Ivkovikj v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1014

1. On 2 February 2018, the applicant was granted a Visitor (Subclass 600) to travel to Australia for 3 months with the visa condition 8101, being that she was not to engage in work in Australia (Court Book (CB) 15).

1. On 12 October 2018, the applicant lodged an application for a further visitor visa based on the following claims (CB 16 to 29):

(a) The applicant stated that she would be residing with an acquaintance of her cousin, Mr Zoran Nastevski (Mr Nastevski) and his family. The applicant stated she came to Australia to help the community by healing and that she had assisted sick people. She wished to remain onshore to convey her story and had been in contact with the current affairs program, 60 Minutes, about a news segment (CB 29); and

(b) The applicant further stated that she would not be working as she was not paid or hired and that she planned to spend time with family and friends and complete her interviews with 60 Minutes. The applicant claimed that she had an incentive to return to Macedonia where her husband and child reside, that she would be fully supported by her cousin and Mr Nastevski and that she was aware of the conditions on her visa (CB 29).

1. On 30 October 2018, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a further visitor visa as the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant met cl 600.211 in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations), being that the applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted (CB 47 to 48).
2. On 19 November 2018, the applicant lodged with the Tribunal an application for review of the delegate's decision (CB 50 to 51).

1. On 3 August 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse to grant the applicant a visitor visa (CB 82 to 88). The Tribunal's reasons are dealt with below, when considering each of the grounds for judicial review.

1. The applicant's application dated 3 September 2020 contained the following grounds for judicial review (as per original):
   1. The Second Respondent's decision was affected by jurisdictional error in that the applicant was denied procedural fairness under s359 of the Migration Act 1958 and failed to take into account relevant considerations.

Particulars

1. The Applicant applied for a review of her decision. There was no way that the Applicant was able to know of the likely time frame to have a hearing allocated by the Second Respondent as there was no consistency.

2. The Tribunal failed to provide procedural fairness to the Applicant in circumstances where the Tribunal failed consider how much the applicant has assisted Australian citizens through her spiritual guidance. The applicant has contributed in a great way to Australian society through her gift of healing.

3. The Second Respondent did not consider that the applicant had devoted her life to helping people and only wishes to stay longer in Australia to continue to help people through the tough time of Covid-19.

4. The Second Respondent made jurisdictional error in that it denied the applicant procedural fairness and did not consider that the refusal was based on unfounded information from an anonymous source, and that the evidence provided by the applicant was not considered.

1. The applicant appeared at the hearing before me as a litigant in person, assisted by an interpreter in the Macedonian language. I ensured the applicant was in possession of all relevant documents, namely the Court Book, application, supporting affidavit of the applicant and the Minister's written submissions.
2. Mindful of the Court's duty to unrepresented litigants (Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 at [309] to [316]; SZRUR v Minister Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445 at [37]), I explained to the applicant the role of the Court in undertaking judicial review, being that:

(a) the Court could only set aside the decision of the Tribunal if it found that the decision of the Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error: ss 474 and 476 of the Act; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; [2003] HCA 2; MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506; [2021] HCA 17 at [2] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ; and

(b) the applicant for judicial review under s 476 bears the onus of establishing jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1 at [67] per Gummow J (Heydon J agreeing at [91] and Crennan J agreeing at [92]); Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173; [2015] HCA 50 at [24] per French CJ, Bell, Keane, and Gordon JJ.

1. The applicant requested that Mr Nastevski assist the applicant as a support person in Court and be allowed to make submissions on her behalf. In support of this request, the applicant sought to rely on the affidavit sworn on 7 April 2025, which was admitted only for the purposes of determining whether to allow Mr Nastevski to make submissions on the applicant's behalf. The said affidavit attached a medical report from Dr Predrag Tomasevic (Dr Tomasevic), a general practitioner, who said that on 13 August 2023 the applicant sustained a stroke and as a result has a permanent speech impediment. The applicant said that Mr Nastevski is a friend, who she trusts to help. The Minister did not object to Mr Nastevski making submissions on the applicant's behalf.
2. In considering the applicant's application that Mr Nastevski be allowed to make submissions, I have considered the decision of Edelman J in Nepal v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 366; 327 ALR 89 (Nepal), where his Honour permitted a friend of the appellant to make submissions on his behalf in recognition of the extension of the concept of a Mckenzie friend.
3. At [14] of the decision in Nepal, Edelman J said:

