Kapatu & Kapatu [2025] FedCFamC2F 1118 (14 August 2025)

(a) the principal of $176,000 as a debt; and

(b) interest on the principal in accordance with clause 4 of the said loan agreement ("the July 2017 debt") less interest paid to date and/or subsequently consolidated.

1. Pursuant to a loan agreement entered into between C Pty Ltd as lender and Mr Kapatu as borrower in July 2017, Mr Kapatu is liable to pay C Pty Ltd:

(a) the principal of $85,000 as a debt; and

(b) interest on the principal in accordance with clause 4 of the said loan agreement ("the July 2017 debt") less interest paid to date and/or subsequently consolidated.

1. Pursuant to a loan agreement entered into between Mr B Kapatu as lender and Mr Kapatu and Ms Kapatu as borrowers in February 2021, Mr Kapatu and Ms Kapatu, are jointly and severally liable to pay Mr B Kapatu the principal of $200,000 as a debt upon the first to occur of:

(a) the sale of the property known and situate at F Street, Suburb G, in the State of Victoria ("Suburb G");

(b) a transfer of any interest in Suburb G; or

(c) April 2031

AND interest on the principal in accordance with clause 4 of the said loan agreement ("the February 2021 debt") less interest paid to date.

1. Payment of the July 2017 debt, and the February 2021 debt has priority over any interest of Mr Kapatu and Ms Kapatu in the property (or proceeds of sale thereof) known and situate at D Street, Suburb E in the State of Victoria and Suburb G.
2. It is lawful for the July 2017 debt and the February 2021 debt to be secured by Mr B Kapatu against the property (legal or beneficial) of Mr Kapatu and/or Ms Kapatu.
3. It is lawful for the July 2017 debt to be secured by C Pty Ltd against the property (legal or beneficial) of Mr Kapatu.

1. The wife and husband ("spouse parties") do all acts and things and sign all documents required to authorise Kenna Teasdale Lawyers to pay to the second and third respondents the funds currently held by Kenna Teasdale Lawyers, in the sum of $14,870.01, with such payment to be in part payment of the debt owed to the second and third respondents pursuant to the loan agreements dated July 2017.
2. Within thirty days of the date of these orders, the wife and husband do all acts and things and sign all documents required to place on the market for sale and sell Suburb G.
3. The terms and conditions of the sale of Suburb G ("the sale") be as follows:

(a) The spouse parties have the joint conduct of the sale;

(b) Suburb G be listed for sale with such agent as agreed between the spouse parties in writing and in default of agreement, the husband nominate three potential agents within 14 days from the date of these orders from which the wife must select one within seven days of receipt of the husband's nominations and failing selection by the wife within seven days, the husband select the agent from those candidates nominated by him ("the selling agent");

(c) The method and terms and conditions of the sale be as agreed between the spouse parties in writing, and in default of agreement, in accordance with the recommendations of the selling agent;

(d) The sale price be as agreed by the spouse parties in writing and in the absence of agreement the reserve price be $775,000 unless agreed in writing by the spouse parties;

(e) The parties have liberty to apply in respect of the reserve price and sale price if Suburb G does not sell within 90 days of being advertised for sale;

(f) The spouse parties promptly comply with all reasonable requests of the selling agent including executing all documents that may be required to sell the property including but not limited to the authority to the selling agent, the contract of sale and the documents required to facilitate settlement;

(g) The spouse parties comply with all reasonable recommendations of the selling agent with respect to the conduct of the sale; and

(h) The conveyancer be a solicitor agreed between the spouse parties in writing and in default of agreement, the husband nominate three solicitors to conduct the conveyance of the sale from which the wife must select one within seven days of receipt of the list and failing a nomination by the wife within seven days, the husband select a solicitor to conduct the conveyance of the sale from those candidates nominated by him ("conveyancer").

1. Upon settlement of Suburb G, the proceeds of sale be applied in the following manner and priority:

(a) First, to pay all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale including selling agent's fees and conveyancing fees;

(b) Second, to discharge the mortgage to the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Pty Ltd secured against the title of Suburb G ("the mortgage");

(c) Third, to pay all outstanding rates and utilities for the property;

(d) Fourth, to pay to the second and third respondents such amount as is required to discharge the debts owed to them pursuant to the loan agreements dated July 2017 and February 2021 including interest pursuant to those loan agreements, in the following priority:

(i) First, pursuant to the loan agreement dated July 2017;

(ii) Second, pursuant to the loan agreement dated July 2017; and

(iii) Third, pursuant to the loan agreement dated February 2021,

taking into account any amount already paid pursuant to order 8 of these orders and interest paid by or on behalf of the spouse parties to date; and

(e) Finally, the balance then remaining (if any) be divided 55% to the wife and 45% husband.

(a) The wife continue to make all required payments in respect of the loans secured by mortgage and all outgoings for Suburb G as and when they fall due;

(b) The wife and husband are restrained from encumbering or further encumbering Suburb G without the consent of all other parties in writing;

(c) The wife have sole use and occupation of Suburb G, provided she keeps Suburb G clean and tidy and in a good state of repair (fair wear and tear excepted), makes a key available to the selling agent and makes the property available for inspection by prospective purchasers at all reasonable times and on reasonable notice from the selling agent; and

(d) Each of the husband and the wife hold their interest in Suburb G on trust for the other parties pursuant to these orders.

1. Within 60 days from the date of these orders, the wife pay the costs ordered on 12 August 2024 (being $2,093.62 to the husband and $2,093.62 to the second and third respondent), via their solicitors.
2. Within 60 days from the date of these orders, the husband pay to the wife the sum of $15,192, less the sum of $2,093.62 if the wife has not by that time paid to him the costs ordered on 12 August 2024 in accordance with order 13 of these orders.
3. Each of the husband and the wife otherwise retain property and chattels they have in their respective possession and control and any superannuation entitlement and benefits they may have and responsibility for loans in their names.

1. All extant applications be dismissed save for the applications for costs made by each of the husband and the second and third respondents.

1. By no later than 4.00 pm on 4 September 2025, each of the parties file and serve an affidavit and written submissions in support of their respective applications for costs.
2. Should any of the parties fail to file documents within the timeframe provided by order 17, that party's application for costs will stand dismissed.
3. The cost applications be listed for hearing on 14 October 2025 at 9.30 am to be conducted electronically via Webex.
4. Each party's affidavit is to be limited to five pages, with no more than five annexures.
5. Each party's written submissions are to be limited to five pages and are to state if they consent to the application/s for costs being determined "on the papers" without the need for a hearing, in which case (if all parties indicate their consent) the costs applications be determined in chambers and the hearing listed pursuant to order 19 be vacated.
6. If documents are filed exceeding the specified page limit or number of annexures, the additional pages or annexures be disregarded.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This proceeding concerns the child, X, aged 10, and in particular a dispute in relation to his schooling. The applicant is X's mother. The respondent is his father.
2. The proceeding also relates to an application for an alteration of property interests under section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). Both parties seek orders by way of property adjustment after the breakdown of their marriage.
3. As they were married, I will refer to the applicant as the wife and the respondent as the husband and together as the "spouse parties". I do so without intending any disrespect to them.
4. Also party to these proceedings are the husband's father, Mr B Kapatu (the second named respondent) and a company, C Pty Ltd ("C Pty Ltd") of which the second respondent is the sole director and shareholder (the third named respondent). I will refer to the second respondent as the husband's father. I will also refer collectively to the husband, his father and C Pty Ltd as "the respondents".
5. Happily for X, the husband and wife reached agreement during the running of the final hearing in relation to most parenting issues, leaving only one issue for determination by the court. Final parenting orders were made by consent on the fourth day of the final hearing (on 14 March 2025) reflecting the parents' agreement they will have joint decision-making responsibility for major long-term issues in relation to X and that he will live with the wife and spend time with the husband for five nights each fortnight during school term periods and for half of school holiday periods. The final parenting orders made by consent also provide (in summary and among others) for X to spend time with both parents for various special occasions, changeover, communication between them and with X, the provision of and access to information about X, injunctions to safeguard him from denigration and other conduct agreed to be contrary to his best interests, and in respect of travel.
6. The only remaining parenting issues in dispute are the school X will attend in 2026 to complete year 6, being the final year of his primary school education, and if an order should be made now for him to attend a particular secondary school in 2027 as proposed by the wife.
7. The dispute in relation to property matters is more significant.
8. The second and third respondent contend they advanced monies to the husband and wife by way of loan, amounting to $461,000, as reflected in three alleged loan agreements. Two of the loan agreements are, on the face of it, signed by the husband and the wife as the borrowers. One of the loan agreements is signed only by the husband as a borrower.
9. The second and third respondents intervened in the proceeding and seek orders providing for repayment of the loans, from the proceeds of sale of two real properties owned by the husband and wife. One of those properties, at D Street, Suburb E ("Suburb E"), has been sold with only a small sum held in trust after the discharge of a mortgage and payment of sale costs ($14,870). The other is the former family home at F Street, Suburb G ("Suburb G"), with modest equity of approximately $282,154. The wife lives in the home at Suburb G with X along with a number of extended maternal family members, and she seeks to retain it subject to home loans secured by mortgage.
10. If the loans alleged to have been advanced by the second and third respondents are accepted by the court, repayment of two of the loans has been triggered by the sale of Suburb E. Repayment of the third loan will be triggered by the transfer of Suburb G (as sought by the wife) or sale of Suburb G (as sought by the husband).
11. The husband supports the position of the second and third respondents and agrees to the repayment of the asserted loans from the proceeds from the sale of the spouse parties' real properties. If an order is made providing for repayment of the loans and interest as sought by the second and third respondents and supported by the husband, there will likely be no funds remaining from the proceeds of sale of the spouse parties' two real properties and they will remain indebted to the second and third respondents, in the order of approximately $164,000 plus interest, disregarding sale costs for Suburb G.
12. The wife disputes the loans alleged by the husband and the second and third respondents. She asserts the loan agreements bearing her signature were not signed by her. She "does not concede" monies were advanced by the second and third respondents by way of loan and asserts she had no knowledge of the advancement of funds by the second and third respondents. If the court finds the funds were advanced, she submits it is open to the court to find they "should be considered a gift", for the court "not to take the alleged loans into account" or for "apportionment between the parties of any alleged debt". In the minute of orders sought by the wife,[1] she seeks the husband be solely liable for each of the loans and that he indemnify her against any liability arising from the loan agreements. This was in contrast with her formal application[2] in which she simply sought "the intervener application be dismissed".
13. The wife also asserts the husband has an interest in a business in H Street, Suburb J ("the Suburb J Business") owned and operated by the third respondent in which the husband is employed as a manager. She seeks to include the Suburb J Business as an asset of the husband or a financial resource to him, valued at $1 million. The minute of orders sought by the wife[3] seeks a declaration that the Suburb J Business, including any associated assets and goodwill, be included in the matrimonial asset pool for the purposes of property division notwithstanding she was refused leave on 14 August 2024 to amend her Initiating Application to make a claim against the second and third respondents.
14. It is not in dispute the husband was previously a director and shareholder of each of K Pty Ltd ("K Pty Ltd") and C Pty Ltd ("the companies"). However, the husband resigned as director and transferred his shareholding in K Pty Ltd in June 2012 and in C Pty Ltd in April 2016, well prior to the spouse parties' separation in 2021. Each of the respondents deny the husband has any interest in the Suburb J Business and maintain he is only an employee, holding the position of manager.
15. The wife contends the husband has not made full and frank disclosure, including in respect of monies she asserts were withdrawn from his bank accounts and remain unaccounted for. She seeks various sums, amounting to more than $1.1 million be "added back" to be treated notionally as assets alongside the spouse parties' other assets. The husband denies he has failed to make full and frank disclosure and opposes the add backs asserted by the wife.
16. In relation to property matters, the orders sought by each of the parties were set out at the commencement of the final hearing in a minute of orders sought, provided to chambers as directed[4] and, in respect of the second and third respondent, in a more detailed minute provided during the hearing.[5]
17. As to the positions of the spouse parties, in summary, the wife seeks the division of non-superannuation assets 70% to 80% in her favour and for each spouse party to retain their superannuation. She seeks to retain Suburb G and to assume responsibility for the home loans secured by mortgage. The husband seeks Suburb G be sold and the proceeds from the sale of the spouse parties' real estate be applied towards the debts he and the second and third respondents say are owed pursuant to the loan agreements. He seeks he and the wife then each retain the few remaining assets they have in their names and possession and their superannuation interests.

1. Having considered the orders sought by each of the parties and the submissions made by them, the following issues require determination:

(a) In relation to X:

(i) Should he complete his primary school education at his current school, being L School, or change schools in 2026 to undertake grade 6 at M School before commencing secondary school in 2027?

(ii) Should an order be made for him to attend N School in 2027?

(b) In relation to the assets and liabilities of the spouse parties:

(i) Were monies advanced by the second and third respondents to the spouse parties as asserted by each of the respondents?

(ii) If so, were those monies advanced by way of loan? This requires consideration of whether the wife signed two loan agreements as asserted by the respondents, including the consideration of evidence from alleged witnesses to the loan agreements and a single expert handwriting expert;

(iii) If so, are the loans repayable and should an order be made providing for the repayment of those loans by the spouse parties or should the husband assume full responsibility for the liabilities as contended by the wife?

(iv) Should the spouse parties' bank balances be included on the balance sheet for division between them? If so, what value should be attributed to the husband's bank accounts?

