s.394 - Unfair dismissal

[1] On 16 December 2025 Ms Kieya Smith (Ms Smith) made an application (Application) to the Fair Work Commission (FWC) pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) for an order granting a remedy, alleging that she had been unfairly dismissed from her employment with Catholic Education Western Australia Ltd (CEWA) on 24 November 2025.

[2] An unfair dismissal application must be lodged with the FWC within 21 days after the dismissal takes effect. The Application was lodged 22 days after the dismissal took effect. The FWC may only allow a further period for lodgment in exceptional circumstances.

[3] Ms Smith has made an application for an extension of time to file the Application.

[4] Directions for the filing of materials were issued to the parties on 15 January 2026 (Directions). The Directions also required the parties to file an Agreed Statement of Facts.

[5] On 22 January 2026 CEWA filed a response to the Application opposing the application for an extension of time.

[6] On 2 February 2026 a conciliation conference was held but the matters in dispute were unable to be resolved.

[7] The materials filed by the parties did not disclose any factual dispute. In these circumstances, at the request of the parties, I have determined whether to grant Ms Smith an extension of time to file the Application solely on the materials filed by the parties without a hearing.

• [8] In advance of the Hearing Ms Smith filed a witness statement setting out her own evidence in chief [1] and the evidence in chief of Mr Mark Elliot (Mr Elliot)[2]. Mr Elliot is the Deputy Secretary of the Independent Education Union of Australia, Western Australian Branch (IEUWA). Mr Elliot represented Ms Smith throughout the investigation into allegations of misconduct which led to Ms Smith's dismissal from CEWA. Mr Elliot also prepared and lodged the Application.

[9] CEWA chose not to file any witness statements.

[10] A digital court book containing the evidence and submissions of the parties was prepared by the parties and filed on 11 February 2026 (DCB).

[11] In reaching my decision, I have considered all the submissions made and the evidence tendered by the parties, even if not expressly referred to in these reasons for decision.

• [12] CEWA is a Western Australian wide system of schools, colleges and early years learning and care facilities established by the Catholic Bishops of Western Australia. CEWA. is a national system employer for the purposes of s 14 of the FW Act.[3]

• [13] At the time of her dismissal Ms Smith was employed by CEWA on a fixed term contract at St Francis Xavier Primary School in Geraldton (St Francis Xavier).[4]

• [14] On 23 November 2025 Ms Justine Smith the Principal of St Francis Xavier (Principal) informed Ms Smith that she had received a report that a child may have witnessed Ms Smith engage in inappropriate conduct in the classroom.[5]

• [15] The following day the Principal instructed Ms Smith to attend her office and informed Ms Smith that she had spoken to the parents of one of the children involved and that Ms Smith should leave the school premises immediately and not return until the following week.[6]

• [16] On 3 November Ms Smith was directed to attend a meeting with the Principal and Deputy Principal at which they informed Ms Smith that the school would be investigating allegations of misconduct in accordance with the CEWA Unsatisfactory Performance and Misconduct Procedure and that Ms Smith would be stood down immediately on pay while interviews were conducted (Investigation).[7]

• [17] On 5 November 2025 Ms Smith received a letter of allegations alleging that on multiple occasions during Terms 1, 2 and 3 she made inappropriate physical contact with Year Six students by placing her hands around their necks in a choke hold in a manner which caused the children to feel scared and unsafe (Allegations).[8]

• [18] The same day Ms Smith contacted the IEUWA and her matter was allocated to Mr Elliot.[9] Mr Elliot contacted Ms Smith on 7 November 2025 and supported her through the Investigation and prepared and filed the Application on her behalf.[10]

• [19] On 12 November 2025 Ms Smith provided a written response to the letter of allegations denying the Allegations and acknowledging her awareness of the relevant policies and guidelines in relation to teacher student interactions.[11]

• [20] Mr Elliot provided a supplementary response to CEWA in relation to whether CEWA was required to report the Allegations to the Ombudsman pursuant to the Reportable Conduct Scheme implemented following the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. [12]

• [21] On 17 November 2025, St Francis Xavier sent a letter to Ms Smith: [13]

1. informing her that the outcome of the Investigation was that the Allegations had been substantiated;
2. advising her the Teachers Registration Board had been informed of the Investigation; and
3. inviting Ms Smith to respond to the CEWA's proposal that termination of her employment with CEWA was an appropriate disciplinary outcome.

