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[2026] FWC 847
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2026-03-16
Original judgment source is linked above.
s.365 - General protections
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal - jurisdictional objection - whether Applicant was dismissed - s.386(1)(b) - whether resigned but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged by the employer - jurisdictional objection upheld/dismissed - application dismissed or matter listed for conference
[1] Mr Johnnu Beyene (Applicant) has made an application pursuant to s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) alleging that he was dismissed from his employment with C&H Acquisition Pty Ltd (Respondent or C&H) because he exercised a workplace right by engaging in industrial activity within the meaning of s.347(b)(iii) and (f) of the Act.
[2] The Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection on the ground that the Applicant voluntarily resigned and was therefore not dismissed within the meaning of s.386 of the Act. A dismissal is a fundamental prerequisite that must be established before the Commission is able to deal with this dispute.
[3] Section 386(1) of the Act relevantly provides that a person has been dismissed if:
(a) the person's employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer's initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.
[4] The application was heard on 9 January 2026. Both parties were represented.
[5] For the reasons outlined below, I find that the Applicant was not dismissed within the meaning of the Act.
[6] In Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd v Shahin Tavassoli_1 (Bupa),_ a Full Bench of the Commission examined the relevant authorities as to what constitutes 'dismissed' under s.386(1) which included the following:
(1) There may be a dismissal within the first limb of the definition in s.386(1)(a) where, although the employee has given an ostensible communication of a resignation, the resignation is not legally effective because it was expressed in the "heat of the moment" or when the employee was in a state of emotional stress or mental confusion such that the employee could not reasonably be understood to be conveying a real intention to resign. Although "jostling" by the employer may contribute to the resignation being legally ineffective, employer conduct is not a necessary element. In this situation if the employer simply treats the ostensible resignation as terminating the employment rather than clarifying or confirming with the employee after a reasonable time that the employee genuinely intended to resign, this may be characterised as a termination of the employment at the initiative of the employer.
(2) A resignation that is "forced" by conduct or a course of conduct on the part of the employer will be a dismissal within the second limb of the definition in s.386(1)(b). The test to be applied here is whether the employer engaged in the conduct with the intention of bringing the employment to an end or whether termination of the employment was the probable result of the employer's conduct such that the employee had no effective or real choice but to resign. Unlike the situation in (1), the requisite employer conduct is the essential element.
[7] In Lance Gunther & Michele Daly v B & C Melouney T/A Easts Riverside Holiday Park,2 Deputy President Sams noted the following when considering whether the applicant in that matter was dismissed:
(a) Jurisdiction can only exist where termination of employment at the initiative of the employer has occurred. 'Initiative' is relevantly defined in the New Shorter Oxford Dictionary as: "the action of initiating something or of taking the first step or the lead; an act setting a process or chain of events in motion; an independent or enterprising act."
(b) This definition was considered in _Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd_3 (Mohazab) where a Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia said, "... a termination of employment at the initiative of the employer may be treated as a termination in which the action of the employer is the principal contributing factor which leads to the termination of the employment relationship."
"In these proceedings it is unnecessary and undesirable to endeavour to formulate an exhaustive description of what is termination at the initiative of the employer but plainly an important feature is that the act of the employer results directly or consequentially in the termination of the employment and the employment relationship is not voluntarily left by the employee. That is, had the employer not taken the action it did, the employee would have remained in the employment relationship."
(d) A Full Bench of the AIRC in Stubbs v Austar Entertainment Pty Ltd said,4 "...to constitute termination at the initiative of the employer the termination must be the direct or consequential result of 'some action on the part of the employer intended to bring the employment to an end and perhaps action which would, on any reasonable view, probably have that effect ..." [Rheinburger v Huxley Marketing, 16 April 1996 per Moore J].
[8] Finally, it is the case that "considerable caution should be exercised in treating a resignation as other than voluntary where the conduct of the employer is ambiguous and it is necessary to determine whether the employer's conduct was of such a nature that resignation was the probable result such that the employee had no effective or real choice but to resign".5
[9] Both parties sought leave to be legally represented before the Commission.
[10] The Act provides that a party may be represented in a matter before the Commission only with the permission of the Commission.[1] It also provides the reasons that permission may be granted.[2] Previous cases determined by the Commission or superior courts give guidance as to how these reasons should be considered.[3]
[12] The matter proceeded to a hearing before me on 9 January 2026.