(v) What value should be attributed to the husband's motor vehicle?

(c) Should the sums asserted by the wife be "added back" and considered alongside the legal and equitable interests of the husband and wife in property, as assets notionally retained by the husband?

(d) How should the spouse parties' contributions be assessed?

(e) What "adjustment" if any should be made to the contribution-based assessment, having regard to those matters relevant pursuant to section 75(2) of the Act? This requires, among other things, consideration of whether the Suburb J Business constitutes a financial resource to the husband as asserted by the wife.

1. The matter was ultimately heard over five days, with extended sitting days, notwithstanding the estimate of four days. The hearing took place in person at the Melbourne Registry. Each of the parties were represented by counsel and each of the parties were in attendance. The husband's father was assisted by an interpreter. The wife's brother also availed himself of assistance from that interpreter.

(a) Her Amended Initiating Application filed on 14 July 2024;

(b) Her affidavit filed on 14 July 2024 ("wife's trial affidavit");

(c) Affidavit of Mr O ("wife's brother") filed on 11 August 2024, with leave as ordered on 14 August 2024;

(d) Her financial statement filed on 15 July 2024;

(e) Her outline of case ("case outline") filed on 3 March 2025;

(f) Minute of final orders sought by her, submitted by email on 3 March 2025;[6]

(g) Response to objections to evidence, filed on 6 March 2025;

(h) Her costs notice filed on 7 March 2025;

(i) Her updated costs notice filed as directed, on 13 March 2025;

(j) Written submissions in respect of preliminary issues, including objections to evidence, filed on 7 March 2025; and

(k) Written closing submissions filed on 3 April 2025.

(a) His Amended Response to Initiating Application filed on 29 July 2024;

(b) His affidavit filed on 29 July 2024 ("husband's trial affidavit");

(c) His affidavit filed on 25 February 2025 in response to the affidavit of the wife's brother and by way of update in relation to parenting matters, as permitted by the orders made on 14 August 2024;

(d) His financial statement filed on 29 July 2024;

(e) Written objections to evidence filed on 5 and 6 March 2025;

(f) Minutes of final orders sought by him, submitted by email on 5 March 2025;[7]

(g) His case outline filed on 6 March 2025;

(h) His costs notice filed on 7 March 2025; and

(i) His updated costs notice filed as directed, on 13 March 2025.

(a) Their Amended Response to Initiating Application filed on 7 August 2024;

(b) Affidavit of the husband's father filed on 7 August 2024 ("trial affidavit");

(c) Affidavit of the husband's father filed on 18 February 2025 in response to the affidavit of the wife's brother, as permitted by the orders made on 14 August 2025;

(d) Affidavit of Ms P (former employee of the third respondent) filed on 5 August 2024;

(e) Affidavit of Mr Q (former employee of the third respondent) filed on 7 August 2024;

(f) Their updated case outline filed on 3 March 2025;

(g) Minute of orders sought by them, submitted by email on 3 March 2025;[8]

(h) Their costs notice filed on 6 March 2025;

(i) Their updated costs notice filed as directed, on 13 March 2025;

(j) Written submissions on preliminary matters, including objections to evidence, filed on 11 March 2025;

(k) Amended minute of final orders sought, submitted by email on 14 March 2025;[9] and

(l) Written closing submissions filed on 3 April 2025.

1. The parties each also relied on the affidavit of the single expert handwriting expert, Mr R, including the annexures to his affidavit, and in particular his single expert report dated 11 June 2024. The wife ultimately withdrew an oral application made at the commencement of the final hearing to rely on evidence from another handwriting expert engaged by her.
2. In relation to the issue of X's schooling, the husband and wife each relied on the affidavit of the single expert family report writer, Ms S ("family report writer"), including the annexures to her affidavit, and in particular the family report dated 7 March 2025 ("family report").
3. The parties jointly relied on the following documents which were filed or tendered at the commencement of the final hearing pursuant to pre-trial directions issued from chambers:

(a) Joint minute, setting out the terms of agreed orders and the orders sought by each party in respect of matters in dispute;[10]

(b) Joint chronology;[11] and

(c) Joint balance sheet.[12]

1. The parties also relied on documents tendered by them during the course of the final hearing, including tendered annexures from affidavits, which were recorded as exhibits.

1. A number of affidavits were the subject of objections, which were determined at the outset of the hearing with oral reasons provided for each determination. I have disregarded that evidence in respect of which objections were upheld and those parts of the wife's written closing submissions referring to evidence ruled inadmissible.

1. Various financial records, including bank statements and cheque butts, were put to the wife in cross-examination and tendered by the second and third respondents, supporting the evidence of the husband and the husband's father in respect of monies advanced pursuant to the loan agreements. In her written closing submissions, the wife asserts those records had not previously been disclosed and that in the absence of an opportunity to undertake a forensic accounting the records should not be regarded as conclusive of the facts sought to be proven. During the hearing, counsel for the wife foreshadowed she would object to documents being tendered that had not been disclosed prior to the hearing and I advised I would deal with each objection and application for leave as it arose. However, no such objections were made during the running of the hearing. It was not put to the husband or his father in cross-examination that the tendered bank statements and cheque butts were not an accurate record of banking transactions. Each of the tendered bank records were put to the wife in cross-examination, providing her with an opportunity to respond to them. I have put weight on those tendered bank records, which supports the evidence of the husband and his father.

1. Section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ("Evidence Act") provides as follows:

(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.

(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:

(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject‑matter of the proceeding; and

(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

1. In assessing the evidence, I have applied the balance of probabilities as the standard of proof. In making my findings I have given careful consideration to all of the evidence, the nature of the proceedings, the seriousness of the allegations made, including the implied allegation of forgery made by the wife, and the consequences that flow from those findings.

1. The provisions of section 69ZT of the Act apply to the child-related aspect of the proceeding, excluding operation of specified provisions of the Evidence Act. Those exclusions do not apply to the property matters before the court in respect of which the usual rules of evidence apply.

1. I have read and considered all evidence adduced by the parties, save for that which was ruled inadmissible, including tendered documents. If I have not mentioned a piece of evidence or an argument presented at the hearing that does not mean I have not considered it. As the High Court said in Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon:[13]

A judge's reasons are not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue. Judgments of trial judges would soon become longer than they already are if a judge's failure to mention such facts and arguments would be evidence that he or she had not properly considered the losing party's case.

1. I have also had the benefit of observing the appearance and demeanour of the parties when giving their evidence.

1. I will make some preliminary observations in relation to the evidence of the parties and witnesses before considering their evidence in more detail as relevant to each of the issues for determination and the required statutory considerations.

1. The wife's affidavit was remarkably short[14] and lacking in detail given the significance of known disputed issues and the serious allegations made by her. Her affidavit contained numerous generalised assertions and submissions, many of which were the subject of successful objections and ruled inadmissible.
2. Her bold assertions and denials about the spouse parties' property transactions and monies asserted to have been advanced to them by way of loan was at odds with her evidence she had little knowledge of their finances, including her evidence:

(a) The husband controlled all finances, buying and selling properties and making all finance-related decisions; and

(b) He kept her away from all "financial knowledge" and never involved her in any discussion in relation to financial affairs.

1. This evidence was in turn undermined by the wife's evidence given in cross-examination, including that she had signed contracts and mortgage documents upon the acquisition of Suburb E and Suburb G, that she had conversations with the husband about the development of Suburb E, that she had credit card accounts of her own, that her name appeared on joint accounts with the husband,[15] and that she received her own income (paid into her own account) from which she made regular transfers to the husband.
2. When cross-examined, the wife's evidence was often confusing and contradictory. By way of example, I will refer later in my reasons to her evidence about signing the contract for the purchase of Suburb E. The wife did not identify any language difficulties to explain the manner in which her oral evidence was given. Her affidavits were made in English and she did not request an interpreter. Even allowing for the stress of court proceedings and the experience of being cross-examined, I found the wife to be an evasive witness rather than a confused witness.
3. Some evidence of the wife was demonstrated to be inaccurate. By way of example only, whilst the wife expressly confirmed under cross-examination she did not have any credit cards in 2017, when presented with bank statements showing payments to credit cards in her name, after initially providing non-committal answers (including that she would have to check), she eventually admitted she had credit card accounts to which payments were made in 2017.
4. The wife's answers to questions under cross-examination were often unresponsive notwithstanding repeated guidance from counsel and the bench. At times she failed to answer questions put to her and on one occasion expressly refused to answer.
5. The wife's denial of knowledge her brother had been convicted of dishonesty offences was contradicted by his oral evidence that he had informed her of those matters. Notwithstanding her knowledge of those matters, the wife gave evidence her brother "is truthful and honest person" and "always tells the truth".
6. I will explain later in my reasons my finding the wife filed the affidavit of her brother containing evidence she knew to be untrue - namely, that her brother attended a meeting at her home and witnessed the husband's father threaten her during that meeting. It was only when presented with the inconsistency in his evidence and her own evidence (and then, only reluctantly after repeated cross-examination), she admitted her brother had lied in his affidavit. After acknowledging her brother's lie, she continued to rely on his affidavit and allowed her counsel to tender his affidavit as evidence of truth.
7. On the second day of the hearing, while the wife was under cross-examination, it was reported to me the wife conducted a conversation with her solicitors in the court room during a brief adjournment. I shared this report in court and the wife was cross-examined about it. She acknowledged my direction the previous day that she could not talk to her solicitors or anybody about her evidence in the case and that she had understood that direction. She admitted she had disobeyed my direction, approached her solicitor and asked her solicitor about some bank statements. Subsequently, on the third day of the hearing, while the wife remained under cross-examination she admitted to speaking with her legal representatives that morning about evidence she might provide in the case.
8. I found the wife to be a wholly unsatisfactory witness. I accept her evidence in respect of disputed matters only where that evidence is corroborated by other credible evidence or against her interests.

1. An affidavit sworn by the wife's brother, Mr O, on 9 August 2024 was filed on 11 August 2024, only three days prior to the date on which this matter was initially listed for final hearing. When the final hearing was adjourned, leave was granted to the wife to rely on that late-filed affidavit and an opportunity was provided for the respondents to file short affidavits in reply to it.
2. At the commencement of the hearing, I heard submissions in respect of objections taken to the wife's brother's affidavit and a significant proportion of his evidence was ruled inadmissible. Other aspects of his evidence not the subject of rulings consist of generalised statements, asserted beliefs and opinions and is evidence upon which I put no weight.
3. The wife's brother attended at court to be cross-examined. He availed himself of assistance from an interpreter arranged for the husband's father for most of his cross-examination.
4. When cross-examined, the wife's brother acknowledged conviction for dishonesty offences, including using deception to dishonestly appropriate property belonging to another, intending to permanently deprive them of it and obtaining property by deception. He acknowledged he had been the subject of a determination made by the Department of Home Affairs refusing a visa application, involving a finding he had provided or caused to provide false or misleading information in relation to a visa, although he denied he had provided false or misleading information and attributed responsibility to his migration agent.
5. As recorded earlier in my reasons, the wife admitted she knew her brother to be lying when he gave evidence on affidavit that he attended a meeting with her and the husband's father and in respect of the threats he said he witnessed during that meeting.
6. The reliability of other aspects of the wife's brother's evidence was undermined by cross-examination, including documentary evidence put to him[16] and by his evidence he did not remember discussions he said had occurred.
7. I find the wife's brother to be an unreliable and untruthful witness and do not put not any weight on his evidence save in respect of evidence given against the wife's interests. For example, I accept his evidence that he considered the husband's father to be family, the husband's father loaned him $50,000 in late 2020 and that interest was charged by the husband's father on that loan.

1. The husband was a responsive witness. He answered questions put to him in a clear and direct manner. His evidence was plausible and his narrative logical. His evidence was generally consistent with the evidence of his father, the witnesses relied upon by his father, and with tendered documents. His evidence was not undermined by cross-examination.
2. Where the evidence of the husband and the wife conflict and there is no corroborating evidence, I prefer the evidence of the husband.

1. The husband's father likewise answered questions put to him through an interpreter in a responsive manner. His evidence was consistent with the evidence of his witnesses and the husband and with tendered documents. His evidence was not undermined by cross-examination and I accept him to be a truthful witness.

1. I accept the submission made by counsel for the second and third respondent that the evidence of Ms P and Mr Q was compelling and not undermined by cross-examination. I am not persuaded their former employment in the businesses operated by the companies and Mr Q's ongoing friendship with the respondents undermines the credibility of their evidence. Whilst the wife asserted from the witness box that Mr Q and Ms P had lied when they each gave evidence they witnessed her sign the first and third loan agreements, it was not put to either of these witnesses that they lied, or even that they were mistaken, when giving that evidence.
2. Ms P gave evidence that after the husband and wife separated she was phoned by a person identifying herself as the wife, who told her that if she said anything in relation to the signing of the loan agreements, the caller would lodge a complaint against her to the Department of Immigration. She deposed the caller threatened to get her student visa cancelled. Ms P confirmed this evidence when cross-examined. Under cross-examination, the wife admitted obtaining Ms P's phone number and calling her at a time after she and the husband separated. However, she denied making the alleged threat. Evidence was not adduced from the wife as to an alternate purpose for the call. I accept Ms P's evidence in respect of that call.

