Jenkins v Todd [2017] NTSC 26

Not long afterwards (on a different date) Mr Jenkins again came before me seeking bail. This time he was calm and behaving appropriately. I made sure he had a copy of the Bail Act 1982 (NT) and asked him to explain why he should get bail by reference to the criteria set out in s 24. He did so; we went through the relevant considerations one by one; and I granted Mr Jenkins bail.

I do not think that a fair minded observer with knowledge of those two proceedings and the surrounding circumstances would entertain a suspicion that I might not bring an open and unbiased mind to the exercise of determining the applications involving Mr Jenkins that are now before me.

(b) Mr Jenkins complained that I have never understood any of his cases and that he felt that he would have won the contempt proceeding, but he didn't feel any trust in my being able to listen to an argument because every time I said he was able to make submissions, he couldn't make submissions.

In fact in the contempt proceedings Mr Jenkins filed voluminous submissions (albeit not in accordance with the timetable fixed at directions hearings) which I read and considered in detail in my written judgment handed down on 20 April 2016.[3] He would have been given an opportunity to supplement those with oral submissions at the hearing, however he failed to appear (in breach of his bail). I therefore elected to proceed in his absence.

(c) Mr Jenkins complained that I told him to "shut up", numerous times. In fact, while I agree that I have many, many times directed Mr Jenkins not to interrupt, to sit down and to be quiet when he was speaking out of turn, I have never told him to "shut up".

Counsel for the Registrar, Mr Macdonald, said in his submissions on the bias application, that he had no recollection of my telling Mr Jenkins to shut up. I said, "I most certainly did not tell Mr Jenkins to shut up."[4]

Mr Jenkins interrupted saying, "Your Honour, that's not true," and a little while later (again to me), "[Y]ou're lying."[5] He said that the "exact date" was the last mention of this matter before the hearing[6] and that on that occasion I said, "Shut up Mr Jenkins," three times. I told him I would check the transcript. I have done so and, unsurprisingly, it shows no such thing.

(d) Mr Jenkins said that I do not understand self-represented litigants and the fact that he is under pressure when he appears in court. He advised me that I "really need to be trained in how to treat self-represented litigants".[7] Mr Jenkins explained that there are completely different standards for self-represented people and gave a number of examples.

• He said that all he wants (and what he expects) is for the judicial officer to ask, 'What do you want to know, Mr Jenkins? Okay, I'll deal with that and I'll explain what's going on.' (The inference was that all queries and interruptions should be dealt with in this manner immediately.)
• He explained that it was the duty of the presiding judicial officer "to give [him] the full understanding of what's going on" "and that's what [he] expect[s]."[8] (Mr Jenkins was referring there not to me, but to Judge Smith in the proceeding in the Local Court in which Mr Jenkins is said to have breached the condition of his suspended sentence, but I include it here as an illustration of Mr Jenkins' expectations, which expectations I have not met.)
• He referred to "the bench book of how unrepresented litigants are supposed to be treated". [9] In that (according to Mr Jenkins) the Chief Justice in New South Wales says quite clearly, "If you [as an unrepresented litigant] want to say something, you interject and ask a question." The judicial officer should then say, 'Okay, Mr Jenkins, what's the question?' (I have checked the New South Wales Criminal Trials Bench Book and, needless to say, it says no such thing. I will refer in more detail to what it does say in my reasons for decision on the breach proceedings below.)
• Mr Jenkins suggested that I should help him to be the great person that he is and train him (or get the Law Society or Bar Association to give him a course in how to behave).[10]
• He also said, "[S]elfrepresented litigants need to be listened to. It's as simple as that."[11]

Mr Jenkins is unarguably correct in saying that unrepresented litigants need to be listened to. However, it does not follow from that, that Mr Jenkins is entitled to immediate attention any time he decides to interrupt proceedings, and entitled to ignore directions from the presiding judicial officer. I will deal with this in more detail below in considering Mr Jenkins' submissions in relation to the actual breach application. For now, all that it is necessary to say is that Mr Jenkins' perception that I am unskilled at dealing with unrepresented litigants and need training in that art is not a sufficient reason for me to recuse myself.

(e) He said further that he feels I have "a bias towards him because of his previous cases". He "doesn't feel in his heart that he's going to get a fair hearing because of the way [I've] dealt with him in a previous situation - when he's put in applications to get adjournments, for example".[12] When I pointed out to him that in this matter he had applied for adjournments three times and got the adjournment every time, Mr Jenkins dismissed that as being "only because of Legal Aid".

Mr Jenkins subjective feeling that he will not get a fair hearing is not relevant to the application that I recuse myself for apprehended bias. The test is an objective one: might a fair-minded observer entertain a reasonable apprehension that I might not bring an open and unbiased mind to determining whether Mr Jenkins has breached the conditions of his suspended sentence and, if he has, what consequence should follow.

(f) Mr Jenkins complained that I had interfered in his Legal Aid review by asking NTLAC to bring forward the date of his review. Mr Jenkins had applied for legal aid and was refused. He sought a review. The Court was advised that the review was scheduled to be heard on 10 March 2017. Because of that, the breach proceeding and related applications were adjourned to 15 March to enable the review to take place first. The Court was later advised that the review had been put off until 15 March which meant either that the hearing date would have to have been vacated or that Mr Jenkins would have been unrepresented at the hearing even if his review application was ultimately successful. As there was no other available date in my list for many months, I asked my Associate to send an email to the Legal Aid Commission asking if the review could take place before the date on which the matter was listed for hearing. (Both Mr Jenkins and counsel for the Registrar were advised of this.)

Again, I do not think that a fair-minded observer would entertain a reasonable apprehension that I might not bring an open and unbiased mind to judging Mr Jenkins' case as a result of this action which was aimed only at preserving the hearing date and ensuring that, if Mr Jenkins review was successful, he would be represented at the hearing.

(g) Another complaint was that in the contempt proceedings I made directions that Mr Jenkins file submissions and name witnesses, and that he did name witnesses but those witnesses were never called.[13] In fact Mr Jenkins did not file and serve any witness statements and did not attempt to call any witnesses in the contempt proceeding. He filed written submissions but failed to answer his bail and did not appear at all at the hearing. There is no factual basis to this complaint.

