Note: The portion of the decision under review dated 4 December 2024 varying the adjusted taxable income of Mr Kinchen for the period 26 June 2024 to 30 September 2025 remains unchanged.

CHILD SUPPORT - departure determination - ground for departure - special needs - cost of maintaining the children - private school expenses - adjusted taxable income - special circumstances - reducing work hours - ground for departure - decision under review varied

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision and replaced with generic information pursuant to subsection 16(2AB) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

1. This is a review of a decision of Services Australia (Child Support) about an application for a change of assessment (COA). Ms Kinchen and Mr Kinchen have had a child support assessment for their children [Child 1] and [Child 2] since 18 April 2024. The children are currently in the primary care of Ms Kinchen (72%) and the regular care of Mr Kinchen (28%)[1]. Mr Kinchen is the parent assessed to pay child support.
2. On 10 May 2024, Ms Kinchen made an application to Child Support for a COA on the grounds that the children's private school expenses and Mr Kinchen's income used in the assessment made the assessment unfair. At the time of her application, and up until a decision was made on her application, the assessments were as follows:
   • For the period 18 April 2024 to 31 August 2024, Mr Kinchen was assessed to pay an annual rate of $1,350 based on his 2022/23 adjusted taxable income (ATI) of $34,082 and Ms Kinchen's ATI for the same period of $30,906.
   • For the period 1 September 2024 to 30 November 2025, Mr Kinchen was assessed to pay an annual rate of $1,676 based on his 2023/24 provisional ATI of $35,445[2] and Ms Kinchen's ATI for the same period of $62,714.
3. On 5 September 2024, Child Support made a decision to depart from the assessment as follows:
   • For the period 1 May 2024 to 31 December 2024, the annual rate of child support was increased by $3,749 to reflect Mr Kinchen's share of 2024 school costs.
   • For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, the annual rate of child support was increased by $2,893 to reflect Mr Kinchen's share of 2025 school costs.
   • For the period 26 June 2024 to 31 December 2025, Mr Kinchen's ATI was set to $133,024 (with a note that if Mr Kinchen's employment higher duties ended prior to 31 December 2025, his ATI would revert to $116,840 from the date he notified Child Support that his higher duties had ended, confirmed with a payslip or evidence from his employer).
4. On 30 October 2024, Mr Kinchen objected to this decision. As he had objected more than 28 days after receiving notice of the decision, he applied for an extension of time to object, which was granted by Child Support.
5. On 4 December 2024, Child Support made a decision which partly allowed the objection as follows:
   • For the period 18 April 2024 to 31 December 2024, the annual rate of child support is increased by $2,499
   • For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, the annual rate of child support is increased by $2,841
   • For the period 26 June 2024 to 10 October 2024, Mr Kinchen's ATI is set at $126,676
   • For the period 11 October 2024 to 30 September 2025, Mr Kinchen's ATI is set at $67,000.
6. This decision had the effect of reducing the annual rate of child support that resulted from the original COA decision (and Mr Kinchen's arrears), although the annual rates were still significantly higher than those provided for by the original assessments.
7. On 21 December 2024, Ms Kinchen applied to the Tribunal for review of this objection decision. On 25 July 2025, the parties attended a telephone directions hearing with the Tribunal. The Tribunal directed that certain documents were to be provided by the parties before the hearing, and they have complied with these directions. The Tribunal and the parties received hearing papers from Child Support numbered 1-760 and C1-C45. Ms Kinchen provided submissions numbered A1-A372 and Mr Kinchen provided submissions numbered B1-B35. The papers have all been exchanged with the parties and considered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal held a hearing on 14 October 2025 with both parents attending and giving evidence by telephone. The Child Support Registrar did not participate in the hearing.

1. The statutory provisions relevant to this review are contained in the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (the Act) and the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Assessment Act). Section 89 of the Act gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to review the decision made by Child Support.
2. In addition to the statutory provisions, the Tribunal also had regard to relevant Australian government policy found in the Child Support Guide (at https://guides.dss.gov.au/child-support-guide). The Federal Court observed in the case of G v MIBP [2018] FCA 1229 that it is clear from earlier authorities that in the absence of any statutory indication to the contrary, any lawful executive policy enacted to guide the exercise of a statutory power is a relevant factor for the Tribunal to take into account when conducting reviews.
3. The issues which arise in this case are:
   • In the special circumstances of the case, does a ground for departure exist?
   • If so, would the departure be just and equitable?
   • If so, would the departure be otherwise proper?

1. Section 98B of the Assessment Act allows a parent to apply for a COA. Section 98C allows Child Support to make a decision to depart from the usual assessment when an application for a COA is made if the Child Support Registrar is satisfied that, in the special circumstances of the case, one or more grounds exist to depart, and that it would be just and equitable regarding the parties and the children and otherwise proper to make a particular departure decision. The Tribunal must consider these same matters.

Issue 1: In the special circumstances of the case, does a ground for departure exist?

1. The grounds to depart are outlined at subsection 117(2) of the Assessment Act. Child Support has categorised these into 10 reasons, which can be found summarised in the Child Support Guide at chapter 5.2. In this case, the relevant reasons are 3, 8A and 8B. Each of the grounds to depart provided for in the Assessment Act require special circumstances to be present in the case in order to be satisfied that there is a ground to depart. Special circumstances are not defined by the Assessment Act, but the courts have considered the meaning of the term on many occasions when considering departure applications, or reviews of decisions of the Tribunal's predecessor, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT). In Gyselman & Gyselman [1991] FamCA 93 (Gyselman), the Full Court of the Family Court stated in respect of the term:

Whilst it is not possible to define with precision the meaning of that term, as a generality it is intended to emphasise that the facts of the case must establish something which is special or out of the ordinary. That is, the intention of the Legislature is that the court will not interfere with the administrative formula result in the ordinary run of cases. In Savery's case (at Fam LR 815 FLC 77,897), Kay J, adopting the view in In the Marriage of Philippe (1977) 4 Fam LR 153; [1978] FLC 90-433 at Fam LR 155 FLC 77,202 in a different context said that "special circumstances" were "facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases". The approach to the interpretation and application of the particular grounds in s 117(2) must be guided by that qualification. (at [39])

1. The Family Court observed in Carmel-Fevia & Fevia (No.3) [2012] FamCA 631 that 'Special circumstances refers to something quite unusual but that must be measured against and in the context of, the administrative formula otherwise applying'. This means that the Tribunal ought to find that there is something particular in the facts of this case that makes it appropriate to depart from the assessment that would otherwise apply.

1. Paragraph 117(2)(b) of the Assessment Act provides that it is a ground to depart from the assessment if:

'in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected ...(ii) because the child is being cared for, educated or trained in the manner that was expected by his or her parents...'.