1. Mr R is a forensic document examiner. He was jointly instructed by the parties as a single expert to provide an expert report regarding a signature comparison between the two purported loan agreements alleged to have been signed by the wife and a set of specimen documents signed in her name. He was instructed to determine if the signatures attributed to the wife on those two purposed loan agreements match the signatures on the specimen documents.
2. Mr R affirmed an affidavit on 25 February 2025, annexing his expert report dated 11 June 2024. His report detailed his qualifications, training and experience as a forensic document examiner, including his membership of professional organisations relating to his field of expertise.
3. Mr R identified as a limitation to his examination and expert opinion, that the sample documents examined by him were reproductions. He also identified various assumptions, including that the sample signatures provided to him were true and accurate copies of source documents bearing genuine, naturally written signatures of the wife.
4. Mr R provided his expert opinion that, based on his examination and subject to the limitations and assumptions identified in his report:

(a) The evidence provides very strong support for the hypothesis that the questioned signature for the wife appearing on the loan agreement dated July 2017 "was not written by the writer of the sample signatures and is the product of a simulation / forgery process"; and

(b) The evidence provides very strong support for the hypothesis that the questioned signature for the wife appearing on the loan agreement dated February 2021 "was written by the writer of the sample signatures."

1. When cross-examined by counsel for the second and third respondent, Mr R acknowledged:

(a) He had not complied with aspects of the duty of experts to the court provided in Division 7.1.5 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021(Cth) ("the Rules"), including in respect of the form of his affidavit, in that he had not included a statement as required by rule 7.21(2) and, in particular, had not identified the professional codes of conduct or protocol governing his work;

(b) He had referred in his report to an expert witness code of conduct applying in another court;

(c) His report identified he is a member of the Australasian Society of Forensic Document Examiners (ASFDE) and of the Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society (ANZFSS). However, when cross-examined, he gave evidence he was not in fact a member of the ASFDE at the time of the hearing. He acknowledged the ASFDE has a code of ethics but that as he is not a member he is not bound by that code. He ultimately agreed ANZFSS has a code of professional practice and that as a member he is bound by that code. However, notwithstanding his evidence he has been a member of that organisation for more than 20 or 25 years, he admitted he had not read that code which he acknowledged came into effect in 2014; and

(d) In respect of the content of his report, there are a range of methodologies that can be used by handwriting experts (stating "there could be hundreds") and that the methodology he had adopted is based on "accepted practice" in Australia and New Zealand. Mr R acknowledged he had not identified in his report any other methodologies that might be used in undertaking his expert evaluation and the reason for selecting the method he used. He acknowledged he had not identified literature or material supporting that the methodology he adopted had been peer reviewed, was consistent with standards or protocols or supporting the opinion scale he adopted.

1. I put little weight on Mr R expert opinion in respect of the two subject signatures on the two loan agreement documents given:

(a) The limitations of his report acknowledged in his report;

(b) The further limitations of his report revealed in cross-examination;

(c) What was acknowledged by the wife in her trial affidavit to be "a mixed opinion", being that one of the subject signatures was likely made by the wife and the other was likely the product of a simulation or forgery process. That being so is implausible given the wife's evidence that she did not sign either loan agreement and the evidence of the husband, his father and the witnesses called by the husband's father that the wife signed both loan agreements; and

(d) His expert opinion provided under cross-examination by counsel for the second and third respondent that:

(i) The signatures examined were relatively complex signatures;

(ii) The more complex the signature, the less likely there would be a false positive (a false signature assessed to be genuine) and the more likely there would be a false negative (a genuine signature assessed to be false); and

(iii) He could be mistaken in concluding the loan agreement dated July 2017 was not signed by the wife and he could be mistaken in concluding that signature was produced by simulation forgery.

1. The family report writer was not required for cross-examination. Accordingly, her expertise, evaluation and recommendations are not challenged. I put significant weight on her evaluation and recommendations when considering the matter of X's schooling.

1. I have been assisted by the joint chronology[17] which records key events relevant to my determination and identifies where events are not agreed by all parties.

1. The husband and wife were each aged 39 when the final hearing commenced and are now aged 40. They met in early 2010 and married in Melbourne in 2010. They began living together with the husband's parents, in their home in Suburb T in 2010.
2. The husband says he and the wife separated under the one roof on 23 July 2021. The wife says they separated on 15 November 2021. Little turns on this when their contributions before and after separation are to be taken into account. The husband left the former family home at Suburb G in February 2022. The wife has continued living in Suburb G since that time (so for more than three years) with X and members of her family. The husband and wife are divorced, pursuant to an order made in mid-2024.

(a) The husband owned a unit in Suburb U, subject to a mortgage;

(b) The husband gave unchallenged evidence he owned a motor vehicle and had modest savings;

(c) The husband was a director of K Pty Ltd. His father gave unchallenged evidence the husband held 1 of 100 shares in that company. K Pty Ltd at that time operated a business in Town V ("the Town V business"), purchased in 2008;

(d) The husband was a director of C Pty Ltd, along with the husband's father, his father's business partner, and other directors, and held shares in that company. C Pty Ltd had been recently incorporated, in mid-2010, and purchased a business operating in W Street ("the W Street business") in 2010;

(e) The wife deposed she had savings of "approximately $20,000" but the husband deposed he did not know her to have any significant assets at the commencement of their relationship. Faced with the husband's position, the wife did not adduce any evidence to corroborate that she had savings in 2010 and she did not give evidence of how those monies, if they existed, were applied by her;

(f) The wife referred to "cash dowry amounts, and jewellery items" she asserted had been provided to the husband by her family in her trial affidavit but did not adduce admissible evidence of dowry or jewellery paid or gifted to the husband by her family. The husband asserted only that the wife received gifts of jewellery from her family. Although she was aware of this dispute, the wife did not adduce evidence from her parents and did not explain her failure to do so. In the absence of an explanation by the wife as to her failure to call her parents to give evidence on her behalf and where they are persons who could cast light on a key factual issue asserted by her, namely her assertion of dowry, I draw an inference their evidence would not have assisted her case. I do so applying the principle commonly expressed as the "rule in Jones v Dunkel",[18] which was summarised by the High Court in Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd as follows (citations omitted):[19]

... the unexplained failure by a party to call a witness may in appropriate circumstances support an inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted the party's case. ... The failure to call a witness may also permit the court to draw, with greater confidence, any inference unfavourable to the party that failed to call the witness, if that uncalled witness appears to be in a position to cast light on whether the inference should be drawn...

The rule in Jones v Dunkel permits an inference, not that evidence not called by a party would have been adverse to the party, but that it would not have assisted the party. ...

(g) The husband's brother, Mr Y, was the registered proprietor of Suburb G, purchased in May 2010. The wife asserts Suburb G was purchased by the spouse parties but registered in Mr Y's name and then transferred to them in February 2021. I am not persuaded the spouse parties had an interest in Suburb G until they acquired legal ownership in 2021, preferring the evidence of the husband and his father over the evidence of the wife and her brother, including as follows:

(i) The husband deposed he and the wife rented Suburb G from Mr Y from around July 2013 and then purchased Suburb G from Mr Y in early 2021. He deposed he did not pay any amount towards the purchase or improvement of Suburb G, until it was purchased by him and the wife in 2021. This is consistent with the evidence of the respondents in respect of the monies they say were advanced to the husband and wife pursuant to the third loan agreement in 2021, the contract of sale signed by the husband and wife in 2021, and the bank loan taken out by the husband and wife in 2021 secured against Suburb G;

(ii) The husband's father deposed he helped Mr Y search for a suitable property to buy for approximately nine months prior to the purchase of Suburb G and that he then gave Mr Y $20,000 for the deposit. This evidence was not the subject of cross-examination by counsel for the wife;

(iii) The wife deposed she contributed to the purchase price for Suburb G but did not adduce admissible evidence in support of that assertion, beyond her contributions as a co-borrower to the bank loan in 2021. She did not adduce evidence of any representations made by Mr Y that he held legal title to Suburb G other than beneficially; and

(iv) The wife's brother deposed that in early 2011, the husband and the husband's father told him they had bought a block of land with the help of dowry money received from his father (the wife's father). Given my findings in respect of the credibility of the wife's brother, I do not accept that evidence.

1. Throughout their relationship, the husband has worked as a manager in businesses owned and operated by the companies, save for periods I accept he took off work to care for X. He gave unchallenged evidence his income was applied towards the payment of expenses for the spouse parties including rent, utilities and outgoings, groceries, day-to-day living expenses, holidays and X's expenses.
2. The wife deposed she worked as a sales assistant at the Town V Business from immediately after she and the husband married, for almost 3.5 years. She claimed she did not receive any wages for her work. The husband and his father each deposed she worked at the Town V Business only for about two months in 2011, for which she was paid. When cross-examined, the wife was asked if it was true if she was paid a wage during her employment and she answered, "I don't know" and then "yes". I accept the evidence of the husband and his father that the wife worked in the business only briefly and that she was paid for her work.
3. The wife deposed that, in or around 2011 "we built a house on the block of land" (referring to Suburb G) and that she and the husband attended meetings with the builder. In response to that evidence, the husband deposed the wife accompanied him to select some items for his brother's build. He was not challenged in respect of that evidence under cross-examination. Whilst the wife identified the builder in her affidavit, she did not adduce evidence from the builder to support her assertion. She did not assert she and the husband met the cost of construction of a home on Suburb G.
4. In July 2013 the husband and wife moved into Suburb G. The husband gave evidence they paid rent to Mr Y ranging from $1,200 to about $2,000 per month.
5. It is not disputed the husband and wife travelled extensively. After considering the husband's evidence and hearing the wife cross-examined about this issue, I accept the husband's evidence some of their travel was funded by him drawing down on the Suburb U mortgage and his personal credit cards.
6. The wife deposed that while pregnant with X, she commenced a community worker course. She claimed the husband did not provide her with any financial support for the course so she borrowed money from her parents. The husband and his father gave evidence the husband's father paid for the wife's enrolment fees. I accept the evidence of the husband and his father in respect of the payment of those fees where they were not cross-examined in respect of that evidence, the wife did not adduce any evidence to corroborate her evidence to the contrary and she did not call her parents or explain her failure to do so, from which I infer their evidence would not have assisted her.

1. X was born in 2014 and is now aged 10. The wife's mother stayed with the husband and wife from around June 2014 until January 2015.
2. In early 2015, the wife began employment as a community worker, working around three days a week. The husband gave evidence he cared for X during the day when the wife returned to work and worked in the evenings, until her mother returned to Australia in late 2015 and assisted with X's care during the day. He deposed he then resumed working during the day, returning home at 2.00 pm most days to relieve the wife's mother from caring for X.
3. The wife increased her work hours to full-time in or around 2016 and in early 2017, X began attending childcare. The husband deposed he collected X at around 1.00 pm on three days each week and cared for him until the wife returned from work at around 7.00 pm and in the evening when she attended at the gym, with assistance from the wife's mother when she was staying with them.
4. The wife gave evidence "my mother and I have always taken full responsibility for the child", "[the husband] has barely contributed to providing care to the child and his daily activities", "I always asked [my brother] to look after my child in my absence", and "only on a few occasions did [the husband] pick up the child from the childcare and drop him off at my mother's. Apart from this, [the husband] never provided any other help with our child's daily care".
5. I accept the husband's evidence over that of the wife in relation to X's care, in light of my assessment of the parties' evidence generally, the husband's detailed evidence about his involvement in X's care compared with the wife's broad emphatic statements.

1. In 2012, the businesses commenced court proceedings against K Pty Ltd alleging a breach of a franchise agreement. In June 2012, the husband ceased to be a director of and relinquished his one share in K Pty Ltd. The husband's father gave evidence this was because the husband was at that time unable to manage the business and it was trading at a loss and the husband was therefore not paid for his share. It was put to the husband by counsel for the wife he relinquished his interest in the company because of the legal action and this was expressly denied by him.
2. In 2015, the W Street Business was sold by C Pty Ltd. The husband ceased being a director and shareholder in C Pty Ltd in April 2016. When cross-examined he gave evidence he was not paid for his shares as that business too had been running at a loss. In 2016 K Pty Ltd sold the Town V Business. The husband's father gave evidence both businesses were sold at a loss.
3. In 2016, C Pty Ltd purchased the Suburb J Business. The husband's father deposed the purchase was funded by borrowings of $700,000 and the business is trading at a loss following the Covid-19 pandemic. He said he is looking to sell the business as soon as he finds a suitable buyer who offers a price that covers the business loans.
4. This evidence of the respondents was not undermined by cross-examination or evidence adduced by the wife.

1. The husband asserts that in or around 2015 and/or 2016, he and the wife discussed with his father purchasing a property. This is denied by the wife but consistent with the evidence of the husband's father and with what subsequently occurred.
2. In February 2016, settlement of the sale of the husband's property in Suburb U was effected.
3. In July 2017, the husband and the wife jointly purchased Suburb E for $880,000. The wife did not give any admissible evidence on affidavit in respect of the purchase save that it was purchased in joint names.
4. When cross-examined, the wife initially gave evidence she signed the contract for purchase but later said she meant she signed the mortgage documents but did not sign the purchase contract or "any contract". She gave evidence she did not recall the purchase price or how much stamp duty was paid, but ultimately accepted Suburb E was purchased for $880,000 and that if a 10% deposit was required, that would be a payment of $88,000 and that stamp duty was payable on the purchase price of $880,000.
5. The wife initially gave evidence she and the husband did not borrow to fund the purchase but then acknowledged taking a bank loan secured by mortgage. She then gave evidence she did not know how much money was borrowed from the bank and how much money was required beyond the bank loan to compete the purchase, saying it was handled by the husband. When it was put to her she and the husband took a loan from Westpac of about $690,000, she answered "somewhere around that". Notwithstanding that evidence, the wife did not accept her memory about the purchase of Suburb E was poor.
6. When asked where the money came from to purchase Suburb E, the wife gave evidence the husband told her he sold the business and got money from the business. She did not adduce evidence of any particular conversations with the husband to support this assertion. Given the lack of detail in the wife's evidence, my assessment of her credibility and the absence of corroborating evidence, I do not accept her evidence that this is what she was told.

