Khalid v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 2000

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. On 24 June 2022, the applicant lodged an application, under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 29 May 2022. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (subclass 500) visa under s 65 of the Act.
2. For the reasons that follow, the application to this Court is dismissed.

1. At the time of the Tribunal's decision in May 2022, cl 500.217(1) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) provided as a time of decision criterion for a student visa:

The applicant satisfies public interest criteria 4001, 4002, 4003, 4004, 4010, 4013, 4014, 4020 and 4021.

1. Public interest criterion 4020 (also known as PIC 4020) in Schedule 4 to the Regulations relevantly provided:

(1) There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, .... a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:

(a) the application for the visa; or

(b) a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made.

...

(4) The Minister may waive the requirements of any or all of paragraphs (1)(a) or (b) and subclause (2) if satisfied that:

(a) compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia; or

(b) compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen;

justify the granting of the visa.

(5) In this clause:

information that is false or misleading in a material particular means information that is:

(a) false or misleading at the time it is given; and

(b) relevant to any of the criteria the Minister may consider when making a decision on an application, whether or not the decision is made because of that information.

Note: For the definition of bogus document, see subsection 5(1) of the Act.

1. The term "bogus document" is defined in s 5(1) of the Act as follows:

"bogus document", in relation to a person, means a document that the Minister reasonably suspects is a document that:

(a) purports to have been, but was not, issued in respect of the person; or

(b) is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so; or

(c) was obtained because of a false or misleading statement, whether or not made knowingly.

1. On 29 April 2021, the applicant applied for a subclass 500 student visa.
2. On 12 August 2021, a delegate of the first respondent refused to grant the applicant the visa on the basis that he did not satisfy cl 500.217 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. The applicant included with his application a document titled "Account Maintenance Certificate" dated 23 April 2021 which, on its face, was issued by Invest Capital Investment Bank Limited (ICIBL) and recorded that the applicant's father had Rs 4,000,000 in a specified account on 22 April 2021 (AMC). The delegate "reasonably suspect[ed] that the Account Maintenance Certificate ... to be a bogus document" and therefore the applicant had given a bogus document to the Department of Home Affairs (Department), did not satisfy PIC 4020, and did not satisfy cl 500.217 of Schedule 2.
3. On 27 August 2021, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision.
4. On 13 December 2021, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing by video link on 13 January 2022.
5. On 13 January 2022, the applicant appeared at the hearing before the Tribunal by video link with the assistance of an interpreter.
6. On 29 May 2022, the Tribunal made a decision affirming the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a student visa.

1. The Tribunal at [7] noted that "the issue in this review is whether the applicant meets [PIC] 4020 as required by cl 500.217(1) for the grant of the visa".
2. The Tribunal at [14]-[24] reviewed the documentary materials before it concerning the AMC, including:

(a) the provision of the AMC as part of the applicant's visa application (at [15]);

(b) a letter from the Department to the applicant dated 9 July 2021 inviting a response to the Department's concern that the AMC was a bogus document and the applicant's response dated 9 July 2021 (at [16]-[17]);

(c) information received from the applicant on 6 January 2022 (at [19]-[21]);

(d) a letter from the Tribunal to the applicant dated 12 January 2022 inviting a response on adverse information concerning the AMC (at [22]); and

(e) additional documents received from the applicant on 27 January 2022 (at [24]).

1. The Tribunal at [25]-[37] made findings concerning whether the applicant gave, or caused to be given, a bogus document to the Department. The Tribunal found:

(a) at [35] that it "holds a reasonable suspicion that the AMC document is a bogus document that is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so";

(b) at [36] that "the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister ... a bogus document as defined in s 5(1)(b) of the Act in relation to the visa application"; and

(c) at [37] that "the applicant does not meet PIC 4020(1)".

1. The Tribunal at [38]-[40], with reference to PIC 4020(4), considered whether the requirements of PIC 4020(1) should be waived. The Tribunal recorded that the applicant confirmed at the hearing in January 2022 that he was not making a claim that either of the provisions in PIC 4020(4)(a) or (b) apply in his case. It followed that the requirements of PIC 4020(1) should not be waived.

Judicial review application and steps up to hearing on 25 September 2025

1. On 24 June 2022, the applicant lodged an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's decision.
2. On 20 September 2022, a registrar of the Court made procedural orders, including that, upon the matter being listed for hearing, the applicant file and serve at least 28 days before the hearing a written submission, any amended application with proper particulars, and any additional evidence on which the applicant sought to rely.
3. Following a period of inactivity, on 5 August 2025 the parties were notified by the registry of the Court that the matter was listed for hearing on 25 September 2025.
4. On 28 August 2025, the applicant took steps to file an amended application. Because of events which occurred at the hearing in this Court on 25 September 2025, the amended application was replaced by a further amended application lodged on 3 October 2025 (FAA). The document contains the following grounds:

1. The Second Respondent misinterpreted and or misapplied the law to the facts, and or the decision is legally unreasonable and or is made in the absence of probative evidence.

Particulars

(i) In finding that the Applicant did not satisfy subclause 500.217 of Part 500 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 ('the regulations'), on the basis that the Applicant did not satisfy public interest criterion 4020 (PIC 4020) of the regulations, the Tribunal reasoned at [14], [35]-[36] of its decision:

1. The visa was refused because the delegate held a reasonable suspicion that the applicant provided a bogus document relating to the visa application...