1. In this matter, the children are both attending a private Catholic school which they were attending prior to the parents separating. It is also the school at which Ms Kinchen is employed and as such the children's fees are discounted. The children were in year 2 and 4 in 2024. The parents agree to having both expected that the children be educated in such a manner, and they continue to agree to this, however they disagree as to how the costs of that education should be managed now that they have separated. Mr Kinchen submitted that the child support amount set by the decision under review covered his contribution to the costs of the children including matters such as school fees, and that he is paying as much as he can on what he is earning. Ms Kinchen believes Mr Kinchen's share should be higher to take compulsory costs other than tuition into account, and that the decision should be extended into 2026.
2. Ms Kinchen has met the full costs of the children's schooling in 2024 and 2025 aside from some uniform items. While Mr Kinchen had previously raised with Child Support that some of those payments were taken from joint accounts in existence before separation, at the directions hearing it was agreed that in respect of the 2024 and 2025 fees Ms Kinchen has paid the school fees directly to the school and Mr Kinchen had contributed only through the child support assessment. Any residual issues pertaining to the use of joint accounts can be resolved through the parties' property settlement which is in progress.
3. Evidence has been provided of the following education costs for the children in 2024, 2025 and 2026, noting that the child support assessment only commenced part way through 2024. The figures below have been taken from the school debtor transaction documents at page A299 of the hearing papers, and are rounded to the nearest dollar:
   • 2024 total fees less discounts: $4,998. Total costs including fees and other compulsory expenses (levies, camps, swimming program and term instrumental lessons plus minor stationery and extracurricular activities charged by the school) but not including uniforms, less discounts: $7,439
   • 2025 total fees less discounts: $5,396. Total costs including fees and other compulsory expenses (levies, camps, swimming program plus minor stationery and extracurricular activities charged by the school) but not including uniforms, less discounts: $7,582
   • For 2026, no evidence of actual costs is available yet in the evidence provided, but given the total costs less discounts from 2024 to 2025 showed a 2% increase, a total cost (less discounts) of around $7,733 is likely. This does not include uniforms.
4. Child Support only included the actual tuition portion of the compulsory school fees in its departure. However, that leaves around $2,500 of additional expenses each year that are being met solely by Ms Kinchen. This appears to be a high proportion of the cost in relation to the fees. However, as an employee of the school, Ms Kinchen receives tuition fee discounts for each child, as well as additional discounts for having a second child at the school and for early payment of fees. Ms Kinchen gave evidence that the costs in the school invoices were compulsory. No evidence was provided to dispute this, and the Tribunal accepts it. While non-tuition fees such as levies are found in any type of schooling, and extracurricular activities and camps are common to most school students, the Tribunal accepts that the public system typically has lower costs and camps and activities are usually optional additional expenses. Child Support's policy at chapter 5.2.3 of the Guide states:

The most common application for this reason involves the payment of private school fees ... Other costs required for the ... education ... may also be considered where they are above what would normally be incurred. For example, the costs of uniforms or computer requirements of some private schools may be significantly higher than would be incurred at a state school.

1. School uniforms and devices were also raised as a significant cost by Ms Kinchen. The parents disagree as to their individual expenditure for uniforms. Ms Kinchen gave evidence that she has a full set of both girls' uniforms, and they take those to Mr Kinchen's house when they are staying with him. Mr Kinchen gave evidence that he has purchased uniforms for his house and provides the children's uniforms when they go to school on his days of care. Ms Kinchen also gave evidence that in 2026 [Child 1] was moving from the junior school into the middle school, which required a full new uniform. In addition, the whole school has introduced a new uniform for all students, which has an 18-month transition period from the beginning of 2026. She submitted that she would therefore need to buy a full new uniform for [Child 1] at the beginning of 2026 and would also need to gradually update [Child 2's] uniform over 2026. She provided a letter from the school about the new policy, confirming that students were expected to be fully in the new uniform by 2027 (page A368). Mr Kinchen said he was not aware that [Child 1] would require a full new uniform next year with the transition to middle school, but submitted that, if a new uniform was required, he would also purchase it. He said he had been told by the uniform shop that there would be a grace period for the new whole school uniform until 2028.
2. The costs of a uniform are common for most Australian school children regardless of private or public education and therefore may not constitute special circumstances. Ms Kinchen provided evidence about the school's high cost of uniforms (particularly the blazer which at over $200 each would not be an item usually required for public primary school children in Australia). The Tribunal accepts that a portion of the costs of uniform are higher than would otherwise be incurred because of the children being educated in the manner expected by the parents. However, both parents gave evidence of purchasing items for each child and the Tribunal is satisfied that, to at least some extent, these costs are already shared between the parties, as will the future costs be. For that reason, the uniform costs will be excluded from any departure.
3. Ms Kinchen has also provided evidence from the school about the specifications of the laptop and accessories she needs to purchase for [Child 1] for 2026 based on the school's stated requirements, totalling $1,922 based on the quote provided. This has not yet been purchased but must be prior to school commencing in 2026 as the school requires students to have their own device for middle school. Mr Kinchen did not dispute the requirement or the cost, but stated he could not afford to purchase the device. Ms Kinchen said she would be purchasing it as it was necessary; however, she also submitted that she could not afford to do so. Ms Kinchen provided evidence about the school's specifications for a device resulting in a higher cost than public schooling would require. The Tribunal accepts her submissions that the type of device and accessories required by the school cost substantially more than a generic device that could otherwise be purchased, and this will be considered if 2026 costs are to be included in any departure.
4. The costs of the children in the formula assessment in the relevant period would be $9,896. The school fees and compulsory costs outlined above (at an average of around $7,500 per year plus an estimated additional $1,000 for the extra cost of the device in 2026) represent a significant portion of those costs and remain a significant portion of the costs of the children even if some aspects common to most students such as levies are excluded from those figures. Ms Kinchen is meeting the full cost of these expenses which significantly affect the costs of the children. The Tribunal finds that special circumstances exist in respect of those high costs of educating the children in the manner expected by the parties, and the ground is established. How those costs may impact any departure will be addressed further in these Reasons.
5. As a ground has been established to depart from the assessment, the Tribunal must consider whether a particular departure would be just and equitable. The other potential grounds for departure (8A and 8B) will be considered in the following section, as the factors relevant to those grounds are included in the just and equitable considerations the Tribunal must make. In the case of Marsh and Eccles [2008] FMCAfam 1417 the court found that it was sufficient to proceed to the just and equitable considerations once at least one ground to depart was established in the relevant period, even when the application pertained to more than one type of special circumstance.

Issue 2: Would the departure be just and equitable?

1. Subsection 117(4) of the Assessment Act requires that when determining whether to make a particular departure, the decision maker must have regard to specifically listed factors in order to determine whether that departure would be just and equitable as regards the child, the carer entitled to receive child support, and the parent liable to pay child support. These factors are listed as subheadings below. The Full Family Court, in the case of Gyselman, stated that:

some of the matters listed in sub-section [117](4) may overlap with matters already considered under sub-section [117](2) and some of the paragraphs in sub-section (4) may be more significant in one case than they would be in another or of little relevance in a particular case. It is an essential part of the s.117 exercise to carry out the obligation under sub-section (4). However, that does not mean that it is necessary in each case to slavishly go through each of the paragraphs. The extent to which it is necessary to do so will depend upon the facts and conduct of the individual case and the analysis already performed under subsection (2).

