applicable to an application for recusal on the ground of bias are well-established.
4. Where actual bias is alleged, the question is not whether a decision-maker's mind is blank, but whether it is open to persuasion. The state of mind for actual bias in the form of prejudgement is one so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or argument may be presented: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507 at [71]- [72] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J). Prejudgement of that nature must be firmly established: Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; 170 CLR 70 at 100 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
5. Where a reasonable apprehension of bias is alleged, the governing principle is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 at [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). The application of this principle requires two steps. First, identification of what it is alleged might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. Second, there must be a logical connection between that matter and the feared departure from the judge deciding the case on its merits. After those steps have been taken, the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias can be assessed: Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; 273 CLR 289 at [11] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ).
6. In the application of the test, '[a]lthough it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.' Thus, disqualification is only made out by firmly establishing that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of prejudgement: Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342 at 352 (Mason J).
7. While the fair-minded lay observer 'is not assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or the character or ability of a particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice': Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488 at [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). The fair-minded lay observer will be aware of the question the judge is tasked with deciding and its legal, statutory and factual context: Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [2024] HCA 32; 419 ALR 212 at [95] (Gageler CJ, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ). Further, the test is to be applied to 'a professional judge whose training tradition and oath or affirmation require [the judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial: Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502 at 527 (McHugh JA), cited in Johnson at [12].
8. Articulating the logical connection between the identified source of bias and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on the merits requires that the party fearing bias identify an objectively credible reason why the judge might lack the requisite impartiality to decide the legal and factual issues. Merely determining interlocutory applications against a party or making a procedural order that affects a party in a particular way does not provide an objectively credible reason for fearing that a judge will not decide other legal or factual issues according to the merits.
9. The basis for the appellant's application appears to lie in a decision of a Registrar to refuse to accept a proposed interlocutory application that the appellant lodged for filing, subsequent communications between the appellant and Court staff, including staff of my chambers, and an order I made administratively on 20 March 2026 directing that, until further order, no party is to communicate with the Court in relation to these proceedings other than by email addressed to the Western Australian District Registry email address. As will be explained, these are all matters of an administrative nature or of practice and procedure that do not involve any determination of substantive or procedural rights.
10. On 18 December 2025 a lawyer from Clayton Utz, the legal representative of all the respondents except the second respondent, sent an email to the Queensland District Registry requesting a copy of the transcript in which the primary judge gave his reasons for refusing an application the appellant had made for the primary judge to recuse himself. That email was not copied to the appellant.
11. On 2 January 2026 the appellant lodged a proposed interlocutory application in the Queensland Registry of this Court through eLodgment. In that document the appellant proposed to apply, amongst others, for orders to the following effect:

(1) An order providing access to the file, including the full audio recording in the proceeding QUD409/2025.

(2) An order providing copies of the audio for the entire sessions of hearing which the applicant was a party before Judge Vasta, including the parts involving other litigants' proceedings.

1. On 8 January 2026 the chambers of the primary judge responded to the email from Clayton Utz to the Queensland Registry of 18 December 2025 indicating that the transcript would not be ordered, but that the oral reasons for the recusal application would be ordered and, once settled, provided to the parties. That email was copied to the appellant.
2. On the same day the appellant forwarded the email communications with the primary judge's chambers to the generic email address for my associate. That email was not copied to the legal representatives of the respondents and was in the following terms:

...

I received the below correspondence from the Federal Circuit Court below earlier today. It appears that, in proceedings before Justice Feutrill where one of the issues is [Judge] Vasta's conduct and whether he is a Judge due to his lack of mental competence:

1. The respondents have made an ex parte application in the present proceedings, presumably without the permission of Justice Feutrill and which was somehow delivered to [Judge] Vasta. [Judge] Vasta has purported to issue a ruling of some kind, through his Chambers Associate.

2. Emails and submissions in relation to the present proceedings are being made available to [Judge] Vasta and his Chambers, which is unsatisfactory to say the least. I note that an application I registered in the system last week has still not been stamped concerning the same matter (but seeking audio recordings), despite the QLD registry reopening on the 2nd of January 2026.

I have not copied the other parties to give Justice Feutrill flexibility, but I should be grateful if this could be promptly drawn to his attention. In particular, directions may need to be issued, requiring all filings to go direct to Justice Feutrill's chambers and orders preventing any Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court and/or [Judge] Vasta (or his chambers) having access. There are also in theory possible contempt issues that arise from the interference in the Federal Court proceedings.

