Amongst the other offences were five stealing offences, one of fraud and one of giving the police a false name. There were also four burglary offences for which his Honour had to sentence the applicant because she had breached an order for probation which had earlier been made in the District Court.

I will not in these reasons refer to the details of every offence for which the applicant was sentenced. However, when sentencing the applicant for the armed robbery charge and the stealing of the motor vehicle, his Honour noted that after having served a term of imprisonment in New South Wales, the applicant had been brought back to Western Australia on 29 October 1997. His Honour was well aware that the applicant had served a term of 6 months' imprisonment in New South Wales. He then referred to the fact that with a male co-offender the applicant had stolen a motor vehicle from the Hillary's Harbour carpark and had then driven to a store in Morley where, while the applicant waited in the car, the co-offender had threatened a female staff member with a screwdriver. The co-offender had then removed $10 from the till before he was disturbed by other people. He was chased from the store and apprehended by members of the public. The applicant had then driven the stolen vehicle away. Later that day she had been apprehended. She had admitted her involvement in stealing the motor vehicle but had denied any knowledge of the robbery.

The learned Judge said that subsequently when interviewed in a video record of interview, although the applicant had been suffering from the effects of Rohypnol and had "appeared to be not altogether with it", the applicant had persisted in her denials. She had later been committed for trial in the Supreme Court on the robbery charge.

In his sentencing remarks, the learned Judge dealt with the applicant's prior history. He noted that she had had no contact with her natural father from approximately one year of age and had been brought up by her mother who had subsequently re-married. Both the applicant and her mother had been physically abused by her mother's second husband. His Honour noted that the applicant's mother had been unfailing in her support of the applicant but that unfortunately the applicant had had a series of relationships with men who were involved in drug abuse and offending behaviour. The applicant had become addicted to heroin and had ceased a course at TAFE because of that. She had attempted to re-commence that course but had discontinued with it after a very short period due to drug abuse.

His Honour said that the applicant had consumed alcohol and cannabis since the age of 13. At the age of 14 she had experimented with LSD and had been using it regularly within a year. At the age of 15 the applicant had experimented with Ecstasy and had later used amphetamines and cocaine. She had been a regular user of amphetamines between the ages of 15 and 17 years of age. She had first used heroin at the age of 16 and this had become her preferred and primary drug. Her heroin habit had quickly escalated to cost about $500 per day. When heroin was not readily available the applicant had used tranquillisers or Rohypnol.

The learned sentencing Judge then referred to the applicant's earlier criminal convictions which had included offences as a juvenile. On 14 March 1996 the applicant had been convicted in the District Court of six offences of burglary, thirteen offences of fraud and one offence of stealing. On that day the learned Judge in the District Court had placed the applicant on probation for a period of 2 years and 6 months in connection with those offences. That probation had been due to expire on 13 September 1998 which meant that the offence of armed robbery and the stealing of the vehicle had involved breaches of that probation order.

Following the making of the probation order on 14 March 1996, the applicant had again lapsed into drug use. However, she had remained drug free between 5 August 1996 and November 1996. During that time the applicant had completed 126 hours of community work at the Salvation Army Training Centre. Due to the fact that the Centre was not approved as a project by the Balcatta Community Corrections Centre, those hours were not formally credited to the applicant.

The applicant had appeared in the Supreme Court early in December 1996 on the robbery and car stealing charges to which I have already referred. However, some time prior to 23 January 1997 she had absconded to New South Wales whilst she was on bail. In New South Wales she had been sentenced to imprisonment for six months for a burglary which had been committed in the State. On completion of her service of that sentence and on 28 October 1997 the applicant had been extradited to Western Australia where she had arrived on 29 October 1997. The applicant had been in custody since that date, which was approximately one month prior to the sentencing on 27 November 1997.

In short, the recent history of the applicant was that she had been in prison from April 1997 for the burglary offence until she was sentenced on 27 November 1997.

