Criminal law - Appeal and new trial - Appeal against sentence - Grounds for interference - Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate - Stealing a firearm and burglary - Appellant with lengthy criminal history - Term of imprisonment of twelve months with eligibility for parole after six months not manifestly excessive.

1. I agree with Brett J. I joined in the order dismissing the appeal for the reasons now stated by his Honour.

1. On 25 February 2025, the appellant pleaded guilty before Jago J to one count of stealing a firearm and the summary offences of three counts of burglary and one count of stealing. The burglary and stealing offences were deemed to be simple offences by virtue of s 71 of the Justices Act 1959. Her Honour was dealing with those matters pursuant to s 385A of the Criminal Code.
2. On 15 April 2025, the learned sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of imprisonment for a term of 12 months, with a non-parole period of one half of that period. The appellant has appealed against that sentence. The sole ground of appeal is that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
3. The appeal was heard on 21 August 2025. In a unanimous decision, the appeal was dismissed. The Court briefly explained its reasons for dismissing the appeal, but indicated it would provide more detailed written reasons at a later time. These are my reasons for joining in that order.
4. The principles applicable to the ground of manifest excess are well known. In the absence of specific error, this Court may only interfere with the sentence if error can be inferred because the sentence is "unreasonable or plainly unjust, it being outside the range of a sound sentencing discretion". This Court may not interfere simply because it would have exercised the sentencing discretion differently. There is no single correct sentence and a wide measure of latitude and flexibility should be accorded to the sentencing judge. See Taylor v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 72, McLure JA at [27]-[31], as cited in JWE v Tasmania [2025] TASCCA 8 per Estcourt J, with whom Cuthbertson J and I agreed.
5. The crime and offences arose from the same occasion. On the night of 25/26 August 2023, the appellant unlawfully entered an unlocked shed on the complainant's property. The shed contained two vehicles and a locked firearm safe. The appellant used bolt cutters which he found in the shed to break padlocks and gain access to the firearm safe. He removed a .22 calibre Norinco bolt action repeating rifle. The breach bolt action part of the rifle and its magazine were located in a separate locked safe in the shed. The appellant did not break into that safe nor remove that property. Without the breach bolt action, the firearm was not capable of discharge. The firearm was estimated to have an approximate value of $400.
6. The appellant also unlawfully entered two vehicles contained in the shed. He stole cash from those vehicles in the total sum of $320.
7. The appellant was arrested in January 2024. He was identified as the perpetrator by DNA evidence from the bolt cutters and a photograph found on his mobile phone showing the stolen firearm. The firearm was located on 3 May 2024. It was found by chance in a location in which it had been hidden.
8. The appellant was 37 years of age at the time of sentence. He had had a difficult family life as a child and at an early age had developed a significant addiction to illicit drugs. He had suffered sexual abuse while in detention as a youth and at the time of sentence suffered from significant mental health problems including post traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression. He was using drugs heavily when the crimes were committed. The sentencing judge was told that he had committed the crimes in order to obtain funds to purchase more drugs.
9. The appellant also had a lengthy and concerning criminal history. According to his criminal record, he first came into contact with the criminal justice system when he was nine years of age. Thereafter the record demonstrates a history of prolific and regular offending, as a child, youth and adult. Many of the convictions were for offences of a similar nature to those which were the subject of this appeal. They included numerous instances of aggravated burglary, burglary and stealing. Sentences imposed in the past included actual and suspended terms of imprisonment as well as community-based orders. In 2021, the appellant had been sentenced to a drug treatment order, but this order was cancelled and the custodial period activated approximately six months later. It was also clear from his record that he was on bail for a number of charges, including some related to family violence when he committed the offences under appeal. It should be observed, however, that the only prior conviction related to firearms were those related to the possession of a single round of ammunition in 2021.
10. The sentencing judge noted that the appellant had expressed insight into the need to deal with his drug problem particularly having regard to the recent birth of his child. Her Honour also noted that the appellant came before her remanded in custody after having served a 10 month sentence of imprisonment, which had commenced in March 2024 and was completed on 21 January 2025. Her Honour noted that "principles of totality have work to do". Despite mitigation arising from this, her Honour noted that "a substantial period of imprisonment is required" having regard in particular to the need for general deterrence. It is clear that her Honour's primary concern in respect of the objective seriousness of the crime and the need for general deterrence was the theft of the firearm. Her Honour noted that such criminal conduct "directly results in these dangerous weapons coming into the hands of criminals".
11. I respectfully endorse and agree with the comments made by the learned sentencing judge in respect of the theft of the firearm. The serious nature of this conduct is compounded when the theft takes place during the course of a burglary, aggravated or otherwise, and whether the purpose of the burglary is to steal firearms or it occurs opportunistically during the commission of that crime. It is apparent from my own experience as a sentencing judge that such crimes have increased in prevalence over the last few years. This is undoubtedly related to the concerning increase in the use of illicit drugs and crimes associated with drug use. It is obvious that criminals are stealing firearms because there is a lucrative market for them among criminals generally, and this provides a ready source of funds for the purchase of illicit drugs. The direct consequence of the existence of this market is that stolen firearms come into the possession of criminals and become available for use in criminal activity. This is a matter of great concern to the community. Indeed, that concern was reflected in legislative amendments in 2013 which made stealing firearms an indictable crime. Of course, it should not be overlooked that the appellant stole the firearm while he was committing the burglary of a shed on a residential property. The sentencing judge correctly observed that "breaking into another persons home involves a terrible breach of privacy and intrusion into the sense of security to which a homeowner is entitled". Once again, I endorse those comments. Finally, the fact that the firearm was not in an operable state when it was taken because of the lack of the parts that were in the other safe did not affect the objective seriousness of the crime to any significant extent. Such a weapon can still be used to threaten and intimidate, and in the hands of criminals can contribute to criminal activity.
12. In my view, the learned sentencing judge was correct to emphasise the need for general deterrence in respect of the appellant's criminal conduct. Given the appellant's criminal history, there was also a significant need for specific deterrence. Apart from totality and the appellant's plea of guilty, there was little mitigation available to him. In my opinion, these considerations were appropriately reflected in the sentence. The sentence was well within her Honour's sentencing discretion. This is particularly so when one considers that her Honour set the minimum non-parole period. A lengthier period could have been justified having regard to the appellant's criminal history.
13. It was for these reasons that I determined that the appeal was without merit and joined in the order dismissing it.

1. I have read the reasons for judgment of Brett J. They accord with my reasons for joining the order of the Court dismissing the appeal.