1. The Tribunal has considered each of the matters set out in subsection 117(4) of the Assessment Act but will only refer to those considerations where there are matters necessary to explain particular to this case.

1. Section 3 of the Assessment Act states that parents have the primary duty to maintain their child, and that this duty has priority over all commitments of the parents other than those necessary to enable the parent to support him or herself and any other child the parent has a duty to maintain. Section 4 of the Assessment Act outlines the objects of that Act, including that the level of financial support to be provided by parents for their children is determined according to their capacity to provide financial support, and in accordance with the costs of the children. This duty of both parents has been considered in coming to an appropriate departure in this matter.

1. The proper needs of the children in respect of their education have already been detailed, and how those costs will be distributed in this departure is spelled out further in these Reasons. Ms Kinchen also provided information about extra-curricular activities that she pays for the children (page A348). This includes dance, drama, tennis, netball and athletics (although Ms Kinchen said that Mr Kinchen paid half for netball in 2025). These are optional extracurricular activities and while the Tribunal accepts that Ms Kinchen is meeting these costs, it does not accept there is a special need for them and will not include them specifically in the departure.
2. Considering the proper needs of the children requires consideration of any special needs the children may have. Ms Kinchen gave evidence at hearing about these special needs and associated medical expenses that she was paying out of pocket for. This included the gap fee on psychological appointments which the court had recently ordered, and gap fees for [Child 2's] ongoing [specialist 1] appointments, which are currently incurred fortnightly while she is suffering from an acute [condition]. While [Child 1] has an NDIS plan, which covers some of her costs, there are still out-of-pocket expenses related to her autism and anxiety diagnoses and related support needs.
3. Mr Kinchen stated that they each had to pay the gap for appointments that fell within their care time and so he incurs these costs too. Ms Kinchen raised that all the appointments currently fall in her care time until at least next year, and so she bears the burden of these, and Mr Kinchen did not dispute the timing of appointments. The Tribunal accepts that Ms Kinchen is incurring as a minimum the costs as listed in her Statement of Financial Circumstances (estimated to be $50 per week), although she submits it is now much higher because of the current appointments of the children. Specific evidence has not been provided such as receipts evidencing out-of-pocket expenses, and the increase in costs has been reasonably recent (for example, the consent orders for psychological support was only made around 6 weeks prior to hearing). It is unknown how long these out-of-pocket costs will be incurred, and if they are ongoing and substantial they may be the subject of a future COA application supported by documentary evidence.
4. Other regular costs of the children that form part of the parents' weekly expenses are outlined under the heading about the parents' self-support commitments further in these Reasons. The Tribunal considers that for the purposes of this review, the costs of the children in the formula assessment, which will be increased by virtue of increasing Mr Kinchen's income from the taxable incomes that would otherwise be used in the assessment, in addition to accounting for school fees, will be sufficient to address the proper needs of the children.

Income, property and financial resources of the parents

1. Ms Kinchen originally applied for a COA partly on the basis of Mr Kinchen's income. Child support assessments are usually based on each parent's ATI in the last relevant year of income (LRYI). The LRYI is the full financial year that finished prior to each child support period. Sometimes the ATI being used in the assessment results in an unjust amount of child support because of the special circumstances of the case. Paragraph 117(2)(c) of the Assessment Act provides it is a ground for departure if:

...in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the child of the provisions of this Act relating to administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child: ...(ia) because of the income, property and financial resources of either parent ...

1. Both parties' circumstances have changed since completing the Statement of Financial Circumstances and they provided these details at hearing. In respect of property and other assets that could be a financial resource, the parties are still going through a property settlement which is anticipated to be finalised sometime in early to mid-2026. There are significant funds held in trust that cannot be accessed by either party or without the consent of both parties until that settlement. Ms Kinchen is still residing at the farm property previously shared by the parties, and both parties have sold some assets, the profits of which are in trust. The Tribunal is satisfied that the listed properties and assets of the parties (including their superannuation and investments) form a pool of resources that will be considered through the family law system and in the interim, there are no other financial resources outside of that pool that the parties have current access to as a separate resource available to maintain the children above what their incomes allow. While Mr Kinchen alleged that Ms Kinchen could consent to them accessing some trust funds in the interim, this matter is the subject of negotiations between the parties through their legal representatives and the Tribunal is of the view that this review process will not be used to pre-empt the upcoming financial settlement which includes those funds. This decision will therefore focus on the incomes and personal liabilities of the parties since the case commenced and for a short period into the future.