[13] At the hearing the Applicant was represented by Mr Ian Neill SC of Counsel instructed by Mr Rohan Tate of Turner Freeman Lawyers and the Respondent was represented by Ms Michela Agnoletti of Counsel instructed by Mr Adam Lambert of KHQ Lawyers.
[14] The Applicant gave evidence on his own behalf.
[15] Mr Chris Doherty, Branch Manager - Brisbane Crane, gave evidence for the Respondent.
[16] Both parties filed submissions and made oral closing submissions following the witness evidence and cross examination of all the witnesses.
[17] On 21 June 2021, the Applicant commenced his employment for the Respondent as a Rigger.
[41] In response, the Respondent claims that:
[43] The Applicant's application was filed within the required 21-day period on 1 October 2025.
[44] The Applicant submits that the Commission can and should be satisfied that he was dismissed within the meaning of s.386(1)(b) of the Act, as the section applies whenever a "person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer".
[45] According to the Applicant, he resigned from his employment on 29 September 2025 by means of an email that attached correspondence stating that he "had no choice but to resign".
[46] In a statement to the Commission dated 9 December 2025, the Applicant summarised why he felt forced to resign as follows:
(a) after taking industrial action, the Applicant was separated from other workers who did not take industrial action;
(b) an investigation into a complaint into racism which found that he was called a "pirate" did not action his complaint and found there were no issues in the workplace even though he was called a pirate;
(c) he was provided no meaningful work, which was rigging work prior to taking industrial action, until 23 September 2025;
(d) he was disciplined for being so unwell that he could not contact his employer, noting that, although it was the "sickest [he had] ever been", the employer disciplined the Applicant as opposed to conducting a welfare check; and
[47] Submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant highlight three of the Applicant's characteristics relevant to this application.
[48] Firstly, the submissions note that the Applicant is a man of Ethiopian descent whose parents came to Australia as refugees from Ethiopia. The submissions assert that, given the Applicant's racial background, he was more vulnerable to C&H's conduct than other workers without this background.
[49] Secondly, the submissions note that the Applicant is a young man who started his employment at C&H - his first "adult" job - when he was 21 years old and was only 25 years old when he was reportedly forced to resign. The submissions contend that, given the Applicant's young age, he was more vulnerable to C&H's conduct than other workers without this attribute.
[50] Thirdly, the submissions point out that the Applicant was a union member who participated in industrial action. According to the submissions, due to the Applicant's industrial activity, C&H took steps to target him by segregating him and other workers from other employees who did not take industrial action, and by failing to provide to him "meaningful work". The Applicant does not accept the Respondent's contention that the Applicant was provided with a week of meaningful work.
[51] The Respondent argues that the Applicant was not forced to resign and that the Respondent did not engage in a course of conduct which would mean that his employment was at risk. By contrast, the Applicant submits that his employment was threatened on two occasions, in the forms of:
(a) a threatened redundancy process after the Applicant engaged in industrial action, which was later rescinded; and
(b) the instigation of a disciplinary process and a warning issued by Mr Doherty in circumstances where the Applicant had informed C&H, as soon as he was able, about his illness and fitness to work.
[52] The Applicant claims he was unable to immediately advise his employer as to his fitness for work as he:
(a) was experiencing diarrhoea at least every hour, sometimes constantly;
(b) was unable to keep any fluids down and was chronically vomiting at least every hour and every time he attempted to have fluids or eat food; and
(c) was fatigued and not thinking properly and, if he was not on a toilet, was in bed.
The Applicant's reasons as to why he felt forced to resign
[53] With respect to the Applicant's reasons as to why he felt forced to resign articulated at [40] of this decision, submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant provide further explanation.
[54] Concerning (a) and (c) - that the Applicant was separated from other workers and provided with no meaningful work - the submissions note that the Applicant is party to a proceeding where it is alleged that the Respondent's conduct constituted adverse action due to the Applicant's engagement in industrial action. The Applicant contends that the Respondent's conduct was part of a course of conduct calculated and engaged in by the Respondent to place "maximum pressure" on the Applicant to cause him to resign.
[55] Regarding (b) - that an investigation into the Applicant's complaint about racism did not action the complaint - the Applicant submits that the investigation was not "diligent". According to the Applicant, the Respondent substantiated that the Applicant was called a "pirate" but took no steps in respect of this finding. In addition, the Applicant submits that the Respondent failed to properly investigate whether the Applicant, as he alleged, was called a "useless cunt", as the Respondent did not interview witnesses nominated by the Applicant.
