The terms of the contracts for sale
236 The contracts relating to TM Index and TMK Index were prepared by, or under the instruction of, Mr Wang against the background of the provisions of Pt 7.6 of the Corporations Act, dealing with the licensing of providers of financial services. Mr Wang must have been familiar with those provisions, in that he was a solicitor who also conducted a business of buying and selling companies with AFSLs. A person who carries on a financial services business in Australia must hold an AFSL covering the provision of the financial services: s 911A(1), subject to a number of exemptions from that requirement set out in subs (2). The criteria for the grant of an AFSL are set out in s 913B, including a requirement that the fit and proper person test set out in s 913BA be satisfied in relation to the applicant and the licence applied for. ASIC may vary an AFSL to take account of a change in the licensee's name if the licensee lodges with ASIC an application for the variation accompanied by any documents required by the regulations: s 915A(1). If an entity starts to control, or stops controlling, a financial services licensee, the licensee must lodge a notification with ASIC in the prescribed form within 30 business days after the entity starts to control, or stops controlling, the financial services licensee: s 912DA(1).
237 There is obviously no ability for AFSLs to be transferred from one entity to another, and any such notion would be plainly contrary to the regulatory purposes of Pt 7.6 of the Corporations Act. However, as s 912DA recognises, the shareholder or shareholders of an Australian financial services licensee may transfer their shares, but the licensee must notify ASIC if such a share transfer would amount to an entity starting to control, or stopping control, of that financial services licensee. Accordingly, as Mr Pritchard SC, who appeared for Mr Wang, submitted, there is nothing unlawful as such in the buying and selling of shares, including controlling shareholdings, in entities which hold AFSLs. However, as Mr Pritchard SC accepted, the buying and selling of AFSLs would be contrary to Pt 7.6 of the Corporations Act.
238 Turning then to the terms of the contracts pertaining to TM Index and TMK Index, the first salient point to note is that Party A has been left blank in both contracts. Mr Pritchard SC sought to explain that omission in the TM Index Contract as a reflection of the early stage of negotiating that contract, in which "Johnson" had not yet identified the entity which he would nominate to be the contractual counterparty. However, there was no subsequent draft or further iteration of that contract, and Mr Wang had already taken steps to comply with that anticipated contract by 28 October 2014 by procuring the change of the company's name from Taemus Funds Ltd to TM Index Ltd, and by making corresponding changes to the name in which the AFSL was held. That new AFSL extract was sent to "Johnson" as part of the email attaching the contract itself. Further, the TMK Index Contract was not only the final iteration of that contract, but it was performed both by Mr Wang as the controlling mind of Party B and also by the unidentified Party A, which paid approximately US$250,000. The only possible means of identifying Party A to the TMK Index contract was the signature by way of initials which was apparently inserted on 15 May 2015, but there is no evidence as to whose initials they are. I am unable to infer that the initials are those of "Johnson". Moreover there is a real doubt as to whether the person referred to as "Johnson" (or as "johnsontanjun" in the email address) refers to a person who actually exists and bears that name. As Mr Walker SC, who appeared for Mr Kim, put it, the name was an "evocative sobriquet" (T8.43).
239 It strikes me as most peculiar that an experienced solicitor would treat as binding, and take steps to perform, a so-called contract in which the contractual counterparty was not identified in a way which would make the contract enforceable either as a matter of law or as a matter of practical feasibility. I infer that it was obvious to Mr Wang that the contractual counterparty referred to as "Party A" wished to remain anonymous. I also infer that that anonymity was for the obvious purpose of concealing the identity of the counterparty from third parties, including any law enforcement agencies, and that Mr Wang was aware of that purpose, in the absence of any other plausible explanation for Party A's anonymity.