• [22] In the same letter Ms Smith was invited to respond to CEWA's assessment that the substantiated Allegations constituted physical assault and therefore reportable conduct for the purposes of the Reportable Conduct Scheme. [14]

• [23] On 18 November 2025, Mr Elliot sent a letter to St Francis Xavier requesting access to the evidence upon which CEWA determined that the Allegations were substantiated. [15]

• [24] On 19 November 2025, St Francis Xavier informed Mr Elliot that it was CEWA's view that Ms Smith had been provided with the necessary information to enable her to respond to the Allegations. [16]

• [25] On 20 November 2025, Mr Elliot sent a letter on behalf of Ms Smith to St Francis Xavier alleging that Ms Smith had been denied procedural fairness and requesting that CEWA suspend the show cause process and engage an independent investigator to reinvestigate the Allegations.[17]

• [26] On 24 November 2025, Ms Smith attended an outcome meeting accompanied by Mr Elliott and was informed that her employment with CEWA would be terminated, effective immediately. Later the same day Ms Smith received a letter confirming the termination of her employment with CEWA and advising her that the Teachers Registration Board and the Ombudsman had been informed of the outcome of the Investigation in accordance with the Reportable Conduct Scheme. [18]

• [27] On 25 November 2025 Ms Smith sent an email to Mr Elliot stating that:[19]

"I'm going to get a start my fair work unfair dismissal claim form today".

• [28] Mr Eliott replied the same day as follows: [20]

"...Don't worry about drafting the form/claim yourself: that is something I can do for you. Once I've got a draft ready, I'll provide it to you for review/approval.

The deadline for filing an unfair dismissal claim is 21 days after the date the dismissal took effect which means that the last day for us to file a claim is 9 December 2025".

• [29] Ms Smith says that on 9 December 2025, she telephoned Mr Elliot about the status of her unfair dismissal claim given Mr Elliot had told her that 9 December 2025 was the last day to file the claim. According to Ms Smith during the telephone call Mr Elliot told her that "we still have time" as the last date to file was 16 December 2025, and not 9 December 2025 as he had previously incorrectly advised. Ms Smith says that Mr Elliot further informed her that he was continuing to prepare her unfair dismissal application.[21]

• [30] At 4:14pm on 15 December 2025, Mr Elliot provided Ms Smith with a draft of the Application for her to review. She reviewed the draft then returned it to Mr Elliot at 5:57pm on 15 December.[22]

• [31] Between 5:57pm on 15 December 2025 and 11:57am on 16 December 2025 Ms Smith sent three further emails to Mr Elliot proposing amendments to the Application. [23]

• [32] On 16 December 2025 at 11:57AM, Mr Elliot sent an email to the Fair Work Commission copying in Ms Smith, filing her unfair dismissal claim. [24]

• [33] On 24 December 2025 Ms Smith was notified by the FWC that the Application was incomplete as the Application was filed by Mr Elliot 1 day out of time but did not address the reasons for the delay. [25]

[34] Mr Elliot filed an amended application on 15 January 2026.

[35] Subsection 394(2) of the FW Act provides that an application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be made 'within 21 days after the dismissal took effect', or within such further period as the FWC allows pursuant to subsection 394(3) of the FW Act.

• [36] The 21 day period does not include the day on which the dismissal took effect.[26]

• [37] If the final day of the 21 day period falls on a weekend or public holiday, the prescribed time will be extended until the next business day.[27]

• [38] It is not in dispute, and I so find, that the dismissal took effect on 24 November 2025. [28]

[39] The date 21 days after the dismissal took effect was 15 December 2025.

• [40] It is not in dispute, and I so find, that the Application was made on 16 December 2025.[29]

[41] The Application was therefore filed 1 day out of time.

• [42] The FW Act allows the FWC to extend the period within which an unfair dismissal application must be made only if it is satisfied that there are 'exceptional circumstances'. Exceptional circumstances are circumstances that are out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon, but the circumstances themselves do not need to be unique nor unprecedented, nor even very rare.[30] Exceptional circumstances may include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors, or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together can be considered exceptional.[31]

[43] Section 394(3) of the FW Act requires that, in considering whether to grant an extension of time, the FWC must take into account the following:

1. the reason for the delay;
2. whether Ms Smith first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect;
3. any action taken by Ms Smith to dispute the dismissal;
4. prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay);
5. the merits of the Application; and
6. fairness as between Ms Smith and other persons in a similar position.

