Pursuant to s 131(2) of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Act 2020 the proceedings on the complainant's complaint are to be transferred to the Magistrates Court of Tasmania.

Federal jurisdiction - Tribunal power to separate / combine complaints.

Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), ss 16, 17, 22, 62A, 63, 64, 67.

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020, ss 3, 85, 131.

Judicial Review Act 2000.

Anti-Discrimination Commissioner v White [2023] TASSC 26;

Jago v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal [2021] TASSC 10;

Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn [2022] HCA 16; (2022) 276 CLR 216;

Searle v McGregor [2022] NSWCA 213;

Foxe v Brown [1984] HCA 69;

Re v Oregan: Ex parte Oregan [1957] HCA 18; (1957) 97 CLR 323;

Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156.

Elizabeth Bertenshaw v Bruce Warner [2020] TASADT 4;

Shuttleworth v Pearson [2018] WASAT 112.

1. On 4 November 2024, the complainant lodged a complaint with the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (ADC) naming the respondents as Office of Tasmania Assessment Standards and Certification (TASC), Tamara Corbett, Shivangi Gheewala and Hayley Patmore.
2. In this complaint, the complainant alleged discrimination on the basis of age, gender, industrial activity and offensive, humiliating, intimidating, insulting or ridiculing conduct, and also victimisation.
3. The complainant alleged that these breaches of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) (the Act) arose when he sought employment as an exam supervisor at the Launceston College. On 14 November 2023, TASC informed the complainant that his application for the role of exam supervisor was unsuccessful. The decision that the complainant could not work at the Launceston College site was made by Tamara Corbett and Shivangi Gheewala.
4. On 7 December 2024, the complainant lodged a further complaint with the ADC naming the respondents as TASC, Jane Read and Alison Savage.
5. The complainant alleged discrimination on the basis of gender and offensive, humiliating, intimidating, insulting or ridiculing conduct on the basis of gender.
6. The complainant alleged that these breaches of the Act arose when he sought employment as an exam supervisor and sought to work at the Launceston Church Grammar School exam centre. On 14 November 2023, TASC informed Mr Jacobson that his application for the role of exam supervisor was unsuccessful. The decision that Mr Jacobson could not work at Launceston Church Grammar School site was made by Jane Read.
7. On 4 December 2024, the ADC published a written decision to the parties named at that time, in which the ADC decided to combine the complaints lodged on 4 November and 7 November 2024 pursuant to s 62A of the Act.
8. The reasons given for the ADC's decision to combine these complaints was stated as follows:
   • Both complaints lodged by Mr Jacobson relate to Mr Jacobson being notified on 14 November 2023 that his application for employment as an exam supervisor with TASC was unsuccessful.
   • Given both complaints relate to this allegation, I consider it would be administratively convenient for the first and second complaint to be treated at one complaint.
   • I note that Mr Jacobson has expressed a preference that the complaints not be combined and has stated "the first complaint is likely to prejudice the outcome of the second complaint". Mr Jacobson did not provide any reasons as to why the first complaint would prejudice the outcome of the second complaint, and it is not apparent as to why this would be so.
   • On both of the complaint forms used by Mr Jacobson, there is a section asking the complainant what they are seeking for resolution. The resolution outcomes Mr Jacobson has said he is seeking in the second complaint mirror those he said he is seeking in the first complaint and include two additional resolution outcomes (training and the development of an equal opportunity policy).
   • As the complaints relate to the same event and the resolution outcomes Mr Jacobson is seeking for both complaints are largely similar, I am satisfied any attempt at resolution is not likely to be prejudiced by combining the complaints.
9. From that date the complainant's complaints of 4 November and 7 November 2024 were treated as one complaint, the ADC allocating one complaint reference, 2024/11/012/DAW.
10. In the ADC's decision of 4 December 2024, the ADC also decided to part accept, part not accept, and part reject aspects of the combined complaint.
11. The ADC decided to accept part of the combined complaint for investigation under the Act because it showed the following possible breaches of the act:
    • Direct discrimination (as defined in s 14) against the complainant on the basis of age and gender in connection with employment (breaches of s 16(b) and (e) and 22(1)(a); and
    • Conduct that is offensive, humiliating, intimidating, insulting or ridiculing of the complainant on the basis of age and gender in connection with employment (in breach of s 16(b) and (e), 17(1), and 22(1)(a).
12. The ADC did not accept part of the complaint concerning allegations of conduct by the complainant against the respondents which had been made more than twelve months previously as they were out of time pursuant to s 63(1) of the Act.
13. The ADC also decided to reject the part of the complaint against Hayley Patmore and Alison Savage under s 64(1)(b) of the Act because it did not relate to discrimination or prohibited conduct.
14. On 13 June 2025, the ADC referred the combined complaint by the complainant against TASC, Tamara Corbett, Shivangi Gheewala and Jane Read to the Tribunal pursuant to s 67 of the Act on the basis that its investigation had not been completed within six months of the respondents being notified of the complaint.

