Keng & Hun [2025] FedCFamC2F 1881 (10 December 2025)

(a) To complete a post-separation parenting course as nominated by the Independent Children's Lawyer;

(b) To be of good behaviour for a period of 2 years; and

(c) To comply with the Orders of 20 May 2025 as varied by the Orders of 10 December 2025

1. The application for costs by the Applicant, Mr Keng ('the Father') be and is dismissed.

1. The Mother, Ms Hun born in 1980 and her servants and/or agents be and are hereby restrained by injunction from removing or attempting to remove or causing or permitting the removal of the child X born in 2017 from the Commonwealth of Australia. This order ceases to have effect 1 year after the date on which it is made or until further order.
2. The Court requests that the Australian Federal Police give effect to this order by placing the Mother, Ms Hun born in 1980 and the child, X born in 2017 on the Family Law Watch List in force at all points of international arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia and maintain the child's name on the Family Law Watch List for the said period, until the Court orders its removal, or with the consent of all parties. This order ceases to have effect 1 year after the date on which it is made or until further order.
3. The Marshal and all officers of the Australian Federal Police and of the police forces of the various States and Territories are requested and empowered to take all necessary steps to give effect to these orders.

1. Order 2(a) of the orders of 20 May 2025 be varied so that changeover occur at Suburb C McDonalds at B Street, Suburb C and otherwise the parents do all acts and things to cause and ensure the child spends time with the Father each Sunday from 11.00am until 3.00pm.
2. Order 2(b) of the orders of 20 May 2025 be varied so that commencing Wednesday 17 December 2025, telephone or Facetime communication between the Father and the child be each and every Wednesday between 7.00pm - 7.15pm with the Mother to facilitate that call and to provide the child with privacy to take the call and the child to communicate with the Father for 10 minutes.

1. Within seven (7) days of these Orders, the Mother enrol in and attend an accredited post-separation parenting program as nominated by the Independent Children's Lawyer and provide the Father/the Father's solicitor's and the Independent Children's Lawyer written confirmation of enrolment and certificate of completion within 48 hours of her receiving the same.
2. All extant interim applications are otherwise dismissed.

1. If in any proceedings there are allegations of family violence and the provisions of section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 apply (see attached Family Violence Information Sheet), any unrepresented party will not be permitted to personally cross-examine the other party/parties.
2. Affected unrepresented parties may apply to the court and then to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme ("the Scheme") for representation but any such application must be made at least 12 weeks prior to the final hearing.

1. Further information about the legislation and the Scheme can be found at Part 4 of the attached Family Violence Information Sheet.

1. If s102NA applies and a party becomes unrepresented after trial directions have been made, that party is required to promptly advise the Court.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are the settled reasons of a judgment delivered ex tempore pursuant to section 69ZL of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('the Act'). These reasons were delivered orally. They have been corrected from the transcript. Grammatical errors have been corrected. Observations and findings overlooked in the urgency of the ex tempore reasons have been added. Citations and/or passages of authorities and evidence referred to have added. And an attempt has been made to make the transcript of the orally delivered reasons easier to read, but the substance is unchanged.

1. The matter of Keng and Hun came before me on Tuesday, 9 December 2025, whereupon the respondent, Ms Hun appeared in person and represented herself.[1] It was apparent that Ms Hun needed the services of a Mandarin interpreter to interpret simultaneously during the proceedings. The Court provided an interpreter.
2. Mr Eley of counsel appeared on behalf of the applicant, Mr Keng. Ms Hun and Mr Keng are the parents of X born in 2017 and now eight years old.
3. Also listed that day before me, apart from the contravention application, was Mr Keng's application to restrain Ms Hun from taking X out of Australia. Also listed was Ms Hun's application to take X out of Australia for the purpose of visiting her maternal grandmother in the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as 'China').
4. Because of the applications regarding travel to China, the Independent Children's Lawyer ('the ICL') appeared in those applications by counsel but did not propose to participate in the contravention proceedings. After my invitation, the ICL determined to instruct Ms Dunlop of counsel to appear in the contravention proceedings as well.
5. I determined that I would deal with the contravention application first, before turning to the other applications. There was no objection to that course.

