3.2.2 Columbus' case on breach
49 Columbus put its case that Pioneer breached this obligation in various ways as the case developed. In its opening submissions Columbus said that:
32. The fundamental problem with Pioneer's procedures was that Ms Dando was placed in a position by Pioneer where she could personally handle, if she so chose, all dealings between Pioneer and borrowers such as Lim & Lam, the Roberts and the Angus. This flaw in procedure was particularly egregious in circumstances in which redraws could be obtained from ANZ without any signature from a borrower but through the simple completion of an on-line form by a Pioneer employee, which form could then be forwarded to ANZ electronically.
33. Because of the above, Pioneer effectively equipped the one employee (Ms Dando) with the wherewithal to:
(a) Identify (through Ms Dando's personal contact with borrowers and her access to their account balances) those borrowers less likely to notice fraud because their loans had previously been paid out yet were still formally on the books and available as the subject for redraws;
(b) Plausibly assert (being a point of contact between Pioneer and the borrowers in question) that the those borrowers had made redraw requests;
(c) Complete and submit redraw requests to ANZ;
(d) Avoid any audits by knowing the audit procedures and thus being able to avoid them (for example by limiting redraw amounts to less than $10,000 per redraw) and being the superior of the staff conducting such audits; and
(e) Hide any complaints made by the borrowers (Ms Dando being, if she so desired, the contact person to whom those complaints would be directed, as well as being the manager of all other staff members who could potentially be involved with such complaints).
50 The reference to audit procedures for amounts of $10,000 or more relates to the reporting requirement identified above. The form required to be completed by two Pioneer employees referred to these requirements:
Redraws
Daily reports have been reviewed and all redraw transactions (CAP codes 61067 and 60101) have been checked for correctness.
Daily reports have been checked for redraws greater than $10,000.
Customer authorisations are to be held by Mortgage Managers for all redraws.
51 The parties are at issue concerning the requirement to check redraws for amounts less than $10,000, it being Pioneer's position that there was no such requirement. As it had not yet had the benefit of the oral evidence when preparing its opening submissions, particularly the evidence of Ms Pryde, Columbus initially confined itself to the following observations about the failure to detect Ms Dando's frauds over a period of many years. Columbus said:
36. Although Ms Pryde at [31] in her 22 December 2014 [affidavit] states that there was a system in place whereby on a quarterly basis for a "senior employee in the position Operations Manager and a clerk to review the requests and their supporting identity material", there is no explanation as to how such checks failed to identify any of the redraw frauds (unless, consistent with Ms Lewis' evidence, the checks were confined to redraws of $10,000 or over).
37. There is no evidence of any written redraw requests in relation to the 3 loans (let alone written requests supported by identity material) and Ms Dando's confession of her wrongdoing did not include any claim that such material had been created. It would thus appear likely that there was no written request and no supporting identity material created to support the fraudulent redraws.
38. It follows that if the quarterly review did indeed occur, it failed to detect that the many redraw requests in relation to the 3 loans over the space of several years and totalling hundreds of thousands of dollars was unsupported by any written documentation.
52 By the time the evidence had been completed, Columbus' contentions of a failure by Pioneer to "take such steps and maintain such procedures as would be taken and maintained by a reasonably prudent mortgagee in connection with each" of the loans included other matters, specifically based on Ms Pryde's evidence that the checking process involved checking all redraw documents in a folder which Pioneer maintained. In other words, the checks carried out were confined to redraws for which the required paperwork had been created. Ms Dando's frauds were committed using the software system and, it is clear from the evidence, did not involve the creation of any paperwork. Ms Pryde pointed out that, from 2009 onwards, Pioneer did not automatically receive the daily reports. As the agreed facts disclose, however, these reports were available on request in an electronic format which was searchable by reference to the two transactions codes for all redraws (CAP codes 61067 and 60101 according to the reporting form).