The learned sentencing Judge noted that the pre-sentence report suggested that the applicant was a mature, intelligent and affable young person. However, his Honour said that this was clearly at variance with the picture represented by her offending behaviour. The applicant's risk of re-offending had been assessed as high and directly linked to her drug addiction. His Honour accepted that the drug addiction explained why the applicant had committed the various offences for which he had to sentence her. His Honour accepted the proposition that previous community based orders had had no deterrent affect upon the applicant and that it did not appear that any community based disposition would be of any benefit.

The learned sentencing Judge noted that the co-offender in the armed robbery and the stealing of the motor vehicle had been sentenced to imprisonment for four years in respect of the armed robbery and one year in respect of stealing the motor vehicle. Those sentences had been ordered to be served concurrently with sentences imposed upon him for a number of other offences. He had been sentenced in total to an aggregate of 8 years and 7 months' imprisonment with eligibility for parole.

The learned sentencing Judge said that each offence of the applicant in failing to comply with the probation order made in the District Court on 14 March 1996 had constituted an offence contrary to s16(1) of the Offenders Community Corrections Act 1963. His Honour noted that he was required to deal with those offences as if the applicant had just been convicted of those offences. As stated above, those offences had involved six counts of burglary, thirteen charges of fraud and one charge of stealing. His Honour recorded that the applicant had also been convicted of breaches of a probation order which had been made by a Court of Petty Sessions on 18 March 1995 following the commission of later offences.

The learned sentencing Judge said that the four convictions of burglary in the District Court had involved burglaries of four dwelling houses in the Greenwood area. I will not set out the full details of those offences but on one occasion $200 in property was stolen. On another occasion $3,506 worth of property was stolen. On a third occasion $8,555 worth of property was stolen and none of the property was recovered. On the fourth count, property to the value of $10,450 was stolen and none of that was recovered. The total amount involved in the four offences had been $22,511. At the time the applicant had been spending between $300 and $400 per day on drugs. She had also been in custody from 7 June 1995 to 22 January 1996 in respect of those offences.

Sixteen charges against the applicant which were the subject of a s656A notice, included a breaking and entering and stealing property to the value of $1,265, none of which was recovered. There was a theft from the SGIO building in St George's Terrace of sundry items valued at $285, none of which were recovered. There was a purchase at a Perth store with a stolen cheque for the sum of $339. None of that property was recovered. There had been a further fraudulent purchase of clothing at $309. None of that property had been recovered. There had been a similar purchase of clothing valued at $160, which was not recovered. There were further similar purchases of clothing at $248, which clothing was not recovered and a purchase of clothing at $240, which clothing was not recovered. There was a purchase of clothing with false cheques for $199 which was not recovered and a similar purchase of $16 worth of clothing which was not recovered. Other items purchased with false cheques had included sunglasses to the value of $219 and other clothing valued at $400. The applicant had said that goods she had purchased had been given to friends for money for drugs. His Honour noted that the value of property not recovered amounted to $2,504.

In sentencing the applicant, the learned Judge said that he had to take into account in her favour that she had pleaded guilty at the first opportunity and had shown regret for her actions. His Honour said that the applicant had attempted to overcome her drug problem, but she had committed serious offences of burglary involving invasion of other people's homes together with substantial thefts. On 14 March 1996 when the applicant had been placed on probation for 2 years and 6 months the learned District Court Judge had extended her great leniency.

His Honour referred to the other offences with which he had to deal which had included such offences as stealing a motor vehicle, stealing an antique tray valued at $2,500, the property of Stirling Galleries and stealing a purse and cash valued at $130. All of these offences had been committed whilst the applicant was on bail in respect of the armed robbery offence and on which she had absconded.

His Honour told the applicant that if he sentenced her to the appropriate sentence for each of the offences committed between 12 January 1994 and 8 February 1997 which was a period of little over two years, she would be imprisoned for a very long time. He accepted that such a sentence would be crushing for a person only 21 years of age. He structured the sentence so that the total aggregate for all the offences was 7 years' imprisonment.

Having regard to previous decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal in this State commencing with R v Petersen [1984] WAR 329, it could not be said that the 4 years' sentence of imprisonment for the armed robbery was outside the permissible range of sentencing for those types of offences: see also Norman v R, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 9489; 1 February 1989; Miles v R, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 970258; 7 May 1997 and Taylor v R, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 980152; 6 April 1998. The armed robbery was not the first offence by the applicant. Although the applicant was young, she had an extensive record of serious criminal behaviour prior to that offence.