Please confirm receipt of this email and that it has been put before Justice Feutrill.

...

1. On 12 January 2026 my chambers staff responded by email addressed to the appellant and the respondents' legal representatives in the following terms.

...

Chambers is in receipt of the below email from the appellant.

All communications between chambers and parties to a proceeding should be conducted in an open manner with all parties' legal representatives copied into the correspondence.

Further, all communications to chambers should be consistent with the Federal Court of Australia's Guide to Communications with Chambers Staff (available here).

Correspondence that does not fall within the category of appropriate communications with chambers will not be considered by chambers and will be referred to the Registry for any response that may be appropriate.

In accordance with the guide, the email below has been referred to the Registry.

...

Where the email said 'available here', there was a hyperlink to the relevant guide.

1. The Guide to Communications with Chambers Staff to which that email made reference provides, amongst other things, the following guidance on communications with chambers staff.

(1) A judge's associate assists the judge in court and in chambers on legal matters and case management by acting as an intermediary between parties and the judge: para [1.4].

(2) Self-represented litigants should liaise with registry staff for additional assistance and support: para [1.6].

(3) Communications with chambers staff, unless in the nature of an ex parte application, should:

(a) only take place where it is necessary and appropriate to do so in the circumstances: paras [2.1(b)(i)], [3.1];

(b) be confined to matters concerning, procedural, administrative or practical matters that are not controversial: paras [2.1(b)(ii)], [3.4]; and

(c) be 'open'; that is, communicated to all parties to the proceeding: para [2.1(b)(iii)].

(4) Communications (including emails) containing allegations or matters of substance should not be forwarded to chambers without the parties' collective agreement: para [3.7].

(5) Communications should not be with the judge directly: para [3.8].

1. Examples of appropriate communications are given: para [3.6]. Examples of inappropriate communications are also given: para [4.1]. An example of an inappropriate communication is an attempt to contact a judge directly about a matter for which the judge is responsible outside of a court hearing, or otherwise attempting to gain an unfair advantage or inappropriately influence the conduct of the proceeding: para [4.1(a)].
2. The appellant's email to my associate of 8 January 2026 was not an appropriate communication because it was not 'open', sought to address matters of substance, and was an attempt to contact me directly outside a Court hearing. The inappropriateness of any party attempting to have private out-of-court communications with a judge about the substance of a pending proceeding cannot be understated. As the High Court observed in Charisteas at [13]:

Ordinary judicial practice, or what might be described in this context as the most basic of judicial practice, was relevantly and clearly stated by Gibbs CJ and Mason J in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL9 [(1986) [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342 at 346, 350-351] in 1986 by adopting what was said by McInerney J in R v Magistrates' Court at Lilydale; Ex parte Ciccone [[1973] VR 122 at 127. Now reflected in Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration Inc, Guide to Judicial Conduct, 3rd ed (2017) at 19-20 [4.3]] in 1972:

"The sound instinct of the legal profession - judges and practitioners alike - has always been that, save in the most exceptional cases, there should be no communication or association between the judge and one of the parties (or the legal advisers or witnesses of such a party), otherwise than in the presence of or with the previous knowledge and consent of the other party. Once the case is under way, or about to get under way, the judicial officer keeps aloof from the parties (and from their legal advisers and witnesses) and neither he nor they should so act as to expose the judicial officer to a suspicion of having had communications with one party behind the back of or without the previous knowledge and consent of the other party. For if something is done which affords a reasonable basis for such suspicion, confidence in the impartiality of the judicial officer is undermined."

1. On 13 January 2026 the Queensland Registry sent the appellant an email referring to the email from my chambers and enquiring if he required any information from the Registry. On 14 January 2026 the appellant responded with an email to the following effect:

...

Thank you for your email. I would be grateful if the Court could answer the following.

1. Why the Court is delaying heavily in issuing an application that I have lodged (which has taken nearly 2 weeks)?

2. Why [Judge] Vasta is receiving correspondence about the proceedings in question and has been given access to the file in relation to a Federal Court challenge against his decision (and is being allowed to block access to relevant Court records).

3. When does the Court propose to make available the audio recordings that I have asked for, pursuant to the Australian Constitution.

4. Why is [Judge] Vasta still being allowed to pretend he is a judicial officer and no steps have been taken to suspend him (this might be a question for the Chief Judge to answer).

...

