The Requirements of the Native Title Act
11 Section 87 of the Native Title Act empowers the Court to make orders by consent on an application for the determination of native title under s 61 upon certain conditions. Those conditions are not onerous, but they must be satisfied.
12 Certain of those conditions are procedural in nature. The period of notice under s 66 must have elapsed. It has clearly done so in relation to both Eringa #1 and Eringa #3. A signed copy of the agreed orders must have been filed with the Court. That has also taken place.
13 More substantively, s 87(1) of the Native Title Act requires that, for the Court to make the proposed consent determination of native title without a hearing, the Court must be satisfied that such an order would be within its power, and s 87(2) requires the Court to be satisfied that it would be appropriate to make the orders agreed upon. In addition, because the orders seek a determination of native title, they must comply with s 94A of the Native Title Act. That section requires the proposed orders to set out details of the matters mentioned in s 225 of the Native Title Act.
14 Section 225 defines a determination of native title as:
A determination…whether or not native title exists in relation to a particular area (the determination area) of land or waters and, if it does exist, a determination of:
(a) who the persons, or each group of persons, holding the common or group rights comprising the native title are; and
(b) the nature and extent of the native title rights and interests in relation to the determination area; and
(c) the nature and extent of any other interests in relation to the determination area; and
(d) the relationship between the rights and interests in paragraphs (b) and (c) (taking into account the effect of this Act); and
(e) to the extent that the land or waters in the determination area are not covered by a non-exclusive agricultural lease or a non-exclusive pastoral lease - whether the native title rights and interests confer possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of that land or waters on the native title holders to the exclusion of all others.
15 The term "native title rights and interests" is defined in s 223(1) of the Native Title Act as:
[T]he communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples…in relation to land or waters, where:
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples…; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples…, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia.
16 It is important to explain why those requirements are satisfied. It is especially important, because the recognition given by the orders to be made will apply not just between the parties who have participated in the proceeding, but to all the people of Australia: Munn (for and on behalf of the Guggari People) v The State of Queensland (2001) 115 FCR 109 (Munn).
17 In Lota Warria (on behalf of the Poruma and Masig Peoples) v Queensland (2005) 223 ALR 62, Black CJ said of those requirements at [5]-[8]:
There can be no doubt as to the jurisdiction of the court to make the orders sought (sees 81 of the Act) and there is nothing in the agreed terms that would suggest that the power of the Court would be exceeded by making those orders. As the proposed order sets out details of each of the matters mentioned in s 225, the requirements of s 94A of the Act are satisfied.
It remains only to consider whether it would be "appropriate" to make the orders sought.
As I have noted elsewhere, the discretion conferred by s 87(1) must be exercised judicially, and within the broad boundaries ascertained by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act. The matters to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion, and the weight to be given to those matters, may very well vary according to the particular circumstances of each case.
In the present case, it is clear that the parties have had independent and competent legal advice and there is no suggestion that the agreement was not freely entered into. The agreed terms of the proposed orders are unambiguous and are appropriate in the circumstances.
18 His Honour then proceeded to consider briefly the material before the Court. He considered it appropriate to make the orders as agreed.
19 More recently, the Court has been prepared to rely upon the processes of the relevant State or Territory about the requirements of s 223 being met to be satisfied that the making of the agreed orders is appropriate. That is because each State and Territory has developed a protocol or procedure by which it determines whether native title (as defined in s 223) has been established. It acts in the public interest and as the public guardian in doing so. It has access to anthropological, and where appropriate, archaeological, historical and linguistic expertise. It has a legal team to manage and supervise the testing as to the existence of native title in the claimant group. Although the Court must, of course, preserve to itself the question whether it is satisfied that the proposed orders are appropriate in the circumstances of each particular application, generally the Court reaches the required satisfaction by reliance upon those processes. They are commonly explained in the joint submissions of the parties in support of the orders agreed. That is the case in this instance.
20 Hence, in Lovett on behalf of the Gunditjmara People v State of Victoria [2007] FCA 474, North J stated at [36]-[37] that:
The Act [Native Title Act] is designed to encourage parties to take responsibility for resolving proceeding without the need for litigation. Section 87 must be construed in this context. The power must be exercised flexibly and with regard to the purpose for which the section is designed.
In this context, when the court is examining the appropriateness of an agreement, it is not required to examine whether the agreement is grounded on a factual basis which would satisfy the Court at a hearing of the application. The primary consideration of the Court is to determine whether there is an agreement and whether it was freely entered into on an informed basis: Nangkiriny v State of Western Australia (2002) 117 FCR 6; [2002] FCA 660, Ward v State of Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848. Insofar as this latter consideration applies to a State party, it will require the Court to be satisfied that the State party has taken steps to satisfy itself that there is a credible basis for an application: Munn v Queensland (2001) 115 FCR 109; [2001] FCA 1229.
21 The Court does not therefore routinely embark on its own inquiry of the merits of the claim made in the application to be satisfied that the orders sought are supportable and in accordance with the law: Cox on behalf of the Yungngora People v State of Western Australia [2007] FCA 588 at [3] per French J. However, it might consider that evidence for the limited purpose of being satisfied that the State is acting in good faith and rationally: Munn at [29]-[30] per Emmett J. See also Smith v State of Western Australia (2000) 104 FCR 494 at [38] per Madgwick J:
State governments are necessarily obliged to subject claims for native title over lands and waters owned and occupied by the State and State agencies, to scrutiny just as careful as the community would expect in relation to claims by non-Aborigines as to significant rights over such land.
