1. The applicant, Dr Khan, purchased a house in East Brighton in 2008. At the time when he moved in, in 2009, the respondents Mr David Longmire and Mrs Fiona Longmire were already residing in the neighbouring property. The Longmire's property was slightly uphill from Dr Khan's.
2. Dr Khan has come to the Tribunal seeking damages under s 16(1) of the Water Act 1989 (Vic) ('Water Act') and an order for a mandatory injunction requiring the Longmires' to perform works in order to prevent any further unreasonable flow of water onto his property. The damages sought relate to both the cost of rectification work and damages for distress.
3. Section 16(1) of the Water Act provides:

(1) If -

(a) there is a flow of water from the land of a person onto any other land; and

(b) that flow is not reasonable; and

(c) the water causes -

(i) injury to any other person; or

(ii) damage to the property (whether real or personal) of any other person; or

(iii) any other person to suffer economic loss -

the person who caused the flow is liable to pay damages to that other person in respect of that injury, damage or loss.

1. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal in this proceeding is derived from s 19 of the Water Act which relevantly provides:

(1) The Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to all causes of action (other than any claim for damages for personal injury) arising under sections 15(1) , [19](https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/vic/consol_act/wa16, [19](https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/vic/consol_act/wa17(1) and [198](https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/vic/consol_act/wa157(1) of this Act or at common law in respect of the escape of water from a private dam.

(2) [Repealed]

(3) In exercising jurisdiction conferred by subsection (1), the Tribunal -

(a) may by order, whether interim or final, grant an injunction (including one to prevent an act that has not yet taken place) if it is just and convenient to do so;

(ab) may make an order for payment of a sum of money awarding damages in the nature of interest; or

(b) may make an order that is merely declaratory.

