1. to ascertain the identity and an address of each of the individuals to be able to effect service of originating documents;

1. The relevant statutory provisions of the Freedom of Information Act relating to this proceeding are -

(1) Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if it is a document the disclosure of which under this Act -

(a) would disclose matter in the nature of opinion, advice or recommendation prepared by an officer or Minister, or consultation or deliberation that has taken place between officers, Ministers, or an officer and a Minister, in the course of, or for the purpose of, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the government; and

(1) Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be reasonably likely to -

(a) prejudice the investigation of a breach or possible breach of the law or prejudice the enforcement or proper administration of the law in a particular instance;

(b) prejudice the fair trial of a person or the impartial adjudication of a particular case;

(c) disclose, or enable a person to ascertain, the identity of a confidential source of information in relation to the enforcement or administration of the law;

(d) disclose methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law the disclosure of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures; or

(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person (including a deceased person).

information relating to the personal affairs of any person includes information -

(a) that identifies any person or discloses their address or location; or

(b) from which any person's identity, address or location can reasonably be determined.

EXEMPTION CLAIMED PURSUANT TO S 31(1)(a) AND (b)

1. The respondent claims exemption pursuant to s 31(1)(a) and (b) in relation to all documents in dispute except Document 41. In relation to the trial of the two persons named, who have been charged in relation to the incident, those documents form part of the brief of evidence or would otherwise disclose evidence to be called in the prosecution of those alleged offenders.
2. In paragraphs [15] to [23] inclusive of the witness statement of Detective Senior Constable Hayes, he correctly describes each of those documents as follows:
   1. Documents in categories 3 and 4, and the records of interview for the accused in category 5, form part of the brief of evidence. The remaining documents, although they do not form part of the brief, contain details about the incident the subject of the charges. Also, documents such as those in categories 2 and 7 are often called for and used by both sides - by the prosecution in preparation for trial and by defence counsel in making forensic decisions and often in cross-examination. There is a very real likelihood that such documents could eventually form part of the evidence at trial. Also, they contain evidence which may be relied on in future prosecutions.
   2. Document 1 is an extract from the LEAP database. It is a record of the incident. The report was submitted to the LEAP database by a police member, to record the details of the incident. It is used as a reference by police members State-wide as it includes every particular of the incident including date, time, narrative and people involved.
   3. Document 12 is an internal report by Constable Phyland's supervisor on the night of the incident, in which he briefed detectives from Yarra CIU on the incident. This was the standard protocol for handing over serious crime incidents that had occurred during night shift.
   4. Document 18 is photographs of important evidence in the prosecution case. Document 22 is CCTV footage taken from the security system at the public housing where the incident took place.
   5. Document 23 is a witness statement taken from Steven Doulgeris, who was a witness to the incident.
   6. Documents 27 and 28 are transcripts of the audio-visually recorded interview of suspects by the police during which allegations were made to the suspects and other related questions asked. Document 27 forms part of the brief of evidence. Document 28 does not. However, Document 28 may form part of the evidence in a future prosecution if further charges are brought.
   7. Document 34 is a copy of email correspondence between police officers. It concerns, amongst other things, the involvement in another criminal investigation of the suspects arrested and a discussion about the first investigation. Document 41 is the daybook notes of a police officer that detail his opinion on the second investigation.
   8. Document 42 is a handwritten account by a police officer of the duties conducted on the date some suspects were arrested and interviewed.
   9. Document 47 is a document created by me outlining the planned investigation of the incident. It contains details of the incident and planned avenues of enquiry.

KEY ELEMENTS OF S 31(1)(a) AND (b)

1. For a document to be exempt pursuant to s 31(1)(a) and (b) of the Act, its disclosure would be reasonably likely to : prejudice the enforcement or proper administration of the law in a particular instance or prejudice the fair trial of a person_._
2. In Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VicRp 73; (1989) VR 836 at 842 Marks J sitting in the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria stated (with agreement of Young CJ and Teague J) as follows :

The expression 'reasonably likely' is substantially idiomatic, its meaning not necessarily unlocked by close dissection. In its ordinary use, it speaks of a chance of an event occurring or not occurring which is real - not fanciful or remote. It does not refer to a chance which is more likely than not to occur, that is, one which is 'odds on', or where between nil and certainty it should be placed. A chance which in common parlance is described as 'reasonable' is one that is 'fair', 'sufficient' or 'worth noting'. It is not inapt to attribute such meaning to the expression in s 31(1) of the Act.

1. That passage was approved by Bromberg J in the Federal Court in Eatock v Bolt [2011] FCA 1103 at [259]- [260].

1. In Sobh v Police Force of Victoria [1994] VicRp 2; (1994) 1 VR 41 at 55, Nathan J who was sitting as a Member of the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria stated :

Prejudice is not a term of legal art. It means to impede or derogate from. Its content is governed by the matters which may be impeded or derogated from, which in this case is the administration of the law.

1. In this particular instance, Mr Nekvapil counsel for the respondent submitted that, "a criminal prosecution for an indictable offence is at the core of what is meant by 'enforcement or proper administration of the law in a particular instance'." He further submitted : "it identifies a specific countervailing public interest, sufficient to provide an exception to the general public interest in disclosure".
2. While this phrase is not exclusive to the criminal law, it is certainly very important in criminal law cases that release of documents should not prejudice the proper administration and enforcement of the law or the right to a fair trial. Thus I accept Mr Nekvapil's submission on this point.

1. Judge Fricke (Deputy President) sitting in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Re O'Sullivan and Police Force of Victoria 1 VAR 171 at 175 considered the meaning of enforcement in s 31(1)(a) of the Act. After considering the authorities, his Honour stated :

The concept of 'enforcement ... of the law in a particular instance' may be similar to that of an investigation: ... It seems to contemplate that an offence has already been committed, following which investigations are conducted and proceedings brought.

1. In this particular instance, an alleged offence has already been committed and proceedings have been brought against two of the alleged perpetrators. Therefore, it seems clear that in this particular instance documents which have been created, relate to the enforcement of the law.

1. There was considerable debate between the applicant and Mr Nekvapil as to the meaning of the words "proper administration of the law". The applicant said that the administration of the law should be confined to practice and procedure which he submitted is not concerned with the success or otherwise of the prosecution.
2. In support of the above proposition, the applicant referred to the decision of Ashley J in Sobh's case (supra) at p 63 where his Honour stated :

... I accept, that the 'administration of the law' required to be considered is the administration of the law unaffected by any right to access of documents given by the Act.

