4. This issue was discussed in the directions hearings I have conducted in this matter, particularly in the hearing I conducted on 11 December 2024, and the parties made submissions concerning the issue which are in summary, as follows.
5. Mr Quinn referred to the decision of Re PCM[3] and submitted that the question of permission should be dealt with as a preliminary issue, and the application for review should be dismissed because:

a) In relation to the issue of administration, the application for review seeks to unreasonably pursue QKC, and to use this process to achieve a forensic examination of the attorneys' accounts, when any such action should properly be done utilising the process under the Powers of Attorney and Agency Act 1984 (the PAA Act). > > b) In relation to the issue of guardianship, the original Order is clearly consistent with the wishes of the protected person as expressed in her Advance Care Directive (ACD), and the Tribunal was correct in placing emphasis on that consideration due to the principles contained in section 5 of the G&A Act, and in particular, that the Tribunal should give paramount consideration to the wishes of the protected person.

6. Ms Doyle (who appeared as counsel for the applicants in this particular directions hearing) submitted that due to the complexity of the matter, the Tribunal should not deal with the issue of permission as a preliminary question, but should deal with the issue as part of the determination of the application for review. Ms Doyle submitted that this approach would be the most efficient way to address the issue of permission. She also submitted that the grounds of the review involve multiple procedural issues as well as issues raised in relation to the substantive orders and these issues needed to be properly explored before the Tribunal could determine the question of permission. Ms Doyle submitted that the decision of Re PCM is not analogous to this matter.
7. In considering this issue in the course of the directions hearings, I decided that it would not be appropriate to determine the issue of permission as a preliminary question.
8. I have now decided that permission should be granted for a number of reasons.

a) I consider that the Tribunal made a procedural error in terms of the constitution of the panel for the final hearing on 7 August 2024. The Tribunal had conducted hearings on 10 November 2023 and 18 January 2024 before conducting the final hearing on 7 August 2024. Member Gooch conducted the hearings on 10 November 2023 and 1 January 2024 as a single member panel. The hearing conducted on 7 August 2024 was conducted as a two member panel with Member Gooch presiding, and Member Irving also participating. Unfortunately, it appears that Member Gooch was under the misapprehension that the panel had been reconstituted,[4] but this had not actually occurred and so I consider this was a procedural error.[5] This is ground 7 of the amended grounds of review. > > b) Prior to the original Order, the Tribunal made an order on 26 July 2023 in relation to the protected person. This order was made on the application of a social worker from the Royal Adelaide Hospital and the guardians. They were seeking orders under section 32 G&A Act because the protected person was to be discharged from hospital into a memory support unit which was locked by way of keypad entry, and the protected person did not have the code to the keypad.

The Tribunal order of 26 July 2023 made orders under section 32(1)(a) and (b) G&A Act in favour of the substituted decision-maker QKC, under the misapprehension that he was the sole substituted decision-maker appointed under the ACD and therefore had the power to make decisions about accommodation, in relation to the protected person.

It appears that the order made on 26 July 2023 was not discussed at the hearing conducted on 10 November 2023 and there was no discussion about the medical evidence that had been provided to the Tribunal for that hearing.[6] The order was disclosed in the directions made by the Tribunal on 10 November 2023, but I consider that the parties should have been made aware of the previous order and there should have been a discussion about the medical evidence available to the Tribunal from that hearing.[7]

1. The Tribunal did not allow questions to be asked of the persons who were the interested parties in the original proceedings, and who I am describing as the guardians in this matter. Up until May 2025, the position of those persons has consistently been that they wished to retain their position as guardians for the protected person. For most of the original proceedings, they also wished to be considered to be appointed as administrators. I consider that where a person is seeking an appointment under the G&A Act as guardian or administrator, they should be prepared to answer questions generally about their suitability for the role, and in particular, whether or not they meet the criteria under section 50 G&A Act,[8] if that is disputed by a person with a proper interest (or the Tribunal itself wishes to ask such questions).

d) I consider that the Tribunal's approach in refusing to take into account the actions of the first respondents as attorneys for the protected person, in relation to the issue of their suitability to be appointed guardians for the protected person, was incorrect.[9] In my view, if that evidence is relevant to the issue of the suitability of the attorneys to be guardians for the protected person, then it should be taken into account, particularly if the evidence is relevant to the criteria in section 50 G&A Act.[10]

"The administrator is advised that allegations of financial mismanagement have been made and the administrator should consider this while reviewing the records provided and act accordingly."

I do not consider this statement provided adequate direction to the administrators in this matter. I consider that further direction should have been provided.[11]

For the above reasons, I will grant permission for the application for internal review to proceed - I consider that the applicants have raised arguable issues and the justice of the case requires that I grant permission. Subject to my further comments in paragraph 17 concerning the grounds of review, I will address any other issues raised in the grounds of review, in the course of my decision.

Failure to disclose appointment to the Administrative Review Tribunal

1. In grounds 6, 7 and 8 of the amended grounds of review, the applicants state that there was a procedural defect in the original proceedings because Ms Gooch did not disclose her appointment to the Administrative Review Tribunal effective from 19 August 2024, which must necessarily have meant that she did not have a proper opportunity to consider all of the evidence and submissions in this matter, and accordingly her decision-making must have been flawed.
2. I do not accept this proposition. Member Gooch issued her decision before she left SACAT. There is nothing to suggest that she did not consider she had an adequate time to properly consider the matter and I do not accept the applicants' submissions that she curtailed the hearing process because of that appointment.

The Tribunal's approach to the issue of confidentiality

1. Throughout the original hearing process, and the internal review process, the applicants have claimed that Member Gooch's decision not to disclose to them a copy of the protected person's will, and copies of financial information relating to the management of her affairs by her attorneys, was unfair and impaired their ability to be in a sufficiently well-informed position to properly argue their case.
2. The applicants argued that even though they had been informed by the Tribunal that QKC is named in the will of the protected person, without knowing the extent of his entitlement under the will, they are unable to make submissions as to the extent of his conflict.[12] They argued that the process adopted in the original hearings in relation to the financial documents, by which Ms Nelson was provided with access to certain financial information, but she was unable to copy or remove any of it, was unreasonably restrictive.
3. The request for this access was opposed by Mr Quinn and Ms Hanna.
4. I dealt with this aspect of the matter in the directions I made on 12 December 2024, in which I referred to the decision of the Tribunal in Re XHQ.[13] In particular, I consider that the following statements provide useful guidance in these matters:

59. Confidentiality issues arise in guardianship proceedings in different contexts.

5. As this matter illustrates, there can often be a tension between three important factors:
   • The principle of open justice and accountability
   • The principle of procedural fairness
   • The nature of the guardianship jurisdiction with its unique issues and focus on the protection of the individual.
6. There is no doubt that the first two principles must on occasions be modified in their application due to the nature of the jurisdiction in which they are being applied ...
   1. The nature of the guardianship jurisdiction is unique. It is not an "inter partes" jurisdiction. The purpose of the jurisdiction is to protect persons who have a mental incapacity. (I will refer to such persons as "protected persons" and use that term to include those who are the subject of applications under the G & A Act, even where an order has not yet been made).[14] The focus of the jurisdiction is not on the rights of interested persons, but on the rights and interests of the protected person.
   2. Others, such as family members, may have an interest in the matter but the Tribunal is not determining the relevant issues as between the protected person and others. The nature of the jurisdiction is inquisitorial and protective.
   3. The applicant for an administration order (perhaps a family member or a health practitioner) is not seeking to enforce any existing legal right, but rather to create a new legal right or status.
   4. Protected persons are not normally before the Tribunal of their own volition. They are brought there by others and the proceedings will often concern matters which are highly personal, sensitive and confidential. If the person had capacity, no-one else would have the right to access such personal information. The protected person's right to privacy is an important aspect of personal dignity which the legislation seeks to preserve and respect ...
   5. The rules of procedural fairness are flexible, [and allow for different approaches in different matters, depending on the nature of the matter]
   6. Section 8(1)(g) of the SACAT Act (while strictly referring to "procedures") acknowledges the need for flexibility in dealing with "particular cases" and "particular jurisdictions". Section 60 of the SACAT Act confers on the Tribunal flexible powers for dealing with the tensions which have been noted. That section recognises that there will be situations in which the "confidential nature of the evidence to be given before the Tribunal" will be a sufficient basis for making orders under the section. Furthermore, such orders can be made "for any other reason that the Tribunal thinks fit". The powers contained in s 60 must of course be exercised judicially, but the very breadth of the powers is instructive. The guardianship jurisdiction stands out as an area where the use of such broad powers may be applicable to protect persons with mental incapacity and achieve the objectives of the G & A Act.
7. In the directions I made on 12 December 2024, I said that I had concluded that I would not adopt a different approach from that adopted by Member Gooch in the original proceedings. In particular, I stated that I did not accept that even if the guardians are named as executors or beneficiaries in the will of the protected person, this necessarily creates a conflict.[15] I also stated that I did not consider that further disclosure of the financial documents was warranted and I noted in particular in relation to that issue, that the guardians were no longer seeking to be appointed as administrators.

1. On 14 May 2025, the Tribunal received an application by the guardians, supported by affidavits of QKC and VJU, and a statutory declaration of MAB.
2. In his affidavit, QKC said that he has recently experienced a number of medical issues of concern to him. He stated that because of those medical conditions, he wished to revoke his consent to act as guardian for the protected person. QKC provided a letter from his doctor in support of his affidavit.
3. In her affidavit, VJU said that she has been diagnosed with a medical condition for which she is receiving treatment, and she also wished to revoke her consent to act as guardian for the protected person. VJU provided a medical report in support of her affidavit.
4. In her statutory declaration, MAB also stated that she wished to withdraw her consent to act as guardian for the protected person.
5. The interlocutory application sought an order from the Tribunal appointing the Public Advocate as guardian for the protected person.
6. I raised this issue as a preliminary matter and invited submissions about it on the first day of the full hearing.
7. Initially, Mr Quinn submitted that all three of the guardians had decided to withdraw their consent to act as guardians, and their position was that the correct or preferable order would be to appoint the Public Advocate instead.
8. The application was opposed by Ms Nelson who submitted that if the guardians withdrew their consent to act as guardians, the Tribunal must determine who should be appointed as guardian, but she acknowledged that it would no longer be necessary for her to ask questions of VJU or QKC as to their suitability to be appointed as guardians.
9. In dealing with the application for review, I am dealing with the application under section 70 SACAT Act. Section 70 SACAT Act requires the Tribunal to make the correct or preferable decision on review. The forms of order that can be made when the Tribunal is dealing with an application for internal review are contained in section 70(6) SACAT Act and they are an order to:
   • Affirm the decision under review;
   • Vary the decision under review;
   • Set aside the decision under review and either remit the matter for re-consideration, or substitute a different decision.
10. Therefore, there is no scope for the Tribunal to make an order on the basis of a request by a party, or the parties, even if that request is made by consent (and in this case, the applicants did not consent in any event) - unless I considered the order sought is the correct or preferable order.
11. Therefore, I informed the guardians that it was not open to them to withdraw their consent to act as guardians, on condition that the Tribunal would appoint the Public Advocate as guardian for the protected person. I informed the parties that if the guardians withdrew their consent to continue to act as guardians, then it must necessarily follow that their appointment to act as guardians would terminate,[16] but who should be appointed as guardian instead, was an issue that must be determined by the Tribunal.
12. I allowed a brief adjournment for the parties to consider these views. At the resumed hearing, Mr Quinn informed me that VJU still wished to withdraw her consent to act, but QKC did not. MAB that she also wished to withdraw her consent to act. The review proceeded on that basis.