1. Rule 11.69 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 provides the procedure for contravention proceedings, and that procedure was followed in this case.

11.69 Procedure at hearing

At the hearing of an application referred to in item 2, 3, 4 or 5 in Table 11.1, the court must:

(a) inform the respondent of the allegation; and

(b) ask the respondent whether the respondent wishes to admit or deny the allegation; and

(c) hear any evidence supporting the allegation; and

(d) ask the respondent to state the response to the allegation; and

(e) hear any evidence for the respondent; and

(f) determine the proceeding.

1. Division 13A of the Act is also applicable in this case. In particular, the following provisions:

70NAC Meaning of contravene a child‑related order

(1) A person contravenes a child‑related order only if:

(a) the person is a person (other than a child) to whom the order applies and:

(i) the person intentionally fails to comply with the order; or

(ii) the person makes no reasonable attempt to comply with the order; or

(b) the person is not a person to whom the order applies, and the person is not a child, but:

(i) the person intentionally prevents compliance with the order by a person to whom the order applies; or

(ii) the person aids or abets a contravention of the order by a person to whom the order applies.

[...]

70NAD Meaning of reasonable excuse for contravening a child‑related order

Where person did not understand obligations

(1) A person has a reasonable excuse for contravening a child‑related order if:

(a) the person contravened the order because at the time of the contravention the person did not understand the obligations imposed by the order; and

(b) the court considers that the person ought to be excused in respect of the contravention.

(2) If the court decides that a person has a reasonable excuse under subsection (1) for contravening a child‑related order, the court must explain to the person, in language likely to be readily understood by the person:

(a) the obligations imposed on the person by the order; and

(b) the consequences that may follow if the person contravenes the order again.

Protection of health or safety of a person

(3) A person has a reasonable excuse for contravening a child‑related order if:

(a) the person contravened the order because the person reasonably believed that the person's actions constituting the contravention were necessary to protect the health or safety of the person, a child or any other person; and

(b) the period of the contravention was not longer than necessary to protect the health or safety of the person, child or other person.

Section does not limit circumstances of a reasonable excuse

(4) This section does not limit the circumstances in which a person may have a reasonable excuse for contravening a child‑related order.

70NADA Burden of proof in relation to reasonable excuse

A person who claims to have a reasonable excuse for contravening a child‑related order has the legal burden of proving the excuse.

70NAE Standard of proof

The standard of proof to be applied in determining matters in proceedings under this Division (other than paragraph 70NBF(1)(d)) is proof on the balance of probabilities.

[...]

70NBF Orders where contravention established without reasonable excuse

Orders for contraventions without reasonable excuse

(1) If the court finds that the respondent has contravened a child‑related order without having a reasonable excuse, the court may make any of the following orders:

(a) an order requiring the respondent to enter into a bond in accordance with section 70NCA;

(b) if an order is made under paragraph (a), and the respondent fails, without having a reasonable excuse, to enter into the bond - an order imposing a fine not exceeding 10 penalty units on the respondent;

(c) where the contravention resulted in a child not spending time with, or living with, a person (the affected person) for a period - an order requiring the respondent to compensate the affected person for some or all of any expenses the affected person reasonably incurred as a result of the contravention;

(d) where the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent contravened the order:

(i) an order imposing a fine not exceeding 60 penalty units;

(ii) an order imposing a term of imprisonment.

[...]

Matters to be considered by the court

(2) In making an order mentioned in subsection (1), the court must have regard to:

(a) the likely effects of making the order on any child, or any other person; and

(3) Without limiting the matters the court may take into account, the following matters must be taken into account by the court when having regard to the seriousness of the contravention:

(a) whether a court has previously found that the respondent has contravened a child‑related order without having a reasonable excuse;

(b) whether the respondent behaved in a way that showed a serious disregard of the respondent's obligations under the child‑related order mentioned in subsection (1);

(c) the behaviour of any person with whom the child is to live or spend time under the child‑related order mentioned in subsection (1).