1. However, the quotation referred to above by the applicant ignores what his Honour Ashley J said in the very next paragraph of Sobh's case, where he stated at pp 63-64:

To say that 'the proper administration of the law' is inclusive of its practices and procedures does not, in my opinion, exhaust the content of that imprecise phrase. It should be considered to extend to the conduct of litigation generally, the object of which is to achieve justice between the parties; not abstract 'justice', but justice achieved within the framework of the law - a framework encompassing both substantive law and practices and procedures both pre-trial and during trial. In Croom's Case ([1991] 2 VR 332) at p 324, Young CJ referring to s 31(1)(a) said this '... the administration of the law indicates, something concerned with the process of the enforcement of legal rights or duties. I agree, with respect, in O'Bryan J's observation that to fall within s 31 a document should have a connection with the criminal law or with the process of upholding or enforcing civil law'."

1. It should also be noted that his Honour had earlier stated between lines 15 and 27 at p 63 :

In resolving the problem before the court it should be accepted that the phrase 'the ... administration of the law' includes relevant matters of practice and procedure. ... It does not follow, however, that the phrase is concerned only with such matters.

1. Having considered what has been said in Sobh's case, I agree with the submission made by Mr Nekvapil that "the distinction between 'enforcement of the law' and 'proper administration of the law' is enforcement of the law deals with the actual enforcement (ie, in this context prosecution) of the law whereas 'proper administration of the law' deals with the manner in which the law is administered". In this particular instance, the documents concerned with this exemption fall within the meaning of both "enforcement of the law" and "proper administration of the law" as they are likely to be relevant to the committal proceedings and perhaps subsequent trial of the two persons charged with matters arising out of the incident.

Whether the release of the documents over which the exemption in s 31(1)(a) is claimed would be reasonably likely to prejudice the prosecution

1. The respondent relies upon the evidence of Detective Senior Constable Hayes to show that if the documents were released to the applicant the prosecution could be severely prejudiced in the trial of the two individuals referred to above who have been charged in relation to the incident.
2. Detective Senior Constable Hayes in his witness statement at paragraphs [25] to [33] inclusive states as follows :
   1. All categories contain either evidence that will be directly relied on in the upcoming prosecution (eg category 3 contains exhibits, category 4 contains witness statements, and category 5 contains records of interview) or documents that provide circumstantial evidence or information relating to the evidence (eg category 1 contains LEAP reports relating to the accused and to suspects, category 2 contains detailed summaries of the alleged incident, category 6 contains deliberative documents relating to the investigation, and categories 7 and 8 contain records and intelligence products relating to the second investigation). The release of documents to the Applicant, prior to that prosecution, would undermine the enforcement of law and prejudice the fair trial of the accused in that prosecution.
   2. In the event that one or both of the accused contest the charges against them, as may happen in the immediate future, the applicant would be likely to be called as a key witness in that prosecution. Based on my experience, the release of the brief of evidence to a witness would be contrary to standard criminal procedure. I have never known this to happen, and have not heard of it happening.
   3. Courts and judges go to great lengths to ensure that each witness has an independent recollection of events and that their recollection is not contaminated. For example, in my experience, witnesses are typically allowed to provide evidence of an incident they witnessed first hand, are instructed not to discuss their evidence with other witnesses, and are commonly ordered out of court rooms while other witnesses give evidence.
   4. In my experience, and training, it is extremely difficult for a witness to isolate their original memory from new information, even where there they make a conscious effort to do so. In my view, it would be very difficult for the applicant to not have his memory influenced by his having access to the documents in dispute, given that the relevant incident occurred over 2 years ago (January 2009).
   5. I have read an article titled 'Combating Co-witness Contamination: Attempting to Decrease the Negative Effects of Discussion of Eyewitness Memory'. Immediately under the heading, 'Practical implications', the authors state that once witnesses encounter information from a co-witness, it affects their memory of the original event. The conclusions of this article accord with my experience and training. ...
   6. All of the documents sought contain evidence relating to the prosecution of the assault, including the names of those involved, the appearance and clothing of those individuals, the manner on their involvement, the time of events, and important items of evidence. These details are likely to affect the applicant's recollection of events, even if subconsciously. It could also alert the applicant to points that the prosecution considers salient or alternatively incomplete or weak. In my view, release of this information to the applicant would affect his ability to provide an independent recollection of events, which is the key requirement of a witness. At the same time, access to this information would also undermine the applicant's credibility as a witness.
   7. Based on my training and experience, when investigating offences I go to great lengths to avoid witness contamination. For example, when using photo boards, I consider carefully which witnesses to show the photo board to, and the way the photo boards are compiled. I go to great lengths to ensure that the photos are in different positions to avoid witness collusion, and that the images depicted are of similar race, age, ethnicity and general appearance, to ensure fairness to the accused. I do all of this to try to prevent any witness contamination. Police officers are aware that showing a witness anything that might impact on their memory may affect the reliability of evidence at trial.
   8. It is not uncommon in criminal prosecutions for witnesses to be cross-examined about whether their recollection of an event, person or object is truly an independent recollection. It is often put to the witness that their recollection has been confused by reference to documents, media report, discussions or the like. If a defence lawyer became aware that a key witness had reviewed the witness statements, LEAP records, photographs of evidence, and other documents of the kind in dispute, I consider it very likely - based on my experience of criminal prosecutions - that this would form the basis of an effective cross-examination to undermine the reliability of that witness's evidence.
   9. I am very concerned that the release of the documents would undermine the impending prosecution.
3. The applicant submitted that the opinion of Detective Senior Constable Hayes should not be accepted. The applicant stated that Detective Senior Constable Hayes did not have sufficient experience in matters of this nature, that is, similar trials to the alleged assailants in this instance.
4. Detective Senior Constable Hayes said that he had had experience in over 300 trials and 50 trials of a serious nature. He stated that when giving evidence, Detective Senior Constable Hayes admitted that he had not been involved in a case of this nature before. However, in fact, Detective Senior Constable Hayes did not answer that question because it was objected to. I was impressed with the way Detective Senior Constable Hayes gave his evidence and he made concessions when necessary quite properly. I formed the view that Detective Senior Constable Hayes had a good understanding of what happens at criminal trials, and the importance of making sure that witnesses did not become contaminated. In my view, the view that Detective Senior Constable Hayes expressed was quite properly founded and should be accepted.
5. The applicant also criticised Detective Senior Constable Hayes on the basis that he only completed a Detective course in February of this year and he therefore concluded he was only recently qualified. However, this is not the case. Detective Senior Constable Hayes has been a policeman for many years and a detective for a number of years following. The course that Detective Senior Constable Hayes completed in February this year which gave him further qualifications to conduct investigations and practical training. That was not a course that he was required to complete in order to be a detective at the time that he became a detective.
6. The applicant criticized Detective Senior Constable Hayes' reliance on an article "Combating Co-witness Contamination" by Paterson and others. The Detective did no more than rely on the article to support the view he already held. In any event, it is quite proper from an expert, such as Detective Senior Constable Hayes, to rely on such an article to support his view.
7. After considering the applicant's submissions in relation to Detective Senior Constable Hayes' evidence, I reject the same. I am of the view that, as I have previously stated, Detective Senior Constable Hayes' evidence and opinion was well founded, and he does have the experience to be able to give such an opinion. In these circumstances, I accept the evidence of Detective Senior Constable Hayes.
8. The applicant also submitted that as the documents would only be released for the purpose of him bringing civil proceedings and private prosecutions in relation to the incident against all the alleged assailants and police investigating, it was reasonable that the documents should be released to him. He relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218, where it was held that the degree of likely dissemination may be taken into account in relation to s 33 of the Act.
9. In XYZ v Victoria Police [2010] VCAT 255 at paragraphs [178] to [188], Bell J, President of the Tribunal, made the point that it would be only in an exceptional kind of case that release of the information of the kind in Marke's case would not be assumed to be to the world at large.
10. The applicant stated that this was an exceptional case. He stated it was an exceptional case because he wanted the documents for the purpose of a prosecution and civil claim.
11. Mr Nekvapil suggested that the reasoning applied by Bell J in XYZ case also applies to s 31(1)(a) and the documents in dispute in this case. He then correctly submitted :