(h) Mr Jenkins also complained that during the contempt proceedings I put him in the vulnerable witness room. As I explained in my reasons for decision on the contempt proceeding,[14] during that proceeding, on a number of occasions Mr Jenkins interrupted me, spoke over me, objected to being required to stand when he was being spoken to, and failed to do so. He also interrupted and spoke over counsel for the Registrar. Eventually, on several of those occasions, when Mr Jenkins failed to comply with my directions to cease interrupting, I had him removed from the courtroom and gave him the option of participating in the proceeding via audio-visual link from the vulnerable witness room. The purpose of this was to ensure that Mr Jenkins could see and hear everything that occurred in the courtroom via the audio-visual link, but would be prevented from interrupting and disrupting proceedings by having his microphone placed on mute if necessary. Given the circumstances, I do not think that my having taken this course would induce in a fair-minded observer a reasonable apprehension that I might not bring an open and unbiased mind to judging Mr Jenkins' case.

(i) Mr Jenkins complained further that in the contempt proceedings I did not give him an opportunity to make submissions on sentencing. I pointed out to him that I did invite him to make submissions on sentencing and that he had responded by jumping up and down and taking all his clothes off.[15] Mr Jenkins replied that that was because I had restricted him from talking. There is no basis in this submission for a finding that I should recuse myself.

I have checked the relevant transcripts and what actually happened was this. Mr Jenkins did not appear in Court when I handed down the decision finding him guilty of contempt and I issued a warrant for his arrest. He was arrested on a weekend and brought into Court on Monday 9 May 2016. He threw a tantrum in the cells and took his clothes off. (He then put them back on.) I arranged for an audio visual link into the cells. I then invited Mr Jenkins to make submissions on sentencing. He responded by screaming and yelling. I asked if he agreed to the provision of a previously ordered psychological report to Mr Macdonald. Mr Jenkins responded (in part): "... I would like to see my solicitor. I (inaudible) report. You're not providing (inaudible) justice. Leave me the fuck alone (inaudible)."[16] I took this as an application for an adjournment to seek legal advice. I adjourned and Legal Aid was contacted. When Court resumed at 2.00pm, a Legal Aid lawyer appeared and advised that Mr Jenkins wished to continue representing himself. I again asked Mr Jenkins whether he consented to my providing a copy of the psychological report to Mr Macdonald. Mr Jenkins said that he would need to read it first and that he had not committed any contempt. I adjourned again so Mr Jenkins could be given a copy of the report. During the adjournment, security guards tried to give Mr Jenkins a copy of the report but he refused to accept it. When court resumed Mr Macdonald made submissions on sentencing. I again invited Mr Jenkins to make submissions on sentencing. He said he had to bend over to a grate to talk into the microphone. I said that if he undertook to behave I would have him taken to the vulnerable witness room where he could make his submissions in more comfort. Mr Jenkins said, "That's fine. Yeah." I adjourned again, Mr Jenkins was taken to the vulnerable witness room and he made submissions to the effect that a community service order would be appropriate. He applied for and was granted bail to get an assessment for suitability for a community work order. The matter was adjourned to the next day at 1.30 pm for sentencing. (It was during sentencing the next day and not as I had originally recalled during sentencing submissions that Mr Jenkins took his clothes off. He insisted on talking and shouting while I was sentencing him so I turned off the microphone in the vulnerable witness room and he responded by taking off his clothes.)

(j) He complained that at the end of the sentencing hearing, when I arranged for him to be assessed for suitability for community service, I did not allow him sufficient time to approach people, like the Salvation Army, to be able to present his case for getting community service.[17] That submission reflects a misunderstanding of the process. Such an assessment is a simple matter of having the corrections officer interview the offender, explain what is involved in a community service order and ask the offender some relevant questions. The corrections officer then does a report stating whether the person is suitable for supervision on a community service order. In Mr Jenkins' case the corrections officer reported that he was not suitable for supervision for the following reason:

Mr Jenkins presented with an aggressive and argumentative manner at interview with Community Corrections staff in the duties of undertaking the assessment for this report. While Mr Jenkins advised he is willing to comply with a Community Work Order, he presented as uncooperative and would not be possible to place with a community provider. There is also concern that Mr Jenkins would be disruptive should he be placed on a work crew with other community work offenders.[18]

If Mr Jenkins wanted to call evidence on the sentencing hearing he could have done so. There is no basis in this submission for a finding that I should recuse myself.

(k) Towards the end of the hearing on 15 March 2017 Mr Jenkins said that he wanted me to recuse myself because I don't care about him, and that I should be helping him. It is not my function to "care" about Mr Jenkins in the nurturing sense in which I gather Mr Jenkins is using the word. A judge's duty is to administer the law in accordance with the terms of the judicial oath, "without fear or favour, affection or ill-will."[19]

[7] In my view, none of the matters relied on by Mr Jenkins in oral submissions would cause a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend that I might not bring an open and unbiased mind to determining either the breach proceedings against Mr Jenkins or the two remaining preliminary applications. Nor do I think that those matters in combination are apt to have that effect. Accordingly I decline to recuse myself.

Application for a stay of the breach proceeding as an abuse of process

[8] The second application is for the proceeding to be permanently stayed as an abuse of process. I have read the four "affidavits" filed by Mr Jenkins in the breach proceeding dated 19 January 2017, 27 January 2017, 31 January 2017 and 9 February 2017. Although these are headed "affidavit", they do not depose to facts, they are more in the nature of submissions.

[9] The "affidavit" of 19 January 2017 sets out a number of contentions. First, it contends that the application was filed three months after the alleged breach and the time limit for filing an application for breach is 21 days. Both of those statements are inaccurate. The breach is alleged to have occurred on 21 October 2016. The application was filed on 5 December 2016, one month and two weeks later. Second (and more fundamentally), there is no time limit for instituting proceedings for breach of a condition of a suspended sentence under s 43(2) of the Sentencing Act. (Proceedings in relation to a breach by reoffending under s 43(1) must be brought within two years of the expiration of the operational period.)

[10] The second contention is that Ms Lau cannot be a witness in the breach proceeding because she was the prosecutor in the proceeding before Judge Smith in which the breach is said to have occurred. (Ms Lau filed the original application and swore an affidavit in support annexing the transcript and audio recording of proceedings before Judge Smith.) There is no basis in law for this assertion and in any event, an amended application and supporting affidavit have been filed by Mr Greg Macdonald on behalf of the Registrar. It is that amended application which is before me.

