Jenson & Lockridge (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 44 (19 March 2026)

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Jenson & Lockridge has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. By way of an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 27 November 2025, Ms Jenson ("the appellant") appeals from orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) on 22 September 2025 determining competing applications between she and Mr Lockridge ("the respondent") pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act").
2. The respondent opposes the appeal.
3. For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed.

1. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ("the FCFCOA Act") and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules") direct precision to ensure the fair and orderly conduct of appellate processes.
2. The appellant disclosed during the hearing of the appeal the use of a "professional" version of artificial intelligence ("AI") "used by law firms" in the formulation of the grounds of appeal, the drafting of her Summary of Argument and the content of her oral argument.
3. The conduct of this appeal illustrates the challenges presented to the Court and litigants from reliance on artificial intelligence, notwithstanding that it may present as offering expertise and efficiency. The risk that entering documents into an AI program will result in a breach of s 114Q of the Act (Mertz & Mertz (No 3) (2025) FLC 94-285) is outside the scope of this appeal.
4. The Full Court has said "[r]eliance upon unverified research generated by AI has the capacity to confuse, to create unnecessary complexity, to result in wasted time and to mislead the Court and other parties" (Helmold & Mariya (No 2) (2025) FLC 94-272 at [8]). As will be seen, the appellant's deployment of AI in this appeal:

(a) Attributed reasoning to the primary judge that does not appear in the reasons under challenge (referred to as AI producing hallucinations);

(b) Amalgamated disparate legal principles into the appellant's Summary of Argument and oral submissions, contributing to the repetition of uncontextualised appellate phrases;

(c) Prosecuted complaints in the grounds of appeal that were either contrary to the appellant's case at trial, or were abandoned by the end of the trial; and

(d) Obscured the remaining grounds of appeal, thwarting their forensic utility.

1. The appellant and the respondent commenced cohabitation in mid-2017, married in late 2018 and separated in late 2021. They have one child born mid-2019 ("the child"). That child, together with the appellant's older child from a previous relationship, lived with the appellant after they left the home in early 2022.
2. On 11 June 2025, on the application of the respondent supported by the ICL, the primary judge was satisfied that there was an unacceptable risk of harm to the child were she to remain in the care of the appellant and made orders that the child live with the respondent.
3. The trial as to the parenting and financial matters was listed for four days commencing on 30 June 2025. It continued until 3 July 2025 and was adjourned part-heard, concluding on 8 September 2025 and 9 September 2025.
4. Final consent parenting orders were made at the end of the fifth day of the trial, being 8 September 2025. The orders provide for the respondent to have sole parental responsibility for the child, for the child to live with him and to spend limited supervised time with the appellant. The reasons record that evidence of risk to the child in the care of the appellant was overwhelming (at [62]). The evidence and submissions on the last day of the trial, being 9 September 2025, were restricted to the competing claims for property settlement.
5. The primary judge's reasons record the evidence was less than optimal, due in part to significant non-disclosure by the appellant (at [4]). The primary judge's reasons recite the evidence, interspersed with factual findings and reasons for them, then finds that the superannuation and non-superannuation property of the parties was valued at $1,116,809, their liabilities valued at $464,382, and their net property (including superannuation) was $652,427.
6. The primary judge found, as conceded by the appellant at trial, that the respondent made the overwhelming majority of financial and non-financial contributions, and the majority of the homemaking contributions (at [106]). A contribution finding was made as to 80 per cent in favour of the respondent and 20 per cent to the appellant (at [120]). The primary judge found that the appellant had obtained the benefit of significant property post separation and failed to fulfil her duty of disclosure of her relevant financial circumstances (at [4] and [82]), impacting on the current financial circumstances of the parties. No adjustment was made to the contribution finding on consideration of s 79(5) factors (at [132]). The primary judge determined that it was just and equitable for the appellant to "keep whatever cash and property she has already taken" resulting in the appellant receiving "more than the twenty per cent division" of the property of the parties (at [140]).
7. The orders under challenge broadly provided for each party to retain their current property, for the accounts of the parties' self-managed superannuation fund to be brought up to date, for the appellant's entitlement in the fund to be valued and for she to then roll her entitlement out of the fund.

1. There is a presumption at law that a primary judge's decision is correct, the onus resting on the appellant to show otherwise (Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation v The Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621). The primary judge in this matter exercised a broad discretion in making orders adjusting the property of the parties pursuant to Pt VIII of the Act. It is well established that, except as to grounds asserting procedural error, for an appellant to succeed in an appeal from an exercise of that discretion they must bring their appeal within one of the recognised categories of appellate intervention identified by the High Court in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, namely the primary judge's discretion miscarried by:

(a) Making an error in approach or principle;

(b) Failing to consider a relevant circumstance and/or considering an irrelevant circumstance;

(c) Making an error in the findings of fact such that the finding is unsupported by the evidence; or

(d) Making orders that fall so outside a reasonable exercise of discretion that the orders were "unreasonable or plainly unjust".