Additionally, the learned sentencing Judge was sentencing the applicant for the total criminality involved in the other offences already referred to in these reasons. His Honour took into account that the armed robbery had been committed only four months after the applicant had been placed on probation for serious offences in the District Court. Also, as the learned Director of Public Prosecutions said on the hearing of this application, there had been a constant deprivation by the applicant of other people's property. The learned sentencing Judge had taken careful consideration of all matters, including those personal to the applicant and had decided that a total aggregate sentence of 7 years' imprisonment was justified. There was an order that the applicant be eligible for parole.

In my opinion, it cannot be said that the aggregate sentence of 7 years in these circumstances is unreasonably long.

I note that the learned sentencing Judge backdated the total 7 years' imprisonment by one month to allow for the time which the applicant had spent in custody on her return from New South Wales before sentencing.

It was contended for the applicant that his Honour had not allowed sufficient credit for the 6 months' term of imprisonment which the applicant had served in New South Wales prior to her return to this State. However, his Honour had been well aware of that imprisonment and stated that the applicant had been extradited from New South Wales following that term of imprisonment.

Considering the four burglaries and the four stealing offences alone, without regard to the other offences, it could not be said that a three year term cumulative upon the four year sentence for the armed robbery was outside the permissible range.

I agree with Murray J for the reasons he gives, that the sentences which were described in the criminal calendar as being in respect of items 6 to 25 inclusive on the s32 request notice and which were referred to as being breaches of probation, should be quashed.

The application for leave to appeal should therefore be granted and the appeal allowed to the extent of quashing the sentences which were imposed in respect of items 6 to 25 inclusive on the s32 request notice.

This application for leave to appeal against sentences aggregating 7 years imprisonment with eligibility for parole was argued upon the ground that the total term imposed was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances, including the applicant's personal circumstances, by reference to a parity argument having regard to the sentences imposed upon a co-offender, and particularly relying upon the totality principle.

The applicant was sentenced in this Court on 27 November 1997. Having been born on 14 October 1976, she was then just 21 years of age. A term of 6 months imprisonment had been imposed upon her in New South Wales on 29 April 1997 and so this was the second occasion upon which she was sentenced to imprisonment. She had been extradited from NSW on the completion of service of the sentence imposed upon her there and she had been in custody on remand since 29 October 1997. Her sentences were backdated to that date. By that means, proper allowance was made for time she had spent in custody on remand but, of course, the term of 6 months imprisonment served in NSW had a relevance from the point of view of the application of the totality principle.

The applicant came before this Court for sentence on an indictment charging two offences. She had originally been committed to the December 1996 sittings of the court and was then remanded to 23 January 1997 on bail. She failed to appear on that date and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest. She was subsequently charged with the breach of bail, contrary to the Bail Act 1982 (WA), s51. As I have mentioned, she did not again appear before the court in respect of the indictment until after her extradition from NSW.

Ultimately then, when the applicant came before this Court and was sentenced on 27 November 1997, after she pleaded guilty to all offences before the court, she was dealt with for the breach of bail as well as for the offences in the indictment, offences of stealing a motor vehicle and armed robbery, both committed on 30 July 1996 with an accomplice, a male friend, one Goedhart. The two were together when the vehicle was stolen and they drove it to a shop in Morley. The male offender entered the store armed with a screwdriver, with which he threatened a female shop assistant, stealing $10 from the counter of the shop and demanding that she open the till. The shop assistant made so much noise that the attention of people in nearby shops and business premises was attracted and a number of people came to the shop and disturbed Goedhart, who ran from the shop and was apprehended by those people.