[11] The third contention is a vague allegation that Ms Lau, the Registrar of the Supreme Court, Mr Macdonald and several other people all acted outside the law. No rational basis is given in the "affidavit" for this assertion.

[12] The "affidavit" of 27 January 2017 repeats most of the allegations in the earlier document. It also accuses Ms Lau of perjury and malice without any basis whatsoever.

[13] In that "affidavit" Mr Jenkins contends that a three month old affidavit cannot be accepted as evidence and cites s 6(i), (ii) and (iii) and s 20(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Evidence Act as authority. This is the plainest nonsense. There are not even any such numbered sections in either the Evidence Act or the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT).

[14] In the "affidavit", Mr Jenkins foreshadows an intention to call the Registrar, Ms Lau, Mr Macdonald and several others as witnesses. Of these the only one who might be able to give relevant evidence is Ms Lau who was present when the alleged breaches occurred and she is not necessary given the existence of the recording. (In any event Mr Jenkins has elsewhere asserted she in not able to give evidence in the proceeding.)

[15] Mr Jenkins complains further that the Sheriff has refused to give Mr Jenkins access to a computer on a day suitable to him. I have spoken to the Sheriff and am satisfied that he has offered Mr Jenkins the use of a court computer on which to listen to the recording of the relevant court proceeding subject to reasonable conditions and Mr Jenkins has rejected the offer. In any case his preparation is a matter for him - not the Court. I note that there are a number of (largely incomprehensible) emails from Mr Jenkins on the court file so it is clear that he has access to a computer to listen to the recording if he wishes. There is an affidavit of service on file. Mr Jenkins was served with a copy of the recording.

[16] Mr Jenkins complains of "double jeopardy" on the ground that Judge Smith elected not to deal with him for contempt. That is a matter for Judge Smith.[20] The fact that Judge Smith did not charge Mr Jenkins with contempt for his conduct does not mean that that conduct was not a breach of a condition of his suspended sentence. These are two completely different matters.

[17] He seeks "a formal listing and setting aside until these matters are fully venerated in full". This seems to be an application for a stay but no basis for the grant of a stay is set out.

[18] He makes reference to Order 23 i), ii) and iii) and says that the Registrar should have picked up that this application and supporting affidavit are an abuse of process and should have rejected them. There are no such Rules. On the assumption that the intended reference was to Rule 23.01, that rule provides that the Court may stay proceedings which are an abuse of process - not the Registrar. In any case Mr Jenkins has set out in his "affidavit" no rational basis for supposing that the application is an abuse of process.

[19] In the "affidavit" of 27 January 2017 Mr Jenkins complains of lack of access to the Supreme Court library. There is no automatic right for members of the public to use the judges' library. The Supreme Court Library is for the use of and within the exclusive control of the judges of the Supreme Court. It is located on a restricted private access floor which also houses the chambers of the judges and Master of the Supreme Court, and the judges of the Federal Court and the Federal Circuit Court. The judges of the Supreme Court have extended conditional use privileges to certain limited classes of people (including legal practitioners) as specified in the Access & Loans Policy. Prior to the hearing of the breach proceeding, Mr Jenkins was given the opportunity to use the Supreme Court Library on reasonable conditions on application to the Master but he refused to comply with those conditions. He has stated elsewhere that he has access to the Charles Darwin University library. In any case, this is not a reason to stay the breach proceedings. The breach proceedings do not require resort to a library. The issues are factual and discretionary: did Mr Jenkins breach the conditions of his suspended sentence and, if so, what should the consequences be?

[20] The "affidavit" says that Mr Jenkins wants to have the breach proceedings vacated because he is suffering from stress. That is not a reason not to proceed. Being dealt with for an alleged breach of a suspended sentence of imprisonment, carrying with it as it does the risk that the person maybe returned to prison, is an intrinsically stressful experience. That is no reason why it should not be done.

[21] The "affidavit" says that Mr Jenkins wants a three week adjournment of the proceeding. This was given to him, and the proceeding was further adjourned on 10 February 2017 to 8 March 2017 (and then again to 15 March 2017).

[22] Finally, the "affidavit" makes reference to a number of irrelevant matters (Mr Jenkins' prosecution of the Sheriff and his application for an Ochre Card) and says that he has been working on this matter right through Christmas and New Year.

[23] The "affidavit" of 31 January repeats the same complaints as the first "affidavit" of 19 January.

[24] Further, it makes a vague un-particularised complaint about "administrative irregularities" in the amended application and affidavit filed by Mr Macdonald. That complaint is baseless. This is a perfectly straightforward breach application in the prescribed form (Form 4).

[25] The 31 January "affidavit" also asserts that because Ms Lau withdrew her application - the same application Mr Jenkins complains was improperly brought - "legally the matter is dead". That is not correct. The breach allegations have yet to be dealt with. The court is not functus officio. There is no issue estoppel or res judicata or anything of that nature.

[26] Finally, that "affidavit" complains that the allegations of breach are insufficiently particularised. I disagree. The application sets out the conduct complained of by reference to the paragraphs of the order suspending the sentence and gives the transcript page references and the times on the audio recording where this conduct is evidenced. Mr Jenkins is clearly on notice that at the times specified he is said to have disrupted the proceeding before Judge Smith and failed to comply with his directions, and he is directed to seven pages of the transcript where this occurred.

[27] In his "affidavit" of 7 February 2017 Mr Jenkins again repeats his previous complaints. He also says he has applied for legal aid. (Because of this he was granted a further adjournment.)

[28] He then refers to "three pertinent new facts". These appear to be:

• (a) the fact that he wants to make application for a stay of these proceedings as an abuse of process;
• (b) an assertion that he has made application for judicial review; and

(c) an assertion that a corrections officer who wrote a report saying Mr Jenkins was not suitable for community work had committed perjury.[21]

[29] Mr Jenkins does not specify what these matters are said to be pertinent to. Nor does he say what decision he is seeking to have judicially reviewed. (Judicial review is governed by Order 56, not Order 75: that deals with contempt proceedings.) In any case those proceedings (if they exist) can have no bearing on the present application by the Registrar for Mr Jenkins to be dealt with for breach of his suspended sentence. The existence of other proceedings does not act as a stay of the sentence, affect Mr Jenkins' duty to comply with the conditions of his suspended sentence, or have any bearing on the factual question of whether he has failed to do so or what the consequences should be if he has. Exactly the same goes for the alleged perjury of the corrections officer. (It should be noted that the officer's report was not on oath. Further, I have seen nothing to suggest that the officer behaved at all improperly.)