...

1. The Tribunal ... holds a reasonable suspicion that the AMC document is a bogus document that is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so.

2. The Tribunal is further satisfied that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, ... a bogus document as defined in s 5(1)(b) of the Act in relation to the visa application.

(ii) A bogus document is defined by s 5 of the Migration Act 1958 ('the Act') ...

(iii) The task of determining whether the AMC document was a bogus document, on the basis that the Tribunal reasonably suspected that the AMC document was counterfeit or that the AMC document had been altered by a person who did not have authority to do so, required the existence of facts and circumstances which, objectively viewed, were sufficient to induce the requisite suspicion in a reasonable person. Those facts did not exist. Furthermore, the deposit in the AMC document was only two weeks old when the visa application was made, the Applicant's father was the account holder, and evidence was given that he had sufficient funds.

(iv) The Tribunal decision is also devoid of any reference to facts and circumstances, that allowed it to underpinned its finding that it reasonably suspected that the AMC document was an unauthorised copy or that the AMC document had been altered by a person who did not have authority to do so.

(v) The Tribunal therefore misinterpreted the applicable law and or misapplied the law to the facts, and or its decision is legally unreasonable and or was made in the absence of probative evidence to support its finding that the AMC document was a bogus document. It therefore committed jurisdictional error in finding that the Applicant did not satisfy clause 500.217 of the regulations by reason of its finding that the Applicant did not satisfy PIC 4020.

2. The Second Respondent failed to conduct the review required by s 348 of the Migration Act 1958.

Particulars:

The Tribunal failed to conduct the review required by s 348 of the Act because:

(a) The Tribunal relied on the finding of the delegate of the Minister that the AMC document contains features 'that were identified in the investigation as common with documentation issued by ICIBL', rather than making its own finding in relation to the purported common features and whether those features met the 'reasonably suspects' threshold for the definition of a bogus document contain in s 5 of the Act, despite its function to review the application de novo. That failure constitutes jurisdictional error, as the Tribunal failed to exercise its core function, which is to review the decision; and or

(b) The Tribunal failed to make relevant enquires, and or it was legally unreasonable to rely on the Department's findings, in circumstances where the Department's investigation had erroneously found that the ICIBL was a 'ghost bank', had erroneously found that the bank office did not exist at the address on the AMC document, had erroneously found that the telephone numbers on the AMC document was not listed to ICIBL, had erroneously found that the ICIBL did not operate as a genuine bank, and where the investigation predated the date of the AMC document. The significant errors in the Department's investigation cast a dark shadow over the investigation's integrity and the credibility of the findings made, which the Tribunal nonetheless relied on. In these circumstances, the Tribunal had an obligation to make enquiries in order to conduct the review required of it. That failure constitutes jurisdictional error, as the Tribunal failed to exercise its core function, which is to review the decision.

4. The Second Respondent failed to comply with s 359A of the Migration Act 1958.

Particulars:

(i) The Tribunal stated, as part of the reasons for its decision:

1. There are Department notes about the case on the Department file, including that the application was identified as part of a 'large cohort providing fraudulent financial information from Invest Capital Investment Bank Limited'. This and other information has been provided to the applicant in a letter sent to him by the Tribunal on the review, and is discussed later.

However, the Tribunal did not put to the Applicant, in the letter referred to, and which was required pursuant to s359A of the Act, that the Applicant's application was identified as part of a 'large cohort providing fraudulent financial information from Invest Capital Investment Bank Limited. That was information the Tribunal 'considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason', for affirming the delegate's decision. The adverse information was not put to the Applicant in compliance with s359AA of the Act, such that the Tribunal was required to comply with s359A of the Act, which it failed to do. Its failure to do so was material and therefore jurisdictional.

(ii) The Tribunal relied on the following informing, contained in reports in files numbered ADD2021/6458809 and ADD2021/6458791:

That an Islamabad Information Report in relation to Trust Investment Bank Pty Ltd dated 15 February 2022, and an Islamabad Information Report in relation to Invest Capital Investment Bank Pty Ltd, dated 15 February 2022 had a common feature, being a mobile phone number registered to a person named Mian Ahmed Kaleem, who is registered as owning Allied Construction Company and MAK consultants. an educational consultant company and in relation to whom, the Capital Investment Bank Pty Ltd report states:

Islamabad post has now conducted an Investigation into Trust Investment Bank which has identified Mr Ahmed as a third party contact for this bank, another link between the two institutions.

and which is also reflected in the Trust Investment Bank Pty Ltd report, which states:

Islamabad post contacted the phone number on provided statements by Trust Investment Bank [redacted] The [redacted] bank recommended to contact an outside party Mr Ahmed on 0321 3213322 as he would be the most competent person to speak to. This is the same person identified to post by Invest Capital Investment Bank whose full name is Mr Mian Ahmed KALEEM. This is a link between both banks [redacted]

The common feature of Mr Ahmed, identified as a link between the two banks, was information the Tribunal 'considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason', for affirming the delegate's decision. The adverse information was not put to the Applicant in compliance with s359AA of the Act, such that the Tribunal was required to comply with s359A of the Act, which it failed to do. Its failure to do so was material and therefore jurisdictional.