1. The appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal contained 47 grounds of appeal. The appellant's Summary of Argument did not comply with r 13.23(2)(a) of the Rules by setting out each ground of appeal and, for each ground of appeal, a statement of the arguments setting out the points of law or fact and the authorities relied on together with references to the relevant pages of the Appeal Book and the transcript. The Summary of Argument was directed to four broad complaints, themselves identified as "grounds of appeal". At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant obtained leave to amend her grounds of appeal to be those as contained in her Summary of Argument. The appellant was advised at the hearing of the appeal that the grounds in her Amended Notice of Appeal were taken to be abandoned.
2. Unless an error is reasonably obvious, the onus is on the appellant to identify with precision the error in the grounds of appeal. While allowance is made for the appellant being without legal representation, she is bound by the same principles and obligations as any other litigant, in that the appeal is confined to the metes and bounds of the subject matters of her amended grounds of appeal as contained in her Summary of Argument.

THE APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL TO ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE

1. The appellant sought leave to adduce further evidence on appeal by way of an Application in an Appeal filed on 3 November 2025 supported by an affidavit filed on that day. The further evidence sought to be adduced on appeal was an affidavit of the respondent filed on 20 October 2025 in support of an application for costs. Section 35 of the FCFCOA Act gives the appellate court unfettered discretion to admit further evidence on appeal. The discretion exists to serve the demands of justice and is informed by a consideration of a number of factors (CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 ("CDJ v VAJ"); Hsiao v Fazarri [2020] HCA 35; (2020) 270 CLR 588 at [43]).
2. The further evidence sought to be adduced was not available to the appellant at the time of the trial. The appellant submitted that the respondent's costs affidavit demonstrated "improper conduct, conflict [and] breach of confidentiality", said to be relevant to, and buttressing, her grounds as to a failure to afford procedural fairness and as to s 79(5) complaints.
3. The appellant submitted that the invoices issued by the respondent's solicitors attached to the costs affidavit established that there had been collusion between the respondent's solicitor and the appellant's former partner, that the solicitor had obtained "documents from [her] previous partner...directly", generating a reasonable apprehension of misuse of confidential information. She further asserted that the affidavit established that the respondent's credibility had been undermined because invoices established that he had obtained the benefit of a grant of s 102NA representation when he had appeared pretrial absent representation. It was also asserted that the affidavit informed whether the ICL had discharged their statutory function.
4. Insofar as the further evidence was directed to the parenting dispute and potentially to the terms of its compromise, each is outside the scope of this appeal. The primary judge's credibility findings as to the respondent are not the subject of challenge on appeal and hence the further evidence is not relevant on this topic. The appellant did not identify any nexus between the further evidence and a failure at trial to afford her procedural fairness in the property determination, or as to the consideration of s 79(5) factors.
5. I am not satisfied that the further evidence has any impact on the appeal and thus does not meet the requirements identified by the High Court, namely that it is necessary to receive it to avoid an error "which cannot be otherwise remedied by the application of the conventional appellate procedures" (CDJ v VAJ at [109]). The Application in an Appeal filed on 3 November 2025 will be dismissed.

1. I will adopt the headings of the grounds as identified by the appellant in her Summary of Argument.

"Ground 1: Denial of procedural fairness and failure to exercise protective jurisdiction"