[56] Further, the Applicant's submissions note that the term "pirate" was deeply offensive to the Applicant and, given that he is of African descent and was, at the relevant time, wearing a durag, the connotation was that the Applicant was an "African pirate".
[57] Regarding (d), the Applicant submits that he provided an update regarding his absence as soon as he was able.
[58] Foremost, the Respondent submits that the Commission lacks jurisdiction because the Applicant was not "dismissed" within the meaning of the Act. Section 365 permits an application only where a person "has been dismissed". Before any power under s.368 can be exercised in relation to an alleged contravention of the general protections provisions, the Commission must first be satisfied that the Applicant was an employee who was dismissed.
[59] The Respondent submits that s.386(1) is not engaged as the Applicant's employment was not terminated at the Respondent's initiative and the Applicant tendered a written resignation on 29 September 2025.
[60] The Respondent further submits that s.386(1)(b) is not engaged as the agreed facts do not support a characterisation of the dismissal as one forced by conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by the employer.
[61] The Respondent submits that the Applicant had a choice to remain employed and, but for his voluntary resignation, there is no evidence that his employment would not have continued. The Respondent notes that the Applicant's resignation email dated 29 September 2025 annexed a letter setting out his stated reasons for resigning. Further, the Respondent suggests none of the state reasons, whether separately or cumulatively, meet the requisite standard for a "forced dismissal". Each is addressed below.
[62] The Respondent identified and presented in its favour the Full Bench's test in Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd t/a Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli [2017], being whether "the employer engaged in the conduct with the intention of bringing the employment to an end or whether termination of the employment was the probable result of the employer's conduct such that the employee had no effective or real choice but to resign".
[63] In accordance with the Bupa test, the Respondent submitted that its conduct was that which would reasonably be expected by an employer in its position and entirely appropriate to the circumstances.
Alleged segregation and lack of meaningful work
[64] The Respondent submits that the Applicant's assertion - that following his return to work on 28 July 2025 (after an extended period of industrial action) he was segregated for approximately 1.5 weeks and was not provided with meaningful work until 23 September 2025 - cannot constitute a forced resignation.
[65] Further, the Respondent suggests that even on the Applicant's version, he had been receiving meaningful duties and working alongside other employees for at least a week before resigning.
[66] The Respondent submits that the Applicant's complaint about racism was diligently investigated and closed out by early August 2025, nearly two months prior to his resignation, and that the Applicant's contrary assertion is not supported by evidence and cannot sustain a finding of forced resignation.
[67] The Respondent submits that the warning issued on 17 September 2025 for failing to notify an absence was lawful and proportionate. The letter stated that further disciplinary action may be taken if there were further incidents or other serious matters arose. The Respondent further submits that proper management of this kind does not, without more, amount to conduct leaving an employee with no option but to resign.
[68] The Respondent submits that the dismissal of another union member, Mr Jeremy Richardson, on 2 September 2025 for reasons including dangerous driving on the Port of Brisbane premises, is irrelevant to the Applicant's employment. The Respondent further submits that it made no allegations that the Applicant engaged in any similar conduct, and Mr Richardson's dismissal cannot rationally support a belief that the Applicant would be targeted.
[69] To the extent the Applicant suggests he had no choice but to resign because he was a union member who had engaged in industrial action, the Respondent submits that contention is untenable. The Respondent highlights that it continues to employ four employees who are union members and who participated in the same industrial action.
[70] The Applicant submitted that the Commission was required to consider s.386(1)(b). The Applicant contended that the relevant test was whether the employee had no choice but to resign, and that there is no requirement to establish circumstances in which the employee objectively had no choice.
[71] What mattered, the Applicant argued, was that the Commission determine whether the employee held a belief that he had no choice but to resign. The Applicant submitted that whether that belief was reasonable or not was a matter going to the merits of the case, not the jurisdictional objection. The Applicant relied on the High Court's authority in BHP Coal in support of the proposition that the state of mind of the employee, and the subjective reasoning for his decision, were relevant to determining whether he was forced to resign.
[72] The Applicant said he had formed the view that his employment would be terminated because of the protected industrial action he had engaged in and that he would be humiliated and suffer ramifications for his future employment. He said he was a young man, this was his first adult job, he was not "sophisticated", and he believed the employer had targeted him for dismissal and that the pressure on him was not stopping.