1. In accordance with usual Tribunal processes, case conferences were conducted between the complainant and the representatives of the named respondents.
2. During a telephone conference with a Senior Case Officer on 19 November 2025, the respondents' representative raised an issue of Federal jurisdiction with the matter being referred to me for an initial directions conference.
3. During this directions conference on 16 December 2025, the complainant confirmed that he wished to have the Tribunal separate his complaints to the ADC of 4 November and 7 November 2024. The respondents indicated that they wished to provide submissions in relation to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to conduct the inquiry referred by the ADC. Directions were made accordingly.
4. On 17 December 2025, the complainant provided his written submissions, and on 16 January 2026, the respondents provided their written submissions. On 29 January 2026, the complainant provided his final responsorial submissions.
5. In a directions conference on 2 February 2026, both the complainant and the respondent indicated they were content for me to determine the issues relating to:

(i) Whether the Tribunal could or should separate the complainant's complaints of 4 November and 7 November 2024; and

(ii) The broader Federal jurisdictional question as to whether or not the Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with any aspect of the inquiry, on the papers without the need for a hearing.

1. In light of these indications, I reserved my decision.
2. For the reasons which follow, I find that the Tribunal has no power to separate the complainant's complaints of 4 and 7 November 2024 which occurred by a decision of the ADC on 4 December 2024. I also find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint as it involves questions of Federal jurisdiction and refer it to the Magistrates Court of Tasmania for determination pursuant to s 131 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (TASCAT Act).

1. On 7 November 2024, in an email responding to an email from the ADC of that date, the complainant indicated that it was his preference was that the two complaints not be combined. His reasoning was that the first complaint is likely to prejudice the outcome of the second complaint notwithstanding that the respondents, other than TASC, were different.
2. It is apparent from the Tribunal's file that the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and determine the complainant's combined complaint was initially raised in the teleconference on 17 September 2025.
3. It was not until the complainant's correspondence to the Tribunal and the respondents of 23 September 2025 that he formally raised the issue of the separation of his complaints as a basis for him asserting that this should not have occurred. He further submitted that his complaint of 4 November 2023, given the evidence that the respondent Miss Corbett resided in Victoria, would best be heard in the Magistrates Court, whilst in relation to his complaint of 7 November 2024, given the evidence that the named respondent Ms Read was still a resident in Tasmania, would be best heard by the Tribunal.

1. In response to the complainant's submissions that the ADC erred in combining of the two complaints pursuant to s 62A of the ADA, in their written submissions of 16 January 2026, the respondents submit that submission lacked merit because:

(a) The Tribunal is not engaged in judicial review of the ADC decision of 4 December 2024 to combine the complaints. The correctness or otherwise the Commissioner's decision is not relevant to whether the Tribunal now has power to split the complaint or whether it would be in the interest of justice to do so.

(b) It was open to the ADC to combine the complaints because:

(i) Contrary to the complainant's submission, the complainant was afforded procedural fairness in relation to the decision to combine the complaints. The complainant stated his preference on 7 November 2024 that the two complaints not be combined and stated "the first complaint is likely to prejudice the outcome of second complaint". In the Assessment Decision, the ADC observed that "Mr Jacobson did not provide any reasons as to why the first complaint would prejudice the outcome of the second complaint, and it is not apparent as to why this would be so". The complainant was afforded an opportunity to be heard and he exercised that opportunity.