1. Ground 1 makes four categories of complaint in the Summary of Argument in narrative form as to a failure to afford the appellant procedural fairness. I will identify each category as a sub-ground.
2. Procedural fairness only requires each party to be given an adequate opportunity to be heard, and to present their case (Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550), being directed to the procedure of the hearing, and not the fairness of the outcome (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [25]). It is only the opportunity to present evidence and argument that the interests of justice require, not the actuality of it.
3. The first sub-ground is directed to "practical injustice". The complaint asserts that the primary judge "erred in law by refusing the [a]ppellant's application for an adjournment and proceeding to final hearing on 8 September 2025".
4. The appellant's Summary of Argument did not identify any evidence in the Appeal Book or reference in the transcript of any application for an adjournment, or the refusal of any such application by the primary judge. The primary judge's reasons record some of the accommodations afforded to the appellant:
   1. The trial was originally listed for three days commencing 11 June 2025. The [appellant]'s solicitors appointed under the Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme had a conflict of interest and withdrew on 15 May 2025, less than a month prior to the trial. The [appellant]'s new solicitors came onto the record on 20 May 2025, three weeks prior to the trial. There was insufficient time for them to adequately prepare and the trial was adjourned to 30 June 2025.
5. During the hearing of the appeal, the appellant asserted that an application for an adjournment was made on 8 September 2025. A reading of the transcript does not support that assertion. She then said that she did not have the benefit of legal representation on 9 September 2025. The transcript records that Mr Cash of counsel appeared on her behalf on that day.
6. It emerged during late in the appeal hearing that on 8 August 2025 the appellant filed an Application in a Proceeding (Appeal Book p.200) supported by an affidavit (Appeal Book p.1,243) seeking:
   1. That Final Hearing be adjourned for the [appellant] to receive treatment for her mental health.
   2. That $16,800 be paid from funds held in trust with [CC Law Firm] and paid directly to [BB] Hospital for the [appellant] to receive two weeks inpatient treatment for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
   3. That any additional medical fees incurred during the [appellant's] treatment are paid from funds held in trust within seven days of invoice in line with the hospital's policy.
   4. The the [sic] respondent sign the enrolment paperwork for [the child] to attend supervised visits at [support centre] with 24 hours of these orders.
   5. That fortnightly supervised visits commence with [the child] and the [appellant] at [support centre].
   6. That the cost of these visits be paid in advance directly to [support centre] between the time of the orders and Final Hearing from funds held in trust with [CC Law Firm].
   7. That the [appellant] is released from the Harman Undertaking to use subpoena material from their own medical records from [...] medical centre, [...] medical centre, [...] Medical Practice [...], DVCS and NSW Victims Services in Children's Court at ACT Magistrates Court.
   8. That the [appellant] is released from the Harman Undertaking to use their case outline from a separate family law matter with [the appellant's previous partner], matter number [...] in Children's Court at ACT Magistrates Court.
   9. That the [appellant] is released from the Harman Undertaking to use affidavits from a previous matter with [the appellant's previous partner], matter number [...], in the current matter before the Family Court and ACT Children's Court. These affidavits belong to [...] and [the respondent] and are dated 21st August 2023 and the [appellant] dated 22nd August 2023.
   10. That leave is granted for the [appellant] to use information obtained by subpoena from the respondents CommBank account [...] in relation to a transaction to [the appellant's previous partner] on the 12th February 2022 referenced as 'Work' in the matter before ACT Children's court.
7. On 15 August 2025, the primary judge ordered:
   1. The application in a proceeding dated, 8 August 2025, is summarily dismissed on the basis it has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. The appellant's solicitor appeared at the hearing on 15 August 2025. The reasons for judgment delivered on that day were not included in the Appeal Book.
2. The determination made on 15 August 2025 dismissing the appellant's application for an adjournment of the trial was not the subject of an appeal. That said, in and of itself absent more, an order refusing to vacate or adjourn a trial cannot be the subject of a competent appeal (s 26(2)(b)(ii) and s 26(2)(b)(iii) of the FCFCOA Act). Nothing submitted by the appellant in the appeal demonstrates the adjournment refusal deprived the appellant of procedural fairness. Her submissions in support of the application were heard but rejected. Axiomatically, no procedural unfairness can flow from a correctly made interlocutory decision, even though the dissatisfied party may regard the consequences as being disadvantageous. When the part-heard hearing recommenced on 8 September 2025 and 9 September 2025, the appellant had both counsel and a solicitor appearing on her behalf. The appellant made no further application for an adjournment, nor was complaint made as to a failure to afford procedural fairness to the appellant by way of the determination made on 15 August 2025. These factors are fatal to the first sub-ground of Ground 1. The appellant failed to establish how the procedural determination on 15 August 2025 caused the trial to miscarry or compromised the outcome.
3. The second sub-ground of Ground 1 is a complaint as to a failure of the primary judge to appoint a "case guardian" for the appellant pursuant to r 3.16 of the Rules. Rule 3.16 is applicable to a person who is a manager of the affairs of a party. It provides that such a person is entitled to be a litigation guardian in a proceeding pursuant to the Act. It has no application in the circumstances of this matter.
4. The second sub-ground asserts that "objective indicia of incapacity" ought to have directed the primary judge to enquire as to whether the appellant was in fact a "person under a disability". The Summary of Argument makes complaint as to the failure of the primary judge to recognise that a "case guardian" ought to have been appointed for the appellant. Doing the best I can on the material available, the complaint by way of the sub-ground focuses on a contention, first made on appeal, that the appellant required the appointment of a litigation guardian pursuant to r 3.12 of the Rules. That rule provides as follows:

3.12 Person who needs a litigation guardian

(1) For these Rules, a person needs a litigation guardian in relation to a proceeding if the person:

(a) does not understand the nature and possible consequences of the proceeding; or

(b) is not capable of adequately conducting, or giving adequate instruction for the conduct of, the proceeding.