1. On 14 January 2026 the Queensland Registry responded to the appellant's queries as follows:

...

1. The application received 2 January 2025 requires a listing date from Chambers. Once this is received it will be accepted for filing.

2. I cannot comment.

1. Your request for audio is contained in the application filed 2 January 2026. The audio cannot be released until the application has been determined by the Judge.

2. I cannot comment. If you wish to make a formal complaint about Judge Vasta you can do so via the Complaints policy | Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

...

1. On 20 January 2026 a Registrar of this Court made a decision under r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) not to accept the appellant's proposed interlocutory application for filing. The Registrar sent the appellant a letter explaining his reasons for not accepting the document. Amongst other things, the Registrar said:

...

The document has been referred to me in my capacity as the case management Registrar assisting the Hon. Justice Feutrill in this proceeding. In that capacity I may review and determine whether the document should be accepted for filing.

Rule 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides that a Registrar may refuse to accept a document if the Registrar is satisfied that the document is an abuse of the process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious.

I have carefully considered the document and decided that the document should be refused for filing in accordance with rule 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). These are my reasons for doing so.

...

The letter then set out the various terms of the proposed application and continued:

I consider paragraphs 1 and 2 (which seek audio recordings) may be treated as an application to access documents and things in the custody of the court or another court under rule 24.24 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and which may be dealt with administratively by the Registry accordingly.

I am of the view that paragraphs 3 to 6, inclusive, render the document as an abuse of process, or are frivolous or vexatious.

The term "abuse of process" in rule 2.26 includes an application that has no reasonable prospects of success. The terms "frivolous" and "vexatious" were considered by Justice White in Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2021] FCA 592 at [27] to [30]. A matter that is frivolous may be described as one that is "without substance or groundless or fanciful" and a matter that is vexatious is an abuse of the process of the Court.

...

1. Reference has already been made to paragraphs 1 and 2 in relation to the recordings. Paragraphs 3 to 6 of the document proposed an application for the following orders:
   1. An order providing copies of any complaints made to the Chief Judge about [Judge] Vasta, including informal ones.
   2. An order providing copies of the audio recordings of all public proceedings where [Judge] Vasta purported to preside from the 12th of February 2025 to today's date.
   3. An order providing any available evidence held within the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (including by Judicial Officers and purported judicial officers) as to the mental incompetence of Judges, including the evidence apparently available to Judge Joshua Wilson, in respect of an Article in the Guardian [https://www.theguardian.com/law/2023/may/26/judge-apologises-after-claiming-that-colleagues-areappointed-regardless-of-merit\]. This includes the conference paper dated the 17th of April 2023 due to be presented at the International Association of Judges that the Chief Justice censored and any records concerning that.
   4. Any medical records or other evidence about [Judge] Vasta's mental competence held within the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. This includes abusive or authoritarian emails sent on his behalf or by his chambers staff
2. On 21 January 2026 the Queensland Registry informed the appellant that the proposed application had been rejected. On the same day the appellant sent an email to the Queensland Registry in the following terms:

...

Thank you for your email. I exercise my right under Section 35A(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to refer the real decision (the Registry refusing to exercise its functions under Federal Court Rule 24.24) to a Judge.

Please see the attached and confirm this has been directly placed before a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia (not a Registrar, or a Registrar selected Judge, or any administrator, associate etc).

As will be seen from the attachment, as it has regrettably become necessary to do so, I also give notice prohibiting all Registrars from participating in my proceedings pursuant to Sections 35A(5) and 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

...

1. Attached to that email was the proposed interlocutory application and a document entitled 'In the Matter of QUD409/2025 - Notice and Application of Section 35A(5) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)'.
2. On 27 January 2026 the Queensland Registry sent the appellant an email in which he was informed that if he wanted to review the Registrar's decision to accept or reject the document for filing he needed to file the appropriate application. A link was provided to information on judicial review applications and the Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Practice Note (ACLHR-1). The appellant responded with an email indicating that he was proceeding under s 35A(5) of the Federal Court Act and that it was not an application for judicial review. On 30 January 2026 the Queensland Registry replied indicating that the document the appellant had filed was not the correct process under s 35A(5) of the Federal Court Act. The appellant responded with an email in the following terms:

...

Thank you for your email. As I explained, you are referring to an entirely different legal process. I direct that you place this before the Judge, rather than unlawfully obstructing my access to the Court with made up processes.

...

