JANSSEN AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DR J?RG DIETER KRONE [2026] WASC 23 (9 February 2026)

1. The deceased died on a date between 28 April 2023 and 1 May 2023. He was 83 years old. He was survived by his long-term de facto partner, Mr Biagio Iannaccone.
2. The deceased left a will, dated 3 July 2000.
3. By that will, the deceased appointed both his sister and Mr Iannaccone as his executors. Pursuant to the will, Dr Krone bequeathed all his real and personal property as follows: in two equal shares divided between his sister and Mr Iannaccone, and, if either or both his sister and Mr Iannaccone predeceased him, then the share to which they were entitled was to be equally divided between Dr Krone's nephews and his niece.
4. Dr Krone's sister predeceased him. The Beneficiaries of the estate are presently therefore Mr Iannaccone and the nephews and niece of the deceased.
5. The administrator, Professor Dr Janssen, was appointed by a grant of letters of administration (with the will annexed) on 18 August 2023. Within these reasons, I will refer to the plaintiff as the Administrator and to the deceased's estate as the Estate.
6. In this proceeding, the Administrator seeks judicial advice as to two proceedings, one being extant and the other being prospective:

(a) First, the Administrator seeks judicial advice in connection with proceedings in this court which have been brought by a third party (Mr Loren Ross Bywaters) against both the Administrator and Mr Iannaccone. The Administrator seeks an order that he would be justified in defending the claims pleaded against him. I will refer to the proceeding (being CIV 1418 of 2025, which is being case managed by Howard J), as the Estate Proceeding.

(b) Second, the Administrator seeks judicial advice in connection with a prospective claim against Mr Bywaters, for recovery of a loan alleged to have been made by the deceased to Mr Bywaters on or about 2 December 2022, in the amount of $140,000. The Administrator seeks an order that he would be justified in commencing a counterclaim in the Estate Proceeding, or fresh proceedings in the District Court of Western Australia, to recover the loan. I will refer to this prospective claim as the Loan Claim.

1. The Administrator also seeks an order that the costs of this application be paid out of the Estate on an indemnity basis.
2. As to the nature of the Estate left by the deceased, it is apparent that it is quite valuable.[4] Most of that value is held in real estate in Western Australia, although there are other assets as well including approximately $667,000 in controlled money accounts (as at July 2025).
3. The most valuable asset held by the Estate is described as a substantial cattle farming property in Burekup, Western Australia, which is known as 'Tynedale'. I will refer to this property as the Tynedale Farm. It has a market value estimated between $17 million and $22 million (as at late January 2024).
4. The Tynedale Farm property is not the subject of any present claims, although at one point Mr Bywaters had lodged a caveat claiming an interest in the property. It appears that caveat lapsed in July 2024.

Section 92 of the Trustees Act

1. It is convenient at this point to identify the text of the statutory provision and the uncontroversial principles which guide the court's application of that provision. Section 92 provides as follows:
   1. Directions, trustee may ask Court for

(1) Any trustee may apply to the Court for directions concerning any property subject to a trust, or respecting the management or administration of that property, or respecting the exercise of any power or discretion vested in the trustee.

(2) Every application made under this section shall be served upon, and the hearing thereof may be attended by, all persons interested in the application or such of them as the Court thinks expedient.