The words 'reasonably likely' do require the Tribunal to consider what will actually happen if these documents are released to this applicant. That focus is heightened under s 31(1)(a) by the fact that what is to be examined is prejudice 'in a particular instance'. That becomes a much more specific inquiry than the inquiry under s 31(1)(d), for example.

1. Thus I conclude that release of the documents in this particular instance would be to the world at large.
2. However, even if I am wrong in that conclusion, I hold the view for the reasons expressed below that it would not be reasonable to release these documents because it is likely to affect the prosecution of the two alleged assailants involved in the incident.
3. In Detective Senior Constable Hayes' oral evidence, he stated that the applicant was one of the two victims to the incident and, as such, he was a key witness. The term "key witness" was challenged by the applicant because the applicant alleged that there was another eye witness. While there may have been somebody else present at the time, the applicant is nonetheless the person who was assaulted and is able to give precise details of not only the assault but the circumstances surrounding the incident. Given these circumstances, and having seen the relevant documents, I have formed the view that the applicant is in fact a key witness and that if his story is impeached, because he had seen other witnesses' statements or the documents that may be used in the prosecution (which include all the documents apart from Document 41), it could well be submitted by the defence that the applicant's story has been coloured or contaminated.
4. The applicant also submitted that he made a witness statement soon after the incident and, as a result, the witness statement could be relied upon to show that the applicant's evidence was not contaminated. In my view, this submission does not take into account the fact that evidence in a criminal trial is largely given from oral recollection and if the applicant is given the opportunity to study documents that will or may be used by the defence to lessen the weight of the applicant's evidence. There will, at the very least, be a perception the applicant's evidence is contaminated. This situation may well cause a jury to place far less weight, if any weight at all, on the applicant's testimony, than it would if he had not seen the other prosecution documents.
5. If the applicant were to have seen and studied the documents prior to the trial of the two alleged assailants, his ability to withstand cross-examination would be greatly diminished. It is likely that any competent cross-examiner in a criminal trial would put to the applicant that he had seen the other documents, including other witnesses' statements. If the documents were released to the applicant, he would, of course, be required to answer that question in the affirmative. That would immediately suggest to a jury that the applicant's evidence is somewhat contaminated. Also, even though the applicant may not think it would affect his evidence, having read statements of others, it is likely that subconsciously those statements may have an effect on the applicant's thinking which, in turn, would have an effect on the evidence which he gives. If this was the case, it would greatly diminish the weight of the applicant's evidence to the point where it may have little or no weight at all.
6. The effect of a witness knowing the evidence that other witnesses will give has been discussed by text writers and judges. It is their general view that it is highly undesirable for a witness to know the testimony of other witnesses. Heydon and Byrne, the authors of Cross On Evidence, (LexisNexis, online, 2012)[17170] when discussing the basic aspect of criminal legal practice, state that :

... it is wrong for witnesses to be handed copies of each other's statements or proofs of evidence in circumstances enabling them to compare what each had said; for statements of proofs of evidence to be read to witnesses in each other's presence; for witnesses to discuss what evidence they will give; and for witnesses to be trained or coached in their evidence, whether one-to-one or in groups.

1. In this particular instance, one of the aspects of the applicant's testimony that will be important will be relating to identification of the accused. Mr Nekvapil comments on this matter at paragraph 69 of his submissions when he states :
   1. The common law has long treated with concern the prospect that the testimony of a witness about an event may be affected by matters seen, heard or discussed subsequent to, that event. That is because the independence of the witness is thereby compromised. For example, in cases concerning identification great caution is taken in respect of the 'displacement effect', whereby subsequent images may have displaced the memory of a witness, who is then unable to provide a reliable identification at trial.