240 Second, cl 2, which was intended to describe the scope of financial operation in Australia of TM Index and TMK Index respectively, was also left blank. That might be thought merely to reflect the fact that both companies were dormant or non-active companies, and did not conduct any financial services business, as Mr Wang was aware. However, the sample contract referred to below between Hangyu Tang and Guofei Chen dated 20 January 2014 shows that cl 2 was filled out in that earlier contract by reference to a description of the activities authorised by the AFSL, irrespective of whether they were (or were proposed to be) carried on by way of an actual financial services business. The complete omission of any such description in the contracts relating to TM Index and TMK Index reflects an awareness on the part of Mr Wang that any such statement was a matter of indifference to Party A, and also an awareness by Mr Wang that Party A's objectives would be satisfied merely by the existence of an AFSL in the name of TM Index and TMK Index respectively.
241 Third, the contracts speak of the purchase from Party B of both the AFSL which the company has obtained in Australia, and also the purchase of the shares in that company. As I have indicated above, the purchase of an AFSL itself would be a legal impossibility, yet cl 3.1 of each of the contracts refers to the purchase price of US$250,000 being for the AFSL, and then refers to that as including the name change and share transfer of the company. That might have been regarded as merely infelicitous drafting, except for the fact that cl 4.2 in each of the contracts suggests that the share transfer is a matter which Party A may decide at its own election whether to pursue, rather than the contract obliging Party A to purchase the shares in the company. Clause 4.2 provides in effect that, if requested by Party A, Party B shall start to change the company structure as requested by Party A immediately upon receiving shareholder information from Party A, but that request and shareholder information might not be provided because Party A may decide not to proceed with the share purchase. The inclusion of cl 4.2 by Mr Wang, under whose control the agreement was drafted and sent, reflected an understanding on the part of Mr Wang that Party A may well be able to obtain the commercial benefits it sought from the contracts without ever acquiring any shares in TM Index or TMK Index. Expressly leaving open that possibility is antithetical to any legitimate business purpose in conferring on Party A the benefit of using the AFSL in question, given that the benefit of the AFSL could only be legally transferred to Party A if there were a transfer of the controlling shareholding in TM Index and TMK Index respectively, as Mr Wang must have understood.
242 Mr Wang tendered, through the affidavit of Ms Wei, other sample contracts for the purchase and sale of companies with AFSLs, which stand in stark contrast to the TM Index and TMK Index contracts. One of those sample contracts dated 20 January 2014 identified Party A as Hangyu Tang and Party B as Guofei Chen, and did define the scope of the company's financial operation in Australia. Importantly, the contract obliged Mr Chen, who held 100% of the shares in the relevant company, namely DS Financial Services Pty Ltd, to transfer all of those shares to Party A (cl 4.4). It should also be noted that cl 2, dealing with the "scope of financial operation in Australia" contains reference to the activities which the AFSL authorises the licensee to carry out by way of a financial services business. Similarly, in a contract dated 16 May 2014, Party A is identified as Fong Sim Lung, and Party B is Fropro Group Ltd. That contract defines the scope of financial operation in Australia of the relevant company (in cl 2), originally known as Capital Custodians Australia Pty Ltd and to become known as Easy Fortune & Ever Wealth Pty Ltd. Clause 2 obliged Party B to expand the scope of the business operation in Australia to include the provision of advice to wholesale clients relating to derivatives and foreign exchange contracts, and also dealing in those classes of financial products. Clause 4 provided that upon receiving all information regarding directorship and shareholders from Party A, Party B shall complete the process of changing the director and shareholders within 5 working days, and cll 1 and 3 referred respectively to the agreement being for the purchase of the company and the transfer of shares in it.