1. A trustee, including an executor of a deceased estate, if in doubt about the course of action to be adopted in the course of administration of the estate or the trust, may apply to the court for its opinion, direction or advice pursuant to this statutory provision. This position is long established.[5]
2. Section 92 permits a trustee to obtain judicial advice about the prosecution or defence of litigation, 'in recognition of both the fact that the office of trustee is ordinarily a gratuitous office and the fact that a trustee is entitled to an indemnity for all costs and expenses properly incurred in performance of the trustee's duties'.[6] By obtaining judicial advice, doubt as to whether it is proper for a trustee to incur the costs and expenses of prosecuting or defending litigation can be resolved. In resolving those doubts, the interests of the trust will be protected in that 'the interests of the trust will not be subordinated to the trustee's fear of personal liability for costs'.[7]
3. There is a jurisdictional bar which an applicant must overcome. Specifically, the applicant must point to a question respecting the management or administration of trust property, or a question respecting the interpretation of a trust instrument. There is no question that the jurisdictional bar is satisfied in the present case and the plaintiff has standing to seek the advice of the court. The court nonetheless retains a discretion whether to provide a direction under the provision.
4. It should be remembered that judicial advice proceedings, such as the present application, are not to be treated as a trial of the issues that are to be, or may be, agitated in the principal proceedings - the process is intended to be a summary one: Blatchford v Laine.[8] Thus, on the present application, the court is not required to undertake an investigation of the evidence and make final findings as to the success or otherwise of the proposed proceedings, or the steps within those proceedings, which the plaintiff proposes to take. The question is whether the litigation, or the steps therein, are justified.
5. The key question for present purposes is to determine whether, on the material available, it would be proper for the Administrator to prosecute or defend the proceedings in question. This involves two issues, as explained by Vaughan J in Blatchford v Laine.[9] First, whether the legal issues are properly arguable. Second, whether there are sufficient prospects of success to warrant the trustee in proceeding with the litigation. As his Honour further explained, these enquiries necessitate 'sufficient investigation' of the underlying issues. Accordingly, while the assessment of prospects is made at a 'preliminary level', courts have emphasised that there must be 'sufficient information before the court for it to be satisfied that the proposed action would be for the benefit of the beneficiaries as a whole and otherwise would be prudent to pursue'.[10]
6. The considerations relevant to the court's analysis, which are overlapping in nature, will include: (a) the prospects of success; (b) the means of the other party to satisfy any judgment; (c) the potential for the litigation to deplete the trust estate; (d) the likely adverse costs if the litigation is unsuccessful and whether those costs are likely to be proportionate; (e) the likely irrecoverable costs; and (f) the nature of the case and issues raised and what will be gained if the trustee succeeds in the action.[11]
7. This analysis, and the assessment of whether litigation is 'justified', must be viewed in the context of the duties of an administrator, which include the basic obligation to secure the assets of the estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries as a whole, given the duties of an administrator extend to protecting the estate from claims that are defensible.[12]
8. To reiterate the foregoing, the court's role is not to assess the correctness of the Administrator's decision to take the proposed action, but rather to assess whether he or she has taken proper advice and considered all relevant matters before arriving at a reasoned and appropriate decision.[13]

1. The Administrator has produced to this court material which summarises the issues in, and the status of, the Estate Proceeding, and which also provides details as to the proposed Loan Claim.
2. The Administrator's legal representatives have also offered to produce to the court a confidential opinion prepared by junior counsel which addresses these matters. I have not considered it necessary to review that opinion. The affidavit material, on my assessment, provides an adequate explanation of the issues arising in the Estate Proceeding, and the basis of the Loan Claim.
3. Indeed, it is apparent to the court that the Administrator and his legal representatives have conducted a relatively thorough investigation of the relevant issues and given earnest consideration to whether the Administrator should pursue these courses of action, in terms of the legal prospects of success, the risks and costs involved, and the potential benefit or otherwise to the beneficiaries of the Estate. The 'investigation' of the issues in the Estate Proceeding has naturally been assisted by the litigation steps which have already occurred in that proceeding, including the filing of pleadings and the provision of discovery.
4. It is not necessary to address each and every factual issue, nor every point, raised by the Administrator in the materials filed with the court. Indeed, the court must be conscious that the Administrator seeks judicial advice as to a proposed course of action he wishes to take in defending extant proceedings in this court, which presently involve contested factual allegations and will shortly proceed to a contested trial before Howard J, as well as judicial advice concerning a debt claim against Mr Bywaters which is contested by him.
5. It is sufficient for present purposes to summarise the factual material and allegations in the affidavit evidence, consistent with the principles I have earlier outlined, and remembering that the affidavit material tendered by the Administrator has not been the subject of any cross-examination at this stage. It is convenient to summarise the material separately by reference to the Estate Proceeding and then the Loan Claim, and to consider whether the proposed course of action is justified.
6. I will turn first to the Estate Proceeding.