• [44] The requirement that these matters be taken into account means that each matter must be considered and given appropriate weight in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances.[32]

• [45] The test of exceptional circumstances establishes a high hurdle for an applicant to overcome for an extension to be granted.[33]

• [46] Having taken into account the factors set out in sub-section 394(3) of the FW Act, ultimately, the power to grant an extension for the filing of an application which has been lodged out of time is a discretionary one.[34]

[47] The requirement that there be exceptional circumstances before the time for the lodgement of an application can be extended under section 394(3) of the FW Act contrasts with the broad discretion conferred on the FWC under section 185(3), to extend the 14 day period within which an enterprise agreement must be lodged, which is exercisable simply if in all the circumstances the Commission considers that it is 'fair' to do so.

[48] The onus is on Ms Smith to provide a credible reason for the delay.

• [49] While the delay to be considered is the period subsequent to the expiration of the 21 day period, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal may be relevant in determining whether the reason for the delay constitutes exceptional circumstances.[35]

• [50] In Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic,[36] the Full Bench explained the correct approach by reference to the following example:

"For example if an applicant is in hospital for the first 20 days of the 21 day period this would be a relevant consideration if the application was filed 2 days out of time as occurred in this matter."

• [51] The reason for the delay is not in itself required to be an exceptional circumstance. It is one of the factors that must be weighed in assessing whether, overall, there are exceptional circumstances.[37]

• [52] The absence of any explanation for any part of the delay will usually weigh against an applicant in the assessment of whether there are exceptional circumstances, and a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay will usually weigh in the applicant's favour, however all of the circumstances must be considered.[38]

• [53] The FW Act does not specify what reason for delay might tell in favour of granting an extension. However, decisions of the FWC have referred to an acceptable or reasonable explanation. Ignorance of the 21 day timeframe is not, of itself, an exceptional circumstance.[39]

• [54] The Ms Smith submitted that the delay occurred solely due to representative error. Namely that Mr Elliot miscalculated the last day on which the Application could be filed on two occasions and provided Ms Smith with incorrect advice on 25 November 2025 and 9 December 2025 as to the deadline for submitting the Application. Ms Smith says that she is inexperienced in legal and employment matters, and reasonably relied on the advice of Mr Elliot, her union representation as to the deadline for filing the claim. Ms Smith submits that her circumstances are analogous to those of the applicant in John Jordan and Neil MacLeod v Multiplex Australasia Pty Ltd [2024] FWCFB 440 (Multiplex Case) in which the Full Bench of this Commission determined that Mr Jordan and Mr MacLeod ought be granted an extension of time to file their applications as a consequence of their representative's error.[40]

• [55] Representative error may constitute exceptional circumstances if an applicant has not contributed to the delay.[41] When representative error is relied upon as an explanation for the delay, it is necessary to examine the conduct of the applicant to ascertain the reason for the delay.[42] However, the conduct of the applicant will be relevant only to the extent that it contributed to or explains the delay.[43]

• [56] As noted by the Full Bench in the Multiplex Case:[44]

"The conduct of an applicant might have contributed to a delay in the filing of an unfair dismissal application notwithstanding that the delay was also contributed to by representative error. That might be the case if, for example, the applicant only consults the representative shortly before the expiry of the time limit14, the applicant entrusts his or her application toa representative who is obviously unqualified or unwilling or unable to assist15, the applicant fails to cooperate with the representative by providing the information or assistance necessary to prepare the application or the applicant leaves the application in the hands of his or her representative for an extended period without receiving any communication from the representative and without taking steps to ascertain the status of the application."

[57] CEWA submit that Ms Smith's circumstances are distinguishable from those of Mr Jordan and Mr MacLeod and that she contributed to the delay in the filing of her Application.

