Kenton & Odom [2026] FedCFamC1A 5 (12 January 2026)

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Kenton & Odom has been approved pursuant to s 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. By Application in an Appeal filed 19 December 2025, the applicant seeks to review orders of a senior appeal judicial registrar made 26 November 2025. The orders the subject of the application refused the applicant leave to rely upon an Amended Application in an Appeal filed 26 November 2025, refused an oral application for an adjournment, and dismissed an Application in an Appeal filed 16 October 2025.
2. Upon the hearing of the application this day, the solicitor for the applicant sought an adjournment of the application. Counsel for the respondent consented to the application subject to the question of costs. Despite the consent, the application for adjournment was refused for reasons that will become apparent. The applicant's solicitor subsequently withdrew and the applicant addressed the Court and renewed her application for an adjournment which was refused.

1. On 15 September 2025, on the application of the respondent, a divorce order was made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2). The divorce order took effect from 16 October 2025.
2. No competent appeal was filed prior to the order taking effect.
3. On 16 October 2025, the applicant filed an Application in an Appeal seeking to extend the time in which to file an appeal.
4. On 12 November 2025, on the hearing of the application, the applicant sought an adjournment which was not opposed. The hearing was thereafter adjourned to 26 November 2025.
5. On 26 November 2025, the applicant filed an Amended Application in an Appeal which sought that she be granted an extension of time in which to file her appeal. The applicant also sought that the operation of the divorce order made 15 September 2025 be stayed pending the hearing of the applicant's appeal.
6. On 26 November 2025, the Application in an Appeal was dismissed.

1. Where the applicant seeks a review of the orders made by the senior appeal judicial registrar, the application proceeds as a de novo hearing.
2. In support of the application, I have had regard to the application as well as the documents relied upon by the parties before the senior appeal judicial registrar, the oral submissions of the parties as well as the written submissions of the respondent and documents sought to be tendered.
3. Irrespective of the matters addressed at length and somewhat tangentially by the applicant is the failure to come to grips with the issue central to the determination of this application, namely that the divorce order made 15 September 2025 took effect from 16 October 2025 and there had been no competent appeal filed prior to that event.
4. By the terms of s 55(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") a divorce order takes effect upon the expiration of one month from the making of the order. The divorce order was made on 15 September 2025 and took effect from 12.00 am on 16 October 2025. In Giannis & Giannis [2024] FedCFamC1A 43 at [13] the Full Court described the effect of s 55(1) of the Act as "inflexible and incontestable".
5. Section 60 of the Act provides that an appeal does not lie from a divorce order after the order takes effect. The consequence is that any application, even one seeking an extension of time in which to commence an appeal, is incompetent and as such constitutes an abuse of process and must be dismissed.
6. Consequentially there is no merit to any application sought by the applicant whether it be an adjournment, a stay or an application for the extension of time. Each and all have no utility as the grant of them would be an exercise in futility.
7. The Application in an Appeal will be dismissed.

1. In circumstances where the application will be dismissed, the respondent sought an order for costs.
2. The applicant opposed an order for costs.
3. The Act provides that each party pays their own costs, subject to the provisions of s 114UB(2) which permits the Court to make an orders as to costs if the circumstances justify. No one matter set out in s 114UB(3) of the Act is determinative.
4. The filing of an application that was without merit and has been wholly unsuccessful is a circumstance justifying the making of a costs order (s 114UB(3)(c) of the Act). Relevant to this consideration is that this is a review of a determination of a senior appeal judicial registrar that was undoubtedly correct. Whilst the applicant has the right to seek a review, she does so at her peril. An order will be made that the applicant pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

I certify that the preceding nineteen (19) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Schonell.