[30] In oral submissions on 15 March 2017 directed to the application for a stay of proceedings, Mr Jenkins focused on Ms Lau. His first complaint (essentially) was that Ms Lau should have brought the behaviour complained of to the attention of Judge Smith at the time and that Judge Smith could have dealt with him on the spot for the alleged breach. I pointed out to Mr Jenkins that Judge Smith did not have jurisdiction to deal with him in the Local Court for breach of a sentence imposed by the Supreme Court. Mr Jenkins informed me that I was wrong.

[31] Mr Jenkins' next allegation was (essentially) that Ms Lau had an ulterior motive in bringing the breach proceedings, namely that she wanted to stop him from "winning" in the Local Court proceedings in which she was prosecuting him. There is not the slightest basis in the evidence for such a contention. In any event, the breach proceeding that Mr Jenkins has applied to have stayed is one brought by the Registrar, not Ms Lau, and it is supported by affidavits of Mr Macdonald, not Ms Lau.

[32] In MacDonnell Shire Council v Miller,[22] Mildren J considered what constitutes an "abuse of process". His Honour said:

Proceedings are brought for an improper purpose and are therefore an abuse of process where the purpose is not to prosecute them to conclusion but to use them as a means of obtaining some advantage for which they are not designed or some collateral advantage beyond that which the law offers. However, the existence of an ultimate purpose cannot constitute an abuse of process when that purpose is to bring about a result for which the law provides in the event that the action is successful. Further, the improper purpose must be the predominant purpose.[23]

[33] Mr Jenkins has alleged that the application that he be dealt with for breach of his suspended sentence was brought by Ms Lau to stop him from "winning" in the Local Court proceeding before Judge Smith in which Ms Lau was the prosecutor and Mr Jenkins was the defendant. I have seen no evidence to suggest that that was a purpose on Ms Lau's part, let alone the predominant purpose. In any case, the breach proceedings presently before me are brought on an application filed by the Registrar and supported by affidavits sworn by Mr Macdonald.

[34] Mr Jenkins has not demonstrated that the breach proceedings are an abuse of process. The application for a permanent stay of proceedings is dismissed.

[35] The next application was an application by Mr Macdonald on behalf of the Registrar and the subpoenaed parties to set aside certain subpoenas issued by Mr Jenkins. Those subpoenas were issued to Judge Smith, Mr Macdonald, Ms Lau, Ms Readman, Ms Milligan (or the Registrar), "Orderly C3 21st [illegible] 2016", and "Male Wilson Security Guard Ct 3".

[36] I do not know whether any of those subpoenas were served or, if they were, whether the subpoenaed parties were given the appropriate conduct money as required by s 194(1)(c) of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act and Rule 42.06 of the Supreme Court Rules. Given Mr Jenkins' often repeated statements to the effect that he lives without money, I doubt it.

[37] I set aside the subpoena issued to Judge Smith on the grounds that a judicial officer cannot be subpoenaed to give evidence about what happened in a proceeding before him or her.[24]

[38] I asked Mr Jenkins what evidence he wanted the other subpoenaed persons to give in order to ascertain whether there was a legitimate forensic purpose for the issue of the subpoenas. In relation to Ms Lau, Mr Jenkins began with a long, largely incomprehensible tirade, the flavour of which can be gained from the first few sentences:

Underneath the - underneath the Local Court Act, underneath the civil conditions, if you're calling oral evidence underneath the Supreme Court rules, also if you're calling - calling what you would call oral evidence that you're talking, you can cross-examine the person to say the meaning of that oral evidence that they're saying. So when you're in a situation it's about witnesses. The same as the situation, if I wasn't able to call witnesses in my contempt. There's a situation of the mens rea of what's going on, okay? So why in situation of discovery - and this is why the adjournments are so important. Ms Lau had an intent.[25]

[39] Eventually it seemed to me that Mr Jenkins was saying that he wanted to question Ms Lau about the reasons why she brought the breach proceedings against him (or perhaps why she did not bring them straight away in the course of the proceeding before Judge Smith).[26] As that had nothing to do with the breach proceeding,[27] I set the subpoena aside.

[40] The next subpoenaed person was Jessica Readman. It turned out that she had witnessed Ms Lau's affidavit and served it on Mr Jenkins (according to Mr Jenkins at least).[28] It appeared that he wanted to call her to give evidence that she knew nothing about the matter. (Apparently Mr Jenkins took the fact that she had witnessed an affidavit to be a representation by her that she did know something about the facts set out in it and he wanted to establish that this was not the case.) Accordingly, I set that subpoena aside too.

[41] At this point in the proceeding, Mr Jenkins became agitated. He went into an extended tirade which included assertions that, "I don't like dominant women, I don't like that,"[29] and, "I'm a great, great artist and a great, great person and a great, great person in this society, and I intend to stand for Lord Mayor, and I don't intend to go to gaol, I'll tell you that now. And I'm going to be pushing it."[30]

[42] I gave Mr Jenkins a final opportunity to say what evidence he wanted to call from the people he had purported to subpoena. He failed to do so. I could see no reasonable possibility that any of them would have anything relevant to say in relation to the breach proceeding and I set the remaining subpoenas aside.

[43] After I had made the order setting the subpoenas aside, and before I had published these reasons, Mr Jenkins responded by purporting to issue a bundle of fresh subpoenas dated 10 March 2017. These documents were largely incomprehensible. For the most part it was not clear who they were addressed to, what they required or when they were returnable. They should not have been accepted and stamped with the court seal. That they were issued and stamped is understandable in the circumstances. Mr Jenkins' manner when he attends the Registry is generally difficult and confrontational and on one occasion he physically assaulted one of the Registry staff. This leads staff to simply accept and stamp his documents, regardless whether they are intelligible or otherwise comply with the Rules, and they can hardly be blamed for doing so. The Chief Justice has now issued a direction and order under s 17 of the Court Security Act 1998 (NT) restricting Mr Jenkins' access to the Registry. For the sake of completeness I now set aside the subpoenas which Mr Jenkins purported to issue on 10 March 2017.

