Jackson v Tamine

Texts Cited: M Davies, A S Bell, PLG Brereton and M Douglas, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (10th ed, 2020, LexisNexis)
P Biscoe, Freezing and Search Orders (3rd ed, 2023, LexisNexis)

Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: Frank J Jackson (plaintiff)
Evatt Anthony Tamine (defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
D Cook SC; D Krochmalik (plaintiff)
T Castle SC; C Brain (defendant)
Solicitors:
Hall & Wilcox (plaintiff)
Piper Alderman (defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/369098

Publication restriction: N.A.

JUDGMENT

1. Mr Jackson secured freezing orders, together with ancillary orders, against Mr Tamine from the duty judge (Elkaim AJ) on an ex parte basis on 25 September 2025. The Court exercised power pursuant to rule 25.11 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). The Court was satisfied that Mr Jackson had a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action that is justiciable in the Supreme Court of Bermuda. The Court was also satisfied that there is a sufficient prospect that the Supreme Court of Bermuda will give judgment in favour of Mr Jackson and that there is a sufficient prospect the judgment will be registered in or enforced by this Court: see UCPR r 25.14(3).

2. On 8 October 2025, Mr Tamine exercised his liberty to apply. He contended that the ancillary orders should be vacated or varied. Mr Tamine did not seek to vacate the freezing orders (but sought to reserve the right to do so and did not concede that the orders were justified).

3. For the reasons set out below, I propose to vary the ancillary orders.

The character of the application

4. Mr Tamine submitted that the ancillary orders should not have been made ex parte. He relied on the following passage from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ward v Hoenig [2025] NSWCA 180 (at [85]):

Urgency absent a risk of defeating the purpose of the relief sought does not relieve a moving party from the obligation of notifying a defendant or respondent of the fact that the Court is being approached for urgent relief. That requires notification of which judge is being approached urgently (whether by name or status for example the Common Law Duty Judge), at what time any such approach is to be made and, if known, in which court room the judge will be sitting. Such information facilitates a prospective defendant or respondent’s ability to appear not only to apprise him, her or itself of the matter but, importantly, to have an opportunity to make any submissions relevant to the urgent relief sought. In a day of instantaneous communications, such notification should include the electronic provision of Court documents to be relied upon in support of urgent relief, where an email address is known or readily ascertainable such as by a telephone call.

5. Mr Jackson pointed out that the Court of Appeal recognised (at [84]) that there will be circumstances where moving ex parte is justified because the giving of notice would risk defeating the very purpose of the interlocutory relief that was being sought. A freezing order was expressly identified as an example of such circumstances. That is not to say that it will always be appropriate to obtain freezing orders on an ex parte basis; merely that where freezing orders are warranted, it will sometimes be the case that giving notice will have the consequence that any freezing orders will have no utility because there will be no assets left to freeze.

6. It is not inevitably the case that ancillary orders should be made ex parte even if there is a proper basis to obtain freezing orders on an ex parte basis. Any ex parte relief should extend only so far as is necessary to avoid defeating the purpose of seeking the relief. That may require a distinction to be drawn between orders that freeze assets and orders that require a defendant to take steps to provide information. I recognise that Practice Note SC Gen 14 includes an example of an ex parte freezing order that includes ancillary orders requiring the provision of information. Nevertheless, at least some judges of this Court (myself included) require separate and strong persuasion to support an ex parte application for ancillary relief in support of freezing orders. By their nature, ancillary orders require steps to be taken sometime after the orders have been made. Often there is no special reason for ancillary orders to be made ex parte, rather than inter partes on an early return date. They are not an automatic adjunct to freezing orders: see H Biotechnology Pty Ltd v Shao*;* H Biotechnology Pty Ltd v Chen [2020] NSWSC 585 at [20]-[22].

