Khadem & Dabiri [2026] FedCFamC1A 48 (24 March 2026)

Dabiri & Khadem (No 4) [2025] FedCFamC1F 644

De Winter and De Winter (1979) FLC 90-605

DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26

Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296; [1971] HCA 54

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22

Graham & Squibb (2019) FLC 93-892; [2019] FamCAFC 33

Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516; [1998] HCA 27

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 (2021) 272 CLR 329; [2021] HCA 6

Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VicRp 2; [1989] VR 8

Weir and Weir (1993) FLC 92-338; [1992] FamCA 69

Wei v Xia (No 5) (2023) 67 Fam LR 421; [2023] FedCFamC1F 679

Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal fixed in the sum of $10,000 within 42 days.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Khadem & Dabiri has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. By a Notice of Appeal filed 5 November 2025, the appellant seeks to appeal final orders made on 31 October 2025 pursuant to Pt VIII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act").
2. The reasons for judgment were delivered on 16 September 2025 (Dabiri & Khadem (No 4) [2025] FedCFamC1F 644), at which point the parties were given the opportunity to submit a set of proposed orders reflecting the reasons ahead of final orders being made. These reasons are the basis of the final orders made on 31 October 2025 and this appeal. Where we refer to the primary judge's reasons, we are referring to the reasons of 16 September 2025.
3. For the reasons set out below the Notice of Appeal will be dismissed.

1. On 9 December 2025, an appeal judicial registrar made orders which included, apposite to this appeal, a requirement that the appellant file a Summary of Argument and List of Authorities by 4.30 pm on 19 January 2026.
2. By letter dated 22 December 2025, the parties were advised that the appeal would be heard by the Full Court on 25 February 2026. The letter also reminded the parties of the filing directions.
3. The appellant did not comply with the directions, and on 20 January 2026 the appeal judicial registrar wrote to the appellant's solicitors confirming the listing of the appeal and noting that the non-compliance had not been remedied. The letter also reminded the appellant that the Full Court may dismiss any appeal pursuant to s 32(3)(f)(i) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) for failure to comply with a court direction, as well as under r 13.45 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules"). The letter went on to give notice that the Full Court would consider whether to dismiss the appeal at the hearing on 25 February 2026.
4. On 30 January 2026, the appellant's solicitors filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act. That same day, the appeal judicial registrar wrote to the appellant directly, confirming the hearing date of the appeal, attaching the earlier correspondence sent to the appellant's lawyers, a copy of the Notice of Appeal, the orders made, and the relevant extract of the Rules.
5. On 15 February 2026, the appellant emailed the appeal judicial registrar. The email commenced with the words "Submission Subject: Appeal Case NAA541/2025..." and went on to make a series of discursive complaints, including assertions of racial bias, complaints about the conduct of his own lawyers, complaints about the conduct of the respondent's lawyers and criticisms of the findings of the primary judge. No aspect of the email attempted to engage in a systematic or ordered way with the grounds within the Notice of Appeal.
6. On 16 February 2026, the appeal judicial registrar wrote to the appellant advising that he could not make submissions by email, informing him that he needed to e-file a Summary of Argument which he would require the Court's leave to rely upon and enquired whether he would be attending the appeal.
7. The appellant did not respond to the email.
8. On the day before the hearing of the appeal, the appellant e-filed a document described as "Outline of Argument - Appellant". That document identified seven grounds of appeal. While much of it repeated the grounds in the Notice of Appeal, it also advanced several new grounds.
9. At the hearing, the appellant appeared unrepresented assisted by an interpreter and sought to rely upon both the Notice of Appeal and the very late filed Outline of Argument. The respondent opposed that course. Over objection, we permitted the appellant to proceed with his argument for leave to rely on the late filed Outline of Argument and to address the merits of the appeal.
10. Parties who fail to comply with directions do so at their peril. Non-compliance with directions made for the orderly administration of the Court's business impacts not only the respondent but also the wider community, who are seeking to have their appeals heard as promptly as possible. Delinquency of the kind demonstrated by this appellant exposes an appeal to the potential of being summarily dismissed pursuant to r 13.45 of the Rules_._
11. In that respect, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 said as follows:
    1. ...when an appellant has instituted an appeal within time, if all other things are equal, the bare fact that the appellant has failed to take some interlocutory step within the time fixed by the rules would not be reason enough to shut that appellant out from the pursuit of the appeal unless it were clear that the appeal would fail. Of course, the qualification "if all other things are equal" is very important and it should not be permitted to obscure the fact that very often the fact that an appeal is pending may itself affect the respondent adversely in some way...
12. Respectfully, their Honours' words are apposite to the situation here. The contumelious conduct of the appellant means that "all other things are [not] equal". His conduct has caused injustice to the respondent involving delay, the continuation of the litigation and unnecessary cost.
13. Their Honours' observations also carry an important qualification, namely, "unless it were clear that the appeal would fail". A consideration of both the Notice of Appeal and Outline of Argument comfortably leads to that conclusion.
14. Before turning to the grounds, it is necessary to briefly set out the background to the proceedings and to identify aspects of the primary judge's findings that bear upon the grounds.