1. On 28 August 2025, the applicant filed a written submission (AS).
2. On 11 September 2025, the first respondent filed a written submission (RS).

1. At the hearing in this Court on 25 September 2025, Nigel Dobbie from Dobbie and Devine Immigration Lawyers appeared for the applicant. Nicole Maddocks of counsel appeared for the first respondent.
2. Ms Maddocks tendered a Court Book (CB) which contained the Tribunal's decision and documents before the Tribunal.
3. Ms Maddocks read an affidavit of Bethany McNamara sworn on 11 September 2025. The affidavit annexed a document which contained three file notes written by the delegate who made the decision dated 12 August 2021 (Department File Notes). The Tribunal referred to the file notes in its decision at [18].
4. Ms Maddocks also sought to tender two partially redacted documents, each titled "Islamabad Information Report" dated 15 February 2022 (Department Investigation Reports). One document had a subheading "Invest Capital Investment Bank Ltd" and the other document had a subheading "Trust Investment Bank Ltd". At CB 186 is a certificate issued under s 375A of the Act by a delegate of the first respondent dated 22 December 2021 concerning two investigation reports. Ms Maddocks informed the Court that the two Department Investigation Reports she sought to tender were partially redacted copies of the two reports the subject of the s 375A certificate. On this basis, the Tribunal had a copy of the unredacted reports at the time of its decision and so the two documents, although partially redacted, were relevant to considering whether there was a jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. Mr Dobbie, who had been provided with a copy of the two partially redacted documents the previous day, did not object to the tender. I received the Department Investigation Reports into evidence. I make further comments about these documents in paragraphs 49 and 50 below.
5. Ms Maddocks and Mr Dobbie then made oral submissions on behalf of their clients. I refer to the parties' written and oral submissions below.

1. The evidence before the Tribunal and the Court has complexities. It is desirable to review the evidence and complexities before addressing the grounds of review in the FAA.
2. On 29 April 2021 the applicant applied for a student visa and included the AMC to prove he had "genuine access to funds" during his stay in Australia to satisfy the criterion in cl 500.214 of Schedule 2. According to the AMC, the applicant's father deposited Rs 4,000,000 into an account at ICIBL on 15 April 2021 and the money was still in the account on 23 April 2021.
3. On 9 July 2021, the Department sent a letter to the applicant inviting him to comment on adverse information concerning the AMC (July 2021 Letter). The adverse information put to the applicant in the letter was as follows: (ICIBL Adverse Information) (CB 76)

In February 2021, a Departmental Officer, conducted checks to confirm the information contained within the abovementioned Account Maintenance Certificate and confirmed the following:

• there are no bank offices located at the address mentioned on the Account Maintenance Certificate.
• the telephone number, as declared on the Account Maintenance Certificate, is registered with the Pakistan Telecommunication Company but is not listed to the ICIBL but rather to another business.
• ICIBL does not operate as a genuine bank for financial purposes.

(a) The Tribunal, in its decision dated 29 May 2022, made findings which suggested that some of the ICIBL Adverse Information was or might be wrong.

(b) One of the applicant's grounds of review in the FAA was based on the unreliability of the ICIBL Adverse Information.

1. The July 2021 Letter relied on an investigation by an officer of the Department in February 2021. The AMC was dated 23 April 2021. A question, which the Tribunal acknowledged in its decision at [30], was whether, in considering whether the AMC was bogus, it could rely on information obtained from an investigation carried out two months before the AMC was created.
2. According to the delegate's decision dated 12 August 2021, on 9 August 2021 the Department received a response from the applicant to the July 2021 Letter (CB 80). The applicant wrote in the response:

Now, I came to know about this bank issue. My father was unaware about this issue. This bank was very renowned and well-known. Now my father has withdrawn his account [from] this bank. However, considering the consequences my father has decide to provide details for other accounts of his for my financial support. For that reason, I am providing Department of Home Affairs the other bank statement which [is] on my father Khalid Mehmood name.

1. The "other bank statement which is [in] my father ... name" is at CB 71-72. The statement is from BankIslami Pakistan Limited (Bank Islami), dated 5 July 2021, and records that on 30 June 2021 the father deposited 4,000,000 Pakistani rupees into an account at this bank, which amount remained in the account on 5 July 2021 (BIPL Statement).
2. According to the Department File Notes, the applicant provided the BIPL Statement to the Department on 8 July 2021, which was prior to the date of the Department's July 2021 Letter. Thus, the applicant took steps to substitute the AMC with the BIPL statement before he was put on notice by the Department of its concern about the AMC communicated by the July 2021 Letter.
3. On 12 August 2021, the delegate made a decision that the AMC was a bogus document and the applicant therefore did not satisfy a criterion for a student visa. In relation to the delegate's reasons for concluding that the AMC was a bogus document, the delegate placed "more weight on the investigations carried out by the Departmental Officer" (CB 88.1) than on the applicant's evidence or contention that the AMC was genuine.
4. On 12 August 2021, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision. The applicant wrote: (CB 97)

On 29 April 2021, I applied for a student visa to study in Australia and was refused on 12th of August 2021. I believe that my visa was refused on wrong basis. The visa was refused on the basis that suspected bogus document was provided with my visa application. Last week of June 2021 I had a telephonic conversation with my visa consultant stated that some applicants with similar bank for proof of funds received a letter with a suspicion for this bank ICIBL and was suggested that I should provide some other bank statement as proof of balance. In response to this suggestion I provided a different bank statement and proof of balance.