(2) Unless the court otherwise orders, a minor in a proceeding is taken to need a litigation guardian in relation to the proceeding.

1. The appellant says that the evidence of the independent psychiatric expert, Dr T (Appeal Book p.776), and of a psychiatrist by way of a letter dated 1 September 2025 (Exhibit ICL5), establishes that she was "unable to give coherent instructions or cross-examine, rendering [her] participation illusory". This in turn generates a failure to afford procedural fairness "effectively allow[ing] an incapacitated litigant to conduct her own trial". Some context is required to unpack the sub-ground.
2. The primary judge accepted the evidence of Dr T making findings as to the appellant living with complex post-traumatic stress disorder, attention-deficient hyperactivity disorder and alcohol use disorder (at [122]).
3. During the period that the trial was part-heard, on 17 July 2025, the appellant was engaged in a serious motor vehicle collision with a high range blood alcohol concentration. The transcript records the appellant in cross-examination on 8 September 2025 contending the collision was a suicide attempt, and that the contemporaneous objective records of the hospital and professional services, including psychologists and psychiatrists, did not record that the car accident was a suicide attempt (Transcript 8 September 2025, p.17 lines 30-44). These conflicts in the evidence, having regard to the consent parenting orders made late on 8 September 2025, were not determined
4. The appellant was admitted to BB Hospital on 18 August 2025. Exhibit ICL5 was a letter from a psychiatrist at BB Hospital dated 1 September 2025 addressed to "Victim Support team/Whom it may concern" that consideration be given to the appellant's inpatient psychiatric care at BB Hospital being extended for a further seven days. The appellant discharged herself from BB Hospital on 3 September 2025 (Transcript 8 September 2025, p.36 lines 22-34). On 8 September 2025, she gave evidence that she was fully compliant with her medication regime and actively engaged in group therapy including that she was still receiving treatment during the trial (Transcript 8 September 2025, p. 35 lines 18-25 and p.38 lines 15-25).
5. The appellant's assertion that the primary judge's failure to appoint a litigation guardian for her "effectively allowed an incapacitated litigant to conduct her own trial" is wrong. She agreed during the hearing of the appeal that the transcript accurately records that she had the benefit of a solicitor and counsel throughout the trial.
6. The primary judge throughout the oral evidence of the appellant requested she advise if she needed a break. The appellant acknowledged on appeal that the Court had facilitated a "directions support worker" for her benefit over the course of the trial. Findings were made that court processes exacerbated the appellant's conditions, that the appellant at times was overwhelmed, found it hard to focus, regularly told the Court she had been unable to sleep or eat, and looked very unwell for much of the final hearing (at [122]).
7. The primary judge was cognisant that the appellant's diagnoses and presentation generated challenges for her ability to engage in the court room environment and answer questions in cross-examination. It is acknowledged that the circumstances surrounding the litigation and court processes, including cross-examination, were difficult and posed significant challenges to the appellant. Nevertheless, the focus of this enquiry on appeal is upon error demonstrated on the part of the primary judge.
8. The appellant could not identify any reference in the transcript at any point during the trial where the primary judge refused or failed to accommodate the challenges she encountered. Neither she, nor her lawyers, made an application for an adjournment during the days of the trial, or for any other accommodation to facilitate the appellant's engagement as a litigant in the trial, including during her cross-examination, other than those recorded in the reasons.
9. It was not the appellant's case at trial that she sought or required a litigation guardian. She did not adduce any evidence on appeal as to exchanges between she and her legal representatives either prior to, or over the course of the trial, as to she not understanding the nature and possible consequences of the proceedings, or she not being capable of giving adequate instructions for the conduct of the proceedings. Implicitly, absent evidence to the contrary, her legal representatives were engaged to protect and promote her interests such that in the event the appellant presented as a person who needed a litigation guardian as identified in Pt 3.5 of the Rules, such application would be at least made known to the primary judge. Importantly, the appellant's legal representatives had the benefit of Dr T's report and Exhibit ICL5, with the ability to engage with the contents of each and obtain the appellant's instructions in relation to them prior to the completion of the trial on 8 September 2025 and 9 September 2025. They were present with her and had the capacity to observe her evidence including her presentation, during the trial over those further two days.
10. The appellant was afforded procedural fairness, being the opportunity, with the benefit of her counsel and solicitor, to present her own case and to challenge the case made against her by the respondent (Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38). The complaint as to a denial of procedural fairness is not made out. The complaints by way of the second sub-ground are forlorn.
11. The third sub-ground of Gound 1 asserts that "[t]he [primary judge's reasons] rely on the [a]ppellant's 'confusion' and 'unwell presentation' as grounds for adverse credit findings". The primary judge's reasons record:
    1. The [respondent] was a generally credible witness. He gave his evidence in a straightforward manner and made reasonable concessions. On contested matters, where there was independent evidence, he was almost always shown to be more accurate than the [appellant].
    2. The [appellant] was not an impressive witness. She alleged that she and both children were abused and controlled by the husband throughout the relationship but provided few particulars. She also alleged the husband had sexually abused the children during the relationship. None of her allegations were proven**. On the contrary, the [appellant] was shown to be dishonest, opportunistic, highly manipulative and emotionally abusive of the children**. On 3 July 2025, on the strength of the evidence against the [appellant] as it evolved during the trial, the ACT child protection authority (which had a history of concerns about the [appellant]) removed [the appellant's oldest daughter] from the [appellant's] care. [The child] was already living with the [respondent] in accordance with the interim orders made on 11 June 2025.
    3. It was often hard to understand the [appellant's] case as she filed very late and there were many contradictions in her evidence, and in the case she was prosecuting...
    4. When faced with contradictory evidence given by her in different situations, the [appellant] repeatedly fell back on statements that she was unable to recall certain things because of trauma caused to her by the violence and abuse of the [respondent] and [her former partner].