[73] The Applicant submitted that there were five classes of conduct, each of which had a cumulative effect on his mind and bore upon his assessment of his situation. First, the Applicant said he was segregated from other workers who had not taken industrial action. The Respondent claimed this segregation was for operational reasons, but the Applicant said this was never explained to him.
[74] Second, the Applicant referred to the requirement for him to undertake training. He contended that Mr Doherty never explained that the training was required because of complaints made, nor that it was because he had been out of the workplace for a period of time.
[75] Third, the Applicant referred to racist treatment about which he had previously complained. It was found that the Applicant had been called a "pirate", which he found offensive, and he said the Respondent did nothing about it.
[76] Fourth, the Applicant said he had no meaningful work to do. While yard work included rigging duties, the Applicant submitted that, putting aside the two days of rigging work performed in September prior to his resignation, he considered the work to be materially different from the work he performed prior to the industrial action.
[77] Fifth, the Applicant submitted that the warning letter was disproportionate. He said that his failure to notify his absence on 8 September was a one‑off incident, that he had been seriously unwell and unable to notify the employer, and that the reasons given in the warning letter about the impact of his conduct were not real. He submitted that it was heavy‑handed to suggest that one incident could completely destroy trust. He also submitted that the warning letter threatened his ongoing employment if he made one more mistake, and that it was not unreasonable for him to form the view that he had no choice but to resign because, if the employer terminated his employment, it would affect his future employment prospects.
[78] In reply, the Applicant accepted that other choices were always available besides resignation, and that there is always a choice to stay. He submitted, however, that this did not alter the legal test. The Applicant referred to paragraph 49 of Sydney Water and to paragraphs 50 and 51 of Perry v Bupa, and said these authorities supported consideration of the cumulative application of conduct.
[79] The Applicant submitted that the tone and content of the warning letter of 27 September 2025 were grossly disproportionate to what he had done, and that it was open for him to form the view that his employment was going to be terminated. He submitted that the behavioural training had never previously been imposed on anyone again in such a short period of time.
[80] He also contended that the Respondent's submissions about the yard work failed to address his evidence that the yard work he performed in August and September was materially different from the work he performed before. While he accepted that he performed some rigging work in the two shifts before the termination, he said it was not enough. In response to the Respondent's reliance on the investigation letter, the Applicant contended that the matters raised were not significant issues.
[81] He also made submissions about the use of cameras without audio, which he ultimately did not press when challenged. The Applicant submitted that when he said that the resignation was voluntary, he meant only that it was he who tendered the resignation, and that this did not address the legal test of why he made that decision.
[82] The Respondent submitted that the issue of reasonableness must be considered in determining whether the employee had formed a reasonable belief that he had no option but to resign. The Respondent contended that if an employer could be held responsible simply because an employee formed a belief, it would lead to an extraordinary and absurd outcome. If that proposition were accepted, it would mean that if an employee formed a belief that their employment contract had been repudiated, then the contract would be repudiated merely because of that belief. The Respondent submitted that this does not make sense and that the employee's belief has to be reasonable.
[83] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant resigned because he received a warning letter, and that the other classes of conduct relied on by the Applicant were not connected. They were not connected in time, and Qube did not terminate people because they had taken protected industrial action. Mr Richardson, who was referred to by the Applicant, was terminated because of misconduct involving a traffic incident, and the Applicant acknowledged that his belief that Richardson was terminated because of protected action was not reasonable. No other people who took protected industrial action were terminated.
[84] The Respondent submitted that the evidence the Applicant was too sick to notify his absence only emerged during these proceedings. The only information before the decision‑maker at the time was that the Applicant had not notified his absence because he was forgetful. The Applicant was told in the warning that he needed to follow the process. There was no threat to his employment in that letter, and the Respondent submitted that the Applicant's belief that his employment was at risk was wholly unreasonable. The Respondent also submitted that because the Applicant had always previously notified of his absences, it was not an unreasonable requirement to expect him to notify absences moving forward. The Respondent said the authorities are clear that reasonable management conduct does not result in a forced resignation, and the Respondent submitted that its conduct was reasonable management action.