1. HYN is a cousin of the protected person. She is supportive of QKC's actions as attorney and guardian for the protected person. On 23 May 2025, HYN made a request that she be permitted to join in the proceedings, and that she and a long-term friend of the protected person, WTI, should be considered as potential guardians for the protected person.
2. HYN made brief oral submissions in the hearing conducted on 26 May 2025.
3. My understanding of HYN's position is that she and WTI were agreeable to acting as guardians either instead of QKC, or jointly with him.
4. I rejected the application for the following reasons:
   • If HYN and WTI wished to make submissions generally in support of the actions of the guardian or any of them, or they wished to consider being appointed as guardians either on their own or with one or all of the guardians, then they could have made their submissions or requests in the original hearing process.

• The general approach of the Tribunal in dealing with original applications concerning guardianship or administration is not to require or allow multiple applications or cross applications, particularly from family members - they can be heard without a separate application being made by each person.[17]
• This is a review process. The primary function of a review is to consider whether the original Order is the correct or preferable order on the basis of the evidence available to the Tribunal at the time. Although the Tribunal has a discretion to admit fresh evidence under section 70(4) SACAT Act, that discretion should be exercised with caution, and it should not be used to create a scenario in which the issue being determined in the review process, is something quite different from what was determined in the original Order.
• The Tribunal has power to join a party to proceedings, under section 54 SACAT Act. I do not consider that HYN's application satisfies any of the criteria in that section. In addition, I consider that any decision to join a party must be consistent with the objectives of the SACAT Act and the G&A Act. I do not consider that is the case because both the SACAT Act and the G&A Act require the Tribunal to act expeditiously.[18] I consider that the application for internal review can be adequately dealt with, without joining HYN and WTI in these proceedings - if I decided that the appointment of QKC as guardian should be revoked, and I considered that HYN and WTI (or either of them) was likely to be the most suitable guardian/s, then I could set aside the original Order, and remit the matter for re-consideration.

1. Ms Peterson and Mr Falzarano attended the first two directions hearings in this matter. They provided a letter in response to my directions of 11 November 2024. They did not wish to participate further in these proceedings, and I excused them from further attendance.

The position of the legal representative for the protected person

1. Ms Hanna and Mr Bickle of the Legal Services Commission represented the protected person in this matter but in doing so, they made it clear to the Tribunal that the protected person has lost capacity and is unable to communicate her views.[19]

1. The protected person is 71 years old. She is a single person and she has no children. She grew up in Toowoomba with her parents and her brother. By the time of the original application, all of those family members had died.
2. On 31 May 2017, the protected person was diagnosed with Alzheimer's Disease.
3. On 11 July 2017, the protected person signed:
   • An enduring power of attorney (EPOA) by which she appointed QKC and VJU as her attorneys with their appointment effective immediately and continuing notwithstanding any subsequent incapacity;

• An ACD by which she purported to appoint the guardians as her substitute decision-makers, however, as the document was not properly executed by all parties, the Tribunal subsequently found that the appointments of the substitute decision-makers was invalid;[20]
• A will.

1. Dr Short, neurologist, confirmed by letter dated 16 August 2023 that in her opinion the protected person had testamentary capacity when those documents were executed.
2. In about 10 March 2022 the guardians commenced making decisions for the protected person, pursuant to the ACD.
3. On about 18 May 2023 the protected person was admitted to residential care at Resthaven Leabrook where she resided in the secure memory support unit. On or around 28 June 2023 the protected person was hospitalised for a period of approximately seven weeks at the Royal Adelaide Hospital due to behavioural and psychological symptoms of dementia.
4. On 29 June 2023, Dr Yu, geriatrician, referred to the protected person's diagnosis as early onset dementia of "severe severity" probably due to Alzheimer's dementia, noting global deficits complicated by behavioural and psychological symptoms. In Dr Yu's opinion, the protected person had no decision-making capacity at that stage.
5. The guardians (and a social worker) applied to the Tribunal seeking orders under section 32(1)(a) and (b) G&A Act and on 28 July 2023, the Tribunal granted those powers to QKC but on the misapprehension that he had been validly appointed as the substituted decision-maker for the protected person under her ACD. The Tribunal directed that the order should be reviewed on or before 25 January 2024.
6. On 4 August 2023 the applicants lodged an application seeking orders appointing all or any of them to be the guardian and administrator of the protected person.
7. On 12 November 2023 the Tribunal declared the appointment of the substituted decision-makers under the ACD to be invalid, appointed the guardians as interim guardians for the protected person and confirmed the orders previously made under section 32(1) G&A Act. The role of the guardians was limited to making decisions about:
   • Accommodation;
   • Health.
8. On 18 January 2024 the Tribunal appointed the guardians to be limited guardians for the protected person to make decisions about:
   • Health;
   • Accommodation;

and continued the powers made under section 32(1) G&A Act.

1. In about July 2024 the attorneys instructed Harcourts Pilgrim to sell the house of the protected person and on 16 July 2024 her house was sold for $2,030,000.
2. On 15 August 2024 the Tribunal made the original Order (subject to a slip rule order made on 12 September 2024) which:

(a) Appointed the guardians to be the guardians for the protected person to make decisions about:

• Where the protected person is to reside;
• Healthcare and medical treatment of the protected person;
• Advocating generally for the rights of the protected person.

(b) Appointed Nicole Peterson and Luigi Falzarano as full administrators of the estate of the protected person.

1. The applicants lodged an application for internal review of the original Order on 13 September 2024.
2. In May 2025, the protected person was moved out of the memory support unit at Resthaven to a general area as she was no longer at risk of absconding, and that is where she currently resides.

1. Section 70 SACAT Act requires that when dealing with an internal review, the Tribunal must make the correct or preferable decision taking into account the evidence available at the original hearing, giving appropriate weight to the original Order, and taking into account any other evidence which has become available in the review hearing process and which is relevant and appropriate to take into account (and subject to the issue of permission).
2. The requirement to determine whether or not the original Order is the correct or preferable order, requires the Tribunal to consider the basis on which the original Order was made (including relevant provisions of the G&A Act).
3. Section 29 G&A Act states that if the Tribunal is satisfied that a person suffers from a mental incapacity and that an order should be made appointing a guardian, then the Tribunal may appoint a guardian either as a limited or full guardian. Generally speaking, a guardian will be appointed if the Tribunal forms the view that due to a mental incapacity, the person is unable to look after their own health, safety or welfare, there are decisions to be made about those issues, and any informal arrangements in place in relation to those decisions, are inadequate.
4. Section 29(4) G&A Act provides that the Public Advocate may be appointed if there is no other suitable person to be appointed in that role.
5. Section 35 G&A Act states that if the Tribunal is satisfied that a person suffers from a mental incapacity and that an order should be made appointing an administrator, then the Tribunal may appoint an administrator either as a limited or full administrator. Generally speaking, an administrator will be appointed if the Tribunal forms the view that due to a mental incapacity, the person is unable to manage their own affairs, there are decisions to be made about their finances or legal matters to be determined, and any informal arrangements in place in relation to those decisions, are inadequate.
6. Section 35(3) G&A Act provides that the Public Trustee may be appointed as administrator.
7. In making an appointment of a guardian or administrator, the Tribunal must be guided by the principles in section 5 G&A Act which are in summary:
   • Consideration must be given to what the wishes of the person would be if that person did not have a mental incapacity;
   • The present wishes should be sought where it is reasonably practicable to do so;
   • The adequacy of existing arrangements must be taken into account;
   • The decision should be the least restrictive in relation to the person's rights and autonomy.
8. In considering the suitability of a person to be appointed as guardian or administrator, section 50 G&A Act requires the Tribunal to consider:
   • Whether the potential appointee and the protected person would be incompatible;
   • Whether there is some existing family arrangement or relationship that should be preserved or should not be disturbed;
   • Whether the potential appointee would be competent to discharge the functions of guardian or administrator under the order and would do so in accordance with the principles stated by the G&A Act;
   • Whether the potential appointee would be readily available for discharging those functions;
   • Whether any conflict of interest would arise from the appointment;
   • Such other matters as the Tribunal considers relevant.

1. Therefore, in dealing with an application for the review of orders made under the G&A Act, the Tribunal would generally consider the questions:

a) Does the protected person have a mental incapacity?

b) If the protected person has a mental incapacity:

• should a guardian be appointed;
• if so,
  • who should be appointed as guardian and
  • should the appointment be general or limited?

c) If the protected person has a mental incapacity:

• should an administrator be appointed;
• if so,
  • who should be appointed as administrator and
  • should the appointment be general or limited?

1. In the original Order, the Tribunal stated that there is no dispute between the parties that the protected person has a mental incapacity for the purposes of the G&A Act.[21] That position continues to be the case in the internal review process, and in fact, there is evidence that the protected person has deteriorated further.[22]
2. There is substantial evidence before the Tribunal concerning the mental incapacity of the protected person, and it is not disputed.[23] This is clearly the correct determination in relation to the issue of mental incapacity.

The guardianship question: Should a guardian be appointed, and if so, who should it be and should their appointment be general or limited?