1. Each of the respondents depose the husband and the wife entered into a loan agreement with the husband's father, whereby he agreed to advance them the sum of $176,000 to be applied to the purchase of Suburb E. They give evidence this loan agreement was the subject of a written loan agreement signed by the husband, the wife and the husband's father in July 2017 ("first loan agreement"). The wife maintains she was not aware of any such loan and did not sign the first loan agreement, which appears to bear her signature.
2. The first loan agreement[20] is dated July 2017 and is identified to be made between the husband's father (as the lender) and the husband and the wife (as the borrower). It bears three signatures, identified on the loan agreement as signatures of the husband's father, the husband and the wife, and three signatures of a witness identified to be Mr Q. The loan agreement records (in summary and among other things):

(a) The advance of $176,000;

(b) The rates and means of calculating interest payable on the advance;

(c) The purpose of the advance, being for the purchase of Suburb E;

(d) The repayment date, for the principal advance and interest being April 2028 or the transfer or sale of the security property, being Suburb E; and

(e) Security in the form of a caveat over Suburb E.

1. The husband, his father and Mr Q each gave evidence the agreement was signed by them and the wife, at the home of the husband and the wife, witnessed by Mr Q. The husband's father credibly deposed he asked Mr Q to be the witness because he lived close by to the husband and the wife, which was confirmed by Mr Q. He and Mr Q each deposed the wife's mother and brother were also present when they and the spouse parties signed the loan agreement. Mr Q confirmed this under cross-examination.
2. The wife did not call her mother as a witness to challenge this evidence and did not provide an explanation for her failure to do so, from which I infer the wife's mother's evidence would not have assisted her case. I do not accept the following evidence of the wife's brother given my assessment of his credibility:

I further confirm that [the husband], his father, second respondent and [Mr Q] never visited my sister at her place in my presence and never executed any agreement.

1. I accept the evidence of the husband's father that, consistent with the terms of the first loan agreement, he advanced the following sums towards the Suburb E purchase, being:

(a) The deposit of $88,000 paid to the agent by cheque in July 2017;[21] and

(b) The balance of $88,000 for settlement of the purchase in October 2017, consisting of the following:

(i) The sum of $65,165 by not insisting upon the repayment of monies he had loaned to the husband and wife in that amount, to pay off credit card accumulated by them by October 2017. A large proportion of those payments made by the husband's father towards credit card liabilities of the spouse parties were corroborated by tendered bank statements and cheque butts.[22] Whilst the wife initially gave evidence she did not know about the husband's credit card debts, she did not dispute the husband had accumulated credit card liabilities to meet their expenses. Her counsel did not cross-examine the husband's father or the husband in respect of his evidence those monies had been paid to the husband's credit cards by his father with expectation of repayment;

(ii) $9,800 in cash, paid into a bank account of the husband on 2 October 2017, which payment was corroborated by a tendered bank statement;[23]

(iii) $12,000 transferred to a bank account of the husband on 12 October 2017, which payment was corroborated by a tendered bank statement;[24] and

(iv) The balance remaining in cash.

1. When cross-examined, the wife agreed she did not have the funds herself to pay the deposit of $88,000 and her family did not make those payments on her behalf. She agreed she had not identified any bank statements showing the husband had the funds to pay the deposit after issuing subpoenas of his bank statements. She did not adduce evidence to demonstrate the payments asserted to be made by the husband's father pursuant to the first loan agreement were not made or were made from some other source.

1. When cross-examined by counsel for the husband, the wife gave evidence the husband mentioned to her developing the Suburb E property but said it was just a conversation and nothing proceeded. When cross-examined by counsel for the second and third respondent, the wife acknowledged "a general conversation" with the husband about the development of Suburb E. When further questioned about this, she gave evidence it may have happened "randomly" but she did not recall any conversations. I accept the wife may not have been directly involved in the plans for development of Suburb E, including the engagement of professionals, permit applications, and preparation of drawings and quotes to progress those plans[25] but I am satisfied she was involved in conversations about a plan to develop the property.

1. The husband and his father gave evidence the husband entered into a second loan agreement, with C Pty Ltd, whereby C Pty Ltd agreed to advance the sum of $85,000 to the husband and wife to be applied to the purchase and development of Suburb E. They gave evidence this loan agreement was the subject of a written agreement signed by the husband and the husband's father (in his capacity as director of C Pty Ltd) in July 2017 ("second loan agreement"). The wife asserts she had no knowledge of this agreement but she did not dispute that it was signed by the husband and his father or assert that it was signed at a time other than on 30 July 2017.
2. The second loan agreement[26] is dated July 2017 and is identified to be made between the third respondent (as the lender) and the husband (as the borrower). It bears two signatures identified on the loan agreement as signatures of the husband's father and the husband, and two signatures of a witness, identified to be Mr Q. The loan agreement records (in summary and among other things):

(a) The advance of $85,000;

(b) The rates and means of calculating interest payable on the advance;

(c) The purpose of the advance, being for the purchase and development of Suburb E;

(d) The repayment date, for the principal advance and interest being July 2028 or the transfer or sale of the security property, being Suburb E; and

(e) Security in the form of a caveat over Suburb E.

1. Each of the husband, his father and Mr Q gave evidence the second loan agreement was signed by them and witnessed by Mr Q.
2. The respondents give evidence the following payments were made pursuant to the second loan agreement, which evidence was substantially corroborated by tendered documents:

(a) On 9 October 2017, the sum of $50,000 paid into the husband's bank account[27] by Z Pty Ltd, being a company owned by the husband's paternal uncle. The husband's father deposed this sum was borrowed by C Pty Ltd to fund the loan to the husband. He deposed the husband told him this sum was applied to stamp duty upon the purchase of Suburb E and fees for permits and architectural drawings in anticipation of he and the wife developing Suburb E;

(b) On 10 November 2017, the sum of $8,674 was transferred to the husband;[28]

(c) On 3 May 2018, the sum of $6,500 was transferred to the husband;[29]

(d) On 23 May 2018, the sum of $8,750 was transferred to the husband; [30]

(e) In November 2018, the sum of $5,500 was transferred to the husband; and

(f) Other expenses were paid by the third respondent relating to the planned development of Suburb E.

1. In October 2017, the purchase of Suburb E settled.
2. When cross-examined, the wife agreed she did not have the funds herself to pay stamp duty upon the transfer of Suburb E and her family did not pay it on her behalf. She did not adduce evidence the husband had the funds to pay the stamp duty upon the purchase of Suburb E after issuing subpoenas of his bank statements.
3. When cross-examined, the husband explained detailed plans to develop Suburb E, to build luxury townhouses, with the aim of selling two to fund the project. The evidence given by the husband and his father in relation to the progression of those plans (drawings, permit applications and the like) was supported by tendered documents.[31]
4. The husband explained the development plans did not ultimately proceed because the forecast development costs increased so significantly due to the Covid-19 pandemic, including that estimated building costs almost doubled. He gave evidence he and the wife therefore decided to sell Suburb E.
5. The husband gave evidence that at that time, there was an expectation Suburb E would sell for significantly more than it ultimately did and he and the wife would be in a position to repay the first two loans from the second and third respondents. This accorded with the evidence of the husband's father who said he agreed to lend money to the husband and the wife to purchase Suburb G because they had told him they would sell the Suburb E property and repay the earlier loans.

1. It is not disputed that in 2021, ownership of Suburb G was transferred from Mr Y to the husband and wife. The husband deposes the property was purchased for $608,000 plus stamp duty, funded by a loan from his father and a bank loan of approximately $480,000. The wife asserted this transaction was only a transfer of legal ownership and to the best of her knowledge there was no money paid to Mr Y.
2. Contradicting her own evidence, the wife annexed to her trial affidavit a copy of a contract of sale for Suburb G dated February 2021, identifying Mr Y as the vendor and the husband and the wife as the purchasers.[32] When cross-examined by counsel for the husband, she recalled borrowing approximately $500,000 from the ANZ bank in 2021 and signing the loan documents. At odds with that evidence, she initially maintained Suburb G was "just transferred". When cross-examined by counsel for the second and third respondent, she admitted signing the contract. She admitted the contract recorded the purchase price of $608,000 and provided for the payment of a deposit of $121,600. She agreed she did not pay the deposit and nor did her parents or brother pay on her behalf. She acknowledged she had not identified from subpoenaed bank records of the husband evidence to show he paid the deposit from his own funds. She acknowledged the contract provided the balance of the purchase price was $486,400 and accepted she and the husband paid that balance by means of a bank loan. The wife and husband agree the transfer was completed in April 2021. The wife gave oral evidence she thought stamp duty was not paid on the transfer but did not adduce evidence of the basis for her belief or documentary evidence to support it.
3. I accept the evidence of the husband in respect of the spouse parties' purchase of Suburb G from Mr Y in 2021, which is supported by the signed contract of sale.
4. The wife submits in her written closing submissions that the court may infer from the husband's failure to call Mr Y that the evidence of Mr Y would not assist his case. However, the husband relies on the signed contract of sale. It is the wife that bears the onus of establishing her claim that the beneficial ownership of Suburb G was other than as reflected on title. She did not seek to adduce evidence from Mr Y, by subpoena or otherwise.
5. The husband and his father assert the husband and wife entered into a loan agreement with the husband's father, whereby the husband's father agreed to advance the further sum of $200,000 to the husband and wife - $150,000 to be applied to the purchase of Suburb G from Mr Y and $50,000 applied to interest accrued pursuant to the first two loan agreements. The husband's father gave evidence the third loan incorporated interest payable on the amount already advanced under the first two loans because of the expectation Suburb E would be sold and those loans repaid. I accept that evidence.

1. The husband and his father gave evidence this loan was the subject of a written agreement signed by the husband and wife and the husband's father in February 2021 ("third loan agreement"), which I note was two days after the spouse parties signed the contract to purchase Suburb G. The wife maintains she has no knowledge of this agreement and did not sign the loan agreement dated February 2021 purporting to bear her signature.
2. The third loan agreement[33] is dated February 2021 and is identified to be made between the second respondent (as the lender) and the husband and the wife (as the borrower). It bears three signatures identified on the loan agreement as signatures of the husband's father, the husband and the wife, and three signatures of a witness, identified to be Ms P. The loan agreement records (in summary and among other things):

(a) The advance of $200,000;

(b) The rates and means of calculating interest payable on the advance;

(c) The purpose of the advance, being for the purchase of Suburb G;

(d) The repayment date, for the principal advance and interest being April 2031 or the transfer or sale of the security property, being Suburb G; and

(e) Security in the form of a caveat over Suburb G.

1. The husband, his father and Ms P gave evidence the third loan agreement was signed by them and the wife, witnessed by Ms P.
2. When cross-examined, the wife maintained she did not sign the third loan agreement and she was not present when the agreement was signed by the applicant, the second respondent and Ms P.
3. The respondents gave evidence the husband's father paid $150,000 to the husband and wife on 25 February 2021 (by way of a cheque to their joint account) and assert this sum was applied to the purchase of Suburb G. The husband's father deposes that in October 2020, he refinanced a loan secured against a property owned by him in Suburb AA to increase his borrowings from $149,000 to $300,000 to raise the sum of $150,000, to assist the husband and the wife to purchase Suburb G from Mr Y. Tendered documents corroborate that evidence, showing a withdrawal from his account of $150,000 on 25 February 2021[34] and the receipt of $150,000 on the same day in an account in the joint names of the husband and wife.[35]

1. Whilst the circumstances in which Suburb E was first listed for sale were disputed, it was not disputed there was an attempt to sell Suburb E in 2021 and the property was passed in at auction.

1. The husband and wife separated under the one roof in July or November 2021.
2. In December 2021, each of them ceased making repayments towards the home loan secured by mortgage against Suburb G. The wife deposed she ceased making repayments because she was not in a financial position to do so. The husband deposed he could no longer afford to meet the payments as he needed funds to rent independent accommodation. In the absence of evidence the husband (or the wife) had savings at that time, I accept he would have had to save for a bond and advance rental. However, I also note his oral evidence he ceased making repayments because the wife stopped contributing her share of the mortgage and household expenses.
3. The father left the family home in mid-February 2022. X continued to live with the wife and maternal grandmother in the home at Suburb G. I accept the husband's evidence he initially continued to collect X from school each day and deliver him to the maternal grandmother's care at the request of the wife and that X spent time with him on weekends, as could be agreed between the spouse parties.

1. In her trial affidavit, the wife alleged the husband's father and the husband's father's brother-in-law, Mr BB, "visited my residence and threatened me and my parents" and "[t]hey would make my journey ugly and brutal". She did not give evidence of when these threats were alleged to have occurred and who, if anyone else, was present.
2. The wife's brother, Mr O, deposed:

After my sister's separation from [the husband], the Second Respondent and his brother-in-law [Mr BB] visited us at my sister's residence in [Suburb G]. During the meeting, I, my mother and my sister [the wife] were present. This meeting was held on the second respondent's request to discuss an amicable resolution of the outstanding property matters between [the husband] and my sister. That meeting was not successful.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Second Respondent threatened me that if my sister proceeded with court action, he would ensure that she received nothing from his son.

