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[2003] FCA 662
plaintiff. Kelrit was directed to elect between the assessed contract and statutory damages and to file and serve proposed minutes of order within 14 days.
Kelrit rebuilt a fire-damaged industrial building after Transform promised to take up its five-year lease option if the work met Transform's needs. Transform later chose not to renew. The Federal Court found that the promise was a binding oral contract and that Transform's representation was misleading or deceptive. It assessed two alternative amounts of damages, $406,402 for breach of contract and $5,000 under the Trade Practices Act, but required Kelrit to choose between them before final orders. The Court also found that Asquith and Ness were knowingly involved in the contravention.
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Kelrit Investments Pty Limited owned an industrial site at 50 Clyde Street, Broadmeadows, Newcastle. Transform Composites Holdings occupied the main building under a four-year lease commencing 1 October 1996, with a five-year option from 1 October 2000 [4]. The lease's option clause required Transform to give at least three months' written notice if it wished to renew [14]. The fire-damage clause did not impose a mandatory obligation on Kelrit to rebuild [12]-[13].
A fire on 18 August 1998 substantially damaged several sheds in the main building [7], [28]. The central factual dispute was whether Transform's directors, Ralph Asquith and Brian Ness, promised that Transform would remain for the balance of the lease and exercise its option if Kelrit rebuilt the damaged area to Transform's specifications.
Finn J rejected the respondents' denials. He found that at a meeting on 7 September 1998 Asquith made the representation and offer, with Ness's knowledge. Transform wanted the replacement building to accommodate its business requirements, including a high clearance and a proposed five-axis machine [102]. Kelrit then rebuilt. Transform participated in design discussions and supplied input on the building's requirements [103]-[104].
By November 1999, Transform said its plans had changed and it would not exercise the option [68]-[72], [108]. Kelrit claimed damages for breach of contract, damages under ss 52 and 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), and equitable compensation [9]. Claims against Asquith and Ness included accessory liability under s 75B of the Act and a claim under s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) [9].
The Court found a binding oral contract and misleading or deceptive conduct. It also found that Asquith and Ness were knowingly concerned in the contravention [112], [120], [182]. It assessed two alternative damages amounts, $406,402 for contract and $5,000 under s 82, but made no final damages order. Because the remedies were inconsistent, Kelrit was directed to elect and provide proposed minutes of order within 14 days [121], [183].
Credibility was decisive. Finn J described Asquith as unreliable and found that his later affidavit about a conversation concerning the lease was “calculatingly deceptive” [90]. He considered Ness's evidence unreliable on strategic matters and not independent corroboration of Asquith [91]. By contrast, he accepted Renee Hawkins as a conscientious witness and considered Clive Hawkins truthful despite aspects of his evidence being unreliable or coloured by his personal perspective [88]-[89].
The Court drew a careful distinction between the early post-fire discussions and the meeting on 7 September. The earlier exchanges created expectations and reassurance but did not, in Finn J's view, establish a clear and unqualified commitment [95], [98]. At the 7 September meeting, however, the Hawkins' evidence established a specific conditional promise: Kelrit would rebuild to Transform's requirements, and Transform would exercise the five-year option [102], [112].
The subsequent conduct supported that account. The Court accepted evidence that Asquith played a substantial role in the building's design and gave instructions about its specifications [104]. The building was therefore being developed for Transform's requirements in circumstances consistent with the promise. Finn J found Kelrit rebuilt because of the representation and offer, rather than simply because it received legal advice about its obligations after the fire [103].
The contract analysis treated the rebuilding as the requested performance. Applying Beaton v McDivitt, Finn J explained that a promise may request an act or the fulfilment of a condition, and that doing the requested act in reliance on the promise will usually provide consideration [114]. On his findings, Kelrit performed the requested act and the oral contract was formed.