(4) The court may sentence the respondent to imprisonment under subparagraph (1)(d)(ii) only if the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate for the court to deal with the contravention in any other way under subsection (1).

(1) This section sets out requirements relating to bonds that the court may require the respondent to enter into under paragraph 70NBF(1)(a).

Matters dealt with in bonds

(2) A bond is to be for a specified period of up to 2 years.

(3) A bond may be:

(a) with or without surety; and

(b) with or without security.

(4) The conditions that may be imposed on the respondent by a bond include (without limitation) conditions that require the respondent:

(a) to attend a post‑separation parenting program; or

(b) to attend an appointment (or a series of appointments) with a family consultant; or

(c) to attend family counselling; or

(d) to attend family dispute resolution; or

(e) to be of good behaviour.

(5) Before requiring the respondent to enter into a bond, the court must explain to the respondent, in language likely to be readily understood by the respondent:

(a) the purpose and effect of the proposed requirement; and

(b) the consequences that may follow if the respondent:

(i) fails to enter into the bond; or

(ii) having entered into the bond - fails to act in accordance with the bond.

70NCB Procedure for enforcing bonds

(1) This section applies if:

(a) the court finds that the respondent has contravened a child‑related order without having a reasonable excuse; and

(b) the respondent has entered into a bond in accordance with an order made under paragraph 70NBF(1)(a); and

(c) the respondent fails, without having a reasonable excuse, to comply with the bond.

(2) The court may:

(a) without prejudice to the continuance of the bond, impose a fine not exceeding 10 penalty units on the respondent; or

(b) revoke the bond and deal with the respondent in any manner in which the respondent could have been dealt with for the contravention of the child‑related order if:

(i) the bond had not been entered into; and

(ii) the respondent was before the court under this Division in respect of the contravention of the child‑related order.

(3) Without limiting the matters the court may take into account, the court must take into account the following matters when acting under subsection (2):

(a) the fact that the bond was entered into;

(b) anything done pursuant to the bond;

(c) any fine imposed, and any other order made, for or in respect of the contravention of the child‑related order.

1. I also take into account section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth):

140 Civil proceedings: standard of proof

(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.

(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:

(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject - matter of the proceeding; and

(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

1. The contraventions alleged breaches of paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of the orders of 20 May 2025. Mr Keng had issued proceedings back in July 2024, seeking to be able to spend time with X.
2. The parties had commenced to live together in 2015, they were married in 2016, X was born in 2017, and the marriage relationship of the parents broke down when they separated in October 2019, when X was two years old. It is apparent that for some time thereafter, Mr Keng spent some time with X by agreement between the parents, albeit that was a poor parental relationship, and Ms Hun complains about the consistency of Mr Keng's attempts to see the child X.
3. Orders were made on 7 December 2024 by consent that the Mr Keng would see X in a supervised setting. The report of those supervised sessions was tendered in evidence before me.
4. Ms Hun alleges that the time between X and the Mr Keng more or less continued the same until "the slap". Doing the best I can, it appears the slap is alleged to have occurred sometime before April 2024. The slap is alleged to have been applied by Mr Keng to X's ear. Mr Keng concedes using physical discipline around about the time of the complaint, but the exact particulars of that physical discipline are in dispute.
5. There was, back in December 2024, an order made by consent that restrained Mr Keng from using physical discipline. It is also uncontroversial that Mr Keng has undertaken a parenting course, or courses, since these proceedings were commenced. There is also an affidavit filed in these proceedings of the contact service report between the Father and X. A brief summary of that report is as follows:

The father was consistently on time and well-presented, with no issues collecting [X] from after-school care. [X] appeared happy to leave with her father. She seemed to enjoy her time with him and other family members who attended 2 out of the 4 visits. [X] appeared relaxed in her father's care, able to express what she wanted and didn't want to do, and he always respected her boundaries.