1. As I have mentioned above, the protected person's ACD is invalid as it was not properly executed.
2. As the protected person's condition has deteriorated to a point where she is unable to make any decisions for herself, all decisions in relation to her health, safety or welfare must be made by someone on her behalf.
3. In these circumstances, the determination in the original Order, was that a guardian should be appointed.
4. In the final review hearing, Mr Quinn submitted that due to the protected person's situation being relatively settled, there are very few decisions that need to be made for her in relation to her health, safety or welfare.
5. I accept that for the time being, the accommodation arrangements for the protected person are settled, but there will be decisions to be made about her health and medical treatment amongst other things, and accordingly I consider that there will be decisions to be made, and as the appointment of the substituted decision-makers under the ACD is invalid, then a guardianship order should be made.

The submissions of the applicants as to who should be appointed as guardian

1. In summary, the applicants submitted that none of the guardians is a suitable person to be appointed as guardian for the following reasons.

a) QKC and VJU have not made decisions in the best interests of the protected person

1. The applicants say that the decision to place the protected person in Resthaven was made too quickly and without fully exploring other options such as the possibility of keeping her at home with the assistance of paid carers. Alternatively, there may have been other facilities which would have been more suitable for the protected person.
2. The applicants say that the decision to have the protected person's dog Bella, euthanised the day after the protected person moved into Resthaven was not in the best interests of the protected person due to her strong attachment to Bella.[24]
3. The applicants state:[25]

"... her [the protected person's] dog Bella was her most precious companion at the time when she was committed to Resthaven (something known not only to [QKC] but to all those who knew her closely), and yet the first thing he did after putting her into Resthaven was to put the dog down."

b) QKC and VJU have failed to properly discharge their fiduciary obligations as attorneys for the protected person

1. In their submissions of 22 May 2024 the applicants make the following statement about the obligations of an attorney:[26]

"...an attorney owes fiduciary obligations to their [principal] and is subject at all times to two essential duties, namely, the duty not, except with the informed consent of the principal, to put themselves in a position where there may be a conflict between their duty as fiduciary and their own interests and not to make a profit out of the relationship with the principal except with the principal's informed consent. "

2. They have submitted that QKC and VJU are in breach of their fiduciary obligations as attorney in multiple ways and this makes either of them unsuitable to be guardians for the protected person;[27] in particular:

(i) QKC terminated the appointment of the long-term financial advisors of the protected person, Byron Capital, at a time when the protected person had lost capacity to make a decision about that issue herself. QKC's approach was essentially to keep a watching brief on the investments at that time (2020) as he considered they were sufficiently diverse.[28] This approach was inconsistent with his fiduciary obligations as an attorney.

(ii) During this period, the protected person's car was damaged beyond repair in a car accident and a new car was bought from her funds at a cost of approximately $71,000. QKC's actions in this regard were inconsistent with his fiduciary obligations as an attorney because:[29]

• The new car was registered in QKC's name when all of the money to buy the new car had come from the funds of the protected person, and QKC's argument that he did this because the protected person no longer had a driver's licence is an inadequate explanation of this arrangement;
• After the protected person moved into Resthaven, QKC continued to drive her car and would have continued to use her car for his own purposes but for the intervention of the Tribunal process;
• During this time QKC sold his own car but he made no contribution at all out of the proceeds of sale from his car towards the purchase of the new car;
• The new car was electric, and QKC installed a charging station at his house but not at the house of the protected person - this action demonstrates his intention to use the car for his own personal use, and his explanations to the contrary are inadequate.

(iii) QKC's actions in relation to the protected person's house were improper and placed him in a position of conflict:

• QKC had been living in the house for 2 1/2 years before the protected person moved into Resthaven without making any contribution towards rent or the outgoings of the house - this placed him in a position of conflict;
• It took about a year for the house to be sold after the protected person moved into Resthaven; it should have been clear that she would be unable to return home even for a visit within the first few months, and the house should have been sold or rented out sooner.

(iv) QKC and VJU's actions as her attorneys have been conducted in a manner which involves irregularity and mismanagement to such an extent that it necessarily means they are not suitable persons to be appointed as her guardians. In particular, QKC's record-keeping was inadequate.[30]

(v) The manner in which QKC sought reimbursement for expenses incurred by him, is in breach of his fiduciary obligations as attorney.

(a) While acting as her attorney, QKC "reimbursed" himself for expenses which he had incurred while caring for the protected person - this happened during the period 27 March 2020 until the time that the protected person moved into Resthaven. The amounts transferred to QKC in this manner were not actually reimbursements because they did not reflect the precise amounts spent. The amounts QKC transferred to himself were ever increasing amounts based on his own estimate of how much he had spent on behalf of the protected person, but when he was asked to produce records to substantiate those amounts, he did not do so.[31]

(b) During this period, many of the expenses for which QKC reimbursed himself were related to entertainment such as light meals at coffee shops or things of that kind. QKC also derived a benefit from those outings. He should have been at least sharing in those expenses.[32]

(c) During the time that QKC was acting as her attorney, QKC took the protected person on two car trips to visit cousins. His approach to reimbursement for the costs of those trips was the same as that outlined in the above paragraph, and accordingly, it was not appropriate. QKC also attempted to recover from the protected person, a charge for depreciation on his car for the trip, which is inappropriate particularly if they were a couple, and in any event, he did not reciprocate the arrangement when he used the car of the protected person for a trip to Melbourne to visit one of his friends.[33]

1. There are two principal aspects to this which have been raised by the applicants.
2. First, QKC has relied on his relationship with the protected person as justification for his approach in decision-making concerning her financial affairs, and in particular, in relation to the issue of reimbursement. The nature of the relationship is disputed by the applicants.
3. The applicants say that QKC has failed to be transparent and consistent with his statements to the Tribunal concerning his relationship with the protected person. They refer to his earlier submissions that after the initial stage of the relationship ended (which it is not disputed was an intimate personal relationship); when a relationship between QKC and the protected person was re-established (the second phase), it was a relationship which was not an intimate personal relationship, but in the review hearing, QKC said that it was an intimate personal relationship.[34]
4. On the basis of statements made by the protected person to her friends, the applicants say that the second phase of the relationship was not an intimate personal one, and so QKC's approach to issues such as the car, the house and reimbursement for expenses was particularly inappropriate.
5. Second, the applicants say that the evidence establishes that QKC exercised coercive control over the protected person.
6. In particular, the applicants referred to the following evidence in this regard:

(i) The evidence that QKC embarked on a practice of isolating the protected person from her friends - for example, by removing a phone number from her phone and discouraging her from socialising with her friends.[35]

(ii) QKC's actions in not allowing the protected person the opportunity to engage with her friends without him being present - when the protected person's friends arrived at her house to visit, there was a pattern observed by a number of them, that QKC would arrive at the house, and they would be deprived of the opportunity to spend time with the protected person without him being present.[36]

(iii) QKC's actions in continuing to remain at the house of the protected person even after she had clearly expressed anger/frustration at QKC being present at her house.[37]

(iv) The actions of QKC concerning the financial affairs of the protected person, and her concern that he was accessing her finances - as evidenced by a text message sent to KGH by the protected person in early 2021 in which the protected person expressed concern that QKC was getting into her money. That message was subsequently deleted from her phone.[38]

1. QKC has a conflict of interest in making any decisions about the protected person because he is named as a beneficiary in the will of the protected person. [39]

e) The application to revoke consent to act as guardian

1. QKC's application to revoke his consent to act as guardian, and for the Public Advocate to be appointed instead, must cause the Tribunal concern because of the inconsistency in his position, and because of the concern it must raise as to whether or not his health is good enough for him to continue in that role (particularly as he will not have the support of the other guardians who have withdrawn their consent to act).
2. The applicants submitted that each of them is a person of integrity with a long-standing personal connection with the protected person, and any of them or all of them would be suitable to be appointed as guardians for the protected person as they meet the criteria in section 50 G&A Act. They say that as the G&A Act states that the Public Advocate may only be appointed if there is no person who is suitable to be appointed as guardian, the Tribunal should appoint one of the applicants.[40]

The submissions of the respondents as to who should be appointed as guardian

1. In summary, at the review hearing, the respondent QKC submitted that he is the most suitable person to be the guardian of the protected person for the following reasons.

a) QKC and VJU have made decisions in the best interests of the protected person

1. Mr Quinn referred to the reports of Catherine King and Dr Singh concerning the suitability of the accommodation at Resthaven for the protected person. He submitted that other alternatives were investigated, and Resthaven was considered the most suitable. He referred to the affidavit evidence concerning the tendency of the protected person to "wander off" and accordingly, the necessity for her to be placed in secure accommodation.[41]
2. Mr Quinn referred to the affidavits of VJU which contain explanations concerning the decision to euthanise the protected person's dog Bella - in particular, her medical conditions of dermatitis, separation anxiety and aggression towards other dogs. Mr Quinn also submitted that at her stage of dementia, the protected person could not remember her dog anyway.[42]

b) QKC and VJU have properly discharged their fiduciary obligations as attorneys for the protected person

1. In relation to the decision to terminate the long-term financial advisors for the protected person, Byron Capital, QKC said that his actions were reasonable as they were taken after consultation with that firm, and on the basis that the investments in the portfolio required little if any action. Mr Quinn referred to the fact that QKC managed the investments through the Netwealth platform.[43]
2. In relation to the issue about the car, QKC and VJU said as follows.
3. In relation to the purchase of the new car from the protected person's funds, QKC said that the name in which a vehicle is registered is not indicative of ownership. QKC paid for the cost of the installation of a charging station for the new car at his own house but there was a small power point installed at the house of the protected person.[44]
4. In the review hearing, VJU explained her approach to the situation with the car as follows:[45]
   • QKC did not tell her about his approach concerning depreciation and she only became aware of that in the course of the proceedings;
   • It was appropriate for QKC to continue to drive the protected person's car after she went into care, to visit her;
   • QKC is the life partner of the protected person and they had recommenced an intimate personal relationship;
   • Therefore it was appropriate for QKC to use the car for his own purposes - it was their "family car";
   • She was aware that QKC sold his own car for $20,000 at about the time the new vehicle was bought out of the protected person's funds and that he did not contribute any of those funds towards the purchase of the protected person's car.
5. In response to a question from Ms Nelson as to whether or not she understood that as the donee of the protected person's power of attorney, she had a duty to preserve and maximise her assets, and how she had discharged that duty in relation to the car, VJU said that the protected person loved QKC and they were a "family - the fact that he was married to another person, had nothing to do with anything."
6. In relation to the allegations about the protected person's house, at the review hearing, QKC said that he was living at her house for about 2 1/2 years before the protected person went into Resthaven, and he acknowledged that he did not pay rent or make any contribution towards the outgoings of the house. However, he said that he had performed tasks that would otherwise have required a handyman. He said that the protected person would not have wanted him to make a financial contribution towards the house one way or another.
7. QKC and VJU have denied any wrongdoing in the manner in which they managed the financial affairs of the protected person, and in relation to QKC's record keeping.
8. In their submissions in the original proceedings, the guardians have described the obligations of an attorney in the following terms:[46]

• Is placed in the position of a fiduciary in relation to their principal;
• Generally possesses the authority of an agent for the principal;
• As the principal's agent, is accordingly empowered to do on behalf of their principal anything that the principal can lawfully do by an attorney;
• Is not a trustee for the principal (in the strict sense), as the attorney does not take legal ownership of any of the assets of the principal;
• Is under a duty to account to their principal including by maintaining records of all financial transactions conducted on the principal's behalf; and
• Has a right to reimbursement of payments made conferring a benefit on the principal."

