IUX25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

1. Before the Court is an Application for Review of a Registrar's decision filed on 29 October 2025 (Review Application).
2. The application before the Registrar was an Application by the first respondent (Minister) for summary judgment of the applicants' application for judicial review filed on 31 July 2025 (Substantive Application).
3. On 25 September 2025, the Registrar made orders for there to be judgment for the Minister against the applicants' and for the Substantive Application to be dismissed pursuant to s 143(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act), and r 23.08(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (2025 GFL Rules). The Registrar further ordered that the first and third applicants pay the Minister's costs fixed in the sum of $4,553.02.
4. Rule 3.08(1) of the 2025 GFL Rules provides that a review of the exercise of power by a Registrar must proceed by way of a hearing de novo. Accordingly, the Minister's Application for summary judgment (Summary Judgment Application) is to be considered afresh.

1. The applicants are citizens of India. The first and third applicant are wife and husband, respectively, and the second applicant is their child.
2. On 12 September 2017, the applicants' entered Australia on a visitor visa.
3. On 1 December 2017, the first applicant (Applicant) applied for a student visa, which was refused on 18 April 2018.
4. On 24 June 2021, the Applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (Visa). The second and third applicant were included in the Visa application as members of the Applicant's family unit. In the Visa application, the applicants nominated the email address (applicants' email address) for correspondence.
5. On 9 June 2024, the Department of Home Affairs (Department) sent a letter to the Applicant by way of email to the applicants' email address, inviting the Applicant to provide further information regarding certain claims made by the Applicant in the Visa application pursuant to s 56 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) (s 56 Invitation).
6. The applicants did not provide a response to the s 56 Invitation.

1. On 13 July 2024, a delegate of the Minister (Delegate) refused to grant the Visa as they were not satisfied that the applicants were persons in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under ss 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act (Delegate's Decision). On the same day, the Delegate sent a copy of its decision and reasons to the applicants' email address.

Application for review at Tribunal on 21 March 2025

1. On 21 March 2025, the applicants applied to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Tribunal) for review of the Delegate's Decision. In the application for review, the applicants nominated the email address (Applicant's email address) for correspondence.
2. On 26 May 2025, the Tribunal emailed the applicants inviting them to comment on the validity of their application for review (Invitation to Comment). The Tribunal noted that the application appeared not to have been lodged within the relevant time limit and invited the applicants to make any comments in writing by 10 June 2025 on whether a valid application had been made.
3. On 29 May 2025, the Applicant wrote to the Tribunal in response and provided a written submission in response dated 29 May 2025.
4. On 4 July 2025, the Tribunal found that the review application was not properly made and therefore it could not review the Delegate's Decision. On 10 July 2025, the Tribunal sent a copy of its 'Notice of application not properly made' to the applicants by way of email to the Applicant's email address.

1. The Tribunal issued its decision on 4 July 2025 (Tribunal Decision).
2. At paragraph [3] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that the applicants were notified of the Delegate's Decision on 13 July 2024 by way of email, in accordance with the statutory requirements.
3. At paragraphs [4] - [7] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal considered the applicants' response.
4. At paragraphs [8] - [9] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that the applicants were taken to have been notified of the Delegate's Decision on 13 July 2024 pursuant to s 494C(5) of the Act, and that the prescribed period in which the applicants could apply for the review ended on 9 August 2024. As the application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 21 March 2025, the Tribunal found the application was not made in time and had not been properly made.
5. Accordingly, the Tribunal found it could not review the Delegate's Decision.

1. On 31 July 2025, the applicants filed the Substantive Application.
2. In the Amended Response filed 12 September 2025, the Minister sought that the Court exercise its discretion under r 23.08(1)(a) of the 2025 GFL Rules to enter summary judgment against the applicants in relation to their Substantive Application on the grounds that the applicants have no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.
3. On 26 August 2025, orders were made listing the Minister's Summary Judgment Application for hearing on 25 September 2025. Procedural orders were also made for the filing of a court book, written submissions and any additional evidence upon which the parties sought to rely. The applicants did not file any written submissions or further evidence in opposition to the Summary Judgment Application.

1. The Summary Judgment Application was heard by the Registrar on 25 September 2025. On the same day, the Registrar made orders that there be judgment for the Minister against the applicants for the whole of the applicants' claim pursuant to s 143(2) of the FCFCOA Act, and r 23.08(1)(a) of the 2025 GFL Rules, and that the Substantive Application be dismissed. The Registrar settled their reasons into judgment on the same day: IUX25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1582 (Registrar's Decision).
2. Rule 23.08(1)(a) of the 2025 GFL Rules provides that:

(1) The Court may order that judgment be given against a party if the Court is satisfied that:

(a) the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or

1. Section 143(2) of the FCFCOA Act provides that:

(2) The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:

(a) the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and

(b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.

1. In Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28 the majority in the High Court said at [59]:

In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like "clearly", "manifestly" or "obviously") as "frivolous", "untenable", "groundless" or "faulty". But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power...

(Emphasis added.)

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF A REGISTRAR'S DECISION

1. Rule 3.06(1) of the 2025 GFL Rules provides that an Application for review of a Registrar's decision must be made within 21 days. Rule 1.15 of the 2025 GFL Rules provides that time may be extended by the Court.
2. The Registrar's Decision was made on 25 September 2025. An application for review of that decision in this Court was therefore required to be made no later than 16 October 2025. The Review Application was not lodged until 23 October 2025.
3. Accordingly, the Review Application was lodged seven (7) days after the expiry of the statutory timeframe.
4. No formal application for an extension of time is sought by the applicants in the Review Application. The Minister opposed any extension of time.

Should the Court be satisfied to make an order extending time?