[14] The label 'McKenzie friend' comes from the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in McKenzie v McKenzie [1970] 3 All ER 1034; [1970] 3 WLR 472 (McKenzie), although the principle is much older. At first instance, in McKenzie, Lloyd-Jones J had refused to allow an Australian barrister to assist a party in family law proceedings by sitting at the bar table and prompting the party. The Court of Appeal quoted from Lord Tenterden CJ in Collier v Hicks [1831] EngR 686; (1831) 2 B & Ad 663 669; [1831] EngR 686; 109 ER 1290at 1292 that "[a]ny person, whether he be a professional man or not, may attend as a friend of either party, may take notes, may quietly make suggestions, and give advice." Sachs LJ explained that litigants "should be seen to have all available aid on conducting cases in court surroundings, which must of their nature to them seem both difficult and strange": McKenzie at All ER 1036; WLR 479.

1. His Honour at [15] of Nepal said (omitting citations):

[15] On occasion, courts have denied an application by a person to make oral submissions (by extension of this concept of a McKenzie friend) on the basis that a McKenzie friend cannot perform the role of an advocate. I doubt whether there is any such absolute prohibition on assistance by making oral submissions. Nevertheless, where a party cannot obtain representation by a lawyer, great care must still be taken before allowing a non-lawyer to speak for the party to legal proceedings. The non-lawyer is not regulated, the non-lawyer has not been trained in the ethical duties of lawyers to the court, and the non-lawyer may do more harm to the party than good. The stance of the Minister in this case, however, recognises the limits and constraints placed upon Mr Nepal in conducting his appeal as well as the apparent ability of Mr Remely.

1. In this case, given the constraints placed on the applicant as identified in the medical report from Dr Tomasevic, being that the applicant has a permanent speech impediment due to her stroke and given her friendship with Mr Nastevski, I consider it appropriate that leave be granted to permit Mr Nastevski to make submissions on behalf of the applicant as she has requested. In granting such leave, I emphasised to the applicant that if at any time she disagreed with anything that Mr Nastevski said or if she wished to add anything to what Mr Nastevski had said, that she was to inform me.

1. Mr Nastevski submitted as follows (Tp 8.30 - Tp 9.14):

MR NASTEVSKI: For the purpose of - for the court record, that she's not a fit person. She's not well - to be deported, because you can see that.

.....

MR NASTEVSKI: No, for the court to record that she's not a fit person - you know, that she's not healthy. And no matter what happens from now, what orders are made, Immigration will have to take that in consideration, because she's not healthy. So we don't know where this is going to go down the track, so what we're saying is she's not fit to travel, and that's where I will - we are going to leave the matter to Immigration to decide what they want to do, because the - if you give me a couple of minutes, so what happened when she first arrived in the country - that was about seven years ago now - I met her as - Todora does spiritual healing. And my mum said, "You got to come in - translate, translate." There was - so I acted as a translator from Macedonian to English to a gentleman who was of English background, and all these things started happening.

So she does spiritual healing. She was brought in on a visa from another - a Macedonian-Australian family seven years ago. They sponsored her, brought her in for that healing. They abandoned her here. So it's only the community that got together that, you know, looked after her while she was here, from one house to another to another to another to another. So I've come in in - pathway through the whole thing and tried to help her not to be stranded, and that's my involvement, your Honour. So that's how I know her, and her - she is - she - you know, she can't travel. If she can travel, she wants to go home, she said, but her health condition is not right, and this is why we leave it to Immigration. The people that brought her into the country are the ones that walked away from her - the sponsors. So from a humanitarian point of view, I've been helping her. Like, I do a lot of other humanitarian stuff for churches, for both the Serbian and the Macedonian charities and this is my involvement with Todora.