7. In the circumstances of this case, I see no utility in giving any consideration to whether the ancillary orders were improperly obtained. That is because, while there was some criticism of the disclosure to the duty judge, Mr Tamine does not submit on this application that the freezing orders should be discharged for want of disclosure or any other reason. The freezing orders remain in place. Furthermore, the hearing before me was conducted on the basis that it was for Mr Jackson to make his case for the continuation of the ancillary orders: see Resort Hotels Management Pty Ltd v Resort Hotels of Australia Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 730 at 731. Given that the time to comply with the ancillary orders had not elapsed at the date of the hearing, in effect the matter was heard as a fresh application for ancillary orders. But that application was heard against the backdrop of freezing orders that remained in place. Thus, Mr Tamine had the benefit on an inter partes basis to resist Mr Jackson’s application for the ancillary orders.

The freezing orders

8. The Court has made orders freezing Mr Tamine’s assets in Australia up to an unencumbered value of USD $36,500,000. That figure is derived from letters from the Public Prosecutor Office of the Republic and Canton of Geneva and the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police that allege that Mr Tamine had embezzled or misappropriated funds up to that amount. The second letter (dated 15 July 2020) concludes: “Mr Tamine could have illegally misappropriated the assets of [Cabot and Edge], in whole or in part, according to the parties involved in each of the trusts. He would be guilty of embezzlement and criminal mismanagement”. It appears that freezing orders were made in Switzerland against various companies associated with Mr Tamine, but were lifted on 7 May 2025.

The ancillary orders

9. Although long, it is appropriate that I set out the principal ancillary orders that Mr Jackson seeks (reflecting the orders already made on an ex parte basis):

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

10 Subject to paragraph 11, you must before the further hearing on the return day and in any event within 14 days after being served with this order, to the best of your ability inform the applicant in writing of:

a. all your assets exceeding USD 10,000, or the equivalent of AUD 15,177, in Australia, whether in your own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving their value, location and details (including any mortgages, charges or other encumbrances to which they are subject) and the extent of your interest in the assets. Your disclosure obligation under this paragraph includes disclosure of all and any assets held under a trust, or other similar regime set up to hold or receive assets by you and/or in which you hold the position of beneficiary (including under a discretionary trust) or object of a power of appointment, trustee or director of a trust company;

b. the purpose of the following payments; any invoice, contract, understanding, agreement or obligation (if any) which they were paid pursuant to; and the whereabouts or what has become of those amounts (to the extent known):

i. the transfer of AUD 4,881,845 (equivalent to USO 3,500,000) on 29 April 2019 from an account in the name of Cabot Global Investments Ltd to Trezetto Pty Ltd;

ii. the transfer of AUD 145,180 (equivalent to USO 100,000) on 17 June 2019 from an account in the name of Edge Capital Investments Ltd to Estovir Pty Ltd;

iii. the transfer of USO 10,000,000 on or about 10 September 2019 from an account of Cabot Global Investments Ltd to FC Lawyers Pty Ltd or the law firm known as FC Lawyers;

iv. the transfer of USO 2,000,000 on or about 18 March 2020 from an account of Edge Capital Investments Ltd to FC Lawyers Pty Ltd or the law firm known as FC Lawyers;

v. transfer of AUD 24,470 on or about 13 December 2019 from an account of Edge Capital Investments Ltd to the law firm known as Clark McNamara Lawyers; and

vi. any other transfers from 2011 to present made by Addington Trading LLC, Cabot Global Investments Ltd, Cascade Holdings LLC and Edge Capital Investments Ltd to an account in Australia.

c. the source of funds for the purchase of each of the properties listed in Schedule C of this order;

d. within 21 working days after being served with this order, swear and serve on the applicant an affidavit setting out the above information and exhibit copies of such documents in your possession, power or custody as are sufficient to identify:

(i) the existence, location, value and details your assets in Australia;

(ii) any invoice, contract, understanding, agreement or other obligation (if any) pursuant to which the payments in sub-paragraph (b) above were made and any document evidencing the whereabouts or what has become of those amounts (to the extent known): and

(iii) the source of funds for the purchase of each of the properties listed in Schedule C of this order.