Transform argued that the oral contract was ineffective under ss 23C and 54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). Finn J accepted the approach taken in Baloglow v Konstanidis. The oral agreement was executory, so s 23C did not apply. It also did not vary the existing option or dispose of an interest in land for s 54A purposes. The lease continued to define the option and the lessor's obligation to grant a renewal; the oral agreement committed Transform to exercise the choice it otherwise had [118]. The Court therefore rejected the writing objection without needing to decide the alternative estoppel argument [119].
For the Trade Practices Act claim, the respondents accepted that if the representation was made, it was misleading or deceptive because they had no intention at the time of exercising the option [120]. The Court found Kelrit relied on it. For damages under s 82, it applied the counterfactual comparison described in Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Pty Ltd: the actual position was compared with the position Kelrit would have occupied but for the contravening conduct [168].
Finn J found that, absent the representation, Kelrit would have sought a cash settlement from its insurer rather than rebuild. He assessed the likely settlement at $630,000, taking account of the estimated reinstatement cost and the discount the insurer would likely have negotiated [146]-[147], [167]. The calculation also accounted for the steel payment, remediation costs, rental income, interest savings, taxation and property value [169]-[179]. Those benefits substantially reduced the reliance loss.
The judgment applied existing authorities rather than announcing a new general rule. For consideration, Finn J relied on Beaton v McDivitt for the proposition that performance of an act requested by a promise will usually constitute consideration [114]. The case applies that reasoning to a landlord's rebuilding of premises after a tenant's conditional promise to exercise a lease option.
On the statutory writing question, the Court followed the New South Wales Court of Appeal's approach in Baloglow v Konstanidis [118]. Finn J distinguished the concern drawn from Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan's Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd about whether a variation of a contract subject to writing requirements must also be written. His analysis was that the oral promise did not vary the option: it bound Transform as to how it would exercise the choice under the existing lease [116]-[118].
The reasons also refer to equitable estoppel authorities, including Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher and Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd [117]. But Finn J expressly left the estoppel questions undecided because his contract and statutory analyses resolved the relevant issues [119]. It would therefore overstate the decision to describe it as a ruling that estoppel defeats the Conveyancing Act writing requirements.
For statutory damages, the judgment applies the counterfactual comparison associated with Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Pty Ltd [168]. For inconsistent remedies, it applies Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd and Tang Man Sit v Capacious Investments Ltd in requiring an election before judgment [121]. The judgment itself does not establish what the law was before these authorities or how the law developed afterwards. It records how Finn J applied them in 2003.
At [114], Finn J describes a promise made in exchange for another party's requested performance. In plain English, a promise can be supported by consideration where the recipient does what the promisor asked them to do, in reliance on the promise. In this case, the relevant act was rebuilding the premises to the tenant's requirements.
At [118], Finn J says the oral contract “fettered” the tenant's existing choice. In plain English, Transform still had an option under the written lease, but it separately promised Kelrit how it would use that option if Kelrit rebuilt. The Court viewed that promise as a commitment about the exercise of an existing right, not as a new grant or variation of the land interest.
At [119], Finn J calls the facts a possible “quintessential” case of equitable estoppel, but says he need not decide the issue. The practical significance is limited: the Court's decision rests on its contract and statutory analysis, not on a final estoppel ruling.
At [168], the Court explains that s 82 damages require comparing actual and counterfactual positions. In plain English, the calculation is not simply the cost of the rebuilding or the amount of a promised lease. It asks what Kelrit actually received or spent, then compares that with what it probably would have received, spent or saved if the representation had not been made.
At [178], Finn J explains why the statutory damages figure was modest. The steel payment, rental receipts, savings and other advantages reduced the loss on the counterfactual measure. The Court considered the larger expectation loss to be associated with the contractual claim, not the reliance-based statutory comparison.
The decision is most relevant to disputes where a party makes a conditional promise that induces another party to perform a substantial act, and the promisor later seeks to resile. Here, the lessor was asked to rebuild a building to the tenant's specifications, and the tenant promised to exercise a lease option in return [102]-[104], [112].