1. After hearing these submissions, which were seeking me to engage in the merits of whether to grant the visa, I again explained to the applicant that I only had power to review the Tribunal's decision to see whether there had been any jurisdictional error. I directed the applicant to the grounds and asked Mr Nastevski, on behalf of the applicant, what she wanted to say in support of grounds 1 and 2.
2. Mr Nastevski said he did not have anything to add to grounds 1 and 2 set out in the application for review, but he said that the applicant's real complaint was that there was no evidence to support the Tribunal's findings at [37] and [38] of its reasons, where the Tribunal said:

[37] The Tribunal finds the applicant has been providing healing services in Australia. It is of the view healing services are normally remunerated, regardless of whether they are humanitarian in nature, conventional treatments, or effective. The Tribunal is satisfied there is an expectation that the applicant will be supported for her work; hence the support in the form of airfares, accommodation, food and clothing. Considered overall the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant has been working in Australia and, while it accepts she has not been receiving cash, it is satisfied she has received other benefits for her services.

[38] As discussed with the applicant at the hearing each visa she has held in Australia has been subject to condition 8101 - No Work. The Tribunal finds, by providing spiritual healing, the applicant has been working in breach of condition 8101. It is also satisfied that she intends to continue to provide spiritual healing, and accordingly intends to continue to breach any No Work condition which would be imposed on any future Subclass 600 visa.

1. Given the applicant was self-represented, I reviewed the reasons of the Tribunal to determine whether there was any self-evident jurisdictional error: BGZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1095 per Flick J at [11]. I raised with the Minister whether the Tribunal failed to correctly apply the applicable law, when considering whether the applicant was in breach of a previous visa condition 8101, which required that she not engage in work in Australia. I gave the Minister an opportunity to file further submissions on that issue, which were filed on 15 May 2025. I resumed the hearing on 4 June 2025 to give the Minister an opportunity to make submissions.

1. At the resumed hearing, the Minister accepted that the following two additional grounds of review were raised by this matter and leave was granted to the applicant to raise these two further grounds:

(a) First, whether the Tribunal failed to correctly apply the applicable law, when considering whether the applicant was in breach of a previous visa condition 8101, which required that she not engage in work in Australia.

(b) Second, whether the Tribunal's finding that healing services are normally remunerated, regardless of whether they are humanitarian in nature, was a finding made without evidence.

1. I will first deal with the above two new grounds for judicial review and then for completeness, I will deal with the grounds raised in the applicant's application for judicial review dated 3 September 2020.

New grounds for review whether the Tribunal failed to correctly apply the applicable law

1. This ground raises the question of whether the Tribunal failed to correctly apply the meaning of work as defined in reg 1.03 of the Regulations for the purposes of considering whether the applicant breached condition 8101 of her first visitor visa not to engage in work in Australia. In order to consider this ground, it is useful to set out the relevant legal principles.

1. In relation to the subclass 600 visitor visa, the Tribunal was required to be satisfied that the applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted. Clause 600.211 of the Regulations provided as follows:

The applicant genuinely intends to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted, having regard to:

(a) whether the applicant has complied substantially with the conditions to which the last substantive visa, or any subsequent bridging visa, held by the applicant was subject; and

(b) whether the applicant intends to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 600 visa would be subject; and

1. Condition 8101, that the holder must not engage in work in Australia, was attached to the applicant's first visitor visa.
2. Regulation 1.03 defines "work" as meaning "an activity that, in Australia, normally attracts remuneration".
3. In Dib v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 415; (1998) 82 FCR 489 (Dib), Justice Einfeld was considering the meaning of work as set out in reg 1.03. At [493], his Honour noted that the definition of work in reg 1.03 was inserted on 17 September 1991 to introduce a statutory definition, which was different from the ordinary meaning in common usage of the word "work".
4. At [494], in Dib, Einfeld J noted that monetary reward is not a necessary component of the statutory definition of "work", which has a wider meaning in the Act and in support referred to the decisions of Broussard v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 21 FCR 472. Justice Einfeld at [495] noted that in order to determine whether a particular activity constitutes "work" for the purposes of the statutory definition, "all the facts peculiar to the case are to be taken into account", including the "commercial, social, domestic or altruistic motivations, may in the context of all the facts of a case, assist in determining whether a particular activity undertaken voluntarily is one that ordinarily attracts remuneration".
5. In Xu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 285, the Court was considering the meaning of "work" as defined in reg 1.03 of the Regulations for the purposes of considering whether the applicant breached condition 8101 of the Regulations. The Court relevantly said the following:

[9] The concept of "remuneration" was undefined, but neither counsel argued that it should not be given the ordinary meaning of "that which remunerates; reward; pay", where "remunerate" means "to pay, recompense, or reward for work, trouble, etc" (see Macquarie Dictionary Revised 3rd Edn.).