1. Mr Quinn made the following submissions concerning the allegations about financial irregularity and mismanagement in connection with the actions of QKC and VJU as the attorneys for the protected person:

(a) QKC's record keeping is adequate and was reviewed by VJU regularly.[47] QKC kept detailed spreadsheets and has provided additional financial information to the administrators. He has actually incurred more expenses than those for which he has been reimbursed.[48]

• QKC has produced documents for the review of the administrators.[49]
• It is established that a person who is acting as a guardian or in a similar capacity for a person who has lost capacity, is entitled to an incidental benefit for expenses incurred while caring for the person, and in any event, QKC's evidence under cross-examination, was that he paid for about 40% of the expenditure incurred on joint outings with the protected person.[50]

Mr Quinn referred to various authorities which had previously been provided to the Tribunal, and his submissions about those authorities, in particular the decision of Countess of Bective v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[51] and the following statements:

"it is a general rule that guardians, of infants, committees of the person of lunatics, and others who are entrusted with funds to be expended in the maintenance and support of person under their care are not liable to account as trustees. They need to vouch the items of their expenditure, and if they fulfil the obligation of maintenance in a manner commensurate with the income available to them for the purpose, an account will not be taken...always the end in view is to supply the daily wants of an individual, to provide for his comfort, edification and amusement, and to promote his happiness...Courts of equity have not disguised the fact that the general rule gives to a parent or guardian dispensing the fund an opportunity of gaining incidental benefits ...

A guardian is not permitted to receive moneys for maintenance without liability to account except upon the condition that he discharges his duty adequately to maintain and not otherwise ...

Where the condition is performed the Court does not inquire whether the money has been completely expended or whether the recipient has spent small sums of his personal benefit, but nevertheless, it remains an allowance to a person in a fiduciary capacity and for a definite purpose."[52]

Mr Quinn also referred to the decision of Crossingham v Crossingham[53] and in particular, the following passage:[54]

"... the general principles do not take account of the fact that prior to his death the relationship between the deceased and the defendant was analogous to that of a guardian and ward or persons having management of a disabled person's estate and the disabled person. The relationship was not that of strangers, or businessmen, or professionals, but of a son providing day-to-day care of his father in a way analogous to the care provided by a parent or guardian for a child. ...If the guardian performs his or her duty adequately to maintain the person entrusted to his or her care, the guardian is not ordinarily required to account for the expenditure of income available for that purpose..."

(c) QKC acknowledges that he charged for depreciation on his vehicle, but Mr Quinn observes that there were multiple wear and tear expenses on QKC's vehicle which were not otherwise paid for.[55] A mistaken reimbursement in relation to the second Queensland trip was refunded by QKC.

1. Mr Quinn submitted that QKC was in a close, loving, caring relationship with the protected person. He took her on holidays and outings which she would not otherwise have enjoyed, and even if QKC received an incidental benefit from those outings, that is permissible in the context of their relationship.
2. Mr Quinn disputed the submissions of the applicants concerning their claims that QKC exercised coercive control over the protected person and referred to the following evidence:[56]

(i) There is substantial evidence in the affidavits of QKC and VJU that the protected person was not isolated from her friends by QKC. There was a time during the COVID pandemic when QKC and the protected person took precautions - but this was in isolation generally, not isolation from the friends of the protected person. Gradually, as her condition worsened, and partly due to the pandemic, the protected person became more dependent on him - there was nothing untoward about that, it was simply a natural progression.[57] When the protected person went into Resthaven, QKC acknowledges that he did not inform the applicants, but that was on the basis of expert advice that she needed time to settle in without distractions which may be unsettling for her.

(ii) The applicants were not regular visitors to the protected person and so they were unaware of the difficult personal circumstances of the protected person as her condition worsened, and the pressure this had placed on QKC and VJU (for example, in relation to their caring responsibilities).

(iii) Any irritable behaviour or requests by the protected person, for QKC to leave the house, and any actions such as the deletion of text messages are likely to be attributable to her deteriorating condition.[58]

(iv) In the review hearing, QKC said that he loves the protected person, he has loved her for a long time and he has been devastated by the impact of her illness.[59]

1. Mr Quinn disputes any allegation of a conflict of interest due to QKC being a beneficiary named in the will.
2. At the review hearing, QKC stated his position to be that he is willing and able to continue to act as guardian for the protected person, notwithstanding his affidavit and earlier stance being that he wished to withdraw his consent to act as guardian.

My conclusions as to who should be appointed as guardian

Should QKC's appointment as guardian continue?

1. In the original Order, the Tribunal placed significant weight on the wishes of the protected person as to who should be making decisions for her, as evidenced by her attempt to appoint the guardians as her substituted decision-makers by her ACD. The Tribunal stated as follows:

"28. I do not accept..that the incidents relied on by the applicants demonstrate that [QKC] has exercised anything other than appropriate care for [the protected person] in fulfilment of her wish to remain in her own home for as long as possible.

2. While I do accept that the decision to euthanise Bella did not reflect the likely wishes of [the protected person], this decision was taken by [VJU] and [QKC] together on the basis of Bella's presentation at that time and on [VJU]'s considered professional opinion. It is unlikely, given the deterioration in [the protected person]'s cognition, that the decision had any adverse impact on her.

3. In making a guardianship decision, the Tribunal is obliged, by Section 5 of the Act to take into consideration, to the extent it can be ascertained, the wishes of the protected person.
4. In this matter [the protected person] has made her wishes known in 2017 by attempting to appoint [QKC], [VJU] and [MAB] as her substitute decision-makers via her Advance Care Directive.

33. There is no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that decisions made to date by these persons have been anything but appropriate in providing for [the protected person]'s health, safety and welfare."

5. As VJU and MAB have withdrawn their consent to continue to act as guardians, it is not necessary for me to consider whether or not they are suitable for that role. Accordingly, I will contain my findings to the question of whether or not I consider QKC should be appointed as guardian, and if not who should be appointed as guardian.
6. I have concluded that QKC's appointment as guardian should be revoked because I consider that he does not satisfy the criteria in section 50 G&A Act for the following reasons.

1. I consider that the decision to place the protected person in a residential facility was reasonable and supported by the evidence of her advancing dementia and tendency to wander. I accept the evidence of the experts that the accommodation at Resthaven was suitable for the protected person, and she was having her needs met there.[60]

1. It is not disputed that the protected person was extremely attached to her dog. In the review hearing, Ms Nelson suggested to QKC that this attachment was so strong that the protected person would not go to a restaurant without her dog. QKC did not agree with that submission, but he did agree that she was particularly attached to Bella.[61]
2. In the review hearing, VJU said that Bella was neurotically attached to the protected person, and vice versa. She said that because of this she considered that it was kinder to euthanise Bella and that any attempt to re-home her would be unsuccessful.[62]
3. The extent of the devotion of the protected person to her dog is illustrated by her attitude in buying a new car - in the affidavit of LXF, she says that when looking to buy the new car, the protected person referred to getting a car "..which would suit Bella's needs and allow Bella to continue to enjoy the lifestyle that she had become accustomed to.."[63] The protected person also went to the extent of signing off her text messages "Cheers [protected person's name] and Bells".[64]
4. I do not accept that Bella's various health issues and behavioural issues were sufficient to justify the decision to euthanise Bella - certainly not within 24 hours of the protected person being placed in Resthaven.[65] I consider it is likely that these issues could have been managed with the appropriate resources allocated to them.
5. I am not convinced that the decision to euthanise Bella would have made no difference to the protected person because of her advanced dementia. I note from the detailed diary submitted by QKC as an exhibit to his affidavit of 9 November 2023,[66] that even after her admission to Resthaven, the protected person enjoyed music and even a small amount of dancing.[67] It seems likely to me that if the protected person responded well to music, she may also have responded well to a visit from her dog.
6. I accept that it would have been inconvenient to make arrangements for the care of Bella after the protected person went into Resthaven, but section 5 G&A Act clearly states that where a guardian or administrator makes any decision in relation to the affairs of the protected person or about the protected person, the paramount consideration must be what the wishes of the protected person would have been (but for their mental incapacity).
7. I consider that the choice to euthanise Bella the day after the protected person was admitted to Resthaven was not a decision in her best interests and was not made taking into account her preferences. The protected person is a person of substantial wealth. I have no doubt that should she have had capacity to make a decision about Bella at this point, her decision would have been to spend some of her funds in the care of Bella.

b) The claims that QKC and VJU have failed to properly discharge their fiduciary obligations as attorneys for the protected person

1. I consider the allegations about financial mismanagement by QKC when he was acting as attorney for the protected person are concerning and likely to be relevant to section 50(1)(c) G&A Act which requires a guardian/administrator to be competent to discharge those functions, and to do so in accordance with the principles under the G&A Act. In particular, I observe as follows.