It is particularly relevant where the promise concerns a party's future exercise of a right already created by a written agreement. The distinction between varying the underlying right and making a separate commitment about how to exercise it was central to the Court's treatment of ss 23C and 54A [116]-[118]. The decision does not establish that every oral agreement about a lease option will avoid those provisions. Its analysis depended on the terms and operation of the particular lease and oral agreement.
The damages discussion may be relevant where misleading conduct causes a claimant to choose one course over another, and the claimant alleges that it lost the benefit of the alternative course. The counterfactual must be supported by evidence and account for relevant receipts, costs, savings and benefits [167]-[179]. In this case, the likely insurance settlement was estimated rather than an amount actually offered and accepted [142]-[147].
The decision also addresses cases where contract damages and statutory damages are pleaded in the alternative but cannot both be recovered. The Court assessed both measures so that Kelrit could make an election, but it did not award both [121], [183].
The supplied judgment does not discuss decisions made after 3 July 2003, so it cannot establish how later courts treated Kelrit Investments Pty Limited v Transform Composites Holdings Pty Limited. No later cases or subsequent appellate history are identified in the text.
Within its own reasoning, the decision applies and distinguishes earlier authorities. It applies Beaton v McDivitt on consideration by requested performance and Baloglow v Konstanidis on the Conveyancing Act writing provisions [114], [118]. It distinguishes the relevance of Tallerman to a variation, on the basis that the oral agreement did not vary the option itself [116]-[118]. It also applies authorities on inconsistent remedies and counterfactual statutory damages [121], [168].
The judgment therefore supplies a factual application of those principles, but the provided text does not support any claim about whether the decision has been followed, distinguished, criticised or limited later.
Finn J did not decide the equitable estoppel issue. He observed that the facts appeared to present a strong example, but considered it unnecessary to determine whether Transform was estopped from relying on the writing provisions or resiling from its promise [119]. The judgment consequently does not settle the relationship between estoppel and ss 23C or 54A in a case where the statutory argument is decisive.
The case also leaves open how the writing provisions would apply where an oral agreement actually changes the terms of an option, creates a new interest in land, or changes the lessor's obligations. Finn J's conclusion depended on his characterisation of this agreement as an executory promise that committed Transform to exercise an existing option without altering it [118].
The damages assessment depended on the evidence of what Kelrit would probably have done with its insurance claim. The Court found a likely cash settlement of $630,000, using an estimated reinstatement cost and an assessed discount [146]-[147], [167]. The reasons do not establish a general method for valuing a hypothetical settlement where the insurer's position, the insured's financial circumstances, or the available repair options differ.
Finally, the Court assessed but did not finally order either damages figure. The ultimate remedy depended on Kelrit's election, and the reasons do not record what election or final orders followed [121], [183].
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT The Parties 1 The applicant, Kelrit Investments Pty Ltd ("Kelrit") was incorporated for the purposes of a family business in 1983. Though it diversified over time its core business was that of fibreglass moulding and manufacturing this being conducted at premises it owned at 50 Clyde St, Broadmeadows in Newcastle. By 1990 that part of its business was carried on under the name "Transform Composites". In 1994 it was sold by Kelrit to the first respondent, Transform Composite Holdings Pty Ltd ("Transform") as a result of a management buyout proposal put by the second and third respondents, Ralph Asquith and Brian Ness who were respectively, a director and the managing director of Transform. 