243 Fourth, the amount of the purchase price of US$250,000 in each of the TM Index and TMK Index contracts is a striking feature of those contracts, given that the companies in question were dormant companies with no significant assets other than the fact that they each held an AFSL. Mr Pritchard SC submitted that that sum was in line with the market price for such contracts, and pointed to the price of US$290,000 in the contract between Mr Tang and Mr Chen, the price of "RMB one million Yuan" in the contract between Mr Lung and Fropro Group Ltd, the price of US$225,000 in a contract dated 29 September 2014 between NZ Global Financial Trading (Pty) Ltd and VQ Seychelles, and the price of US$260,000 in a contract dated 22 April 2015 between an unidentified Party A (but apparently associated with "Johnson") and VQ Seychelles. However, there is no evidence as to the purpose or purposes to which those contracts were put by the various purchasing entities, or the commercial legitimacy or lawfulness of those purposes. In my view, a more cogent guide to the market price for the shares in dormant companies which have an AFSL is provided by the contract under which VQ Seychelles acquired the shares in TM Index from National Civil Recovery Pty Ltd for A$75,000, and the contract by which Successway Ltd acquired the shares in TMK Index from Fish Capital Pty Ltd (a different party not apparently associated with National Civil Recovery Pty Ltd) for A$60,000. No question was raised at the trial concerning the commercial integrity and competence of the sellers of the shares in those two contracts. Accordingly, the arm's length price agreed in those two contracts provides the best evidence of Mr Wang's understanding as to the reasonable market value between parties of commercial integrity and competence for the shares in a dormant company which holds an AFSL. Contrary to Mr Pritchard SC's submission (at T56.20-33), there is no evidence that the sellers to Mr Wang's interests of the shares in TM Index and TMK Index were underinformed.
244 The disparity between the range of A$60,000 to A$75,000, on the one hand, and the figure of US$250,000 in the contracts for TM Index and TMK Index, on the other hand, is striking. Mr Pritchard SC submitted that the difference may be explained (at least in part) by the added value of providing an Australian resident director and a registered office (T57.1-7), but ultimately accepted (correctly in my view) that those additional services were in consideration of the additional monthly fee of US$25,000 (T74.32-37). In my opinion, the available inferences include that Mr Wang must have understood that the unnamed Party A expected that the commercial benefit to it in being able to make use of the AFSLs in question (irrespective of whether they actually purchased the shares in the companies) would exceed the amount of US$250,000, which itself greatly exceeded Mr Wang's understanding of the fair market value of those companies. Further, the size of the amount of US$250,000 compared to the range of A$60,000 to A$75,000 strengthens the inference from the matters previously considered that Mr Wang was aware that it was most unlikely that the proposed use of the AFSLs by the unidentified Party A would be lawful and legitimate. The transactions were akin to (although not as stark as) an airline passenger being offered a large amount of money by a stranger to carry a suitcase through customs, being a task which is not physically onerous, but the legal risk being undertaken explains the size of the payment, to everyone's unspoken understanding.
245 Fifth, the so called "operational service fee" of US$25,000 per month was itself a large amount, although there was no obligation on the part of Party A to maintain the arrangement. Both contracts in cl 9.3 acknowledged that Party A may cease paying that fee, in which case Party B had the right to terminate the service, and the TMK Index Contract included an express provision in cl 9.7 to the effect that Party A could stop paying the operational service fee at any time. Clause 10.3 of each contract expressly acknowledged that Party A was free to choose whether it would carry out any business activities at all under the name of the Australian company.
246 Sixth, cl 10 in each contract referred to the "foreign director provided by Party B", which was Mr Forrester in the case of TMK Index. Clause 10.2 of each contract provided that the final commercial decision-making power and financial power shall remain with Party A and that the director provided by Party B had no authority to sign any contracts on behalf of Party A. Clause 10.2 appears to describe Party A as owned by the shareholders of the Australian "holding company" but, as cl 4.2 recognises, it was a matter for Party A to decide in due course whether it would become, or nominate anyone to become, a shareholder of the company. In effect, cl 10.2 obliged Party B, being VQ Seychelles, to provide a director who would comply with instructions provided by Party A, irrespective of whether Party A, or its nominees, were shareholders of the company. That is reinforced in the case of the TMK Index contract by the stipulation that the director will be an employee of Party A. Clause 10.2 in each contract opens up a possibility, as a matter of legal theory, that Party A may have been able to control the conduct of a financial services business under the authority of the AFSLs held by TM Index and TMK Index, without acquiring a controlling shareholding in TM Index or TMK Index, by giving instructions to the director of each company. However, Mr Wang knew that that would not occur while Mr Forrester was the appointed director, because Mr Wang understood that Mr Forrester would only act as director if the companies remained dormant, and Mr Wang had given an assurance to that effect. Accordingly, Mr Wang must have understood that Party A would not be conducting any financial services business through TM Index or TMK Index in the foreseeable future.