[85] The Respondent noted that when Mr Beyene was asked whether the resignation was voluntary, he said "yes", and he gave evidence to that effect. In respect of the training, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant had been absent for 61 days, and that the training would only take a few hours to half a day to complete. The Applicant accepted that he was required to be across the policies. He also accepted that there were other options available to him besides resignation, for example utilising the dispute resolution clause, and that just because he did not know the exact wording of the clause did not mean that he did not understand that other options were available if he disagreed. The Applicant conceded he had previously performed yard duties, and that the two shifts prior to his resignation constituted rigging work at a client yard. He also gave evidence that the other yard duties he performed in the relevant period included rigging paperwork, cleaning, and inspecting work for crane jobs to occur.
[86] In relation to the workplace bullying complaint, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant's claim that no proper investigation had occurred was not correct. The Respondent submitted that after receiving the outcome, the Applicant did not take any steps to raise concerns at the time he received the complaint findings. The evidence, the Respondent submitted, was that a diligent investigation was conducted, with the complaint received on the Friday and action taken the following Monday. The Respondent relied on this in reply.
[87] The only matter the Commission is required to determine is whether the Applicant was dismissed within the meaning of s.386(1)(b). That is whether the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.
[88] The onus is on the Applicant to prove that he had no real or effective choice in the circumstances but to resign because of the Respondent's conduct either with respect to each of the circumstances upon which he relies or whether with respect to the cumulative effect of those circumstances.
[89] In this decision, I have summarised the evidence before the Commission in addition to the submissions made. In reaching these conclusions I have considered all the material, evidence and submissions before me, whether or not it is explicitly noted in this decision.
[90] In considering the reasons for which the Applicant contends this to be the case, I conclude as follows:
[91] I accept the Respondent's evidence that it directed the Applicant to undergo training as a consequence of his extended absence, coupled with concerns regarding complaints by other staff in respect of inappropriate workplace behaviour believed to have been taken by the workers who took industrial action. This is a reasonable response to the situation and, indeed, the Respondent had a duty of care to both the Applicant and its other workers to take these steps. I am satisfied that there was a further delay caused by the Applicant's own refusal to do the inappropriate workplace behaviour training. Once the Applicant completed that training, I am satisfied that the work he performed was reasonable in all the circumstances, including the duties that he performed which included building a crane and an igloo as well as taking a number of days off work.
[93] In regard to the disciplinary action taken for his failure to notify his employer of his sick leave, I accept that a failure to notify of an intended absence has an impact on the Respondent's ability to fulfil its obligations to its clients and it is not unreasonable to have a policy in place that employees are required to comply with. The Respondent followed an appropriate process and provided the Applicant with a warning. It was open to the Applicant to dispute that warning, seek advice from his union or lodge a dispute about it with the Fair Work Commission. I do not accept that any potential ignorance about the Enterprise Agreement, if that existed at all, eliminates the fact that the Applicant had a number of options open to him to resolve the matter which he failed to take. I reject the contention that the warning letter given to the Applicant was disproportionate, given the impact on the Respondent a warning was appropriate. I also reject the contention that by virtue of the warning letter putting him on notice that one more mistake could cause his employment to come to an end and that this might impact on his future employment prospects. This reasoning does not negate the requirement that the Applicant needed to demonstrate that there was no other option but to resign. The Applicant could simply have ensured he complied with the direction of the Respondent ant notified of future absences accordingly or he could have lodged a complaint about the warning. He did not do so.
[94] Having considered the issue of whether another union delegate's loss of employment meant that the Applicant should believe he was to be targeted next, I find this unlikely especially in circumstances where I accept the evidence of the Respondent that the person who was terminated was terminated for another very serious reason related to safety and not because of industrial action. Further, I accept the evidence that the other 8 or 9 employees who took industrial action all remained employed by the Respondent. In all the circumstances, I do not accept there was action taken by the Respondent that would force a resignation by the Applicant. In the case of the employee who was terminated, that termination occurred as a consequence of that employee's actions, not the Respondent's.
[95] I am not satisfied that any of the Applicant's complaints, individually or collectively, meet the threshold of leaving the Applicant with no real or effective choice but to resign. In summary, I accept the evidence of the Respondent's witnesses in relation to each of the key events relied on by the Applicant, including those concerning the allegations of an improperly conducted investigation, that the Applicant was segregated, that the Respondent withdrew meaningful work from the Applicant, that a warning letter was issued, and that, as a union member, the Applicant was targeted. Each of these matters was adequately explained in the evidence of the Respondent's witnesses and in its submissions.