On 9 July 2021, I received a letter of invitation to comment, before I received this letter my latest bank statement and proof of balance was submitted along with an explanation to why I was submitting this document. The Natural Justice Letter said that I submitted a document for which the said bank does not exist whereas it does exist physically as stated on their website, has a registered telephone number under the name of bank, and listed with SECP (Securities and Exchange Commission Of Pakistan) as well as listed in PSX (Pakistan Stock Exchange) as ICIBL. The refusal letter says that I provided with new bank statement as a document in response to the Natural Justice Letter I received for comment although that is not a fact nor were my intention. I submitted latest bank statement before receiving Natural Justice Letter as a gesture of good will, which later has been interpreted against me.

1. On 13 December 2021, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing on 13 January 2022. (CB 102)
2. On 5 January 2022, the applicant provided to the Tribunal an "Appointment of Representative" form which indicated that the applicant had appointed an Australian lawyer as his representative.
3. On 5 January 2022, the applicant's new representative provided to the Tribunal (CB 113) a letter from the applicant dated 5 January 2022 (CB 117-120) and a bundle of documents (CB 121-144) which sought to persuade the Tribunal that, contrary to the ICIBL Adverse Information, there was an ICIBL bank office located at the address on the AMC, the telephone number on the AMC was listed to ICIBL, and ICIBL operated as a genuine bank.
4. The documents provided by the applicant's new representative to the Tribunal included an affidavit from the applicant's father (CB 141). The father stated that he had PKR 4 million in his account at Bank Islami as evidence of funds to cover the applicant's educational and living expenses in Australia. The father said nothing about having held the same amount of money in an account at ICIBL between April and June 2021.
5. On 12 January 2022, the Tribunal sent a letter to the applicant inviting him to comment on adverse information. (CB 152-154) The letter commenced by explaining that the Department held "investigative reports into" ICIBL, but a delegate had issued a certificate under s 375A of the Act which prevented the Tribunal from providing a copy of the reports to the applicant. The letter from the Tribunal continued:

We may, however, provide you with the gist of the information, which we have chosen to do in your case, as follows:

a) In early 2021, the ICIBL was identified as a bank of concern in the Pakistan student visa caseload and an investigation was undertaken relating to a large number of student visa applications with the statement of funds provided by ICIBL.

b) Through the investigation, it is reported;

1. ICIBL has been identified as a 'ghost' bank

2. ICIBL has provided statements, to students from Pakistan applying for an Australia student visa, of funds that do not exist or do not belong to the student visa applicant or their financial sponsors

3. The arrangements were made by a third party, for payment of a fee.

4. The student visa applicants were referred to or put in touch with the third party by the head office verification officer at ICIBL

5. The statement given by you to the Minister, in support of your subclass 500 student visa application made on 29 April 2021, contains features that were identified in the investigation as common in documentation issued by ICIBL. In particular, the bank statement you provided lists a single large credit to the account, and no other transactions.

This information is relevant because you provided the statement as evidence of your having access to sufficient funds to support yourself during your stay in Australia, relating to the subclass 500 student visa application you lodged on 29 April 2021. If the Tribunal relies on the above information relating to the investigation into ICIBL that is included in the documents with the folio numbers specified in the s.375A nondisclosure certificate, the Tribunal may reasonably suspect that the statement you provided in relation to a person is a bogus document, as defined in s.5(1) of the Migration Act 1954, because it is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority do so. In which case, you would not meet public interest criterion 4020(1). This would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review.

You are invited to give comments on or respond to the above information in writing.

1. A key part of the information disclosed in the Tribunal's letter was that "ICIBL has provided statements to students from Pakistan applying for an Australia student visa, of funds that do not exist or do not belong to the student visa applicant or their financial sponsors" (Non-Existent Funds Statements).
2. There are significant differences between "the gist of the information" provided by the Tribunal to the applicant in its letter dated 12 January 2022 (CB 153) and the ICIBL Adverse Information provided by the Department to the applicant in the July 2021 Letter (CB 76), and on which the delegate placed weight in her decision dated 12 August 2021. For example, the ICIBL Adverse Information focused on the physical contact details for ICIBL and stated that ICIBL "does not operate as a genuine bank", while the information provided in the letter from the Tribunal dated 12 January 2022 was to the effect that ICIBL operated as a genuine bank in Pakistan but, presumably due to fraudulent or wrongful conduct by one or more officers within ICIBL, ICIBL "has provided statements to students from Pakistan applying for an Australia student visa, of funds that do not exist or do not belong to the student visa applicant or their financial sponsor".
3. The Tribunal's letter dated 12 January 2022 invited the applicant to respond to the letter by 27 January 2022.
4. On 13 January 2022, the applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal by video link. The applicant's representative was also in attendance. (CB 158)
5. On 27 January 2022, the applicant's representative, in response to the letter from the Tribunal dated 12 January 2022, provided to the Tribunal (CB 161, 173-176):

(a) a letter from the applicant to the Tribunal dated 27 January 2022 containing further evidence or submissions (CB 177-179); and

(b) further documents (CB 163-172 and 180-184).

