Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1551

1. Before this Court is an application for judicial review of a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal).
2. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the then Minister for Home Affairs (Delegate), to refuse to grant Pardeep Kaur (Primary Applicant) a Student (Temporary) (class TU) Student (subclass 500) visa (Student Visa).
3. This matter was:

(a) allocated to the Court as presently constituted on 28 July 2025;

(b) listed for hearing on 31 July 2025; and

(c) heard on 19 September 2025, proceeding in person at the Court's Melbourne Registry.

1. To obtain relief from this Court, the Applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. For the reasons that follow, this Court has determined that no jurisdictional error arises from the Tribunal's decision.
2. The application for judicial review is, accordingly, dismissed.

1. The background to this matter is derived from the submissions of the parties and, unless otherwise indicated, does not appear to be in dispute.

1. The primary issue is whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error in affirming the decision of the Delegate to not grant the Student Visa.

1. The Primary Applicant is a citizen of India[1] who arrived in Australia on 8 May 2008 as the holder of a student (subclass TU-573) visa, which was granted offshore on 28 April 2008 and valid to 23 September 2010.[2]
2. The Primary Applicant was further granted two Student (subclass TU-572) visas and one Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass UC-457) visa. The Primary Applicant's last visa (subclass UC-457) was granted onshore on 30 December 2012 and was valid until 30 December 2017.[3]
3. Prior to coming to Australia, the Primary Applicant's highest level of education was a Bachelor of Arts, from Guru Nanak Dev University in India.[4]
4. Provider Registration and International Student Management System (PRISMS) indicated that the Primary Applicant appears to have completed the following courses since her arrival in Australia:[5]

(1) English for Academic Purposes;

(2) Certificate III in Hairdressing;

(3) Certificate IV in Hairdressing;

(4) Diploma of Hairdressing and Salon Management;

(5) Diploma of Management; and

(6) Diploma of Business.

1. The Applicant has not studied in Australia since January 2013.[6]
2. On 27 December 2017, the Applicant lodged an application for a Student Visa.[7] The Primary Applicant's husband Sukhpal Singh (Second Applicant) was included in the application as a member of the family unit.[8]
3. The Primary Applicant provided a Confirmation of Enrolment (CoE) with her application; she intended to study an Advanced Diploma of Business which would have commenced on 5 February 2018 and ended on 5 August 2019.[9]
4. The Primary Applicant also included a Statement of Purpose (Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) Statement) in her application, which can be summarised as follows:[10]

(1) the Applicant was working on a 457 visa and wished to gain a deeper understanding of business. She enrolled in Diploma of Hair Dressing & Salon Management in 2010 and hoped to run her own Salon in India;

(2) she completed a Diploma of Management in 2011 and learnt how to manage staff;

(3) she then completed a Diploma of Business in 2013 and learnt how to grow a business and about advertising;

(4) afterwards she completed an Advanced Diploma of Management, in which she learnt how to manage, grow and satisfy clients;

(5) she then worked in a salon on a 457 visa, gained practical experience and a better understanding of how to run a business;

(6) an Advanced Diploma of Business would "refine [her] business skills more back in India", increase her advertising, human resource and finance knowledge, and she would be more equipped with skills to run her business;

(7) the Advanced Diploma of Business would not be too challenging given her work experience and previous courses completed;

(8) Australia Education Academy was an ideal institution to study with great facilities and high standards of excellence;

(9) Australia had all the elements to make it a desirable destination to study; and

(10) she lived with her family and was supported by her husband.

1. The Primary Applicant appointed a migration agent Jay Ghose of "Fasttrack Migration Aust Pty Ltd" as the authorised recipient.[11]Postal address
2. From July 2017 to the time of the application, the Primary Applicant was employed as a hairdresser at "Seven Angels Hair & Beauty Salon."[12]

1. On 16 February 2018, the Delegate refused to grant the Primary Applicant a Student Visa.[13] Because her husband was included in the visa application as a dependant, his application was also refused.[14] The Delegate was not satisfied that the Primary Applicant met the Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) criterion under clause 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations).[15]
2. The key facts and findings underpinning the Delegate's decision can be summarised as follows:[16]

(a) the Primary Applicant studied for over five years in Australia, the highest qualification was at the Diploma level and she did not progress beyond the VET sector. The Delegate noted the Primary Applicant enrolled in a Bachelor of Social Science (Criminal Justice) in 2010 however, did not commence study for this course;