[58] Mr Jordan and Mr MacLeod were dismissed by Multiplex Australasia Pty Ltd (Multiplex) on 12 July 2024. Both were members of the Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees' Union, Construction and General Division, WA Divisional Branch (CFMEU). Similarly to Ms Smith, Mr Jordan and Mr MacLeod requested their union to provide representation and assistance in filing of their unfair dismissal applications. The CFMEU represented to them that it would handle the filing of their unfair dismissal applications. Both Mr Jordan and Mr Macleod were responsive to requests from the CFMEU for information to prepare the applications.

[59] The CFMEU employee responsible for filing their applications, Mr Rhys Cardinal (Mr Cardinal), in stark contrast to Mr Elliot who is an experienced and senior official in his union, Mr Cardinal was a legal assistant. Mr Cardinal miscalculated the 21-daytime period for lodging applications. Mr Cardinal calculated the last day on which the applications could be filed to be Saturday, 3 August 2024. This was incorrect. The last day was in fact Friday, 2 August 2024. Mr Cardinal believed that, given 3 August 2024 was a Saturday, he could file the applications on Monday, 5 August 2024, which he did. If the time limit had expired on the Saturday, Mr Cardinal would have been correct in that regard. As the time limit had expired on the Friday, the applications were filed three calendar days and one business day late.

[60] CEWA submit that Ms Smith's circumstance are distinguishable from those of Mr Jordan and Mr MacLeod because Mr Elliot's initial, and grossly incorrect, calculation of the filing date notwithstanding the senior position he held in the union should have put Ms Smith on notice that she ought not rely solely on his advice and ought take her own steps to confirm the correct filing date given she was aware that a time limitation for lodgment applied.

[61] CEWA note that Ms Smith has not provided any material evidence to:

1. explain her response (or lack thereof) to Mr Elliott's initial (significant) error (other than cursorily stating that she relied on his experience); or
2. provide more details as to the substance of her conversation with Mr Elliott on 9 December 2025 including any questions asked or subsequent correspondence provided.

• [62] CEWA submit that it is therefore open to the FWC to make a Jones v Dunkel[45] inference that Ms Smith has not provided this because it would have been prejudicial to the explanation provided.

• [63] Mr Elliot had been assisting Ms Smith since she was first stood down and was responsible for preparing responses during the Investigation and show cause process. Ms Smith informed him that she wanted to make the Application the day following her dismissal.[46] Ms Smith was aware that a time limit applied to the lodgement of the Application.[47] In these circumstance Ms Smith ought have expected that the preparation of her Application would be completed well before 9 December 2025, the date Mr Elliot initially indicated was the final day upon which the Application could be filed. However, there is no evidence that she took a proactive approach to ensuring that the Application was prepared within this timeframe.

• [64] Her own evidence is that after their communication on 25 November 2026 she did not contact Mr Elliot again until 9 December 2026. The date she believed was the last day upon which the Application could be filed. Notwithstanding that Ms Smith and Mr Elliots witness statements contain the precise timestamps on which they communicated with each other following the dismissal for various communication they engaged in both omit to provide any time reference for their communication on 9 December 2026.[48] The inference which can be drawn from this is that the evidence was not provided because it would have been prejudicial to application for the extension of time to file the Application.

[65] After having been told by Mr Elliot that he had grossly miscalculated the last date for filing and discovering that the Application was not ready to be filed there is no evidence that Ms Smith took steps to independently check the correct final date for filing or to follow up on the preparation of the Application not withstanding it should have been in an advanced stage of preparation. The evidence is that it was Mr Elliot who contacted Ms Smith at the end of the day on 15 December 2026, the last day before the final day upon which they both believed the Application could be filed.

[66] I note that having been made aware that the Application was deficient on 24 December 2025, and having informed Mr Elliot the same day, there is no evidence that Ms Smith followed up to ensure that deficiency was corrected. Ultimately it was a further 22 days before Mr Elliot filed an amended application on 15 January 2026.

• [67] While the bulk of the delay of one day may be attributed to representative error on the part of the IEUWA, I am inclined to a similar conclusion to that reached by Deputy President Roberts in Mr Beau Scholtz Pty Ltd, Diverse Group (Australia) Pty yd, Diverse Holding (Australia) Pty Ltd[49] at [17] (in also distinguishing Multiplex) who found that:[50]

"The responsibility for the delay rests overwhelmingly with the Applicant's solicitor who chose to make what were in the end only limited further inquiries of the First Respondent and wait for a response, rather than meet the statutory deadline of which she was clearly aware. However, for the reasons referred to above, I do not think that the Applicant can be entirely excused from the responsibility for the delay."