1. Some of the documents sought to persuade the Tribunal that a branch of ICIBL existed at the address on the AMC. None of the documents contained probative evidence which addressed the concern that ICIBL, even if it was a genuine bank with contact details as recorded on the AMC, issued Non-Existent Funds Statements.
2. The letter from the applicant dated 27 January 2022 addressed the concern that ICIBL issued Non-Existent Funds Statements in the following manner: (CB 178-179)

Fabricated statements: Department's investigation identifies that the ICIBL have issued statements without holding any fund in their possession to facilitate Australian Visa for Pakistani students. It is my humble submission that the solvency certificate issued from ICIBL was genuine and my father used to hold necessary funds in that financial institution when the certificate was issued. Therefore, the certificate was valid.

Prior to the natural justice letter dated 09 July 2021 I provided Statement from BankIslami Pakistan Limited. This evidence suggests, I have access to fund. I further have lead evidence in my hearing that I have transfer across the funds to Australia and have acquired cars worth $32,000.00

Arrangement with third party: Department's investigation further identifies that the solvency certificate issued by ICIBL were arranged by third party. It is my humble submission that I did not have to go through such arrangement as my father have access to funds and it is evident from the statement of BankIslami Pakistan Limited.

Fabricated verification: Department's investigation further identifies that the solvency certificate was verified through third party in the head office of ICIBL. It is my humble submission that I am not aware that the Department did verify my statement from ICIBL. I have not provided any information to the Department which includes a direct phone or email address of any individual in ICIBL head office.

...

In light of the above, I submit that the Department's claim about ICIBL may be true but is not substantiated in my case. I have not knowingly provided a document which amount to be bogus and intended to mislead the Department about my financial ability. I submit that I am a victim of the circumstance and the circumstance is truly beyond my control.

1. In paragraph 25 above I explain how the Department Investigation Reports were tendered at the hearing in this Court on 25 September 2025. When preparing this judgment, I had difficulty reconciling the date on the Department Investigation Reports (15 February 2022) with the date on the s 375A certificate (22 December 2021). I sought information or submissions from the parties. I received from the first respondent, without objection from the applicant, an affidavit of a solicitor employed by the first respondent dated 27 November 2025 which explained the following based on information contained in files held by the first respondent's solicitor and on instructions from officers of the Department:

(a) The two investigation reports the subject of the s 375A certificate are dated in June 2021.

(b) In February 2022, an officer of the Department prepared abridged versions of the two reports for release to the Tribunal (Abridged Reports). The Abridged Reports were finalised on, and dated, 15 February 2022.

(c) The Department Investigation Reports which were tendered at the hearing in this Court on 25 September 2025 are redacted versions of the Abridged Reports.

1. It would appear from this explanation that, when the Tribunal wrote its letter dated 12 January 2022, it had a copy of the unabridged investigation reports. It is unclear to me why, a month later in February 2022, the Department provided to the Tribunal an abridged version of the two reports. However, I do not need to clarify this matter in order to address the grounds in the FAA.

1. The nub of ground 1 of the FAA appears in particulars (iii) and (iv) of ground 1 as follows:

(iii) The task of determining whether the AMC document was a bogus document, on the basis that the Tribunal reasonably suspected that the AMC document was counterfeit or that the AMC document had been altered by a person who did not have authority to do so, required the existence of facts and circumstances which, objectively viewed, were sufficient to induce the requisite suspicion in a reasonable person. Those facts did not exist ...

(iv) The Tribunal decision is also devoid of any reference to facts and circumstances, that underpinned its finding that it reasonably suspected that the AMC document was an unauthorised copy or that the AMC document had been altered by a person who did not have authority to do so.

1. The applicant's written submission at AS [12] added a reference to the statement in Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51; 250 FCR 309 at [92] that, in relation to the term "reasonably suspects" in s 97 of the Act, "it is necessarily implicit in the phrase 'reasonably suspects' that the facts and circumstances, objectively viewed, must be sufficient to induce the relevant state of mind, ie suspicion, in a reasonable person".
2. Mr Dobbie contended that it is likewise implicit in the phrase "reasonably suspects" in the definition of 'bogus document' in s 5 of the Act that the facts and circumstances, objectively viewed, must be sufficient to induce suspicion in a reasonable person.
3. The applicant's written submission at AS [19] added that, in light of some findings by the Tribunal, "the Department's investigation into the [AMC] is ... so flawed and deficient that it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to rely on its findings in relation to ICIBL". Although this complaint about the Tribunal's reliance on the Department Investigation Reports (or the unabridged versions of the Department Investigation Reports) is not particularised in ground 1, it is particularised in ground 2 such that the first respondent was on notice of the complaint.
4. I agree with Mr Dobbie that, with reference to PIC 4020(1), where a decision-maker finds there is evidence that the applicant has given to the Minister a bogus document, being a document that the decision-maker "reasonably suspects" is a document which satisfies one of the limbs of the definition of bogus document in s 5(1) of the Act, the facts and circumstances, objectively viewed, must be sufficient to induce suspicion in a reasonable person.
5. However, I disagree with the applicant's contention that the facts and circumstances in the present matter were insufficient.
6. The Tribunal at [26] effectively accepted that ICIBL was a bank with contact details in Lahore as recorded on the AMC. The remaining issue for the Tribunal arose from evidence in the Department Investigation Reports concerning Non-Existent Funds Statements issued by ICIBL in circumstances where the AMC had "features in common with the fraudulent documents that were being issued by ICIBL" and the "AMC document was identified [by the Department] along with others as one issued by ICIBL relating to the investigation": Tribunal at [30]. These matters provided a probative basis for the Tribunal's concern that the AMC might, like the ICIBL statements the subject of the Department's investigation, refer to funds that do not exist. The Tribunal addressed this issue at [28] when it stated:

Consideration has been given to evidence provided in support of the applicant's claims that the funds were in the ICIBL account, relating to the AMC document, that his father did not transact on the account between 15 April 2022 and the date of the visa application and at the end of June 2021 his father closed the ICIBL account. However, there is no probative evidence that satisfies the Tribunal as to any of these claims.

1. There is force in the last sentence of [28] - that "there is no probative evidence that satisfies the Tribunal as to any of these claims". Mr Dobbie did not contend that there was any error in this finding or that there was some probative evidence before the Tribunal that "the funds were in the ICIBL account relating to the AMC document".
2. If the Tribunal had not sent the letter dated 12 January 2022 to the applicant and given the applicant an adequate opportunity to respond to the letter, I may have been concerned that the applicant either:

(a) was not given adequate notice of the determinative issue (or an "issue arising in relation to the decision under review" - see s 360(1) of the Act); or

(b) was not given an adequate opportunity to respond to that notice.

1. However, first, the Tribunal's letter dated 12 January 2022 put the applicant on notice of the determinative issue. Second, the applicant, by letter dated 27 January 2022, responded to this issue. Third, the applicant had a representative, who was a lawyer, who assisted the applicant respond to the issue. Yet, the applicant did not provide a further affidavit from his father, or any business record or contemporaneous document which comprised "probative evidence" "that the funds were in the ICIBL account"(Tribunal at [28]). Nor did the applicant explain to the Tribunal why he could not provide probative evidence in circumstances where the evidence before the Tribunal indicated that the applicant could obtain an affidavit from his father if he wished (see affidavit from father at CB 141).
2. It follows from the above that the Tribunal relied on the following facts and circumstances as a basis for its suspicion that the AMC was counterfeit:

(a) the evidence in the Department Investigation Reports concerning the issue of Non-Existent Funds Statements by ICIBL - to which the Tribunal at [29] gave "significant and substantial weight";

(b) the Department's view that the AMC contained features in common with the fraudulent documents issued by ICIBL (Tribunal at [29] and [30]); and

(c) the fact that the applicant, having been put on notice by the Tribunal of the evidence in the Department Investigation Reports about Non-Existent Funds Statements, "provided no probative evidence" to establish that the funds were in the ICIBL account (Tribunal at last sentence of [28]), and also did not explain why he could not provide probative evidence.

1. In relation to the facts and circumstances in paragraph 61(a) above, Mr Dobbie contended at AS [19] that, in light of some findings by the Tribunal, "the Department's investigation into the [AMC] is ... so flawed and deficient that it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to rely on its findings in relation to ICIBL".
2. This contention requires a consideration of the redacted copy of the Department Investigation Reports concerning ICIBL which Ms Maddocks tendered at the hearing in this Court on 25 September 2025. The report contains a combination of:

(a) information collected from investigations by one or more officers of the Department based at the Department's Islamabad post; and

(b) opinions expressed by the author of the report based on the information collected.

1. It is not evident that the Tribunal made any findings of fact contrary to information collected in the Department Investigation Reports. For example:

(a) The Tribunal at [26] accepted "that ICIBL's head office is at Zahidjee House at the Gulberg II address in Lahore". This finding is not inconsistent with any information in the Department's report. For example, the Department's report records that an "officer contacted ICIB Lahore head office" and "the bank recommended he contact an outside party". Subject to the qualification that this paragraph was partially redacted in the version of the report in evidence before the Court, the text suggests that a head office exists in Lahore. The next page of the report, again in a partially redacted paragraph, suggests that an ICIBL document stated that the Lahore head office was located in "Block A New Muslim Town" but, upon investigation by an officer from the Islamabad post, "there was no business signage for ICIB or evidence of an actual bank present". However, the Tribunal's acceptance that the ICIBL head office was located "at Zahidjee House at the Gulberg II address in Lahore" is not inconsistent with the information in the Department's report.

(b) The Tribunal at [26] accepted that "the phone numbers on the two phone bills provided confirm that the accounts are held by ICIBL for the numbers that appear on the AMC document". However, the phone numbers on the AMC and on the two phone bills at CB 139-140 end with the digits "85", while the phone number investigated in the Department's report ends with the digits "58". Again, the Tribunal's findings concerning the phone number on the AMC is not inconsistent with information in the Department's report.