1. The primary judge recorded that the parties were born in Country E, with the appellant aged 60 and the respondent aged 54. The primary judge noted that while the parties initially married in Country E in 1997 and divorced in late 2001, they recommenced their relationship and remarried in Country E in late 2002. The parties subsequently immigrated to Australia.
2. They have one child, who at the time of hearing, was over 18.
3. The parties separated on a final basis in May 2018 and were divorced in early 2020.
4. The hearing took place over six days in April and May 2025. The appellant was represented until the last day when his counsel and solicitor were granted leave to withdraw. As set out above, on 16 September 2025, the primary judge delivered reasons and made orders for the parties to "file and serve a proposed final order to reflect the Reasons for Judgement" (Order 1). Following receipt of a proposed draft order on behalf of the respondent and a document titled "Written Submissions" from the appellant, the primary judge made final orders on 31 October 2025.
5. The primary judge recorded that in addition to the proceedings before the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, the appellant brought criminal and civil proceedings against the respondent and her sisters in Country E. The primary judge described this as amounting "to no more than vexatious conduct" and that the appellant pursued his claims in the Country E courts "in bad faith and with malice" (at [57]).
6. The primary judge observed that the parties did not agree on the composition of the pool of assets for division. A significant issue was the respondent's contention the appellant was the owner of property in Country E which he said was owned by his mother (referred to as the BB Street property), whether he owned a second property in Country E (referred to as the Suburb U property), whether he owed his mother over $500,000 and assertions that he had failed in his duty of disclosure.
7. Central to the determination of these and other issues was the primary judge's findings as to credit and non-disclosure. The primary judge found the appellant "does not have any credibility whatsoever. His evidence cannot be believed" (at [58]) and that he was "such a poor witness that it is difficult for the Court to know whether or not anything that he said in his evidence was truthful" (at [72]). In contrast, the primary judge concluded the respondent "is a witness who tells the truth", whilst the appellant "is a witness who does not tell the truth" (at [178]).
8. The primary judge found repeated and serious failures by the appellant to comply with his obligation of full and frank disclosure, including "a deliberate non-disclosure" in relation to bank statements and properties in Country E (at [138]). The primary judge found that the appellant had "acted fraudulently" and "fabricated this evidence" (at [174]), was "not candid, not honest and not cooperative" (at [182]), and had "acted dishonestly time and time again" (at [255]). The primary judge concluded that he "ought not be permitted to profit from his dishonest conduct" (at [210]) and described his overall conduct as "egregious" and "outstandingly bad" (at [257]).
9. The primary judge found the net property pool to be $2,064,220 (at [211]), the contributions of the parties to be equal, and that there was no necessity to make any adjustment to the contribution-based finding.

**Ground 1 - The trial judge erred in finding that the respondent transferred AUD350,000 to the appellant when the evidence showed the sum was in Country E Currency 1

Ground 2 - The trial judge erred in accepting late raised evidence of a AUD350,000 transfer that was not disclosed in the respondent's earlier affidavits, thereby denying procedural fairness**

1. These grounds address the same issue, namely the primary judge's findings in relation to funds the respondent says she transferred to the appellant. Each ground refers to a transfer of AUD350,000. The primary judge's reasons make no reference to such a transfer but do deal with the transfer of AUD370,000. In the absence of any reference to AUD350,000, the grounds must be infelicitously drawn in referencing such a sum.