1. The husband's father deposed that in November 2021, he and Mr BB, attended at the Suburb G home by arrangement with the wife's parents, to see if they could help the husband and wife with their separation issues. He said he mentioned the need to repay the loans for the Suburb E and Suburb G properties and the wife said to him, "I don't owe you any money". He denied he or his brother-in-law threatened the wife or her family. He denied the wife's brother was in attendance at that meeting.
2. When cross-examined about the alleged threats, the wife gave evidence there had only ever been one meeting involving her, the husband's father and Mr BB, which occurred at her home in November 2021. She gave evidence her mother was present for this meeting and repeatedly confirmed her brother was not present. She acknowledged her brother could not have been threatened by the husband's father at that meeting as he was not there. It was then repeatedly put to the wife she knew her brother to be lying when he gave evidence about this meeting and she repeatedly evaded answering that question before ultimately agreeing that she knew him to be lying.
3. The wife did not adduce evidence from her mother who she said was present at this meeting or explain her failure to do so. I infer she did not do so because it would not assist her case.
4. I am not persuaded any threats were made by the husband's father to the wife.

1. On 7 December 2021, the wife lodged caveats against the titles of Suburb E and Suburb G asserting a trust, notwithstanding she was a registered proprietor of both properties. On 8 December 2021, the husband's father registered caveats on the titles to Suburb G and Suburb E, pursuant to the loan agreements. On 25 March 2022, his former lawyers sent a letter to the husband and the wife requesting repayment of the loans.
2. Suburb E was tenanted at the time of separation. The husband deposed the rental of $1,500 per month was paid to his bank account and applied to mortgage repayments of approximately $3,000 per month, until March 2022 when the wife spoke to the tenant. The wife deposed she approached the tenant and requested the rent be paid into the spouse parties' joint bank account which request was refused. The wife alleged in her trial affidavit that the husband did not disclose the rental income and failed to provide the rental ledger. The husband deposed in reply he had provided the rental ledger to the wife and he was not challenged in respect of that evidence or in respect of his evidence about application of the rent.

1. On 28 November 2022, the wife commenced these proceedings.
2. X has lived with the wife and spent increasing time with the husband pursuant to interim parenting orders since February 2023.
3. In May 2023, the husband began making interest payments on the loans alleged to be owing to the second and third respondents of $1,920.83 per month.
4. On 5 June 2023, orders were made to sell Suburb E and for the sale proceeds to be paid to "discharge all registered encumbrances" ("June 2023 orders").
5. The wife deposed she was informed about default notices issued by ANZ in respect of the Suburb G home loans on 15 June 2023 and made a hardship application which was approved on 31 July 2023. She began making repayments towards the Suburb G home loans in August 2023.
6. On 28 July 2023, the husband's father filed a notice of intervention in this proceeding. The wife opposed the joinder of the second and third respondents, so the matter was listed for interim hearing. On 11 October 2023, orders were made by consent joining the second and third respondents to the proceedings.

1. The Suburb E property again passed in at auction in December 2023 and was ultimately sold at a third auction in July 2024. The property sold for $827,000, being less than the $880,000 it was purchased for and less than the price of $1.1 million the husband gave evidence he and the wife were hoping to achieve in 2021 when it was passed in for around $1,020,000.
2. Settlement of the sale of Suburb E was effected in October 2024. The net proceeds from the sale after discharging the mortgage secured against Suburb E amounted to only $14,870.01 and are held in trust by Kenna Teasdale Lawyers. The wife has refused to apply those proceeds towards the loans alleged to be owed to the second and third respondents, notwithstanding the June 2023 orders required the proceeds to be paid to discharge all registered encumbrances and Suburb E was encumbered by a caveat lodged by the husband's father in accordance with the first and second loan agreement.

1. At the hearing of a subpoena dispute on 12 August 2024, the wife foreshadowed an application for an adjournment of the final hearing listed for 14 August 2024. An order was made requiring any such application to be made by way of an Application in a Proceeding filed and served by no later than 12 noon the following day.
2. On 13 August 2024, the wife filed an Application in a Proceeding, seeking the "final defended hearing listed hearing to be adjourned to a further date". That application was supported by an affidavit made by the wife's solicitor, relying upon the orders made the previous day granting leave to issue a further subpoena, referring to recent and pending disclosure and a pending single expert valuation report for Suburb G, and deposing that "our counsel briefed for the matter has become unavailable to appear at the final hearing", without providing particulars of that brief.
3. When the matter came before me for trial on 14 August 2024, as well as pressing for an adjournment (including because he had been briefed very shortly before the hearing) counsel for the wife made an oral application for leave to further amend her Initiating Application, to seek orders against the second and third respondents. Her counsel foreshadowed the variation would include orders in respect of the husband's former single share (which I note was held in K Pty Ltd and that company is not a party to the proceeding) and to seek "that transfer be set aside" referring to the husband's former single share. I refused the wife leave to amend her application providing oral reasons for my determination. In summary, the wife had previously opposed the second and third respondent being joined to the proceeding, it was not disputed she had been put on notice by the second and third respondent in November 2023 that if she was to make any claim in respect of the business she should do so promptly, the matter had subsequently been prepared for final hearing, the relief the wife intended to seek against the second and third respondent was not articulated before me, and I was not taken to evidence to support her proposed claim.
4. Unfortunately, the matter ultimately could not be accommodated on 14 August 2024 as listed, due to another matter proceeding with priority. It was adjourned to 11 March 2025, with a revised estimate of four days (it had previously been listed for three days). Further orders and directions were made to ensure the matter would be ready to proceed on the adjourned date, including for the preparation of a private family report given parenting matters remained in dispute.

1. X currently attends L School, where he is progressing well. He has attended that school since his prep year, in 2020. X is now in grade 5, being his penultimate year of primary school. He attends before and after school care on days he is in the wife's care. The family report recorded that he has no known diagnosed disability, developmental concern or health issues, and this was not disputed.
2. Pursuant to the final parenting orders made by consent during the final hearing, during school term periods X lives with the wife and spends five nights each fortnight with the husband. He also spends half of school holidays with each parent and spends time with each parent on special occasions.

1. The wife lives in the former family home at Suburb G. She works full-time as a community worker. She deposes she is in good health. When cross-examined, the wife gave evidence her parents, brother and cousin live with her, although she said her parents come and go and her brother sometimes stays elsewhere. Her brother gave evidence his wife also lives with him temporarily at Suburb G.
2. The husband lives in rental accommodation at Suburb CC. He works as a manager, employed by the third respondent to manage the Suburb J Business. He is able to work flexibly to care for X, including to take him to and from school. He deposed he has not re-partnered.

1. As noted, the only parenting issue requiring determination is the matter of which schools X attends in 2026 (for grade 6) and from 2027 (for his secondary schooling).

1. The wife seeks orders for X to move from L School to undertake grade 6 in 2026 at M School. She also seeks an order providing for X to attend N School in 2027.[36]
2. The wife says she intends to continue living in Suburb G and that N School is the designated public school for that catchment zone. She submits it will be easier for X to transition to N School in 2027 if he attends M School in 2026 and transitions to secondary school with other students from that school, submitting it is a "feeder" school to N School. The wife did not adduce any evidence, including from the Department of Education or from either N School or L School, in support of those submissions.
3. She also contends it is in X's best interests to attend M School to reduce the travel time to and from school from her home and his attendance at before and after school care on days he is in her care, because she can instead rely on her mother to care for X if he attends school in proximity to their home, reducing her child care expenses.
4. The wife deposed it takes her over 40 minutes each way to travel between her home and L School. The father submits the travel time is comparable for both parents and gave evidence the travel time between the school and his home is approximately 30 minutes. His travel time was disputed by the wife but I accept the husband's evidence given he undertakes that travel regularly with X and the wife did not adduce evidence to the contrary. The wife asserts X is fatigued by the commute to and from school and his attendance at before and after school care and does not enjoy attending before and after school care.

1. The husband did not particularise the orders he sought in relation to X's schooling ahead of the final hearing, reserving his position pending receipt of the family report recommendations.[37] After receipt of the family report and finalisation of all other parenting matters, the husband seeks X remain at L School for the remainder of his primary school education. He proposes he and the wife consult with one another and jointly make a decision on X's secondary school education in 2026, once property matters have been determined and their future living circumstances are known, in accordance with the final parenting order they consented to providing for them to have joint decision-making responsibility in relation to major long-term decisions for X.
2. The husband deposed X has told him many times that he does not wish to change schools, that he likes his teachers, and that he has made a number of close friends at his current school. He states that X is a "shy boy and finds it difficult to make new friends" and therefore it is in X's best interests to remain at a school where he is currently progressing well. About this, the family report writer considered the husband's reservations about X changing schools are influenced by his own experience of bullying and racism when he changed schools himself as a child. This is in my view demonstrates a child-focussed approach by the husband, considering the potential disadvantages to a change in school from X's perspective, informed by his own experience.

1. The husband relies on the family report writer's recommendation that X remain at L School for the remainder of his primary school education. In making this recommendation, the family report writer reported:

Regarding [the wife]'s application for [X] to move schools, the writer is of the view that due to [X] having attended the school since his preparatory year and the connection he has to the current school community, as well as him being well supported at the school, the writer considers there to be insufficient evidence to warrant a school change for [X] at this time.

The writer notes [the wife]'s concern around the travel time for [X] and having to attend before and after school care and wanting to move [X]'s school to the feeding primary school into [N School]. However, the writer would be concerned about [X]'s stability having a change at this time. [X] has verbalised that at the moment things are calmer in his life since the parental separation. Further, it appears that his school has been a form of stability for him and he can remain there for another two years. It will also allow him to finish with his peers before transitioning to high school. Further, it is noted that [the wife] and [the husband] have not yet agreed on a high school option for [X] and therefore if [N School] is not the agreed high school, it would essentially defeat [the wife]'s purpose of enrolling [X] into [L School] at this time.

1. Part VII of the Act contains the statutory provisions applying to the making of parenting orders. In making my decision, I have had regard to the objects of Part VII of the Act, set out in section 60B of the Act, including specifically to ensure that the best interests of children are met.
2. Section 65D(1) of the Act provides that, subject to some other provisions, the court may make such parenting order as it thinks proper. Consistently with the objects of Part VII, section 60CA makes clear that in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, a court must regard the best interests of a child as the paramount consideration. In determining the best interests of a child, section 60CC(1)(a) provides the court must consider the matters set out in section 60CC(2), under the heading General considerations.
3. In making my decision, I have considered all of the relevant sections of the Act. I am not required to specifically address each provision in my reasons and, given the narrow scope of the issue in dispute, it is not necessary for me to traverse each of them. The general considerations key to my decision on the remaining issue in dispute are:

(a) The views expressed by X, pursuant to section 60CC(2)(b);

(b) X's developmental, psychological and emotional needs, pursuant to section 60CC(2)(c); and

(c) Practical considerations, relating to the parents' living and work arrangements including as may affect their capacity to meet X's schooling needs, pursuant to sub-sections 60CC(2)(d) and (f).

1. The applicable legal principles for schooling disputes were discussed by Austin J in Bilz & Breugelman[38], as follows:

Schooling disputes are not resolved by application of a "blanket presumption" or preference for the views held by the residential parent (Re G at [29], [45], [65]). The Court is required to apply the objects and principles of Part VII of the Act and to consider the statutory criteria in forming conclusions about the child's best interests (Re G at [66]-[68]).

That is probably self-evident, but other more generalised observations were made by the Full Court. In particular, the process of evaluation should not entail an assessment of the relative merits of the schools preferred by the parties, at least in circumstances where the competing schools are prima facie satisfactory (Re G at [91]-[92]). Ordinarily, it will be in the child's best interests to attend a school close to his or her residence, and further, it is proper to consider evidence as to any greater effect of the decision upon the resident rather than non-resident parent (Re G at [92]-[93]), but that does not mean the convenience of the non-resident parent is ignored (Eden-Proust at [56]-[63]). While the views of the child are relevant to the inquiry, as s 60CC(3)(a) of the Act now stipulates, those views are usually not determinative. That is because, unless a child is actively unhappy in a particular school environment, it is not at all unusual for the child to express a desire to remain at his or her existing school (see Re G at [96]).

1. After considering the evidence before me, I have determined I am not in a position to make a determination in relation to X's secondary schooling at this point in time, having regard to the following in particular:

(a) The absence of evidence in relation to N School and the suitability of that school for X. The wife does not mention N School in her trial affidavit or indeed the matter of X's secondary schooling at all;

(b) The absence of evidence in relation to X's eligibility to attend other schools, in the catchment zone of either parents' home, in proximity to his current primary school, or elsewhere; and

(c) The lack of certainty in the parents' future living arrangements, pending finalisation of property matters between them. The wife gave evidence she intends to continue living in Suburb G no matter the outcome of the property dispute, but if she does not do so then X may not be eligible to attend N School as the wife contends he is. If X was to attend M School and then was unable to attend N School, then part of the wife's purpose for him to attend M School will not be fulfilled as observed by the family report writer.