247 In my opinion, those features of the contracts relating to TM Index and TMK Index give rise to the following inferences as to matters within Mr Wang's actual knowledge, bearing in mind that it was Mr Wang who drafted (or controlled the drafting of) those contracts:
(1) the commercial benefit which Party A sought to obtain from the contracts was to ensure that the companies would be called TM Index and TMK Index respectively and would have AFSLs;
(2) it was immaterial to Party A in deriving commercial benefits from those contracts whether there would be a transfer of shares in TM Index or TMK Index respectively in favour of Party A or its nominees;
(3) Party A had no genuine intention of conducting a financial services business through TM Index or TMK Index as authorised by their AFSLs, because the only way in which it could do so would be if it obtained a transfer of the shares in TM Index and TMK Index respectively, which Party A had given no indication of requiring, and because the contracts failed to articulate the scope of the companies' financial operation in Australia;
(4) Party A expected to derive more than US$250,000 from the commercial benefits conferred by each of those contracts;
(5) the likely (or only realistic) way in which Party A would derive revenue from the names TM Index and TMK Index and from the fact that they each held an AFSL was by representing to members of the public that TM Index and TMK Index were selling products or services which were legitimate and regulated by ASIC;
(6) Party A would be making such representations imminently, and as soon as it reasonably could once the name change to TM Index and TMK Index and the corresponding change of name for the AFSL licensee was made, which would occur within the timeframe of 7 working days in relation to the TM Index contract and 15 working days in relation to the TMK Index contract, a point reinforced by the email of 21 May 2015 as to the urgent need for the change of name for TMK Index; and
(7) those representations were false because in truth TM Index and TMK Index were dormant, non-active companies and did not carry on the kind of financial services businesses which were permitted by the AFSLs, and did not make any products or services available to the investing public.
248 In the language of Lord Sumner in The Zamora (No 2), the substance of the Legitimacy Representations and of their falsity was "borne in upon [Mr Wang's] mind with a conviction that full details or precise proofs may be dangerous, because they may embarrass his denials or compromise his protests". I am comfortably satisfied that Mr Wang had actual knowledge of the Legitimacy Representations and of their falsity for that reason. To the extent that Mr Wang did not actually know further details as to the use of the material which he had caused to be sent to "Johnson" (such as the matters referred to by the primary judge at [112], including the identity of those who created the documents containing the misrepresentations, and how the material was given to them by "Johnson"), that was the product of wilful blindness in the second of the senses referred to by Lord Sumner in The Zamora (No 2), and does not affect the ultimate conclusion that he had actual knowledge of the Legitimacy Representations and of their falsity.
249 There are some particular aspects of the reasoning of the primary judge on which I should comment.
250 First, there is an apparent contradiction between (i) the inference which the primary judge made that Mr Wang certified the name change to TM Index and TMK Index and extracted the timestamped version of the AFSL for each company "after making enquiries as to the purpose for which that material was to be used" (see [94(b)] and [96(b)] as found in [95] and [97]), and (ii) the inference expressed at [104] as to "a deliberate decision on the part of Mr Wang not to know what the purchasers of the rights under the contracts proposed to do", and the finding at [109] that Mr Wang did not want to know and ensured that he did not know what the purchasers would do with the rights they acquired. Mr Pritchard SC suggested that the two sets of inferences may be reconciled by reading the first set as enquiries by Mr Wang as to why his staff needed a copy of the AFSL with the name change within the office of Wang & Associates, whereas the latter set of inferences related to a decision not to make enquiries of the purchasers themselves (T65.31-66.4). I do not think that argument is available in light of the broad way in which the primary judge expressed both sets of inferences. More importantly, I do not see how the argument reconciles the contradictory findings. An enquiry by Mr Wang of his own staff as to why the AFSL licence with the name change was needed by Wang & Associates would have invited an answer which may well have disclosed the intention of the purchasers themselves, given that the reason for obtaining the extract of the AFSL with the name change was for it to be communicated to the purchasers. Accordingly, an enquiry of the more limited kind suggested by Mr Pritchard SC would not ensure that Mr Wang was not told directly of the purchasers' purposes.