1. The discretion of the Court to extend the time for the filing of an application for review is broad but must be exercised in the interests of justice. It will not be in the interests of justice to extend time for the bringing of a review application "if the substantive application does not have sufficient prospect of success to make it just that the prospective appellant be permitted to proceed with it" e.g., in another context, WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399 at [9].
2. The principles to be applied in considering whether to extend time are well established and were considered in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49. In that decision, Jagot and Halley JJ found that the Court has an obligation "to evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Further, they identified that whilst the matters to which regard may be had are not expressly confined by the Act, the following are usually relevant when considering an extension of time - although it is noted that this list is not exhaustive:

(1) the extent of the delay and the explanation for it;

(2) any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted; and

(3) the merits of the substantive application.

1. At the hearing before me on 13 November 2025, the applicants appeared on their own behalf assisted by an interpreter in the Punjabi and English languages. The Minister was represented by Mr McDonald, solicitor, of Clayton Utz.

1. The delay is not particularly lengthy, being a period of seven (7) days.
2. At hearing the applicants' explanation for the delay in filing was somewhat confused and contradictory. They submitted that the delay was due to their lawyer's tardiness in filing but also said that they had trouble lodging the Review Application with the Court. Further, they submitted that they were not aware of the procedure to seek review of the Registrar's Decision.
3. There is no lawyer on the record for the applicants and the Review Application is signed by the Applicant. Further, ignorance of requirements or applicable time limits is not a satisfactory explanation for delay: SZOCH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FMCA 300 at [43]; SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500 at [8].
4. The applicants' have not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay.
5. This weighs against the grant of an extension of time.
6. Notwithstanding the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, given the modest period of the delay, had I been persuaded that the grounds of review had any reasonable prospect of success I would have been inclined to grant an extension of time. However, for the reasons set out below, I do not consider the grounds of review to have any reasonable prospect of success.

1. The Minister properly contends that it would not suffer any particular prejudice, other than as to costs, if an extension of time were granted.
2. However, the mere absence of prejudice is not sufficient to justify a finding in favour of an extension of the time for filing: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6].

1. The Substantive Application for judicial review filed on 31 July 2025, raises five grounds of review. All of those grounds, as expanded upon in the Applicant's affidavit filed on the same date, contend that the Delegate's Decision was attended by error.
2. The Delegate's Decision is a "primary decision" as defined in s 476(4)(b) of the Act. Pursuant to s 476(2)(a) of the Act, this Court has no jurisdiction in relation to a primary decision.
3. The grounds in the Substantive Application therefore have no prospect of success.

Did the Tribunal have jurisdiction to conduct the review?

1. The Substantive Application does not contend that the Tribunal erred. However, it is necessary that I consider whether the Tribunal correctly found that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct the review.
2. The Delegate refused to grant the applicants the Visa on 13 July 2024. The applicants were notified of that decision on that date by email (Notification Letter). The Notification Letter included the following:

Review rights

The Department cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision. An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within the period of 28 calendar days, commencing on the day you are taken to have received this letter.

As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.

The time mentioned above in which you may apply to the AAT for merits review of this decision is prescribed by law and cannot be extended.

1. Pursuant to s 494C(5) of the Act, the applicants are taken to have received the Notification Letter by the end of the day on which it was transmitted.
2. The application for review of the Delegate's Decision was required to be made within 28 days after the day on which the applicants were notified of the decision: s 412(1)(b) of the Act and reg 4.31 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The applicants did not apply for review of the Delegate's Decision until 21 March 2025, being 251 days after notification of the decision and 223 days after the 28-day application period expired.
3. As the review application was out of time, it was not a valid application for the purposes of the Act. As the Tribunal did not have a valid application before it, it did not have jurisdiction: s 414(1) of the Act.
4. It is well established that the Tribunal has no power to extend the 28-day application period: Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 267 FCR 15; [2018] FCAFC 228 (McKerracher, Reeves and Thawley JJ) at [53] - [83]. This is so even in cases where it can be fairly said that the failure to apply within the 28-day application period was not the applicant's fault: DAP17 v Minster for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 801.
5. Further, as submitted by the Minister, to the extent that the Tribunal owed the applicants any duty of procedural fairness, that duty was discharged by the sending of the Invitation to Comment.
6. Finally, the Notification Letter was sent by email to the last email address provided to the Minister for the purpose of receiving documents (s 494B(5)(b)) and as required by s 66 of the Act under the heading "Review Rights" identified that the applicants:
   • were entitled to apply to the Tribunal for merits review of the Delegate's Decision: ss 66(2)(d)(i), (iii) and (iv);
   • had a period of 28 calendar days to apply, commencing the day they were taken to have received the letter: s 66(2)(d)(ii); and
   • were taken to have received the Notification Letter at the end of the date it was transmitted by email (being on 13 July 2024).
7. Accordingly, the applicant's were correctly notified of the Delegate's Decision and the Tribunal correctly found that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct the review. Further, the Tribunal had no discretion to waive the requirement that an application for review must be filed within time to be valid.
8. No error on the Tribunal's behalf is disclosed and the applicants have no reasonable prosect of success.

1. For the reasons set out above, the Minister has established that the applicants have no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting their claim for relief. The Summary Judgment Application must therefore succeed. As the Substantive Application has no reasonable prospect of success, it is not in the interests of justice to extend the time for bringing the Review Application.
2. The Registrar's orders made on 25 September 2025 dismissing the Substantive Application remain in full force and effect.

1. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time to review the decision made by a Registrar on 25 September 2025 is refused and the Review Application is otherwise dismissed.
2. The Minister seeks the applicant pay its costs in the amount of $ 2,000. I note that this is less than the amount provided for in sch 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth). I shall order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge J Young.