10. Order 11 was another ancillary order (being itself ancillary to order 10). It concerned the privilege against self-incrimination in connection with the provision of information.

11. Orders 10 and 11 were framed in part by reference to the example form of order contained in Practice Note SC Gen 14. Paragraph 8 of the example orders is in the following terms:

8. Subject to paragraph 9, you must:

(a) at or before the further hearing on the return day (or within such further time as the Court may allow) to the best of your ability inform the applicant in writing of all your assets in [Australia] [world wide], giving their value, location and details (including any mortgages, charges or other encumbrances to which they are subject) and the extent of your interest in the assets;

(b) within [ ] working days after being served with this order, swear and serve on the applicant an affidavit setting out the above information.

12. The ancillary orders Mr Jackson seeks go further than what is contemplated by the example. The other parts of the ancillary orders require Mr Tamine to identify: (a) the purpose of various payments, (b) the source of funds for various payments, and (c) the whereabouts of amounts paid. They also require him to produce underlying documents.

Proceedings in Bermuda

13. Mr Jackson is suing Mr Tamine and other entities in the Supreme Court of Bermuda. The proceedings and background circumstances are complex. Large sums of money are involved.

14. The statement of claim filed in the Supreme Court of Bermuda alleges that Mr Tamine was the sole director of two trustee companies, referred to as Willow Trustee and Chelsea Trustee, who were, respectively, the trustees of charitable trusts referred to as Aberdeen CT and Service CT. It is alleged that Mr Tamine caused Willow Trustee and Chelsea Trustee to exercise a power to transfer all of the assets of the trusts to two other trustee companies, called Messery Trustee and Alpheus Trustee.

15. It is alleged that Mr Tamine was in breach of his duties as a director and as a fiduciary and that he is liable to restore and reconstitute the assets of the two trusts. It is alleged that the transfers are void. Mr Jackson seeks various forms of proprietary relief to restore the assets of Aberdeen CT and Service CT as well as damages or equitable compensation against Mr Tamine for trust money or property that was misappropriated.

16. The statement of claim in the Supreme Court of Bermuda refers in detail to the letter from the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police that I have referred to above. As I noted, that letter refers to the possibility that Mr Tamine has embezzled large sums of money. The statement of claim goes on to plead as follows (at [54]):

Reserving the right to further plead once Mr Tamine has disclosed evidence as to his dealings with the assets of Messery CT and Alpheus CT, the assertions in the letter indicate grounds upon which:

a. Mr Tamine has committed breaches of trust and fiduciary duty in relation to Cabot and Edge assets, in which he has no legal or beneficial entitlement.

b. Further, Mr Tamine has received funds from Cabot and Edge with knowledge that such funds were transferred in breach of trust and/or fiduciary duty. To the extent Mr Tamine did not have actual knowledge, such breaches of trust and/or fiduciary duty would have been apparent upon reasonable inquiry.

c. Further, Mr Tamine dishonestly assisted the trustees of the trusts and the directors of Cabot and Edge to commit breaches of trust and fiduciary duties.

By this pleading, Mr Jackson seeks to reserve his right to make further, and serious, allegations against Mr Tamine after disclosure.

17. While the statement of claim makes allegations that Mr Tamine acted in breach of his duties as trustee or director, it does not plead or particularise that Mr Tamine has embezzled funds in the manner alleged in the letter from the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police. Part of the relief claimed is that Mr Tamine (and others) provide information in order for an account and inquiry to be taken in relation to Alpheus CT and Messery CT.

18. On 20 August 2025, the Supreme Court of Bermuda granted, on an application made by Mr Jackson, a “worldwide proprietary asset preservation and freezing injunction” against Mr Tamine and various companies. The order included ancillary orders requiring information to be provided. Mr Tamine was ordered to inform Mr Jackson of all Mr Tamine’s assets worldwide (where value exceeded USD $10,000). The order gave Mr Jackson express permission to initiate proceedings for the purpose of enforcement or recognition of the order in foreign jurisdictions, including Australia.