53 On the basis of that evidence, Columbus submitted that:
33. The fact that ANZ's manuals contained an express requirement to undertake certain verification procedures in relation to redraws over $10,000 does not obviate the responsibility of Pioneer under clause 5.1 of the MOMD to act in an efficient and businesslike fashion and take such steps and maintain such procedures as would be taken and maintained by a reasonably prudent mortgagee. Clause 5.1 expressly states that Pioneer's obligations remain "irrespective of any alleged or actual default of the Bank or the Trustee".
34. Pioneer effectively acknowledged the need to review redraws below $10,000 by the fact that it had a procedure in place to make such checks, in the form of Ms Pryde's quarterly reviews. This procedure failed in its purpose, however, due to the manner Ms Pryde conducted these reviews. Instead of checking the computer reports to see what redraws had in fact occurred and then cross-check to ensure that the written borrower requests and identity material required by Pioneer's own procedures was present on file for each redraw, Ms Pryde merely checked Pioneer's redraw file to see whether the documents in that file were in order, thus failing to check whether redraws had been made for which there was no paperwork at all.
35. Ms Pryde admitted that she should have checked what redraws had occurred and then looked for the paperwork for each redraw, but did not in fact do so. She admitted that this was required for her to have acted in a businesslike or prudent fashion... This is very powerful evidence of breach of clause 5.1.
36. Pioneer's own expert, Mr Warren Williams, acknowledged that Ms Pryde's failure to detect in her quarterly reviews that Ms Dando had made redraws for which there was no paperwork was a failure in Pioneer's systems... Mr Williams was of the view that there needed to be at least random sample checks of redraws made at regular intervals…
37. The relevant LR10104 reports were available to Pioneer at all times either through the Control D computer system or by email request. Those reports were much shorter than the sample Aussie Home Loans report annexed to Mr Herring's final affidavit, as Aussie managed far more loans than Pioneer. Even the emailed LR10104 reports (which were in .txt format) were searchable using the "Find" or "Control F" function present in word processors which causes, at the press of a single button, the screen to jump to the next instance of a particular set of characters. These characters can be the transaction code. There was a transaction code common to all redraws performed through CAP Bureau, making it quick and simple to check any LR10104 report for such redraws which had occurred in the period covered by that report.
54 Ms Pryde's evidence included the following exchanges in which I have highlighted certain key matters:
MR YOUNG: So the quarterly check by client services staff was only in relation to redraws greater than 10,000. Is that right? Correct, yes.
But the monthly checks by client services and the quarterly checks by you were in relation to redraw amounts of any size. Is that correct? The monthly checks, which were also on the procedural reporting forms, were to verify redraws over $10,000.
I see. But [y]our quarterly checks were in relation to all redraws of any amount. Is that right? Correct. Yes, all the redraws in the redraw folder.
Because it's necessary, isn't it, to look at redraw amounts whether they are more or less than $10,000. You agree that that's a prudent step that needs to be taken? I was verifying that we had customer identity which matched the redraw form that was processed and that the redraws were confirmed. A letter was confirmed back to the borrower confirming that the redraw had been processed.
But you agree, don't you, that it's a vital step for Pioneer to take to check the documentation not just for redraws over $10,000, but for all redraws. Do you agree with me there? Yes.
Yes. And that's why you were, on a quarterly basis, making those checks. Isn't that right? I said my reasons for checking those.
Yes, but there would have been a hole in the system if you only checked for redraws of $10,000 or more. You would agree with that, wouldn't you? That was a requirement from Origin that we had to report. That was the basis of that procedural report.
Madam, if you can just please listen to my question and just answer my question. There would have been a hole in Pioneer systems if Pioneer had only checked for redraw amounts of $10,000 or more. Isn't that right? No, I don't believe so.
Now, your quarterly review was designed to plug any hole that there would otherwise have been by you checking for redraws of any amount. Isn't that correct? My quarterly review was in relation to the whole procedural report, which also contained three other items from the support area. I was confirming that what had been verified had been actioned and the reports that had been actioned had been done and they were supplied with the report.