The respondent's evidence was that AUD370,000 was transferred by her to the appellant in 2010 (respondent's affidavit filed 12 March 2025, paragraph 108). No objection was taken by the appellant's counsel to the evidence of transfer or to the conversion rate used by the respondent as the foundation for her conclusion.

1. During cross-examination, the respondent was asked by the primary judge how much money was transferred and she responded as follows:

HIS HONOUR: Does she remember how much money it was, approximately?

THE INTERPRETER: $370,000, I think, roughly.

HIS HONOUR: A$370,000?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE INTERPRETER: Yes.

(Transcript 29 April 2025, p.116 lines 12-20)

1. Her oral evidence did not depart from her affidavit. The respondent was not challenged on her evidence as to the amount transferred or how she calculated what the amount was in AUD. Her oral evidence was later reconfirmed in re-examination.
2. An appellant asserting an error of fact must establish that the incontrovertible facts or the uncontested evidence demonstrates the primary judge's conclusions were either erroneous or alternatively his determination was "glaringly improbable" or "contrary to compelling inferences" (Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [29]). That is not apparent here.
3. The primary judge accepted the evidence of the respondent that the amount was AUD370,000. The primary judge's finding accords with the unchallenged evidence and was consequently open on the evidence (Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296). Thus, there is no merit to Ground 1.
4. Likewise Ground 2 has no merit. Whether or not the AUD370,000 transfer was disclosed in an earlier affidavit is immaterial. The evidence was disclosed in the respondent's trial affidavit and was not the subject of challenge by the appellant's counsel. As an appealable proposition, a denial of procedural fairness ground can only be directed to the fairness of the hearing, not the result (Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 [2021] HCA 6; (2021) 272 CLR 329). The appellant's real complaint concerns the use the primary judge made of the respondent's evidence. Ground 2 must fail.

Ground 3 - The trial judge erred in admitting and/or relying upon a secretly obtained recording made by the parties' child

1. The respondent said she had a voice recording of the appellant saying he was going to deny ownership of the Suburb U property. Her affidavit records that a copy of the voice recording was disclosed to the appellant's legal representatives, and she annexed to her affidavit a transcript of the recording. No objection was taken by the appellant to the paragraph, and the respondent was not cross-examined on either the paragraph or the annexed transcript.
2. To succeed, even assuming the primary judge erred in admitting the evidence (about which we express no view), the appellant would have to establish the evidence was of such materiality that it influenced the primary judge's findings (De Winter and De Winter (1979) FLC 90-605).
3. The primary judge addressed the recording in the reasons for judgment as follows:
   1. Even without the benefit of the voice recording (Annexure "[DABIRI]-30") there is sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a property in Suburb U and that it is matrimonial property.
4. It is clear from the primary judge's reasons that the requirement of materiality is absent. Ground 3 fails.

**Ground 4 - The trial judge erred in attributing ownership of the Suburb U property to the appellant despite affidavit evidence that it was owned and sold by a third party

Ground 5 - The trial judge erred in rejecting the appellant's evidence of a $500,000 loan from his mother, supported by affidavit evidence**

1. Grounds 4 and 5 contend error in the factual findings made by the primary judge.
2. The primary judge's reasons deal at significant length with the Suburb U property at [127]-[138] and the loan from the appellant's mother at [144]-[167]. The resolution of the issue of ownership of the Suburb U property and the loan from the appellant's mother turned on the primary judge's acceptance of the respondent's evidence in preference to that of the appellant.
3. The primary judge's finding was soundly based. The primary judge found the respondent was a truthful witness (at [31]), that the appellant was not a truthful witness (at [31]), that he made false allegations (at [48]), that he was dishonest and lacked credibility as a witness (at [50]), that his conduct was vexatious, in bad faith and conducted with malice (at [57]), that he "does not have any credibility whatsoever. His evidence cannot be believed" (at [58]) and that he was evasive and intent on obfuscation (at [72]).
4. If that were not enough to sustain the rejection of any evidence advanced in the appellant's case, the primary judge found "the [appellant] was a very unimpressive witness. Indeed, the [appellant] was such a poor witness that it is difficult for the Court to know whether or not anything that he said in his evidence was truthful" (at [72]).
5. The primary judge fortified his reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence in relation to the alleged loan from his mother by observing the appellant's failure to call his mother to give evidence. The reasons reveal that the primary judge correctly drew the available inferences consistent with authority (Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011] HCA 11; (2011) 243 CLR 361). There is no merit to Grounds 4 and 5.