(c) The Tribunal at [26] accepted "that ICIBL is licensed by the SECP to carry on business as a NBFC". This finding is not inconsistent with any information in the Department's report.

1. Further, there was additional information in the Department's report which supported the opinions of the report's author that ICIBL was a "bank of concern" (referred to by the Tribunal at [29]), such as:

(a) "The Islamabad office address mentioned on the website did not exist and phone numbers were not operational ... Islamabad post conducted a site visit to the claimed location of the ICIB Islamabad branch office. At the advertised address there is no business signage for the bank displayed and no evidence of a branch presence at the location ... The office address advertised on the bank's website is occupied by a different entity who claim to have occupied the space for at least six months."

(b) "The ICIB Karachi Office phone numbers were not operational."

1. In light of the above matters, I consider that it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal, despite its findings that ICIBL had an office in Lahore with the contact details recorded on the AMC, to place weight, including "significant and substantial weight" (Tribunal at [29]) on "the findings made by the Department overall relating to its investigation into ICIBL as a bank of concern" (Tribunal at [29]) and on the information in the Department's report (presumably in the unabridged reports, or in the unredacted version of the Abridged Reports, because the information does not appear in the redacted version of the Abridged Reports) concerning the Non-Existent Funds Statements.
2. As stated above, the Tribunal effectively accepted that the AMC was issued by an officer or employee of ICIBL. A question I asked the parties during the hearing on 25 September 2025 was whether, if the AMC was issued by an officer or employee of ICIBL, the document was "counterfeit or ... altered by a person who does not have authority to do so". Is a document issued by an organisation, but which contains information which someone in the organisation involved in creating the document knows is false, "counterfeit or ... altered by a person who does not have authority to do so"? The question requires consideration of the meaning of "counterfeit". The parties were not aware of any Federal Court authority which discusses the meaning of "counterfeit".
3. The Macquarie Dictionary Online defines "counterfeit" as meaning:

adjective 1. made to imitate, and pass for, something else, not genuine: counterfeit coin.

2. pretended: counterfeit grief.

noun 3. an imitation designed to pass as an original; a forgery.

1. Ms Maddocks relied on Arora v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 35; 238 FCR 153 (Arora) at [15] where the Full Court, in responding to a contention by the appellant concerning the proper construction of "bogus document", stated:

Properly construed there is no requirement in PIC 4020(1) that the falsity of a bogus document should be relevant to the criteria that the Minister is considering ... The definition of 'bogus document' in s 5 is not concerned with the truth or otherwise of statements but with the reliability of documentation. It would be a most unworkable outcome if the Minister could not rely on the fact that a document was counterfeit but had to consider, in turn, whether the statements contained in it were, in any event, correct and otherwise relevant to the matters he had to consider...

1. For the following reasons, I consider that it was open to the Tribunal to reasonably suspect that the AMC was "counterfeit or altered by a person who did not have authority to do so", despite the Tribunal accepting that the document was issued by ICIBL:

(a) Paragraph (c) of the definition of 'bogus document' has the effect that a document issued by an organisation may be bogus even if genuinely issued by the organisation. As stated in Arora at [11], "the effect of subcl (c) of the definition is that if the delegate or the Tribunal reasonably suspected that the TRA issued its skills assessment because of false or misleading statements in the reference purportedly from the cake shop then the TRA assessment will itself be a bogus document". That a document genuinely issued by an organisation may be "bogus" within the meaning of paragraph (c) of the definition of "bogus document" supports an interpretation of "counterfeit" in paragraph (b) which permits a document issued by an organisation to be bogus in particular circumstances.

(b) In Arora at [15], the Full Court stated that "the definition of 'bogus document' in s 5 is not concerned with the truth or otherwise of statements but with the reliability of documentation". This supports a broader, rather than narrower, construction of the term "counterfeit" in paragraph (b).

(c) As indicated in paragraph 68 above, the adjective "counterfeit" has different shades of meanings. One meaning encompasses a document issued by an organisation, or by a person within the organisation, which contains information which the author knows is false. The document is thereby "not genuine" or "made to imitate ... something else". This was the circumstance in the present case, as noted by the Tribunal's reference at [30] to "fraudulent documents that were being issued by ICIBL".

1. For the above reasons, ground 1 does not identify a jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.

1. Ground 2 contains three complaints.
2. First, it is contended that "the Tribunal relied on the findings of the delegate of the Minister that the AMC document contains features that were identified in the investigation in common with documentation issued by ICIBL, rather than making its own findings in relation to the purported common features and whether those features met the 'reasonably suspects' threshold for the definition of a bogus document" and "that failure constitutes jurisdictional error": particular (a).
3. This ground appears to challenge the last two sentences of [29] where the Tribunal stated:

The applicant was informed that ICIBL provided statements to students from Pakistan applying for an Australian student visas of funds that do not exist or do not belong to the student or their financial sponsor, and they have uncovered that the applicants were put in touch with or referred to a third party by an employee of ICIBL for payment of a fee, to obtain the financial statements. The Tribunal gives significant and substantial weight to the veracity of the findings made by the Department about these matters.