1. I note two matters. First, under ss 19(1), the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to all causes of action under s 16(1), save for damages for personal injury. Accordingly, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to award Dr Khan damages for stress: see Collins v Greater Geelong City Council[2]. The Tribunal held in that case, at [26], 'Because the claim includes damages for "worry and anxiety" it is clearly a claim for personal injury.' In Collins, the Tribunal followed the much earlier decision Kopitschinski v Song[3].
2. The second matter is that the Tribunal derives its jurisdiction to grant an injunction from ss 19(3) of the Water Act which provides in ss (a) that in exercising its jurisdiction conferred by ss 19(1) the Tribunal may grant an injunction, (including one to prevent an act that has not yet taken place) if it is just and convenient to do so.
3. At the hearing Dr Khan appeared in person. He called two expert witnesses. The first was Mr Ken MacLeod, a very experienced civil and structural engineer. The second was Mr Hai Truong Nguyen, a quantity surveyor who prepared a costing of the works that Mr McLeod recommended be carried out on both Dr Khan's property and the Longmires' property.
4. The Longmires were represented by Ms Angelika Yianoulatos of Counsel instructed by Ms Kate Brockman, from Bayside Solicitors. The Longmires called one expert, Mr Anton Molnar, a forensic building consultant. He gave evidence relevant to both liability and quantum.
5. After Dr Khan moved into the property with his family in 2009, they lived there until early 2015. They moved out but moved back in 2020 and are currently living there.
6. The managing agents had issued a fencing notice on Dr Khan's behalf to the Longmires on 18 September 2020, but they took no action.
7. The managing agents issued this application on behalf of Dr Khan(the file shows that the application was sent to the Tribunal in December 2020 but the relevant fee not paid until February 2021). In the application, Dr Khan sought an injunction 'to enforce installation of a retaining wall on the neighbours' side of the boundary to stop unreasonable flow of water to [Dr Khan's property]'.
8. He also sought an injunction to "enforce" the installation of a retaining wall on the Longmires' side of the boundary to stop an unreasonable flow water from their property. He made a complaint about elevation of the natural ground level on both sides of the boundary fence and the planting trees on the boundary. It was asserted that the lack of a retaining wall, the build up in soil, and the huge number of trees were causing an unreasonable flow of water. Consequential damage to his property including the gardens and the house was also alleged.
9. Dr Khan issued Points of Claim on 19 August 2021. The Points of Claim were largely concerned with a flood from the Longmires' property on to Dr Khan's property which occurred just before Christmas in 2011, which I will refer to as the '2011 flood'. The Longmires had constructed a new pool at the rear of their property, and during the installation process, just before Christmas, a problem was discovered with a flow control mechanism which caused a leak. It was impossible for the Longmires to get professional assistance at that time, and. the leak continued for about 10 days until it was stopped. There is no doubt that a substantial flow of water passed over the boundary into Dr Khan's property in this period. It took several weeks for the water to evaporate or drain away.
10. Dr Khan, in his Points of Claim, alleged that the surface drainage runoff caused foundation movement, moisture in the subfloor and rising damp resulting in mould and fungus. Importantly, Dr Khan did not make reference to any continuing unreasonable flows and water.
11. The Longmires filed Points of Defence in September 2021. They accepted liability for the 2011 flood and said that the pool contractor had accepted responsibility and agreed to meet with Dr Khan to resolve his concerns.
12. In respect of the 2011 flood, the Longmires relied upon the defence of time created by the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ('Limitation of Actions Act').
13. I find that as s 5(1)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act provides that an action founded on tort including actions for damages for breach of a statutory duty shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, the defence of time is made out.
14. This defence bars all claims arising from the 2011 flood. However, in practical terms, this may not have made a difference to the outcome of the case because there was no evidence of permanent damage to Dr Khan's property arising from the 2011 flood.
15. In his Points of Claim, Dr Khan sought damages in respect of damage to his dwelling both internally and externally, including but not limited to the footings, some floors and some walls.
16. I note that there is no evidence of any damage to the floors. I also notice that in an engineering report relied on by Dr Khan, appended to his Points of Claim, there is said to be some evidence of staining on the floor joists and bearers which is said to indicate rising damp. However, this report was prepared by an unidentified engineer for a builder, who was asked to prepare a quote for Dr Khan for the restoration and repair work. Neither the builder nor the engineer was called to give evidence. I have no idea what the qualifications of the engineer were and I cannot be satisfied that he had suitable qualifications to opine in the manner he did. Nor can I be satisfied that he was independent, as he had been subcontracted by a builder who was pitching for work from Dr Khan. Did he have sufficient independence to meet the Tribunal's expectations of an expert witness? Finally, I note that the engineer was not available for cross examination. For these reasons, I place little reliance on anything drawn from the engineer's report.
17. Having made that point, I note that there is no suggestion in the engineer's report that the joists were damaged.
18. Mr MacLeod did not suggest there was a structural issue with the house. His observations of damage were limited to the presence of moisture and delamination of the plaster in bedrooms 3 and 4. Mr MacLeod also confirmed that the drainage system was working, and he referred to a photograph showing discharge from a drain at the kerb outside Dr Khan's house.
19. Mr MacLeod opined that the 2011 flood caused the paving surface drainage grates on the side concrete path at Dr Khan's residence to be partially filled with silt, clogging the drainage system. The only work he recommended to that drainage network was cleaning it out.
20. Dr Khan claims arising from the 2011 flood are time barred. He must accordingly identify damage that has been caused by flooding subsequent to the 2011 event.
21. Dr Khan faces two problems in this respect. Firstly, there is no evidence of any unreasonable flow of water since 2011. Secondly, there is no causal link between any water passing from the Longmire's property on to his property and causing damage.
22. The first point, that there has been no unreasonable flow water since 2011, can be broken down into two sub points. The first of these is that there is no evidence of any complaint about any flow of water from the Longmire's property between late 2011 and the institution of proceedings in late 2020. The second is that any flow of water from the Longmire's property has not been unreasonable.
23. I interpose to discuss the relevant time frame for the establishment of a claim. Because of the of the Limitation of Actions Act, the challenge for Dr Khan is to establish that damage occurred within six years before the commencement of the proceeding. The process of commencing the proceeding began on 17 December 2020, when Dr Khan's managing agents, Hodges, completed an application form and sent it to the Tribunal. That is why the Tribunal's file for the proceeding was opened in 2020. It happens that the application fee was only paid on 20 February 2021. Under the usual process the Tribunal follows, the payment of the fee is the date that the application is viewed as having been lodged. On this basis, Dr Khan must establish that there has been an unreasonable flow of water since 20 February 2015.
24. It happens that Dr Khan was not living at the property between early 2015 and 2021. He became aware of water damage to a bedroom wall in 2016 when the tenants complained. Dr Khan gave evidence that he had discussed the damage with his managing agent. He thought that the problem might arise from a poor paint job which had been carried out at the time he renovated the house after he moved in. He did not relate the damage back to the 2011 flood or any other event of water travelling from the house next door. After that point, Dr Khan said he paid the painter to rectify the paint problem. However, he did not keep a copy of the painter's invoice.
25. In Dr Khan's first witness statement, he deposed, at [19]:

When there is rainfall greater than a short, light shower water flows under and through the boundary fence between [my property] and [the Longmire's property]. The heavier or longer the rainfall, the greater the flow of water across the boundary.