1. The assessment was using Mr Kinchen's 2022/23 ATI of $34,082 from the start of the case, then would have used his 2023/24 ATI of $50,258 from the new child support period commencing 1 September 2024 if the COA decision was not in place. These incomes were made up primarily of employment, business and rental income with voluntary superannuation contributions being added back as per the Assessment Act. Mr Kinchen provided his 2023/24 tax return, evidence of his 2024/25 income from his employer, 2024/25 rental ledgers, and recent payslips (his 2024/25 tax return had not been lodged at the time of hearing). Incomes prior to 2024/25 were earned mostly during the period prior to the parties' separating when they were still residing at their farm residence together. The farm was the source of business income and tax deductions which significantly reduced Mr Kinchen's taxable income. There is no dispute that after the start of the child support assessment, Mr Kinchen's actual income from employment was higher than his ATIs otherwise used in the assessment reflected, as he no longer had the benefit of the business structure and tax deductions through the farm. Mr Kinchen's income from employment for 2024/25 was gross taxable $83,833 and he stated that he did not contribute any additional superannuation in that financial year, which is supported by his payslips and payment summary.
2. Ms Kinchen submitted that Mr Kinchen had the benefit of a car through his employer, however no fringe benefits are shown in the payment summary and as discussed at hearing there is no evidence Mr Kinchen receives a benefit from a car that would form the basis for a departure from the assessment. The Tribunal accepts Mr Kinchen's submissions that he can only use a work vehicle for work travel, and this is strictly audited through his employment in a federal government organisation.
3. Mr Kinchen said that he was on higher duties until October 2024, and then had to reduce to part-time hours because of his mental health. This reduction will be addressed further in the consideration of earning capacity. His payslips show that when he was acting in higher duties his annual salary (full time rate) was $124,676, and that his base position paid an annual salary of $108,492, which increased to $112,615 in 2025. His payslips demonstrate that after taking some personal leave until early October 2024, his hours reduced from full time to 45 hours per fortnight, or 3 days per week. His current income from this part-time employment is $67,340 per annum, as evidenced by his recent payslips, not including any tax deductions. He receives no income support or other Centrelink payments. Aside from any further departure due to earning capacity, discussed below, the Tribunal considers that a departure more in line with Mr Kinchen's actual taxable income during 2024/25 is appropriate, as it was significantly higher than the previous taxable incomes and as such would produce a significantly higher annual rate. For the period from the start of the case until the end of the 2023/24 financial year, the Tribunal considered whether it was appropriate to bring forward the use of Mr Kinchen's actual 2023/24 ATI in that period to replace the low 2022/23 ATI otherwise used in the assessment. However, as outlined further in these Reasons, in the consideration of hardship, the Tribunal finds that the addition of school fees alone in the earlier period of the assessment lead to an annual rate that is just and equitable in the circumstances.
4. Ms Kinchen submitted that Mr Kinchen was strategic in reducing his income as having a lower taxable income reduced his capital gains liability for the investment property sale. Mr Kinchen said that the sale occurred in July 2025 and gave evidence that there were unpaid loans on the farming property, and the decision was made that the investment property would be sold to pay down those liabilities in advance of the property settlement, and so he has not yet gained a benefit from the sale as the remaining profits are held in trust pending settlement. Any benefits of the sale and the associated impact on liabilities are a matter for settlement, however the rental income prior to sale is relevant.
5. The Tribunal considered the income and any net rental property losses for Mr Kinchen prior to the property being sold. Evidence was provided by Mr Kinchen at B26[3] onwards from the real estate agent for monies out and in for the 2024/25 year as directed. Mr Kinchen submitted that for prior years, his tax returns have included the relevant benefit, and for 2023/24 he said that all up he received around $2,000 profit, which was as per Child Support's assessment of the rental property benefit to him. He said that he did not expect his 2024/25 return to reflect much difference in benefit as even if the rent was higher, the interest increased on the loan. The real estate evidence shows rent received of $24,026 and costs of $7,575, which amounts to a net credit of $16,450. Mr Kinchen said that the 'money out' does not include interest, which was around $10,000 the prior year and may have been higher for 2024/25, and land tax of around $2,500. Ms Kinchen submitted that she will be liable for half of the relevant expenses as part of the property settlement, and that also she was concerned that monies out in the B26 document may not accurately express what was spent as she is aware that rates and similar expenses may not have been paid. The Tribunal is satisfied that the monies out were actually spent as they would not be recorded in that manner by the agent if they had not been, but it is entirely possible that rates for the property may have been in debit regardless of those payments. As the property has now sold, those would presumably have been reconciled from the profits of sale.
6. As the Tribunal cannot anticipate the result of the settlement and Mr Kinchen's 2024/25 tax return was not prepared at the time of hearing, the Tribunal intends to deal with the rental benefit to Mr Kinchen for 2024/25 by assuming that it is the same as the year prior, which the raw 2024/25 figures do approximately represent once the estimated interest and land tax is included. Ms Kinchen submitted that as the mortgage on the property was either on hold or unpaid for a period after separation, Mr Kinchen had an increased benefit from the rent of the property in the year prior to sale. As the Tribunal does not have specific evidence to satisfactorily account for this beyond what has already been outlined here, any other issues relating to the personal benefit of either parent in respect of the rental property, including whether Mr Kinchen had a greater financial benefit prior to sale for any of the above reasons, can be raised with their legal advisors in the context of property settlement negotiations.
7. While the objection decision applied Mr Kinchen's higher duties income for the period he was receiving it and then reduced it once he went part time, the full financial year income is now known to the Tribunal. The Tribunal calculated the likely annual rates applying the 2024/25 income to the assessment in real time over that financial year, which is an assessment period fully in the past and so will only affect the arrears amount of Mr Kinchen. While some annual rates were reduced, a substantial period were increased and resulted in an arrears amount that, when combined with the school fees decision, would have placed Mr Kinchen in such a position of hardship that it would have impacted his ability to meet his child support liability. For this reason, the Tribunal has determined that it is just and equitable to apply the fluctuations in Mr Kinchen's income over the past year in the same way as Child Support did in the objection decision. Consideration of the income to be used for Mr Kinchen in late 2025 and into 2026 is outlined below in the Reasons regarding his earning capacity.

1. Ms Kinchen was initially assessed on her 2022/23 ATI of $30,906 and then her 2023/34 ATI of $62,714 from the new child support period starting on 1 September 2024. As with Mr Kinchen, these financial years were mostly prior to separation. She is still with the same employer although her part-time hours have fluctuated, most notably in term 3 of 2025 when she was able to backfill a [colleague] on leave and work almost full time for a term, with her income going up to around $108,000 per annum in that 10-week period, before reducing to her usual 0.63 part-time load. Ms Kinchen had not completed her 2024/25 tax return by the hearing and so provided her employer income statement for 2024/25 of $68,233. She agreed her tax deductions would be similar to previous financial years, which for 2023/24 was around $4,600, meaning that her likely taxable income for 2024/25 would be just higher than the previous year. Oncer her tax return is processed it will be provided to Child Support by the ATO to be used in the assessment.
2. Ms Kinchen also provided evidence of her current net weekly pay from 6 October 2025 of $1,092.42 now that her 10-week increased hours has ceased. The Tribunal is satisfied that her current year employment income will be consistent with her incomes in the past 2 years. Ms Kinchen also receives some government support through single parent, carer allowance and family tax benefit. These payments are either not included in the child support assessment under the Assessment Act, or Ms Kinchen receives such a minimal amount that it makes little to no difference to her overall financial position.
3. The Tribunal considered bringing forward the use of Ms Kinchen's 2023/24 and 2024/25 incomes to be used in real time in the assessment, as will be done for Mr Kinchen, which would reduce the assessment where the low 2022/23 income is otherwise being used to assess Ms Kinchen. However, the Tribunal has determined, on balance, that it is appropriate to leave the assessed incomes for Ms Kinchen in place as the difference is only for a period of about 4 months, and it in part provides some redress for the many expenses that Ms Kinchen has been meeting for the children aside from school costs.
4. In terms of property and assets, Ms Kinchen has remained at the farm property after separation, and while there is evidence that she has sold some farm assets, it is undisputed that proceeds have gone into trust pending the settlement, and any that had already been paid out to the parties had been split equally and used to address existing debts. The Tribunal is satisfied that it is just and equitable to leave Ms Kinchen's relevant incomes to be assessed as per the standard Assessment Act.

1. Subsection 117(7B) of the Assessment Act contains strict requirements for making a decision that an assessment is unfair because a parent has a higher earning capacity than their ATI used in the assessment reflects:

(7B) In having regard to the earning capacity of a parent of the child, the court may determine that the parent's earning capacity is greater than is reflected in his or her income for the purposes of this Act only if the court is satisfied that:

(i) the parent does not work despite ample opportunity to do so;

(ii) the parent has reduced the number of hours per week of his or her employment or other work below the normal number of hours per week that constitutes full‑time work for the occupation or industry in which the parent is employed or otherwise engaged;

(iii) the parent has changed his or her occupation, industry or working pattern; and

(b) the parent's decision not to work, to reduce the number of hours, or to change his or her occupation, industry or working pattern, is not justified on the basis of:

(c) the parent has not demonstrated that it was not a major purpose of that decision to affect the administrative assessment of child support in relation to the child.