The termination of the services of the financial advisor

1. In the review hearing,[68] QKC confirmed that he decided to terminate the services of the long-standing financial advisor, Byron Capital. He acknowledged that at the point when this occurred (in about 2020), the value of the combined portfolio of the protected person was in excess of $2m. He said that he spoke to an advisor whose opinion was that the portfolio was well balanced, and it would be unlikely that it would require much adjustment. He said that this has been proven in the performance of the portfolio since then.
2. Even if the performance of the portfolio has been satisfactory since the financial advisors ceased to have a role with it, I do not accept that it was an appropriate strategy to assume that for the long-term, little adjustment would need to be made to the portfolio. In my view this is not a prudent approach.
3. Further, as QKC is a beneficiary under the will of the protected person, I consider this immediately creates the possibility of a conflict in relation to any decisions to be made about the investments - it is in his interests to preserve the capital of the portfolio for his subsequent benefit. That does not necessarily align with the best interests of the protected person.
4. My concern is that QKC apparently did not appreciate his position of conflict. If he had, then he should have taken advice from an independent expert - even if that advice was not to make any significant changes in the portfolio, but the advice should have been sought on a regular basis - for example, on an annual basis. This approach is relevant to the criteria in section 50(1) G&A Act, in particular, paragraphs (c) and (e).

1. I consider that the approach of QKC and VJU in relation to the car was not appropriate and it was in breach of their fiduciary obligations as attorneys in particular, because QKC should have sold the car as soon as he realised the protected person would be permanently residing in residential accommodation. By registering the car in his name, not making a financial contribution towards the cost of a car he was regularly using for his own purposes, and by installing a charging station at his house, QKC was putting himself in a position of conflict.
2. These factors are relevant to the criteria in section 50(1) G&A Act, particularly paragraphs (c) and (e).
3. I will comment further below, on VJU's statements about the reasonableness of their actions concerning the car in light of the relationship between QKC and the protected person, and because they were a "family".

1. In the review hearing, QKC stated that he had lived with the protected person in her house for about 2 1/2 years before she went into Resthaven, and he continued to reside in the property for a few months after she went there[69]. As I have stated above, he did not pay rent or make a contribution towards the outgoings of the house.
2. It is clear that QKC was receiving a financial benefit from living in the house with the protected person. Even if he was performing some handyman tasks around the house, the value of such work is unlikely to be equivalent to the cost of rent and a 50% share in the running costs of the house (which is in Dulwich and subsequently sold for in excess of $2m).
3. I found QKC's statement in the review hearing that he could not afford to live elsewhere,[70] concerning. He could have returned to live with his wife, but it is clear that he preferred to live with the protected person. This choice suggests an approach to decision-making which suited him.
4. Even if QKC was caring for the protected person during this time (and so there was some benefit to the protected person in QKC residing at her house), that was his choice. I am not satisfied that it would necessarily have been the choice of the protected person. Although I note here, that some of the protected person's family members (including her cousin HYN), spoke in support of QKC and effectively stated that he had provided a high level of care and support for her.
5. This situation placed QKC in a position of potential conflict where a decision arises in relation to the house where the interests of QKC and the protected person are not necessarily aligned. My concern from QKC's comments in the review hearing, is that he did not seem to appreciate the potential conflict. This is relevant to the criteria in section 50(1) G&A Act, particularly in paragraphs (c) and (e).
6. Finally in relation to the issue of the house, although I acknowledge that the house could have been sold sooner, I consider it is unlikely this resulted in any loss to the estate of the protected person due to the increase in housing prices in Adelaide during that time. I accept that it would have been difficult to rent out the house due to the amount which would have been necessary to spend on repairs.

The allegations about QKC and VJU failing to keep proper records and their mismanagement of the financial affairs of the protected person

1. In relation to the keeping of proper financial records, and in particular the issue of reimbursement, the applicants say that because QKC has paid himself sums on a regular basis which are not actually reimbursement, but estimated amounts in reimbursement; and he has not produced source documents in support of his record keeping; therefore he has acted in a manner which is in fundamental breach of his fiduciary duty as the donee of the EPOA and he is not suitable to be appointed either as guardian or administrator.
2. On the other hand, the respondents say that QKC has provided spreadsheets of expenditure, and he has provided his bank statements to the administrators. On his calculation, it is unlikely that he has been reimbursed more than he spent and in fact it is likely to be the opposite. In any event, if he did receive an incidental benefit, because of the nature of his relationship with the protected person, that is not something for which he should be criticised.
3. I find QKC's general lack of understanding of his obligations as an attorney, and his failure to inform himself about those obligations, concerning:

• In the review hearing,[71] QKC said that he had only been provided with extremely broad instructions from the solicitor who prepared the EPOA, as to the duties of an attorney and he had not sought any advice other than that.
• His understanding of the duties and obligations were expressed in the hearing in the broadest terms and for example did not refer to the requirements of the PAA Act to keep proper accounts.
• Therefore it appears that QKC did not have a good knowledge or understanding of his duties and obligations as an attorney, and he did not inform himself about those duties and obligations.
• The manner in which QKC discharged his duties and obligations was not consistent with the precise requirements of the PAA Act, and it is not clear whether he had turned his mind to that, and made a conscious decision about whether or not his approach was reasonable.
  1. The appointment of QKC and VJU as attorneys was not expressed to be joint and several and so they should have exercised their powers jointly, but there is no dispute that QKC made the vast majority of decisions concerning financial arrangements for the protected person, paid all the bills for her,[72] and VJU checked the bank accounts from time to time but did not see underlying invoices for the amounts reimbursed by QKC (although he would inform her when he was making a payment to himself).

1. QKC's willingness to manage the financial affairs of the protected person without reference to his duties and obligations and with minimal consultation or oversight by VJU suggests a disregard for the duties and obligations of an attorney, and my concern in him continuing in his role of guardian, would be a similar disregard for his statutory obligations in that regard (which is a factor to be taken into account under section 50(1)(c) G&A Act).
2. I agree that the records kept by QKC do not demonstrate the reimbursement to him of precise amounts, but rather the repayment to him of amounts he has estimated are likely to be about the same as the amounts spent by him on expenses for the benefit of the protected person.
3. I accept that even in circumstances where there is a dispute about the nature of QKC's relationship with the protected person, it is clear that he was her principal carer. In that scenario, it is probably reasonable to allow some minor discrepancies in any claims for reimbursement. The issue is the extent of any discrepancy. I consider that QKC's approach of refunding himself estimated amounts, is inappropriate at best. He should have been more diligent in this regard.
4. I have considered the authorities referred to by Mr Quinn. The decision in Countess of Bective, discusses the responsibility of a person in the role of guardian for another, in relation to account keeping. When QKC and VJU were managing the financial affairs of the protected person, they were doing so as attorneys under the PAA Act which is a different scenario from the position of a guardian, and I note in particular that the PAA Act makes it an offence for an attorney not to keep proper accounts.[73]
5. The decision in Crossingham[74] referred to fiduciary obligations arising in the context of a family - such as a parent and a child. That approach is problematic here given the dispute about the nature of their relationship.

1. I accept the submission of the applicants, that the nature of QKC's relationship with the protected person was problematic in the context of his fiduciary obligations to her.
2. I accept the submissions of the applicants that QKC's position in relation to the nature of that relationship was inconsistent in the course of the Tribunal process. There is no dispute that in the initial stage of their relationship, QKC and the protected person were in an intimate personal relationship. However, after the break and when their friendship was rekindled, QKC's evidence about what happened at that stage was inconsistent. Initially, he said it was merely a close friendship and it was not an intimate personal relationship,[75] but during the course of the review hearing, he clearly stated that the second phase was an intimate personal relationship.[76]
3. I find this change in QKC's position is concerning for two reasons. First, it brings into question the reliability of his evidence in the Tribunal process. Second, it raises a question as to the reason for the change in QKC's position. My concern is that he may have changed his position because he thought that would be a better position in which to justify the reimbursement.
4. I do not accept that QKC and the protected person were a family (as claimed by VJU), or in a de facto relationship in the second stage of their relationship. I consider the most likely scenario is that they were friends at this point, but due to her illness and probably to a certain extent out of convenience, the protected person became increasingly dependent on QKC. He became her primary carer.
5. It may be that QKC wanted the relationship to be something which the protected person did not.[77] In any event, QKC was not married to the protected person, he was still lawfully married to his wife and as I understand it he returned to live with his wife once the protected person was living in Resthaven on a long-term basis. In these circumstances, QKC should have been careful and conscientious in the manner in which he discharged his obligations as attorney.

1. In making the decision in the original Order to appoint the guardians, the Tribunal placed significant weight on the principle stated in section 5(a) G&A Act that the Tribunal should give paramount consideration to the wishes of the protected person, and in this matter, that meant giving significant weight to the attempt of the protected person to appoint the guardians as her substituted decision-makers under her ACD.
2. However, I consider the original Order does not place sufficient weight on the evidence about coercive control and I consider that evidence is relevant to this consideration.
3. That evidence includes the following:
   1. The friends of the protected person found it difficult to be with her without QKC being present;[78]

• The protected person's friends found it difficult to have phone conversations without him being present;[79]
• QKC would become angry if the protected person saw her friends without his permission;[80]
• The friends of the protected person observed on a number of occasions that the protected person did not want QKC at her house and would tell him to go away;[81]
• A text message sent to KGH expressing concern that QKC was accessing her accounts, and subsequently that message being deleted;[82]
  1. QKC not informing the friends of the protected person that she was residing in Resthaven and discouraging them from visiting her;[83]
• Becoming angry with OQF when she did visit the protected person at Resthaven.[84]

1. I do not consider it is necessary for me to make a finding about the allegations of coercive control in this matter. However, I consider that the evidence about coercive conduct is sufficient to warrant a reconsideration of the wishes of the protected person as expressed in her ACD and EPOA. In my assessment, the evidence about coercive control means that the weight given to the protected person's choices as expressed in the ACD, should be substantially lower than it might otherwise be.
2. Therefore, I consider that the Tribunal erred in the amount of weight given to the wishes of the protected person in that regard.

1. As I have mentioned above, in an affidavit made on 13 May 2025, QKC said that he wished to withdraw his consent to act as guardian because of a number of medical issues. He provided the Tribunal with a confidential letter from his doctor.
2. However, QKC's position was predicated on the basis of a misunderstanding that if all the guardians withdrew their consent to act as guardians, the Public Advocate would be appointed in their stead. When I explained that was not the case, and it was for the Tribunal to decide, QKC decided not to withdraw his consent to act.
3. This occurred at the hearing conducted on 26 May 2025 - a short time after QKC's affidavit had been sworn and lodged (the timing of which in itself, is troubling).
4. I consider that QKC's sudden change in his position about withdrawing his consent to act as guardian, is relevant to section 50(1)(d) G&A Act which requires that a person must be readily available to discharge the function of either a guardian or administrator.
5. For all of the above reasons, I do not consider that QKC is a suitable person to be appointed as guardian for the protected person.