1. Mrs Longmire addressed this evidence in her second witness statement dated 7 August 2024. She deposed, at [11]:

We have repeatedly asked for evidence of the water flow. The only evidence given has been from photos from 2011 when our pool leaked. There has been no evidence forthcoming since then. During heavy rainfall, we have looked over the fence and seen no evidence of water flow.

1. She returned to this topic, at [14] of her witness statement, saying:

I say that if Dr Khan has noticed water flowing across the boundary, I am at a loss as to why this was never brought to our attention prior to 2020, when it was first suggested and no photos or videos were taken. After continual requests for evidence, none was forthcoming except a few photos from the time the pool leaked in 2011 claiming to be current day photos.

1. Dr Khan relied on two pieces of evidence supporting the proposition that there have been continual floods. The first is a photograph to be to be found at page 313 of the Tribunal Book. Dr Khan said the photograph had been taken by tenants. When I asked where the tenants were, he said that they were from the United Kingdom and had returned and could not be at the hearing.
2. The Longmires submitted, through their counsel, that the photograph was ambiguous. It looked as if it has been taken after a rainstorm. It certainly did not demonstrate that the water had emanated from the Longmires' property. Indeed, when I look at the photograph I can see vegetation, I can see the Dr Khan's house, but the fence is obscured. The photo suggests that water is pooling on the path. This may be because the drainage system has been blocked. This leads to the question of whether Dr Khan has been maintaining the drainage system.
3. The other piece of evidence relied on is a photograph to be found in Mr Macleod's report dated 23 June 2023, at [15]. The photograph is said to suggest that water is seeping through the fence after light rainfall. Measurements taken by the Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology suggest the rainfall at the time was between 1mm and 5mm. The photograph does not establish that water passes through the fence along its length. However, it passes through in sufficient quantity to show dampness at a point for about a metre. There is no suggestion that water gushes or flows through the fence. In my view, this is not a photograph which establishes an unreasonable flow of water.
4. On the basis of the evidence presented by Dr Khan, I find that there is no evidence of any unreasonable flow of water after February 2015.
5. This is an important finding, because Mr MacLeod's conclusions regarding the work that should be carried out, outlined at [19] of his first report, were premised on the proposition that there had been a succession of flooding events. This is apparent from the report, at [18] where he opines that:
   • These occasional local flooding events [at Dr Khan's house] will have caused seepage into the soil below the concrete path and the north side of the residence through the garden bed, the joints in the paving and the paving abutment to the house wall.
   • This excess seepage into the soil on the north side of the residence... is the cause of the localised rising damp in two walls of Bedroom 3 of [Dr Khan's house].
6. The premise on which Mr MacLeod founded his opinion must have been based on information provided by Dr Khan. That information is not backed up by objective evidence, such as emails or correspondence or photographs.
7. I have noted that there was no evidence of a succession of water events. I turn to the question the reasonableness of the established flow of water. It is necessary to deal with Dr Khan's argument that there was an unreasonable flow of water because it has been caused by works which were not authorised.
8. The basis of this submission is to be found in s 20 of the Water Act which requires the Tribunal to take into account certain matters in determining whether a flow of water is reasonable or not. Sub-section 20(1)(a) is concerned with whether, if the flow was caused by works, the works were authorised.
9. It was common ground between the experts that the Perspex sheeting over the Longmire's rear deck should have been constructed with a gutter being connected to the storm water system. It was not. The Longmires accept they should put guttering on their Perspex roof. However, there is no evidence that the lack of guttering has caused any unreasonable flow of water on to Dr Khan's property.
10. I say this because it is clear from Mrs Longmire's first witness statement that their house had the deck with the Perspex roof at the time the Longmire's bought the property in 2006. This is evidenced by a photograph she extracted from marketing materials for the house at the time it was purchased, which she included in the Tribunal Book, at page 311. The importance of this is that there was no evidence of any water damage to Dr Khan's residence between the time he moved in in 2009 and the date of the 2011 flood. Accordingly, I conclude that any water coming off the Perspex roof was not sufficient to cause an unreasonable flow of water into Dr Khan's property.
11. Dr Khan also relies upon the fact that the Longmires manipulated the contours of their land by placing fill from the excavation of the pool in their backyard along the fence line without compacting it and then creating the deck above it. There is a lack of evidence about whether there is compacted fill under the deck, but there is clear evidence that the Longmires placed fill in a garden bed along the southern boundary of their property and raised the soil level above the natural ground level by about 300mm. This was evident from the site inspection.