[44] The final matter I dealt with on 15 May was the application that Mr Jenkins be dealt with for breaching his suspended sentence.

[45] On 20 April 2016 I found Mr Jenkins guilty of contempt of Court. On 11 May 2016, I convicted him and sentenced him to imprisonment for three months suspended after two weeks beginning on 7 May 2016 on the following conditions.

For the next 12 months after you are released, when appearing before any court:

(i) you are not to engage in any behaviour that is intended to disrupt any court proceedings or which has the effect of disrupting any court proceedings (This includes, without limiting the generality of this condition, interrupting or talking over the judge.);

(ii) you are to address the presiding judge correctly as "your honour";

(iii) you are to conduct yourself courteously and avoid abusive and offensive language;

(iv) you are to comply with all directions of the presiding judge.

[46] The notice of conditions of the suspended sentence bearing the words: "I acknowledge that the conditions have been explained to me and I understand them and consent to them," was signed by Mr Jenkins on 12 May 2016. Mr Jenkins was released from prison on 20 May 2016.

[47] Mr Jenkins appeared before Judge Smith in the Local Court on 21 October 2016 on the hearing of a number of charges against him including assault and causing substantial annoyance and it is alleged that during the course of that proceeding Mr Jenkins breached the following conditions of his suspended sentence:

• (a) He engaged in conduct that was intended to disrupt proceedings or which had the effect of disrupting proceedings.

• (b) He did not comply with directions of the Judge.

[48] The applicant gave particulars of the alleged breaches. They are said to be evidenced by pages 10 to 17 of the transcript of proceedings on that day and digital recording of proceedings between 10.47.30 and 10.50.30.[31]

[49] To put the allegations in context, during that part of the proceeding recorded on those pages and that part of the recording, the prosecutor, Ms Lau, was calling evidence from one of the prosecution witnesses, Mr Pratt. (This begins at p 8 of the transcript.) Mr Jenkins began interrupting the witness's answers and Judge Smith directed him not to do so. The first example occurs on page 9:

WITNESS: We were in the presbytery and we met just on the corner of that covered ----

HIS HONOUR: Mr Jenkins, I've already had to deal with this on the last occasion. If you disagree with the witness that's a matter for you. You cross-examine him. You're not to interfere with his evidence.

HIS HONOUR: Well, you can bring your evidence about that when you put a correct one. Sit down.

MR JENKINS: Can I put a correct film in there, Your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Whenever you have a film of it you could put it in, in a way that's part of your case. Sit down.

MR JENKINS: This is an incorrect drawing. Can I do a proper drawing of how it is?

HIS HONOUR: Sit down Mr Jenkins. You're not doing any drawings at the moment. This is Ms Lau's witness. She's examining him. Sit down.

[50] Mr Jenkins' behaviour continued (and intensified) on the pages which constitute the particularised conduct. He ignored the judge's direction not to interrupt the witness's evidence and spoke over and interrupted the judge. The following extract from pp 10 and 11 to the top of p 12 followed on immediately from the passage set out above.

MS LAU: Your Honour, I tender that. I believe it's P6.

MR JENKINS: I object to that your Honour. This isn't evidence, your Honour. I object to that. It's an incorrect drawing.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Jenkins, sit down. I've already given you a final warning. There won't be another one. If you do not sit down within five seconds and stop this you'll be taken into custody.

MR JENKINS: How do I object to this if I don't want ---

HIS HONOUR: You've objected. I understand you object. You'll need to either cross-examine him or call your own evidence. Now allow Ms Lau to give her evidence.

MR JENKINS: I'm not allowing this to be put into evidence, Your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: It's going in. You can cross-examine on it.

[51] Ms Lau managed to ask three more questions. Before the witness answered the third question, Mr Jenkins interrupted again.

MS LAU: It's on the witness list that's been provided.[32]

MR JENKINS: Can I get a list of that? Can I get the name please?

HIS HONOUR: Just ask the witness to spell out the name please?

WITNESS: I can spell out the first name but I can't spell the second name.

MR JENKINS: It's what the defence does, your Honour. If I do it well what's wrong with that?

HIS HONOUR: You do it all day long for other purposes.

[52] Ms Lau asked one more question and received one answer before Mr Jenkins interrupted again.

MR JENKINS: Can I ask why he was moved into the presbytery?

HIS HONOUR: No you can't. You can ask that in cross-examination. Sit down.

[53] Ms Lau asked one more question and received one more answer and Mr Jenkins interrupted again. The questions related to some photographs that were being shown to the witness.

[54] It was established that Mr Jenkins had already been provided with a copy of the photographs and Ms Lau gave him another set. Then Mr Jenkins continued with his interruption.

MR JENKINS: I've looked at these and they're all false your Honour. That's why I don't use them.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Well you do your cross-examination on that.

HIS HONOUR: When you cross-examine. You know how to cross-examine Mr Jenkins.

[55] Ms Lau asked a series of questions and tendered a number of photographs and then Mr Jenkins interrupted again (at p13).

MR JENKINS: I'd like a general objection, your Honour, that when these photographs were taken all the furniture and everything's been moved from what it was when I was there.

[56] Ms Lau asked two more questions and got two more brief answers when Mr Jenkins interrupted again with further commentary on the witness's evidence.

MS LAU: Did Father Roy come inside after that? --- Yes he did.

MR JENKINS: Objection your Honour. He didn't say that. He said that they moved inside and then they were going to wait. So they actually moved inside. Not till 10 past 7.00. They went inside. That's what he said. Now he's changing his evidence.

HIS HONOUR: Sit down Mr Jenkins. Sit down please. I understand your objection.

[57] Ms Lau asked two more questions and got two more answers and Mr Jenkins interrupted again (at p 14).

MR JENKINS: So does that mean he waited outside or he waited inside?

HIS HONOUR: Just a moment please Mr Jenkins. You can ask these questions in your cross-examination. If the Crown fails to elicit relevant evidence that's to your advantage. Now ---

[58] Four more questions followed concerning where a person referred to as "Father Roy" was standing at a particular time and Mr Jenkins interrupted again (still at p 14) with further commentary on the witness's evidence.