1. In The Queen v Mendoza [2007] VSCA 120, the Court of Appeal, when considering identification evidence given by two witnesses who had previously discussed their evidence, said that it was obvious that the possibility of two women "mutually confirmed and contaminated their separate identifications had to be considered". There was then reference to the risk posed by "the displacement effect" and the "possible contamination of the recollection as a consequence of her discussions with Ms Corpus".
2. In The Queen v Dupas [2011] VSC 180 Hollingworth J allowed expert evidence from Dr Richard Kemp as to witness contamination. At paragraphs [11] to [12], her Honour described Dr Kemp's research as follows :
   1. The second report outlined scientific research that has been conducted on human memory and the ways that memory can be affected by exposure to 'post-event information'. Dr Kemp elaborated on this phenomenon, which he also described as the 'misinformation effect', in his evidence on the voir dire.
   2. He spoke about the research which shows that people can incorporate information that they acquire after an event into their memory of the event, without being aware that they have done so. Such information includes information from media sources, such as newspapers and television. It is not only small details that can be modified in this way, entire episodes can be modified.
3. If it came out in trial that the applicant as a witness, had seen other police documents, the trial judge would be required to give a warning. As Mr Nekvapil said :

... in the present context, the giving of a warning does not mitigate the prejudice; rather, it demonstrates that prejudice has already been suffered. In other words, once the stage is reached of the trial judge giving a direction, the trial has already been seriously prejudiced by the need to give a warning.

1. The jury's perception of a witness in a criminal trial is extremely important. Therefore, even if the applicant's evidence is not affected in any way, by having read the police documents, there is likely to be a perception by the jury that his evidence has been contaminated. Such perception could be extremely damaging to the prosecution's case because it would have a serious effect on the acceptability and/or weight to which the applicant's evidence might otherwise be given.
2. The applicant relied on the fact that there is video evidence of the incidents. He stated that as there was video evidence of the incident, his evidence would be far less important than it would otherwise. While this to some extent may be true, quite frequently video evidence does not show the whole picture or does distort a picture. Given these circumstances, in my view, it would be quite wrong to say that the video evidence would displace the importance of the applicant's evidence.
3. Given these circumstances, I have formed the view that if any of the documents in dispute other than Document 41 were released to the applicant, those documents would be reasonably likely to prejudice the enforcement or proper administration of the law in this particular instance. This is because it would be likely to have a serious effect on the trial of the two alleged assailants. Releasing such documents is reasonably likely to cause what otherwise may be a successful prosecution to fail. Therefore, the exemption claimed pursuant to s 31(1)(a) is made out.

Effect of release pursuant to s 31(1)(b)

1. To a large extent, in the discussion that I have had in relation to prejudice of a prosecution relating to s 31(1)(a), a number of the same considerations apply to s 31(1)(b) and I do not need to repeat those considerations. It necessarily follows that if the applicant's evidence is contaminated or even perceived to be contaminated, then that is likely to prejudice a fair trial of the proceeding.
2. Further, if the applicant does in fact see the documents, and the accused counsel is not aware that he has seen such documents, it necessarily follows that there will be a prejudice to the trial of the accused by giving the proper prosecution an improper benefit.
3. Detective Senior Constable Hayes has commented on these matters at paragraphs 34 and 35 of his witness statement. He there states as follows :
   1. For the same reasons as discussed immediately above, the applicant's reliability as a witness would be vulnerable to attack because of the distinct possibility that his exposure to the documents in dispute would have enhanced or altered his evidence, bringing it into line with the other evidence to be presented in the prosecution case. The flipside of the concerns expressed above is that his evidence might not be undermined in cross-examination. This would unfairly and improperly enhance the prosecution case, to the detriment of the accused. The applicant would have the opportunity to see the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's case and would be able to alter his evidence accordingly. Given that the applicant has such a strong interest in this prosecution (as he was the victim), there is a real risk that the trial could not fairly proceed with the applicant as a witness if the applicant received the documents in dispute.
   2. Furthermore, some of the documents contain material which may be inadmissible at the trial of the accused, for example, LEAP records contain prejudicial details of their other interactions with Victoria Police. If this inadmissible material is disseminated by the Applicant, it may become available to potential jurors who will hear charges against the accused. This may prejudice the fair trial of the accused.
4. I again accept Detective Senior Constable Hayes' evidence and conclude that the exemption claimed in relation to all documents apart from Document 31 is made out in relation to both s 31(1)(a) and (b).

Section 31(1)(d) - exposure of methods and procedure for investigating breaches of law

1. The exemption in 31(1)(d) relates to two sampled documents in categories 1 and 8. Those documents are Document 1 and Document 47. Those documents are described by Detective Senior Constable Hayes at paragraphs [36] and [37] of his witness statement as follow -
   1. Document 47 discloses methods and procedures about the process of investigating an offence of this type, including the sequence followed in such investigations. Because it contains a detailed methodology about how such offences are investigated, if it fell into the wrong hands, or became publicly available, it would be very likely to undermine our ability to continue using these same methods of investigation in future.
   2. Document 1 discloses the sequence of events used in an investigation of offences of this kind. The sequence itself is as important as the individual techniques used. Release of this information would be very likely to affect our ability to conduct future investigations of this kind.
2. It should also be noted that I have referred to a description given by Detective Senior Constable Hayes of Document 1 earlier in this decision. This section is described by Pizer in his work Victorian Administrative Law at [31.160] as follows :

A document is exempt under s 31(1)(d) if its disclosure under the Act would, or would be reasonably likely to, disclose methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law the disclosure of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures.

1. Citing from Western Suburbs Legal Service v Victorian Police (unreported AAT of Vic), Galvin DP on 18 August 1995 made the point that prejudice to the effectiveness of police officers in their application methods or procedure is tantamount to prejudice of their effectiveness.
2. The applicant in his submissions referred to paragraph [177] of the Western Suburbs case for the proposition that assault offences were a very common type of offence particularly those without premeditation. The Deputy President also stated that, as such the, methods and procedures were frequently discussed in open court.
3. However, in this particular instance, the investigation became somewhat out of the ordinary for a normal assault investigation. That is, because after the first charge was made and not served, and as a consequence became stale, further investigations were made. As such, Detective Senior Constable Hayes gave evidence that a special team, of which he was a member, was formed in order to investigate the incident. He stated that this was a most unusual course. Therefore, in this particular instance, it is clear that Document 47 sets out a very special procedure that would not be involved with most assault cases.
4. Given these circumstances, I agree with Detective Senior Constable Hayes that if Document 47 was to fall in the wrong hands or become publicly available, it would be very likely to undermine the police's ability to continue using the same methods of investigation in the future. As the applicant has stated that he intends to use these documents for both civil cases and private prosecutions, it is likely that these documents would be disseminated from the applicant to a class of persons that may be able to obtain advantage from the use of those documents that would seriously inhibit and prejudice the effectiveness of further investigations by revealing methods of procedure. Thus, Document 47 is exempt pursuant to s 31(1)(d).
5. The respondent, through Detective Senior Constable Hayes, alleges that Document 1 discloses the sequence of events used by investigating officers and that sequence is as important as individual techniques. The applicant states that as this investigation was created 1½ years after the incident, it is unlikely that the sequence of events relating thereto would prejudice future investigations.
6. As I have stated previously, it is the making of a second investigation in this particular instance that makes this particular investigation and documents relating thereto somewhat unusual. Given those circumstances, in my view, the LEAP document, being Document 1, would disclose procedures for investigation that would be likely to prejudice effective methods of investigation in the future. This would be in a similar way to what I have described in relation to Document 47.
7. The applicant also raises the issue of s 31(2)(c) of the Act. That section reads as follows :

