austlii:cth/FedCFamC2G/2025/991
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC2G
2025-06-27
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) personal information about the applicants;
(b) whether the applicants want a hearing and require an interpreter;
(c) the education and work history of the main applicant prior to arrival in Australia;
(d) travel by the main applicant to Australia and to their home country;
(e) the main applicant's visa history;
(f) current proposed study and enrolment and history of study in Australia;
(g) why the applicant did not seek to undertake their current course in their home country;
(h) work history and living expenses in Australia;
(i) the main applicant's family, community ties in their home country, community ties in Australia and assets; and
(j) the main applicant's future plans.
(a) the applicant's current and proposed courses of study;
(b) the applicant's living expenses;
(c) the applicant's community ties in Australia;
(d) the applicant's community ties in India; and
(e) the applicant's expected remuneration, utilising the qualifications he hoped to attain, upon returning to India.
The member fell into jurisdictional error because they took into account an irrelevant consideration because
A: In paragraph 14 & 15 she put a lot of emphasis not traveling to India. As we are a family of three and my mother was fighting cancer and there was no such circumstances that I can afford to go and I tried to help with the treatment and she said that I have no strong ties where she lacked to understand my situation.
...they [referring to the delegate and the Tribunal member] failed to consider the personal circumstances of the applicant and the global border shutdown that occurred due to COVID-19 pandemic.
(1) His 5 week stay in India in 2011;
(2) His 6 week stay in India in 2013 for his wedding;
(3) His visit to India in September 2013 to visit family and collect his wife; and
(4) A visit to his mother in September 2014.
Amid a perfect storm of emotions, the applicant could not answer the member's questions adequately.
What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the considerations to be taken into account, it will often be necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant factors - and in this context I use this expression to refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider - are not expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard (see Reg. v. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 62; (1979) 144 CLR 45, at pp 49-50, adopting the earlier formulations of Dixon J. in Swan Hill Corporation v. Bradbury [1937] HCA 15; (1937) 56 CLR 746, at pp 757-758, and Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (N.S.W.) v. Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492, at p 505).
The limited role of a court reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion must constantly be borne in mind. It is not the function of the court to substitute its own decision for that of the administrator by exercising a discretion which the legislature has vested in the administrator. Its role is to set limits on the exercise of that discretion, and a decision made within those boundaries cannot be impugned (Wednesbury Corporation, at p.228). It follows that, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker and not the court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power (Sean Investments Pty Ltd v. MacKellar, at p 375; Reg. v. Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd [1965] HCA 27; (1965) 113 CLR 177, at p 205; Elliott v. Southwark London Borough Council (1976) 1 WLR 499, at p 507; (1976) 2 All ER 781, at p 788; Pickwell v. Camden London Borough Council (1983) QB 962, at p 990). I say "generally" because both principle and authority indicate that in some circumstances a court may set aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to a relevant factor of no great importance. The preferred ground on which this is done, however, is not the failure to take into account relevant considerations or the taking into account of irrelevant considerations, but that the decision is "manifestly unreasonable".
(1) whether the Act and Regulations contain an implication that a decision-maker considering a student visa application may not consider whether and how often an applicant has returned to their home country; and
(2) whether the Tribunal's consideration of that issue as it addresses the question posed by cl 500.212 of the Regulations was manifestly unreasonable.
500.212 The applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:
(a) the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having regard to:
(i) the applicant's circumstances; and
(ii) the applicant's immigration history; and
(iii) if the applicant is a minor - the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and
(iv) any other relevant matter.
9b. the extent of the applicant's personal ties to their home country (for example family, community and employment) and whether those circumstances would serve as a significant incentive to return to their home country;
Determination - Failure to consider relevant consideration
Determination - Failure to consider relevant consideration
Additional Grounds in Applicants' Outline of Submission
I certify that the preceding eighty-nine (89) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Doust.
Kaushal
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 991
(1965) 113 CLR 177
(1947) 74 CLR 492
(1986) 162 CLR 24
(2024) 418 ALR 152
(1937) 56 CLR 746
(2003) 256 FCR 593
(1979) 144 CLR 45