MR JENKINS: Your Honour, there's a large distance between that and the covered in area.

[59] The witness was asked by Ms Lau to mark on a photograph where he said Father Roy was standing and Mr Jenkins continued his commentary.

MR JENKINS: The covered in area is about another 20 foot away.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Jenkins, this is not a matter for you to make commentary. I'm not going to allow you to persist with this. If you go on with it I've already warned you of the consequences. Yes Ms Lau.

[60] Before Ms Lau could ask her next question Mr Jenkins responded (at p15) with an irrelevant interjection.

[61] Ms Lau managed to ask one more question before Mr Jenkins interrupted again.

MS LAU: At some point after that did Father O'Neill come inside? --- Father Roy.

MR JENKINS: You said to point out the place. He hasn't pointed out the place where he was standing.

HIS HONOUR: Will you show this to Mr Jenkins please?

MR JENKINS: There's no mark on there. That's right down by the car park.

HIS HONOUR: Whatever it is, that's what he says it is. You can cross-examine on it. Now sit down.

MR JENKINS: It should be on this photo. That's how ---

[62] Ms Lau asked four more questions and Mr Jenkins commented on the fourth answer (at pp 15 -16).

MR JENKINS: Objection. How could he identify me when he can't see me?

HIS HONOUR: Sit down Mr Jenkins, and I reject the objection. I'll allow the question.

[63] Before the witness could answer that question, Mr Jenkins decided to take over the questioning of the witness (at p16).

MR JENKINS: Was Father Roy inside or outside when he said that?

[64] Ms Lau asked the witness two questions about how he knew Mr Jenkins and Mr Jenkins interrupted again - this time to take over answering the questions and to argue with the Judge (at p16 -17).

MR JENKINS: As a prison guard he knows me well, your Honour. I was in remand ---

HIS HONOUR: Mr Jenkins, I've given you how many last opportunities? If you interject with a commentary I will have you taken out of this court.

MR JENKINS: Well how do I make objection what his evidence is?

HIS HONOUR: This is the final time I'll tell you. She is entitled to ask her questions and he answers the questions. You make notes. When your cross-examination comes in that's when you put to him that something else is the case. We went through this on the last occasion with Father Neil.

Think about it carefully, Mr Jenkins. She puts her case and then you put your propositions to the witness. If you say that he's not telling the truth you wait until you get to the cross-examination and you put it to him in your cross-examination. This is not a matter where you jump up every ten seconds and interrupt as you have been doing for the last 15 minutes.

MR JENKINS: What happens when I do that, your Honour is that Ms Lau will say, 'I didn't say that,' and I will say he did say that and I have to go and get a transcript and appeal because nobody remembers what he says, okay.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Jenkins, I'm not going to argue with you. The transcript will be available. If you think you can't make your submissions I'll order the transcript before I hear the submissions and then we'll know exactly what was put on the record. Proceed Ms Lau.

THE WITNESS: Can I just clarify? In the prison, whenever Trevor comes in, it's the medium side. I work in the maximum side so I have no contact with Trevor Jenkins.

MR JENKINS: That's incorrect, your Honour. I mean, that's a complete lie because I was on remand.

HIS HONOUR: I'm going to stand the matter down. Mr Jenkins---

MR JENKINS: What am I supposed to do? He's on oath and he's lying.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Jenkins, I'm ordering that given your persistent interruptions throughout this matter I'm going to have you remanded in custody. I have revoked your bail. You are remanded in custody. I will determine after that whether and how I hear --- allow you to continue.

Thank you, sir, please take Mr Jenkins into custody. I've remanded him in custody. I've revoked his bail.

HIS HONOUR: I just note, I have the bail here that was signed by Mr Jenkins on 17 May. Adjourn the court please. Take him into custody.

MR JENKINS: When am I going to have the case heard?

[66] I have reviewed the transcript carefully and listened to the recording and I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Jenkins has breached the conditions of his suspended sentence.

[67] First, he failed to comply with the judge's repeated directions to him not to interrupt the questioning of the Crown witnesses with commentary and other interjections. Second, by that same behaviour he disrupted the proceeding and I am satisfied that he did so intentionally.

[68] I considered whether Mr Jenkins may simply have misunderstood the process of taking objections. In his oral submissions, Mr Jenkins made reference to "the bench book of how unrepresented litigants are supposed to be treated". (See [6](d) above.) The New South Wales Criminal Trials Bench Book contains the following suggested explanation of the objection procedure which may be given by the presiding judge to an unrepresented defendant.

You can object to any question asked by the Crown Prosecutor if you have a legal basis for doing so. An example of a legal basis for an objection is that a question is not relevant or it is unfair. If you want to object to any question, after it is asked but before it has been answered, you must stand up and say "I object". I will then hear whatever you want to say about the question, and depending on why you are objecting, I may do so in the absence of the jury. You cannot object simply because you disagree with the evidence. If you are unsure about your right to object to a question on legal grounds, you should ask me for assistance.

If the Crown seeks to tender material such as a document, photograph, video or other item, you have the right to object to its tender if there is a legal basis for the objection. If you want me to rule on the tender of any such material you should stand up and say, "I object", and I will then hear whatever you want to say. Again, I may do so in the absence of the jury.[33]

[69] I thought it possible that Mr Jenkins may have read and misunderstood this and, in particular, that he may not have understood the difference between objecting to a question on a ground that provides a legal basis for objection, and objecting to an answer on the basis that he thinks it is untrue or that he doesn't like it for some other reason. I do not dismiss that as a possibility, but nevertheless I am convinced beyond reasonable doubt that his disobedience to the judge's repeated direction to stop interfering was deliberate. I consider that there is no reasonable possibility that Mr Jenkins did not understand what the judge explained to him - ie that he must not interrupt the questioning by the prosecutor, and that if he wanted to challenge the evidence of the witness he must wait and do that in cross-examination. As the extract from p 16 of the transcript (referred to at [63] above) demonstrates, Mr Jenkins understood clearly what the judge was directing him to do, but he did not want to proceed that way for his own reasons. He therefore chose, intentionally, to ignore that direction and to disrupt the proceeding by persistently interrupting the Crown's evidence. Mr Jenkins' oral submissions about "the bench book of how unrepresented litigants are supposed to be treated" confirmed this view which I had reached on reviewing the transcript and the recording.