(b) the Primary Applicant changed courses and education provider several times; courses included Hairdressing, Community Welfare Work, Management, Business, Social Science, Hospitality as well as the course in Business to which the visa related;

(c) the Primary Applicant sought nomination from her employer to be sponsored on three occasions in 2016 which was refused every time;

(d) the Primary Applicant's UC-457 visa was valid until 30 December 2017, and only applied for a Student Visa 3 days before the expiry of this visa;

(e) there was no evidence the Primary Applicant held ties to her home country that served as a significant incentive to return home at the end of her stay. For instance, the Primary Applicant had only left Australia twice since 2008 and not travelled outside Australia since 2012. She declared she had family in India but had not visited them on a regular basis. Thus, the Delegate was concerned that the Primary Applicant did not have a sufficient incentive to return to India;

(f) the Primary Applicant was well established in Australia: she had a job as a hairdresser and her husband and child (born in Australia) resided here. The immediate family in Australia, reduced this incentive to return to her home country on completion of her studies;

(g) the Delegate was not convinced this course would add value to the Primary Applicant's future; she has not demonstrated a clear and substantial improvement arising from the proposed study that would outweigh the significant time and monetary commitment; and

(h) it appeared to the Delegate that the Primary Applicant re-commenced study for the purpose of securing a student visa, and to prolong her stay in Australia, rather than because she held a genuine interest in the area of study or wished to progress academically.

1. On balance, the Delegate was not satisfied that the information provided regarding her circumstances in their home country, circumstances in Australia, value of the proposed course to her future and her immigration history, were sufficient to demonstrate that she was a GTE.[17]
2. By operation of s 476(2)(a) of the Act, this Court has no power to review the decision of the Delegate.

1. On 22 February 2018, the Applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision.[18] The Primary Applicant's son (Third Applicant) was included in the application.
2. On 16 April 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicants' representative requesting information under s 359(2) of the Act (s 359(2) invitation). The letter invited the Primary Applicant to provide evidence that she was:[19]

(1) enrolled in a registered course of study; and

(2) a genuine temporary entrant, consistent with the requirements of cl.500.212 of the Regulations and Direction Number 69 - Assessing The Genuine Temporary Entrant Criterion for Student Visa And Student Guardian Visa Applications (Direction 69).

1. The Applicants had until 30 April 2019 to respond to the s 359(2) invitation or request an extension. The Tribunal put the Applicants on notice of the consequences of not responding to the s 359(2) invitation:

If we do not receive the information within the period allowed or as extended, we may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain the information. You will also lose any entitlement you might otherwise have had under the Migration Act 1958 to appear before us to give evidence and present arguments. [20]

1. The Applicants did not respond to the s 359(2) invitation nor requested an extension.[21]
2. On 1 May 2019, the Applicants' then authorised recipient wrote to the Tribunal informing the Tribunal he was no longer representing the Applicants.[22] The Migration agent provided an updated Appointment of Representative form.
3. On 16 July 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision not to grant the Primary Applicant the Student Visa.[23] The Secondary Applicants being dependent on the Primary Applicant were also refused visas. The Applicants were notified of the Tribunal's on 18 July 2019.[24]

1. The Tribunal's decision is four pages long and spans 19 paragraphs.
2. The key facts and findings underpinning the Tribunal's decision can be summarised as follows:[25]

(1) The Tribunal wrote to the Primary Applicant pursuant to s 359(2) inviting her to provide further information to the Tribunal, including information in relation to enrolment: cl.500.211(a). The Tribunal was satisfied that the Primary Applicant was properly sent an invitation to provide further information under s 359(2) but did not receive any response;

(2) as the Primary Applicant failed to respond within the prescribed period, s 359C(1) applied and pursuant to s 360(3), she was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal;

(3) the Tribunal decided not to exercise its discretion under s 363(1)(b) to adjourn the review, as the Primary Applicant had a fair opportunity to respond; and

(4) the Tribunal carefully considered the Delegate's decision record dated 16 February 2018 and concluded it did not have any evidence before it which indicated that the Primary Applicant was at the time enrolled in a course of study as required by cl.500.211(a).

1. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision to refuse the Student Visa, albeit on a different basis.