2 From about the time of the sale to Transform the directors and shareholders of Kelrit were the founder's children, Clive Hawkins, Renee Hawkins and Chris Hawkins. The 50 Clyde Street Property 3 This property was bought by Kelrit in 1988 for $2.2 million. It contained a number of industrial buildings which were divided into discrete areas which were referred to as "sheds". The largest of these ("the main building") was a saw toothed structure built in the early 1900s which housed shed 9, 11, 11A, 11B, 12, 13A, 13B, 13C and 13D. 4 In August 1998 Transform leased the main building from Kelrit under a four year lease commencing 1 October 1996 with a five year option from 1 October 2000. Transform had previously occupied the premises under shorter term tenancies. 5 When Kelrit purchased the site in 1988 the purchase included the dismantled steel frame of an open portal building. That frame is of some significance in this proceeding. 6 In September 1989 substantial damage was done to the Clyde Street property by the Newcastle earthquake. Kelrit's insurance claim for damage suffered resulted in a cash settlement with its insurer. The Present Claim 7 Parts of the main building (sheds 13A, 13B, 13C and 13D) were substantially damaged by fire on 18 August 1998. Kelrit's case is that, shortly after the fire, both Mr Ness and Mr Asquith represented and offered to Kelrit (though Clive and Renee Hawkins) that if Kelrit rebuilt the damaged part of the main building to the specifications and to meet the requirements of Transform, Transform would remain in possession of the premises for the balance of the term of the lease and would exercise the option. 8 Kelrit, relying it is said upon the representations of, and its contract with Transform rebuilt the main building as required by Transform. In late November 1999, Transform indicated it had no need for the premises and would not be exercising the option. It vacated the premises at the end of September 2000 on the expiration of the lease. 9 Kelrit's claims against Transform are (i) for damages under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the TP Act") in respect of a contravention of s 52 of that Act; (ii) for damages for breach of contract; and (iii) for compensation in equity. The claims against Mr Asquith and Mr Ness are under the accessory liability provisions of the TP Act (s 75B) and under s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW). 10 To foreshadow what follows, Mr Asquith and Mr Ness deny making the representations and offers on which Kelrit's claim is based. I have not accepted their denials. 11 There is a substantial dispute between the parties as to whether, in the event of a contravention of the TP Act or a breach of contract being found, Kelrit actually suffered loss and damage. I will consider separately the questions of contravention/breach of contract and of damages. Transform's lease 12 There are only two parts of the 1996 four year lease to which it is necessary to refer. First, clause 4:03 (as varied) made provision for the respective rights and obligations of the lessor or lessee in the event of destruction or damage in whole or in part of the leased premises by fire. A proviso to that clause stipulated that if such destruction or damage occurred, then: "if the demised premises shall not be rebuilt or made fit for the occupation and use of the lessee or shall not become accessible to the lessee within six (6) months of the date upon which such destruction or damage or such inaccessibility shall have occurred then at or after the expiration of such period either party may determine this lease by giving written notice of cancellation to the other party." 13 What I would emphasise is that this provision imposed no mandatory obligation on Kelrit to rebuilt in the event of total or partial destruction of the main building by fire. 14 The lease provided for an option to renew for a further five years in the following terms (insofar as presently relevant): "If the Lessee shall desire to take a renewed lease of the demised premises from the expiration of the term of this Lease for a further term of [five] years … and shall give to the Lessor not less than three (3) months notice in writing thereof … the Lessor shall at the cost and expense of the Lessee grant to the Lessee a lease of the demised premises for the same further term … PROVIDED HOWEVER that the granting of a renewed Lease pursuant to the option herein contained is dependant upon the exercise of the option in the manner herein provided …" Factual Setting 15 The applicant's case is founded on a number of discussions and communications between one or other or both of Clive Hawkins and Renee Hawkins on the one hand and Mr Asquith and Mr Ness on the other. The substance of these discussions and communications is contested by Mr Asquith and Mr Ness as, in some instances, is the occurrence of them. The issue of credibility looms large in all of this. 16 Before detailing those discussions in their context it is necessary to refer to several matters by way of background.