1. Reason 8B has been raised as a concern by Ms Kinchen in relation to Mr Kinchen reducing his income after the child support assessment commenced, and she made submissions to Child Support and the Tribunal about the timing of the reduction being after the COA application was made. Mr Kinchen agrees that he had reduced from full-time to part-time hours after being on paid personal leave for a period in mid- to late-2024. The reduction in his income at the time he lodged the objection to the COA decision was a drastic one that directly impacted a large reduction to his child support liability from the original COA to the objection decision. The first of the above criteria is met as he has reduced his hours below full-time work.
2. The Tribunal must then consider whether Mr Kinchen's decision to reduce his work hours is not justified on the basis of his health or caring responsibilities. This is an objective test meaning that the Tribunal must consider whether an ordinary, reasonable person would consider the parent's decision to be justified, rather than whether the parent who made the decision considers that their decision was justified. Chapter 5.2.9 of the Guide states:

It would usually be expected that a parent who claims to have made a decision to change their work arrangements because of their health will have been diagnosed by a qualified medical practitioner; treated for the condition and have made that decision based on medical advice. Therefore, the parent would usually be able to provide medical certificates or reports from their treating doctor, and/or reports from any specialist to whom the parent was referred. The following factors are relevant in considering whether the parent's decision about their working arrangements is justified on the basis of the parent's state of health.

• The fact that the parent is suffering from a medical condition and the effect that this has upon their capacity to work
• The expected duration of the condition
• Any recommended treatment, and the impact that this has on the parent's capacity to work
• The availability of light duties, if the parent could work in a restricted capacity.

1. Mr Kinchen provided evidence about his reduction in hours as follows:
   • Medical certificates issued by a doctor stating that Mr Kinchen was receiving medical treatment and was unfit to continue his usual occupation from 29 July 2024 to 8 October 2024.
   • A letter from a counsellor dated 12 November 2024 stating Mr Kinchen contacted them for support and was placed on the waitlist on 26 March 2024. His sessions commenced on 16 July 2024, and he had completed 9 sessions since that time and had reduced his hours of work for the purpose of supporting his mental health.
   • A letter from a registered psychologist dated 28 October 2025 stating that Mr Kinchen had accessed his employee assistance program (EAP) for the purpose of counselling with her and they had sessions during 2025 on 17 September, 1, 13 and 28 October, with the next appointment booked for 17 November 2025. Mr Kinchen had 7 sessions remaining that were available to him under the EAP.
   • An email from the office of the same registered psychologist to Mr Kinchen stating that she is unable to provide a letter of support (regarding his reduced work hours) as it was not included as part of the EAP services.
   • Submissions from Mr Kinchen explaining that the EAP psychologist could not provide evidence regarding his reduced hours, and that he is on the waitlist again to resume seeing his counsellor (who provided the November 2024 letter, and he believes she may be able to provide further evidence).
2. In respect of the last point, the Tribunal has already provided extensive additional time for further evidence before and after the hearing and will not provide further time. Mr Kinchen stated at hearing that he had wanted to provide evidence of his mental health and why he still needed to work part time, however as it was within 14 days of hearing he did not believe he was able to provide it and so did not. The Tribunal agreed to give Mr Kinchen additional time to submit that evidence post hearing. The Tribunal granted Mr Kinchen an extended period to 29 October 2025 to allow for him to have his next appointment and obtain a letter, as he believed he could get evidence in that time to demonstrate that his mental health was the reason he could not work full time. The evidence provided is in the final 3 dot points above in paragraph 48 and only supports that he has recently commenced sessions with a psychologist through his employer‑funded scheme.
3. Ms Kinchen is of the view that Mr Kinchen should be able to work full time and should prioritise financially supporting the children over his own needs. She has questioned the timing of his behaviours in reducing his income in relation to both the child support assessment and financial settlement. While it is not in dispute that Mr Kinchen has been seeking psychological support since early 2024 and has taken personal leave relating to this in mid- to late-2024, the Tribunal notes the absence of evidence of any medical diagnosis impacting his ability to work after October 2024, or any medical or psychological evidence about his inability to work more than 3 days per week during 2025 or into the future, despite being given additional time to provide evidence after the hearing. The evidence indicates that from late 2024 or at least early 2025 to September 2025 Mr Kinchen was receiving no medical or psychological support in relation to the issues that originally caused him to take leave from work and reduce his hours.
4. The Tribunal finds that while Mr Kinchen is seeking mental health support again from mid-September 2025, and that there was evidence to be satisfied of a health reason for his reduction in hours in late 2024, from January 2025 onwards there is insufficient evidence to be satisfied that Mr Kinchen's decision to remain part time at 3 days per week is justified on the basis of health. As he has ongoing regular care of the children and had higher care for a brief period in late 2024 to mid-January 2025, the Tribunal accepts that a minimal level of reduced hours could be justified on the basis of caring responsibilities, however his level of care does not justify a part-time arrangement of only 3 days per week.
5. This leaves the third and final consideration, which is whether Mr Kinchen has demonstrated that it was not a major purpose of that decision to affect the administrative assessment of child support. Child Support at chapter 5.2.9 of the Guide state that the third part of the test is a rebuttable presumption, meaning that the Tribunal can presume that the purpose of Mr Kinchen's actions in reducing his income has been with a major purpose of affecting the assessment, unless Mr Kinchen has demonstrated otherwise. The courts have considered this provision in various decisions. In Carlson & Acuff & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2010] FMCAfam 677, the court said that instead of creating a rebuttable presumption the provision put the onus on the person who made the choice about reducing their income to prove the major purpose of that decision. Later decisions however described the test as a rebuttable presumption (such as Penman & Child Support Registrar & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2013] FCCA 492 at [60]).
6. A parent can have more than one major purpose in deciding to work less than full time. The Guide at 5.2.9 states 'a major purpose does not have to be the dominant purpose. It is more than a 'significant purpose'. A suitable test would be whether affecting the child support assessment was one of the most important factors in the parent's mind at the time of making the decision about their working arrangements. The usual way for a parent to rebut the presumption would be to show that there were other factors that they considered which were the major purpose and that affecting the child support assessment was not a major purpose... If the parent cannot demonstrate that affecting the child support assessment was not one of the major purposes in the decision, they will fail to rebut the presumption and it may be appropriate for the Registrar to make a decision to base the assessment on that parent's earning capacity. It is more likely that a parent will be found to have a higher capacity to earn where they have voluntarily made a change resulting in a reduction in their income.'