(2) This section does not apply to any document that is -

(c) a document containing any general outline of the structure of any programme adopted by an agency for investigating breaches of, or enforcing or administering, the law; ...

1. After having looked at these documents, I have formed the view that they go well beyond "a general outline". They are specific to this type of matter. Given those circumstances, I am of the view that s 31(2)(c) does not apply.

1. The exemption pursuant to s 30(1) is claimed in relation to sample documents 34 and 41. Both documents fall within category 6 of the sample documents, being "deliberative documents about the second investigation". Document 34 is described in the schedule as :

Email chain involving email from Sergeant Nathan Kaeser to Detective Senior Constable Adrian Smith and others.

1. Detective Senior Constable Hayes describes the documents relevant to this exemption in paragraph 39 of his witness statement as follows -
   1. The documents in category 6 contain information that constitutes internal working information of Victoria Police. Documents 34 and 41 are the representative documents and contain opinion and deliberation relating to the conduct of the investigation. For the reasons that follow, the release of these documents, and those that it represents, would be contrary to the public interest.
2. The scope of the exemption in s 30(1) is described by the author of Victorian Administrative Law at [30.40] as follows -

1. The document must contain matter in the nature of opinion, advice or recommendation prepared by an officer or Minister or consultation or deliberation that has taken place between officers, Ministers or an officer and a Minister; and
2. Such matter must be made in the course of, or for the purposes of, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the government; and
3. Disclosure of the matter under the FOI Act would be contrary to public interest.
4. The applicant has submitted that :

It would appear that an email from Nathan Kaeser who was in charge of the investigation of the operation 'Soarer' and Detective Senior Constable Adrian Smith who appears to have been in charge of the investigation of the assault and affray at the Bubble night club would contain a mixture of facts and opinion as well as purely factual exchange. As such, the exemption will not apply to this material.

The documents may also appear to contain a statement of subjective feelings of the author. Such a statement has been found not to be covered by s 30(1) (see Pritchard v Victoria Police [2004] VCAT 1329, [20].

1. By and large, these documents do contain matters of opinion, advice and recommendation made in the deliberative process. While there may be some factual material or even on a view some subjective feeling, those matters are so intertwined in the opinion, advice and recommendation that it would be impossible to redact the document to allow the factual matters or the feelings to be released. Put a different way, the documents are written in such a way where the matters that the applicant has referred to could not possibly be released without revealing the advice, opinion or recommendation.
2. Thus, the matters referred to in s 30(1)(a) have been made out.

Section 30(1)(b) of the Act requires that it would be contrary to public interest to release these two documents

1. At paragraphs [40] to [46] inclusive Detective Senior Constable Hayes describes the importance of the confidentiality of the email process and notes and day books in relation to deliberative process by Victoria Police -

Use of Victoria Police email system for debate and deliberation

1. The emails are part of a broader dialogue that took place among members of Victoria Police both about the first investigation and the second investigation. The emails in dispute are only those retained by Victoria Police in the investigation folder. There were also telephone conversations about these matters. Based on my experience with the Applicant since June 2010, I consider it highly likely that if the emails were disclosed to him he would get an incomplete picture of the full dialogue, and I am concerned that any interpretation of the overall dialogue formed by him on the basis of these documents would be false or misleading.
2. It is of utmost importance that debate and deliberation in the course of criminal investigations be promoted. Investigators and their superiors must feel free to conduct a rigorous and robust investigation, putting forward their opinions and challenging ideas put forward by others. Debate and deliberation are a necessary and important element of any investigation, and promote rigour, transparency, scrutiny and consistency in agency processes and standards. This ensures the best possible outcome for any investigation.
3. If debate and deliberation are essential to the investigative process, secure and confidential channels of communication are essential to this full and robust exchange of opinions and ideas in the investigation process. If such exchange of opinion and analysis were to be made public then members may feel inhibited in the disclosure of that information, ideas or opinion. They may be less willing to challenge the opinions of others, or insist on their own positions if their positions may be open to public criticism.
4. It should be noted that the ability to communicate openly via written channels is especially important in an organisation such as Victoria Police that is composed of over 14 000 sworn and unsworn members, who work at different times throughout the day and night, and who are geographically dispersed throughout the State. It would be simply impossible to conduct all conversations relating to investigations face to face or over the telephone. When the Police Association called for industrial action recently, by way of not using emails, it was so poorly received by police that it was prematurely ended. It was poorly received because of the significant impact it had on our ability to do every aspect of policing in a timely and effective manner.
5. The investigative processes would be greatly hampered if written channels of communication were not confidential. In any case, written records of interactions are also beneficial and should be encouraged and not hampered by disclosure where this would be adverse to the public interest.
6. In addition, views of the kind expressed in the second paragraph on the first page of document 34 and the first paragraph on the second page of document 34 would, if released, be detrimental to relationships between members of Victoria Police. If it were released, it would stifle open debate and deliberation of this kind, which is important to the efficiency of investigations.