22 That approach has been adopted in a number of recent decisions: Jungarrayi on behalf of the Mirtartu, Warupunju, Arrawajin and Tijampara Landholding Groups v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 766; Kngwarraye on behalf of the members of the Arnerre, Wake-Akwerlpe, Errene and Ileyarne Landholding Groups v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 765; Campbell v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 580; King v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 582; Wavehill v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 581; Wavehill v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 584; Young v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 585; Young v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 583; Jones v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 573; Carlton v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 576; Paddy v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 574; Simon v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 575; Long v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 571; Rosewood v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 572; Barunga v State of Western Australia [2011] FCA 518; Goonack v State of Western Australia [2011] FCA 516; Kngwarrey on behalf of the members of the Irrkwal, Irrmarn, Ntewerrek, Aharreng, Arrty/Amatyerr and Areyn Landholding Groups v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 428; and Nelson v Northern Territory of Australia (2010) 190 FCR 344 (Nelson).
23 In Nelson, Reeves J adopted that approach and explained the reasons for doing so in the following way at [12]-[13]:
It is appropriate to make some comments about the difficult balance a State party needs to strike between its role in protecting the community's interests, including the stringency of the processes it follows in assessing the underlying evidence going to the existence of native title, and its role in the native title system as a whole, to ensure that it, like the Court and all other parties, takes a flexible approach that is aimed at facilitating negotiation and achieving agreement. In Lovett North J commented:
… There is a question as to how far a State party is required to investigate in order to satisfy itself of a credible basis for an application. One reason for the often inordinate time taken to resolve some of these cases is the overly demanding nature of the investigation conducted by State parties. The scope of these investigations demanded by some States is reflected in the complex connection guidelines published by some States.
The power conferred by the Act on the Court to approve agreements is given in order to avoid lengthy hearings before the Court. The Act does not intend to substitute a trial, in effect, conducted by State parties for a trial before the Court. Thus, something significantly less than the material necessary to justify a judicial determination is sufficient to satisfy a State party of a credible basis for an application. The Act contemplates a more flexible process than is often undertaken in some cases.
I respectfully agree with North J in these observations. In my view, it would be perverse to replace a trial before the Court with a trial conducted by a State party respondent and I do not consider that is what is intended by the provisions of s 87 of the Act.
24 In this matter, the Court has had the benefit of the joint submissions. They confirm that the State is satisfied that the agreed determination is a proper one. It has had the benefit of a thorough examination of the available evidentiary material. The joint submission in turn refers at considerable length to the material on which it has relied.
25 It is helpful to refer to that material in a little detail.
26 The evidence in these matters includes three reports co-authored by anthropologists for the South Australian Native Title Services (SANTS), Ms Susan Woenne-Green, Ms Lyn Coad and Mr Jacob Habner. Ms Woenne-Green is an anthropologist with many years' experience with Western Desert peoples in South Australia. Ms Coad has worked with SANTS since 2000. Mr Habner was a research officer with SANTS from 2004 to 2009. Their reports initially consisted of a 268 page Witjira Native Title report, plus appendices, genealogies and a site index. A Witjira Supplementary Report and further statements were subsequently provided. In addition, the applicants rely on evidence, including anthropological reports, prepared by Dr Scott Cane in November 2005 and February 2006.
27 Dr David Martin, the State's independent consultant anthropologist assessed the evidence. Dr Martin has extensive experience in a large number of native title claims and has been an adviser in native title matters for both the State and for the applicants.
28 The fact that the State, through its legal representation, is sufficiently satisfied as to the proposed evidence of the Eringa Peoples and has considered the interests of the community generally means the Court can move with some assurance to proceed to make the Determination. In this matter, it is evident that the State has applied a rigorous approach to assess the proposed evidence of the claims, broadly in accordance with its document entitled Consent Determinations in South Australia: A Guide to Preparing Native Title Reports (sometimes called the State's CD Policy).
29 Each of the respondents has received a position paper explaining the basis for the State's view and has had the opportunity to review its conclusions and to ask any questions about them. I am also satisfied that the consent of the State and the other respondent parties to the proposed determination is a fully informed and conscientious one, having considered the requirements of the Native Title Act.
30 However, it is fitting that I should explain why the Court is satisfied of those matters. The evidence must show that there is a recognisable group or society that presently recognises and observes traditional law and customs in the determination area. In defining that group or society, the following must also be addressed:
1. that the claim group comprises a society united in and by their acknowledgement and observance of a body of accepted laws and customs; and
2. that the present day body of accepted laws and customs of the society in essence is the same body of laws and customs acknowledged and observed by the ancestors or members of the society adapted to modern circumstances; and
3. that the acknowledgement and observance of those laws and customs has continued substantially uninterrupted by each generation since sovereignty, and that the society has continued to exist throughout that period as a body united in and by its acknowledgement and observance of those laws and customs.
31 The claim group must show that it still possesses rights and interests under the traditional laws acknowledged and the traditional customs observed by them, and that those laws and customs give them a connection to the land. See generally Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422; Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404; and Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1.