7. When asked for his submissions about his decision to remain part time in 2025 and whether it was not for the major purpose of reducing his child support, Mr Kinchen said that he is going backwards financially (by his calculations more than $500 per week) and is in hardship and this should demonstrate that he was only working part time for health reasons. He said that he did not know when he would be able to increase his hours and was struggling with his mental health as a result of the separation and related matters since that time. His part-time hours arrangement at work is still ongoing. As he owns an APS full-time ongoing position (page 252), the Tribunal finds that he can increase his hours by requesting to do so.
8. Ms Kinchen submitted that the timing of Mr Kinchen's actions have been to affect the assessment. The Tribunal considered the timing of relevant events. While the 2024 reduction to part-time hours is not in question, the chronology includes those dates to give context when considering Mr Kinchen's decision in 2025 to not return to work full time:
   • During March 2024, Mr Kinchen went on a wait list to see a counsellor.
   • On 18 April 2024, Ms Kinchen applied for child support.
   • On 8 May 2024, the parties were notified that the application was accepted, and on 10 May 2024 Ms Kinchen applied for the COA based in part on Mr Kinchen's income.
   • On 16 July 2024, Mr Kinchen commenced counselling.
   • On 29 July 2024, Mr Kinchen commenced his medical leave.
   • On 12 August 2024, Mr Kinchen was advised of Ms Kinchen's COA application. In his first conversation with Child Support on 13 August (page 128) he stated that he was employed full time.
   • On 5 September 2024, Child Support made the COA decision increasing Mr Kinchen's child support significantly. In the records of conversations with Mr Kinchen prior to making the decision there is no mention that he was on personal leave, and he did not raise any issues regarding his health.
   • On 8 October 2024, Mr Kinchen finished his personal leave and discussed objecting to the COA decision with Child Support on the same day. He reduced his hours to part time just after this date.
   • On 30 October 2024, Mr Kinchen objected to the COA decision, including for the reason that his higher duties had not been extended, and 'on account of my mental health, my employment has been reduced to part-time' and seeking that his new lower income be used to calculate his child support.
   • On 6 November 2024, Child Support spoke to Mr Kinchen about his objection and recorded 'he stated he has had to reduce his hours of work due to mental stress, he stated he was FT, his is now 06 FTE.' He was asked to provide evidence of this and his prior medical leave, which he did. After this the COA objection decision was made setting his income to a lower amount on the basis of his reduced income.
   • On 25 July 2025, the telephone directions hearing was held at the Tribunal where the relevant grounds and suitable evidence was discussed, and the hearing was set down for 14 October 2025. After the directions hearing but before the substantive hearing, Mr Kinchen commenced counselling sessions again, this time through his EAP.
9. The Tribunal has considered the lack of any medical evidence relating to the period between the objection decision being made in December 2024 and the telephone directions hearing at the Tribunal in July 2025, and in particular the timing of Mr Kinchen's return to seeking psychological support after the directions hearing and before the hearing. The Tribunal also considered his claim that due to the financial impact he must only be doing it because he needs to for his health. While his health may have been a purpose and even a major purpose in his decision to not return to full-time employment in 2025, the Tribunal is not satisfied on the evidence that reducing his child support liability was not a major purpose of Mr Kinchen's decision. Were Mr Kinchen to be assessed now on his actual full-time income of more than $100,000, even without the higher duties he had in late 2024, Mr Kinchen is aware his child support assessment would be significantly higher than it is based on a $67,000 income. The Tribunal does not question that Mr Kinchen has suffered from mental health issues over the past 18 months, and in particular notes that he went on a waitlist for counselling before he was aware of the child support assessment commencing, but this does not explain his lack of any diagnosis or evidence relevant to his decision in 2025 to not work full time, or his timing in only seeking assistance again after the directions hearing. The third criteria is satisfied.
10. The Tribunal is satisfied that at a conservative estimate for earning capacity purposes, Mr Kinchen was able to work at least 4 days per week during 2025, with the fifth day in consideration of his fluctuating level of care of the children. However, to depart for the past 11 months in a manner that not only increases Mr Kinchen's school fees contribution but also assesses him on an income he was not actually earning would place him into significant arrears that would impact his ability to provide ongoing support of the children. It is a difficult matter to balance, as Ms Kinchen has also been in hardship over that period as she is actually meeting the costs of the children and has only managed to do so along with her own liabilities and expenses by taking out a large and costly personal loan in anticipation of property settlement. The Tribunal finds that, on balance, it is better to deal with the income of the parties in a more holistic manner by instead assessing Mr Kinchen on his actual 2024/25 income during that period and continuing the use of his likely 2024/25 ATI into early 2026 to provide some certainty to the parties while their property settlement is managed. The Tribunal finds that the objection decision varying Mr Kinchen's ATI to $126,676[4] for the period 26 June to 10 October 2024 while he was on higher duties, and then to $67,000[5] from 11 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 is the appropriate means of reflecting that first period and adopts the same approach. This portion of the decision will not affect the past child support or arrears as it has already been assessed at this rate.
11. The Tribunal will also vary the decision under review by departing for the period from 1 October 2025. For this period, the Tribunal finds that it is just and equitable to apply an income of $84,000 for Mr Kinchen as reflective of the likely 2024/25 ATI that would otherwise be used in the assessment once his ATI was available. This figure has been reached by adding his gross taxable employment income of $83,833 with his likely rental profit of $2,000 and rounding down to allow for reasonable tax deductions. This income will be applied until 31 March 2026 to allow for the property settlement, which goes to trial in February 2026, to be finalised or at least at the point of a pending court determination. While the Tribunal could have left the assessment to be based on the actual ATO income once available to Child Support when the latest child support period commences, Mr Kinchen could have immediately lodged an estimate of income to reduce this to his part-time salary. The income determination is intended to reflect a portion of his actual present earning capacity (which is reasonably between $90,092 per annum at 0.8 FTE to $112,615 full time), and to be a just and equitable basis for the decision in conjunction with the school fees and in the context of the current circumstances of the parties. While this determination cannot be reduced by an estimate, it similarly cannot be increased if his hours increase in that time. If Mr Kinchen has new special circumstances which he has evidence that prevents his ability to work to at least an amount of hours equivalent to an $84,000 annual salary, or if Ms Kinchen has evidence that his income has increased sufficiently above that to make the decision unfair, either party can discuss a new COA application with Child Support.
12. The Tribunal also considered earning capacity in respect of Ms Kinchen, who is a part-time [occupation 1] whose income has been detailed above in these Reasons. Ms Kinchen's taxable income used in the assessment has increased each year. She has increased her part-time hours when there have been opportunities to do so and gave evidence that she is working as much as she can despite having the higher levels of care of the children, as she needs the income to meet her and the children's expenses post‑separation. Ms Kinchen does not meet the legislative requirements to have a higher earning capacity taken into account.