...

1. There were many other instances in which the [appellant's] evidence was shown to be either mistaken or deliberately deceptive, but the details are not necessary to the determination of the property proceedings. However, the instances were so numerous that, wherever there is a direct conflict in the evidence of the [respondent] and the [appellant], I prefer that of the [respondent].

(Emphasis added)

1. Primary findings or secondary findings, based on a combination of impressions about the credibility or reliability of witnesses and other inferences from primary facts must, to be reversed, be shown to be contrary to "incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony" or be shown to be "glaringly improbable" or "contrary to compelling inferences" (Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [28]-[29]; Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129 at [55]). Findings are not wrong "merely because an appellant can point to some countervailing evidence" (Cizek & Mihov [2024] FedCFamC1A 151; (2024) FLC 94-206 at [21]).
2. The appellant's disagreement with the assessment of her evidence does not impugn the validity of the primary judge's observations and findings. The subject matter of complaint is an essential part of the judicial function for the primary judge to form impressions, at least in so far as they affected findings then made about the appellant's reliability as a witness. The appellant did not identify anywhere in the Appeal Book or the transcript as to why the impugned findings were demonstrably wrong by incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony, were glaringly improbable, or were contrary to compelling inferences. This sub-ground must fail in circumstances where there was a failure to identify admissible evidence that the appellant's credibility or reliability as a witness had been impacted by her adverse mental health. The third sub-ground of Ground 1 is rejected.
3. The final sub-ground is a complaint as to a "[d]enial of procedural fairness and [a] failure [of the primary judge] to exercise the protective jurisdiction". The appellant submits the primary judge failed to provide her the "appropriate accommodations", such as an adjournment or "procedural scaffolding" at times when she no longer had legal representation. The sub-ground has no merit for the reasons identified earlier as to the second and third sub-grounds of Ground 1.
4. Ground 1 is rejected.

"Ground 4: Errors of fact and principle in the determination of the asset pool and needs"

1. The appellant's Summary of Argument and oral submissions did not specify an error in the identification or application of relevant principle. Her grievances by way of Ground 4 were directed to specific items of property or controversies. The primary judge applied the provisions of s 79(3) of the Act (Shinohara & Shinohara (2025) FLC 94-266), making findings identifying the assets and liabilities of the parties (at [105]) as:

[CC Law Firm] Trust account - remaining proceeds of sale of sale of [Suburb O]

1. The appellant complains on appeal that the value of the real properties at the time of the trial was greater than that found by the primary judge (at [105]), citing a raft of Full Court authorities said to be authority for valuation methodology, evidence being adduced by an expert other than a single expert, and the provision of adequate reasons in determining valuation disputes. The complaint is easily disposed of. During submissions, counsel for the respondent sought a finding as to the value of each real property lower than that opined by the ch 7 single expert, while the appellant sought a finding as to the value of each real property being that as opined by the ch 7 single expert (Transcript 9 September 2025, p.98 lines 10-47). The reasons hence unsurprisingly record:
   1. The major assets at the time of the trial were the [respondent's] properties at [W] St, [City H], and [Y] St, [City G]. Both were valued in August 2023. [W] St was valued at $570,000 and [Y] Street at $240,000. The [appellant] relied on those valuations. The [respondent] argued for a lower value. He said he had a recent email from a real estate agent who advised he should list the [Y] Street property for sale at less than $240,000 as that was the selling price of a similar unit higher up in the complex with much better views. I am confident of the existence of the email as it was read to the [respondent] in cross-examination. Nevertheless, the best evidence of the value of both properties is the evidence of the single joint valuer and that is the value I will adopt.