Should all or any of the applicants be appointed as guardian for the protected person?

1. The application seeks an order appointing all or any of the applicants as the guardian for the protected person.
2. The guardians disagree with this proposal on the basis that it would not accord with the wishes of the protected person, as evidenced in the ACD and as stated to QKC (at least in relation to KGH and LIL).
3. KGH is a veterinary surgeon who was married to the protected person from 1973-1978.
4. LXF has been a friend of the protected person and a neighbour from 1992. They would often socialise together.
5. LIL was formerly in an intimate personal relationship with the protected person from 1996-2004.
6. HTJ is the wife of KGH.
7. PXK has been a friend of the protected person since 1987. They struck up a friendship when they were both working at the Royal Adelaide Hospital in 1981/1982.
8. OQF is the sister of LIL. She and the protected person have been friends for 30 years.
9. In their submissions which were handed up on 16 May 2025, the applicants state that they are ready and able to act as guardians; they have provided extensive evidence of their long-standing, close relationships with the protected person and their desire to see her needs are taken care of.[85]
10. In their submissions of 28 January 2025, the applicants refer to the fact that there has been no request for the applicants to be cross examined as to their suitability to take on the role of guardian for the protected person.
11. In his affidavit of 4 August 2023, LIL states that he is prepared to act as guardian and/or administrator for the protected person and he refers to some of his qualifications and experience by way of explanation as to his suitability for the role[86].
12. In his affidavit of 31 July 2023, KGH provides details of his friendship with the protected person after their divorce, and the fact that she would regularly seek advice from him about financial matters, and on one occasion had sought his advice about looking into whether or not QKC was accessing her funds without her authority.[87]
13. In their Outline of Argument for the internal review hearing, the applicants state:[88]

... [LIL] is a senior practising member of the profession and his affidavits as to the state of his relationship with [the protected person] and his suitability to act as guardian should be taken at face value where he has no reason to be part of the within application other than out of concern and care for [the protected person]. and, like the other applicants, have nothing to gain personally from the application. > > The same goes for [KGH] who is a respected professional. The evidence is clear beyond doubt that while [KGH] and [the protected person's] marriage ended in divorce, the two have had a warm and close relationship for many years and there is absolutely no basis to suggest that [KGH] was after her money or that he was motivated by anything other than concern and care for [the protected person] ...

14. In their Outline of Argument for the internal review hearing, the first respondents state:[89]

6.1 The Applicants have led no evidence suggesting that any of them would be compatible as guardians for [the protected person]. Whereas, [QKC] and [VJU] have advanced clear and cogent evidence over the course of these proceedings detailing the nature of their relationships with [the protected person] in the years prior to her cognitive decline, and of their love, care and support for [the protected person] as her mental state declined. Their evidence is the best (and only) evidence of [the protected person]'s wishes for them to manage her affairs as her cognitive state declined and she lost capacity to do so. > > 6.2 In terms of existing family arrangements or relationships, the Applicants' evidence suggests that many of the Applicants had not seen [the protected person] for a considerable period of time prior to her cognitive decline, and indeed at least two of the applicants have previously had personal and romantic relationships with [the protected person] which were ended by way of separation and/or divorce. [QKC] and [VJU], on the other hand, have advanced clear and cogent evidence describing their ongoing, close personal relationships with [the protected person]. There is no good reason to disturb those existing relationships and [the protected person]'s current care arrangements. > > 6.3 The Applicants have led no evidence in relation to their competency in discharging the functions of a guardian (or guardians). The evidence before the Tribunal demonstrates that [KGH] and [VJU] have the relevant competency required to continue acting as [the protected person]'s guardians, based on the level of care, maintenance and support provided across time.

My conclusions as to whether all or any of the applicants be appointed as guardian for the protected person

1. I accept Ms Nelson's submissions as to the integrity of LIL and KGH and their abilities to discharge the function of guardian. I accept Ms Nelson's submissions that the applicants' actions in lodging the initial application and then the application for review, demonstrate their loyalty to and concern for the protected person, and their commitment to ensuring that decisions are made in her best interests.
2. I accept that each of the applicants has a long-standing relationship with the protected person which has been maintained to a greater or lesser extent over the years.
3. On the other hand, QKC has said that the protected person made it clear to him that she did not want either LIL or KGH making decisions about her affairs.[90] MAB has also said that the protected person clearly stated to her that she did not want KGH involved in decisions about her.[91] Although the communication to QKC was made at a time when her capacity to form an independent view may have been doubtful, the view expressed to MAB was in 2017 when she did have capacity.
4. In the review hearing, Mr Quinn also submitted that the situation of the protected person is now relatively settled, and there are few decisions to be made about her day-to-day circumstances.
5. I consider the following statement of her Honour Justice Hughes to be particularly helpful in this context:[92]

"Guardianship entails decision-making on behalf of a person regarding matters which, if the person had capacity, would be made by reference to personal experience and preference. For this reason, it is preferable that an appointee have a deep knowledge of the person to whom they have been appointed. The attribute of knowing someone deeply is not one that requires professional skill and the task of substitute decision-making is not readily measurable such as to lend itself to the imposition of a charge. ...the scheme [under the G&A Act in relation to the appointment of guardians] anticipates that guardians will usually be family members...."

6. Both parties have (appropriately) reminded me throughout these proceedings, about section 29(4) G&A Act, which states that the Public Advocate may be appointed as guardian, but only if no other order would be appropriate.
7. I must also bear in mind the requirements of section 5 G&A Act and in particular, the paramount consideration of what would have been the wishes of the person should she have been able to make this decision.
8. In my view the requirement of section 5 G&A Act is the most important factor in this aspect of my decision. I have no evidence that the protected person would have wanted any of the applicants to make personal decisions for her in the event of her incapacity - notwithstanding her undoubted friendship with each of them, and notwithstanding the personal characteristics that might make all or any of them particularly suitable for the role.
9. I consider there are two further factors which are relevant to this aspect of my decision. First, this matter has involved a significant amount of conflict between the applicants and the guardians. Although this factor is not determinative, it is something to be taken into account.
10. Second, as Mr Quinn has submitted, section 50(1)(b) G&A Act states that one of the factors to be taken into account in making a guardianship or administration order, is whether there is some existing family arrangement or relationship which should not be disturbed. I accept that notwithstanding my reservations about the nature of the relationship between QKC and the protected person, he should still be able to see her. I consider that the protected person should have a reasonable opportunity for all of the applicants and each of the respondents to visit her. It is clear that they all care about her. However, due to the level of conflict, I consider this would be best achieved if an independent guardian is appointed.
11. Accordingly, I have concluded that the correct and preferable decision is to appoint the Public Advocate to be the guardian of the protected person.
12. In my view, despite Mr Quinn's submissions about the likely few decisions to be made about the protected person, the appointment of the Public Advocate should be general as I consider that all aspects of her personal life should be determined in an impartial and objective manner and in accordance with her best interests and decisions about issues such as access may otherwise be problematic.

The administration question: Should an administrator should be appointed, and if so, who should it be and should their appointment be general or limited?

1. It is not disputed that an administrator should be appointed and there is no dispute that any administration order should apply to the entire estate of the protected person (or that the Tribunal may make two administration orders which together, cover the entire estate of the protected person).
2. In the original Order, the Tribunal appointed Nicole Elizabeth Peterson and Luigi Giovanni Falzarano of PKF Adelaide as the full administrators of the estate of the protected person. Member Gooch stated as follows in relation to this aspect of her decision:

"5. All parties agree that an administration order should be made. > > 6. A limited administration order is not appropriate. > > 7. It is agreed that an independent administrator should be appointed.

3. The applicants' submissions press for the appointment of an administrator primarily skilled in investigation of past financial management.
4. In my view this is not in [the protected person's] best interests. It is my view [the protected person's] best interests will be best protected by appointment of an administrator skilled in the management, investment and growth of her estate sufficient to provide for her proper care.
5. I accept the submissions of the interested persons that PKF Adelaide is best positioned to act in that role. They have assured the Tribunal that in the event it appears that investigation of past financial transactions is required they will be able to arrange for that investigation to be completed. They have also advised that they have the necessary systems to manage an estate such as [the protected person's] and to complete their reporting obligations to the Public Trustee with cost savings to the estate."
6. In Order 5 of the original Order, the Tribunal stated as follows:

"The administrator is advised that allegations of financial mismanagement have been made and the administrator should consider this while reviewing the records provided and act accordingly."

7. In their grounds of review, the applicants seek orders for the involvement of Mr Brian Morris or Mr Peter Holmes in the administration of the estate of the protected person.[93]
8. In their amended grounds of review, the applicants have also stated that the Tribunal failed to give sufficient direction to the administrators as to the manner in which they were to conduct their duties as administrators.
9. The position of the applicants may be summarised as follows:[94]

a) An administrator has a duty to get in the assets of the estate and where appropriate to investigate claims of past misappropriation of those assets and, if necessary, to take action to obtain redress. > > b) In the original hearing process, the administrators referred to the forensic accounting expertise of persons in their office, suggesting that those persons could be relied on to carry out any enquiries about the past management of the affairs of the protected person, but the administrators' position appears to have changed as that position has been stated in their letter to the Tribunal of 29 November 2024. > > c) The position of the administrators as they have expressed it in their letter to the Tribunal of 29 November 2024, demonstrates a lack of understanding of their duties and obligations as administrators and suggests that they will not undertake any further enquiries about QKC's management of the affairs of the protected person. This is not consistent with their statements in the original hearing process, and it is not sufficient for them to discharge their obligations as administrators under the G&A Act. > > d) There is strong evidence to suggest that the financial affairs of the protected person have been mismanaged by QKC and VJU as the attorneys for the protected person, and it is likely that as a consequence of that mismanagement, the protected person's estate is owed a substantial debt by QKC (possibly also VJU). > > e) It is incumbent on the administrators that they conduct an enquiry about the attorneys' management of the financial affairs of the protected person, and the Tribunal should make such orders as are necessary to ensure that occurs.