Self-support commitments (including any other dependants)

1. Neither parent raised any personal expense that was related to their own special needs, but both parents claim to be in financial hardship as without the benefit of access to their asset pool until settlement occurs, they each submit that their incomes are insufficient to meet the expenses for themselves and the children, whether that be through direct expense or child support payments. Neither parent has any other dependants. Mr Kinchen submitted he had liabilities of $140,000 in unpaid legal fees, $10,000 in credit card debt, and a HECS liability. He is no longer paying a mortgage as the property it related to has been sold (as detailed below), but he pays rent of $520 per week for his current accommodation. He calculates the average weekly expenditure for himself, and the children when they are in his care, is $1,535 in addition to his child support, standard tax on his employment income, and $29 per week in life insurance. Based on his provided figures and his recent payslips, his current take home income of about $1,700 per fortnight less listed necessary expenses leaves him with a deficit of around $600 each week to address his liabilities other than his child support arrears (as child support payments including a portion for arrears are now deducted from Mr Kinchen's wages before he is paid). However, Mr Kinchen has been able to pay his child support arrears over that time and presented no evidence that he cannot meet necessary expenses such as his rent, petrol, food and utilities. It is likely that his debts will increase until settlement occurs, but that legal fees and other liabilities will be paid from each parent's portion of the property settlement. Mr Kinchen's current financial position is therefore temporary in that he expects a property settlement and can increase his hours of employment.
2. Ms Kinchen provided details of her self-support expenses as follows: She no longer has a mortgage payment from July 2025 due to the only mortgage being on the shared investment property, not the farm property she resides in, but prior to that she stated the mortgage payment was $558 per week. Mr Kinchen stated that Ms Kinchen was not paying the mortgage at all which is part of the reason the investment property had to be sold, and Ms Kinchen claimed the mortgage was on hold so neither were paying it. She has a personal loan of $250,000 for a 12-month period incurring interest at 9.78% that she is not presently able to make any payments towards but intends to repay it out of the property settlement if possible. Once the mortgage payments are removed, Ms Kinchen's estimated average weekly expenses for her and the children total $2,200, although this does not include the full amount of higher current medical out-of-pocket expenses. Ms Kinchen submitted at hearing that her high fuel costs are currently higher than estimated as due to her location she is having to make frequent long drives for the children's regular appointments for their special needs. In respect of her high estimated clothing and shoes cost of $200 per week, which was discussed at hearing, Mr Kinchen disputed Ms Kinchen's costs were as high as estimated, however Ms Kinchen submitted that she checked her bank statements for the year, and including school uniforms and shoes plus clothing to account for both children growing, this was accurate when averaged over the year.
3. The Tribunal noted that there are expenses that appear to be discretionary despite the position Ms Kinchen claims to be in, such as for the children's extensive extracurricular activities, although she stated that they no longer do dance or piano as the costs were too high. The Tribunal notes that even with discretionary spending removed, Ms Kinchen's expenses (which include her self-support commitments and the children's proper needs) exceed her current take home pay substantially. Some costs listed relate to maintaining the property Ms Kinchen lives at (such as mowing and pool maintenance) and she submitted that she has been advised that despite these expenses going towards the maintenance of a joint asset, they will not be added back as part of the settlement. She also submitted at hearing that she had forgotten to include large costs for the property that were not weekly expenses, such as large bills for the property including $4,500 annual insurance and $8,500 in rates. Ms Kinchen's evidence is that she cannot meet her costs, and this is why there are liabilities such as the mortgage and now the personal loan that she cannot make repayments on. As with Mr Kinchen, her debts are likely to increase until the settlement is finalised.
4. While the Tribunal does not find it appropriate to increase the self-support amount for either parent, their expenses have been considered in coming to a just and equitable departure and in particular in relation to the hardship considerations below.

Costs incurred by the carer in providing care for the children

1. Both parents provide care for the children, and both have claimed their ability to work full time is impacted by their care of the children, although Ms Kinchen has a significantly higher level as the primary carer and Mr Kinchen has claimed he would like to increase his care to around 50%. The care has fluctuated throughout the assessment although is usually above 70% with Ms Kinchen, although the exact percentages for each period have been taken into account in calculating the departures for this decision. In each period, Ms Kinchen is the parent assessed to receive child support. The Tribunal is satisfied that her costs incurred will be adequately reflected in the formula assessment once the school fees are included and the incomes are updated.

Proposed departure, and any hardship to the parents or the children caused by making or refusing to make a departure determination

1. Mr Kinchen submitted at hearing that he was going backwards financially around $500 per week and was in severe financial hardship with the current child support payments and suggested that higher payments may lead him into bankruptcy. He expressed frustration that Ms Kinchen would not agree to release some funds from the sale of the investment property that are held in trust pending the final property settlement. The Tribunal has decided not to include that pool of funds as they are the subject of negotiations in respect of the property settlement. He submitted that through the exchange of documents in their family court proceedings he could see that Ms Kinchen had paid $180,000 or more up front to her lawyers and did not know how that was possible given her claims of hardship.
2. Ms Kinchen submitted that she did not have those funds but rather had to take out her personal loan which needed to be repaid from the settlement. She maintains that Mr Kinchen can increase his income at any time if he was legitimately in hardship. She submitted that she was in financial hardship with the current departure in place, even though it was higher than what would otherwise be provided for in the usual assessment. As of the hearing, she said the latest assessment going forward was an annual rate of $4,825 per week for both the children and she was receiving some ongoing child support now that payments were being deducted from Mr Kinchen's employment income.
3. Ms Kinchen made submissions that Mr Kinchen should continue to contribute to the children in the same way that he did prior to separation. However, the reality is that the financial situation of the parents has changed drastically because of the separation. The parties are in somewhat of a financial limbo until the property settlement is finalised. The Tribunal considers that while both parties are experiencing financial difficulty now, it does not mean they will be once the assets are distributed, which should occur early to mid-2026. Both have given evidence of funds held in trust pending the outcome of the proceedings, in addition to their other assets. As of the hearing date, there was only around $800 remaining in arrears and Mr Kinchen was meeting his ongoing child support commitments plus a contribution to the arrears (established by the COA objection decision) through employer withholding. Any increase of the rate prior to hearing will increase those arrears in circumstances where Mr Kinchen may not presently have capacity to pay them without increasing his work hours. Conversely, Ms Kinchen has had to pay for nearly all expenses for the children that far exceed Mr Kinchen's contribution when the Tribunal has found she does not to have capacity to meet those costs and is incurring substantial personal debt to do so.
4. As the future circumstances of the parties are difficult to determine, the Tribunal proposes to only make a departure in respect of income to 31 March 2026 to allow immediate certainty before the family court matters are fully resolved. The Tribunal will, however, include a full year of school fees for 2026 as this is a cost that will be incurred by Ms Kinchen regardless of whether a COA decision is in place and will avoid the need for the parties to immediately apply for a further COA on that basis. The Tribunal considered whether neither parent could afford the school fees, despite their joint intention that the children continue at their current school. Ms Kinchen has already paid the fees since the commencement of the case and through the COA objection, Mr Kinchen has now paid some contribution through his child support. This decision slightly increases that contribution and requires it for 2026 in circumstances where Mr Kinchen can increase his income, but Ms Kinchen is unlikely to be able to. Had Mr Kinchen not been found to be able to increase his income, and had the parties not had an imminent property settlement through which each will be able to access more funds, the Tribunal may have found that it was not just and equitable to extend the departure into 2026 on the basis of neither parent being able to afford future fees. If Mr Kinchen is not required to contribute to school fees, the Tribunal is satisfied that it will cause hardship to Ms Kinchen and in turn, the children. The Tribunal also notes that if the Tribunal had not determined to depart from the assessment at all, a large overpayment would have been applied to Ms Kinchen leaving her without ongoing child support for some time in addition to the ongoing school costs and causing significant hardship to her and the children.
5. The Tribunal proposes to depart from the assessment regarding school fees by taking a portion deemed to be above the usual cost for most children for each year and dividing the cost by half for each parent so that Mr Kinchen's assessment is increased to cover his share. There are no standard figures available for the average cost of Australian public primary schooling, and it can be as little as zero dollars if parents cannot afford to contribute. However, some contribution to costs is usual. The Tribunal has decided it is reasonable in the circumstances of this case to adopt a reduction of just over $400 each year as an estimation of usual levies and other parent contributions to items such as stationery and camps that are more common to all school children. This is not an exact science but represents what the Tribunal believes to be a just and equitable apportionment of the education costs in all of the circumstances of the parties. The portions of the fees from those outlined at paragraph 17 that will be included in the departure decision have been calculated as follows:
   • 2024: All fees and costs (not including uniforms) less discounts, rounded down from $7,439 to $7,000 to reflect the likely cost over and above a usual levy and other similar costs incurred by most parents with primary school age children. $7,000 divided by 50% = $3,500 per parent.
   • 2025: All fees and costs less discounts (not including uniforms), rounded down from $7,582 to $7,100 as above, divided by 50% = $3,550 per parent.
   • 2026: Likely fees and costs less discounts (not including uniforms), rounded down from $7,733 to $7,300. $1,000 as an estimated additional cost of the device to be purchased is added to this, leading to $8,300, which divided by 50% = $4,150 per parent.
6. The Tribunal finds that a departure in the following terms would be just and equitable:
   • For the period 18 April 2024 to 31 December 2024, the annual rate is increased by $3,500 to account for Mr Kinchen's 50% share of the 2024 education expenses, but only from the start of the assessment, meaning this increase will not address the portion of fees for the part of the year prior to the assessment commencing.
   • For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, the annual rate is increased by $3,550 to account for Mr Kinchen's 50% share of the 2025 education expenses.
   • For the period 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026, the annual rate is increased by $4,150 to account for Mr Kinchen's share of the 2026 education expenses.
   • For the period 26 June 2024 to 10 October 2024, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Kinchen is varied to $126,676.
   • For the period 11 October 2024 to 30 September 2025, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Kinchen is varied to $67,000.
   • For the period 1 October 2025 to 31 March 2026, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Kinchen is varied to $84,000.
7. The annual rates for each period under the objection decision are on page C25 of the hearing papers. This decision increases those annual rates in 2024 by approximately $1,001, and to 30 September 2025 by approximately $709. While these rates are a moderate increase on the objection decision outcome, they are significantly higher than the underlying assessments were prior to any departure. In addition to the past period, the rates from 1 October 2025 are calculated by the Tribunal to be as follows (noting these will change once Child Support generates new child support periods using a 2024/25 ATI for Ms Kinchen):
   • 1 October 2025 to 31 December 2025: $11,478
   • 1 January 2026 onwards will be calculated by Child Support although it is likely to be similar to the late 2025 rate, plus an additional $600 for the 2026 increase to Mr Kinchen's school fee contribution
8. Mr Kinchen currently owes minimal outstanding child support as Child Support has been collecting arrears and ongoings from his wages. As of 24 September 2025, the total liability remaining was $826.20. This departure will impact those arrears by increasing them by approximately $1,400 in respect of the school fees, and approximately $955 in respect of the income commencing from 1 October 2025. He can discuss with Child Support whether his existing payment arrangement is sufficient to continue to address these arrears until he actually increases his work hours or can otherwise afford to pay the outstanding liability.
9. The departure commences from the start of the child support case, which was only a matter of weeks prior to Ms Kinchen making her application for the COA. The slight backdating to allow for the school fees will not significantly impact the arrears amount, and the Tribunal finds it is appropriate to do so in the interests of allowing for the school expenses to be more equitably distributed. The decision will also bring Mr Kinchen's incomes forward to be used in the assessment in real time, as opposed to relying on former financial year incomes when the parties were still in a relationship and Mr Kinchen was still involved in the farm business. The Tribunal has declined to increase his 2024/25 income to include a period of higher earning capacity as to do so would create additional arrears over and above those already calculated that would cause financial hardship to Mr Kinchen and affect his ability to meet his ongoing child support liability. If either parties' special circumstances change significantly as a result of the property settlement so that the existing COA becomes unfair, they can apply for a new COA at any time.
10. As the Tribunal finds that the departure outlined above is just and equitable, it must also consider whether it would be otherwise proper to make such a departure.