...

[19] Critical to the correct application of the definition of "work" is the identification of the particular "activity" of the visa holder which is under consideration. The decision-maker must make an identification of this, before considering whether it is an activity which "normally attracts remuneration". Absurd and unintended results occur if the applicant's activity is characterised without reference to its surrounding circumstances. If particular actions in some circumstances "normally attract remuneration", the same actions in other circumstances may not normally be remunerated. In such situations, the surrounding circumstances in which the visa holder's activity is undertaken or performed determine whether the activity performed by him or her is one which "normally attracts remuneration". In these cases, it is legally insufficient for the decision-maker to limit the identification of the activity to a generalisation about the visa holder's activity detached from its actual circumstances. The failure to take into consideration circumstances relevant to identifying and characterising the applicant's particular "activity" then reveals a misconception of the relevant legislation, and gives rise to jurisdictional error (cf Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82] citing Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179).

[20] This point is clearly illustrated in relation to activities which, in some circumstances, have an essentially domestic character and normally are not performed for remuneration; for example, domestic cleaning, caring for children or incapacitated persons, or building maintenance activities. The definition of "work" cannot intend that performance of such an activity should in all cases lead to visa cancellation, merely because the activity is, in some circumstances, performed by persons who are normally remunerated for their services. The definition must, therefore, be construed as meaning "an activity that normally attracts remuneration" to a person performing the activity in the same situation as the applicant. Although the intent of the definition is to allow a finding that a visa holder is "working" even if there is no evidence that they are actually receiving remuneration, it does not intend that the visa holder is to be deemed to be performing an activity in different circumstances from those in which he or she is actually performing the activity.

[21] The characterisation of the "activity" of the visa holder therefore requires consideration of its actual surrounding circumstances, including the motivations and agreements which have resulted in the performance of the activity, and the personal and economic context in which the activity is performed, including whether there is evidence of any remuneration actually being received. The definition allows the decision-maker to find that the visa holder is "working" in breach of his or her visa notwithstanding that he or she is not found to have actually been remunerated, but only if "normally" a person in the same situation would receive a return or reward for their services by way of "remuneration".

1. The Tribunal noted the applicant's evidence before it was as follows:

(a) The applicant came to Australia to help the community by spiritually healing and assisting sick people and she was not being paid for the spiritual healing she provided ([8], [10] and [18] of its reasons).

(b) The applicant said the spiritual healing provided was humanitarian work and she did this with pleasure ([14] and [15] of its reasons).

(c) The applicant said that she did not charge anyone that she had healed but she had been bought clothes and "other things" ([16] of its reasons).

(d) The applicant said that her attendance to heal in Australia was arranged before her arrival and advertised on community radio, arrangements had been made for her to provide spiritual healing ([17] of its reasons).

(e) The applicant said the first time she went to Perth to provide spiritual healing, her air fares were paid by the Macedonian club and she was accommodated by the people she healed. She also said that the first time she went to Perth, there were 1,000 people wanting to see her, and the second time there were 700 people wanting to see her ([19] of its reasons).

(f) The applicant gave evidence that she was able to live in Australia for two and a half years because her food, accommodation and clothing had been provided by the people she helped ([28] of its reasons).

(g) The applicant said that the people who needed her assistance contributed to the purchase of airline tickets, and she would be picked up and dropped off by members of the community ([28] of its reasons).

(h) The applicant said she was unaware who covered her rent, but she understood it was covered by the people who needed her ([29] of its reasons).