10. The position of QKC and VJU may be summarised as follows:[95]

a) The true nature of the application in relation to administration, is to seek a retrospective forensic examination of all transactions occurring during the time that QKC and VJU were acting as attorneys (this was between 2 March 2020 and 30 June 2023 - the relevant period),[96] which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

b) The appropriate forum for any challenge to their actions in that regard, is the Supreme Court, under the PAA Act, not the Tribunal.

c) They dispute the claims that QKC or VJU has mismanaged or inappropriately dealt with the assets of the protected person. They argue that if QKC did receive any financial benefit from things such as joint outings during the relevant period, it was incidental and appropriate because of the benefit derived by the protected person and the nature of the relationship of QKC and the protected person, and it should not be the subject of the kind of forensic enquiry suggested by the applicants.

d) The costs of any forensic examination of the expenditure of the funds of the protected person's funds during the relevant period would be disproportionate to any likely benefit, as demonstrated in the information provided to the Tribunal by them.

e) The administrators have been provided with relevant information (including confidential information) that was before the Tribunal concerning the management of the financial affairs of the protected person during the relevant period.

f) The letter provided by the administrators in response to the Tribunal's directions of 8 November 2024 demonstrates an appropriate approach, and it is for them to decide whether or not there is any proper basis for any further investigation in that regard.[97]

1. When an administrator is appointed under the G&A Act, although the legal ownership of the protected person's assets does not vest in the administrator, the administrator has the control and management of them, and the administrator has the duties and obligations of a trustee and is accountable as a trustee in relation to the estate of the protected person.[98]
2. Section 39(2) G&A Act sets out various powers of an administrator, which includes the power to institute or defend legal proceedings for the benefit of the estate of the protected person (paragraph (j)); the power to demand and receive all money payable or belonging to the protected person and take any action necessary to recover that money (paragraph (n)); and to exercise any other powers conferred on the administrator under the G&A Act or any other Act (paragraph (zc). Section 39(4) G&A Act places some restrictions on the exercise of an administrator's powers.
3. Section 35(4) G&A Act states that an administration order may be subject to such conditions or limitations as the Tribunal thinks fit, and may confer such further powers on the administrator as the Tribunal thinks necessary or desirable for the proper administration of the estate.
4. In contrasting the duties and obligations of an administrator and those of the donee of a power of attorney, his Honour Justice Parker made the following observations about the role of an administrator:[99]

"...The role of administrator is created by the G&A Act. It is a purely statutory function and not a creation of the common law nor of equity. > > The powers and functions of an administrator are defined in great detail by the G&A Act ... > > Section 39(1) has the effect of imposing upon an administrator the body of equitable principles applicable to trustees, including fiduciary duties. ..To the extent that s 39 provides differently to the equitable principles applicable to trustees, the statute will prevail..."

5. Throughout these proceedings, the position of the applicants has been that a significant aspect of this role must necessarily be a full investigation of the management of the affairs of the protected person by QKC (and VJU) during the relevant period, and due to the expertise required, that either Mr Morris or Mr Holmes should be appointed to discharge that function. In the internal review process, their position has been modified to an extent, by suggesting that one option would be for the administrators to carry on in their current role, subject to the appointment of Mr Morris and/or Mr Homles to carry out the investigation.
6. The position of the first respondents during the proceedings has consistently been that the role of the administrator should not be primarily focussed on an enquiry as to QKC's management of the affairs of the protected person as her attorney, because that is not the proper role of an administrator, and the likely costs of any such investigation would far outweigh any likely benefit to the estate of the protected person. Further, there is an alternative proper mechanism for such an enquiry which is through the process allowed for under the PAA Act.
7. I agree with the conclusion of Member Gooch that in making a decision as to who should be appointed as administrator of the affairs of the protected person, the primary consideration should not be the expertise of the person in the area of conducting forensic accounting enquiries, but the expertise of the person in the area of prudent financial management of the affairs of the protected person under the G&A Act, consistently with the objects of the G&A Act, and in accordance with their duties and obligations under the G&A Act.
8. Further, the appointment of any administrator under the G&A Act should only occur after a consideration of the criteria in section 50 G&A Act.
9. During the original hearing process, in an affidavit made on 6 August 2024, Mr Falzarano relevantly stated that he:[100]
   • Has considerable experience in the management of estates subject to protection orders;
   • Has been involved in the management of deceased estates and the management of clients' affairs routinely;
   • He is familiar with the relevant provisions of the G&A Act and the Trustee Act;
   • He consents to being appointed administrator of the affairs of the protected person;
   • He understands his reporting obligations.
10. In the same affidavit, Mr Falzarano made the following statements about PKF:
    • He referred to the size of the firm and the breadth of their services;
    • He referred to the professional indemnity insurance the firm has in place;
    • The firm has documented policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the Trustee Act;
    • The firm offers a comprehensive financial service in consultation with external advisors, which includes preparing detailed financial management plans, including the making and variation of investments;
    • The firm has compliance measures in place to monitor investments against strategies;
    • He referred to the firm's fee structure.
11. The applicants provided a letter from Mr Morris of Morris Forensic dated 13 August 2024 in which Mr Morris stated as follows:
    • He recommended the consideration of the appointment of himself and the other partner of his firm Ms Leanne Thomas, as administrators of the estate of the protected person;
    • He referred to the expertise of Ms Thomas as being in the field of personal taxation;
    • He stated that he believed that they would have the necessary expertise to manage the financial affairs of the protected person;
    • He stated that although neither he nor Ms Thomas has previous experience as an administrator under the G&A Act however, he and Ms Thomas have both been appointed as executor and trustee of deceased estates, trustee of a trust and he has provided advice in relation to protected estates;
    • He stated that their firm specialises in the examination of and reporting on the internal controls for the management of protected estates;
    • He referred to the experience they have both had - for example, their experience as directors, including for not for profit organisations.
12. Mr Morris also sets out a fee structure, and states that their firm does not hold an Australian Financial Services Licence. He refers to his expertise in forensic accounting.
13. In my view, due to the relevant experience of Mr Falzarano and the resources available in his firm, the Tribunal was correct to appoint him and Ms Peterson as administrators of the estate of the protected person.
14. However, I consider that the Tribunal did not provide adequate guidance to the administrators as to their role in collecting the assets of the protected person, and in particular, what enquiries they should make in relation to the allegations about mismanagement of the protected person's affairs by her attorneys.
15. I acknowledge that Member Gooch's approach is consistent with the Tribunal's general practice in such matters, however, in this particular matter I consider that further direction was required.
16. In taking this view, I acknowledge two issues. First, there may be some overlap in the role of an enquiry under the PAA Act, and the duties of an administrator under the G&A Act. Second, it is not for the Tribunal to provide legal advice to the administrators - but on the other hand, the G&A Act specifically envisages that an administrator may seek direction from the Tribunal[101] and the Tribunal may grant an administrator additional powers for the proper administration of the estate.
17. In the directions I made on 8 November 2024, I directed as follows:
    1. The administrators will lodge with the Tribunal by close of business on Monday 2 December 2024:-

a) a copy of the accounts which they were required to lodge with the Public Trustee within 28 days of their appointment to the role; > > b) a brief explanation of:- > > (i) the steps they have taken so far concerning the investigation of the allegations of financial misconduct concerning the affairs of the protected person prior to their appointment; > > (ii) their proposed approach in this regard in the future; > > (iii) whether their enquiries to date have revealed any irregularities, any matters they consider require further investigation, or any matters of note.

18. In summary, in their letter of 29 November 2024, the administrators have stated:
    • They were provided with no detail of the allegations of financial mismanagement prior to their appointment;
    • They would be concerned that without specific terms of reference for any enquiry about the alleged financial mismanagement, that the likely costs of the enquiry would exceed any likely benefit;
    • They consider that they do not have the specific powers or instructions to carry out such an investigation;
    • They do not consider it is appropriate for them to carry out such an investigation as it would compromise their independence and may damage their relationships with those involved in the care of the protected person;
    • They are lacking underlying financial information which would be necessary to undertake such an enquiry, such as for example, evidence of the spending patterns of the protected person prior to her loss of capacity.
19. Although they are now saying that they do not wish to use their in-house expertise for such an enquiry, it seems to me that the main impediment for the administrators in any further enquiry about the actions of the attorneys, is a lack of information and guidance on which to initiate such an investigation.
20. In my view, the general approach of the administrators should be as follows:

a) A fundamental obligation of administrators is to get in the assets of the protected person. An administrator must take such action as is reasonably required to discharge that obligation. If the administrator is in doubt about what action they may need to take, then they should seek the advice of the Tribunal. > > b) Where there have been serious allegations of financial mismanagement by an attorney prior to the appointment of the administrator, then if there is a reasonable possibility that the attorney's actions have resulted in a debt which should be readily identifiable (subject to reasonable enquiries), and which should be repaid to the protected person, then the administrators should carry out such enquiries as are reasonably necessary to make a decision about whether or not to take action to recover the debt. > > c) Where there have been allegations against an attorney which are more general and which suggest that the attorney may have been in breach of their fiduciary obligations to the donor, for example, to maintain proper records of their actions, or not to put themselves in a position of conflict; then unless those actions are likely to have resulted in a debt which should be readily identifiable (subject to reasonable enquiries) and which should be repaid to the protected person, then the administrator is not obliged to take further action in that capacity under the G&A Act.