• [68] Ms Smith was aware a time limit applied to the filing of the Application from the day after her dismissal. Given the severity of the error in initially calculating the final date of filing, notwithstanding the seniority of her representative, it ought to have been apparent to her on 9 December 2025 that her representative was "unqualified or unwilling, or unable to assist"[51]. Other than contacting Mr Elliot on 9 December 2025, potentially after the close of business, there is no evidence that Ms Smith did anything other than left "the application in the hands of his or her representative for an extended period without receiving any communication from the representative and without taking steps to ascertain the status of the application".[52] notwithstanding her awareness of the statutory time limits.

[69] Had Ms Smith checked Mr Elliot's calculation, for example by simply calling the FWC helpline, or had followed up on the preparation of the Application knowing that a time limit applied to the filing of the Application the delay would have most probably not have occurred.

[70] I am therefore satisfied that Ms Smith bears some responsibility for the delay and it can not be excused entirely by representative error.

Did Ms Smith first become aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect?

• [71] It was not in dispute, and I so find, that the Ms Smith was notified of the dismissal on the same day that it took effect and therefore had the benefit of the full period of 21 days to lodge the unfair dismissal application.[53]

• [72] On balance the submissions and evidence before me with respect to this consideration do not weigh in favour of a finding that exceptional circumstances exist in this Application.[54]

What action was taken by Smith to dispute the dismissal?

• [73] Action taken by an applicant to contest the termination, other than by virtue of making the application will be relevant and may weight in favour of granting the extension of time.[55]

• [74] Ms Smith denied the Allegations during the course of the Investigation and disputed the proposed termination of her employment during the show cause process. Following her dismissal she instructed the IEUWA to prepare and file the Application.[56]

[75] There is no evidence that Ms Smith took any other steps post her dismissal other than by virtue of making the Application.

[76] On balance the submissions and evidence before me with respect to this consideration are neutral in determining whether exceptional circumstances exist in this Application.

What is the prejudice to CEWA (including prejudice caused by the delay)?

• [77] Prejudice to the employer will go against the granting of an extension of time. The mere absence of prejudice to the employer is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time.[57]

[78] The employer must produce evidence to demonstrate prejudice. It is then up to the employee to show that the facts do not amount to prejudice.

• [79] A long delay gives rise "to a general presumption of prejudice".[58]

[80] CEWA say that prejudice lies in the loss of opportunity and certainty of relying on the statutory time limit. Ms Smith submits that as the Application was filed less than 12 hours late that CEWA has endured no substantial prejudice (if any) due to the delay in filing the Application.

[81] The delay is not exceptionally long. Even in the absence of prejudice, I would attribute it little weight in consideration of whether there are exceptional circumstances. The mere absence of prejudice to the employer is of itself an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time.

• [82] If an application has merits, this will weight in favour of the grant of an extension of time.[59]

[83] Ms Smith submits that the Application has merit because the Allegations are not true, the Investigation was procedurally unfair and that dismissal was harsh in the circumstances. It is unclear on the materials currently before me that Ms Smith has an arguable case that she was denied procedural fairness.

• [84] The merits of the Application and the appropriateness of the disciplinary outcome turn on contested points of fact as to whether the Allegations can be substantiated, evidence in respect of which would be heard and weighed in a hearing of the merits of this matter, if an extension of time were granted. It is well established that, "it will not be appropriate for the Tribunal to resolve contested issues of fact going to the ultimate merits for the purposes of taking account of the matter in s.366(2)(d)"[60] and the same applies to s.394(3)(e).

[85] In the absence of a hearing of the evidence, it is not possible to make any firm or detailed assessment of the merits. If the Allegations can not be substantiated Ms Smith has an apparent case, if the Allegations can be substantiated CEWA has an apparent defence.

[86] In the circumstances, it is not possible to make an assessment of the merits of the Application.

[87] The merits of the Application are therefore a neutral consideration.