The statutory basis for the freezing orders

19. As I have already noted, the freezing orders in this Court were made against Mr Tamine because the Court was satisfied (on an ex parte basis) that there is a sufficient prospect that the Supreme Court of Bermuda will give judgment in favour of Mr Jackson and that there is a sufficient prospect the judgment will be registered in or enforced by this Court. The freezing orders anticipate the enforcement of a Bermudan judgment in New South Wales and were made in aid of that prospective enforcement: see Keynes Capital Global Limited v Guo [2020] NSWCA 178 at [4].

20. UCPR r 25.14(4) relevantly provides that the Court may make a freezing order or ancillary order or both against a prospective judgment debtor if it is satisfied that there is a danger that a prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because the assets of the prospective judgment debtor are removed from Australia, or disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value.

21. Judgments from the Supreme Court of Bermuda cannot be enforced in Australia pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth). If Mr Jackson obtains a judgment in Bermuda, any enforcement of the judgment in Australia will have to occur under the common law. That has various implications, including that the judgment can only be enforced if it is for a fixed or readily calculable sum: see Nygh*’*s Conflict of Laws in Australia 10th ed at [40.38]. This means that any judgment will not be enforced to give effect to any injunctive or proprietary relief.

The purpose of ancillary orders generally

22. The purpose of an asset disclosure order was explained in Deputy Commission of Taxation v Shi (2021) 273 CLR 235; [2021] HCA 22 as follows (per Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ at [22], footnotes omitted):

A freezing order, and an asset disclosure order, have the same fundamental purpose: “to prevent the abuse or frustration of [a court’s] process in relation to matters coming within its jurisdiction”. Freezing orders may be made, and may continue to operate, after final judgment to protect the efficacy of the execution. And for freezing orders to be effective there needs to be timely disclosure of assets. The utility in both orders lies in ensuring that the court’s processes for enforcement of a judgment are not frustrated by assets being spirited away between the time of commencement of the proceedings and eventual enforcement.

At [46], their Honours also noted:

…The purpose of the disclosure is to identify assets that are subject to or caught by the freezing orders and to permit the party with the benefit of the freezing orders to take steps, if necessary, to attach the freezing orders to the assets which are disclosed in the information and notify any affected third parties.

23. To similar effect, in Emmerson International Corporation v Renova Holding Ltd (British Virgin Islands) [2019] UKPC 24, the Privy Council held (at [13]):

…The restraining provisions and the disclosure provisions both have the same purpose, namely to protect Emmerson against the potential dissipation of assets by Renova. They are intended to operate together as parts of an interlocking protective regime constituted by the freezing order as a whole. Both parts are necessary to secure the protection which the freezing order is intended to provide. Since the basis for the grant of a freezing order is the risk of improper dissipation of assets by the defendant to whom the order relates, the restraining provisions may be rendered nugatory unless the defendant is compelled pursuant to provisions in the freezing order to provide information about the location and control of its assets so that the applicant for the order can serve it on third parties to prevent such dissipation or can use it as the basis for taking action in other jurisdictions to safeguard assets or execute against them…

24. The Hon Peter Biscoe refers to the timely disclosure of assets to enable freezing order to “be policed”: see Freezing and Search Orders 3rd ed at [3.9]. Mr Biscoe relevantly observes (at [3.10]) that asset disclosure orders: (a) make it more difficult for a respondent surreptitiously to disobey the freezing order; (b) identify third parties who have custody of the assets and enable notice of the order to be given to them; and (c) assists an applicant to make a rational decision whether to continue its undertaking as to damages.

25. Mr Biscoe states: “[l]ike thunder and lightning, the freezing order and the ancillary asset disclosure order go together”. I have already observed that different considerations may apply in the context of ex parte orders. However, for the reasons explained in Deputy Commission of Taxation v Shi and Emmerson International Corporation v Renova Holding Ltd (British Virgin Islands), ancillary asset disclosure orders will often be necessary (and will be made on an inter partes basis) in order to give efficacy to freezing orders. If a Court is persuaded that freezing orders are justified, it will usually be important to identify with precision the assets that have been frozen.