21. In this matter, I will categorise the allegations about financial mismanagement as follows:
    • Allegations about inaccurate or inadequate records of financial transactions;
    • Allegations about general mismanagement of the funds of the protected person in situations where QKC is likely to have a conflict - for example, the arrangements concerning the purchase of the car; the delay in the sale of the house and the arrangements for QKC to live in the house for 2 1/2 years without paying rent or contributing towards the outgoings; the termination of the services of the financial advisor;
    • Allegations about inappropriate "reimbursement" of QKC;
    • Allegations that QKC has received an unreasonable incidental benefit from expenditure made by him on behalf of the protected person.
22. I consider that the general allegations about inaccurate or inadequate records of financial transactions, and the allegations about the general mismanagement of funds in circumstances where QKC is likely to have a conflict of interest, are not matters which the administrators should consider it is necessary to investigate as I consider that they are unlikely to create a readily identifiable debt which the administrators should be collecting as part of their obligation to call in the assets of the estate.
23. However, I consider that the allegations about inappropriate "reimbursement" and the allegations that QKC has received an unreasonable incidental benefit from expenditure made by him on behalf of the protected person, are matters which the administrators should investigate further because it may be that such an investigation would reveal a debt to be called in by them as part of their duties as administrators.
24. I consider that an appropriate approach by the administrators would be for them to arrange for an audit of all relevant financial records for a sample period, and on the basis of that audit, the administrators can then form their own preliminary views as to whether any further action should be taken (for example, they may consider a cost/benefit analysis of taking any further action), and at that stage, they should seek further guidance from the Tribunal.
25. The purpose of the audit will be to:
    • Identify any material discrepancy between the expenses incurred by QKC on behalf of the protected person and the "corresponding" amount paid to QKC by way of reimbursement;
    • Identify any material incidents where QKC appears to have received an unreasonable incidental benefit from a payment he has made on behalf of the protected person.
26. In relation to arrangements for the audit, I will issue directions requiring the administrators to identify a period over which the audit will be carried out, they will require QKC and VJU to provide all relevant records for that period, and the administrators will then appoint an auditor (who may be someone in their firm, but the selection of the auditor will be a matter for them), with instructions which accord in general terms with my directions.
27. If the administrators wish to seek further guidance about any aspect of the audit at any stage (for example, to seek approval for the retainer of an auditor for a particular quoted fee), they may make a written request to the Tribunal for a hearing about that, and any such hearing will be conducted in private.
28. I will make orders to reflect my findings above.

1. The Tribunal grants permission for the application for internal review.
2. The Tribunal varies the order of the Tribunal made on 15 August 2024 in matter number 2023/SC003505 (as amended by a slip rule order made on 12 September 2024) as follows:
   1. The Tribunal revokes the appointment of QKC, VJU and MAB as the limited guardians for the protected person.
   2. The Tribunal appoints the Public Advocate as full guardian of the protected person and the Tribunal directs that the Public Advocate will consult with a person nominated by the applicants, and a person nominated by the respondents, in relation to decisions about the protected person.
   3. The Tribunal confirms the appointment of Nicole Elizabeth Peterson and Luigi Giovanni Falzarano of PKF Adelaide as full administrators of the estate of the protected person, subject to the directions contained in order 4.
   4. The Tribunal recommends that the guardianship order and the administration order will be reviewed on or before 16 August 2027.
   5. The Tribunal confirms the special powers orders made previously (pursuant to section 32(1)(a) and (b) G&A Act), and confirms that those orders should be reviewed on or about 16 August 2025.

1. The administrators will cause an audit to be performed of the financial records of the attorneys for the protected person subject to the following:

a) The administrators will identify a period for which the audit will be conducted which will be a period of at least six months and no more than 12 months and between 2/3/20-30/6/23. > > b) The administrators will require QKC and VJU to provide all accounts and source documents for that period which would include: > > * Bank statements for the protected person; > * Invoices, receipts or other records of amounts paid using the protected person's credit card for that period; > * Invoices, receipts or other records of amounts paid by QKC on behalf of the protected person for that period; > * Bank statements for QKC - for any account into which amounts were paid by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by him on behalf of the protected person; > * Any other documents identified by the administrators as relevant to the audit; > * Any other documents which QKC and VJU consider are relevant to the audit.

1. The administrators will appoint an auditor to conduct the audit (and they have an absolute discretion as to who will be so appointed) and they will instruct the auditor to provide a report which identifies: * any material discrepancy between the expenses incurred by QKC on behalf of the protected person and the "corresponding" amount paid to QKC by way of reimbursement; * any material incidents where QKC appears to have received an unreasonable incidental benefit from a payment he has made on behalf of the protected person.

d) Upon receipt of the auditor's report, the administrators will make a preliminary assessment as to what action they consider is reasonable to be taken by them (if any). > > e) The administrators should then report to the Tribunal and seek directions as to the further action to be taken by them to call in the assets of the protected person's estate (if any).

2. At any stage, the administrators may make a written request to the Tribunal seeking further directions in relation to any issue concerning their administration of the estate of the protected person. Any such request may include a request that a hearing be held confidentially (ie without any of the other parties involved in this matter, participating in that hearing).

1. [1] Section 70(1a) SACAT Act also provides that an application for internal review may only proceed with leave.

[2] [2016] SACAT 19 (at para 14).

[3] [2021] SACAT 82.

1. [4] Which can be done under section 23 SACAT Act at direction of the President, or a delegate of the President.
2. [5] Even if the panel had been reconstituted, I consider the issue should have been discussed with the parties and they should have been provided with an opportunity to comment on the proposed reconstitution.
3. [6] The transcript of the hearing conducted by Member Gooch on 10 November 2023, shows that the Tribunal did not mention the existence of the order made by the Tribunal on 26 July 2023 in relation to the protected person, (which had been made by Member Gooch).

[7] This is ground 1 of the amended grounds of review.

[8] This issue is raised in grounds 2.3, 2.4, 3 and 4 of the amended grounds of review.

[9] I refer in particular to the transcript of the hearing conducted on 7 August 2024 at page 5.

[10] In broad terms, this is ground 2.1 in the applicants' amended grounds of review.

[11] This is ground 3A of the amended grounds of review.

[12] At page 5 of the transcript from the hearing conducted on 10 November 2023.

[13] [2018] SACAT 11.

1. [14] I acknowledge that this is not consistent with the definition of a "protected person" in the G&A Act, but it is convenient.

[15] See also the decision of President Hughes in Re PCM [2021] SACAT 82 at paragraph 48.

1. [16] Section 51 G&A Act states that a person may only be appointed guardian or administrator if they consent to the appointment.

[17] Re HWS [2018] SACAT 39.

[18] Section 8(1)(c) SACAT Act and section 64(f) G&A Act.

[19] Pursuant to the scheme established under section 65 G&A Act.

[20] At paragraph 13 of the Tribunal order made on 10 November 2023 in matter number 2023/SC003503.

1. [22] VJU's affidavit of 13 May 2025 at paragraph 12 - it is no longer necessary for the protected person to be in the memory support unit because she is now physically unable to wander off.

[23] For example, the report of Dr Yu, geriatrician, dated 29 June 2023.

[24] At paragraphs 24.9-24.10 and 77 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[25] At paragraph 24.10 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[27] At paragraph 68 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[28] At paragraph 24.3 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[29] At paragraph 24 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[30] At paragraph 38 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[31] At paragraphs 25-31 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[32] At paragraphs 32-34 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[33] At paragraph 35 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[34] At paragraph 24.6 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[35] At paragraph 24.1 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[36] At paragraph 24.2 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[37] At paragraph 24.2 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[38] At paragraphs 24.11-24.12 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[39] At paragraph 24.5 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

[40] At paragraphs 37-44 of the Outline of Argument for the full hearing on 16 May 2025.

1. [41] At paragraph 1 of his summary of evidence and references relating to cross examination topics - I will refer to this document as the respondent evidence summary.

[42] At page 8 of the summary of evidence.

[43] At page 21 of the summary of evidence.

[44] At page 4 of the summary of evidence.

[45] At approximately 11.38 of the audio recording of the hearing conducted on 16 May 2025.

[47] At page 3 of the summary of evidence.

[48] At pages 1-2 of the summary of evidence.

[49] At page 3 of the summary of evidence.

[50] At page 2 of the summary of evidence.

[51] [1932] HCA 22; (1932) 47 CLR 417.

[52] At pages 6-7 of the interested parties' submissions of 10 April 2024.

[53] [2012] NSWSC 95.

[54] At page 10 of the interested parties' submissions of 10 April 2024.

[55] At page 4 of the summary of evidence.

[56] At page 5 of the summary of evidence.

[57] At page 5 of the summary of evidence.

[58] At page 6 of the summary of evidence.

[59] At approximately 3.30pm of the audio recording of the hearing conducted on 16 May 2025.

[60] Aged Care Consultant report - page 266 of Book 1 and geriatrician report (Dr Singh) - page 92 of Book 1.

[61] Audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx. 3.28pm.

[62] Audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx.12.00pm.

[63] Affidavit of 4 August 2023 at paragraph 32.

[64] See for example: Affidavit of KGH of 31 July 2023 at paragraph 71.

[65] See for example, Affidavit of VJU of 13 May 2025 at paragraphs 25-31.

[67] See entry for 11 August - page 424 Book 1.

[68] Audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx. 3.05pm.

[69] Audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx. 3.46pm.

[70] Audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx. 1.43pm.

[71] Audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx. 1.40pm.

1. [72] Audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx. 11.30am - evidence of VJU.

[74] Referred to by Mr Quinn at paragraph 45 of the submissions filed on 10 April 2024.

1. [75] See for example, the Interested parties' submissions of 10 April 2024 at paragraph 60, and the affidavits on which that statement was based.

[76] Audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx. 3.48pm.

1. [77] In the review hearing, he said that he loves the protected person, he has loved her for a long time and he has been devastated by the impact of her illness - audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx. 3.30pm.
2. [78] Affidavit of LXF of 4 August 2023 at paras 16-22; affidavit of PXK of 1 August 2023 at paragraphs 31-32; affidavit of KGH of 31 July 2023 at paragraphs 43-45; affidavit of OQF of 31 July 2023 at paragraph 29.

[79] Affidavit of PXK dated 1 August 2023 at paragraph 57.

[80] Affidavit of PXK dated 1 August 2023 at paragraph 56.

[81] For example, affidavit of PXK dated 1 August 2023 at paragraphs 33, 62-63, 68, 70.

[82] Affidavit of KGH dated 31 July 2023 at paragraphs 71-76 and 82-85.

1. [83] Audio recording of hearing conducted on 16 May 2025 at approx. 3.15pm and at paragraph 41 of the affidavit of OQF of 31 July 2023.

[84] Affidavit of OQF dated 31 July 2023 at paragraphs 42-45.

[90] Affidavit of QKC dated 9 November 2023 at paragraph 14.

[91] Affidavit of MAB dated 12 September 2023 at paragraph 6.

[92] Re MYW (No 2) [2019] SACAT 20 at paragraph 47.

[94] See their Outline of Argument dated 25 March 2025, in particular, paragraphs 60-64 and 80-86.

[95] See their Outline of Argument dated 17 April 2025, in particular, paragraphs 18-24.

[96] At paragraph 12 of the respondents' submissions dated 2 December 2024.

[97] Submissions dated 17 February 2025 at paragraphs 18-26.

[99] AMT v COT & GSZ [2017] SACAT 2 at paragraphs 49-53.