(ii) A necessary subjective jurisdictional fact was whether the ADC was satisfied that "any attempt at resolution, including by conciliation, is not likely to be prejudiced by the making of the determination": s 62A(2) of the ADA. In relation to that consideration, the ADC found:

As the complaints relate to the same event, and the resolution outcomes Mr Jacobson is seeking for both complaints are largely similar, I am satisfied that any attempt at resolution is not likely to be prejudiced by combining the complaints.

(iii) It was open to the ADC to be so satisfied. The power to combine the complaints was therefore enlivened. The complainant's submissions on prejudice do not engage with the relevant statutory test. Further, contrary to the complainant's submissions there was no obligation to attempt resolution or conciliation before the ADC made the decision to combine the complaints.

(iv) Although the complainant did not identify to the ADC any prejudice arising from the combination of the complaints, the matters he now relies upon do not support the splitting of the complaints. That one aspect of a complaint may have stronger or weaker prospects, or that it would be more or less advantageous to the complainant's case for a particular witness to not give evidence in proceedings, does not relevantly constitute prejudice to the complainant, in the sense of a matter being determined otherwise on its substantive merits.

(c) Further in their submissions, the respondents state further reasons as to why the complainant's submissions regarding the separation of complaint lacks merit. These can be summarised as:

(i) The ADC did not err by not explaining to the complainant his appeal or review rights against the decision to combine the complaints in the decision of 4 December 2024;

(ii) The complainant's submissions that the Tribunal is not obliged to accept a decision by the Commissioner to combine the two complaints based on the authorities of Anti-Discrimination Commissioner v White [2023] TASSC 26 and Jago v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal [2021] TASSC 10 engage more with the respondent's submissions regarding the entirety of the complaint attracting Federal jurisdiction.

(iii) The respondent's do not accept the complainant's submission that the combining of the complaint creates prejudice for him. The respondents contend that they do not accept the complainant's characterisation of the evidence he alludes to support his assertion of prejudice by virtue of the combining of the complaints and even taken at its highest, the complainant's submissions are incapable of showing any risk that the complaints may be determined otherwise and on their substantive merit.

1. In their written submissions the respondents assert that the issue of Federal jurisdiction clearly arises as a consequence of the complainant being a resident of Tasmania and the second and third named respondents being residents of Victoria as at 13 June 2025, being the date the complaint was referred to the Tribunal for inquiry.
2. The respondents contend that the complainant accepts that the first complaint of 4 November 2024 is coloured by Federal jurisdiction and must be transferred to the Magistrates Court for hearing but not the second complaint which he contends should be determined by the Tribunal.
3. The respondent's submissions assert that the issue for determination is whether the entire matter is coloured by Federal jurisdiction.
4. The respondents rely on the High Court decisions of Burns v Corbett (2018) 265 CLR 304 and Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn [2022] HCA 16; (2022) 276 CLR 216 in support of their contention that this matter attracts Federal jurisdiction and should be transferred to the Magistrates Court pursuant to s 131 of the TASCAT Act.
5. The respondents state that the question of residency is to be determined at the time the Tribunal's jurisdiction was invoked, this being the date of the referral to the Tribunal being 13 June 2025. In support of this contention the respondents rely on Searle v McGregor [2022] NSWCA 213, Foxe v Brown [1984] HCA 69 and Re v Oregan: Ex parte Oregan [1957] HCA 18; (1957) 97 CLR 323.
6. The respondents also state that the existence of Federal jurisdiction is not to be determined as at the date the complaints were lodged with the ADC being 4 November and 7 November 2024.
7. The respondents also state that the entire matter affects Federal jurisdiction and is incapable of being split by the Tribunal referencing Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156 in support of this contention. They summarise their position by stating that applying the principles summarised in Rana v Google Inc (supra) to the present case, as part of the complaint attracts Federal jurisdiction, the entire matter before the Tribunal attracts Federal jurisdiction. It is a single matter which will remain a Federal jurisdiction regardless of how the Federal claims are determined. It will remain Federal jurisdiction even if the complainant discontinues the complaints against the second and third respondents or if those complaints are struck out. As the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to determine matters in Federal jurisdiction, it lacks jurisdiction to determine any part of the complaint. The Tribunal is incapable of splitting the complaint and determining any aspect of it.
8. In conclusion in their written submissions, the respondents invite the Tribunal to refer the entirety of the complaint to the Magistrates Court pursuant to power under s 131(2) of the TASCAT Act.