(Emphasis original.)

1. The Queensland Registry then replied that information had been provided on the process that the appellant was required to follow and that there would not be further comment.
2. The information that the Queensland Registry had provided to the appellant was correct. The Registrar's decision not to accept the appellant's proposed interlocutory application for filing was an administrative decision. It was not a decision involving the exercise of judicial power delegated under s 35A(1) and, therefore, was not reviewable under s 35A(5) of the Federal Court Act. However, as an administrative decision, it was susceptible to judicial review: Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75; 261 FCR 164 at [30]- [38], [41] (Barker, Banks-Smith and Colvin JJ). Otherwise, the appellant had not made any application that engaged the original jurisdiction of the Court to undertake judicial review of the Registrar's decision.
3. As mentioned earlier, at the time the Registrar refused to accept the appellant's proposed interlocutory application for filing he indicated that he would treat paragraphs 1 and 2 of that document as a request for production of the audio recordings of the hearings before the primary judge under r 24.24 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). That rule relevantly provides:

(1) A party who seeks production of a document or thing in the custody of ... another court may inform a Registrar in writing, identifying the document or thing.

(3) If the document or thing is in the custody of another court, a Registrar must:

(a) ask the other court to send the document or thing to that Registrar; and

(b) after receiving it, produce the document or thing:

(i) in Court or to any person authorised to take evidence in the proceeding as required by the party; or

(ii) as the Court directs.

1. On 30 March 2026 the Registrar sent the appellant a letter in which he referred to his letter of 20 January 2026 and said:

...

I am writing to let you know that, on 18 March 2026, this Registry requested the contracted transcript provider (VIQ Solutions Pty Limited) to deliver on an urgent basis each audio recording made by the provider in any hearings or listing convened in the underlying proceeding by his Honour Judge Vasta. The delay in requesting the recordings was an oversight on our part for which an apology is extended.

I will let you know when the audio recordings are made available to this Registry. In the meantime, please feel welcome to contact me with any questions you may have.

...

1. None of the above events could possibly give rise to a reasonable apprehension that I might not decide any legal or factual issue in this proceeding on its merits. The communications and decisions were all of an administrative nature and were not communications or decisions made by me. These were all decisions and communications within the ordinary workings of the administration of the Court by the staff of the Court involved in that administration. That would be understood by the fair-minded lay observer. Additionally, nothing in those documents and history gives rise to an inference that I have made up my mind on any matter in this proceeding.
2. The appellant also raises various communications made between my chambers and him in relation to other administrative matters. On 13 February 2026 the appellant sent an email to the generic email address of my associate, attaching documents that were to be filed in this proceeding and including a statement in the following terms:

...

As is noted therein, the Applicant has still (after six weeks) yet to receive the materials that he is entitled to, so these submissions can only be regarded as a draft.

I shall provide the 'stamped' version if/when the Court administration provides them. Please let me know if the Court needs anything else.

...

(Emphasis original.)

1. On 18 March 2026, after routine email communications between my chambers and the parties on 16 March 2026 concerning the filing of the second respondent's submissions, the appellant sent an email in the following terms to the generic email address of my associate:

...

I note that Chambers promptly responds to the Respondents, yet the applicant has raised substantial and serious concerns in previous emails, none of which have been replied to. This includes unlawfully obstructing my access to the court and choosing not to register an application to exercise my de-novo rights in respect of decisions taken by a Registrar that appear to address matters on the merit. In respect of any purported attempt to put a power outside of de-novo review, see the recent decision in eSafety Commissioner vs Baumgarten [2026] FCAFC 12 (a case that I effectively ran, as you will see from the record).

In particular, the applicant has been obstructed by Court Staff and Registrars unlawfully acting with the effect of assisting [Judge] Vasta (precisely how people who have had contact or effective work (or have worked) under [Judge] Vasta are able to be involved is remarkable, but seriously undermines the judicial integrity of this court). The letter that was purportedly issued whilst 'assisting the Hon. Justice Feutrill' (Mr Trott's words) suggests considerable bias (see Paragraph 2 of my submissions and the page references therein). The Court has had over a month to respond to that issue. The silence is most troubling.

I also note that I have still not been provided with the audio recordings and other material which I have been told I would be provided with back in January. Similarly, the Court has still failed to register my case as being in the original jurisdiction also. Nor has a stamped copy of my bundle been provided. This is plainly a two-tier service being provided by the Court: the respondents are being favoured improperly (despite all the other unfair advantages, such as unlimited state resources, they already have).