1. The Tribunal at [15] of its reasons asked the applicant for particulars of the spiritual healing she had carried out in Australia and noted that the applicant did not have the details of how many people she had helped or the nature of their problems.
2. The Tribunal at [18] of its reasons noted that it raised with the applicant at the hearing that it may not be satisfied that the applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose of visiting relatives and friends. The Tribunal further raised that it may conclude the applicant wished to remain in Australia to provide spiritual healing and the Tribunal may consider that to be work. The Tribunal noted that it explained to the applicant that if that was the case, she would not meet cl. 600.211 of the Regulations.
3. I note the Tribunal did not expressly refer to the statutory definition of "work" set out in reg 1.03 of the Regulations. However, I note that at [37] of the Tribunal's reasons, it expressly directed its attention to whether healing services are "normally remunerated", which in essence is the statutory definition of "work" set out in reg 1.03 of the Regulations. Therefore, I find the Tribunal was aware that in considering whether the applicant had worked in Australia in breach of condition 8101, it needed to consider whether the applicant was undertaking an activity that in Australia normally attracted remuneration.
4. For the purpose of identifying whether the applicant engaged in "work" within the statutory meaning in reg 1.03 of the Regulations, given the principles derived from the decisions in Dib and Xu, I find the Tribunal has properly identified the particular activity carried on by the applicant, including the surrounding circumstances in which the activity was undertaken and the applicant's motivations for providing the healing services, as follows:

(a) The Tribunal found the applicant's purpose in first coming to Australia was to provide spiritual healing and she sought a further visitor visa to continue to provide spiritual healing in Australia ([32] of its reasons).

(b) Since her arrival in Australia, the applicant had provided spiritual healing and her motivations in providing the healing were humanitarian. The applicant had not received money as payment. The applicant acknowledged that her airfares, accommodation, clothing and food were covered by those for whom she had provided spiritual healing ([35] of its reasons).

1. The Tribunal at [37] of its reasons, stated that it formed the view that healing services are normally remunerated, regardless of whether they are humanitarian in nature, conventional treatments or effective. As I have found, for the reasons set out at [40] to [43] of this judgment, the Tribunal could form a view based on "personal or specialised knowledge, or commonly accepted knowledge" that healing services in Australia, whether they are humanitarian in nature or conventional types of treatment are normally remunerated.
2. The Tribunal was also satisfied that there was an expectation that the applicant would be supported for her healing service in the form of airfares, accommodation, food and clothing, to make the finding that it was satisfied the applicant had been working in Australia for the purposes of the statutory definition in reg 1.03 of the Regulations.
3. For the reasons outlined at [33] to [36] of this judgment, I find the Tribunal was aware of the statutory definition of "work" and correctly applied that statutory definition to the facts of this case.

New ground - whether the Tribunal's finding that healing services are normally remunerated, regardless of whether they are humanitarian in nature, was a finding made without evidence