1. The power for the ADC to combine complaints arises under s 62A of the ADA which states:

62A. Combining complaints > > (1) If -

(a) the Commissioner has received a complaint, (the original complaint); and

(b) at any time before an investigation into the original complaint has been completed the Commissioner receives another complaint (the second complaint) whether by the person who lodged the original complaint or by another person in relation to the matter to which the original complaint refers or a matter related to the original complaint; and

(c) the Commissioner considers it administratively or otherwise convenient to do so -

the Commissioner may determine that the original complaint and the second complaint be treated as one complaint.

(2) The Commissioner is not to determine under subsection (1) that two or more complaints be treated as one complaint unless satisfied that any attempt at resolution, including by conciliation, is not likely to be prejudiced by the making of the determination.

(3) On determining under subsection (1) that two or more complaints be treated as one complaint, the Commissioner is to notify, in writing, all parties to all the complaints of the combining of the complaints.

1. It is clear on the evidence that the complainant's attitude to this decision, being his email to the ADC of 7 November 2024, was considered by the ADC in the decision of 4 December 2024 to combine the complaints, and to treat them as one complaint as the ADC considered it administratively or otherwise convenient to do so.
2. The ADC's decision of 4 December 2024 set out clear reasons for this decision to combine the two complaints.
3. The complainant made no challenge to that decision before the complaint was referred to the Tribunal for inquiry on 13 June 2025 pursuant to s 67 of the ADA.
4. Without the need for me to determine this issue, as at 4 December 2024 the complainant may have had the provisions of the Judicial Review Act 2000 available to him to challenge the ADC's decision to combine his complaints.
5. As the complainant took no action in relation to the decision to combine the two complaints before the matter was referred to the Tribunal as a single complaint on 13 June 2025, the power to consolidate or split proceedings provided by s 85 of the TASCAT Act does not apply.
6. Section 85 of the TASCAT Act states:

85. Consolidating and splitting proceedings > > (1) The Tribunal may direct that 2 or more proceedings that concern the same or related facts or circumstances -

(a) be consolidated into one proceeding; or

(b) remain as separate proceedings but be heard and determined together.

(2) If proceedings are consolidated, evidence given in the consolidated proceedings is admissible in relation to matters involved in either of the proceedings that were consolidated.

(3) The Tribunal may direct -

(a) that any aspect of any proceedings be heard and determined separately; or

(b) that proceedings commenced by 2 or more persons jointly be split into separate proceedings.

1. Section 85 of the TASCAT Act does not provide an avenue for the Tribunal to separate the complainant's complaints as there is only a proceeding before the Tribunal, not proceedings. The proceeding is the single complaint referred by the ADC to the Tribunal on 13 June 2025.
2. This is consistent with the definition of proceedings in s 3 of the TASCAT Act which states:

Proceedings means proceedings of the Tribunal and includes a hearing of the Tribunal and proceedings of the Tribunal that do not consist of a hearing.

3. The powers pursuant to s 85 of the TASCAT Act only enable the Tribunal to:

(a) Consolidate proceedings into one proceeding; or

(b) Have them remain as separate proceedings but be heard and determined together.

1. The complainant's argument that Supreme Court decisions of Anti-Discrimination Commissioner v White (supra) and Jago v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (supra) give the Tribunal power to separate his complaints is also misconceived. These decisions deal with what has become known as the "ambit principle", relating to the evidentiary matters before the Tribunal during an inquiry. In his submission the complainant refers to the comments of Marshall J in Anti-Discrimination Commissioner v White where at [8] his Honour stated:

...it is for the Commissioner and the Tribunal to determine, based on the facts before them, what discrimination or prohibited conduct is raised by the facts or as counsel put it, to sort out "what happened".

2. As Wood J in Jago v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal at [7] stated:

The contents of the referral report including the Commissioner's identification of the respondents, the issues, and potential issues of the AD Act are not binding on the Tribunal.

3. This does not, as the complainant appears to be asserting, provide the Tribunal with the power to separate his complaints. These decisions deal with decisions by the Tribunal (or the ADC), regarding the facts before them and what discrimination or prohibited conduct is raised on those facts, and nothing more. They do not apply to procedures matters as the complainant appears to be asserting.

