Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd & Ors v Mackie, D.W. [1986] FCA 58

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY) No. G8 of 1986 )

KARINA FISHERIES PTY LTD, DINKO LUKIN & CAPTAIN SUZUKI

CORAM: Forster J. The applicants seek a review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act of a decision of the respondent dated 14 February 1986. The respondent (Mackie) is a fisheries officer and his decision required the master of the Daito Maru ("the ship") to take the ship to Port Lincoln and cause it to remain there until its departure was permitted. The decision was evidenced by a written notice addressed to the ship's master signed by Mackie, a copy of which was exhibited to his affidavit. The notice purports on the face of it to be given pursuant to 5.10(1)(e) of the Fisheries Act 1952 and recites that Mackie "being an officer within the terms of the said Act" requires the master to take the ship to Port Lincoln.

The notice recites that Mackie has "reason to believe" that the

ship "has been used in contravention of the said Act". Section

(e) require the master of a boat which the officer has reason to believe has been used, is being used or is intended to he used in contravention of this Act to bring the boat toa place in Australia or a Territory specified by the officer and to remain in control of the boat at that place until an officer permits him to depart from that place;".

It is not disputed that Mackie's decision to issue the notice was a decision of an administrative character made under

an enactment viz. the Fisheries Act 1952 and is thus a decision

to which the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act applies. It is similarly undisputed that at least one of the applicants is a person aggrieved by the decision and may therefore apply under s.5 of the Act for a review of the

The Daito Maru is a fish processing vessel to which has been issued a "processing boat licence" current until 30 September 1986. Conditions of the licence require, inter alia, that the ship report daily to the Fisheries Department information of deliveries to it of tuna by catching vessels and information of "each boat into which the boat named herein

delivers tuna for carriage to a place beyond Australia and the

external territories and the quantity and form of each species 50 delivered". The catching vessels are also similarly required to

report information of deliveries by them to the processing ship.

On the morning of Friday 14 February, a naval vessel, H.M.A.S. Whyalla came alongside the ship and a party from the vessel boarded the ship and the notice referred to above was served upon the master by a fasheries officer. On Saturday morning 15 February, the solictor and junior counsel for the applicants saw me in chambers and in view of what was put to me as to the great urgency of the matter I heard their ex parte application based upon their instructions and with no affidavits or other papers in support. It was put to me that the only thing wrong with the operations of the ship so far as the Fisheries Department was concerned was that there were some unimportant discrepancies in the reports and that these could be cleared up without the ship returning to Port Lincoln. Mention was made of the failure to report the trans-shipment of fish at sea and it was said that the applicants considered that such a trans-shipment did not have to be reported until the ship returned to port. It was said that the return of the ship to Port Lincoln would cause the applicants considerable financial

loss and that the decision was based on infractions of the Fisheries Act which were, in the circumstances, trivial. On the basis of what was put, I made an order suspending until further

order, the operation of the decision in question and ordered

service as soon as possible upon the respondent and adjourned

further consideration of the application until Wednesday 19

February. I also directed the applicant to file and serve a

formal application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial

Review) Act and affidavits to prove the matters put tome in

A review of the decision is sought upon the following

1. That a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the decision (s.5(1)(a) of the

2. That the making of the decision was a improper exercise

of the power conferred by the Fisheries Act (5.5(1)(e) of the

(a) a failure to take relevant considerations into account (5.5(2)(b) of the Act)

(b) an exercise of discretionary power in accordance with a rule of policy without regard to the merits

of the applicants' case (s.5(2)(f£) of the Act) (c) an exercise of power that was s0 unreasonable that

3. That there was no evidence or other material to justify

It is proved by Mackie's affidavit that he was concerned by discrepancies between the reports of deliveries of fish to the ship and those made by the catching vessels and also by internal discrepancies between the radio reports and the forms CR42 submitted by the ship. He was also concerned by a report that there had been an unreported trans-shipment at sea of tuna amounting to approximately one hundred tonnes from the ship to a freighter bound for Japan. As appears from the conditions of the licence such a trans-shipment should have been reported on the day that it was made. It has still not been reported by or

on behalf of the ship. It is proved that during last season the ship reported a number of similar trans-shipments by it in accordance with the terms of the licence. Having as he said, reason to believe that the ship had been used in contravention of the Fisheries Act, he decided to require it to be brought to Port Lincoln so that the discrepancies between reports and the details of the unreported trans-shipment might be investigated by examining the ship's records and interrogating the master and

members of the crew and probably by weighing the fish on board.