"Often it will only be a narrow line that distinguishes conduct that leaves an employee no real choice but to resign employment, from conduct that cannot be held to cause a resultant resignation to be a termination at the initiative of the employer. But narrow though it be, it is important that that line be closely drawn and rigorously observed. Otherwise, the remedy against unfair termination of employment at the initiative of the employer may be too readily invoked in circumstances where it is the discretion of a resigning employee, rather than that of the employer, that gives rise to the termination. The remedies provided in the Act are directed to the provision of remedies against unlawful termination of employment. Where it is the immediate action of the employee that causes the employment relationship to cease, it is necessary to ensure that the employer's conduct, said to have been the principal contributing factor in the resultant termination of employment, is weighed objectively. The employer's conduct may be shown to be a sufficiently operative factor in the resignation for it to be tantamount to a reason for dismissal. In such circumstances, a resignation may fairly readily be conceived to be a termination at the initiative of the employer. The validity of any associated reason for the termination by resignation is tested. Where the conduct of the employer is ambiguous, and the bearing it has on the decision to resign is based largely on the perceptions and subjective response of the employee made unilaterally, considerable caution should be exercised in treating the resignation as other than voluntary." (emphasis added)
[99] I reject the Applicant's interpretation of the High Court authority in BHP Coal that what mattered was that the Commission should determine whether the Applicant held a reasonable belief that he had no choice but to resign. It is nonsensical that that this should be accepted as the test. If it were, it would not matter what the Respondent did at all if an employee simply believed unilaterally that they had no choice but to resign. In my view, that argument is misconceived and must fail. Doumit, as highlighted in the preceding paragraph, further supports this view.
[100] For these reasons, I find based on an objective assessment of all of the circumstances, that the Applicant's resignation was not the probable result of the Respondent's conduct.
[101] The Applicant has not discharged his onus to demonstrate that he had no real, effective or meaningful option but to resign in these circumstances. As a result, I am not satisfied that he was dismissed within the meaning of the Act. The Respondent's jurisdictional objection is upheld and this application is dismissed.
Mr Ian Neill SC of Counsel instructed by Mr Rohan Tate of Turner Freeman Lawyers on behalf of the Applicant.
Ms Michela Agnoletti of Counsel instructed by Mr Adam Lambert of KHQ Lawyers on behalf of the Respondent.
[1] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s.596(1) (the FW Act).
[2] Section 596(2) of the FW Act provides that the Commission may grant permission for a person to be represented by a lawyer or paid agent in a matter before the Commission only if:
(a) it would enable the matter to be deal with more efficiently, taking into account the complexity of the matter; or
(b) it would be unfair not to allow the person to be represented because the person is unable to represent himself, herself or itself effectively; or
(c) it would be unfair not to allow the person to be represented taking into account fairness between the person and other persons in the same matter.
[3] The decision to grant permission is not merely a procedural step but one which requires consideration in accordance with s.596 of the FW Act (see the decision in Warrell v Fair Work Australia [2013] FCA 291). The decision to grant permission is a two-step process. First it must be determined if one of the requirements in s.596(2) have been met. Secondly, if the requirement has been met, it is a discretionary decision as to whether permission is granted (see the decision in Warrell v Fair Work Australia [2013] FCA 291).
[4] Including s.596(2) (a)-(c) and both Note (a) and (b) of the FW Act.
[5] Digital Court Book (DCB) p.25 at [13].
[12] DCB p.327 at [9]; See also QUD450/2025.
[16] DCB p.86 at [38]; See also p.136.
[18] DCB p.327 at [9]; See also QUD450/2025.
[21] DCB p.82 at [23]; See also p.25 at [26].
[22] Ibid at [24]; See also p.328 at [15].
[25] Ibid p.86 at [40]-[41]; See also pp.139-142.
[29] DCB p.88 at [49]-[50]; See also p.32.
[39] DCB p.87 ay [45]; See also pp.144-145.
[57] DCB pp.83-84 at [26]-[27]. (Some of which the Applicant contests at pp.26-27 at [43]-[45].
[61] Queensland Human Rights Commission, Australian Human Rights Commission or Fair Work Commission.
[62] Sydney Water Corporation v Reem Yelda [2022] FWCFB 67 at [49].
[63] Doumit v ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd Dec 1609/96 S Print N6999.
[64] Naomi Harnett v Hands On People Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 636 at [75].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Johnnu Beyene
C&H Acquisition Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 847