3. On 29 November 1994 the learned magistrate who dealt with the respondent's case imposed a sentence of one month imprisonment which was wholly suspended. He also made an order disqualifying the respondent from holding or obtaining a driving licence for a period of three months, such disqualification to take effect immediately upon the expiration of the five year period previously referred to.

4. The complainant now moves the court to review the penalties imposed on the ground that the same were manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances.

5. The respondent, who is now aged 64, has amassed an unenviable record over the last 39 years.

6. He has been convicted on twelve separate occasions of driving under the influence of liquor or driving with an excessive blood alcohol level or both. He has been convicted eleven times for being an unlicensed driver. He has been convicted on nine occasions (including the present conviction) for driving whilst disqualified. He has received a maximum term of imprisonment for driving whilst disqualified on no less than five occasions. The respondent has also been convicted twice of failing to stop after an accident, refusing a breath test, once, and driving whilst consuming liquor on one occasion. He has several convictions for assault.

7. The respondent suffers from blood pressure and he cares for an invalid daughter and a grandson aged 7 years. There was no compelling reason or necessity for him to be driving a motor car on 25 October last year. His counsel, in her plea in mitigation before the learned magistrate, said that he felt a need to go and talk to a friend so he "jumped in his car and unfortunately made a decision to drive". The prosecution did not suggest that he had been drinking when apprehended. It appears that his offence was detected during a random vehicle check by police officers.

8. When he was disqualified for five years on 23 May 1991, the respondent was also given a one month suspended gaol sentence. That sentence was suspended for the duration of the disqualification, viz five years - obviously with a view to encouraging the respondent to refrain from driving during that time. Presumably he will now face proceedings to activate that suspended sentence.

9. There have been many judicial pronouncements in recent years as to the proper approach to sentencing offenders under the Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1970. Miss Mason referred me to many of these cases. There is no need for me to refer to those decisions in detail. A persistent disregard for the law and court orders is always regarded as a factor calling for stern measures to operate by way of personal and general deterrence. Flouting of orders of disqualification and the like brings the law into disrepute. Whilst no man may be sentenced on his record in such a way as to impose a fresh penalty for past offences, a prior record can manifest a continuing disobedience to the law which may indicate the need for a severe penalty by way of retribution, deterrence and the protection of society. In addition it may be said that to suspend an otherwise appropriate sentence will frequently rob it of any personal or general deterrent effect.

10. In the present case the learned magistrate observed, as he sentenced the respondent, "I don't think prison is going to do you a lot of good. You know that. You've been there before." This I think was a quite erroneous approach. Prison is the ultimate sanction. Merely because an offender continues to offend after serving a term of imprisonment is no justification for declining to impose an appropriate sentence on a subsequent occasion. Furthermore, at the time of the present offence the respondent was already subject to a suspended sentence and, in my view, it was quite inappropriate to consider yet another suspended sentence in the circumstances, particularly as the respondent had been given an extraordinarily light penalty of fourteen days' imprisonment, wholly suspended, when he was last before the court for driving whilst disqualified on 23 March 1988.

11. The learned magistrate failed to advert in any way to the need to take account of the factor of general deterrence when sentencing the respondent and I think it likely that he overlooked this matter. In my view, for whatever reason, the learned magistrate imposed a sentence which was manifestly inadequate and consequently the sentence imposed should be quashed.

12. In resentencing the respondent I take account of the fact that neither liquor nor bad driving were associated with the present offence and that despite his appalling record it is some time since his last offence of a comparable nature. Making due allowance for these factors and the other personal matters which were put to the learned magistrate, I am of opinion that an immediate sentence of twelve weeks' imprisonment and the imposition of a disqualification of twelve months from holding or obtaining a driving licence to take effect upon the expiration of the present disqualification imposed in May 1991 would be appropriate. They are the penalties which I now impose.