The applicant had waited in the stolen motor vehicle. She saw her accomplice apprehended and drove the vehicle away for a short distance. She was in fact spoken to by people at the scene of the robbery and later by the police. She originally denied having anything to do with the commission of the offences charged in the indictment, but subsequently, when an interview was conducted with her and recorded on video tape, she admitted her presence at the scene and that she had been involved in the theft of the motor vehicle. But she denied any knowledge of the commission of the robbery. Her plea of guilty ultimately made, of course, concedes that that was not true, but she seems to have played little part in the commission of the robbery and it would seem that her guilt of the offence is established by her knowing presence while it was carried out and the encouragement and aid rendered to Goedhart in that way.

For his part in those offences Goedhart was dealt with in September 1996 when, for a total of 17 offences, including five armed robberies, he was sentenced to a term of 8 years and 7 months imprisonment with parole eligibility. For his part in the offences of stealing the motor vehicle and armed robbery for which the applicant was indicted he was sentenced to 1 year imprisonment and 4 years imprisonment respectively. Those sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, and that was the outcome so far as the applicant was concerned also.

She now complains that a distinction should have been drawn between her and Goedhart. Nothing is known of Goedhart's personal circumstances, but it does seem that, at least in respect of the armed robbery offence, the applicant's involvement in the commission of that offence was of a more minor kind and the principal role in its commission was that of Goedhart.

Having been convicted of the offences contained in the indictment, the applicant was also liable to be dealt with for breaches of probation constituted by those convictions. There were, in fact, 20 probation orders which had been made by the District Court on 14 March 1996 for a period of 2½ years. The orders were made in respect of 20 offences committed by the applicant between 11 December 1994 and 3 June 1995 when the applicant was aged 18 years.

Each order was made in identical terms and contained special conditions, firstly that within 12 months the applicant should complete 200 hours of community service, and secondly that she should undergo such counselling, treatment or other programmes of drug rehabilitation as her probation officer should direct. The Judge indicated at that time that he intended that she should continue with and complete the drug rehabilitation course at Cyrenian House which she was then in the process of undertaking.

The facts in respect of the 20 offences which were before the District Court in February and March 1996, on indictment and by a notice asking that additional offences be taken into account under the Code, s656A, as the relevant provision then was, have been set out by Wallwork J in sufficient detail. The indictment was for four offences of burglary committed between 11 and 14 December 1994. The notice contained an offence of burglary committed on 4 January 1995 and an offence of burglary committed on 14 April 1995 which had originally been brought before the Court of Petty Sessions, and in respect of which, on 18 May 1995, that court had made a probation order for a period of 12 months. At that time the applicant only had one minor previous conviction. However, she lasted no time without again offending after the making of the probation order by the Court of Petty Sessions. On 31 May 1995 she stole a cheque book and other items of property from business premises in the city. Between that date and 3 June 1995, using that cheque book, she committed 11 offences of obtaining property by fraud and two offences of attempted fraud. However, as has been seen, the offence originally dealt with in the Court of Petty Sessions was again, with all the other offences before the District Court, made the subject of a probation order on 14 March 1996.

When those matters, originally dealt with in the District Court, again came before this Court in November 1997, despite the fact that by then the Offenders Community Corrections Act 1963 had been repealed as from 4 November 1996, and that legislation had been replaced by the enactment of the Sentencing Act 1995, which became operative on that date, the breaches of probation were to be dealt with by his Honour under the Offenders Community Corrections Act, s17(6) and the applicant was liable to be sentenced for the offences for which she had been placed on probation as if she had just been convicted by this Court of those offences: Sentencing (Consequential Provisions) Act 1995, ss77-79.

The learned sentencing Judge having imposed a term of 4 years imprisonment in the aggregate for the offences of armed robbery and stealing a motor vehicle contained in the indictment before this Court, imposed 1 year imprisonment concurrent for the breach of bail to which I have previously referred, and 1 year imprisonment for each of the 20 offences which had previously been before the District Court. For two of those offences, the first charge of burglary which was the first count in the District Court indictment and the first charge of cheque fraud contained in the s656A Notice, his Honour ordered the terms of imprisonment to be served cumulatively. Otherwise he allowed those sentences to run concurrently. At that point of the sentencing process the aggregate term imposed was therefore one of 6 years imprisonment, backdated to 29 October 1997, in respect of a total of 23 offences, the most serious by far being the armed robbery offence committed on 30 July 1996.

