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[2026] FCA 604
respondent. Appeal dismissed. The first respondent’s name was amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship” and the second respondent’s name to “Administrative Review Tribunal”. The appellant was...
Hira Singh Kamoh appealed after a lower court rejected his challenge to the refusal of a student visa. The Federal Court found that he had not shown that the lower court made an error. In particular, he did not dispute that he was not enrolled in a relevant course when the Tribunal considered his case, and he provided no particulars or evidence supporting his procedural-fairness allegation. The appeal was dismissed, and he was ordered to pay the Minister’s costs of $5,000.
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2,316 words · generated 02/10/2026
Hira Singh Kamoh appealed to the Federal Court of Australia from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCoA). That court had dismissed his application for judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision to affirm refusal of his Subclass 572 student visa application. Horan J delivered judgment on 11 May 2026 and dismissed the appeal ([1]–[2], [15]).
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The judgment records that Mr Kamoh, a citizen of India, first arrived in Australia on 13 November 2008 as a student. He later held further student and bridging visas ([3]). In June 2016, he applied for a Subclass 572 visa to study an Advanced Diploma of Business. The proposed course was due to run from 11 July 2016 to 9 July 2017 ([4]).
A delegate refused the application on 4 November 2016. The delegate was not satisfied that Mr Kamoh intended genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, so was not satisfied that he met cl 572.223 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) ([5]). The Tribunal affirmed that decision in July 2018. As reported by Horan J, the Tribunal found that Mr Kamoh was not enrolled and had no current offer of enrolment. It also assessed his immigration history, study history, personal circumstances, and reasons for seeking to remain in Australia when considering whether he was a genuine temporary entrant ([6]).
Mr Kamoh then sought judicial review. His stated ground was that the Tribunal had made jurisdictional errors in interpreting the “GENUINE TEMPORARY criteria” and deciding his application ([7]). The FCFCoA found that he had not established jurisdictional error. It concluded that the lack of current enrolment or an offer of enrolment meant that he did not meet the criteria for the visa. It also concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in its genuine-temporary-entrant finding ([8]).
In the Federal Court, the notice of appeal alleged that the primary judge denied procedural fairness and did not properly consider the Migration Regulations ([9]). Horan J observed that the notice gave no particulars of the alleged unfairness and that there was no evidence supporting it. The allegation that the Regulations had been misapplied was also not particularised ([10]).
At the hearing, Mr Kamoh said that family problems and depression had affected his class attendance. He also said that he wanted to remain in Australia to raise his daughter, who was an Australian citizen and in Year 11, and that he had been unable to pay course fees because he lacked employment ([12]). The Court acknowledged those submissions but concluded that they did not identify error in the primary judge’s decision or an arguable error in the Tribunal’s decision ([13]–[14]). The appeal was dismissed. The orders also amended the respondents’ names to reflect “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship” and “Administrative Review Tribunal”, and fixed costs at $5,000 ([15] and orders).
The judgment’s central question was whether the appellant had established an error in the decision under appeal. Horan J answered that question in the negative. The reasons are short and focus on the grounds actually advanced, rather than reconsidering the visa application from the beginning.
First, the procedural-fairness allegation was unsupported. The notice of appeal said that Mr Kamoh believed he had been denied procedural fairness, but did not identify what procedural step was unfair or explain how the primary judge’s conduct affected the decision. Horan J emphasised that there were no particulars and no evidence before the Court to support the allegation ([9]–[10]). The reasons do not set out a detailed general test for procedural fairness. Their point is narrower: on this appeal, the allegation as presented did not establish error.
Second, the appellant did not challenge the key factual position about enrolment. The judgment says he did not contest that he was not enrolled in a course of study when the Tribunal heard his case ([12]). Horan J then held that the Tribunal correctly found he did not meet the mandatory requirements for a Subclass 572 visa in those circumstances ([13]). That conclusion is central to the dismissal.
Third, the appeal submissions did not demonstrate error in the Tribunal’s assessment of the genuine temporary entrant criterion. The Tribunal’s findings, as summarised in the reasons, included the absence of current enrolment, Mr Kamoh’s study and immigration history, the courses he had undertaken, and the circumstances affecting his future plans ([6]). Horan J concluded that no error had been established in the Tribunal’s finding that it was not satisfied he was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student or that he intended genuinely to stay temporarily ([13]).
Finally, the personal circumstances raised at the hearing did not, in themselves, establish that the primary judge’s decision was wrong. Mr Kamoh described family problems, depression, his daughter’s situation, and financial barriers to study ([12]). Horan J’s focus was whether those submissions pointed to an error in the decision under appeal. The Court found they did not ([13]–[14]). The appeal therefore failed ([15]).
This judgment does not purport to reformulate migration law or establish a new test. It is a short, fact-specific appellate decision applying the relevant visa criteria and assessing whether the appellant had shown error in the decision below.