The Estate Proceeding Summary of the proceeding

1. Mr Bywaters commenced the Estate Proceeding in this court in April 2025 by writ of summons endorsed with a statement of claim, naming the Administrator and Mr Iannaccone as defendants. The claims against the Administrator and Mr Iannaccone are not identical.
2. The parties have filed pleadings and given discovery. The action has a listing for a mediation on 23 March 2026 and is listed for a 9-day trial in April 2026.
3. At the centre of the Estate Proceeding is another property situated in Burekup, Western Australia, along Collie River Road. I will refer to this property as the Burekup Property. It is a much smaller property than Tynedale Farm. The registered proprietor of the Burekup Property is, and always has been, Mr Iannaccone. The estimated value of that property is approximately $800,000.
4. There is an issue raised in the Estate Proceeding as to whether the Estate holds a beneficial interest in the Burekup Property. The primary relief sought in the Estate Proceeding is a declaration that Mr Bywaters is entitled to a proprietary interest in the Burekup Property. The court notes that the deceased's will does not refer to any interest in the Burekup Property as being held by Mr Bywaters, nor does it expressly include a bequest of that property to Mr Bywaters. Nonetheless, it is alleged by Mr Bywaters that, shortly before his death, the deceased was considering arrangements to update his will.
5. The alternative claim is for equitable compensation against the Estate. Briefly stated, the following matters emerge from the further amended statement of claim in the Estate Proceeding[14] and the affidavit material filed by the Administrator:
   1. Mr Bywaters asserts that he was employed by the deceased in or about May 1998 as a personal assistant and farm hand at Tynedale Farm. He says he continued to work at Tynedale Farm until after the deceased's death. The employment agreement is said to be an oral agreement. It was terminated by the Administrator on 19 December 2023.
   2. Further, Mr Bywaters asserts that he and his long-term de facto partner, Mr Stephen Guy, moved into the Burekup Property in about May 1998. He says they have lived on that property 'continuously and exclusively' to date. In August 2023, both Mr Bywaters and Mr Guy lodged caveats over the Burekup Property, claiming interests therein.
   3. In the Estate Proceeding, Mr Bywaters has brought a proprietary estoppel claim founded on oral promises alleged to have been made by the deceased to Mr Bywaters in the period from 2009 onwards, in relation to the future ownership of the Burekup Property.[15] The primary relief sought by Mr Bywaters is a declaration that Mr Iannaccone holds his legal interest in that property on trust for Dr Janssen (as Administrator of the Estate), who holds the interest on sub-trust for Mr Bywaters. In the alternative, Mr Bywaters seeks equitable compensation from the Estate. Mr Bywaters has confirmed, through his solicitors, that his claim for equitable compensation is advanced even if the court finds the Burekup Property was not held the subject of a resulting trust in favour of the deceased.
   4. Mr Bywaters asserts that, in or about 2009, he notified the deceased of an alternative employment opportunity available to him in Broome, which would pay about twice his then salary, plus accommodation.[16] Mr Bywaters alleges that, at that time, the deceased orally represented that he would transfer ownership of the Burekup Property to Mr Bywaters in the future, if he remained in his employ at Tynedale Farm.
   5. It is further alleged by Mr Bywaters that this representation was repeated on numerous occasions over the period from in or about 2009 to 2023, on those occasions when Mr Bywaters would discuss alternative employment opportunities with the deceased.[17]
   6. Mr Bywaters says he relied upon the representations made by the deceased regarding a future transfer of ownership of the Burekup Property to him, in not pursuing alternative employment, in not purchasing other property and in making improvements to the Burekup Property.[18] Mr Bywaters submits that he would therefore suffer detriment if his expectation of receiving the Burekup Property was not fulfilled. As I have said, Mr Bywaters alleges that the deceased was contemplating changes to his will shortly prior to his death, although it is not expressly pleaded that this was intended to include a modification concerning the Burekup Property.[19]
   7. In his defence to the action, Mr Iannaccone appears to accept that the deceased paid the purchase price for the Burekup Property and asserts that the deceased told him at the time of the purchase that he was gifting him the property and gave him a copy of the certificate of title.
6. There appear to be three aspects of the Estate Proceeding which require some analysis to determine whether they properly concern the Administrator, or may affect the interests of the Beneficiaries.
7. The first is the resulting trust issue.
8. There is an allegation in the Estate Proceeding (apparently accepted, as noted above) that the deceased paid the purchase price for the Burekup Property. Mr Bywaters asserts that a presumption of a resulting trust arises and the countervailing presumption of advancement does not apply to de facto partners.[20] However, the strength of the presumption of a resulting trust varies from case to case, and may be rebutted by the parties' actual intentions at the time of purchase.[21]
9. The Administrator correctly submits that in ascertaining the intentions of the parties (as to where the beneficial interest in the Burekup Property was to reside), the court is concerned to ascertain the objective, manifest intention of the purchaser. The Administrator also recognises that the court may admit evidence of the relationship between the parties and their acts and declarations before or at the time of the purchase, or so immediately after it that those acts or declarations constitute a part of the transaction.
10. The Administrator recognises that Dr Krone is deceased and cannot give evidence as to what he said or did at the time of the purchase of the Burekup Property, or shortly thereafter. Further, it appears to be common ground that no contemporaneous documentary evidence has been identified regarding the deceased's intentions at the time the Burekup Property was purchased in 1992.
11. In the foregoing circumstances, it is submitted on behalf of the Administrator that it is appropriate for the Administrator to adopt a neutral stance on the resulting trust issue in the Estate Proceeding.
12. The second aspect of the Estate Proceeding concerns the defence of the proprietary estoppel claim. Mr Iannaccone is actively defending this allegation at present. The Administrator submits that it would not be in the interests of the Beneficiaries for Dr Janssen to incur costs duplicating legal work in the defence of the estoppel claims (on questions such as whether the promises were made or relied upon), where that work is being adequately undertaken by Mr Iannaccone and his legal team in a manner that is consistent with the interests of the Beneficiaries as a whole. Nevertheless, the Administrator submits it would be in the interests of the Beneficiaries that he retain the ability to observe and, if necessary intervene, to ensure this remains the case.
13. The third aspect of the Estate Proceeding is the claim for equitable compensation which is brought solely against the Administrator.[22] The claim for equitable compensation gives rises to additional issues, according to the Administrator, such as to appropriate relief and measure of compensation. As earlier noted, Mr Bywaters has confirmed that he maintains his claim for equitable compensation against the Estate even if no resulting trust is established.
14. In the circumstances, it is submitted by the Administrator that it is in the best interests of the Beneficiaries as a whole that Dr Janssen files a defence in the Estate Proceeding and then actively defends the allegations insofar as they pertain to Mr Bywaters' claim for equitable compensation against the Estate. As described by the Administrator, this would involve:

(a) the Administrator observing and maintaining a supporting role with respect to Mr Iannaccone's defence of the estoppel allegations (on common questions such as whether the promises were made and relied upon) to the extent required to remain satisfied that Mr Iannaccone's defence on these matters is sufficient to protect the interests of the Beneficiaries as a whole; and

(b) defending the allegations, and addressing arguments and evidence, that pertain more specifically to the claim against the Estate for equitable compensation.

1. The submissions advanced by the Administrator should be accepted, in my respectful view. The nuanced approach which the Administrator proposes to adopt, with respect to the identified aspects of the Estate Proceeding, is appropriate and properly recognises that the interests of the Beneficiaries would not be served by simply adopting a blanket approach to the litigation.
2. In particular, it is appropriate that the Administrator adopts a neutral stance at this stage to the resulting trust issue, given the available material and given the role which has been adopted by Mr Iannaccone and his legal representatives on this issue.
3. Further, it would not be appropriate for the Administrator to duplicate the work being undertaken by Mr Iannaccone and his legal representatives in defending the proprietary estoppel claim. It remains in the interests of the Beneficiaries that the Administrator adopts a stance by which he can observe this aspect of the proceeding and to intervene, subject to any case management issues associated with that, should the circumstances change.
4. As to the equitable compensation claim, I accept that the Estate's potential exposure for equitable compensation could be up to the estimated value of the Burekup Property, which is around $800,000. So, the claim against the Estate is potentially of some magnitude. In order to establish an equitable or proprietary estoppel claim based on a promise, Mr Bywaters would bear the onus of establishing the following matters:[23]