The District Court's experiment with probation was, upon the basis of the commission of that offence alone, obviously not a success. But there were other offences committed by the applicant to which I should refer, which were before this Court to be taken into consideration when the applicant was sentenced for the offences contained in the indictment, by virtue of a request made under the successor to the Code, s656A, the Sentencing Act, s32. The first of those offences was one of stealing a motor vehicle committed on 19 July 1996 by the applicant in company with a male friend. It was that form of the offence which is committed by the unlawful use of the vehicle. The applicant was a passenger. When interviewed later, she said that she was so adversely affected by drugs at the time that she could not remember being in the vehicle. Then on 28 November 1996, with another, she committed two stealing offences at a shop in Claremont. The offenders stole an antique plate valued at $2500 which was subsequently recovered from the applicant's bedroom, and at the same time they took the shopkeeper's handbag containing her purse and other property to a total value of $130.

On 21 December 1996 the applicant stole a dress valued at $29 from a room in a backpacker's hostel in Northbridge. The owner of the dress saw her and immediately recovered it and detained her while the police were called. When the police arrived and interviewed her she gave a false name and address. On 8 January 1997 the applicant had her hair cut, styled and coloured at a hairdressing salon in Fremantle. By means of a ruse she was able to leave without paying. So, apart from the motor vehicle offence, in that period she committed three offences of stealing, one offence of fraud and one offence of giving a false name and address. The learned sentence Judge imposed 6 months imprisonment for the last mentioned offence and made its service concurrent. He imposed 1 year imprisonment for the other five offences described above. All the sentences were concurrent except that imposed for the offence of stealing the motor vehicle, which was ordered to be served cumulatively, making an aggregate term of imprisonment to that point of 7 years for a total of 29 offences.

It is convenient at this point to say something of the applicant's history. She was born in Poland but her family emigrated to Western Australia, arriving here in 1982 when the applicant was still a small child of about 6 years of age. At that stage the family comprised the applicant, her mother and step-father. The family situation was an unhappy one and both the applicant and her mother were physically abused by her step-father, from whom her mother separated in about 1990 or 1991. During her secondary education the applicant became involved with a peer group who used drugs, particularly cannabis, and alcohol. However, she appears to have completed her secondary education without coming before any court, despite the fact that her drug use was escalating and involved the use of a variety of drugs such as LSD, ecstasy, amphetamines and cocaine. Inevitably, she progressed to the use of heroin and it would seem that almost immediately, at about the age of 16, she became addicted. By 1994 her drug habit was said to be costing about $500 a day, according to the information given to the sentencing Judge in a pre-sentence report.

It seems to be accepted that the applicant's drug abuse is entirely related to the influence of her peer group. Her relationship with her mother, even in November 1997, was reported to be good and, while imprisonment was anticipated, she was welcome to return home upon her release. It is accepted that all her offences were drug related, being either committed whilst under the influence of drugs or for the purpose of obtaining property and money which could be used to acquire drugs. After leaving school the applicant had only had relatively brief periods of employment and whilst she had made attempts at different forms of tertiary education, these had been abandoned when she was unable to cope because of her heroin addiction.

When she first came before the Court of Petty Sessions in May 1995 and was placed on probation, she was required to undertake counselling at the Palmerston Drug Research & Rehabilitation Association. However, she did not do that and nor did she report to her probation officer as required. It is clear that her drug use continued unabated and that she continued to offend. In the second half of 1995 it appears that she returned to Poland as a means of escaping her peer group and to detoxify from her heroin use. She reported that that was successful, but when she returned to Perth late in 1995 she was arrested on warrant and the process which led to her appearance in the District Court in February and March 1996 commenced.

In the meantime, although the pressure to resume her drug use had been reasserted, her resolve to break her addiction remained high. She did relapse into drug use, but she undertook the Cyrenian House treatment programme and, despite evident difficulty in maintaining it, she persisted with it. She was doing so when she was placed on probation in the District Court in March 1996 and, as the learned sentencing Judge on that occasion had hoped, she did in fact complete the programme by April 1996. Clearly, however, she could not maintain herself drug free. She had certainly relapsed by the time of her participation in the offence of stealing a motor vehicle on 19 July 1996.