1. The respondent's submissions correctly state the law in relation to disputes between residents of different states as enunciated by the High Court's decision in Burns v Corbett (supra).
2. It is now settled law that the question of residency is to be determined at the time the Tribunal's jurisdiction was invoked, in this case at the date of the referral to the Tribunal on 13 June 2025, and not at the dates the complaints were lodged with the ADC respectively on 4 November and 7 November 2024 (see Elizabeth Bertenshaw v Bruce Warner [2020] TASADT 4 and Shuttleworth v Pearson [2018] WASAT 112).
3. The evidence before the Tribunal, which is unchallenged by the complainant, indicates that at the time of the referral of the complaint to the Tribunal on 13 June 2025, the complainant was a resident in Tasmania but the second and third respondents, Ms Corbett and Ms Gheewala were residents of Victoria. This clearly provides a basis for a finding that there is a dispute between residents of different states and that consequently matters of Federal jurisdiction have been raised.
4. Although the uncontradicted evidence before the Tribunal was that the fourth respondent Ms Read was a resident in Tasmania, as was the complainant, at the date of the referral of the complaint to the Tribunal on 13 June 2025, on the authority of Rana v Google Inc once a matter is within Federal jurisdiction, the entire matter is within Federal jurisdiction.
5. In the circumstances of this case, these matters have the consequence of denying jurisdiction to the Tribunal for the entire complaint currently before it.

1. Prior to the enactment of the TASCAT Act in 2020, the Tribunal being faced with such an issue would have had no other alternative other than to dismiss the complainant's complaint for want of jurisdiction.
2. However, subsequent to the enactment of the TASCAT Act, s 131 was enacted which states:

131. Transfer to Magistrates Court of applications involving federal jurisdiction > > (1) If a person has standing to make an application to the Tribunal in the exercise of its original jurisdiction under section 72 or its review jurisdiction under section 74 , the application may, if the Tribunal orders under subsection (2) that proceedings on the application are to be transferred to the Magistrates Court, be determined by the Magistrates Court in accordance with this Part instead of the Tribunal. > > (2) If, following an application made to the Tribunal in the manner and form required under this Act for the kind of application concerned, the Tribunal considers that -

(a) it does not have, or there is some doubt as to whether it has, jurisdiction to determine the application because its determination may involve the exercise of federal jurisdiction; and

(b) the Tribunal would otherwise have had jurisdiction enabling it to determine the application -

the Tribunal may order that proceedings on the application be transferred to the Magistrates Court.

(3) Proceedings transferred to the Magistrates Court under subsection (2) are transferred proceedings.

(4) If proceedings are transferred to the Magistrates Court under this Part -

(a) the application made to the Tribunal will be taken to be duly made as an application to the Court; and

(b) the proceedings may be continued and completed as if steps taken in the proceedings prior to the transfer had been taken in the Court.

(5) The fee payable in respect of the application is the prescribed fee (if any) payable to the Tribunal under this Act.

(6) A party to the transferred proceedings is not required to pay any fees in relation to the transfer of the proceedings to the Magistrates Court unless the Court determines that additional fees are payable under the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992 because of a substantial alteration in the nature of the claims in the proceedings.

(7) An order made by the Tribunal under subsection (2) may not be the subject of review or appeal under Part 10.

(8) The Magistrates Court may remit transferred proceedings to the Tribunal for determination if the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the matter.

(9) If the Magistrates Court remits transferred proceedings to the Tribunal, the Court may make the orders, if any, that it considers appropriate to facilitate the determination of the proceedings by the Tribunal.

(10) The Tribunal must determine transferred proceedings that are remitted to it in accordance with any orders made by the Magistrates Court and must determine such proceedings in accordance with any such order.

54. This clearly provides a mechanism for the complainant to pursue his complaint in the Magistrates Court of Tasmania.

1. For all of the reasons indicated above, this is the appropriate mechanism for the complainant's complaint to be resolved.

1. Pursuant to s 131(2) of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Act 2020 the proceedings on the complainant's complaint are to be transferred to the Magistrates Court of Tasmania.