(a) that the deceased in fact made the alleged representations;

(b) that the words spoken gave rise to a sufficiently clear and unequivocal promise; and

(c) that Mr Bywaters relied upon the alleged promise to his detriment; that is, but for the promise, he:

(i) would have pursued better employment opportunities elsewhere; and/or

(ii) would have purchased other properties and obtained capital growth; and/or

(iii) would not have spent money making improvements to the Burekup Property.

1. The credibility of these claims may be tested by reference to the objective facts, the documents available in the case, and by reference to the motives of the parties and the overall probabilities.[24] The Administrator has not located any documentary records supporting the alleged promise.[25] There are also questions as to the inherent probabilities of Mr Bywaters' claims and particularly whether - in the context of an employment relationship - a person in his position would continue to rely upon undocumented and unsecured oral assurances of this nature for some 15 years. That is particularly the case in circumstances where the property in question was not registered in the name of the deceased. I should stress that these are matters which will need to be tested at trial.
2. As matters presently stand, on the material available in this proceeding, it appears that the Administrator (and Mr Iannaccone) would have an arguable defence to the claims advanced by Mr Bywaters, which will likely turn on the oral evidence to be given at trial.
3. The Estate's potential exposure for equitable compensation could be up to the estimated value of the Burekup Property, which is around $800,000 and would also include interests and costs. As I have said, this is a sizeable claim against the Estate and it is appropriate, there being an arguable defence to the claim, that the Administrator take steps to defend the claim. Obviously there will be legal expenses involved in defending the claim. The Administrator's solicitors have estimated the costs of defending the Estate Proceeding to the contested trial (including legal fees and disbursements) will be approximately $250,000 to $350,000.[26]
4. In my opinion, the nuanced approach proposed by the Administrator is appropriate, and I consider the Administrator would be justified in defending the claims in the Estate Proceeding in that manner. It is in the interests of the Estate that the Administrator press the arguable defence to the claim, bearing in mind the large quantum of the claim and even though the legal costs to defend the claim will be material. It is an important consideration that the Estate Proceeding includes a claim, being the equitable compensation claim, which is pleaded solely against the Estate and in respect of which the Administrator is the proper party to run any defence thereto.

1. The Loan Claim contemplated by the Administrator relates to a claim in respect of a loan said to be owed to the Estate by Mr Bywaters. The Administrator contends that the sum of $140,000 was loaned by the deceased to Mr Bywaters, pursuant to a loan agreement entered into on 2 December 2022 or thereabouts.
2. The loan agreement is said to be found within a short note which appears to have been signed by the deceased and by Mr Bywaters. The note records, at least on its face, that Mr Bywaters borrowed $140,000 which was required to be paid in full by 30 June 2023, with interest accruing at 4.0% p.a.
3. Following a review of the deceased's financial records, including bank statements and cheque stubs, the Administrator concluded that the amount in question was transferred from the deceased to Mr Bywaters - Mr Bywaters cashed a cheque for the relevant amount on or around 5 December 2022.[27]
4. On 7 October 2023, based on his enquiries as to the loan as at that date, the Administrator sent an email to the solicitors for Mr Bywaters demanding repayment of the loan amount.[28] On 10 October 2023, the Administrator received a letter from a solicitor on behalf of Mr Bywaters. By that letter, Mr Bywaters denied that he owed the deceased any funds at the date of his death.[29] Mr Bywaters has refused to repay the loan, despite demand.[30]
5. The Administrator observes that, in his correspondence dated 24 July 2025, Mr Bywaters suggested that the deceased forgave the loan on 27 April 2023 (some days before his death) as a recognition of the 25 years' of service given by Mr Bywaters.[31] It is noted that Mr Bywaters has not to date provided any contemporaneous, corroborative evidence to support this assertion.[32] Nor has Mr Bywaters pointed to any consideration that would support an agreement to release Mr Bywaters from his debt under the loan agreement.
6. The Administrator submits that, if the court gives the directions which are sought, the Estate will likely be able to recover the outstanding amount of $140,000 (plus interest and costs) owed to it by Mr Bywaters, which sum will then become available for distribution to the Beneficiaries.

