austlii:cth/ARTA/2026/145
General information, not legal advice.
ARTA
2026-02-05
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) With respect to the stalk and intimidate offence, Mr Kealy stated that he called his ex-partner on the night of the offence after he had been drinking to discuss visiting his son.[19] While on the call, the parties argued, and the next day Mr Kealy's ex-partner contacted the police and made allegations that Mr Kealy had threatened to harm her and damage her car. He stated that 'the conversation on the phone was heated and things were said that shouldn't have been'. However, Mr Kealy denied threatening her. Mr Kealy claims that a few days later his ex-partner contacted him crying and saying she did not mean for it to 'go that far'.[20] > > (b) With respect to the drink driving offence, Mr Kealy stated that he had been drinking with work colleagues the day before the offence and was informed by his ex-partner that that his son had been diagnosed with autism and would most likely remain non-verbal during his life. Mr Kealy stated that he was shocked and upset by the news and had a few more drinks before going to bed. He woke in the early hours of the morning and made the decision to drive to see his son. Mr Kealy states that he was 'emotional' and 'not thinking clearly' when he made this decision.[21] He stated that it was a 'serious error of judgment'.
(a) Anuwar and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Citizenship)[24] in which the applicant had been convicted of offences committed on 4 November 2021 of destroy or damage property, stalk intimidate intend fear physical harm and common assault. He had also been subject to a provision and final apprehended violence order. Mr Kealy submitted that the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant was of good character despite a domestic violence related offence noting that the Tribunal emphasised that the offence was at the low end, significant time had passed, and evidence of rehabilitation and contributions to society outweighed its concerns.[25] > > (b) Jamishi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs[26] to support his submission that his incorrect answers on his RRV application and the Incoming Passenger Cards were not intentional but were due to his dyslexia. In Jamishi, the Tribunal was considering an application for review of a decision to cancel approval of Mr Jamishi's citizenship. Mr Jamishi had provided false information to the Department at his citizenship test when asked whether intervention orders had been made against him. The Tribunal was not satisfied that Mr Jamishi was not of good character. It was satisfied that 'there might well have been a misunderstanding at the time of his citizenship application test both as to the questions posed to him and his responses given'.[27] 'That the applicant would not have deliberately misled the [Department] about the ... intervention order [was] lent credence by the fact that the [department] became aware of the intervention order only be reason of a disclosure by the applicant when seeking a visa.'[28] > > * (c) Arora and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship).[29] In this case, Mr Kealy's stated that Mr Arora's citizenship refusal was set aside because his convictions were over a decade old and he had demonstrated remorse and rehabilitation. He submitted that like Arora, he has shown remorse and taken steps to rehabilitate and demonstrates a low risk of reoffending through years of law-abiding behaviour noting that he has resided in Australia for 15 years. The Tribunal notes that the offending in this case occurred between 15 and 19 years ago.[30]
(a) The Tribunal can and should have regard to the conviction which occurred on 29 April 2020 as well as the underlying conduct which was deemed a verbal threat. This is because Mr Kealy breached his CCO which resulted in his non-conviction for the stalk/intimidate non-conviction being called up and him being convicted. > > (b) Mr Kealy has engaged in a form of domestic violence which resulted in an AVO and convictions. The Australian government takes domestic violence very seriously and it is well accepted that domestic violence does not confirm with the values of Australian society. > > (c) The drink driving conviction is a serious offence and has potential to cause serious harm to Mr Kealy and other members of the community. Mr Kealy has failed to put on substantive evidence on how he would avoid making an error of this kind in the future. In the SOFIC, the Minister contends that proceeding to a conviction and imposing a CCO reflects that the sentencing judge considered this offence to be serious.[37] > > (d) The Minister contends that the Tribunal should find that the Incoming Passenger Cards and failure to disclose criminal convictions in the RRV form amount to dishonest dealings with the department such that the Tribunal should not be satisfied that Mr Kealy is of good character: > > > (i) There is no medical evidence to support the claim that the errors of non-disclosure were caused by his dyslexia, including to verify that he has been diagnosed with dyslexia or the degree of severity of his dyslexia, or the manner in which it might affect his ability to complete a department document. > > > > (ii) There is no medical evidence to assist the Tribunal in determining how Mr Kealy's dyslexia should affect the Tribunal's assessment of his claim. > > > > (iii) Accordingly, less weight should be given to the claim that his failure to disclose his convictions in the Incoming Passenger Cards was caused by dyslexia and associated panic. > > > > (iv) In terms of the RRV, in addition to less weight being given to his claimed dyslexia, more weight should be given to