1. It is also very important, and in the public interest, that Victoria Police officers are able to record full and frank details in their daybooks, such as in document 41. The daybook forms the primary record source for any police officer and they are encouraged and should be encouraged to record as much detail as possible in their daybooks. This also serves to improve the quality of investigations and ultimately the service of Victoria Police to the community. There is a real risk that if opinion of this kind would be disclosed through the FOI process that police officers would feel hindered in what they can record and this would have a detrimental effect on the investigation of crime, and policing more broadly, in Victoria.
2. In Re Gordon and Commissioner of Corporate Affairs (1985) 1 VAR 114 Judge Higgins dealt with the importance of public interest protecting documents in law enforcement agencies. He there stated -

... where an agency is charged with the prosecution and investigation of serious breaches of the law, there is an important public interest which should protect documents which are used as the basis of that decision-making process. The officers ought to be given the freedom to canvass all possibilities and to make what are in fact subjective evaluations of individuals and fact situations, without fear that such comments, assessments and recommendations will go beyond the office of the agency itself. I do wish to stress the view that each case must depend upon its own facts but that where a law enforcement agency is involved, then I believe that a closer examination of the public interest is required than would otherwise be the case.

1. The applicant has submitted that public servants should be subject to a high level of scrutiny (see Thwaites v Department of Premier and Cabinet (unreported AAT Rosen PM 23 March 1994). He stated that the police force should in fact be equally subject to such scrutiny. He referred to the Police Manual at paragraph 95 of his submissions and concluded that the police decisions must withstand public scrutiny. He there stated -

Furthermore, the Victoria Police Manual states that police officers are held to a higher standard of conduct in both public and private lives and are more open to public scrutiny than other members of the public. It further states that public scrutiny is part of the Victoria Police decision-making framework and all employees of the Victoria Police must ensure that their decision withstands public scrutiny.

1. There is no doubt that the conduct of police officers and their decisions is open to public scrutiny. However, what is being dealt with by s 30(1) is the deliberative process. That is, the process by which a decision may or may not be made. It is not the decision itself. It is important, in making a decision, that police officers should be able to freely express their opinion, so that a decision can properly be made. If that opinion is open to public debate, then there is going to be a reticence on behalf of those officers to express that opinion or express it in writing. In my view, that cannot be in the public interest.
2. In Re Shulver and Victoria Police Force (1999) VAR 71 at 83, the Tribunal held that -

There is a clear public interest in protecting the deliberative process of the police force.

1. In this particular instance, the public interest is even greater as the prosecution in relation to the incident has not yet been completed. That being the case, releasing these documents to a person who is going to be a witness for the prosecution in that proceeding could be extremely prejudicial. It is not in the public interest that prosecutions be prejudiced by the release of documents. I agree with the submission made by Mr Nekvapil when he states :

The matters already referred to in relation to section 31(1)(a) and (b) are also matters that militate strongly against disclosure of those documents in respect of which section 30 is claimed. There is a public interest in a key witness in a forthcoming prosecution not being shown internal working documents about the investigations on which the prosecution is based.

1. The applicant has referred to amendments made to the Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act in 2010 in particular to s 11B(4) of the Commonwealth Act which is similar to s 30 of the Victorian Act. He said those amendments show a softening of the exemption and there is a policy movement weakening the exemption.
2. In my view, this submission does not help the applicant's case. The Commonwealth legislation is different legislation and if the Victorian Parliament had wished to adopt the Commonwealth amendment to s 30 of the Victorian Act, it would have done so. Given these circumstances, it is not proper for me to take the Commonwealth amendment into account.
3. For all the above reasons, I find that the exemption pursuant to s 30(1) is made out in relation to Documents 34 and 41.

1. Exemption is claimed pursuant to s 33 of the Act in relation to all the representative documents except for Documents 18 and 19 in category 3 and Document 41 in category 6. For a document to be exempt, pursuant to s 33(1), I must be satisfied that disclosure would involve the disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person and such disclosure would be unreasonable. The personal information contained in the documents in dispute and the concerns about releasing the personal information are referred to by Detective Senior Constable Hayes in his witness statement from paragraphs [47] to [50] inclusive. He there states :
   1. The documents in dispute contain varying amounts of personal information of suspects either in, or related to the assault on, the applicant. It would be unreasonable to disclose the personal information in the documents in dispute for the following reasons.
   2. The majority of persons whose personal information is being denied to the applicant have expressly stated that they do not consent to the release of their personal information via the s 53A process.
   3. The personal information in the documents in dispute has been collected by Victoria Police for the purpose of investigating an assault on the applicant. That information - by the very fact of being collected by the police in this context - is highly sensitive and private. This information was collected for the purpose of law enforcement and for that purpose only and should not be released for other purposes. In fact, Victoria Police is required to guard against the unauthorised and inappropriate access and release of this information. This was highlighted in the context of LEAP reports in a 2005 report on the LEAP program by the Ombudsman George Brouwer, in his role as Director of the Office of Police Integrity. In that report the Ombudsman emphasised the sensitive and personal nature of LEAP records and the importance of respecting individuals' rights to privacy about their personal information. ...
   4. Furthermore, where there is sufficient evidence, as there is in relation to 2 suspects, those persons are to be tried and may be convicted. Where there is insufficient evidence, the remaining suspects will not be charged. The purpose of the evidence is to allow these law enforcement and court processes to occur, or to determine that they should not occur. It would be unreasonable to release such highly sensitive and personal information under freedom of information.
2. It should be noted that it is only the personal information in the relevant documents to which the exemption is claimed. As Nekvapil stated -

The personal information over which section 33 is claimed in the present case is names and personal information of persons who have objected to such information being released.

1. The meaning of the term "unreasonable" in s 33 was discussed in length by the Court of Appeal in Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218. There Pagone AJA said that this limb of the test required the Tribunal to balance the public interest in disclosure against the personal interest of privacy. A summary of the principles set out in Marke's case, was referred to in Morgan v DHS [2008] VCAT 2420 at [63]. This passage has been approved on numerous occasions, for example, Levy v Department of Sustainability and Environment [2011] VCAT 417 at [16] and Duncan v Victoria Police [2011] VCAT 1000 at [26]. In the Morgan case, it was stated as follows :

In Victorian Administrative Law, a number of factors are identified as relevant to determining whether disclosure would be unreasonable. These include :

b. the circumstances in which the information was obtained;

c. the extent to which the information is available to the public;

1. whether the applicant's purpose for seeking the documents is likely to be achieved by disclosure of the personal information;

f. any public or important interest in disclosure of the information;

h. whether release could lead to the person suffering stress or anxiety.