1. Accordingly, I will leave the matter of X's secondary education as a matter for consultation and joint decision-making by the husband and wife in accordance with the final parenting orders made by consent on 14 March 2025. I acknowledge this risks further litigation if, after consultation and following the pre-action procedures for parenting matters, including attendance at family dispute resolution, they are unable to reach an agreement on X's secondary schooling. However, it is not a matter I consider I can determine now, on the evidence before me.
2. I find it is in X's best interests to remain at L School for the remainder of his primary school education. In making this decision, I put particular weight on the following:

(a) The wife told the family report writer she did not have any concerns with the quality of education X was receiving at L School and believed overall X was doing well there;

(b) Evidence was not adduced in respect of the particular curriculum, activities and supports offered by M School ;

(c) To the family report writer, X indicated he enjoys school, in particular playing with his friends. This is consistent with the wife reporting to the family report writer that X told her he would miss his friends if he were to move schools;

(d) To the family report writer, X reported he has been supported by his friends during the stress of his parents' separation and he now feels "calm and easy";

(e) The husband gave evidence X has told him many times he does not wish to move schools. I accept that evidence, being consistent with what X articulated to the family report writer;

(f) The husband told the family report writer X experiences some anxiety entering new social situations. This is consistent with the wife's own view shared with the family report writer that X will be highly anxious if he starts a high school without having some connections;

(g) The family report writer considered the wife appeared to minimise the impact on X changing schools on his level of stability and connection to school community where he has attended since his preparatory year. I accept that opinion which accords with my own assessment of the wife's proposals and evidence;

(h) I accept the family report writer's expert opinion that L School has provided a form of stability for X. I find X would benefit from that continued stability for the balance of his primary school education, particularly given the outcome of the property proceedings is likely to see disruption to his living arrangements;

(i) X changing primary schools in 2026 would see him move schools twice in two years, given he will commence secondary school in 2027;

(j) It is not yet known which secondary school X will attend in 2027, meaning the change in primary schools proposed by the wife may not have the benefits she advocates for, including X transitioning to secondary school with a familiar cohort;

(k) The family report writer did not report from her interviews with X in February 2025 (the month prior to the final hearing), that X was experiencing fatigue or distress from the travel to and from school or from attending before and after school care as asserted by the wife when she made her trial affidavit in July 2024 (approximately eight months prior to the final hearing). The wife did not adduce evidence from X's school or before and after school care providers to corroborate this claim. I am therefore not persuaded on the evidence before me that X is finding the travel to and from school or his attendance at out of hours school care particularly difficult or distressing; and

(l) I place significant weight on the family report writer's recommendation that X remain at L School for the remainder of his primary school education. I do so where the family report is recent, the family report writer had the benefit of reading both parents' court documents and speaking with X and both parents, and where neither the husband or wife sought to cross-examine the family report writer.

1. I have taken into account that under the final parenting orders X will generally travel to or from school from the wife's home on 14 occasions each fortnight and to and from the husband's home on six occasions each fortnight. However, I am not persuaded the practical considerations relating to X's travel and attendance at before and after school care when in the care of the wife outweigh the other considerations which support him remaining at L School.
2. I will therefore make an order reflecting the husband's proposal[39] and the family report writer's recommendation, for X to continue to attend at L School for the balance of his primary school education unless otherwise agreed by the husband and wife in writing.

1. I now turn to consider the spouse parties' applications and the intervener's claims in respect of property matters.

Legal principles - alteration of property interests

1. Significant amendments to Part VIII of the Act, made by the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) ("Amendment Act"), commenced operation on 10 June 2025. Those amendments do not apply to the determination of this proceeding, being a proceeding instituted before 10 June 2025, in respect of which a final hearing commenced before 10 June 2025.[40] All references to provisions of Part VIII of the Act are references to those provisions in effect at the time of the final hearing.
2. Before making any order altering the interests of spouse parties to a marriage in property, section 79(2) of the Act requires that I must be satisfied, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to do so.[41] If I am so satisfied, I then have power under the Act to make such order as I consider appropriate, after considering the matters set out in sections 79(4) and section 75(2), insofar as they are relevant.
3. To consider if it is just and equitable to make an order, I must first identify the existing legal and equitable interests of the spouse parties in property according to common law and equitable principles.[42] This step requires consideration of the claim of the second and third respondents.

1. The spouse parties asserted they had the following legal and equitable interests in property at the time of the final hearing:

ANZ home loans (x2) secured by mortgage against Suburb G

Alleged loans owing to second and third respondents: $461,000 plus accrued interest

Suburb J Business: wife asserts value of $1 million

1. The second and third respondents seek declarations recording the liability of the husband and the wife to repay loans advanced to them by the second and third respondents. In particular, the second and third respondents seek the following declarations:[43]

(a) Pursuant to the first loan agreement, the husband and wife are jointly and severally liable to pay to the husband's father, the principal of $176,000 as a debt and interest on the principal in accordance with clause 4 of the first loan agreement;

(b) Pursuant to the second loan agreement, the husband is liable to pay the third respondent the principal of $85,000 as a debt and interest on the principal in accordance with clause 4 of the second loan agreement;

(c) Pursuant to the third loan agreement, the husband and wife are jointly and severally liable to pay to the husband's father, the principal of $200,000 as a debt upon the first to occur of the sale of Suburb G, a transfer of any interest in Suburb G in April 2031, and interest on the principal in accordance with clause 4 of the third loan agreement; and

(d) It is lawful for the debts to be secured against the property of the spouse parties.

1. The second and third respondents seek the funds held in trust from the sale of Suburb E be paid to them in part-payment of the debt owed by the husband and wife pursuant to the first two loan agreements. They also seek orders for the sale of Suburb G and for the net proceeds of sale to be paid to the second and third respondents in payment or part payment of the debt and interest owed by the husband and wife pursuant to the loan agreements.
2. The husband supports the orders sought by the other respondents.
3. In respect of the three alleged loans, the wife gave the following evidence in her trial affidavit:

I am not aware that the Respondent borrowed a sum of $200,000 from his father or his father's company to secure a mortgage from ANZ bank in relation to the [Suburb G] property. I only became aware of the alleged $200,000 loan when the Respondent's solicitor contacted my previous lawyer.

I confirm that the signatures on the loan agreements are not mine. Moreover, the witnesses to loan agreements are the staff members who worked in the [Suburb J business].

As I mentioned earlier, the Respondent always kept secret our financial matters and never disclosed anything to me. I am unaware of any repayments as alleged in the loan agreements.

I confirm that those documents were never signed by me, and I was not aware how and who signed those documents.

I reiterate that I have never signed any loan agreements with the Respondent's father or made any promises to repay any loan amount.

1. I am not persuaded the wife did not sign the first and third loan agreements as she claims.
2. I accept the evidence of the respondents and of Mr Q and Ms P in respect of the three loan agreements, over the evidence of the wife.
3. The husband denied under cross-examination that he signed either of the first or third loan agreements on behalf of the wife. It was not put to any other witness that they, or another person at their request forged the wife's signature, or that they saw someone else do so. I accept the submission of counsel for the second and third respondent that this allegation needed to be put squarely if it was an allegation made by the wife. The wife did not assert or put to the husband or any other witness that the loan agreements were not signed by the husband or that they were signed on a date other than the date recorded on the agreements.
4. I accept the submission made on behalf of the husband's father that to accept the wife's contention that she did not sign the first and third loan agreements, the court would have to conclude the husband, his father, Mr Q and Ms P each lied to the court and conspired to defeat the wife's property claim. This was not a case theory put to the court and was not an allegation put to those witnesses. I find it improbable this is what occurred.
5. The timing of the loan agreements and the alleged advances is consistent with the parties' acquisition of Suburb E and Suburb G and with the evidence of the husband and the husband's father of plans to develop Suburb E and with the financial position of the spouse parties at the time of those events. It is a logical and not improbable explanation for what occurred. I accept monies were advanced and loans forgiven by the second and third respondents to provide the husband and wife with the funds required to purchase and progress the development of Suburb E, to purchase Suburb G and to consolidate interest accrued on the first two loans.
6. I accept the bona fides of the husband's father in entering into formal loan agreements on semi-commercial terms with the husband and wife to secure repayment of the monies advanced by way of loan. I accept the unchallenged evidence of the husband's father that he had entered into formal loans using the same loan template with family and friends. That he charged interest on the loans is consistent with his evidence and the evidence of the wife's brother, that he loaned the wife's brother and sister-in-law $50,000 in December 2020 to purchase a property and charged interest on that loan. It was consistent with the wife's oral evidence that she has a "very formal relationship" with the husband's father.
7. Having accepted the loan agreements and the evidence of the respondents in respect of the funds advanced pursuant to the loans, I accept the principal sums advanced pursuant to the first and second loan are repayable, given the sale of Suburb E, along with interest pursuant to the loan agreements. The principal advanced pursuant to the third loan agreement will become payable upon either the transfer or sale of Suburb G. The loans have each been secured, by way of caveats in accordance with the terms of the loans.
8. There is no evidence the second and third respondent have waived their rights pursuant to the loan agreements. I do not find the loans are unlikely to be enforced as is sometimes the case with a loan by parents to a child.[44] I accept the evidence of the husband's father, which was not successfully challenged under cross-examination, that he is relying on the repayment of the loans to reduce his own debts (accepting his evidence he borrowed himself to advance $150,000 to the spouse parties for the purchase of Suburb G) and to meet his retirement needs. The terms of the loan agreements are consistent with this intention, providing for the loans to be secured by caveat pending repayment within a fixed period of time or the earlier sale or transfer of the security properties. I do not accept the submission made by counsel for the wife the husband's father would have no expectation of repayment given the spouse parties' modest incomes. I accept the husband's evidence there was an expectation sufficient profit would be generated from the development of Suburb E to pay the first two loans and the evidence of his father that he advanced the third loan in the expectation that the first two loans would be repaid from the sale of Suburb E. Evidence was not adduced of previous loans made by the husband's father being forgiven. The husband's father has not acted inconsistently with the loans being repaid. He has not delayed in seeking to enforce the loans now payable.
9. The husband and wife do not have funds available to pay the sums payable pursuant to the loan agreements if Suburb G is transferred to the wife as she seeks, triggering a condition for repayment of the loan. The sale of Suburb G is therefore required.
10. If Suburb G sells for a price proximate to the value agreed by the husband and wife for that property (adopting a single expert valuation for Suburb G) and orders are made as sought by the respondents, there will be insufficient funds from the sale to pay the principal sums owing to the second and third respondents pursuant to the three loan agreements.
11. In the event the court was satisfied of the loans, the wife did not seek that responsibility for the spouse parties' liability pursuant to the three loan agreements be apportioned until she submitted a minute of proposed orders departing from her formal application on 3 March 2025, just over a week before the final hearing. Her submissions in support of apportionment of the loans did not address section 75(2)(ha) of the Act, being the effect of any proposed order on the ability of the second and third respondent to recover the debts owed to them, or those matters the court must be satisfied of in sub-sections 90AE(3) and (4) if an order binding the second respondent was proposed pursuant to section 90AE(1), substituting the husband for both spouse parties in respect of the joint debt owed to him. Likewise, the respondents did not seek a declaration the parties be jointly liable under the second loan agreement until the second and third respondents amended minute of orders sought was tendered during the hearing.[45]
12. I am not satisfied an order should be made apportioning the spouse parties' responsibility for the loans. This will see the spouse parties jointly and severally indebted to the second respondent in respect of the first and third loans and the husband indebted to the third respondent in respect of the second loan, and will maintain the rights of the second and third respondent to recover their debts from the spouse parties in accordance with the loan agreements.
13. I will make the orders sought by the respondents, providing for repayment of the loans from the proceeds from the sale of the spouse parties' two real properties. I will make an order providing for payment pursuant to the loans in order of priority reflecting the date of the loan, as submitted by counsel for the second and third respondent without opposition by the other parties. As already noted, this will likely leave the spouse parties indebted to the second and third respondent. Interest payable pursuant to the first two loan agreements will be subject to that component of the third loan providing for a consolidation of interest.

1. As recorded earlier in my reasons, notwithstanding an earlier interlocutory dispute about the scope of her application, the wife sought to include the Suburb J Business, owned and operated by C Pty Ltd, on the joint balance sheet,[46] as an asset of the husband or as a financial resource to him with a value of $1 million. In her case outline the wife asserted:

[...] it is the Wife's case that the Husband has a beneficial interest in the business and as such the business ought to be included in the property pool. The Husband is seeking to exclude the business from the property pool, thereby defeating the Wife's entitlement on a final property award.

The Respondent has significant financial resources by way of his ongoing involvement in the said business ventures.