the fact that he was had assistance completing the form, and it was completed onshore, so he had time to complete it and no reason to panic. > > > > (v) The other errors in the Incoming Passenger Cards Mr Kealy states indicate his non-disclosure was inadvertent are largely irrelevant because they are grammatical and do not demonstrate he provided false or misleading information. > > (e) The Minister acknowledges that the offending occurred some time ago, but Mr Kealy has had limited contact with his ex-partner since then, in part because of the AVO. As such, it is unclear how he might react around her particularly noting his intention to pursue legal action for visitation rights in the future. > > (f) The Minister accepts Mr Kealy has put on evidence of his remorse for drink driving, for his criminal offending, his negative comments to his ex-partner and the pain he may have caused her. But, because he continues to deny that he threatened the ex-partner (and thus committed the conduct), it is submitted that Mr Kealy has not taken responsibility or accountability for his actions and cannot be seen to express remorse for the conduct. > > (g) There is no substantive evidence before the Tribunal evidencing the parenting or other course Mr Kealy claims he attended or how they changed his behaviour. There is no evidence in relation to his sobriety or reduced alcohol consumption although the Minister conceded that there have been no further legal issues. Based on this limited evidence, it is submitted that limited weight should be put on rehabilitation. > > (h) None of the character references are from his partner or ex-partner, and do not reference Mr Kealy in a domestic setting. All but one are from professional colleagues and only one stated he was remorseful. It is submitted that limited weight should be put on the references. The Tribunal notes in the Minister's SOFIC, it was contended that the Tribunal should place limited weight on the support letters of Ben Philips and Aaron Worley as these letters do not reference Mr Kealy's prior convictions.[38]
s 21(2)(h) is in issue. 3. Section 52(1)(b) of the Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to review decisions made under s 24 of the Act. 4. In determining whether an individual is of good character, the Australian Citizenship Policy Statement and the Citizenship Procedural Instructions provide guidance for decision makers. The policy relevant to this application is found in Citizenship Procedural Instruction No.15 ('CPI 15') - Assessing Good Character under the Act. 5. The Instructions reflect government policy and are not binding on the Tribunal. However, it is well established that the Tribunal will apply government policy unless there are cogent reasons not to do so.[39] 6. The applicable legal principles were considered by the predecessor to this Tribunal, as presently constituted, in Dawlatshahi and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs[40]. Such analysis is relevant to this application for review and for convenience it is set out below:
4. Pursuant to s. 24(1A) of the Act, the Minister (and hence now the Tribunal) must not approve an application for Australian citizenship unless the applicant satisfies the relevant eligibility requirement under s. 21 of the Act; ... s. 21(2)(h). The Tribunal must be satisfied that the Applicant is of 'good character' at the time of this decision by forming an "opinion requiring an evaluative judgement" and by reaching "an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character" BOY19 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCA 574 at [54]- [55].
5. In determining 'good character' the Tribunal is to look holistically at an applicant's behaviour over time to be satisfied of 'enduring moral qualities' within the prospective Australian citizen. Such phrase, as guided by the Citizenship Policy Instruction 15 - Assessing Good Character under the Citizenship Act (CPI), encompasses the following:
(d) Characteristics which have been demonstrated over a long period of time;
(f) Behaving in an ethical manner, conforming to the rules and values of Australian society.
6. CPI 15 further sets out examples of characteristics of a person of good character and they do not include those who practice deception or fraud in their dealings with the Australian Government or other organisations. For example, intentionally providing false personal information (such as fraudulent work experience or qualification documents); or other material deception during visa and citizenship applications.
7. Section 50 of the Act provides that it is an offence to deliberately make, or cause to make, a false or misleading statement, or conceal circumstances in relation to an application for Australian citizenship.
8. The Tribunal is to consider a range of events and conduct connected with the Applicant: Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 44; (2015) 231 FCR 128 at [60].
9. Justice O'Bryan in BOY19 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCA 574, engaged in a substantial analysis of the meaning of 'good character' in this context. Since not defined, the Parliament intended the term to be used in a broad way:
(a) One looks to the enduring moral qualities of a person and not to the good standing, fame or repute of that person in the community, although the latter may provide evidence of the former;
(b) It does not have a fixed and precise content;
(c) It imports a discretionary value judgement to be made by reference to undefined factual matters confined only by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statutory provisions; and
(d) It requires judgement as to whether any proven deficiencies in the moral qualities of a person are sufficient to deny the person citizenship.