1. In the present context, it is necessary to evaluate, in a summary manner, the prospects or merits of the proposed claim, the likely litigation costs which the Estate would need to incur to pursue the claim, the likely unrecoverable legal costs in the event the claim succeeds, the likely quantum of any adverse costs order if the claim fails, and the recoverability of the judgment sum from Mr Bywaters.
2. The material adduced by the Administrator in respect of the Loan Claim demonstrates, in my view, that the claim is reasonably arguable. The claim is evidenced by a contemporaneous document, albeit a somewhat informal one, and there is documentary evidence that the amount was paid by the deceased to Mr Bywaters. The amount has not been repaid.
3. The Administrator properly recognises that the amount in question, being $140,000 plus interest, is modest in the context of the value of the Estate. The estimated costs (including fees and disbursements) of pursuing a fresh proceeding in the District Court, to the point of a summary judgment application being determined, are in the range of $30,000 to $50,000, according to the Administrator's solicitors. A further amount of $50,000 to $70,000 in costs would need to be incurred if the matter proceeded to a contested trial.[33] These amounts appear to be reasonable estimates of the likely costs involved in pursuing the claim, albeit they are a little on the high side.
4. There is therefore certainly a risk of the judgment sum being eroded by the costs of the litigation, given there will be an unrecoverable costs component even if the claim succeeds. The financial impact to the Estate would be exacerbated if the claim was unsuccessful, bearing in mind the likelihood that the Administrator would then also be exposed to an adverse costs order.
5. The submission advanced by the Administrator is that, having regard to the Estate's prospects of recovering the debt of $140,000 (plus interest and costs), which the Administrator characterises as 'strong', the costs to be incurred by the Estate in pursuing this action are proportionate to the benefit which may ultimately be secured on behalf of the Beneficiaries. As such, pursuing the proposed Loan Claim will not unnecessarily deplete the Estate, according to the Administrator.
6. The Administrator further asserts that he has sought appropriate advice and acted reasonably in forming his opinion that it is in the best interests of the Estate to pursue the Loan Claim.
7. I respectfully agree with the submissions advanced by the Administrator, although I should say I am not in a position to characterise the claim as a strong one. My assessment is that the claim is at least reasonably arguable and has sufficient prospects of success. I note that Mr Bywaters contends that the loan was forgiven and that the deceased altered the original agreement in some manner. These are factual matters which will need to be tested at trial.
8. The Administrator has properly given thought to the best procedural pathway to pursue the Loan Claim. There is some sense in the claim being advanced in the extant proceedings before Howard J, if that is not too disruptive of the main proceeding, rather than have two separate actions on foot between largely the same parties. Avoiding a multiplicity of actions and seeking to save time and reduce legal costs are relevant considerations. The factual connections between the proprietary estoppel claim and the Loan Claim will require close assessment. The additional programming steps required to facilitate the progression of the Loan Claim to trial in April 2026 will need to be carefully considered by the parties, including the necessity for pleading amendments, further discovery, and the filing of any further evidence.
9. The preferable course is for the Administrator's solicitors to confer with the solicitors for the other parties and promptly approach Howard J to enable his Honour to assess whether the institution of a counterclaim is consistent with case management principles, particularly bearing in mind the trial of the action is listed to commence in April 2026. The judge managing the action will be best placed to assess whether the bringing of a counterclaim would impact the trial dates or otherwise result in some unfairness or prejudice to a party.
10. The litigation costs involved in pursuing the Loan Claim, and the unrecoverable litigation costs in the event the claim succeeds, are material relative to the size of the claim. On balance, though, it is appropriate for the Estate to bear those costs in pursuit of the claim against Mr Bywaters, rather than simply abandon the claim entirely. In the event the claim succeeds, there will be an overall net benefit to the Estate and to the Beneficiaries. There is material before the court from which it may be inferred that Mr Bywaters has assets from which the loan amount could be recovered.
11. For my part then, I consider the Administrator would be justified in commencing a counterclaim in the Estate Proceeding to recover the loan amount, and alternatively would also be justified in commencing fresh proceedings in the District Court to recover that amount if that procedural pathway is necessary.