1. For the following reasons, I reject the applicant's contention. The applicant appears to contend that the Tribunal ought to have obtained from the Department the statements provided by ICIBL to students from Pakistan the subject of the Department's investigation and "[made] its own findings in relation to the purported common features" concerning the ICIBL statements. I disagree. In circumstances where the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, the Tribunal was entitled to rely on information in the Department Investigation Reports, so long as the information was "probative" (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [135]; CKL21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 70; 293 FCR 634 at [72], [80] and [86]). If the Tribunal was required to re-undertake the investigation carried out by the Department, this would place an intolerable burden on the Tribunal.
2. Second, it is contended that "it was legally unreasonable [for the Tribunal] to rely on the Department's findings": particular (b). I address this contention in paragraphs 62 to 66 above. For reasons set out in those paragraphs, I consider that it was not legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to rely on information in the Department Investigation Reports.
3. Third, it is contended that "the Tribunal failed to make relevant enquiries" because, in light of "the significant errors in the Department's investigation [which] cast a dark shadow over the investigation's integrity and the credibility of the findings made", "the Tribunal had an obligation to make enquiries in order to conduct the review". Mr Dobbie added at AS [28] that the Tribunal "had an obligation to make enquiries with ICIBL and the Department".
4. In response to this contention:

(a) For reasons explained in paragraphs 64 to 65 above, Mr Dobbie has not established in this Court proceeding that there were significant errors in the Department's investigation.

(b) Even if there were significant errors in the Department's investigation, this does not, without more, create an obligation on the Tribunal to make enquiries with ICIBL or the Department. In Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2; 280 CLR 265 at [25] the High Court stated:

The making of a decision, the decision-maker having failed to inquire about a relevant fact or matter, may involve jurisdictional error capable of characterisation as either a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction or a legally unreasonable exercise of a particular duty or power. While decisions have expressed the criteria for an error of this kind as including that the potential fact was readily ascertainable and was critical or central to the decision, these criteria merely reflect the usually high threshold for a conclusion that a power has been unreasonably exercised as a matter of law.

Mr Dobbie did not explain to the Court what enquiries the Tribunal ought to have made with ICIBL or the Department, or what "potential fact was readily ascertainable and was critical or central to the decision". I do not accept that the Tribunal failed to inquire about a relevant fact or matter in a manner which involved jurisdictional error.

1. For the above reasons, it was not legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to not make enquiries with ICIBL or the Department.
2. For the above reasons, ground 2 does not identify a jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.

1. Section 359A(1) of the Act required the Tribunal to give to applicants "clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review", and invite the applicant to comment on the adverse information.
2. The applicant contends there were two items of adverse information which the Tribunal failed to give to the applicant, resulting in a breach of s 359A of the Act.

There are Department notes about the case on the Department file, including that the application was identified as part of a 'large cohort providing fraudulent financial information from Invest Capital Investment Bank Limited'. This and other information has been provided to the applicant in a letter sent to him by the Tribunal on the review, and is discussed later.

1. The applicant contends the Tribunal did not put to the applicant that his application "was identified as part of a large cohort providing fraudulent information from" ICIBL, and this involved a breach of s 359A(1),
2. This contention overlooks the information put by the Tribunal to the applicant in its letter dated 12 January 2022 (CB 153) that an investigation by the Department indicated that ICIBL had provided fraudulent statements to students from Pakistan applying for Australian student visas and the AMC "contains features that were identified in the investigation as common in documentation issued by ICIBL". I reject the applicant's contention.

1. Shortly before the hearing on 25 September 2025, the first respondent served on Mr Dobbie the Department Investigation Reports. As reflected in the new particular (ii) to ground 4 in the FAA, during the hearing Mr Dobbie contended the Tribunal should have put to the applicant some information on page 2 of the Department Investigation Reports concerning a person referred to as Mr Ahmed. It is stated on page 2:

Islamabad post conducted checks on the mobile number provided for Mr Ahmed. The phone is registered to Mian Ahmed Kaleem, CNIC 352024613381. Mr Mian Ahmed Kaleem is registered as owning Allied Construction Company and MAK consultants. MAK consultants are an educational consultant company.

...

Islamabad post has now conducted an Investigation into Trust Investment Bank which has identified Mr Ahmed as a third party contact for this bank, another link between the two institutions.

1. It is stated in particular (ii) to ground 4 in the FAA:

The common feature of Mr Ahmed, identified as a link between the two banks, was information the Tribunal 'considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason', for affirming the delegate's decision...

1. I reject the contention that these details concerning Mr Ahmed were part of the Tribunal's reason for affirming the delegate's decision. I consider that:

(c) the fact a person named Mr Ahmed was a contact person for ICIBL and for another bank called Trust Investment Bank; and

(d) information relating to Mr Ahmed and his phone number

were irrelevant to the Tribunal's decision.

1. Further, the applicant did not tender, during the hearing in this Court, a copy of the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal. In the circumstances, Mr Dobbie cannot make good the assertion that the information the subject of ground 4 was not put to the applicant at the hearing before the Tribunal, as permitted by s 359AA of the Act.
2. For the above reasons, ground 4 does not identify a jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.
3. It follows from the above that the FAA must be dismissed.

1. I will hear submissions on costs at the delivery of judgment.

I certify that the preceding ninety-two (92) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Zipser.