251 In my view, the two sets of inferences cannot be reconciled. The better reading of the judgment is that the first set of inferences was an error, generated by the fact that in [94] and [96] the primary judge was quoting directly from the written submissions by Mr Kim, rather than expressing findings in her Honour's own words. The findings and inferences expressed at [104] and [109], together with the extensive reasoning concerning wilful blindness as expounded by Lord Sumner in The Zamora (No 2), were central to her Honour's reasoning, and should be read as the paramount findings which prevail over the inconsistency expressed in this aspect of [94]-[97]. That conclusion is reinforced by the fact, as counsel for both sides appeared to acknowledge, that there was no primary evidence on which an inference could be based that Mr Wang did in fact make enquiries as to the purpose for which the certification of the name change to the companies and the extract of the timestamped version of the AFSLs were to be used.
252 Second, at [105], the primary judge placed considerable weight on the provision in the contracts for the activities of TM Index and TMK Index to be lawful, noting that the fact that the companies were not undertaking activities did not mean that they could not be caused to carry out lawful activities in Australia after the contracts had been executed. However, Mr Wang knew that even after the contracts were provided, TM Index and TMK Index remained dormant companies which were not in fact carrying on any financial services business. Indeed, Mr Wang knew that that was the basis on which Mr Forrester had agreed to be the director of TMK Index, and gave an assurance in that regard. In order for Party A to be able to use TM Index or TMK Index to carry out a lawful financial services business as permitted by the AFSLs, Party A or its nominees would have had to become the controlling shareholders of those companies respectively, and then would have had to replace Mr Forrester with another director who would be willing to serve as director of active companies. There is no such thing as a transfer of an AFSL, as Mr Wang must have known. At no stage were the shares in TM Index or TMK Index transferred to Party A, nor was there any request made by Party A for any such transfer. At no time did Party A even provide information as to the identity of any prospective shareholders to whom any such transfer could have been made. Accordingly, Mr Wang knew that TM Index and TMK Index were not undertaking any activities by way of conducting a financial services business, and TMK Index would not be doing so for as long as Mr Forrester was the director of TMK Index. On the contrary, as I have inferred, Mr Wang was aware that Party A (whoever that may have been) was seeking to derive substantial commercial advantage from representing that its activities were those of TM Index or TMK Index, as authorised by the AFSLs and as regulated by ASIC.
253 Third, as to the reasoning in [106], the primary judge said that the continued exercise of control by Mr Wang over TM Index after the name change proves nothing relevant. Mr Pritchard SC sought to bolster his argument as to a lack of actual knowledge of the contraventions on the part of Mr Wang by pointing to two subsequent events relating to TM Index Ltd. One was the fact that Mr Wang had deposited A$149,080.36 in favour of TM Index between 30 June 2014 and 19 March 2015 in order to rectify a non-compliance with condition 9(a) of the AFSL, being the base level financial requirements: T75.27-76.31. The second was the change of name from TM Index Ltd to NZGFT Fund Management Ltd effected by Mr Wang on 17 April 2015: T78.23-42. In my view, neither event is relevant to the question of Mr Wang's actual knowledge of the contraventions. In light of the fact that the contract relating to TM Index had not proceeded, Mr Wang was obviously keen to ensure that TM Index, together with its AFSL, was available to be sold to another purchaser at a later point in time. While the amount of A$149,080 is substantial, it is much less than the evidence suggests could be realised by way of a sale to purchasers in Asia, being in the order of US$225,000 to US$290,000. I note also that the reason why Party A did not proceed with the TM Index contract would appear to be that that contract was provided simultaneously with the ASIC extract of the AFSL with the change of name to TM Index. It would appear that Party A had obtained everything which it sought to achieve by way of the contract by the provision of that AFSL extract, without having had to pay any money for that benefit. Mr Wang did not make that mistake again when it came to the TMK Index contract, ensuring that he received about US$200,000 of the purchase money upfront from Party A before effecting the change of name to TMK Index and providing the ASIC extract of the AFSL with that name change to Party A.