1. The appellant did not identify any evidence in the Appeal Book or reference in the transcript to seek the value of the real property other than that contended by her and accepted by the primary judge. The appellant is bound by her case at trial and cannot raise such an issue on appeal (Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68). The complaint on this subject matter is asinine and is rejected.

1. The appellant contends an "add-back error", being the primary judge's treatment of a $20,000 withdrawal by the appellant during the parties' relationship as a "post-separation 'add-back'" that "artificially inflated her assets", citing principle sourced from the judgments of the Full Court in Trevi & Trevi [2018] FamCAFC 173; (2018) FLC 93-858 and Kowaliw & Kowaliw [1981] FamCA 70; (1981) FLC 91-092. This complaint is absurd. The reasons do not record the notional add-back of any item of property that no longer existed at the time of trial.

1. The basis of this complaint is baffling, being that the asset pool of the parties was "assembled 'on the run'". This complaint is bizarre. The primary judge's reasons as to this item of property uncontroversially record the agreed position of the parties (Transcript 9 September 2025, p.30 line 41 to p.31 line 23):
   1. The value of the funds remaining in the conveyancer's trust account following the sale of the [Suburb O] property was agreed, as was the value of the [respondent]'s [U Company] shares, his business equipment and his vehicles.

...

1. The parties agreed to exclude from the property pool the small balances in their personal bank accounts as they are attributable to post-separation earnings.

(Emphasis added)

1. The appellant did not identify any evidence in the Appeal Book or reference in the transcript as to the value of the funds held in the conveyancer's trust account being other than agreed.

Value of the self-managed superannuation fund

1. The appellant complains that a "core input" of the pool being assembled "on the run" was the valuation of the parties' interests in a self-managed superannuation fund. The reasons record:
   1. Each party is a member of the [Super Fund 1] (the Fund), a self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF) set up by the [respondent] in 2012. Although both parties made reference to the Trust Deed, it did not come into evidence. Section 17A(1) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, requires that each member of a self-managed superannuation fund must be a trustee of the fund or, if the trustee is a body corporate, a director of the body corporate. Although not clearly stated, various parts of the evidence implied the trustee of the Fund is the [respondent]'s company, [B] Pty Ltd. For instance, it was put to the [respondent] in cross-examination, and he agreed, that the [appellant] is a director of the fund. I took that to mean she is a director of the trustee company.
   2. The [appellant] deposed that she joined the Fund in mid-2020 and rolled $320,000 into it from her own fund at that time. When challenged about this, the [appellant] said she erroneously added a zero to the figure in her affidavit and the amount rolled in was $32,000, not $320,000. The [respondent] denied the [appellant] rolled any lump sum into the fund but said she did arrange for her regular superannuation payments to be paid into the Fund over an 18 month period prior to separation. The [appellant] was challenged to produce any evidence of a lump sum roll over into the account and failed to do so.
   3. The [appellant] alleged that various lump sums had been transferred from the Fund into bank accounts in the [respondent]'s name. The [respondent] said all money paid into the Fund was deposited into savings accounts in which he hoped to accumulate sufficient funds to purchase property. No property was purchased but some money was invested in shares. He said he did not use the accounts with superannuation funds for any other purpose and every cent was accountable. He said that, because of the compliance costs, the fund was not profitable and lost money over time.
   4. Both parties sought an order for the [appellant]'s interest in the Fund to be rolled out into another fund and for the [appellant] to then cease to be a member of the Fund. The [appellant] identified the sum as being $31,000. The [respondent] did not nominate a particular figure in the orders he sought.
   5. The value of the parties' interests in the Fund is not known with any precision. In the balance sheet he filed on 9 September 2025, the [respondent] attributed a value of $103,111 to his interest and $12,766 to the [appellant]'s, a total value of $115,877. In the balance sheet in her Outline of Case document filed on 9 September 2025, the [appellant] attributed a value of $51,528 to the [respondent]'s interest and $30,515 to her own interest, a total value of $82,043. The [respondent]'s figures are more likely to be correct. He said the value of the Fund comprises shares and funds in bank accounts.
   6. The [respondent] said that, after separation, he and his accountant combed the bank records to identify all deposits made by or on behalf of the [appellant] to determine the value of her interest in the fund so it could be rolled out into another fund. He said the accountant copied him into emails sent to the [appellant] seeking her assistance in identifying all such sums, but she simply failed to respond. He said he and the accountant had calculated the [appellant] contributed between $19,000 and $20,000 over the 18 months she was a member of the Fund. This is higher than the $12,766 attributed to the [appellant]'s interest in his balance sheet. I gather the difference is because he asserts the [appellant] should pay a proportionate share of the cost of the Fund's financial and legal compliance costs for the period for which she was a member.
   7. On the evidence before me, the Fund is unlikely to be compliant with the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 and the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994. It will be necessary for the Fund to be made compliant and the [appellant]'s interest to be valued before it can be rolled out into another fund in her name. I will make orders requiring these steps be taken. The [respondent] tried to obtain the [appellant]'s consent to use the funds in the [CC Law Firm] trust account to bring the financial accounts of the business and the SMSF up to date and to obtain expert advice about rolling out the [appellant]'s interest. When he was unable to get agreement from the [appellant] to do this, the [respondent] sought orders to that effect in his further amended response filed on 30 June 2025. Those orders were made on an interim basis on 3 July 2025. I assume they were never implemented as there was no evidence about it at the trial and the money in the trust account had not been reduced.
   8. The lack of clarity of the value of each party's interest in the Fund necessitates me dealing with the superannuation separately to the non-superannuation property. This is consistent in any event with each party's position that the [appellant]'s interest be rolled out of the Fund and that they each keep their other superannuation interests which are of modest value. For the sake of obtaining a general value of the entire pool, I will take the [respondent]'s estimate of the total value of the Fund, noting however that it will likely be significantly less once the compliance costs are paid. For the exercise, I will take the value of the [appellant]'s interest in the Fund to be $20,000, with a commensurate reduction in the value of the [respondent]'s interest to $95,877.