1. For these reasons I have outlined, I accept the plaintiff has standing to seek the advice of the court pursuant to s 92 of the Trustees Act, and these are appropriate matters in respect of which to give the Administrator judicial advice.
2. I will make orders to the following effect, subject to hearing from counsel:
   1. The plaintiff is justified in defending the claims pleaded against him in the Estate Proceeding, in the manner identified in these reasons.
   2. The plaintiff is justified in either commencing a counterclaim in the Estate Proceeding to recover from Mr Bywaters the amount of the alleged loan, pursuant to the alleged loan agreement, alternatively in commencing proceedings in the District Court for the same purpose.
   3. The plaintiff's costs of this application shall be paid out of the Estate on an indemnity basis.
   4. The motion will otherwise be adjourned sine die to facilitate any further application for directions by the Administrator as to the Estate Proceeding or the Loan Claim.
   5. Direction will also be made in the Estate Proceeding requiring the parties to promptly confer in relation to the matters the subject of these reasons and the consequential steps required to be undertaken in that proceeding, including as to the bringing of any counterclaim, with a directions hearing to be listed before Howard J in the week commencing 16 February 2026.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] On 9 September 2025, orders were made by Master Russell to have the motion heard as an originating summons.

[2] See the plaintiff's affidavit dated 28 July 2025 (Janssen Affidavit).

[3] See Ms Lukic's affidavits dated 16 January 2026 and 6 February 2026 (First and Second Lukic Affidavits).

[4] The global value of the Estate is the subject of confidentiality orders made by the court. The values of the assets identified in these reasons are not, however, subject to those orders.

[5] Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Incorporated v His Eminence Petar The Diocesan Bishop of The Macedonian Orthodox Diocese of Australia and New Zealand [2008] HCA 42; (2008) 237 CLR 66 [58] (Gummow ACJ, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ) (Macedonian Orthodox Community Church); and Tsaknis v Lilburne [2010] WASC 152 [38] (EM Heenan J); In re Atkinson (dec) [1971] VicRp 73; [1971] VR 612, 615.

[6] Macedonian Orthodox Community Church [71].

[7] Macedonian Orthodox Community Church [71].

[8] Blatchford v Laine [2018] WASC 207 [57] (Vaughan J, as his Honour then was).

[9] Blatchford v Laine [57] (Vaughan J).

[10] Blatchford v Laine [57] (Vaughan J).

[11] Blatchford v Laine [58] (Vaughan J).

[12] Boyle v Farano [2023] WASC 303 [72]-[74] (Quinlan CJ).

[13] Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Attorney General (WA) [2015] WASC 439 [33] (Martin CJ).

[14] A copy of which is attached to the Second Lukic Affidavit.

[15] See the further amended statement of claim filed in the Estate Proceeding (Estate FASOC) at [10] - [12].

[20] See Ryan v Ryan [2012] NSWSC 636 [59] - [69].

[21] See Bosanac v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2022) 275 CLR 37 [12] - [15], [21].

[22] Estate FASOC, prayer for relief 2.

[23] Kramer v Stone [2024] HCA 48; (2024) 281 CLR 484 [36]-[41] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, and Beech-Jones JJ). See the Plaintiff's Submissions dated 29 July 2025 [22].

[24] Plaintiff's submissions dated 29 July 2025 [24], citing Evans v Braddock [2015] NSWSC 249 [73].

[25] Plaintiff's submissions dated 29 July 2025 [35].

[27] Janssen Affidavit [26] - [27].

[30] Janssen Affidavit [32]; Plaintiff's submissions dated 29 July 2025 [31].

[32] Plaintiff's submissions dated 29 July 2025 [32].