[Mr Keng] was very attentive towards [X], even when other family members were present. However, there were some indications that [X] might be coached by her mother regarding accepting food, hugs, kisses, or high-fives. [X] frequently referred to her mother in conversation and clearly has a close relationship with her.

Both the father and his partner, [Ms D], noted some changes in [X]'s behaviour. In the past, [X] was always happy to give hugs and high-fives, but during these visits, she appeared reluctant, which they found unusual.

[X]'s younger sister, [E], missed her and was very happy to see her. [X]'s step-sister and stepbrother were mindful of her need for space and respected her autonomy.

[X] seemed to worry about not finishing her lunch and potentially getting into trouble with her mother. Her father consistently reassured her that it was okay.

Despite the mother initially claiming to not want to see the father, there were no issues after this and the father was able to be present while changeover took place between the supervisor, mother and on one occasion, her partner.

Overall, I have not observed any issues that would prevent me from supporting the father having unsupervised visits with [X].

1. A report was provided to the parties and the Court in or about April 2025 that described the supervised time progressing reasonably well in all the circumstances. Until the start of that supervised time, Mr Keng had not seen X since Ms Hun stopped the time after she learned of what she regarded as the slap.
2. On 20 May 2025, interim orders were made that included the following provisions:

2. The child [X], born [in] 2017 ("[X]") spend time with the father:

(a) every Sunday from 11.00 am to 3.00pm with changeover to take place at the mother's house;

(b) by telephone or FaceTime twice a week at such times and for such duration to be agreed between the parents or failing agreement, Tuesdays and Thursdays at 7.00 pm for half an hour; and

(c) such further and other times as agreed between the parties.

1. The father be at liberty to liaise with [X]'s school with respect to [X]'s supports and attendance AND IT IS REQUESTED that [X]'s school facilitate individual meetings for each parent.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:

Liberty to Apply

1. Liberty is granted to the Independent Children's Lawyer to relist these proceedings before the docket Judicial Registrar for further directions on seven days written notice to each other party and to the Court.

AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1. This matter is allocated to the Evatt list.

2. The Judicial Registrar records that the parties consented verbally to the Orders made by consent herein, and the Respondent was assisted by a Mandarin interpreter.

3. IT IS REQUESTED THAT the Registry Manager arrange for an interpreter fluent in Mandarin to assist the Respondent on the adjourned hearing date.

1. It is common ground that after the orders of 20 May 2025 were made, time and communication proceeded more or less in accordance with the orders, until the end of June 2025, that is, about a month.
2. Count 1, which was not pressed, of the contravention application related to the allegation that Ms Hun had, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow X to communicate with Mr Keng on 24 June 2025. What actually happened is as set out in Mr Keng's affidavit at paragraph 3:
   1. On Tuesday 24 June 2025, I FaceTime called [Ms Hun] at 7:01pm. There was no answer. I tried calling a few more times. At approximately 7:15pm, [X] answered the phone and I started talking to her. At 7:34pm, [Ms Hun] interrupted our FaceTime call and said that she needed to use her phone and hung up the phone.
3. There was no challenge to the event, those facts, and I accept that is close enough to what occurred. The point is that although X did not speak to Mr Keng for the entire half hour, X spoke to Mr Keng for about 24 minutes. Sensibly, count 1 was not further pressed.

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to communicate with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to spend time with the Applicant.

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to spend time with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to spend time with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to spend time with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to spend time with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to spend time with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to communicate with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to communicate with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to spend time with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to communicate with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to communicate with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child,

X, to spend time with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

The Respondent, without reasonable excuse, refused to allow the child, X, to communicate with the Applicant.