1. The appellant broadly asserted in her Summary of Argument that the approach taken by the primary judge on this subject matter was "internally inconsistent", without further explanation. The appellant did not make any oral submissions in support of the complaint. No challenge was made on appeal as to any error in the approach taken by the primary judge in valuing the parties' interests in the self-managed superannuation fund. The primary judge dealt with the interests by broadly making orders in the terms sought by each, being for the accounts of the fund to be brought up to date, for the appellant's entitlement to be valued, and for she to then roll her entitlement out of the fund.
2. This complaint is enigmatic and hence not accepted.

1. The appellant in Ground 4 makes discretionary complaint as to the primary judge taking into account an irrelevant consideration, being a "potential future parenting application 'under s 65DAAA'" of the Act. She submits that the primary judge discounted her s 75(2) "future needs" (not a section of the Act identified in the transcript or the reasons for judgment, the relevant section being s 79(5) of the Act) by speculating on a potential future parenting application "under s 65DAAA". She cited in her summary of argument a first instance parenting judgment that did not engage with s 65DAAA of the Act to support her conclusion that the section is a "gatekeeping provision for parenting". The appellant developed the submission to contend that speculation as to future litigation denies current financial need and hence is in error because property adjustment must be based on the facts as they exist at the time of the trial.
2. This incomprehensible complaint is rejected. The reasons make no reference to let alone considers, s 65DAAA of the Act. It was not the subject of submission by either party at trial.
3. Ground 4 fails.

"Ground 3: Failure to determine the Kennon claim and failure to assess contributions holistically"

1. The appellant's Summary of Argument asserted that unchallenged evidence was adduced of "family violence and its impact", raising a "live Kennon issue" (citing Kennon v Kennon [1997] FamCA 27; (1997) FLC 92-757, as opposed to being a factor to be considered pursuant to s 79(4)(ca) and/or s 79(5)(a) of the Act). The Summary of Argument further asserted that the primary judge "failed to make any findings as to whether this violence occurred or whether it had the requisite 'discernible impact.'" She contended that the silence in the judgment constituted a failure to exercise jurisdiction.
2. These inconceivable submissions are preposterous.
3. The reasons record the appellant's allegations of family violence occasioned by the respondent, the primary judge's careful evaluation of the evidence, and the cogent reasoning rejecting her evidence, or finding it not persuasive, or finding it to be contrary to the weight of the evidence (at [67]-[81]). The appellant failed to establish the allegations of family violence occasioned by the respondent.
4. The appellant could not engage at the hearing of the appeal as to why the failure to make the findings of family violence as she sought was not open on the evidence, or demonstrably wrong by reference to incontrovertible facts, or uncontested testimony, was glaringly improbable or contrary to compelling inferences. Instead, at the hearing of the appeal, she read her AI assisted repetitive oral submissions as to family violence, referencing her trial affidavit and other material that in her view ought to have led to a different conclusion, while ignoring the balance of the evidence adduced by the respondent and the ICL and her own oral evidence in cross-examination.
5. Ground 3 was at all times implausible and is rejected.