1. The applicant contended there was no evidence on which the Tribunal could make the finding at [37] of its reasons, that "it is of the view healing services are normally remunerated, regardless of whether they are humanitarian in nature, conventional treatments, or effective".
2. Before considering the no evidence ground, it is useful to set out the relevant legal principles applicable to this ground.
3. One of the issues in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane (2021) 274 CLR 398; [2021] HCA 41 (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ) was whether the Minister was allowed to make findings about conditions in Samoa based on "personal or specialised knowledge, or commonly accepted knowledge" as it was accepted by both parties the findings were not based on any objective evidence (at [7], [17] to [21]). The High Court found the Minister was allowed to make such findings on "personal or specialised knowledge, or commonly accepted knowledge" as they were not "particular or personal findings about an applicant, which could not have been the subject of any pre-existing personal or specialised knowledge (or common knowledge)" (at [20] and [21]).
4. In Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Mukiza (2022) 291 FCR 568; [2022] FCAFC 89 (Markovic J, Thawley J and Cheeseman J), the Full Court was considering whether a finding about Canadian health and rehabilitation services required "direct evidence" (at [40]). The Full Court of the Federal Court found the finding that Canada has "a comparable standard of health care to that in Australia, in addition to a comparable standard of support for rehabilitation services" was a general finding, not specific to the individual circumstances of the applicant (at [39]). Therefore, the Court found the Tribunal was allowed to make the finding based on "personal or specialised knowledge" or the "accumulated knowledge of the Department... in particular the delegate's decision" (at [41]).
5. The issue in XRZG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 305 FCR 349; [2024] FCAFC 131 (Markovic, Cheeseman and Horan JJ), was whether a finding of the Tribunal was not supported by any evidence and therefore the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable (at [64]). The Tribunal made a finding that drugs were relatively more available in detention than in the community (at [2]). The Full Court found the finding "is not one that suggests any need for empirical evidence... it is clearly directed to matters of a general nature... It is not a "particular or personal" finding about the appellant and his individual circumstances of a kind that could not be the subject of any pre-existing personal or specialised knowledge or common knowledge possessed by the Tribunal, which may therefore need to be supported by some evidence..." (at [53]).
6. Turning to the Tribunal's reasons, the Tribunal did not refer to evidence from which it made the finding that "healing services are normally remunerated, regardless of whether they are humanitarian in nature, conventional treatment or effective." It is noted that the ordinary meaning of "humanitarian" given in the online Oxford English Dictionary is "concerned with humanity as a whole; ...seeking to promote human welfare as a primary or pre-eminent good; acting, or disposed to act, on this basis rather than for pragmatic or strategic reasons". Consistent with the above authorities set out at [40] to [42] of this judgment, I find that it was open to the Tribunal to make the said finding that "healing services are normally remunerated, regardless of whether they are humanitarian in nature, conventional treatment or effective", based on the Tribunal's pre-existing personal or specialised knowledge or common knowledge possessed by the Tribunal, given that the finding was not a "particular or personal" finding about the applicant. Therefore, I find that there is no jurisdictional error disclosed by the Tribunal making the finding sought to be impugned at [37] of its reasons.

Grounds in the application dated 3 September 2020

1. The application for judicial review raised that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, in that the applicant was denied procedural fairness under s 359 of the Act. As at the relevant date of the Tribunal's' decision, s 359 was in the following terms:

(1) In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Tribunal may invite, either orally (including by telephone) or in writing, a person to give information.

(3) If a written invitation under subsection (2) is given to a person other than the Secretary, the invitation must be given:

(a) except where paragraph (b) applies - by one of the methods specified in section 379A; or

(b) if the invitation is given to a person in immigration detention - by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.

(4) If an invitation is given to the Secretary, the invitation must be given by one of the methods specified in section 379B.

1. The applicant also raised in ground 1 that the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant consideration.
2. In relation to this ground, Mr Nastevski submitted on behalf of the applicant, that the applicant did not have anything to say about the ground and the real complaint was that there was no evidence for the Tribunal's finding at [37] of its reasons that "healing services are normally remunerated, regardless of whether they are humanitarian in nature, conventional treatments, or effective". As I have set out above in this judgment, the Tribunal was permitted to rely on its own personal or specialised knowledge or common knowledge in making that finding, given that finding was not a "particular or personal" finding about the applicant.
3. As to ground 1 as set out in the application for judicial review, I find that no jurisdictional error is disclosed for the reason that the Tribunal did not seek information under s 359 of the Act.
4. The other matters in the particulars to ground 1 are seeking to engage me in impermissible merits review as to the reasons the applicant ought to be granted the visa. It is not the role of this Court to review the merits or factual findings of the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shang Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6. As I informed the applicant, as sympathetic as I might be to her situation, I do not have the power to grant her a visa.
5. In relation to ground 2 as set out in the application for judicial review, the applicant contended that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness, in that it is alleged that the Tribunal relied on information from an anonymous source. In relation to this ground, I note that the Tribunal in fact made it clear at [39] of its reasons, that it was not satisfied there was sufficient evidence to support the allegations made by the anonymous informant, that the applicant had caused conflict within families and the Tribunal noted that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to make a finding about this allegation. Therefore, I find the Tribunal did not rely on the information from the anonymous source in making its decision as to whether or not to grant the visa.
6. Ground 2 further alleged that "the evidence provided by the applicant was not considered" by the Tribunal. In relation to this part of ground 2, I find that the Tribunal did consider the evidence of the applicant as set out at [30] and [34] of this judgment.
7. No jurisdictional error is disclosed by ground 2.

1. As no jurisdictional error has been disclosed, the application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kaur-Bains.