12. However, the elevation of the soil level may not have caused any unreasonable flow of water. On the contrary, there is a prospect that the construction of the garden bed with salvaged soil along the whole boundary, taken together with the construction of the fence on the southern edge of the garden bed, may have hindered any water flow. The two garden borders each constituted a barrier to the passage of water. In this way, the garden may have impeded the lateral transfer or water to Dr Khan's property from the point in the Longmire's garden immediately below the edge of the unguttered Perspex roof.
13. I now turn to the issue of causation of damage. There were several issues which require discussion. The first is that the damage to Dr Khan's house is limited to bedroom 3 and bedroom 4. Dr Khan points out that those bedrooms are the closest to the Longmire's deck with the Perspex roof, which he clearly holds responsible for the flow problem. He says that this cannot be a coincidence. He is, in legal parlance, seeking to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is Latin for "the thing speaks for itself". Dr Khan appears to be saying that water is flowing off the Perspex roof, which is not guttered as it should be. The roof is accordingly unlawful. This makes the flow of water unreasonable. There is water damage to the rooms in Dr Khan's house which are the most adjacent to the Perspex roof. Therefore, the unreasonable flow of water must be linked to the damage in his house.
14. In my view, the facts do not speak for themselves or at least are much more complex than this summary of them. I give the following reasons.
15. First, there is the issue of how the water transfers itself into Dr Khan's property after it has fallen from the roof onto the deck below. It must then find its way across the deck without flowing away between the boards vertically or along the boards in a westward direction in accordance with the natural slope of the land.
16. The second point is that immediately adjacent to the boundary fence there is a garden bed. Whatever water gets through the fence should be absorbed when it reaches that garden bed, which is on the far side of the fence.
17. The third point is that if the water gets out of the garden bed on Dr Khan's side of the fence, it will find itself on the concrete path. That path ought to be sloped away from Dr Khan's house and it should be connected with the drainage system. This segues to the question of whether the drainage system has been probably maintained.
18. The fourth matter to be taken into account is that immediately next to bedroom 3, outside the laundry, there is a hot water unit. There was clear evidence, at the site inspection, that moisture was coming out of the overflow pipe from that unit and was pooling on the ground. The render of the wall at that point is showing signs of water damage. The conclusion was inescapable that this was being caused by the overflow pipe, not from any water coming from the Longmire's property.
19. The fifth point is that there was an air conditioning condenser next to the hot water service. One of the experts found vegetation behind the condenser and suggested this might trap water which would affect the render.
20. The sixth point is that only the east wall in bedroom 3 and the dividing wall between bedroom 3 and bedroom 4 were showing signs of dampness. The affected walls are internal and are not external walls immediately adjacent to the Longmire's residence. This raises the question of whether there is some other source of water, which is a seventh issue.
21. There was a dearth of evidence about the condition of the sub-floor of the house. Certainly, that issue was not investigated personally by Mr MacLeod.
22. The Longmire's expert, Mr Molnar, in his first report, exhibited photographs which demonstrated that a water meter reading taken below the damp proof course in the brickwork next to the hot water service showed no unusual dampness. The moisture reading below the damp proof course was 12.4. In contrast, the measurement taken above the damp proof course was 25.5. These readings were the opposite of what one might expect if dampness was rising from the soil below.
23. The eighth point is that Mr Molnar established that a suggestion made by another expert that there was no delamination of plaster in Dr Khan's house, other than on the northern side, near the Longmire's residence, was not correct. He drew attention to a photograph of the wall near the kitchen on the southwest side of Dr Khan's house which showed damaged render. As Mrs Longmire pointed out, this damage was on the opposite side of the house to the observed damage.
24. Dr Khan was quick to point out that Mr MacLeod had an answer to the suggestion that there was water damage on the other side of the house and referred to Mr Molnar's report to submit that the damage was limited to render that was damaged by water running off the kitchen window down to the ground.
25. I am not so sure. Mr Molnar noted that if the house had pipes that were 75 years old, as suggested by Dr Khan, then there was a prospect that the pipes were leaking as Mr Molnar was of the opinion that galvanised pipes might fail after 40 years, although they have been known to last for 70 or 80 years. It was not established, on the balance of probabilities, that a pipe had failed, but there was a prospect that one might have.
26. All these matters are sufficient to displace the presumption that the facts speak for themselves. Taking all the evidence together, I cannot be satisfied that there has been an unreasonable flow of water from the Longmires' property on to Dr Khan' property since early 2015, indeed, since the 2011 flood.
27. Furthermore, I cannot be satisfied that any unreasonable flow on to Dr Khan's property caused the damage to bedroom 3 and bedroom 4 of Dr Khan's house.
28. Dr Khan, not the Longmires, had the burden of proof in the case. As he has failed to prove his claim, he is not entitled to an order that the Longmires carry out any works on their property, or on his property. Nor is there a justification for him to be compensated for any alleged damage.