Ground 6 - The trial judge failed to consider relevant evidence, including the Country E freeze order, lawyers' notes, affidavits, gold coins, savings, and superannuation balances

1. A court is not required to address every factual dispute or every submission made (Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [62]).
2. To the extent there was a failure to consider relevant evidence, appellate intervention would only be warranted where the failure concerned evidence material to the determination. The ground suffers from the deficiency that the assertion that certain evidence was not considered is plainly wrong and is otherwise so imprecisely drawn as to be incapable of establishing error.
3. The primary judge considered the evidence of gold coins at [97], [229], [230] and [231]; the evidence of superannuation at [211], [212], [220], [224], [235] and [251]; and the evidence of savings at [83] and [170]. The assertion that these matters were not considered is erroneous. A search of the electronic appeal book records no reference to a "Country E freeze order". If it is more accurately described as the "no exit order" made by the Country E courts, then again, the assertion that it was not considered is erroneous, as it was addressed by the primary judge at [48] and [50]. What is meant by the contention that lawyers' notes and affidavits were not considered is so opaque as to be specious.
4. There is no merit to Ground 6.

**Ground 7 - The trial judge erred in accepting the lowest valuation of the MM City property without reconciling inconsistent valuations or ordering an independent valuation

Ground 8 - The trial judge erred in accepting inconsistent valuations of the BB Street property without explanation or independent valuation

Ground 9 - The trial judge denied procedural fairness by permitting reliance on expert and valuer affidavits without requiring their attendance for cross examination**

1. These grounds all deal with the same issue, namely the way the primary judge determined the value of the Country E properties described as the MM City property and the BB Street property.
2. The MM City property is in the respondent's name. Notwithstanding the appellant's evidence that his mother is the owner of the BB Street property, the primary judge found it to be the property of the appellant.
3. The respondent adduced evidence of value from a real estate agent. The appellant did not object to the evidence nor challenge it, his counsel merely submitted that the primary judge should give the evidence little weight. The assessment of weight to be given to evidence is entirely the province of the trial judge (CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172) and the primary judge's reasons reveal the weight he gave the evidence. In the absence of a ground contending the decision is manifestly wrong, a challenge to the invitation to give the evidence such weight as is appropriate is not a competent ground of appeal (Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571).
4. The primary judge addressed the question of value in relation to the MM City property as follows:
   1. Neither party provided written valuation evidence by an expert valuer - as we understand that term in Australia. The [respondent] has provided appraisals from real estate agents. This is the best evidence available to the Court. In the particular circumstances of this case, I am prepared to accept the evidence put forward by the [respondent] (from the real estate agents) as to the value of the MM City property. The [respondent] is in a very difficult position in this case. The [appellant] has conducted himself in a dishonest manner in relation to a large number of matters connected to this litigation. The [appellant] has failed to make proper disclosure and, as I will explain later in these Reasons for Judgment, this Court should not be reluctant to make findings in favour of the innocent party - in this case the [respondent].
5. The primary judge addressed the question of value in relation to the BB Street property as follows:
   1. The current value of the BB Street property - according to the available evidence, namely the real estate appraisals - is $547,413.79. It has to be kept in mind that the [appellant] did not disclose that he owns the BB Street property. The [appellant] maintains that the BB Street property is owned by his mother. The [appellant] has not made the property available for inspection or valuation. This failure to make proper disclosure by the [appellant] and this failure by the [appellant] to be candid with the Court leads the Court to conclude that it is appropriate, in the circumstances of this case, for the Court to make findings in favour of the innocent party (the [respondent]). Hence it is appropriate to use the real estate appraisals in relation to the BB Street property.