At the hearing on 19 February it was somewhat faintly

argued that the rules of natural justice should apply to the making of a decision to call the ship into Port Lincoln and that these rules were broken in that the decision was made without

giving the applicants a prior opportunity to refute the

allegations made. In the circumstances it is not, in my view, a decision of the class which requires the giving of prior notice of the intention to make it. Mackie was charged with the duty of investigating possible breaches of the Fisheries Act. Subject to what I say later as to the reasonableness or otherwise of this decision, if he decided that he had reason to believe that the ship had been used in contravention of the Act and that in order to determine whether or not such contravention had occurred, it was necessary to examine the ship's records, interrogate the master and possibly to weigh the fish, it would be a totally unreasonable fetter upon his investigation if he were required to warn the applicants in advance of his intention to investigate, or of any steps considered to be necessary to the investigation. No doubt Mackie's reason to believe must be a genuine one and his decision to require the ship to come into

Port Lincoln must not be capricious or vindictive and without adequate basis and to this extent he must act fairly. However, to say that he must warn the applicants in advance of the steps

proposed to be taken in his investigation, goes altogether too

far. I reject the ground based on the rules of natural justice.

I should perhaps interpolate here that I am aware of the

distinction between an application to review under the

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act and an application

under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act and I am not here

concerned with whether the decision was in an absolute sense

right, but simply whether any of the grounds set out in 5.5 of

the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act are, or may

be, made out. Ground 2(a) in the application was not pressed

The main argument for the applicant was on ground 2(c). It was said that the discrepancies between the reports said by the deponent Burns to be of significance were in fact insignificant and capable of reconciliation and explanation. Because the question of significance is, to some extent a subjective one, I required the respondent to file a further affidavit setting out the general nature of the discrepancies alleged. This has been done and Mackie deposes to a total of discrepancies amounting to about twenty-seven tonnes. He also deposes to the fact that of sixty-two trans-shipments to the ship from the catching boats reported by radio, forty-three cannot be reconciled with the forms later submitted. On either basis these discrepancies seem to me to fit the description "of significance". It is not submitted that the admitted unreported trans-shipment of about a hundred tonnes to a freighter bound for dapan is not of significance. It is argued however by the applicants that even accepting that the fisheries officers needed to investigate discrepancies between the returns and the circumstances surrounding the trans-shipment to a freighter this could be done while the ship is still at sea and that the decision to order the ship's return was entirely unreasonable.

It is argued by the respondent that there are serious

difficulties about sending officers to sea to investigate the

records on the ship and also that there is a satisfactory interpreter for the purpose of interrogating the master and possibly the crew available only in Port Lincoln. More important perhaps it is said that the fish on board the ship may need to Be weighed in order to attempt to reconcile their returns and that it would be most difficult if not impossible to do this

It 1s proved that there are five other fish processing boats in the general area and no irregularities at ali have occurred with respect to any of them. As at present informed I am quite unable to say that Mackie's decision to require the ship to return to Port Lincoln was unreasonable. Certainly I am not satisfied that it was or may have been "so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have s0 exercised the power". At this interlocutory stage I am not trying the matter but simply deciding whether I should continue the suspension of the operation of the decision under s.15(1)(a) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act. I am not satisfied that the applicants have made out an arguable case for continuation of the suspension or that they have made out an arguable case in support of their application for review and indeed, even if I were so satisfied, this would possibly not be sufficient (see Perkins v.

For the above reasons the application for a continued suspension of the operation of the decision was dismissed with

I certify that this and the 8 preceding pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Mr Justice Forster.