The fears concerning Mr Tamine

26. Mr Jackson’s evidence is that he is an attorney in the United States and is assisting the family of the late Mr Robert Brockman to resolve matters relating to his estate, including with the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of America. Mr Brockman was a US citizen who amassed a significant fortune in the 1970s from the development of highly successful computer systems and software for car dealerships. Mr Brockman established various trusts in 1981. Mr Brockman’s financial arrangements were extremely complex, and involved offshore trust structures. The trusts that are the subject of the proceedings against Mr Tamine in the Supreme Court of Bermuda arise out of those financial arrangements.

27. In October 2020, the United States Department of Justice filed a 39-count indictment accusing Mr Brockman of tax evasion, wire fraud, money laundering and other offences. Mr Brockman pleaded not guilty. He died on 5 August 2022 before the proceedings went to trial. The criminal proceedings against him were dismissed.

28. Mr Jackson’s evidence is that Mr Tamine is an Australian national who from 1999 to 2001, and from about January 2004, resided in Bermuda. His evidence is that Mr Tamine was a member of the Bermuda Bar from about 1999. His evidence is that he understands that Mr Tamine began working for Mr Robert Brockman in about 2003. Mr Jackson’s proceedings in Bermuda contend that Mr Tamine has taken steps to, in effect, improperly transfer assets out of trusts set up by Mr Brockman, potentially for his own benefit.

29. Mr Jackson’s evidence is that he has been asked by the family of Mr Brockman to be appointed as a representative plaintiff in these proceedings to assist in the recovery of assets that appear to be under the control of Mr Tamine through various offshore trust structures and asset holding companies. Mr Jackson contends that he is seeking to recover those assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the original trusts, essentially being Mr Brockman’s family. Mr Tamine took issue with the fact that Mr Jackson has not yet made an application to be appointed as a representative plaintiff, but did not go so far as to challenge his standing. In circumstances where Mr Jackson is the plaintiff in the Bermudan proceedings, it seems to me clear that he is a proper plaintiff in this Court.

30. Mr Jackson submitted that Mr Tamine, by his own admission, is a person who is not only skilled at concealing assets from authorities by deploying sophisticated strategies but has engaged in the exercise of destroying evidence. Mr Jackson points to 2 memoranda apparently prepared by Mr Tamine in 2017. Mr Tamine, on this application, did not adduce evidence to suggest that the memoranda were not genuine.

31. The first memorandum is one that Mr Tamine apparently sent to Mr Brockman on 4 June 2017, concerning his 2016 performance evaluation. The memorandum starts with the following piece of self-evaluation:

I would say that without hesitation, 2016 has been my best year. I established beyond any doubt that I can work under pressure with the added threat of detention hanging over me, all for the sake of protecting the AEBCT. At the risk of being accused of having an inflated ego, I would say that there are very few people who could have done all I did in 2016, which brought together so many skills.

In describing what went well, Mr Tamine referred to trips to Oxford at short notice, including to destroy computer drives that had been discovered. He also refers to his “extraordinary efforts … to clean up what Don [Jones, a previous advisor to Mr Brockman] had left behind”. He continued that the efforts “meant that we could rest easily that any attempt to search Don’s home would be fruitless”.

32. The second memorandum is one that apparently Mr Tamine prepared for the “file” on 29 July 2017. That memorandum referred to the recent decision of the Bermuda Commercial Bank to freeze accounts. The memorandum addressed problems and possible solutions. Problems included things such as bank accounts being connected to Mr Brockman. The proposed solution was as follows: “[a]s we have done in Switzerland and Singapore, set up accounts in places where we get to write our own history. Kill off all reference to [Mr Brockman]…” Another problem was the lack of a “real fighting fund for legal fees and living costs” if accounts are frozen. The solution was “a hidden fund, which has nothing to do with either me or [Mr Brockman], but which we could control”. He refers to “a lawyer in Australia who I know and can trust, [who] would be a prospect to hold funds in a trust and make a ‘loan’ for legal fees and living expenses”. The memorandum names an Australian lawyer and there is evidence suggesting that significant sums of money have been transferred to him or his firm. Mr Tamine also refers to the “need to muddy the waters about where I am located” and that with certain strategies “[i]t becomes harder to track me down”.