LOSS IN CAPITAL VALUE $ Value with Transform as sitting tenant 1,710,000 Less: Stelform property 248,812 Net Value 1,461,188 Value with vacant possession 1,400,000 LOSS OF CAPITAL 61,188
TOTAL LOSS 372,846 Interest (April 02 to Mar 03) 33,556 TOTAL LOSS INCL INTEREST 406,402
163 These two separate heads of damage are, in my view, proper expectation losses available to be claimed by Kelrit - subject to any available defence raised by Transform. 164 It is alleged by way of defence that Kelrit was obliged to, but did not, mitigate its losses of rent; that it did not between 12 January 2000 (when Mr Asquith rejected the terms of renewal proposed by Ms Hawkins) and the date of sale of the 50 Clyde Street property. 165 I have referred above to the evidence on the attempts to sell and to rent the property. It doubtless is the case that the sale of the property was the immediate interest of the Hawkins from October 2000 onwards. Nonetheless Mr Hawkins gave evidence that they were still seeking tenants; they reduced the rent; but no tenants were forthcoming. There is no documentary evidence of these efforts. I am, though, prepared to accept that they were made. 166 Accordingly, I reject the mitigation defence and, on the contract claim, award damages in the sum of $406,402 (subject to any variations for interest). TRADE PRACTICES ACT DAMAGES 167 The premise of this claim is that but for the representation I have found was made by Transform and was relied upon by Kelrit, Kelrit would not have rebuilt but would have negotiated a cash settlement of its insurance claim. By rebuilding they lost that opportunity. I have indicated above that $630,000 represents what I consider would have been the likely negotiated cash settlement. I am satisfied and so find that the course that the Hawkins would have taken but for the representation is that of negotiating a cash settlement in that amount. 168 It is accepted by the parties, as it must be: see Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Pty Ltd (1998)196 CLR 494 esp at 512; that it is necessary to compare the position in which Kelrit found itself by having relied upon Transform's contravening conduct and the position in which it would have been but for that conduct. The making of that comparison in this case is not altogether straightforward. In the case of each of the positions to be compared there would have been or were receipts, expenditures and savings that would not have occurred in the case of the other position. The difficulty in making an estimation has been compounded by changes in the expert evidence adduced to remedy deficiencies in calculations and erroneous assumptions made. 169 In the end I consider it appropriate to approach the question of loss through a Table prepared by Ms Maybury and on which Kelrit relies. Save in one respect (noted below) I consider it adequately makes the comparison required in the circumstances albeit in a less than direct and, probably, in a somewhat distorting way. For reasons I give below I consider Ms Maybury's conclusion would overcompensate Kelrit and I have made appropriate adjustments. To render the somewhat Delphic table comprehensible I should make the following observations by way of explanation. 170 (1) The Table takes into account actual receipts enjoyed by Kelrit up to the date of sale of the 50 Clyde Street property. These receipts were (a) the sum of $46,700 for a Cool Room (a matter not considered independently in these reasons); (b) the payment of $118,000 to Kelrit for the steel frame used in the reconstruction; (c) actual rent payments made by Transform from 18 August 1999 to September 2000; (d) the sum of $248,812 derived from the sale of the Stelform property; and (e) $1,400,000 being the sale price of the 50 Clyde Street property. 171 (2) The sum of $118,000 is in my view necessarily to be brought into account as a receipt that Kelrit actually had but which it would not have had if the building was not reconstructed. The circumstances of the reconstruction gave Kelrit the opportunity to obtain that payment. If reconstruction had not occurred it would not have had that opportunity. It would have retained the steel unused as it had done for well over a decade (notwithstanding its ongoing assets sale). There is no evidence of any possible other opportunity to dispose of the steel. 172 (3) Mr Parson's has provided the valuation of the property on the assumptions that it has been remediated; reconstruction did not take place; and that it was untenanted. That valuation is $1,170,000. The notional cost of remediation is $50,000. I have indicated earlier in these reasons (when preferring Mr Clarke's expert evidence to that of Mr Willgoose) why this is the appropriate figure to adopt. 