1. I agree with Mr Nekvapil that each of these factors contra-indicates disclosure of the dispute of personal information in the present case.
2. The applicant has submitted that the respondent should not be allowed to rely solely on the basis of the 53A responses as a ground for non-disclosure. He correctly states that the fact that a person does not want his information disclosed is a relevant consideration to be taken into account but not determinative. See Marke v Victoria Police [2007] VSC 522 at [45].
3. However, in a matter like the present, it has been held by the Tribunal that it is proper to rely solely on s 53A. In Kyriazis v Victoria Police [2011] VCAT 365, it was held that it would be unreasonable to release memoranda, witness statements, charge sheets and exhibit lists prepared as part of an investigation into allegations that never formed part of a charge. In that case, the respondent called no evidence but relied solely on responses from third parties to notices under s 53A and legal submissions. Thus, for those who have responded to the 53A notices, in my view, they fit into the same category as in Kyriazis case. Also it should be remembered that a number of those referred to in the documents have not been charged with any offence and are presumed by the law to be innocent.
4. The applicant has also referred to the fact that he knows the names of some of the people to which the personal information refers and he therefore concluded under those circumstances that it should be released. However, in AB v Department of Education and Early Childhood Development [2001] VCAT 1263 at [58], it was stated :

The applicant may or may not know the names of the persons involved, however, if he were able to obtain the names of the persons concerned in the document, the question then may be asked what would he do with that information and what would be his likely reaction and the likely reaction of the persons whose personal information is contained in the documents?

1. As I have stated previously, the applicant's likely reaction is to use this information in order to bring proceedings. In using this information to bring proceedings, he would in fact be disseminating this information to the public at large. Further, I refer to the comments of Bell J in XYZ. It should also be noted that late in the proceeding or making submissions, the applicant informed me that he had already commenced civil proceedings in relation to the incident in the Magistrates' Court. However, he would not reveal the name of the defendant(s) in those proceedings as he said they had not yet been served.
2. I also refer to matters that I have discussed in relation to the exemption claimed pursuant to s 31(1)(a) and (b). In particular, in circumstances where a victim seeks information about accused persons contained in a prosecution brief for a pending prosecution, it is unreasonable for information about any of the accused person or other witnesses to be provided to the victim. It is unreasonable for a key witness in a prosecution to be given details of other witnesses and the accused. As Mr Nekvapil said-

That prospect raises concerns about the integrity of the trial process like, and additional to, those discussed with respect to section 31(1)(a) and (b).

1. I will now consider the important factors raised in Morgan's case referred to above.

Circumstances in which the information was obtained

1. The information contained in this instance was obtained during the course of an investigation. In Akers v Victoria Police [2003] VCAT 397, the Tribunal accepted that : "persons who provide statements or other information to the police do so with the expectation that these will only be disclosed to the extent necessary to conduct investigations and deal with criminal charges". In that case, photographs, parts of exhibit lists, witness lists, witness statements, patrol duty returns and other such documents of a similar nature to documents in this proceeding were held to be exempt pursuant to s 33.
2. Mr Nekvapil submitted that suspects who are not charged fall into a similar category as what was discussed by the Tribunal in Akers case. He stated the law considers those people to be innocent. He referred to the fact that s 456AA of the Crimes Act (1958) makes it an offence for a person not to provide their name and address when required to do so by a member of the police force who believes on reasonable grounds that the person has committed an offence, or can assist with the investigation of an indictable offence. He stated their personal information was as a result captured on LEAP, in notebooks and other police records, and should not then be available to persons who would then like to sue them or commence private prosecutions against them notwithstanding the authorities have determined not to charge them.

The extent to which the information is available to the public

1. At this point the information sought is not available to the public.

1. The applicant has stated that his reason for seeking the information is to bring private prosecutions and claims for damages both against other assailants and members of the police force. These type of proceedings, in my view, are more in the nature of information sought for a personal crusade rather than information that is of interest to the general public. In Gunawan v Department of Education (VCAT 15 December 1998) Davis SM, it was stated :

Disclosure is more likely to be unreasonable if the applicant's reason for seeking access is out of some particular personal crusade or for the purpose of embarrassing or otherwise harming third persons concerned.

1. While it is not suggested that the applicant is seeking to embarrass or harm the persons, he clearly is seeking a private remedy.

Whether the applicant's purpose for seeking the documents is likely to be achieved by disclosure of the personal information

1. The respondent submitted that insofar as the police officers were concerned, the civil case that the applicant wishes to commence against those officers is bound to fail. The respondent relied upon the decision of Taha v Shaw Industries Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 30 Beach J. In that proceeding the plaintiff's house was initially demolished unlawfully. A police officer was called to investigate and, when he arrived, was told by the demolisher that he had been contracted to do the job. The officer asked for the demolisher's driver's licence, but otherwise did not prevent him from demolishing the house. The plaintiff sued people, including the police officer. The plaintiff pleaded that the police officer owed him a duty of care to "conduct a reasonable investigation". Beach J struck out the pleading. His Honour said, after referring to relevant authorities :

In the absence of exceptional circumstances, police officers do not owe a duty of care to an individual to investigate a complaint of actual or threatened criminal conduct. A duty of care to investigate is not owed by police officers primarily because the imposition of such a duty would be inconsistent with the performance of a policy officer's public duty to enforce the criminal law, which requires them to exercise discretion in prioritising the use of investigative resources in the public interest.

Whilst the authorities in this area allow for the possibility of a duty of care existing in relation to the investigation of actual or threatened criminal conduct in 'exceptional circumstances', neither counsel were able to refer me to any cases where either exceptional circumstances have been held to exist or such a duty has been found. One might have thought that the cases of Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire and Brooks v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis may have involved exceptional circumstances. In Hill, the claim was that the police conducted their investigations negligently, which resulted in their failure to apprehend a serial killer before he murdered the daughter of the plaintiff. No relevant duty was held to be owed in that case. Brooks was a case where the House of Lords had to deal with a claim brought against the police by the surviving victim of a racist attack. A committee of inquiry had 'exposed a litany of derelictions of duty and failures in the police investigations'. Notwithstanding this matter, the House of Lords unanimously declared that no duty of care was owed to the victim. The circumstances of the present case as pleaded by the plaintiff, when compared to the circumstances in Hill and Brooks and the other authorities in this area, are not in any relevant sense exceptional. In any event, the plaintiff in the present case has not pleaded (and was not able to suggest) any circumstances that might be exceptional giving rise to the fifth defendant owing the duty of care pleaded against him.