1. In her written closing submissions, she asserted, "it is the husband not his father who is the beneficial owner of the business".
2. This assertion was made notwithstanding the wife did not seek declaratory or other relief in her Initiating Application (as amended on 14 July 2024), the oral application made on behalf of the wife on 14 August 2024 to amend her Initiating Application to seek unparticularised relief against the second and third respondents was refused and she had not subsequently made any further application for leave to file a further amended Initiating Application.
3. In his trial affidavit, the husband gave the evidence I have outlined in respect of his interests in K Pty Ltd which owned and operated the Town V Business and C Pty Ltd which owned and operated the W Street Business and the Suburb J Business. He denied any interest in the remaining business, Suburb J, in which he is employed.
4. When cross-examined, the husband acknowledged he possibly signed a lease in 2015 for the premises from which the W Street Business was conducted. He acknowledged his signature on a vendor's guarantee, identifying himself as "sole director-secretary" upon the sale of that business. He acknowledged his signature on a lease for an ATM for the business premises as "director" along with the signature of his father as "manager". Those documents were not tendered by the wife. The details of the documents, including the dates of the latter two documents were not put to the husband and acknowledged by him. The second respondent gave unchallenged evidence the W Street Business was sold in 2015, so I infer these documents were signed before then and prior to the husband relinquishing his interest in C Pty Ltd in April 2016.
5. When cross-examined, the husband readily acknowledged he utilised his personal bank account to pay business expenses for the businesses. I accept his evidence he paid some business expenses from his personal account which were reimbursed to him. Counsel for the second and third respondent also pointed to evidence of the husband's name being recorded on accounts, bank accounts and credit accounts for the business. It was put the husband this reflected his role as a manager and I accept his evidence that was the case.
6. The husband acknowledged his phone and internet expenses are paid by C Pty Ltd. I am not persuaded this indicates anything other than a benefit from the husband's employment that ought to have disclosed on his financial statement.
7. Each of the husband and his father maintained their evidence under cross-examination that the husband did not have a role in the Town V Business beyond manager and that he did not have an interest in that business, beyond the 1 in 100 shareholding in K Pty Ltd he held until June 2012. The husband consistently denied that he told the wife he owned the business or that it was a family business.
8. It was not put squarely to the husband or the husband's father that the husband had any particular form of beneficial interest in the Suburb J Business conducted by C Pty Ltd or the manner in which it is asserted it constitutes a financial resource to him. The wife's counsel did not make closing submissions in respect of this issue, beyond her written submissions.
9. I am not persuaded the husband has any interest in the business other than as an employee manager, entrusted by his father with management responsibilities.

1. The balance of the wife's ANZ bank account is included on the joint balance sheet, with a value of $2,073.41.
2. On the joint balance sheet, the wife lists seven bank accounts and two credit card accounts held by the husband, recording the balance for each as "TBD". In a note correlating with these items, the wife asserts these accounts were identified from the husband's disclosure, contends "these accounts remain active and should be included in the asset pool" but says she is "unaware of the amount currently held in each account". When cross-examined, the wife acknowledged she had caused subpoenas to be issued for documents relating to bank accounts held by the husband. On 14 August 2024, an order was made granting the wife leave to issue up to five subpoenas for the production of bank records in relation to the husband. She did not issue any subpoenas pursuant to that order.
3. The husband disclosed only one bank account in his financial statement, being a Westpac account with a nominal balance. He was not cross-examined in respect of this evidence or his bank accounts.
4. The husband submits the court should disregard the spouse parties' bank balances given they have been separated for some 3.5 years.[47] I accept that submission in the absence of evidence that either spouse party has significant savings.

1. Whilst she does not identify any items of jewellery on the balance sheet, the wife seeks an order requiring the husband to return to the wife all jewellery in his possession and that if he fails to do so within 14 days, he pay her the sum of $50,000 by way of compensation for the value of the jewellery.
2. The wife gave the following unparticularised evidence in her trial affidavit:

All cash dowry amounts, and jewellery items were always in the Respondent's possession. The Respondent has always advised me that the jewellery items are kept safe and stored at the [business].

1. The wife's brother gave the following evidence on affidavit:

My sister [the wife] has shared with me on various occasions that all the jewellery remained in the Respondent's possession. The Respondent always gave her the reason that he has a commercial grade Safe at the [business], and it is a safe practice to keep all jewellery and valuables items in the Safe at the [business].

My sister shared with me that after they separated in November 2021, the jewellery items remained in the possession of the Respondent. To the best of my knowledge, the jewellery remains in the Respondent's possession.

1. I do not accept this evidence of the wife's brother, given my findings in relation to the credibility of this witness, and the only stated source of the evidence being alleged, unparticularised discussions with the wife.
2. The husband denied the wife's father gave him any dowry, gifts or money upon their marriage. The husband's father denied he received any dowry payment from the wife's family. The husband gave evidence both families gave each other cheap jewellery, new clothes, fruits, nuts and sweets and photographs were taken to commemorate these exchanges. He said that when he left the home after separation, the gifts given to him were left behind, including his wedding and engagement rings, watch, bracelet and gold chains. He deposed the wife's family made some gifts of jewellery to the wife but not to him. The husband denied he ever kept any jewellery or other valuables in a safe or otherwise at the Business and that he has any jewellery in his possession. The husband's father also denied there is any jewellery kept at the Suburb J Business.
3. The wife did not adduce admissible evidence of the payment of dowry or of jewellery items given to the husband or stored by him or evidence of the value of jewellery owned by or in the possession of either of them. She did not adduce evidence from her parents in respect of dowry or gifts of jewellery. The husband was not cross-examined in respect of the alleged payment of dowry or gifts of jewellery. It was not put to the husband or the second respondent that jewellery belonging to the spouse parties is stored in a safe at the Business owned and operated by the third respondent.
4. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me the husband and wife have jewellery of significant value to be included on the balance sheet.

1. On the joint balance sheet, the wife attributed a value of $14,000 to the husband's motor vehicle and he asserted a value of $8,000. Expert evidence was not adduced in respect of the value of the vehicle and neither spouse party was cross-examined in respect of the issue. The husband deposed to an estimate of value of $9,000 in his trial affidavit and financial statement. In the absence of other evidence to enable me to determine this dispute, I take the value of $9,000 as an admission by the husband.

1. The "adding back" of funds expended prior to trial is exceptional and falls into three categories: where parties have expended money on legal fees; where there has been a premature distribution of matrimonial assets; and in the case of waste or wanton, negligent, or reckless dissipation of assets.[48]
2. The Full Court in Candle & Falkner considered key authorities in relation to the law relating to adding back "notional property" and confirmed that those authorities established four relevant propositions:[49]

... First, adding back property which has been distributed and spent is discretionary, and reflects an exceptional exercise of the discretion as an "accounting" or "balance sheet" exercise for the purposes of ss 79(2) and (4) to achieve justice and equity between the parties. Secondly, the nature of the expenditure reflected in add backs is relevant, and reasonably incurred expenditure does not usually come within accepted categories of addback. Thirdly, the decision in Stanford, followed by Bevan, does not necessarily require the conclusion that adding back notional property is per se an error, but proper consideration must be given to existing interests in property. Fourthly, in cases which are not exceptional, expended interim distributions can be taken up under s 75(2) rather than as part of the balance sheet exercise.

[Emphasis in original]

1. The parties' lawyers each filed updated costs notices on 13 March 2025 pursuant to my direction. Those updated notices recorded the source of payment of legal costs by each of the parties. None of the parties sought any component of the legal costs paid by the other parties be "added back" and considered alongside the spouse parties' assets and liabilities for the purpose of my determination.

1. On the joint balance sheet, the wife identified "excessive withdrawals" totalling $1,139,821.87, as asserted add-backs, as follows:

Withdrawal Addback from Westpac Choice Account ending xx...46

Withdrawal Addback from DD Company Joint Home Loan Account ending xx...64

Withdrawal Addback from Altitude Platinum Card Account ending xx...38

Withdrawal Addback from Commonwealth Bank Smart Access Account ending xx...72

Withdrawal Addback from Altitude Gold Card Account ending xx...83

Withdrawal Addback from Altitude Card Account ending xx...94

Withdrawal Addback from ANZ One Account ending xx...55

1. The wife did not particularise these alleged withdrawals, including by date. She did not tender bank statements or other documents in respect of the alleged withdrawals and her counsel did not cross-examine the husband or make submissions in respect of them.
2. I am not persuaded of any withdrawals made by the husband falling within the recognised categories of exceptional expenditure or dissipation of funds such that they should be added-back and considered notionally alongside the spouse parties' assets available for distribution between them.

1. Pursuant to Part 6.1 of the Rules the wife and husband are required to make full and frank disclosure of their financial circumstances. The wife has made allegations of non-disclosure by the respondents. I am not persuaded of any material non-disclosure, to be taken into account when making findings in respect of the spouse parties' assets, pursuant to section 75(2)(o), or otherwise.

1. Taking into account the above findings, the adjusted balance sheet is as follows:

ANZ home loans secured by mortgage against Suburb G

1. The spouse parties also have the following interests in superannuation:

1. I have relied on the superannuation balances asserted by each spouse party in respect of their own superannuation interests in their case outlines where:

(a) Neither spouse party tendered superannuation information request forms or other documents evidencing updated superannuation balances for the other; and

(b) Neither spouse party was cross-examined in respect of those balances asserted by them.

1. On the joint balance sheet,[50] the wife asserts a higher value for the husband's Super Fund 1 "based on previous disclosure" but did not adduce evidence to support that value. She also asserted he had an interest in Super Fund 4 "based on previous disclosure" but did not adduce evidence to support that or cross-examine the husband in relation to that asserted interest. Counsel for the wife did not object to the closing submission made by counsel for the husband that neither spouse party was seeking a super split, that the wife has "about $68,000" and the husband has "about $65,000" in superannuation.

1. In this case, the most valuable of the spouse parties' non-superannuation assets is Suburb G, which is jointly owned and was their home together. The breakdown of the spouse parties' marriage and their separation brought to an end their common use of property, including their common use of Suburb G. Each of the spouse parties seek orders pursuant to section 79 of the Act. On this basis, I find the requirements of section 79(2) are satisfied and it is, in all the circumstances, just and equitable for there to be an alteration of property interests between the husband and the wife.

1. The wife seeks each spouse party retain their superannuation and she receive 70% to 80% of the spouse parties' non-superannuation assets. Submissions were not made on her behalf as to why a two-pool approach should be preferred in this matter.
2. Given the modest value of the spouse parties' assets after the net proceeds from the sale of their real property are applied to repayment of the loans repayable to the second and third respondents and where they have superannuation of comparable value, I am not persuaded anything other than a single-pool approach should be taken. I therefore consider the contributions made by the husband and wife and the matters relevant to section 75(2) to their non-superannuation and superannuation assets, globally.

1. In exercising my discretion to make order that is in all the circumstances just and equitable, sub-section 79(4)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act, being the provisions relevant to this case, require me to consider the following matters:

(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and

(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and

(c) the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker ...

1. In determining what orders are to be made, I am required to approach the assessment of contributions holistically, by analysing the nature, form and characteristics of those contributions with reference to the particular circumstances of this particular relationship.[51] This process involves the exercise of a wide discretion, not the performance of a mathematical or accounting exercise[52] and should be undertaken without over-zealous attention to the ascertainment of contributions.[53] All contributions are to be weighed collectively, not compartmentalised with some contributions weighed against others.[54]
2. I put some weight on the contribution made by the husband by his ownership of Suburb U at the commencement of the relationship. The husband deposed he purchased Suburb U in 2006 for $218,000 funded with a deposit of $20,000 gifted by his father and a loan secured by mortgage of $195,707. Evidence was not adduced of the value of Suburb U and its equity in 2010 when the husband and wife married and began living together. Counsel for the wife acknowledged in her closing submissions the husband had "some equity" in Suburb U. The husband deposed he increased the mortgage in July 2010 to $297,000, to pay for the spouse parties' wedding in India. This was acknowledged by the wife in her written closing submissions. He deposed he drew a further $30,000 against that mortgage in 2013, to pay for their holiday to Country EE that year, to purchase furniture and towards living expenses and credit card debt. He deposed Suburb U was tenanted during the spouse parties' relationship and the rental income applied toward the loan secured by mortgage. In her written closing submissions, the wife acknowledged this means the spouse parties did not make meaningful direct contributions to Suburb U during their relationship. The husband was not challenged on his evidence that Suburb U was sold in 2015 for $418,000 and that the proceeds of sale (after discharging the mortgage of approximately $330,000 and sale costs) were fully applied to pay for a holiday, a reception for X's second birthday and to repay credit card debts. Whilst I put some weight on this contribution, it was among a myriad of contributions made over the period of the spouse parties' relationship and separation and was not applied directly to the subsequent acquisition, conservation or improvement of property by the spouse parties.
3. I take into account the husband and wife were provided rent-free accommodation by the husband's parents for approximately two years at the commencement of their relationship, although I put only little weight on that contribution in my holistic assessment of the spouse parties' contributions.
4. The wife and husband each worked in paid employment during their relationship. The wife initially returned to part-time employment after X's birth and then full-time employment. They both applied their income to family expenses.
5. The wife's mother assisted with X's care and with household chores when staying with them. Whilst the wife contends this is a contribution made on her behalf, section 79(4)(c) does not contemplate contributions made by third parties to the welfare of the family, including the capacity as homemaker or caring for children. I therefore take this contribution into account pursuant to section 75(2)(o),[55] which counsel for the husband and the wife each acknowledged was appropriate.
6. The husband acknowledged the wife took on a greater role caring for X during their relationship. However, as recorded earlier in my reasons, I have found he was also involved in X's care around his employment.
7. The wife has made a greater contribution to X's care after separation.
8. I do not accept the wife's contention that her contributions in making repayments towards the Suburb G home loans after separation should be given significant weight. She has had the sole use of Suburb G after separation, has had the benefit of occupying the home and providing her family with accommodation there. During that time, she made no contribution to the home loan for a period of time and then made reduced payments pursuant to a hardship application. It was not disputed the balance owing by the spouse parties pursuant to the home loans secured by mortgage has increased by between $35,000 and $40,000 after separation.
9. The husband has continued to meet the cost of home and contents insurance for Suburb G after separation notwithstanding he has not been living there. He also paid insurance and utilities for Suburb E after separation.
10. It is not disputed between the husband and the second and third respondents the husband has been making interest repayments on the loans owed to the second and third respondents since May 2022 of $1,920.83, approximately monthly. I take this into account as a contribution made by the husband reducing the spouse parties' indebtedness under the loan agreements.
11. The wife asserted the husband "has a controlling nature", "always controls all finances, spending, shopping, buying and selling properties, and all related decisions" and controlled her income, demanding she hand her salary over to him. When cross-examined, the wife eventually acknowledged she had her own credit card accounts. She acknowledged her salary was paid into her own bank account. I do not accept her oral evidence the husband also had access to that account given the inconsistency with her oral evidence she withdrew $1,000 in cash from her account monthly and handed it to him at his demand. There would not have been any need for her to withdraw cash from her account to pay it to the husband if he had access to her account. Given my findings in relation to the reliability of her evidence generally, I am not persuaded she did so at the husband's demand, rather than as a voluntary contribution to household expenses, in the absence of evidence to support that assertion. Bank statements referenced by the wife in her affidavit were not tendered. They were shown in court briefly but were heavily redacted and the redactions were not adequately explained by the wife's oral evidence. I am not persuaded she was subjected to financial control by the husband.
12. The wife also asserted she has "been through physical and verbal abuse" and the husband "abused [her] verbally on different occasions". However, she gave little evidence of particular incidents on affidavit to support these claims and it was not contended in the written or oral submissions made on behalf of the wife that her contributions were made more onerous as a result of family violence she alleged she was subjected to by the husband. It is therefore not a matter in respect of which I am required to make findings and it is not a matter I have taken into account when assessing the spouse parties' contributions.