254 Fourth, at [110], the primary judge said of a perceived inability to find that Mr Wang's unwillingness to know resulted from a conviction that full details or precise proofs may be dangerous, that it was "equally plausible" that Mr Wang's unwillingness to know resulted from "a hope that the purchasers would comply with the contract for sale in respect of only conducting lawful activities", and said that that was "a hope that might well have been equal to or greater in weight than a suspicion that, if they chose, the purchasers or others with whom the purchasers might deal could use the companies and the AFSLs they held as instruments of fraud." As Mr Walker SC submitted, a party to a contract which is above board would expect compliance with that contract, not a mere hope of compliance: T41.30-38. Further, as I have said above, any "hope" that the purchasers would comply with the contract in respect of only conducting lawful activities would be unfounded unless there was in fact a purchase and transfer of the shares in TM Index and TMK Index respectively. That was a matter which Mr Wang knew at all material times had not actually taken place. Mr Wang knew that TM Index and TMK Index remained dormant companies with no business operations at all material times after the contracts were entered into by Party A. It could only have been deriving commercial benefit to offset its outlay of US$250,000 by misrepresenting itself as TM Index or TMK Index or both, and misrepresenting that the products or services it was offering were covered by the AFSL held by either or both of those companies.
255 Fifth, at [110], the primary judge said that the failure of Mr Wang to give evidence cannot fill the gap in the proof of actual knowledge.
256 The rule in Jones v Dunkel at 308 (Kitto J), 312 (Menzies J) and 320-21 (Windeyer J) is that the unexplained failure by a party to call a witness may in appropriate circumstances:
(a) support an inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted the party's case, particularly where it is the party who is the uncalled witness; and
(b) permit the court to draw, with greater confidence, any inference unfavourable to the party who failed to call the witness, if that uncalled witness appears to be in a position to cast light on whether the inference should be drawn.
See Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011] HCA 11; (2010) 243 CLR 361 at [63] (Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ); Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd [2011] FCAFC 53 at [79] (Besanko, Perram and Katzmann JJ).
257 In the present case, I have drawn inferences unfavourably to Mr Wang that he had actual knowledge of the making of the Legitimacy Representations and of their falsity. There is no doubt that Mr Wang was in a position to cast light on whether those inferences should be drawn; indeed, he was in the best position of anyone to do so. His failure to give evidence is unexplained. Although it is not necessary for me to rely upon the rule in Jones v Dunkel in order to conclude that Mr Wang was knowingly involved in the contraventions of s 12DA of the ASIC Act, I draw the inferences that he had actual knowledge of the making of the Legitimacy Representations and of their falsity with greater confidence by reason of Mr Wang's failure to give evidence. Contrary to the suggestion in the primary judge's reasons at [111], there is no need for the party relying on Jones v Dunkel to explain the reasons for the decision of a material witness not to give evidence for the opposing party.
258 Sixth, at [111] the primary judge said that her Honour was not able to infer from the rejection of key aspects of Ms Wei's evidence as false that Mr Wang must have something to hide, namely his knowing participation in the making of the misrepresentations knowing them to be false. Her Honour said that that would be "speculation based on suspicion, not inference based on rational reasoning". Her Honour said that Mr Wang might have had many reasons for not giving evidence, and Ms Wei might have had many reasons for not being candid. However, that last proposition does not confront the crucial question, which is what inference to draw from the fact that Mr Wang decided to call Ms Wei to give false testimony.