Before this appeal, the decision under review had already held that Mr Kamoh did not meet the Subclass 572 criteria because he was not enrolled and did not have a current offer of enrolment, and that the Tribunal had not erred in its genuine-temporary-entrant assessment ([8]). Horan J upheld that result, finding no error had been established ([13]–[15]). In that sense, the practical legal position in this case remained unchanged after the appeal: the refusal and the dismissal of the judicial-review application stood.
The judgment refers to cl 572.223 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) as the provision relevant to the original refusal ([5]). It also reports that the primary judge relied on Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 245 FCR 296 at [30]–[31] when addressing the absence of enrolment or an offer of enrolment ([8]). The Federal Court’s reasons do not set out Kaur’s reasoning or independently analyse its application. Accordingly, this judgment supports only the limited proposition that the primary decision’s treatment of the course requirement, including its reference to Kaur, disclosed no error in this appeal.
The material supplied does not identify any later decisions applying or distinguishing Kamoh [2026] FCA 604. It is therefore not possible from this judgment alone to describe how later courts have treated it. Nor does the decision specify whether the relevant student-visa criteria have since changed. The ratio should be read in its statutory and factual context, rather than treated as a complete statement of current student-visa law.
At [2], Horan J says: “there is no error in the decision below, and the appeal should therefore be dismissed.” In plain English, the Court found no demonstrated legal mistake in the decision being appealed, so it would not overturn that decision.
At [10], the Court notes: “No particulars are given of the allegation that the appellant was denied procedural fairness.” This means the appellant asserted unfairness but did not explain what the alleged unfairness consisted of. Horan J also recorded that no evidence supported the allegation. The passage does not decide every possible procedural-fairness issue; it explains why this particular ground was not made out on the material presented.
At [13], Horan J states that the Tribunal “correctly found that the appellant did not meet the mandatory requirements” for a Subclass 572 visa because he was not enrolled in an applicable course. In plain English, the Court treated the lack of enrolment as a decisive problem under the criteria at issue. The appellant did not contest that factual position at the appeal hearing ([12]).
Also at [13], the Court says no error was established in the Tribunal’s finding that it was not satisfied Mr Kamoh was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student or that he intended genuinely to stay temporarily. This confirms that the appeal did not provide a basis to disturb that finding. It does not mean the Federal Court conducted a new assessment of the visa application.
At [14], Horan J explains that the appellant’s submissions were not directed to showing error in the primary judge’s decision and did not identify an arguable error in the Tribunal’s decision. The practical distinction is important: explaining why a visa applicant wants to remain in Australia is not, by itself, the same as showing that a court made a reviewable error.
At [15], the Court concludes: “the appeal must be dismissed.” The orders additionally fixed the first respondent’s costs at $5,000 and amended the respondents’ names.
The judgment is most directly relevant to an appeal where a visa applicant challenges the dismissal of a judicial-review application but does not give particularised grounds explaining how the primary judge erred. Here, the notice of appeal alleged procedural unfairness and failure to apply the Regulations, but supplied no particulars of either allegation ([9]–[10]).
It is also relevant where a Subclass 572 student-visa applicant did not have current enrolment or an offer of enrolment at the relevant time. The Court recorded that the appellant did not contest his non-enrolment and upheld the conclusion that the Tribunal had correctly found he did not meet the mandatory requirements ([12]–[13]). The judgment’s reasoning is tied to the particular visa subclass and statutory setting described in the reasons. It should not be assumed, without checking the governing provisions, to decide the requirements for a different visa subclass or a later version of the Regulations.
The decision may also be pertinent where a Tribunal has made a genuine-temporary-entrant assessment based on a range of circumstances and the appellant does not identify a specific error in that assessment. The Tribunal’s considerations in this case, as reported by Horan J, included immigration history, study history, current enrolment, personal circumstances, and the perceived value of previous study relative to the appellant’s stated goals ([6]). The Federal Court found no error had been established in the Tribunal’s conclusion ([13]).
The case is less directly informative where an appellant provides specific evidence about an alleged denial of procedural fairness, identifies what opportunity was denied, or shows how the alleged denial affected the decision. Those circumstances were not before Horan J in a particularised form, so the judgment does not determine how such a different ground should be resolved.
The supplied judgment contains no information about decisions after 11 May 2026 that applied, followed, distinguished, or otherwise treated Kamoh [2026] FCA 604. Any account of later treatment would therefore go beyond the available source.
The relationships that can be identified from this judgment are limited. Horan J refers to the FCFCoA decision in Kamoh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 861 as the decision under appeal ([1], [8]). The reasons also report that the primary judge referred to Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 245 FCR 296 at [30]–[31] ([8]). The Federal Court does not reproduce or independently analyse Kaur’s reasoning, so the present judgment should not be described as having adopted a broader proposition from Kaur beyond what it expressly says about the decision below.
The judgment’s significance as precedent is consequently narrow. It records an appellate court finding no demonstrated error where the appellant’s grounds were unparticularised, the absence of enrolment was not contested, and the hearing submissions did not point to error in the decisions under review ([10], [12]–[15]). Whether another court later treats that reasoning as applicable to a different statutory provision, factual record, or procedural-fairness ground cannot be determined from this text.