But your quarterly review of redraws of any amount, that was a vital step to make sure that there weren't any frauds taking place in relation to redraws. Isn't that right? Correct.
Because if one relied only on the client services monthly and quarterly reviews, that could only potentially detect frauds of $10,000 or more. You agree? Can you repeat that, please?
If one relied only on the monthly and quarterly client services checks, client services was only looking in relation to redraws of $10,000 or more, so those checks wouldn't reveal frauds of less than $10,000. Isn't that right? No, client services were verifying every redraw check as it was received and processed, regardless of the amount. They were checking the signatures and the identification provided. So a check was done by the client services staff when it was received and by client support. So every redraw was checked for validity.
But you're now talking about what happens at the time the redraw is made. Isn't that right? Correct.
Yes. The questions I'm asking you are about the checks or reviews after the fact, and you've identified that there were three types of checks or reviews after the fact, being the monthly client services review, the quarterly client services review and the quarterly reviews by you. Correct? Correct.
Yes. And the - those three sets of checks or reviews were there, amongst other reasons, to make sure that there wasn't any fraud in relation to redraws. Isn't that correct? Correct.
Yes. And the monthly and quarterly client services reviews, they wouldn't pick up any fraud of less than $10,000. Isn't that correct? Correct.
So the quarterly reviews you were conducting were very important because they were the only after-the-event review that could potentially pick up a fraud of less than $10,000 in relation to a redraw. Isn't that correct? Correct.
Now, you agree, don't you, that in relation to all of Ms Dando's fraudulent redraws, that there was no written borrower request. Isn't that right? Correct.
And in relation to all those fraudulent redraws, there was no document with supporting identity material. Do you agree? Agree.
So when you were conducting your quarterly reviews of all of the redraws that had happened in that quarter, whether they were greater or less than $10,000, you would've noticed, wouldn't you, that in relation to the redraws on the Lam and Lim, Roberts and Angus loans that redraws had been made, but there was no written request and no supporting identity material. That's right, isn't it? Sorry, could you repeat that? It was quite long.
You would have noticed, wouldn't you, during your quarterly reviews that in relation to the redraws on the Lim and Lam loan, the Roberts loan and the Angus loan that redraws had been made but the required borrower requests and supporting identity material were not on filed. Isn't that right? No. Because the review that I did, the third review - sorry. I have just lose my train of thought. The third review that I did was looking just at the redraw folder. It wasn't looking at any other record or report in relation to total amount of redraws done - performed.
So you're saying, madam, you didn't actually check to see what redraws had occurred during that quarter? No. Because I was doing it every quarter to check a daily report which was the LR10104. It would have involved myself as operations manager and, following that, chief operating officer to review 90 - at least 90 days of reports in that quarterly review.
But there's not that many redraws that takes place at any given quarter, are there, madam? No. But that LR10104 report did contain a number of different entries as well.
Yes. Well, there's that report that you mentioned. There is a special transaction code for redraws, isn't that correct? Correct.
Yes. And one can search reports like that for transaction codes. Isn't that correct? Correct.
Yes. So it would have been relatively simple for you to identify what redraws had occurred at any quarter. Isn't that correct? Correct.
And you could then have checked in relation to each of those redraws that the written borrower request and the written supporting identity material was present on Pioneer's file. Isn't that right? Correct. It was my understanding that the client services manager was reviewing those reports.
But only in relation to redraws of $10,000 or more. Isn't that right? Correct.
You knew, didn't you, that you were the only person who was under Pioneer's systems potentially able to detect frauds of $10,000 or less in relation to redraws. Isn't that right? Correct.
And you knew that you could only do that if you checked to see what redraws had occurred in the space of the quarter and then checked to make sure that the borrower written requests and the supporting identity material was on Pioneer's file. Isn't that right? Again, at that time the required verification was the redraws over 10,000 and over 50,000. And that's what my focus was on.