259 The rule in Jones v Dunkel does not permit an inference that evidence not called by a party would have been adverse to the party, merely that it would not have assisted the party: Kuhl at [64]. However, there is a separate principle which gives rise to such an adverse inference by way of an implied admission by conduct of the weakness of the party's case. The majority judgment of Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ in Kuhl at [64] expressed the principle as follows:
Depending on the circumstances, when a party lies, or destroys or conceals evidence, or attempts to destroy or conceal evidence, or suborns witnesses, or calls testimony known to be false, or fails to comply with court orders for the production of evidence (like subpoenas or orders to answer interrogatories), or misleads persons in authority about who the party is, or flees, the conduct can be variously described as an implied admission or circumstantial evidence permitting an adverse inference.
The relevant category for present purposes is the calling of testimony known to be false.
260 As Heydon J said in his Honour's dissenting judgment in Cooper v The Queen [2012] HCA 50; (2012) 87 ALJR 32 at [86]-[87], evidence suggesting a consciousness of guilt is receivable as an admission, and one such category is procuring others to lie, as illustrated by Moriarty v London, Chatham & Dover Railway Co (1870) LR 5 QB 314. Another illustration is where deliberately false evidence is given by the party himself: Oran Park Motor Sport Pty Ltd v Fleissig [2002] NSWCA 371 at [66] (Hodgson JA, with whom Beazley JA at [50] and Einstein J at [125] agreed).
261 As each of Cockburn CJ, Blackburn J and Lush J said in Moriarty, such evidence is not necessarily conclusive against the party, and it is a matter for the jury to decide the effect of the evidence. As Cockburn CJ said in Moriarty at 319, lies may not reflect a consciousness of guilt but rather an attempt to improve a just cause where the liar perceives the result to be uncertain; see J.D. Heydon, "Can Lies Corroborate?" (1973) 89 LQR 553 at 555.
262 In the present case, Mr Wang called Ms Wei to give evidence, which the primary judge was convinced was untruthful, as to her controlling role in relation to the sale of the companies with an AFSL, the lack of any dealings between her and Mr Wang, and Mr Wang's lack of any role in acquiring and selling TM Index and TMK Index: [36]. Further, the primary judge rejected Ms Wei's evidence that she acted as the controlling mind of VQ Seychelles, and found that Mr Wang must have acted as the controlling mind of VQ Seychelles, and that Ms Wei acted in accordance with Mr Wang's directions: [47]. Indeed, her Honour found that everything Ms Wei did, she did under the control and direction of Mr Wang: [49]. The primary judge found that everything done by Wang & Associates in connection with the purchase and sale of companies with AFSLs and their name changes was done under the direction of Mr Wang and with his knowledge and authority, and he was in control of all steps in relation to the purchase and sale of TM Index and TMK Index and their name changes: [83].
263 In my opinion, Mr Wang's conduct in calling Ms Wei to give false evidence in relation to those matters reflected a consciousness that, in truth, he had actual knowledge of the Legitimacy Representations and of their falsity. Ms Wei's evidence was the central plank in Mr Wang's defence at first instance, and it was not merely a case of Mr Wang gilding the lily in order to make a genuinely sound case appear even stronger or less uncertain of success. While I do not regard it as necessary for the ultimate conclusion as to Mr Wang's liability for knowing involvement in those contraventions, there was an implied admission on the part of Mr Wang as to his knowing participation in the contraventions arising from Mr Wang's conduct in calling Ms Wei to give testimony which, on the primary judge's uncontested findings, he must have known to be false.
264 That implied admission is not "speculation based on suspicion" and is indeed an inference based on rational reasoning, contrary to the primary judge's reasoning at [111]. In my view, the submission which Mr Kim made to the primary judge that the fact that Mr Wang had put forward his cousin to give a false account (see [94(d)] of the primary judge's reasoning) was a matter which had to be taken into account in the assessment of whether it should be inferred that Mr Wang had actual knowledge of the essential elements of the contraventions should have been accepted, even though at the level of principle, that matter was not necessarily conclusive against Mr Wang.