The pre-sentence report shows that on 1 August 1996 she reported to her probation officer distressed and anxious and seeking assistance because she had again resumed heroin use. She came under the care of the Salvation Army Wearne Training Centre. She was an outpatient and was performing community work with that centre. That continued until November 1996, during which period she remained drug free and completed 126 hours of community work. It is clear that she thought that would be credited to satisfying that particular condition of her probation orders, but such was not the case because apparently work with the training centre was not formally approved as a project for this purpose. I make no comment on how sensible that was.

It seems to have been upon the conclusion of that programme that the offences of 28 November 1996, 21 December 1996 and 8 January 1997 were committed. By then, indeed on 24 December 1996, she had breached her probation orders by failing to keep an appointment with her probation officer. Some time after the commission of the fraud offence on 8 January 1997, but before 23 January 1997, the applicant absconded and travelled to Sydney. She said that whilst there she attended drug treatment programmes twice but, in each case, shortly after the programme was completed, she lapsed into heroin use again until, as has been seen, for an offence of burglary committed in that State, she was required to serve six months imprisonment between 29 April and 29 October 1997, following which she was extradited to this State to face the charges which came before the court in November 1997.

One final matter needs to be mentioned. As I have said, the applicant breached the reporting requirements of her probation orders on 24 December 1996. A breach report and complaints of the breach were made out in May 1997. One fraud offence seems to have been accidentally omitted and 19 complaints of breach of probation for the failure to report on 24 December 1996 were made. They relate, of course, to the orders made by the District Court on 14 March 1996. When the matter came before this Court in November 1997, each of those complaints was specified in the request to have pending charges dealt with under the Sentencing Act, s32.

Again, they were matters which fell to be dealt with under the repealed provisions of the Offenders Community Corrections Act 1963. In this case the relevant section, to which his Honour directed himself, was s16. Under s16(6) the court was empowered to deal with the applicant for the offences in respect of which the probation orders were made as if the applicant had just been convicted of those offences. His Honour took that course and imposed concurrent sentences of 1 year imprisonment for each of the offences in respect of which the breached probation orders had been made. In other words, the breach of the probation orders by failing to comply with the requirement to report, exposed the applicant to be re-sentenced for the offences in respect of which the probation order was made, in the same way as subsequent offending had done under the Offenders Community Corrections Act, s17.

When the learned sentencing Judge imposed the sentences of 1 year imprisonment in respect of each such offence and made them concurrent, he did not, of course, add to the aggregate term of imprisonment which he had imposed. But in the outcome he did impose two sentences for each of those offences in respect of which the probation orders had been made in the District Court, and in two cases he had already ordered those sentences of imprisonment to be served cumulatively. This does not appear to have been appreciated by counsel, but as the offences for which sentence was passed were the same, the imposition of the second group of sentences was, in my opinion, contrary to the Sentencing Act 1995, s11(1), which prohibits a person being sentenced twice on the same evidence.

Although this occurrence was briefly adverted to in argument on the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, it was not a ground of appeal. But, in my opinion, in view of the conclusion to which I have come, the application for leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal allowed, at least to the extent of quashing these sentences, which were described in the criminal calendar as being in respect of items 6 to 25 inclusive on the s32 request notice, and which were referred to as being breaches of probation.

The significance of what occurred at sentencing seems to me, however, to be wider than that to which I have referred above. Before passing sentence on 27 November 1997, his Honour said:

"In the result, I now have to sentence you for a grand total of 56 offences. If I impose what would be an appropriate sentence for each of the offences you have committed between 12 December 1994 and 8 February 1997, a period of a little over two years, you would be imprisoned for a very long time, which would amount to a period almost equivalent to life imprisonment. I accept that such a sentence would be crushing for a person who is now only 21 years of age. I accept also, notwithstanding the failures of the past, that you do still have the potential at the age of 21 to turn your life around and become a law abiding and contributing member of the community."