Order alleged to have been contravened

(Date of order, and order number or paragraph)

Date, time and location of alleged act or omission

1. Ms Hun being a litigant in person meant that I was required to provide assistance to her in terms of the Court's procedures, the procedures of the hearing and her rights. I took some time to address those matters, including explaining to Ms Hun that the number one right she had at any time was to ask a question if she did not understand what was required of her in the Court hearing.
2. On Thursday 26 June 2025, Mr Keng called and spoke to X for about 20 minutes. After Mr Keng had been speaking to her for that time, he asked her about what he and her should do on the following Sunday. X told him that she did not want him to do anything and did not want him to pick her up, and X hung up. I am satisfied that count 2 is not made out and I dismiss count 2 as a contravention.
3. However, the events of count 2, the alleged failure to communicate that I have dismissed, feature in the chronology of Mr Keng seeking to see his child. After the child had hung up, and I am satisfied at about 7.30 pm, Mr Keng, being unhappy with the way the conversation ended, called back a number of times. Before that, the parents spoke to each other, and Ms Hun was alleging that X was crying and screaming. Mr Keng attempted to explain to Ms Hun the ordinary, appropriate nature of the phone call. Ms Hun then accused Mr Keng of abusing and harassing X.
4. Mr Keng then made several more calls after 7.30 pm in an attempt to speak to X again. That was outside, just, the time he was permitted to call. Promptly thereafter, Ms Hun took X to the local police station, whereupon complaints were made of Mr Keng's behaviour. Ms Hun alleges that the police told her, or told X, that if X did not feel safe, she did not have to attend any time with Mr Keng. The context and the full extent of the conversation between Ms Hun and the police, and X and the police, and whether or not X was present when Ms Hun was explaining the situation from her point of view to the police, is not clear.
5. Ultimately, the police applied for an intervention order against Mr Keng for the protection of X and Ms Hun. However, on the first return of the matter to the Magistrates' Court, the police withdrew their application. But the unhappy circumstances of the previous Thursday, 26 June, including the visit to the police station, was the context to when Mr Keng next attempted, in accordance with the orders, to see X.
6. I am satisfied that on Sunday, 29 June 2025, Mr Keng messaged Ms Hun at about 10.00 am asking if X was ready for a pickup at 11.00 am. I regard that as a sensible and courteous message and communication. There was no response. Mr Keng attended the home, knocked on the door a couple of times, and he says no-one came to the door. He inferred that Ms Hun and her partner were at home because their cars were in the driveway. He tried calling and texting Ms Hun, including the following messages sent by Mr Keng to Ms Hun:[2]

10.13 AM Hi.. will [X] be ready for 11am pick up today?

10.52 AM Im on my way. Please make sure [X] is ready for pick up

11.24 AM Hey.. I've knock on your door 3 separate times. Tried to call your phone a couple of times with no success.

I will try again in an hour or so. Please contact me back as soon as you can

1. They were sensible and courteous text messages.
2. It was common ground in the proceedings that it was on this day that Ms Hun video-recorded X speaking to her father through the closed door. It is apparent from the video, which is in evidence and marked exhibit 'M1', that Ms Hun was some distance from the door, but Mr Keng could be plainly heard through the door attempting to speak to X, and in a not distressed or heightened or abusive manner.
3. The video records the sound of a door slamming very loudly, and Ms Hun's case asks me to accept that she had opened the door so that X could exit if she chose, whilst she, her mother, then removed herself from the scene. The video demonstrates that Mr Keng attempted to persuade X to go with him from outside the premises. Ms Hun remained inside the premises, and some distance from the front door, recording the incident without intervening or speaking to X any further.
4. It is common ground that X did not leave the premises and spend time with Mr Keng that day. Ms Hun's defence, having said that she did not admit that she contravened the order and asserted that she had a reasonable excuse, was to the effect that she had opened the door so that X could, if she chose, leave her premises to go with her father. Further, the substance of her evidence was to the effect of "what more could I do?", and the responsibility rested with Mr Keng in failing to persuade the child to leave Ms Hun's home to spend the time with him.
5. In final address, counsel for Mr Keng referred to Cagney & Nankervis [2024] FedCFamC2F 192, a decision of Judge Parker, as her Honour then was, and specifically paragraph 7 of that decision.
   1. It is well established that a parenting order imposes a positive obligation on the person bound by the order. Compliance requires active steps to encourage and facilitate compliance, the exertion of parental authority over the child, and making the child understand that it is the attitude of the parent that the time (or in this case, communication) required by the orders is to take place. Passive failure to impede compliance, mere invitations to the child to comply and token efforts at compliance are insufficient, as is leaving it to the child to decide whether or not to comply.
6. The further substance of Ms Hun's defence to this count was that X did not wish to go and therefore it was a matter for X, and that further, Ms Hun was not prepared to "force her".
7. Counsel for Mr Keng also referred me to paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the Full Court decision of Stevenson & Hughes [1993] FamCA 14. Those paragraphs are as follows:

Her Honour in dealing with this ground and indeed making a general statement pointed out, in my view quite rightly, that an access order imposes an obligation which goes beyond mere passive non-interference and it imposes upon the party who is obliged to give access a positive obligation to encourage that access and, indeed, as I pointed out in the course of the hearing, that is reinforced in the definition of the meaning of contravening an order under s. 112AB(1)(a)(ii) where it says:-

"A person shall be taken for the purposes of this Part to have contravened an order under this Act if, and only if:-

(a) where the person is bound by the order - he or she has:-

...

(ii) made no reasonable attempt to comply with the order."

The question really before the court, and before us, is essentially how far a party has to go to make a reasonable attempt. The wife's argument was that she had done all that is humanly possible to comply with the order by issuing the invitation. Let me say and this obviously explains too why her Honour looked at the various incidents in a global fashion, that one can look at the matter in graduation. There is, in my mind, absolutely no doubt that when one takes the incident of 31 August - the incident where the wife simply wrote down the telephone number and said "this is the number, you can dial it" - that it could not possibly be argued that the wife had made a reasonable attempt to comply with the order, when one remembers that one is dealing here with a five year old child.

This is what I might call the classical case which the Full Court dealt with in Stavros & Stavros [1984] FamCA 23; (1984) FLC 91-562; 9 Fam LR 1025, namely, that there is an obligation cast upon the custodial parent to take reasonable steps to make the child available for access. It is not open to the custodial parent to do no more than bring the child to the front entrance and invite it to walk of its own accord to the access parent at the garden gate, and to argue that if the child refuses, all her obligations are satisfied by merely standing, as I put it, with folded arms behind the child, doing nothing either to encourage the child to walk to the father or to discourage the child from remaining on the doorstep and, indeed, this situation is directly comparable to it. It is quite clear that such an approach is wrong and that the wife in this circumstance, clearly, was in breach of her obligations under the order.