1. The most important provision concerning costs contained in Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) ('the VCAT Act') is s 109. This section is discussed in more detail below, but for present purposes it is noted that ss 109(1) creates a presumption that each party in a proceeding before the Tribunal must bear their own costs.
2. Ms Yianoulatos, on behalf of the respondents, indicated that they proposed to rely on two offers made under s 112 of the VCAT Act. The importance of s 112 is that if an offer is made which engages the provision, then the presumption as to costs arising under s 109 is reversed. This is because under ss 112(2), unless the Tribunal otherwise orders, a party who made an effective s 112 offer is entitled to an order that the party who did not accept the offer pay all costs incurred by the offering party after the offer was made.
3. The first offer relied on was an offer dated 10 February 2025. Pursuant to the terms of the offer, Mr and Mrs Longmire offered to carry out in a timeframe of six months the removal of a line of palm trees that stood on the boundary between their property and Dr Khan's property, and to remove roof sheeting above their deck. They also offered to pay $10,000 to Dr. Khan inclusive of costs. However, the offer was expressed to be open for a period of seven days only. Dr Khan did not accept the offer when it was open.
4. The stipulation that the offer was open for seven days only meant that it did not operate as an effective offer under s 112, because pursuant to s 112(1)(c), an offer under s 112 must comply with the provisions of both s 113 and s 114. Under ss 114(2), the minimum period that an offer can be specified to be open is 14 days. For this reason, I found that Mr and Mrs Longmire cannot rely on the first offer as an offer under s 112.
5. The second offer relied on by Mr and Mrs Longmire was made on 1 April 2025, which I note was only seven days before the start of the hearing. Under this offer, Mr and Mrs Longmire offered within three months to remove the palm trees and to remove the sheet roofing above the deck. In this offer, they offered to pay $20,000 inclusive of costs to Dr Khan. Unlike the first offer, the time by which Dr Khan had to accept this offer was limited to 48 hours. Dr Khan did not accept the offer.
6. Because the second offer did not comply with the requirement of ss 114(2) that it be open for at least 14 days, the offer could not be viewed as an offer properly made s 112, with the result that Mr and Mrs Longmire could not rely on that provision.
7. The discussion concerning costs took place after Dr Khan knew that his claim had been dismissed. He adopted what might be characterised as a creative strategy, which was to argue that the offer made on 1 April 2025, having been expressed to be an offer made under s 112, must be deemed to be open for at least 14 days. He indicated that he wished to accept the offer.
8. I informed Dr Khan that the offer had been open for only 48 hours, and as it had not been accepted, it had lapsed. It could not now be accepted. The fact that the offer was purportedly made under s 112 did not alter the situation. The reference to s 112 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the offer and deeming it to be open for 14 days.
9. As I had ruled that Mr and Mrs Longmire could not rely on either of the offers they had made, I was informed that Dr Khan had made an offer of his own on 6 March 2025. The offer was that the Longmires would be required to carry out certain work within 60 days and would pay him $50,000. This was to cover the cost of rectification work and costs and disbursements. Mr Khan could not produce a copy of the offer, but this was not material. As Dr Khan had been unsuccessful in the case, his offer was not relevant to the question of costs. This was because it did not engage s 112(1)(d), because in the opinion of the Tribunal the orders made in the proceeding were not more favourable to the other party than the offer.
10. In the absence of any relevant offer, was necessary to determine costs under s 109 of the VCAT Act. Section 109 relevantly provides as follows:

(1) Subject to this Division, each party is to bear their own costs in the proceeding.