173 (4) Mr Maybury's calculations proceed on the premise that the negotiated cash settlement amount would have been applied to offset Kelrit's mortgage so effecting a saving in interest. A net sum is given for the cash settlement in the Table as a means for taking account of receipts that would not have been had if rebuilding had occurred and remediation expenses that would have been incurred if rebuilding had not occurred. 174 (5) The Table makes various adjustments for taxation. While the appropriate rates of tax were questioned (and are now resolved) the adjustments themselves were not. 175 (6) The Table was prepared according to a scale which calculated the loss that would have been suffered depending upon the amount of the negotiated cash settlement. I have not reproduced the entirety of that scale but only the two points on it that bound the $630,000 cash settlement amount that I consider would have been reached. It also included a sum for interest as until March 2000 which I have not reproduced. I will leave the question of interest to be decided when orders are to be made. 176 Ms Maybury's table is as follows: LOSS OF INCOME $ $ Negotiated cash settlement 600,000 650,000 Less: Received for Cool Room 46,700 46,700 Less: Received for Steel 118,000 118,000 Adjusted Cash Settlement 435,300 485,300 Less: Remediation Costs 50,000 50,000 Net Settlement available to offset mortgage 385,000 435,000 Interest saved on mortgage (Oct 98 to Mar 02) 116,021 131,077 Less: Income Tax (3) 39,612 44,753 Net loss of interest 76,408 86,324 Rent from reconstructed premises (18 Aug 99 to Sept 00) (2) 53,738 53,738 Less: Income Tax (3) 19,086 19,086 Net rent from reconstructed premises 34,653 34,653 NET LOSS OF INCOME 41,756 51,671 Add back: Income Tax at Current Rates @ 30% 17,895 22,145 TOTAL GROSS LOSS 59,651 73,816
LOSS OF CAPITAL VALUE $ $ Premises remediated - no tenant @ valuation 1,170,000 1,170,000 Less: Stelform Property 248,812 248,812 Net valuation 921,188 921,188 Negotiated cash settlement 600,000 650,000 Less: Remediation costs 50,000 50,000 Less: Cool Room 46,700 46,700 Less: Steel 118,000 118,000 Total Forgone 385,300 435,300 Less: Actual Received 1,306,488 1,356,488 1,400,000 1,400,000 LOSS OF CAPITAL NIL NIL TOTAL LOSS 59,651 73,816
177 My own qualification to this Table is that, under the loss of capital heading, not only is no loss suffered but an actual benefit is derived of, variously, about $93,000 (at $600,000) and of about $43,000 (at $650,000). If the cash settlement was $630,000 that benefit would have been about $63,000. 178 The "net loss of income" on Ms Maybury's figures for a cash settlement of $630,000 would have been in the order of $68,000. In consequence the total loss suffered would only have been about $5,000. I would have to say I do not find this a surprising outcome. In my view, the Hawkins were able both to dispose of the property and to secure other advantages by way of receipts (eg the $118,000 for the steel) and of savings such that their reliance loss was likely to be slight. It was their expectation loss that was likely to be the only loss of substance. 179 I would also add by way of comment that a bare comparison of Kelrit's actual receipts and expenditures and of its notional receipts, expenditures and savings (by way of interest saved) produces a relatively similar result when account is taken both of Mr Parson's valuation and of the actual total sale price of 50 Clyde Street. 180 On the TP Act damages claim I would award damages in the sum of $5,000. PARTICIPATORY LIABILITY 181 Kelrit has sought findings against Mr Asquith and Mr Ness that they were involved in the contravention of s 52 of TP Act for the purposes of attracting personal liability under s 75B of the Act. 182 I am satisfied that each was knowingly concerned in the contravention I have found and would be prepared to order accordingly. I consider it unnecessary here to recount the evidentiary basis for this finding. CONCLUSION 183 I will direct the applicant to make its election in light of these reasons and to file and serve proposed minutes of order within fourteen days of the date of these reasons. I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighty-three (183) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finn.
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr JV Nicholas SC with Mr C Dimitriadis
Date of Hearing: 10-14, 24, 25, 31 March 2003
Kelrit Investments Pty Limited
Transform Composites Holdings
(1987) 13 NSWLR 162
(1957) 98 CLR 93
(1937) 57 CLR 127
(1988) 164 CLR 387
(1989) 16 NSWLR 582
(1981) 147 CLR 35
(1998) 96 CLR 494
(1980) 147 CLR 35
Kelrit was directed to elect between the assessed contract and statutory damages and to file and serve proposed minutes of order within 14 days.