1. I am satisfied that those two decisions apply, notwithstanding the different legislation now applying.
2. Thereafter, Mr Keng, as provided in the orders, telephoned Ms Hun each Tuesday and Thursday, and on each of those occasions was unable to have any conversation or communicate with X at any length. Ms Hun's evidence and position, which I accept, was that on each occasion when Mr Keng telephoned, she would place the telephone in front of X, having answered it, and then leave the room for the purpose of ensuring that X had privacy to speak to Mr Keng.
3. The sensitivity to privacy is admirable, but the substance of Mr Keng's case is that Ms Hun was merely going through the motions and was not actively exercising her parental authority to assist X communicate with her father. It is also common ground in this case that X is subject to autism spectrum disorder ('ASD'), and it is said by Ms Hun, level 2 of that disorder. I accept that that condition would make it more difficult for Mr Keng to persuade X to leave the house, and more difficult for Ms Hun to persuade X to leave the house. That condition applied to X, obviously, during the whole of the time of the supervised visits and was well known at the time of the 20 May 2025 orders.
4. There is no evidence before me that a child with that condition, as X has, is in any greater or lesser need for involvement of both parents in her life.
5. Thereafter, that circumstance of X not communicating with her father, and effectively, it appears, hanging up immediately after each call, occurred on the following occasions:
   • 29 July 2025; and
   • 31 July 2025; and
   • 5 August 2025; and
   • 7 August 2025; and
   • 12 August 2025.
6. It is clear to me that part of the unfortunate conundrum of the telephone communication of 26 June 2025 was Mr Keng's apparent literal understanding of the telephone communication order. It is apparent, and I am satisfied, that Mr Keng interpreted the order as meaning he was entitled to speak to X for the entire period from 7.00 until 7.30 pm, and that Ms Hun was obliged to have X speak to him for that entire period. And that was so notwithstanding X's ASD circumstance, and the fact that she was only eight years old and would have the attention span of an 8-year-old with ASD.
7. I am satisfied that Mr Keng's interpretation of that order was wrong, and the substance of the order required communication between 7.00 and 7.30 pm for a reasonable period, and something in the order of five to 10 minutes, depending on how the conversation was going and the child's attention to the call. It is for that reason that, as I told the parties, I will dismiss count 2 of the contravention.
8. I then get to the remainder of the counts, and I need to make some observations of Ms Hun's evidence. It was clear that Ms Hun, in the context of alleging family violence during the relationship, as well as her understanding of the slap, has a very poor opinion of Mr Keng. She is entitled to her own opinion, but Court orders are to be obeyed, regardless of the opinion that the parents have of each other.
9. In regard to the telephone calls, it is clear that, save for count 3, Mr Keng did not get to communicate with X thereafter, save for momentarily as she hung up.
10. As to the spend time each Sunday, I next turn to the Sunday following 29 June, which is understood to be the day of the video and the door slamming, that is, Sunday, 6 July 2025. The text messages[3] from Mr Keng to Ms Hun were as follows:

10.44 AM Hey.. im on my way. Please make sure [X] is ready for 11am pick up

11.03 AM Hey.. im outside. Are you home?

I tried calling your phone [...]

1. He received no response. He attended the home at 11.00 am. He knocked on the door a couple of times. No-one came to the door, and he observed Ms Hun's car parked outside her residence, and he inferred that she was at home. Mr Keng sent text messages to Ms Hun on that occasion.
2. A curiosity of this family is that Mr Keng sends Ms Hun text messages in English and she replies in Mandarin[4] which Mr Keng understands, but I do not. But it is clear enough that there was minor argument while Mr Keng pressed to be allowed to see the child and nothing happened. He did not get to see the child. It is unfortunate that, in that text message exchange, Mr Keng said to Ms Hun that Ms Hun was telling lies to the child and that the child was confused. Jacques Chirac, the President of France once said, "Life presents you with opportunities to shut up... and he keeps missing his," and I extend that to text messaging. That occasion was an occasion for Mr Keng to shut up in his text messaging and not say anything further, but to leave.
3. Nonetheless, the argumentative text messages back and forth are merely part of the context of that day and were not relied upon as part of a reasonable excuse.
4. Thereafter, on the occasions 13, 20 & 27 July and 3 August 2025 on each Sunday when his time was due, or thereabouts, Mr Keng sent a text message to Ms Hun to the effect, as submitted by his counsel, that he was ready, willing and able to attend and take X. However, he did not receive any response whatsoever from Ms Hun. But he did not actually turn up and knock at the door again. However, I accept he was ready, willing and able, and the inference is overwhelming that had he turned up and knocked on the door, X would not have moved out of her mother's home and left with him.
5. Thereafter, on the last Sunday described in the contravention application, being Sunday, 10 August 2025, as alleged at count 13, Mr Keng again sent a text message to Ms Hun seeking to confirm his pickup of X that day. He arrived at 11 o'clock. He knocked on the door a couple of times, and no-one came to the door. He tried calling Ms Hun a couple of times, but she did not pick up. On a number of occasions Ms Hun answered the telephone when Mr Keng called on a Tuesday and Thursday, and before X spoke Ms Hun had telephoned him at around the time telling him that X did not wish to talk to him and then hung up the phone.
6. A real issue in this case is the extent to which Ms Hun is able to protect X from her own feelings of very serious antipathy and disapproval of Mr Keng. Ms Hun goes as far as telling me in final address that Mr Keng's motive to see the child is not clear or honest. She tells me in evidence that the slap is so abhorrent to her and her culture that only a criminal would do that. It is clear that is how she regards Mr Keng. She also gave evidence that she can never forgive that, nor can X.
7. Counsel for the ICL asked questions, in the context of one of the answers that Ms Hun had given as to how difficult it would be for X to leave her mother's home, of what arrangements Ms Hun could contemplate that would assist X if that were the circumstance, that is, X did not wish to go. It was suggested to her, "What about a changeover from school?". Ms Hun was clear, firm and emphatic that that was not to be contemplated, and that to her mind she was not prepared to contemplate time alone between Mr Keng and X. That was in the context of a school pickup, but nonetheless I am satisfied that is her genuine feeling in regard to X's time with Mr Keng.
8. Balancing all of those matters, I am satisfied that counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 are made out, that is proven on the balance of probabilities. I am satisfied that on those occasions Ms Hun did not attempt to exercise, or actually exercise, her parental authority to have X communicate or spend time with Mr Keng. I am satisfied that Ms Hun did not use her parental authority and attempt to ensure that X spent time with Mr Keng or communicate with him as required by the orders. I am not satisfied Ms Hun had a reasonable excuse to act as she did.
9. I am satisfied that Ms Hun communicated to X that it was up to X, who was eight years old, with ASD, to determine whether or not X would spend time and communicate with her father. I want to make clear the orders do not require X to do anything. The orders require X's parents to do things. If X told Mr Keng that she did not wish to return to her mother's home on a Sunday morning, that would not be a reason not to return her. If X put on a tantrum and refused to be returned to her mother, her father would be required to return her.
10. Ms Hun has not previously contravened an order of this court. She appears to live in modest financial circumstances. I am satisfied that an order to enter into a bond, that is a solemn promise, to abide the existing orders, is appropriate.[5]