1. The primary judge gave reasons for accepting this evidence at [75], [76] and [111]-[116]. In circumstances where neither party had obtained a valuation, the Court had to do the best it could on the evidence that was available. In that respect, the observations of Callinan J in Chang v Su S104/2002 [2002] HCATrans 549 (5 November 2002) are apposite, where his Honour said:
   1. It does not matter what the principle might be said to be, a court has to do the best it can. It does the best it can, having regard to the evidence that is adduced and if the parties are not frank then naturally there is going to be a measure of imprecision about any findings that the court can make.
2. Such a proposition is even more relevant where one party persistently fails to comply with their obligations of disclosure. As Harper J observed in Wei v Xia (No 5) [2023] FedCFamC1F 679; (2023) 67 Fam LR 421:
   1. ...The jurisprudence in this Court about the consequences of breach of the duty by incomplete or inadequate disclosure are relevant to the assessment of evidence, the drawing of inferences and ultimately may bear on the question of discharge of an onus of proof...

...

1. A failure to disclose in financial proceedings in this Court may lead to unfavourable inferences against the defaulting party very similar to the adverse inferences which may be drawn in accordance with the Blatch v Archer principle discussed above, in the sense of having the effect of discounting the evidence of the non-disclosing party. They are separate bases which can lead to the same or similar result.

1. Grounds 7 and 8 must fail. Ground 9 has no merit in circumstances where no application was made for the valuers to be available for cross-examination.

Ground 10 - The trial judge misapplied Weir and Weir by drawing adverse inferences of nondisclosure without proper basis

1. The primary judge addressed the question of the appellant's persistent failure to comply with his disclosure obligations at [76], [90], [113], [124], [125], [137]-[140], [165], [210], [223], [224], [248], [255] and [257]. The primary judge at [139] accurately recorded the observations of the Full Court in Weir and Weir [1992] FamCA 69; (1993) FLC 92-338 and correctly enunciated the propositions for which that authority stands at [140] and [210]. The reasons as referred to above provide a sound and proper basis, consistent with authority, for the findings and inferences drawn by the primary judge. Ground 10 fails.

Ground 11 - The trial judge failed to exercise independent discretion and gave inadequate reasons, substantially adopting the respondent's proposed orders

1. It is not apparent what is meant by the assertion the primary judge "failed to exercise independent discretion". As framed, it is not a competent ground of appeal. As to the contention of inadequate reasons, Nettle J in DL v The Queen [2018] HCA 26; (2018) 266 CLR 1 observed:
   1. ... although the extent of reasons may depend on the circumstances of the case, reasons must identify the relevant principles of law, refer to relevant evidence, state the judge's findings upon material questions of fact and provide an explanation for those findings and the ultimate conclusions reached by the judge.

1. The primary judge's reasons comfortably satisfy the requirements of adequacy. The primary judge identified the issues required for determination, made findings about the credibility of the parties, addressed the appellant's non-disclosure, addressed various evidentiary issues, made findings as to the parties' assets and liabilities, assessed their contributions and gave reasons for that assessment, and addressed the matters relevant to the determination under s 79(5) of the Act and gave reasons as to why the outcome was just and equitable. The judgment clearly reveals to the parties and this Court the reasoning upon which the decision is based, and justice is seen to be done (Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VicRp 2; [1989] VR 8).
2. The primary judge did not adopt the respondent's proposed orders. The orders made on 16 September 2025 directed the parties to file proposed orders reflecting the reasons for judgment. The respondent complied and the appellant did not.
3. The primary judge's reasons delivered on 31 October 2025 record:
   1. The [appellant] provided a three-page document called "Written Submission" and that document was forwarded to the Court on 7 October 2025. On the third page of that document, I note that the words "compiled with the assistance of AI" have been included. I do not know in what manner or to what extent the [appellant's] written submission was compiled by Artificial Intelligence.
   2. On 13 October 2025 the [appellant] forwarded an email to the Court and at the same time sent to the Court a proposed order comprising six pages. The [appellant's] proposed order is not a proposed order. It certainly does not reflect the reasons for judgment. The document which is entitled "Proposed Final Order" submitted by the [appellant] is in fact a series of written submissions by the [appellant]. When I say submissions - I actually mean a litany of complaints by the [appellant] in relation to the Reasons for Judgment...