33. It is of course possible that this evidence could all have an innocent explanation. However, for present purposes, in the absence of any rebutting evidence from Mr Tamine, the evidence supports the proposition that there is a possibility that Mr Tamine would take steps to hide or surreptitiously remove assets from Australia.

The purpose of the ancillary orders in this case

34. As I have noted, the ancillary orders that Mr Jackson seeks fall into 2 categories. The first category concerns the provision of information to identify the assets that have been frozen, which are the usual form of ancillary orders reflected in the example in the Practice Note. The second category concerns providing information and documents regarding the source and purpose of payments. I will consider the two categories separately.

Information to identify the assets

35. In my view, in order for the freezing orders that have been made by this Court, and which are not presently challenged, to be effective, it is necessary for Mr Tamine to provide information about his assets in Australia, being the assets that are the subject of the freezing orders. The freezing orders were made in anticipation of the enforcement of a Bermudan judgment in New South Wales and were made in aid of that prospective enforcement. In order for those orders to have teeth, it is necessary for Mr Jackson and the Court to know what assets have been frozen.

36. I do not accept Mr Tamine’s submission that ancillary orders of this kind offend any principles of comity as between this Court and the Supreme Court of Bermuda. On the contrary, the orders are intended to assist in the enforcement of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Bermuda. While freezing and ancillary orders have also been made by the Bermudan Court, those orders expressly contemplated, and gave Mr Jackson permission, to initiate proceedings in Australia for the purpose of enforcement or recognition of those orders. Technically, the proceedings in this Court are not proceedings to enforce or recognise the freezing orders in Bermuda. However, the proceedings in this Court are to similar effect.

37. Nor do I accept that the orders in Bermuda render the ancillary orders in this Court superfluous or unnecessary. I consider that the possible enforcement of a Bermudan judgment in Australia would be facilitated by Mr Tamine providing information, including on affidavit, pursuant to orders made in these proceedings. This Court should require Mr Tamine to provide the information about his assets so as to reduce the risk that the freezing orders of this Court will be rendered nugatory.

38. Mr Tamine submits that the ancillary orders should not be made because of a difficulty in the operation of section 128A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which provides a mechanism to protect the privilege in respect of self-incrimination. The asserted difficulty arises from section 128A(8), which concerns the use of information disclosed, including pursuant to UCPR r 25, but only in any proceeding in a New South Wales Court. The concern is about the possibility of self-incrimination in relation to the proceedings in Bermuda. I do not see this as a reason to decline to make the orders. That is because the orders include a regime (in order 11) that will give Mr Tamine an opportunity to seek protection. In short, he can provide the information that may be incriminatory, in the first instance, in a sealed envelope to the Court and object to it being provided to Mr Jackson.

39. The ancillary orders reflected in orders 10(a) and 10(d)(i) are necessary and appropriate orders to support the freezing orders made by the Court of 25 September 2025.

Information about the source of funds and purposes of payments

40. Order 10(b) would compel Mr Tamine to inform Mr Jackson of the purpose of 5 specific transfers as well as the purpose of “any other transfers from 2011 to present” made by 4 separate companies to an account in Australia. In addition, he is to provide documents governing the payments and information about what has become of the amounts paid (to the extent known). Order 10(c) would compel Mr Tamine to provide information about the source of funds for the purchase of 7 separate parcels of land in this State. Order 10(d)(ii) and (iii) would compel Mr Tamine to produce by, way of exhibits to an affidavit, the documents arising relevantly from orders 10(b) and 10(c).