1. The wife contends the spouse parties' contributions should be assessed as equal, on the basis of her asserted balance sheet and denying the loans made by the second and third respondents. The husband contends that if the loans are accepted, the spouse parties' contributions should be considered as equal.
2. I have weighed and assessed the contributions of all kinds and from all sources made by each of the spouse parties throughout the period of cohabitation, as the Full Court in Wallis & Manning[56] made clear, is the task of a trial judge. My holistic assessment of the spouse parties' contributions has extended to the period after separation. Having undertaken this assessment, I find the parties' contributions, assessed in percentage terms, to be equal.
3. The spouse parties' debt to the second and third respondents exceeds the value of their non-superannuation assets. The orders I will make providing for the net proceeds from the sale of the spouse parties' real estate to be applied to the loans (as sought by each of the respondents) will see the spouse parties retaining assets (cars and cryptocurrency) and superannuation, with a combined total value of approximately $165,950, together with their bank accounts.
4. An equal division of those remaining assets and superannuation, would see each of them retain assets and superannuation with a value of $82,975.

1. Section 79(4)(d) of the Act requires me to consider the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the marriage. The husband and wife both derive their income from employment. The orders sought by them do not have any impact on the earning capacity of either spouse party.

1. In considering what order should be made under section 79, subsection 79(4)(e) requires me to take into account the matters referred to in section 75(2) so far as they are relevant.
2. I refer to the background set out earlier in my reasons regarding the spouse parties' ages, health and employment.
3. After the proceeds from the sale of their real property are applied towards the loans owing to the second and third respondents, subject to the sale price for Suburb G far exceeding expectations, the husband and wife will likely continue to be indebted to the second and third respondent. I take into account the husband will be solely responsible for the second loan if it is not fully discharged from the sale of the Suburb G property and the spouse parties will be jointly and severally responsible for the third loan if it in turn is not fully discharged.
4. The wife's income earning capacity has improved during the spouse parties' marriage by undertaking study and obtaining community worker qualifications. She deposed in her financial statement to a gross weekly income of $1,100 in July 2024, working full time, which is equivalent to approximately $57,200 per annum. She also deposes to receiving family tax benefit payments of $137 per week (equating to approximately $7,124 per annum) and child support of $35.45 per week (approximately $1,843 per annum).
5. The husband has maintained a secure but modest income with the support of flexible employment provided by his father. He deposed to a gross weekly income of approximately $1,392 per week, equating to approximately $72,384 per annum. He also has the benefit of phone and internet expenses paid by his employer. I am not persuaded he has the capacity to earn a significantly higher income working elsewhere. He does not receive government benefits.
6. There is a disparity in the spouse parties' income but it is not substantial.
7. The wife has greater caring responsibility for X. Pursuant to final parenting orders made during the final hearing, he will spend nine nights with her each fortnight during school term periods and five nights with the husband.
8. The husband pays only modest child support as assessed. He also pays for private health cover for X, in the amount of approximately $150 per month and pays for equipment required for X's extracurricular activities. The wife emphasises she is solely responsible for X's before and after school care costs while X is in her care. She did not adduce evidence of any application made to Child Support in respect of those costs.
9. The spouse parties have each received assistance and support from family. The maternal grandmother has assisted with X's care and household tasks. As indicated earlier in my reasons, I take this contribution into account pursuant to section 75(2)(o). The wife expects to continue receiving assistance from her mother with X's care. This was evident from her submissions in support of X attending a school closer to her home. The wife has been assisted by her parents and an unidentified friend of her brother to meet her legal costs.[57] The husband's father assisted the husband and wife with accommodation when they first married, the wife's further education costs, and with the loans enabling them to purchase Suburb E and Suburb G. The wife submits the husband can continue to expect to receive support from his father and that constitutes a financial resource to him. I find both the wife and husband are likely to continue to receive support from their families but I am not persuaded this is certain support in a manner constituting a financial resource to either of them warranting an adjustment pursuant to section 75(2)(b).
10. The wife deposed her mother lives with her. When cross-examined, she gave evidence her parents, brother and cousin live with her in Suburb G. The wife's brother gave evidence he has lived with the wife since 2022 and that his wife also currently lives with them, temporarily. The wife's brother gave evidence he works in sales and as a transport worker. When asked if her brother and his wife pay anything towards the mortgage or outgoings at Suburb G, the wife agreed they do, stating they help her if she needs it. However, she did not disclose any other income earners in her household in her financial statement or any expenses they pay for her or that she pays for their benefit and she did not give evidence of the amounts they have contributed to those expenses. I infer the wife's household expenses are less than they otherwise would be by being shared with other income-earning family members. However, there is no certainty she will continue to live with her family with those benefits once Suburb G is sold.
11. In her case outline, the wife seeks an adjustment of 20% to 30% in her favour pursuant to section 75(2) of the Act. In the closing submissions made on his behalf, the husband contended for an adjustment of no more than 5% in the wife's favour.
12. I find an adjustment to my contribution-based assessment of 5% in favour of the wife is appropriate, taking into account all of the above matters and in particular her lower income and greater caring responsibility for X.

1. Pursuant to the above assessment, I consider it just and equitable for the spouse parties to retain those assets and responsibility for those liabilities in their names respectively, and for a payment of $15,192 to be made by the husband to the wife to result in the wife receiving assets and superannuation equivalent to approximately 55% of those remaining assets and superannuation, and the husband 45%. In monetary terms, of the spouse parties' remaining assets and superannuation with a value of approximately $165,950, the wife will receive assets and superannuation valued at $91,273 and the husband retaining assets and superannuation valued at $74,677.
2. This will see the spouse parties indebted to the second and third respondent in respect of any balance owing pursuant to the loan agreements after sale of Suburb G in accordance with the terms of those agreements and each retaining the following assets and superannuation:
3. The wife will retain:

1. I will provide for the costs of $2,093.62 payable to the husband by the wife pursuant to a costs order made on 12 August 2024 to be deducted from the adjusting payment of $15,192, if it is not satisfied by the wife within 60 days. This will make the sum payable by the husband to the wife $13,098.38.
2. I will provide a time frame of 60 days for the adjusting payment to be made by the husband, providing him time to raise those funds. I acknowledge there may be realisation costs and taxation payable if the husband is required to liquidate his cryptocurrency investment to make the required payment and whilst I do not have evidence of what those costs are likely to be, I have taken that possibility into account and I nevertheless find the adjusting payment just and equitable.
3. In the unexpected event Suburb G sells for significantly more than estimated and the loans and interest are repaid in full to the second and third respondent, leaving a surplus, the order I make will provide for the surplus to be divided 55% to the wife and 45% to the husband, reflecting the percentage division I have determined is just and equitable.
4. I consider this to be a just and equitable outcome overall, in percentage and actual terms, consistent with my holistic assessment and weighing of the spouse parties' respective contributions and those matters relevant pursuant to section 75(2) in the context of their marriage with cohabitation of approximately 11 years and one child, and a separation of more than three years, with liabilities exceeding the value of their assets. I am satisfied the configuration of the proposed settlement, in terms of the particular assets and superannuation each spouse party is to retain and the liability they will potentially each retain owed to the second and/or third respondent, is appropriate.

1. I will adopt the terms of order sought by the second and third respondents which is consistent with the terms of order sought by the husband, with some changes to provide clarity and with the aim of avoiding further disputes between the parties. For example, I will make clear in the orders which apply to all of the parties and which apply only to the spouse parties.
2. In respect of the sale of Suburb G, where evidence was not adduced of the willingness of the President of the Real Estate Institute of Victoria to nominate a sale agent or of the process and fees required for that to occur, I will instead make provision for the husband to nominate three potential agents and for the wife to choose one, failing which the husband is to nominate the selling agent. I will require the appointed conveyancer to be a solicitor, given the orders governing the sale and application of the sale proceeds.
3. In respect of the reserve price for Suburb G, the wife did not make any submissions in support of her proposed order for a reserve price to be set at $800,000.[58] Rather than provide for a valuation to be undertaken to fix the reserve price as proposed by the respondents, I will fix the reserve price at $775,000 reflecting the value agreed at trial, with liberty to apply if the property does not sell within 90 days and the spouse parties do not agree otherwise.
4. I will not make the order sought by the respondents requiring the spouse parties to follow the recommendations of the selling agent with respect to any necessary repairs or improvements to Suburb G given there is no evidence the spouse parties have the capacity to meet the cost of such work. If they agree to do so, with the aim of maximising the sale price and reducing their indebtedness to the second and third respondents, that will be a matter for them.
5. I will include provision for the wife to have sole use and occupation of Suburb G pending settlement of the sale provided she complies with the proposed requirement to keep the property in good condition and cooperates with the selling agent to facilitate the sale.
6. The declarations I make will reflect the spouse parties' existing legal liability pursuant to each of the loans where I have not been persuaded it is just and equitable to re-apportion liability for those loans.
7. Submissions were not made against the declarations sought by the second and third respondents, that it is lawful to secure the debts owed to them against the property of the spouse parties. I will make that declaration also, but reflecting the liability of the spouse parties pursuant to each of the loans - the husband and wife in respect of the first and third loans and the husband in respect of the second loan.

1. When cross-examined the wife agreed to payment of the costs ordered on 12 August 2024 being paid from the $20,000 held in trust by her solicitors. However, that was not ultimately proposed by the respondents.
2. As explained, I will provide for the costs payable to the husband to be deducted from the payment I have determined he is to make to the wife. In respect of the costs payable to the second and third respondents pursuant to the order made on 12 August 2024, fixed in the amount of $2,093.62, I will make an order requiring the wife to make that payment within 60 days. This will enable her to pay it from the adjusting payment if she does not have other means.
3. I will make orders providing for submissions to be filed in respect of any application for costs the parties seek to pursue and for those applications to be determined "on the papers" without the need for further hearing if the parties consent to that. I will make directions limiting the material to be filed, in an effort to provide for the expeditious and cost-effective resolution of the costs applications.

1. I make the final order as set out at the commencement of these reasons, considering it to be appropriate and just and equitable in the circumstances.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and sixty-six (266) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge A. Humphreys.

[1] Exhibit W-1, submitted by email on 3 March 2025.

[2] Her amended Initiating Application filed on 14 July 2024.

[4] Exhibit W-1, Exhibit H-2, and Exhibit 23R-1.

[7] Exhibit H-1 (parenting orders sought); Exhibit H-2 (property orders sought).

[13] [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 77 ALJR 1598 at [62] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ.

[14] 11 pages of content in respect of both parenting and property matters.

[18] Derived from Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298.

[19] (2011) 243 CR 361 at [63]-[64].

[32] Annexure -012 to the wife's trial affidavit, tendered by the second and third respondent and marked Exhibit 23R-11.

[36] Exhibit A, at pages [6] and [7].

[38] [2013] FamCA 578 at [81]-[82].

[39] Although not particularised in written form.

[41] Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 ("Stanford").

[44] Prince & Prince [1984] FamCA 7; (1984) FLC 91-501 at 79,076-79,077, citing Af Petersens & Af Petersens [1981] FamCA 50; (1981) FLC 91-095 at 76,669; but see Winston and Winston (No 2) [2013] FamCAFC 147, from [47] to [55].

[48] Omacini & Omacini (2005) FLC 93-218 at [30].

[49] (2021) FLC 94-069 at [58] ("Candle & Falkner").

[51] Dickons & Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 ("Dickons") at [21].

[53] Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513 at [524].

[54] Jabour & Jabour (2019) FLC 93-898 at [73]-[87]; Benson & Drury (2020) FLC 93-998 at [35].

[55] Aleksovski v Aleksovski [1996] FamCAFC 111; (1996) FLC 92-705, per Baker and Rowlands JJ at [83,434].

[57] Wife's updated costs notice filed 13 March 2025.