(2) At any time, the Tribunal may order that a party pay all or a specified part of the costs of another party in a proceeding.

(3) The Tribunal may make an order under subsection (2) only if satisfied that it is fair to do so, having regard to -

(a) whether a party has conducted the proceeding in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged another party to the proceeding by conduct such as -

(i) failing to comply with an order or direction of the Tribunal without reasonable excuse;

(ii) failing to comply with this Act, the regulations, the rules or an enabling enactment;

(iii) asking for an adjournment as a result of (i) or (ii);

(v) attempting to deceive another party or the Tribunal;

(b) whether a party has been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceeding;

(c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties, including whether a party has made a claim that has no tenable basis in fact or law;

(e) any other matter the Tribunal considers relevant.

1. Ms Yianoulatos submitted that ss 109(3)(a) was enlivened because there had been breaches of the orders of the Tribunal. She also submitted that ss 109(3)(c) was engaged because the action is misconceived. It had been commenced effectively as a claim regarding a fence. In so far as it concerned an unreasonable flow of water, any claim arising from the 2011 flood was statute barred by reason of the operation of the Limitation of Actions Act. Her third submission was ss 109(3)(d) applied because of the nature and complexity of the proceeding. It was contended that the case might have been straightforward, but it was made more complicated by the instructions provided by Dr Khan to his experts.
2. Dr Khan disputed that he had relevantly breached any orders. He submitted he should not be held accountable for any delay in commencing the hearing as he had gone overseas. His answer to the suggestion that he had delayed the proceeding by refusing to give access to a builder nominated by the Longmires was that he was entitled to insist that their expert was qualified. As to the strength of his claim, he acknowledged that the claim regarding the 2011 flood was statute barred but said he that relied on an argument that there had been continuous flows of water after this. He disputed that any instructions he had given to his expert had complicated the proceeding.
3. I determined the question of costs by finding that ss 109(3)(c) had been engaged. The fact that Water Act cases could be complex was relevant but not sufficient. The fact that each party had engaged lawyers might, perhaps, suggest that the case was complex, but that in itself was not sufficient to engage ss 109(3)(c).
4. The key point was the case had been made more complex by a number of factors. It began as a case about a fence but then evolved into a case about an unreasonable flow of water. That there was no liability in relation to the 2011 flood was clear. However, Dr Khan made the case more complex in two respects. First, it was asserted that there was evidence about subsequent floods, but they were never established. Second, he engaged Mr Nguyen, a quality surveyor, and asked him to carry out two costings. The first was the cost of works to be carried out by the Longmires on their property and in the second was the cost of works to be carried out on Dr Khan's own property. The total costings came to about $207,000, and this was in addition to a claim for costs. That must have been terrifying to the Longmire's and forced them to take legal advice. The case could have been presented in a straightforward way, because ultimately it was only about damage in two bedrooms which might have been fixed for about $35,000. That is a different order of magnitude to a claim for $200,000. Another point is that the $200,000 included work to rectify Dr Khan's own drainage system. That was not an expense which could ever have been transferred to the Longmires.
5. For these reasons, I made the order regarding costs set out above.

[1] Under Rule 1.07 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2018, the default scale of costs is defined as follows: "Unless the Tribunal otherwise orders, if the Tribunal makes an order as to costs, the applicable scale of costs is the County Court costs scale as defined in Rule 1.13 of Chapter I of the Rules of the County Court as in force on 31 December 2024, being a fee, charge or amount that is 80 per cent of the applicable rate set out in Appendix A to Chapter I of the Rules of the Supreme Court as in force on 31 December 2024."

[2] [2018] VCAT 1873.

[3] [2007] VCAT 1958.