Several matters remain outside the scope of the reasons. First, Horan J did not give a detailed account of the legal test for procedural fairness. The Court held that the appellant had supplied no particulars or evidence to support his allegation ([10]). The judgment therefore does not explain how a properly particularised procedural-fairness claim, supported by evidence, would be assessed.
Second, the reasons do not elaborate on the precise operation of cl 572.223 or reproduce the full wording of the course-enrolment requirements. They record the delegate’s reliance on that clause and the Court’s conclusion that lack of enrolment meant the mandatory visa requirements were not met ([5], [13]). A complete account of the statutory framework would require the relevant version of the Regulations, which is not reproduced in the judgment.
Third, the judgment does not independently explain the genuine temporary entrant criterion or set out a comprehensive method for applying it. It summarises the Tribunal’s factual assessment and states that no error was established ([6], [13]). The decision does not resolve how any one factor, such as family circumstances or financial hardship, must be weighed in another case.
Fourth, the effect of Mr Kamoh’s stated circumstances is addressed only in the context of whether his submissions showed error in the primary judge’s decision. Horan J recorded his evidence about family problems, depression, his daughter, and his inability to pay fees, but concluded that those submissions did not identify an error ([12]–[14]). The judgment does not decide what weight those matters might receive in a different statutory or administrative process.
Finally, the source provides no post-judgment history and no information about subsequent amendments to migration legislation or regulations. Questions about later treatment of this decision, the present status of the Subclass 572 criteria, or the current operation of the relevant temporary-entrant criterion cannot be answered from this judgment alone.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCoA) dated 28 September 2023, dismissing an application for judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal not to grant to the appellant a Student (Subclass 572) visa: Kamoh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 861 (J).
For the following reasons, I consider that there is no error in the decision below, and the appeal should therefore be dismissed.
The appellant is a citizen of India who first arrived in Australia on 13 November 2008 as the holder of a student visa for the purposes of studying a Diploma and Bachelor of Information Technology. He subsequently applied for and was granted further student visas and bridging visas.
On 27 June 2016, the appellant applied for a student visa (Subclass 572) in order to undertake an Advanced Diploma of Business with a commencement date of 11 July 2016 and a completion date of 9 July 2017.
On 4 November 2016, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant a student visa to the appellant. The delegate was not satisfied that the appellant intended genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, and he therefore did not satisfy the requirements of cl 572.223 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).
The appellant sought review by the Tribunal, and attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 20 June 2018. On 4 July 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.
In his application to the FCFCoA for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision, the appellant alleged that the Tribunal “made jurisdictional errors in interpreting ‘GENUINE TEMPORARY criteria’ and in making a decision on my application”.
The primary judge held that the appellant had not established that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by any jurisdictional error. In circumstances where the appellant was not enrolled in any applicable course of study and did not have any current offer of enrolment, he did not meet the criteria for the grant of a Subclass 572 student visa: J [14]–[16], referring to Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 245 FCR 296 at [30]–[31]. Further, while it was strictly unnecessary for the Tribunal to consider whether the appellant met the “genuine temporary entrant” criterion, there was no error in the Tribunal’s conclusion that it was not satisfied that the appellant was a genuine temporary entrant for the purposes of cl 572.223(1): J [17]–[18].
The notice of appeal contains the following ground of appeal:
No particulars are given of the allegation that the appellant was denied procedural fairness in the proceedings before the primary judge, and there is no evidence before the Court to support any such allegation. Similarly, there are no particulars of the allegation that the primary judge (or the Tribunal) failed properly to apply the Regulations.
The appellant has not filed a written outline of submissions. He appeared in person at the hearing this afternoon and made the following submissions in support of his appeal.
The appellant submitted that he told the primary judge that he had not attended his classes due to family problems and depression. He said that he wanted to stay in Australia for the purposes of raising his daughter, who had obtained Australian citizenship and was now in Year 11 at a secondary school. The appellant did not contest the finding that he was not enrolled in a course of study at the time of the Tribunal hearing. He submitted that this was because he had been unable to pay course fees at that time due to a lack of employment. He submitted that he wanted a further chance to remain in Australia for the purposes of supporting his daughter.
There is nothing raised in the appellant’s submissions to indicate any error in the decision of the primary judge. The Tribunal correctly found that the appellant did not meet the mandatory requirements for the grant of a Subclass 572 student visa in circumstances where he was not enrolled in an applicable course of study. No error has been established in the Tribunal’s finding that it was not satisfied that the appellant was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student, nor that he intended genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily.
The appellant’s submissions at the hearing were not directed to establishing any error in the decision of the primary judge, nor did they point to any arguable error in the decision made by the Tribunal.
In such circumstances, the appeal must be dismissed. The appellant should pay the Minister’s costs, fixed in the sum of $5,000.
Kamoh
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
(2016) 245 FCR 296
Appeal dismissed. The first respondent’s name was amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship” and the second respondent’s name to “Administrative Review Tribunal”. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed at $5,000.