So you were content for there to be frauds of under 10,000, right? No. At that time I wouldn't have been content for frauds under 10,000.
Right. But you say you made no attempt to determine what redraws under $10,000 had occurred within a particular quarter, and then cross-checked that against the written material on Pioneer's file. Is that right? It was my understanding that the client services manager had been checking the reports.
But, madam, it was your understanding that the client services manager had only been checking in relation to amounts of $10,000 or more. Isn't that right? Yes, which was the requirement.
You knew that it was only your checks that could pick up frauds in relation to less than 10,000. Isn't that right? I won't say I knew that at the time. On reflection now, yes.
And you knew that only by yourself checking what redraws had occurred over the quarter and then cross-checking them against the borrower requests and supporting identity material could you check whether redraw frauds had occurred in relation to amounts of $10,000 or less. Isn't that right? Yes.
But you failed to do that. Isn't that correct? Yes.
And you should have done that if you were acting in a prudent and businesslike fashion. Isn't that correct?
[Objection - disallowed]
MR YOUNG: And you should have done that if you were acting in a prudent or businesslike fashion. Isn't that right, madam? Yes.
55 Ms Pryde also gave this evidence (and again I have highlighted certain important statements):
…in paragraph 63 of your affidavit on that page, you say:
During the course of performing my obligations as chief operating officer of the applicant, I have observed the first respondent to be the only funder that does not require a copy of the borrower's confirmation and identification before redraws are released for payment.
Do you see that? Yes.
Continuing:
The first respondent was also the only funder that allowed payment direction to any account other than the borrower bank account without requesting further verification.
You see that? Yes.
In making those comments, are you suggesting that the first respondent's procedures were inadequate in some fashion? The system controls.
But you're suggesting that there was some inadequacy in the first respondent's procedures. Is that right? Yes.
I see. And was that something that you were - when did you first become aware of that? I knew from my experience in client services that you could, with Origin, refer to any external bank.
But you knew about these things many years ago, didn't you? I didn't process redraws myself.
No, but the matters you refer to in paragraph 63, these are things that you knew about and thought about before any of the fraudulent redraws took place. Isn't that right? I didn't know in relation to redraws. I knew for direct debits it could go to any external account.
Well? And for transfers between accounts it had to be with other lenders to pre-nominated accounts, so
But, madam, you say:
I've observed the first respondent to be the only funder that does not require a copy of the borrower's confirmation and identification before redraws are released for payment.
You see that? And that was something that you knew before any of the Tupeia Dando fraudulent redraws took place. Is that correct? Correct.
I see. Now, in paragraph 64 you say:
In my experience with the applicant, the only funder to allow us full control of the funder's system to process redraws was the first respondent.
You see? And then you refer to the procedure with other funders:
With the exception of ING Bank, we had to obtain a borrower written request and ID and send the request to the funder's operations team, and they processed it in the system, or, with ING Bank, we would process the redraw, and the funds would only be paid into designated pre-nominated accounts of the borrower.
You see that? Correct, yes.
And those were things that you knew prior to any of the fraudulent redraws that Ms Dando was involved with occurring. Isn't that right? Yes.
Yes. So prior to any of the fraudulent redraws occurring, you were aware of certain matters that you thought were a defect in the first respondent's systems in relation to redraws. Is that right? I guess I can say I didn't see it as a risk at that time.
So what, you see it as a risk now but you didn't see it as a risk then? Is that what you say? Correct.
I see. You would agree, wouldn't you, if you had perceived it as a risk then that would be something that you would want to put procedures in place to head off that risk. Isn't that right? Correct, it would have been a risk for all mortgage managers that had access to cap bureau, because any user could transfer funds to any external account.
Yes, but to the extent Pioneer was aware of any risks inherent in the first respondent's redraw procedures, Pioneer would need to - in order to act in a prudent fashion, to have its own procedures to guard against those risks. Would you agree with me? Correct.