...

1. Leaving aside proposed order 7 (submitted by the [respondent]) I intend to make orders which are substantially in accordance with the balance of the orders sought by the [respondent] and which were forwarded to the Court on 7 October 2025.

(Emphasis in original)

**Ground 1 - Erroneous attribution of the Country E property

Ground 2 - Failure to address the value of the appellant's mother's apartment

Ground 3 - Failure to address the dowry (180 gold coins)

Ground 5 - Failure to deduct the appellant's mother's $500,000 loan

Ground 6 - Insufficient reasoning for fabrication finding**

1. These grounds, in many respects, repeat the contentions of asserted error raised in several of the grounds in the Notice of Appeal. The grounds will be addressed together as they each contend error by a failure to give adequate reasons. The assertion of such failure is specious.
2. As addressed earlier in the context of Ground 4 in the Notice of Appeal, the primary judge's reasons dealt in detail with the ownership of the Suburb U property (Ground 1 in the Outline of Argument) at [127]-[138], and with the loan from the appellant's mother at [144]-[167] (Grounds 2 and 5 in the Outline of Argument). The reasons clearly reveal how the primary judge resolved both the issue of ownership of the Suburb U property and the question of the loan from the appellant's mother, relying in part on the primary judge's acceptance of the respondent's evidence over that of the appellant, the appellant's chronic failure to comply with his disclosure obligations, and his failure to call his mother as a witness. The findings of the primary judge accord with the evidence, and the reasons adequately explain how the primary judge reached his conclusions.
3. The assertion in the Outline of Argument that the primary judge failed to address the value of the Suburb U property or to clearly state whether it "formed part of the pool" is erroneous. The primary judge accepted the respondent's evidence that the appellant had represented the property's value to be AUD600,000 (at [127]), gave reasons for its inclusion in the pool of assets (at [140]), and included it in the pool of asserts (at [211]).
4. Ground 3 in the Outline of Argument contends that the primary judge's reasons do not address the issue of the respondent's dowry. This ground is without merit. The primary judge expressly addressed the issue of the dowry at [52], [98] and [130] concluding:
   1. In any event, I accept the evidence of the [respondent]. The [respondent] did receive 60 gold coins in about 2018 after she brought Court proceedings in Country E. I infer from the available evidence that the [respondent] has had to use those gold coins to help fund living expenses in the seven years that have elapsed since the final separation. In addition, the [respondent] had to spend a significant amount of her Dowry (the gold coins) to retain a lawyer in Country E to represent her and her sisters in order to defend the false claims brought against the [respondent] (and her sisters) by the [appellant]. I have accepted the [respondent's] evidence in relation to this.
5. As to Ground 6 in the Outline of Argument, the primary judge's findings at [31], [48], [50], [57], [58], [72], [138], [174], [178], [182], [210], [255] and [257] set out in detail the reasons for preferring the respondent's evidence over that of the appellant. Grounds 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 in the Outline of Argument therefore fail.

Ground 4 - Failure to address freezing and transfer orders

1. There is no merit to this ground as its success relies upon an acceptance of the appellant's evidence, which the primary judge rejected for the reasons given above.

1. Ground 7 amounts to no more than a submission and does not constitute a competent ground of appeal.

1. For the above reasons, the appeal will be dismissed.

1. The respondent sought an order that the appellant pay her costs in the sum of $10,000 by reference to a Schedule of Costs prepared in accordance with Sch 3 of the Rules. In circumstances where the appellant failed to comply with directions and where the appeal was without merit and will be dismissed, we are satisfied it is appropriate to make a costs order.
2. The Court has the power to fix a sum for costs to avoid delay, aggravation and further costs (Graham & Squibb [2019] FamCAFC 33; (2019) FLC 93-892). There is sufficient evidence before us to fix costs in a set amount, and we are satisfied that the circumstances justify an order for costs in the sum of $10,000. An order will be made for those costs to be paid within 42 days.

I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Aldridge, Kari & Schonell.