[70] Mr Jenkins also said in his oral submissions that he did not intend to disrupt the proceeding but to "bring in a better procedure for unrepresented litigants".[34] Essentially, Mr Jenkins took the view that Judge Smith was not conducting the proceeding the way Mr Jenkins would like it to be conducted (or thought it should be conducted), so he decided to ignore the judge's directions. In doing so he deliberately disrupted the proceeding by intentionally interfering with the giving of evidence by a Crown witness. He seemed absolutely determined to prevent any evidence he did not agree with from going before the judge.

[71] Another explanation given by Mr Jenkins for some of the interruptions relied on by the Registrar as constituting a breach of the suspended sentence was that he got angry and upset that the witness was giving false testimony. This was a reference to the interruptions on pages 16 and 17 of the transcript (set out at [63] above). I took Mr Jenkins to be implying that these interruptions were the result of momentary loss of control. If so, I reject that contention. I have listened to the recording as well as reading the transcript and throughout the particularised portion of the transcript, including pp 16 to 17, Mr Jenkins appears to be calm and measured, quite unlike those occasions on which I have personally witnessed him being agitated and aggressive in court. In fact it is in that portion of the transcript in which Mr Jenkins explained (calmly) why he did not intend to comply with the judge's direction.

[72] Another reason given by Mr Jenkins for his constant interruptions, and one which I accept is true, is that he believed (wrongly as it happens) that such behaviour was advantageous to his case. In oral submissions on 15 March 2017 he made the following remarks:

You mightn't understand, but I have to be whatever you want to say, aggressive or assertive to really push my case. And since I've been doing that, in the last year, I've won my cases against Ms Lau and I've won my cases ... all year.

So I've been a hundred per cent in winning my cases, because I've been an assertive and I've been aggressive. And if you went through any of the transcripts of any of my cases with, for example, Greg Cavanagh, I would have used more interjections than this and I would have used more forceful language, and - in that, and I found it to be effective in winning my cases. So I just feel that this is why I I'm talking about Ms Lau - I'm winning my cases because I have been assertive and aggressive and intelligent in that.[35]

If I don't stand up and argue the way I do, then I don't get things done, and that is just the way it is. So I can't stand back. Unless I stand there strongly, especially in a local court context when you're just running over and I don't sound strong and I don't sound firm, what happens is that if I don't take every opportunity, I've got myself out on bail out from the gaol.[36]

[73] Mr Jenkins' belief that he is justified in constantly interjecting in order to gain an advantage in his case does not mean that behaviour is not a breach of his suspended sentence: if anything it is an aggravating factor.

[74] He also said he didn't think he was disrupting proceedings because the proceedings continued. Apparently Mr Jenkins will only concede that he has caused a disruption if he succeeds in bringing the whole proceeding to a halt. I disagree. His interruptions did cause substantial disruption and a consequential lengthening of the proceeding.

[75] I therefore find that Mr Jenkins breached two conditions of his suspended sentence. He intentionally disrupted proceedings by continually interrupting the evidence of a Crown witness and he failed to comply with numerous directions by the trial judge that he cease doing so.

[76] I want to add some remarks about the extraordinary amount of this Court's resources which are being devoted to Mr Jenkins. It is true that a society can be judged by the way it treats its most disadvantaged members, and Mr Jenkins would have to qualify as among those most disadvantaged. It is also true that doing justice in the case of unrepresented litigants will sometimes involve a patient consideration of submissions that would be given short shrift if they came from a lawyer, to ensure that the unrepresented litigant perceives that he or she has been given an full and fair hearing. However, Mr Jenkins is coming to take up a disproportionate amount of the time and other limited resources of a relatively small court to the detriment of other litigants waiting for their matters to be brought on or for reserved judgments to be delivered.

[77] This is only one of the matters Mr Jenkins has before this Court - and there are others in the Local Court. This matter began as an appeal against three convictions recorded against Mr Jenkins in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction. That appeal was heard by Barr J over six days. The resulting 56 page judgment would necessarily have taken many days work. Barr J allowed the appeal against one conviction on what was essentially a technicality. I have read the transcript and can say that all or almost all of the contentions made by Mr Jenkins over those six days were utterly without merit. (The one aspect on which he succeeded was not advanced by Mr Jenkins but identified by his Honour.)

[78] As a result of his behaviour during the hearing of that appeal, Barr J directed the Registrar to charge Mr Jenkins with contempt. The Registrar did so and this resulted in many directions hearings, an unsuccessful application by Mr Jenkins to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that I had no jurisdiction, a hearing and a sentencing hearing. I spent many, many days reading transcript, sifting through Mr Jenkins' handwritten submissions and bulk photocopied material, and many, many more days writing two judgments - one on the jurisdictional issue and one on the substantive contempt application - as well as sentencing remarks.

[79] That was followed by this application that Mr Jenkins be dealt with for breaching his suspended sentence. Again this has involved multiple directions hearings, dealing with preliminary applications, sifting through a large volume of barely legible, barely comprehensible written material filed by Mr Jenkins trying to identify the substance of his contentions, and many, many days judgment writing dealing with contentions that by and large have no merit whatsoever. This is time I have not been able to spend writing other reserved judgments. Further, in addition to the Court time and judgment writing time involved, there has been a substantial allocation of resources in the registry and the library dealing with Mr Jenkins' special needs and problematic behaviour. This disproportionate allocation of resources cannot continue indefinitely.

[1] Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 493_; Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association_ [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 293-294; R v Watson; ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 at p 258-263

[2] If anything, the fact that the judicial officer imposing the sentence thought fit to suspend (or partially suspend) the sentence subject to conditions would seem to indicate a preliminary view that the person could and would comply with the conditions, not that they were likely to breach them.