Fairness as between Ms Smith and other persons in a similar position

• [88] The FWC may have consideration to fairness in matters of a similar kind that are currently before the FWC or have been decided in the past. This consideration is concerned with the importance of the application of consistent principles in cases of the same kind; however, cases of the same kind often turn on their own facts.[61]

• [89] The FWC has denied extension of time applications for claims commenced even if they are one day out of time[62] particularly in circumstances where the applicant has chosen to leave the filing of the application to the final date by which the application must be lodged and is unable to lodge their application due to some technical issue.

• [90] Ms Smith submits that her circumstances are similar to those of the applicants in the Multiplex Case[63]

[91] Ms Smith's circumstances can be differentiated from those of Mr Jordan and Mr Macleod. There was no reason for Mr Jordan or Mr Macleod to question Mr Cardinal's competency to file their applications in time. In Ms Smith's case a senior employee of the union admitted to an extraordinary error in calculation. This should have put her on notice that she ought not rely exclusively on the advice of her representative.

[92] Having regard to the matters I am required to take into account under section 394 of the FW Act, and all of the matters raised by Ms Smith, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances in this case, either when the various circumstances are considered individually or together.

[93] As I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, there is no basis for me to allow an extension of time. I therefore decline to grant an extension of time under section 394(3) of the FW Act.

[94] Even if I were satisfied that representative error was the reason for the delay I would be disinclined to exercise my discretion to grant the extension given the object stated at s.381(2) of the FW Act to ensure that a "fair go all round" in circumstances where:

1. Ms Smith was on notice from the day after her dismissal that the Application must be lodged within a strict time limit;
2. she was on notice that her representative was prone to significant error in relation to calculating the relevant due date and failed to independently check the date; and
3. she made no proactive effort to ensure her Application was ready to be filed in advance of the final date filing in the event some technical difficulty arose with filing.

[95] An unrepresented applicant who was unaware of the time limit would ordinarily be denied an extension of time. Ms Smith had the advantage of being aware that the time limit existed. An unrepresented applicant who faced delays in securing legal advice would ordinarily be denied an extension of time. Ms Smith had the benefit of legal advice prior to and from the date of dismissal giving her the advantage of a full 21 days to prepare her Application assisted by representatives with prior detailed knowledge of her case. An unrepresented applicant who filed their application late because of a failure of technology on the final day of the 21 day period would ordinarily be denied an extension of time because they would be expected to have prepared their materials with sufficient time to accommodate such an eventuality.

[96] Not being satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, there is no basis for the Commission to allow an extension of time. Accordingly, Ms Smith's application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be dismissed.

• [97] An Order[64] to this effect will be issued with this Decision.

[26] Singh v Trimatic Management Services Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 553, [10]. See also Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 36(1) as in force on 25 June 2009; Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 40A.

[27] Ibid; Stedman v Transdev NSW Pty Ltd [2015] FWCFB 1877.

[30] Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975, [13] ('Nulty').

[32] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd [2018] FWCFB 901, [39].

[33] Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic [2016] FWCFB 349 at [16].

[34] Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Ltd (unreported, AIRCFB, Giudice J, Acton SOP, Gay C, 10 November 2000) Print T2421 at [8].

[35] Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic (n 42) at [31].

[36] [2016] FWCFB 349.

[37] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd (n 41) [39].

[40] Mr John Jordan v Multiplex Australasia Pty Ltd [2024] FWCFB 440, [37]

[41] Ms Medeya Hamzze v SSMG-Wolves Pty Limited [2026] FWC 194, [10].

[42] Mr John Jordan v Multiplex Australasia Pty Ltd [2024] FWCFB 440, [33].

[45] [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 320

[49] [2025] FWC 1326

[50] Mr Beau Scholtz Pty Ltd, Diverse Group (Australia) Pty yd, Diverse Holding (Australia) Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1326 at [17]

[51] Mr John Jordan v Multiplex Australasia Pty Ltd - [2024] FWCFB 440 at [34].

[54] Meek v Baycorp Pty Ltd t/a Baycorp Pty Ltd [2016] FWC 1291 at [15].

[55] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 at 300.

[58] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 556.

[59] Haining v Deputy President Drake [1998] FCA 1168; (1998) 87 FCR 248, 250.

[61] Andrew Green v Bilco Group Pty Ltd [2018] FWC 6818 at [31].

[62] See for example Battigelli v Respiratory West Pty Ltd [2022] FWC 25 and Murray v Ambulance Victoria (n 62).

[64] PR796909

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