It will be seen that his Honour seems to have thought that there were 56 offences before him and the end date of the period in question which he gives is incorrect. Even separately counting each of the matters shown as breaches of probation on the information before the learned sentencing Judge, the total offence count is 48. But in truth, as has been seen, between 11 December 1994 and 23 January 1997, when the applicant breached her bail by failing to appear in this Court because she had gone to NSW, she committed a total of 29 offences in this State, all drug related, and of varying degrees of seriousness. There is a considerable difference, although, of course, it is perfectly obvious that during the period in question, from time to time, despite the applicant's efforts to control her addiction and her behaviour, she committed a very great number of offences for which, despite her youth, her lack of previous offending, her background, her imprisonment only once before in NSW and her previous failed efforts to achieve her rehabilitation, imprisonment was required.

The applicant's situation was neatly summed up by the conclusion of the pre-sentence report before the learned sentencing Judge as follows:

"Owens' risk of re-offending has been assessed as high. This risk is directly linked to her drug addiction.

In the past, Owens has complied with some aspects of community orders when she was not under the control of her drug addiction. At this stage there appears very little that can be offered by the Ministry, as previous Orders have had no deterrent effect. Therefore, at this point in her life, it does not appear that any community based disposition would be of any benefit.

In the event of a custodial sentence it is expected that Owens will be afforded the opportunity to seriously address her drug use through a prison based programme. If parole eligibility is at issue, an Order for eventual release under supervision is suggested."

As I have said, there was evidence before his Honour to support this view and he expressed the same conclusion. A significant piece of evidence was the letter written to the Judge by the applicant in which she discusses her remorse (which was also, of course, reflected in her pleas of guilty), the insight into her behaviour which she had gained during the seven months she had been in prison, her determination now to overcome her heroin addiction and her effort to give herself something to aim at by enrolling as an external student at Edith Cowan University for the degree of Bachelor of Social Science in the hope that she might in future be able to put her experience to use by helping others to understand the destructive effect of drug abuse.

This was a case, in my view, where imprisonment was required to reinforce the effect of particular deterrence by punishing the applicant for her offending behaviour, as well as for the broader purpose of pursuing the aim of general deterrence and the protection of the community. However, as the learned sentencing Judge himself recognised, particularly having regard to the applicant's age and her previous history, it was important that the aggregate term of imprisonment be no longer than was reasonably required for those purposes. It was important to pay full regard to the totality principle, and in that context not to lose sight of the term of six months imprisonment served in NSW: Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR 59, 63; Jarvis v R, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 930341; 14 June 1993.

Further, in my opinion, there was a significant difference in the culpability of the applicant and Goedhart in respect of the commission of the offence of armed robbery. The proper application of the parity principle in my view necessitated that the sentence imposed upon the applicant in respect of this offence for her purely supportive role of passive encouragement to Goedhart should have been significantly less than the sentence imposed upon him: Postiglione v R [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295.

In my opinion, the sentencing discretion miscarried in this case, at least in part because of the misunderstanding of the learned sentencing Judge about the number of offences for which sentence was required to be passed. Apart from the technical problem of double sentencing to which I have previously referred, I am in this case persuaded, for the above reasons, that leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal allowed.

I would restructure the sentences imposed as follows. For the offence of armed robbery in the circumstances of its commission, and having regard to what I conceive to be the proper application of the parity principle in this case, I would quash the sentence of 4 years imposed and substitute a sentence of 3 years imprisonment which, in the circumstances, may be allowed to be served concurrently with the sentence of 1 year imprisonment imposed for the offence of stealing the motor vehicle on 30 July 1996 and for the breach of bail offence committed on 23 January 1997.

I would not alter the length of any of the other 26 sentences of imprisonment imposed, nor would I vary the order for the cumulative service of the sentences imposed with respect to the first count of burglary on the District Court indictment, or the first of the series of cheque frauds committed on 31 May 1995, but I would delete the order for the cumulative service of the term imposed with respect to the offence of stealing the motor vehicle committed on 19 July 1996. I would take that course having regard to the totality principle. In the result, the aggregate term would be one of 5 years imprisonment, or 5½ years when regard is had to the six months served in NSW. I would not, of course, interfere with the order of eligibility for parole or the backdating of the sentence to 29 October 1997.