"Ground 2: Errors of law in the assessment of contributions (s 79(4) / s 90SM(4))"

1. The appellant while broadly asserting error, did not identify the relevant principle not applied. The appellant's Summary of Argument was directed to discretionary complaints and a procedural complaint.

1. The appellant complains that the primary judge failed to take into account a material consideration as to the respondent living with dyslexia. She said that this fact was relevant to the determination of the contributions she made to the business operated by the respondent during the relationship.
2. The reasons record:
   1. At the commencement of the relationship, the [respondent] was working on Fridays and Saturdays at [K Company]. Otherwise, he managed [the] business remotely and attended the [business] as needed. He also derived income from his rental properties and had boarders in the house and granny flat at the [J Street] property. He deposed that he was earning between $170,000 and $223,000 per annum.

...

1. The [appellant]'s evidence was that she worked extensively in the [...] business. This was denied by the [respondent]. He said the [appellant] helped to some extent by drafting occasional emails, doing some social media for the [business] and perhaps by helping to paint the creche at the [business] but that, otherwise, he used his paid staff to carry out necessary tasks. Given the hours worked by the [appellant] in her own job, the [respondent]'s evidence on this point was more credible.

...

1. The [respondent] ran [the] business throughout the relationship, but this is not a significant factor as the evidence suggests it was non-profitable for much of the time. The [appellant] made some contributions to that business by helping to paint the creche area and by assisting the [respondent] occasionally with drafting emails. The [respondent] employed staff and an accountant for the administrative aspects of the business.

2. The parties were largely supported by the [respondent]'s income from his job at [K Company] and the rental income from his properties. Although the [appellant] earned a good income from her employment for much of the relationship, she did not regularly or consistently apply it for the support of the family or the preservation of the assets in the same manner as the [respondent]. She did make some financial contributions but at a low level and used the rest of her income for her own purposes.

(Footnotes omitted)

1. The appellant said in her Summary of Argument that the fact of the respondent living with dyslexia was a "critical corroboration" of her case establishing that she "performed the vast majority of administrative, marketing and correspondence tasks" for the business enterprise.
2. During the hearing of the appeal, the appellant agreed that no submission was made as to the secondary fact of the respondent's dyslexia having a nexus to the primary factual determination as to the appellant's contributions to the business. The appellant by way of this complaint is attempting to re-run the first instance trial on appeal. This was a discretionary decision, to which many factors could be relevant. Unless an oversight by the primary judge was fundamental and obvious, of which there is none, the appellant bore the burden in the appeal of showing how a relevant consideration was drawn to the primary judge's attention and not then taken into account (Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar the Diocesan Bishop [2008] HCA 42; (2008) 237 CLR 66 at [120]-[121]). She did not do so. She is bound by the conduct of her case at trial. No error is demonstrated. The complaint is without merit.

"The Wrongful Exclusion of Witness [Mr DD]"

1. The appellant's Summary of Argument records an alleged determination refusing her leave to call Mr DD to give evidence. She contended Mr DD would give evidence as to her role in the business supporting the factual findings she contended as to contributions.
2. The appellant conceded at the hearing of the appeal that she had not obtained a draft affidavit from Mr DD or a proof of evidence from that potential witness. During the hearing of the appeal, the appellant could not point to any evidence in the Appeal Book or reference in the transcript to an application or request to adduce evidence from Mr DD, or any refusal by the primary judge of such application or request. The appellant said that the primary judge indicated "in about April 2025" her views on evidence being adduced from Mr DD. No application for a subpoena to be issued to Mr DD to give evidence over the months of the part-heard trial was identified.
3. The grievances by way of this complaint are nothing more than assertions. They cannot be accepted and have no merit on appeal.
4. Ground 2 fails.

1. The grounds of appeal are rejected. The appeal is dismissed.

1. The parties conducted the appeal without legal representation. In the event the appeal was dismissed the respondent sought an order for costs fixed in the sum of $1,540 being fees he had incurred in obtaining legal advice for the purposes of resisting the appeal.
2. The appellant opposed any order for costs, submitting that a consideration of her current financial circumstances would militate there being no order as to costs. She asserted that she has been issued a bankruptcy notice by EE Bank claiming $47,000 and has $500 in the bank. The respondent submitted that the reasons for judgment made findings as to the appellant's incoming earning capacity and her inadequate disclosure of property funds she obtained since separation clouding her current financial circumstances.
3. Financial impecuniosity is not a bar to justify costs. The appellant was wholly unsuccessful in prosecuting a misconceived appeal. This circumstance justifies an order for costs in favour of the respondent. The appellant did not put into issue the fixing of the quantum of costs as sought by the respondent at $1,540. An order will be made for the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of $1,540 within 28 days.

I certify that the preceding seventy-nine (79) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Campton.