41. Mr Jackson submitted orders 10 (b) and (c) (and presumably also 10(d)(ii) and (iii)) are in aid of the identification and protection of assets. He submitted that in relation to order 10(b), in excess of AUD $22m has been transferred by Mr Tamine to entities associated with a lawyer in Australia that are all located in Australia. He contended that the information sought, if provided, will allow him to take further steps to follow those funds (and trace those funds into other assets) to ensure that those funds and the traceable proceeds of those funds are preserved. He further submitted that in so far as order 10(c) is concerned, the provision of that information will assist him in discovering other sources of any trust funds used by Mr Tamine to acquire his Australian properties.

42. It is easy to see why Mr Jackson would like to obtain the information and documents identified in orders 10(b),(c), (d)(ii) and (iii). However, it would be an extraordinary thing for the Court to, in effect, require Mr Tamine to answer interrogatories and give discovery in support of a freezing orders made to anticipate the enforcement of a Bermudan judgment in New South Wales. Orders of that kind were not made against Mr Tamine as orders ancillary to the freezing orders made by the Supreme Court of Bermuda. The orders in 10(b), (c), (d)(ii) and (iii) can be seen as requiring Mr Tamine to go some way to provide information that would constitute or enable him to provide an account. As I have noted, one of the remedies that Mr Jackson seeks in Bermuda is that Mr Tamine produce information to enable an account and inquiries to be taken in respect of Alpheus CT and Messery CT. The orders 10(b), (c), (d)(ii) and (iii) would go some way to giving Mr Jackson the relief he seeks in the Supreme Court of Bermuda.

43. Mr Jackson’s evidence is that he seeks orders for the provision of information so that the freezing orders “can be policed in Australia”. He also gives evidence that he asks the Court to make orders requiring Mr Tamine “to explain by way of disclosure orders what he has done with the assets of the trust”. The first reason is legitimate. I am satisfied that orders 10(a) and 10(d)(i) serve that purpose. It seems to me that Mr Jackson’s second reason strays from orders required to police a freezing orders and moves into the territory of seeking evidence to enable him to make a case against Mr Tamine, including one that goes beyond what is currently pleaded in Bermuda.

44. In my view, at least at the present time, the ancillary orders contained in orders 10(b), (c), (d)(ii) and (iii) go beyond what is required to police the freezing orders that have been made. Mr Tamine’s assets have been frozen. He will be directed to provide information about the assets that have been frozen. Those ancillary orders (orders 10(a) and (d)(i)) facilitate the freezing orders for the reasons I have given. The orders in 10(b), (c), (d)(ii) and (iii) would require Mr Tamine to produce information and documents that may assist Mr Jackson to obtain other freezing orders against other persons. They may assist him to advance his case in Bermuda, which is not the proper purpose of ancillary orders.

45. It may be that further information may arise (including in answer to the orders I will make) that will change the complexion of the application. It may be that Mr Jackson could seek order under section 68 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), requiring Mr Tamine to attend Court to answer questions or produce documents. Those are not matters of immediate concern to me.

46. By way of summary, I do not propose to make the extended ancillary orders in orders 10(b), (c), (d)(ii) and (iii) for the following reasons:

47. the Bermudan proceedings only foreshadow the possibility a claim that Mr Tamine has embezzled funds;

48. the Bermudan proceedings seek orders against Mr Tamine in relation to an account or inquiry;

49. the freezing orders made in Bermuda do not extend as far as the orders sought from this Court;

50. objectively, the orders appear more suited as an aid to Mr Jackson in pursuing the Bermudan proceedings in Bermuda than to enforce a money judgment in Australia;

51. the orders to some extent mirror relief claimed against Mr Tamine in the Bermudan proceedings;

52. I am not satisfied that the extended ancillary orders are required to police the freezing orders; and

53. the extended ancillary orders are extraordinary and far-reaching, and should only be made where it is demonstrated that they are necessary, which has not occurred in this case.

I do not consider the orders to be appropriate (see UCPR r 25.12).

47. I direct the parties to provide to my Associate with orders to give effect to these reasons.

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