Can you please explain when the Court proposes to address these important matters? A hearing is listed in 2 weeks from tomorrow and this is giving the respondents a considerable unfair advantage and is further undermining the court's institutional integrity.

I expect this email to be put before the Judge promptly and expect your written confirmation you have done this. Given the nature of the issue, I do not give you permission to transact with the Registry or anyone else on this matter, and any such purported decision shall be referred to the Judge as a self-executing execution of my rights to de-novo consideration: see the notice I have given at p169 of my bundle.

...

(Emphasis original.)

1. On 20 March 2026 my chambers staff sent the appellant an email referring to the email of 12 January 2026 regarding appropriate communications with chambers and again referred the appellant to the Guide to Communications with Chambers Staff. The email also referred the appellant to the Litigants in Person Practice Note (GPN-LIP). Links were provided to both the Guide and GPN-LIP. The email said that the appellant's email had been referred to the Registry for any appropriate response.
2. The appellant replied with an email in the following terms:

...

My email was addressed to the Judge and for the reasons I gave, would be wholly inappropriate to send to the Registry.

I therefore require you to send it to him and confirm that you have done so.

...

1. My chambers staff then responded with an email in the following terms:

...

Thank you for your email.

As mentioned in my earlier email your correspondence is not consistent with the Court's Guide to Communications with Chambers Staff and the Litigants in Person Practice Note and has been referred to the Registry. Accordingly, I will not correspond with you further on this topic and, unless future communications fall within the applicable guidelines, I will refer your correspondence to the Registry for any response.

...

1. The appellant replied with an email that contained the following:

...

I have been clear that the email in question shall not be referred to the registry. I require your purported decision to be immediately referred directly to a Judge for de-novo consideration under s.35A(6) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Although I should not need to point this out to you, obstructing access to the Court is a potential contempt: see Raymond v. Honey [1983] A.C. 1. If you obstruct my access to the Court (including by referring that email to the registry), then I regret to point out that I may be forced to make such an application against yourself personally. I sincerely hope you do not take things that far.

It is regrettably apparent that you have not read the email in question and are simply taking a 'computer says no' approach to things sent by self-represented litigants. Please also explain how I may make a complaint to a Judge about yourself.

...

(Emphasis original.)

1. The Guide to Communications with Chambers Staff to which reference has been made also provides that communications with chambers staff should be made courteously: para [2.1(a)] and scandalous or vexatious communications are inappropriate forms of communication: para [4.1(f)].
2. Material is 'scandalous' if, as well as being irrelevant, it is indecent or offensive or consists of allegations made for the purpose of abusing or (possibly) prejudicing the opposite party: Cashin v Craddock [1876] 3 Ch D 376 at 378-379 (James LJ). It has also been said that scandal consists in the allegation of 'anything which is unbecoming to the dignity of the Court to hear or is contrary to good manners or which charges some person with a crime not necessary to be shown in the cause, to which it may be added that any unnecessary (not relevant to the subject) allegation bearing cruelly upon the moral character of an individual': Hongkong Xinhe International Investment Company Ltd v Bullseye Mining Ltd (No 3) [2021] WASC 260 at [61] (Hill J) citing Legal Practice Board v Said (unreported, WASC, Library No 940003, 12 January 1994) at 3 (Seaman J). Material is 'vexatious' if it is included with the intention of annoying or embarrassing, or for a collateral purpose, or if it raises matters that are 'obviously untenable or manifestly groundless': Attorney-General v Wentworth [1988] NSWCA 8; (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 491 (Roden J); see also Von Reisner v Commonwealth [2009] FCAFC 97; 177 FCR 531 at [27] (Siopis, Cowdroy and Reeves JJ). An obviously unsustainable claim may also be characterised as vexatious: Peruvian Guano Company v Bockwoldt (1883) 23 Ch D 225 at 230 (Jessel MR).
3. Amongst other things, GPN-LIP explains what a person must do if that person brings a case in the Court. These include the following:

4.7. You must act respectfully and honestly when you deal with Judges, Registrars, Court staff and lawyers for other parties:

(a) in all your written documents, emails and phone calls; and

(b) when you meet with people in the Court or elsewhere.