1. The applicant stated that until he had formulated his pleadings, it was impossible for anybody to say whether or not his case against the police officers would be likely to be struck out. He further stated that in Taha's case, the proceeding was not dismissed, but the plaintiff was given leave to re-plead.
2. Further, the applicant said that the circumstances in which he finds himself in in relation to bringing civil proceedings would be "exceptional circumstances" referred to by Beach J in paragraph [11] of his Honour's judgment. It is noted that his Honour does not give any examples of what an exceptional circumstance is. However, in my view, it is unlikely that the circumstances of this matter would be exceptional. There was a police investigation in the first instance which was admitted to be less than satisfactory. However, the second investigation, Detective Senior Constable Hayes though was thorough and proper. There does not seem to be any evidence to suggest otherwise. Given this situation, it is difficult to understand how there could be exceptional circumstances. One would have thought these would be circumstances that would have occurred on a number of occasions.

Whether the applicant's purpose in seeking the documents is likely to be achieved by disclosure of the personal information

1. I agree with the submission made by Mr Nekvapil that the documents will not materially assist the applicant in determining whether to sue the police officers, beyond the material he already has in his possession. In relation to the suspects referred to in the documents, who have not been charged, Mr Nekvapil accepted that having the personal details of those suspects would be of assistance to the applicant. However, because giving the applicant that information would involve giving personal information of a person who has not been charged has not been found guilty of any crime, and who is bound to give their name and address (as referred to above), it would be unreasonable to disclose that information. I refer to what I have stated above.

Any public or important interest in disclosure of the information

1. This is not a case where it is important to "clear the air". As I have stated, Detective Senior Constable Hayes was critical of an aspect of the initial investigation. However, he concluded that the standard of the subsequent investigation was high. It is not unusual for some parts of an investigation to not happen as quickly as what they ought to. However, in this particular instance, the fault was largely rectified. It is worth noting what was said in McIntosh v Webster (1980) FLR 112 at 123 where it was stated :

Arrests are frequently made in circumstances of excitement, turmoil and panic [and] it would be altogether unfair to the police force as a whole to sit back in the comparatively calm and leisurely atmosphere of the courtroom and there make minute retrospective criticisms of what an arresting constable might or might not have done or believed in the circumstances.

1. Even though the applicant has submitted that the documents will promote an important public interest, having regard to the matters to which I have referred, I am of the view that in performing a balancing exercise which is required, the public interest of non-disclosure of the personal view, is far outweighed by its disclosure.

1. Most of those who were sent s 53A notices have responded that they do not wish their personal information to be disclosed. A few have not responded and one has indicated that he is happy for that information to be disclosed. While I would have been inclined to disclose the information of the person who did not mind his information being disclosed, it would be very difficult in the circumstances because such information is intertwined with other information and, in any event, I have found in relation to other exemptions, that subject to s 50(4), the documents should be disclosed. That is, the personal information of those that have not objected pursuant to s 53A should not be disclosed because the documents containing that information are otherwise exempt.
2. Taking all these matters into account, I have formed the view that the information claimed to be personal information by the respondent is in fact personal information and it would be unreasonable to release that information to the applicant.

1. The public interest override does not apply to those parts of the documents exempt pursuant to s 33.
2. Section 50(4) of the Act empowers the Tribunal to grant access to an exempt document, "where the Tribunal is of the opinion that the public interest requires that access to the document should be granted".
3. Mr Nekvapil in his submission has correctly described when the public interest override should operate. At paragraphs [145] and [146] of his submissions he stated as follows :
   1. As the High Court has said recently, (see Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (No 2) [2010] HCA 24; (2010) 241 CLR 320 at [13], [14] and [57]'[t]here are obvious difficulties in giving the phrase 'public interest' as it appears in section 50(4) a fixed and precise content'. Section 50(4) is not to be characterised 'as a power to be exercised only in 'exceptional circumstances'. Nevertheless :

It must be accepted that the word 'requires' which appears in s 50(4) directs the decision-maker to identify a high-threshold public interest before the power can be exercised. It is not enough that access to the documents could be justified in the public interest.

1. The Tribunal must determine in each case whether considerations of the public interest are so strong as to outweigh, or override, those factors by which the documents are exempt documents. The question is whether the public interest demands or necessitates disclosure. This may involve 'resolution of conflicting public interests': the public interest against access inherent in the reason for the relevant exemption, as compared with 'the public interest factors favouring access'. It is a stringent test. The word 'requires' in section 50(4) is synonymous with 'demands' or 'necessitates'; it gives 'a sense of the imperative'. This is consistent with the relevant definition in the Oxford English Dictionary: 'to demand as necessary or essential'.
2. The applicant submitted that it was in the public interest for the documents to be released because the documents "would establish that the police procedures as applied to the investigation of his assault are malfunctioning to such a degree that the public interest would favour release." Further, he stated that it was in the public interest that such malfunctions perpetrated on the applicant by members of the Victoria Police be remedied by civil action and/or private prosecution.
3. While it is certainly in the public interest to know if the police force are malfunctioning and have done things wrong, however, against that principle there must be balanced the effect of the release of these documents. As I have discussed previously, such release is reasonably likely to prejudice the prosecution of the criminal proceedings and, as such, prejudice law enforcement and proper administration of justice. Further, it is likely that there will be a prejudicial effect on the impartial adjudication of the trial of the alleged assailants. These are very important matters to be considered and are not something to be lightly disregarded. In fact, the proper administration of the law and law enforcement is central to our society. Given this fact it is, in my opinion, far more important that the factors which I have referred to in relation to proper administration of the law and law enforcement be considered ahead of the applicant's desire to bring civil proceedings and/or private prosecutions.
4. Further, in my view, the bringing of civil proceedings and/or public prosecutions, is not a matter of great public importance or public interest. It is far more important that there be proper law enforcement and there be proper administration of the law.
5. Given all these circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that s 50(4) of the Act should not operate and that the public interest does not require these documents to be released.

1. I have found each of the exemptions claimed by the respondent to be made out. As a consequence, the decision of the respondent will be affirmed.