[3] Jenkins v Todd [2016] NTSC 21 at [23]- [97]

[4] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 11

[5] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 11

[7] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 60

[8] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 51

[9] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 52

[10] This is just one example of Mr Jenkins' expectations of the level of assistance he feels he should receive from judicial officers hearing proceedings in which he is involved. In written submissions in the contempt proceeding before me Mr Jenkins wrote:

"he [ie Barr J] could easily have said Mr Jenkins it's nice to see you here it is not often a homeless man with no resources takes the time and effort to show himself in court & exercise the mighty priviledge of a just and fair legal apparatus & I know your have no experience so I am going to take the time and explain some processes my assistant will work with you & show how to make submissions ..." Jenkins v Todd [2016] NTSC 21 at [77] contained in footnote 59

[11] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 55

[12] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 7; he also said, "I feel - this is my feeling - you look at the outside of me and you think I'm not an educated person."

[13] Mr Jenkins has made the same complaint about proceedings in the Local Court in which he was dealt with for assault (and other charges) which gave rise to the appeal before Barr J which in turn gave rise to the contempt conviction and the suspended sentence which he is now accused of breaching. It is hard to be certain, but I think he has also made the same complaint about the proceedings against him before Judge Smith in the Local Court which gave rise to these breach proceedings. He seems to be saying that it is the job of the Court (or perhaps the prosecutor) to call his witnesses for him. Yet at other times Mr Jenkins appears to have at least some understanding of the process and of the fact that it is his responsibility to organise and call his own witnesses. (He issued subpoenas in this proceeding. Further, both before Judge Smith and before me, he made enquiries about the times at which his witnesses should turn up.)

[14] Jenkins v Todd [2016] NTSC 21 at [10] and [69]

[15] Later during that hearing on 15 March, Mr Jenkins said, "So like, if you want me to see me take me clothes off again, I will, because this is ridiculous."

[16] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 09.05.2016) at 3

[17] He complained that he was required to run down to the court (ie the Local Court) right at the end of the day to have the assessment done. In fact the sentencing hearing was adjourned to 1.30 pm the following day, and Mr Jenkins was granted bail to enable him to attend to have the assessment completed "as soon as practicable" which it was assumed would be the following morning.

[18] The following is an extract from the transcript of the sentencing remarks immediately following my reading out of this Assessment for Community Work Order report on Mr Jenkins:

You are now shouting, gesticulating, trying to attract attention to yourself from the vulnerable witness room, which is the reason I placed you in there in the first place. It seems to me that although you said you were not argumentative, the likelihood is very high that you were. And in view of your attitude, which you are currently expressing at this very moment, I would not put the burden on Community Corrections to be responsible for supervising you under a Community Work Order.

[19] The Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration Incorporated, Guide to Judicial Conduct, published for The Council of Chief Justices of Australia (2nd ed, 2007) at 1

[20] I made it very clear when sentencing Mr Jenkins for contempt that in imposing the conditions of Mr Jenkins suspended sentence requiring him to behave appropriately in court, I was not purporting to interfere with the control and management of any other court by any other judicial officer. I said:

If you carry on in a disgraceful fashion in a court room again in the next 12 months after you are released, it will of course be a matter for the presiding judicial officer at the time to determine what to do about it. But whatever the presiding judicial officer decides to do, or not to do, in addition to that, you can be expected to be brought back before me and I will almost certainly restore the outstanding balance of your suspended sentence.

[21] Mr Jenkins asserted that the corrections officer told him there was no community service available in op shops and that this was a lie. From the report what appears actually to have happened is that Mr Jenkins asserted an entitlement to choose what kind of community service he should do and was aggressive and argumentative when the corrections officer tried to explain to him how a community work order worked.

[22] [2009] NTSC 46 at [12]

[23] See also Michael Grant CJ, Presidian Legal Publications, Civil Procedure Northern Territory (at 2 September 2016) [5.23.26.]

[24] Hennessy v Broken Hill Co Pty Ltd [1926] HCA 32; (1926) 38 CLR 342 at 349

[25] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 21

[26] His final submission on the matter was: "I'm talking about Ms Lau has to give evidence because I've actually subpoenaed her, okay? So she has to give evidence, the same as I'm turning up." This rather begged the question.

[27] I had already dismissed the stay application. The evidence Mr Jenkins wanted to call from Ms Lau would not have been relevant to that application either. The application before me was brought by the Registrar, not Ms Lau.

[28] It appears from the submissions of Mr Macdonald and the affidavit of Jessica Readman sworn on 12 December 2016 that the only substantive involvement Ms Jessica Readman had in relation to the breach application dated 5 December 2016 (ie Ms Lau's application) was to seek to serve Mr Jenkins with the application for breach. My understanding is that he refused service. In her affidavit, Ms Readman said to Mr Jenkins, "Mr Jenkins, I am serving these documents on you". Mr Jenkins did not accept the documents and simply said, "Fuck this".

[29] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 25; This remark was preceded by the following:

"I'm a self-represented person who is saying, why do I sit with male chief justices, male people and they don't patronise me, they listen. It's easy going. Why do you berate me? Why do you put me down? Why do you put me under pressure? Why? I want it stopped."

This should be contrasted with the submission made by Mr Jenkins during the contempt proceeding that during the hearing of his appeal Barr J had "patronised him, demeaned him, treated him like a child and tried to pick a fight with him" - accusations which I found to be utterly unfounded. Jenkins v Todd [2016] NTSC 21 at [67] - [95]

[30] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 15.03.2017) at 25

[31] Transcript of Proceedings, Police v Jenkins (NTLC, 21556341, Smith J, 21.10.2016)

[32] This is a tactic frequently adopted by Mr Jenkins - interrupting to ask for copies of documents he has already been given (or has been offered and refused) and repeatedly asking for things to be repeated which have just been loudly and clearly stated. During the hearing of the breach application Mr Jenkins kept interrupting during submissions by Mr Macdonald and refused to comply with my directions to be quiet. I threatened to have him taken into custody, but allowed him to remain at the bar table on condition that he "not say another word until invited to do so". He agreed and then asked Mr Macdonald (unnecessarily) to repeat every single transcript page number he referred to. Eventually I resorted to the expedient of having Mr Jenkins take part in proceedings from the vulnerable witness room where the microphone could be turned off.

[33] Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book (at July 2016) [1-820] Suggested advice and information to accused in the absence of the jury

[34] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 09.05.2016) at 55

[35] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 09.05.2016) at 42-43

[36] Transcript of Proceedings, Jenkins v Todd (NTSC, JA10 of 2015 (21425645), Kelly J, 09.05.2016) at 46