1. On 30 July 2019, the Applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision dated 16 July 2019 (Originating Application).
2. The application was brought within the 35-day time limit prescribed by section 477(1) of the Act.
3. The Originating Application sought to quash the decision of the Tribunal (writ of certiorari), however was deficient in seeking a writ of mandamus. At the hearing, to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, the following Order was made:

The application for judicial review, filed 30 July 2019, is amended to include a final order that a writ of mandamus be directed to the Tribunal requiring them to determine the Applicant's application according to law. Pursuant to r 1.10 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth), the procedures for amending an originating application enumerated in Division 8.3 be dispensed with.

1. The Originating Application contained four grounds of review (addressed below).
2. The Primary Applicant also filed an Affidavit on 30 July 2019 (Exhibit A1). In her affidavit the Primary Applicant explained that the birth of her child prevented her from studying for some time and hence there was delay on her part in providing evidence that she was enrolled in a course of study.

1. On 15 August 2019, the First Respondent (Minister) filed its response and opposed the making of the orders sought by the Applicant. The Minister submitted that the application failed to articulate or establish any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. On 10 March 2022, the Minister filed a bundle of relevant documents (Court Book/CB/Exhibit R1).
3. On 13 February 2025, a Registrar of this Court issued an Order (Registrar's Order) directing the:

(a) Applicant to file any amended application with proper particulars, written submissions and further evidence at least 28 days before the hearing; and

(b) Minister to file any written submissions and further evidence in reply at least 14 days before the hearing.

1. The Applicant did not file an amended application nor did she provide further particulars of the grounds for judicial review, despite being invited to do so.
2. On 5 September 2025, an Affidavit of Emma Louise Hubball was filed by the Minister (Exhibit R2). The purpose of that affidavit was to explain the fact that the Secretary of the Department failed to comply with the duty in s 352(4) of the Act to provide relevant documents to the Tribunal. The CoE provided to the Delegate was not provided to the Tribunal by the Secretary.
3. On 5 September 2025, the Minister complied with the Registrar's Order by filing written submissions.
4. Therefore, the materials before the Court are as follows:

(a) the application for judicial review filed 30 July 2019 (as amended on 19 September 2025);

(b) an Affidavit of Pardeep Kaur filed 30 July 2019;

(c) a Court Book numbering 117 pages filed 10 March 2022;

(d) an Affidavit of Emma Louise Hubball filed 5 September 2025; and

(e) an outline of written submissions filed by the Minister on 5 September 2025.

1. At the hearing, the Primary Applicant appeared before the Court without legal representation. The Minister was represented by Jonathan Barrington of Counsel and instructed by Mills Oakley.
2. The Court confirmed with the Primary Applicant that she had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
3. To assist the Primary Applicant, the Court explained that this Court can only turn its attention to the issue of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The Court explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort, however, they most commonly include (but are not limited to) the following categories:

(1) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question;[26]

(2) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material;[27]

(3) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material;[28]

(4) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures;[29]

(5) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias;[30] and

(6) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable.[31]

1. It was also explained to the Primary Applicant that this Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal's decision or grant her the visa she seeks. Rather, the role of the Court is restricted to determining if the Tribunal made a material error in arriving at the decision it arrived at.[32]
2. Noting that the Primary Applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave her an opportunity to elaborate on her grounds of review and to outline any other concerns she might have with the Tribunal's decision. This is now the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection.[33]
3. Before this Court, the Applicant made limited submissions in support of the grounds set out in their application. Those submissions are considered below.
4. The Primary Applicant was also offered a short adjournment to allow her to collect her thoughts, which she did not take up.
5. The Minister made oral submissions in line with their written submissions.
6. After the Minister made their submissions, the Court invited the Primary Applicant to respond to what the Minister's representative had said. The Applicant made no submissions in reply.

THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

1. In Bhasker v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[34] his Honour Judge Fary summarised the role of the Court in judicial review proceedings:
   1. Section 476 of the Migration Act provides that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under s 75(v) of the Constitution.
   2. Section 75(v) of the Constitution provides that the High Court has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Thus, subject to the statutory exceptions provided for in s 476 of the Migration Act, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Further, s 474 of the Migration Act does not preclude judicial review of decisions under the Migration Act where jurisdictional error is alleged.[35]
   3. "The task of the Court [in an application for judicial review] is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it." The court neither consider the merits of the decision nor remakes it.[36]
   4. The Court may grant relief if it is satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error.[37] Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision maker may manifest itself in a variety of ways. Recognised categories of jurisdictional error include "misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness".[38] Different kinds of error may overlap.[39] The categories are not closed.[40] The critical question is whether the decision maker has exceeded the authority or power conferred by the statute.[41]
   5. In most but not all cases, for an error to be jurisdictional, the error must be material to the decision being challenged. The test is whether there is a "realistic possibility" that the decision that was made "could" have been different, but for the error.[42] This is to be determined as "a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts that have been determined".[43] It has been described as an "undemanding" standard.[44]
2. The Court as presently constituted respectfully adopts his Honour's summary of the task before it.
3. Further, disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error.[45]