1. I turn to the competing applications seeking to restrain the Mother from taking X out of Australia and the Mother's application to be permitted to do so. Ms Hun has purchased tickets to leave later this day[6]. I have to balance the risk that the feared event, that is, Ms Hun not returning X to Australia, with the likelihood that that might happen. I have to balance the extent of the risk with what would be for X, the catastrophic circumstances if she was not returned to the country of her nationality.
2. I do take into account that Ms Hun has travelled to and from China over the last nine years, and I accept Ms Hun's case that the support services for X via the NDIS are likely to be superior in Australia to China. But the extent to which Ms Hun has failed to follow the existing Court orders raises the risk that she will not return X to Australia because of how profoundly unhappy Ms Hun is with Mr Keng and with Mr Keng spending time with X. There is some risk, and I cannot determine the extent of that risk, but none the less a real risk, that X would not be returned to Australia, the country of her citizenship and where she has NDIS services available to her, and where she is able to have the love and care of both parents.
3. Further, this is an interim hearing. I am not deciding this forever, and it may be at final hearing that Mr Keng's opposition to X travelling overseas is unsuccessful. But I have to make a decision today on the evidence that I have. Balancing the risk of X not being returned and the consequences for her if she is not returned, I am satisfied that X should remain in Australia until the matter can be fully explored at final hearing and she should be placed on the 'watch list' preventing international travel.

I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge O'Shannessy.

[1] Although a section 102NA order prohibiting the parties personally cross examining each other had previously been made, I discharged that order in earlier orders that day.

[4] But demonstrates real proficiency with an electronic translation service or "App" on her telephone and I am satisfied by that device fully understands Mr Keng's text messages sent in English.

[5] At the conclusion of the hearing Ms Hun entered into a bond to be of good behaviour and to comply with the existing orders.

[6] During the hearing it emerged that Ms Hun may have misread the airline tickets she had purchased and that the intended flight left during the hearing.