10. Justice O'Bryan accepted that "[t]he subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act is informed by its Preamble which states:
The Parliament recognises that Australian citizenship represents full and formal membership of the community of the Commonwealth of Australia, and Australian citizenship is a common bond, involving reciprocal rights and obligations, uniting all Australians, while respecting their diversity.
The Parliament recognises that persons conferred Australian citizenship enjoy these rights and undertake to accept these obligations:
(a) By pledging loyalty to Australia and its people;
(c) By respecting their rights and liberties; and
(d) By upholding and obeying the laws of Australia.
These ideals of diversity, democracy and liberty are to be assessed "by moral qualities that are regarded as a necessary concomitant of Australian citizenship".
11. As to the 'satisfied' requirement in s. 21(2)(h) of the Act, the word:
"is not amenable to the application of an evidentiary burden of proof, such as the balance of probabilities... the decision is an administrative decision to which the rules of evidence are inapplicable, and the evidentiary burden of proof inapposite... the applicant's good character, is not a fact to be proved but an opinion requiring an evaluative judgement. A standard of proof, such as balance of probabilities, is incapable of application to such an opinion".
"The absence of an evidentiary burden of proof does not mean there is an absence of a legal standard of satisfaction. In the context... satisfaction requires that the decision-maker reach an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character. It is not sufficient for the decision-maker to believe that there is a chance that the applicant is a person of good character; equally, it is not necessary for the decision-maker to have a high degree of confidence that the applicant is a person of good character".
12. The decision-making power is therefore to be exercised reasonably.
13. Part of the task is to assess the relative weight to be given to conduct that reflects positively or negatively on the Applicant's character.
"domestic violence...in any form is not acceptable in the Australian community. Behaviour that impinges on the safety of, or creates fear in the community, is not acceptable. Persons taking part in, or condoning, such activities do not respect the rights and liberties of others in the community."
As a general proposition, a person who is of good character would:
moral quality. In that regard, the decision-maker is generally to weigh the offending behaviour against any mitigating circumstances which may indicate the person is of good character despite adverse information. This includes the length of time since the offence was committed, whether they have accepted responsibility and shown remorse for their conduct and whether there were extenuating circumstances relating to the offence.[44]
"... dishonesty in dealings with the department is a very serious matter. The integrity of the immigration system depends on individuals telling the truth about their personal circumstances and history. The department is not in a position to know what applicants know, after all. When dishonesty comes to light, it must be dealt with firmly to deter others who might intend acting dishonestly...". [49]
Time of itself is not enough. The "enduring moral qualities" of which good character speaks must be demonstrated objectively over a sufficient period. How long that will be will depend on all the circumstances of the case_.[54]_
[18] The Tribunal notes that this was submitted to the department after the Application was refused and on the same day he lodged his review with the Tribunal.
[23] The fourth case referenced by Mr Kealy did not include a citation. He referred to it as the 'fearless case' of 2023 noting that the applicant in that case had citizenship granted despite criminal history because of enduring moral qualities shown through long lawful conduct and community contribution.
[25] Ibid, at [44]. The Tribunal stated that 'there is considerable evidence to support a finding that the Applicant is of good character. He contributed to the community through his paid employment and continued to do so after the workplace accident. Except for the incident which led to the offending, the evidence is that the Applicant has upheld and obeyed the law. The nature of the offending was serious, but the overall circumstances and punishment imposed by the court indicate the offending was at the very low end in terms of seriousness. It is also in the Applicant's favour that considerable time has passed since his offending, and he has complied with the court orders.' The Tribunal also notes [39] where it was held that 'there was insufficient evidence to determine the Applicant's mental health at the time of the offending, but [the Tribunal] accep[ed] he may have been experiencing some symptoms of [schizophrenia].
[39] See Re Drake and Minister for Immigration, and Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, 645 per Brennan J, which was cited with approval in Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Gray [1994] FCA 1052; (1994) 33 ALD 13, 30 per French and Drummond JJ.
[40] [2021] AATA 2437 at [4] to [13].
[55] Fenn v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] AATA 931 at [8].
[56] BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574 at [55].
Anuwar and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Citizenship) [2025] ARTA 1043.
Arora and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2023] AATA 1101.
Assafiri and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] AATA 35.
BOY19 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCA 574.
Dawlatshahi and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] AATA 2437.
Fenn v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] AATA 931.
Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 44; (2015) 231 FCR 128.
Jamishi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] AATA 3094.
Re Harry Taradel and Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] AATA 1255.
(2015) 231 FCR 128