1. At the hearing before the Court, the Primary Applicant was invited to make submissions about:

a) why she believed the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error; and > > b) each of the four grounds of review.

2. To the extent that the Primary Applicant made submissions in relation to the specific grounds, they are summarised below in the context of considering each of the grounds. To the extent that the Primary Applicant made more general submissions, those submissions largely invited the Court to engage in impermissible merits review of the Tribunal's decision. As this Court explained to the Primary Applicant at the hearing, the Court cannot consider for itself whether the Primary Applicant meets the criteria for a Student Visa. To the extent that the Primary Applicant's submissions invite the Court to engage in merits review, they do not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.
3. The Minister submitted that the decision of the Tribunal was not affected by jurisdictional error. The Court as presently constituted incorporates (without repetition) paragraphs 14 to 26 of the Minister's outline of submissions.

*** The AAT failed to take the facts of application without giving me sufficient opportunity to justify my claim.**

1. The primary factual matter that the Tribunal was concerned with was whether the Primary Applicant was enrolled in a course of study as required by clause 500.211(a) of the Regulations. Having invited the Primary Applicant to provide evidence of her enrolment (and she having not done so) the Tribunal had no evidence or facts before it that the Primary Applicant was enrolled in a course of study. Consequently, the Tribunal did not err in affirming the Delegate's decision to not grant the Visa. There were no other matters for the Tribunal to consider.
2. In so far this ground relates to procedural fairness, the Primary Applicant had ample time to put forward her case with evidence. The Primary Applicant applied for a review of the Delegate's decision on 22 February 2018, and the Tribunal made its decision on 16 July 2019, during this time the Primary Applicant did not engage with the Tribunal nor put forward any evidence of her enrolment in a course of study (despite being invited to do so).
3. At the hearing the Primary Applicant confirmed that on 16 April 2019, the Tribunal wrote to her and provided her with an opportunity to provide information, and she confirmed that she did not respond to this request. Having not responded to the Tribunal's invitation to provide material the Primary Applicant disentitled herself to a hearing. The Primary Applicant cannot now complain about the Tribunal when she decided not to engage with it. At the hearing the Primary Applicant's asserted that her primary carer responsibilities and COVID-19 explained her lack of engagement with the Tribunal. However, she was unable to articulate how these factors prevented her from providing evidence. The Court further notes that COVID-19 was not a health issue in Australia in 2019.
4. Providing evidence to the Tribunal is by no means a burdensome task and the Primary Applicant not availing herself of the opportunity to provide evidence is the fault of her own not any fault of the Tribunal. At the hearing the Primary Applicant attempted to blame her lawyer. However, there is no evidence in the Court Book that the Primary Applicant had engaged a lawyer. There is material to suggest that at least up until 1 May 2019 the Primary Applicant had a migration agent.[46] If the Primary Applicant's complaint is that her migration agent did not file material with the Tribunal in accordance with her instructions, there is no evidence before this Court about that matter. A Registrar of this Court made orders on 13 February 2025 providing the Primary Applicant with an opportunity to file further evidence. She did not do so. It is not sufficient to make a bare assertion from the bar table about the conduct of her agent. It is well established that the "simple fact of a failure to inform or bare negligence or inadvertence will not necessarily be sufficient to give rise to fraud on the Tribunal."[47]
5. Ground One is dismissed.

*** Tribunal rushed up with its decision without following the principal of natural justice.**

1. At the hearing the Applicant had nothing to say about ground two.
2. That is not surprising because the Tribunal undertook a procedurally fair and measured approach in reaching its decision:

(1) on 16 April 2019, it sought information from the Primary Applicant. The Primary Applicant was provided two weeks to respond to this request, with an option to seek an extension;

(2) the Tribunal put the Applicants on notice of the consequences of not responding to the s 359 (2) invitation;

(3) the Tribunal decided not to exercise its discretion under s 363(1)(b) to adjourn the review, as the Primary Applicant had a fair opportunity to respond;

(4) the Tribunal carefully considered the Delegate's decision record dated 16 February 2018; and

(5) the Tribunal did not have before it any evidence that the Primary Applicant was at the time enrolled in a course of study as required by cl.500.211(a).