4.8. You must not shout, swear, threaten or be rude.

4.9. You must only contact the Court when you have to or when your contact relates directly to your case.

4.10. All your emails or letters to the Court after you have started your case must be copied to the lawyers for the other parties. You must not send multiple similar emails to the Court or try to argue your case in emails. The time and place for presenting your case is during Court hearings or in documents that you have been told by the Court to provide.

(Emphasis original.)

1. The appellant's emails of 18 and 20 March 2026 were not appropriate communications with chambers staff. The communications were discourteous and disrespectful. They contain scandalous or vexatious assertions of Court staff 'unlawfully obstructing access to the court' and of 'improperly favouring the respondents' and a baseless threat to bring contempt proceedings against a member of the Court staff. They again contain attempts to have direct communications with a judge outside of a court hearing.
2. It is necessary for the proper administration of justice that judges of the Court have sufficient and appropriate assistance and resources to allow them to perform their judicial functions. Registrars and other Court staff form part of that assistance and those resources. In addition, judges have staff that work directly with them in judge's chambers. In many, if not most, proceedings the effective and efficient administration of justice is facilitated by parties to proceedings having the ability to communicate with a judge's chambers staff on a range of non-controversial administrative matters. However, the time and resources of chambers staff are limited and must be allocated amongst all matters in a judge's docket. Excessive or undue time spent corresponding with parties or their legal representatives distracts and prevents chambers staff from performing other work in support of a judge's judicial functions.
3. Section 37M(1) of the Federal Court Act provides that the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. The overarching purpose has objectives that include the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court and the efficient disposal of the Court's overall case load: s 37M(2). The civil practice and procedure provisions must be interpreted and applied, and any power conferred or duty imposed by them must be exercised or carried out in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose: s 37M(3). The parties to a civil proceeding must conduct the proceeding in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose: s 37N(1).
4. The Court may make any order it considers appropriate in the interests of justice, may make orders other than in open court, on its own initiative and without an oral hearing: rr 1.32, 1.36, 1.40(a) of the Rules; s 17(2) and s 20A of the Federal Court Act. The Court may also make directions or orders of an administrative nature that do not involve the exercise of judicial power in that they have no effect on a party's substantive or procedural rights and, while related to proceedings before the Court, are not truly ancillary to those proceedings: Legal Aid Commission (WA) v Edwards (No 2) [1982] FCA 103; (1982) 42 ALR 154 at 158-159 (Toohey J); Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 42; 128 FCR 353 at [15]- [20] (Lee, Whitlam and Jacobson JJ); Manolakis v District Registrar, South Australia District Registry, Federal Court of Australia [2008] FCAFC 162; 170 FCR 426 at [20] (Gray, Branson and Besanko JJ).
5. After the appellant's email communications with chambers staff were brought to my attention, orders were made that precluded any party to the appeal from communicating with the Court other than through the Western Australian District Registry. That order affected the appellant and the respondents in equal measure. That order was made for a number of reasons.

(1) The appellant sent repeated inappropriate communications to chambers staff notwithstanding he was informed that the form of the communications were not appropriate and referred to the Court's published guidance on communications with chambers staff and the GPN-LIP practice note.

(2) Receiving and responding to communications of that nature was impeding chambers staff from providing efficient assistance to the Court in the discharge of judicial functions. That was not an efficient use of administrative and judicial resources or disposal of the Court's overall case load.

(3) None of the parties will be prevented by the order from communicating with the Court or communicating with the Court about matters that are appropriately addressed to chambers staff. The parties will merely be required to communicate in writing using a single email address as the point of contact with the Court.

(4) The efficient use of administrative and judicial resources and disposal of the Court's overall case load will be facilitated by Registry staff or a Registrar determining which, if any, communications from any party are appropriate to refer to chambers staff.

(5) As the order was made 'until further order' it is an interlocutory order that any party may apply to set aside or vary: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; 148 CLR 170 at [10] (Gibbs CJ, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ).

1. While not expressed in precisely those terms, most of these reasons are alluded to in the notes to the order made on 20 March 2026.
2. The mere making of an administrative order or direction that affects the manner in which the parties are able to communicate with the Court provides no basis for considering that the Court might not decide any legal or factual issue in the proceeding on its merits. Again, the fair-minded lay observer would understand that, in accordance with the ordinary workings of the Court, the appellant made inappropriate communications with chambers staff and that an order was made to prevent a continuation of communications of that nature.

1. For all of the foregoing reasons the appellant has not demonstrated actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias. Therefore, the application for recusal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Feutrill.