Issue 3: Would the departure be otherwise proper?

1. Paragraph 98C(1)(b) requires the decision maker to be satisfied it would be otherwise proper to make a particular departure determination. Subsection 117(5) states that when determining whether it is otherwise proper to make a particular determination, the decision maker must have regard to:

(a) the nature of the duty of a parent to maintain a child (as stated in section 3) and, in particular, the fact that it is the parents of a child themselves who have the primary duty to maintain the child; and

(b) the effect that the making of the order would have on:

(i) any entitlement of the child, or the carer entitled to child support, to an income tested pension, allowance or benefit; or

(ii) the rate of any income tested pension, allowance or benefit payable to the child or the carer entitled to child support.

1. Ms Kinchen currently receives a minimal amount of family tax benefit that is impacted by her income and the child support assessment. This rate would be higher if the assessments were lower because they were based on Mr Kinchen's last relevant year taxable incomes. To depart from the assessment to more accurately reflect Mr Kinchen's position after the commencement of the case and include a contribution for school fees increases the amount that he as a parent is contributing to the maintenance of the children and reduces the cost to the taxpayer through the rate of family tax benefit that would have been otherwise paid to Ms Kinchen. The Tribunal considers that making the proposed departure is otherwise proper in this matter.

1. As the Tribunal has reached a different conclusion than that of the objections officer as to how the incomes and school fees should be reflected in the departure, the decision under review will be varied in the terms outlined in the decision as already detailed in these Reasons.

The Tribunal varies the decision under review as follows:

• For the period 18 April 2024 to 31 December 2024, the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Kinchen is increased by $3,500 instead of $2,499
• For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Kinchen is increased by $3,550 instead of $2,841
• For the period 1 January 2026 to 31 January 2026, the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Kinchen is increased by $4,150
• For the period 1 October 2025 to 31 March 2026, the adjusted taxable income of Mr Kinchen is varied to $84,000.

Note: The portion of the decision under review dated 4 December 2024 varying the adjusted taxable income of Mr Kinchen for the period 26 June 2024 to 30 September 2025 remains unchanged.

[1] The hearing papers show that prior to this the recorded percentages were 100% with Ms Kinchen from the start of the assessment, then 79% with Ms Kinchen and 21% with Mr Kinchen from 28 August 2024, then 72% with Ms Kinchen and 28% with Mr Kinchen from 23 October 2024, 50% with each parent from 14 December 2024, and 72% with Ms Kinchen and 28% with Mr Kinchen from 19 January 2025.

[2] This would have been updated by Mr Kinchen's 2023/24 taxable income of $50,258 which would have increased the annual rate; however, the COA decision was made in the meantime.

[3] Ms Kinchen raised concerns that she was able to adjust the figures in the B documents sent to her by the Tribunal and questioned whether Mr Kinchen had been able to do the same with evidence sent to him from the real estate agent. As the Tribunal has the original B documents and Tribunal staff prepared the version sent to Ms Kinchen, the Tribunal is satisfied that the documents are correct. Mr Kinchen also stated that Ms Kinchen can obtain these same figures directly from the agents.

[4] This figure represents his higher duties wage at the time plus $2,000 rental profits added back.

[5] This figure represents his reduced wage at the time and accounts for some minimal tax deductions.