1. This process cannot be considered "rushed" and the Primary Applicant was clearly afforded procedural fairness. It is difficult to see how more time would have assisted the Primary Applicant given she did not engage with the Tribunal for over 16 months.
2. Ground Two is dismissed.

*** The member did not consider personal circumstances of mine and inappropriately upheld the decision of the department in a procedural manner.**

1. This ground is unparticularised, and at the hearing the Primary Applicant failed to further elaborate upon it before this Court.
2. As discussed in Ground One, the Tribunal was required by the Regulations to considered whether the Primary Applicant was enrolled in a course of study. There is nothing in the Regulations which obliges the Tribunal to consider an applicant's personal circumstances when determining this question of fact. The decision to affirm the Delegate's decision was open to the Tribunal and as determined in Ground Two this finding was reached in a procedurally fair manner.
3. Ground Three is dismissed.

*** the delegate did not consider the degree of hardship being caused to me.**

1. The Court has no power to review the decision of the Delegate.[48]
2. In so far as this ground is directed at the Tribunal, the Tribunal had one question of fact to resolve: whether the Primary Applicant was enrolled in a course of study. As determined in Ground Three, personal circumstances (including hardship) do not factor into the resolution of this issue. The Court is sympathetic to the Primary Applicant's circumstances, however they do not establish any error on behalf of the Tribunal.
3. Ground Four is dismissed.

Failure of Department to provide the Tribunal with the CoE

1. As a Model Litigant the representatives of the First Respondent disclosed that the Secretary of the Department failed to comply with the duty in s 352(4) of the Act to provide relevant documents to the Tribunal. The CoE provided to the Delegate was not provided to the Tribunal by the Secretary. The CoE before the Delegated indicated that the Primary Applicant was enrolled in a course of study between 5 February 2018 and 5 August 2019. The Tribunal issued its invitation to the Primary Applicant on 16 April 2019 and made its decision on 16 July 2019 (i.e. both dates being during the course of study).
2. While the failure of the Secretary to provide this information to the Tribunal is concerning, this statutory failure does not absolve the Primary Applicant of her lack of engagement with the Tribunal, nor does it lead to jurisdictional error. The Primary Applicant had every opportunity to remedy the Secretary's failure by providing the information she had provided to the Delegate to the Tribunal. She elected not to do so.
3. The Tribunal fulfilled its obligations by requesting evidence that the Primary Applicant was enrolled in a course of study. The Primary Applicant was clearly put on notice about the importance of furnishing this evidence and the Tribunal was not obliged to make further enquiries.
4. The Delegate's decision does point to the fact that the Primary Applicant was enrolled in a course of study,[49] however this pre-dated the Tribunal's decision by nearly 18 months. The Regulations require the Primary Applicant to be currently enrolled in a course of study and the Tribunal had no evidentiary proof that this enrolment was ongoing at the time of its decision.
5. Further in terms of futility, the Primary Applicant's oral evidence at the hearing and her Affidavit explained that she stopped studying due to the birth of her son and the carer responsibilities which came with this. This gives credence to the position that the Primary Applicant did not have an existing CoE at the time of the Tribunal's Decision. Therefore, if the Tribunal did fall into error, on remittal the same decision would be reached.
6. These additional matters do not establish jurisdictional error and must be dismissed.

1. For the reasons set out above, this Court is satisfied that the Tribunal's reasons were not affected by jurisdictional error.
2. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed. The Court will hear the parties on costs.

I certify that the preceding eighty (80) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

[14] Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2 sub-div 500.3.

[26] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.

[27] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.

[28] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.

[29] SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294, [207]-[208].

[30] SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80, [2].

[31] Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332, [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437, [44].

[32] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272.

[33] [2019] FCA 600 at [7].

[34] [2025] FedCFamC2G 620.

[35] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[36] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 Allson CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ at [17].

[37] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[38] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 418 ALR 152 (LPDT) at [3].

[39] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323 at [82].

[41] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 at [82].

[43] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506 per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [38].

[44] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80 per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ (at [33]).

[45] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [40].

[47] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLIX (2008) 245 ALR 501, [33].